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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

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To cite this article: Joseph W. Slap & Eugene E. Trunnell (1987) Reflections on the Self State Dream, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 251-262, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927174

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927174

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVI, 1987

REFLECTIONS ON THE SELF STATE DREAM

BY JOSEPH W. SLAP, M.D. AND EUGENE E. TRUNNELL, M.D.

Self psychologists contend that patients with narcissistic personality disorders have dreams which cannot be understood in terms of current psychoanalytic dream theory and that these dreams, called self state dreams, have a different origin and structure. The manifest content of these dreams is said to reveal the reactions of healthy sectors of the psyche to disturbing changes in the condition of the self. Self psychologists are said to be able to understand these dreams directly, without the patients' associations, as portrayals of the dreamers' dread of threats to the integrity of the self. The authors raise questions about these contentions. They conclude that the self state dream will remain a dubious concept until a more extensive psychology of dreaming is provided by self psychologists.

The concept of the self state dream constitutes a difficult challenge for one attempting to assess its validity. One problem derives from the circumstance that the concept arises from and is a facet of the psychology developed and elaborated by Heinz Kohut and his followers, which has come to be known as self psychology. Thus, any scrutiny of the self state dream will entail some consideration of how the psychic apparatus is conceptualized by self psychologists. A second difficulty has to do with the clinical examples offered by self psychologists: since they arrive at interpretations without the guiding test of the patient's associations and other clinical data of the sessions in which the dreams were reported, they do not provide this material, and, consequently, one is handicapped in any effort to see if these dream specimens can be shown to agree in conceptual detail with dreams as we have understood them.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SELF STATE DREAM

The term self state dream was introduced by Kohut in *The Restoration of the Self* (1977): therein he contended that patients suffering with narcissistic personality disorders have dreams of a kind different from those reported by neurotic patients. These dreams are considered typical of those conditions in which the cohesive self is vulnerable to fragmentation. They are regarded as a different sort of dream which cannot be explained by traditional dream psychology (Kohut, 1984, p. 113). In keeping with this understanding, the manifest content of such dreams is said to reveal the reactions of healthy sectors of the psyche to disturbing changes in the condition of the self. Associations, the self psychologists maintain, do not lead to hidden layers of the mind; rather the "correct interpretation . . . explains the dream on the basis of the analyst's knowledge of the vulnerabilities of his patient in general, including his knowledge of the particular situation that, by dove-tailing with a specific vulnerability, had brought about the intrusion of the hardly disguised archaic material" (Kohut, 1977, p. 110). In his effort to interpret such dreams, the analyst oriented to self psychology does not search for day residue, nor is he concerned with the sources of the various dream details; rather, by virtue of his empathy and knowledge of the state of the patient's self, he is able to understand the dream directly as a portrayal of the dreamer's dread of threats to the integrity of the self.

It is worth noting that Kohut introduced the concept of narcissistic tranferences in his earlier book, *The Analysis of the Self* (1971, pp. 4-5), using dreams of this kind. In one instance the dreamer was going around the globe in a spaceship far away from the earth but was held by the pull of gravity toward the earth's core, and in the other the dreamer was swinging higher and higher on a swing. Kohut believed that these dreams demonstrated that the pull on the narcissistic transference, represented by gravity and by the ropes of the swing, held these

dreamers from flying off into psychosis. His treatment of these dreams exhibits two facets which will be discussed below but which can be mentioned here. First, in his reliance on the manifest content Kohut is selective; he places significance on proprioceptive sensations and affects while showing little interest in the specificity of other dream elements. Second, in likening the ropes of the swing and the pull of gravity to the narcissistic transference he is suggesting that a component of the psychic apparatus (as he understands it) is being graphically represented in the manifest dream.

THEORETICAL ISSUES

Psychic Determinism

In presentations of self state dreams Kohut and other self psychologists read the meaning of the dream directly from manifest content without considering the various aspects of each element of the manifest dream as determined by multiple unconscious forces. For example, one member of this school, Paul Tolpin (1980), defended alterations made in presentations of a particular dream as follows:

> Does it matter in essence whether one is lonely in a lake resort town or in a ghost town? Does it matter in essence if the self is depicted as depleted by the use of an underpowered boat or an underpowered automobile? I think not (p. 9).

For many analysts such an attitude raises serious questions. They would, for instance, anticipate that the patient's associations would reveal reasons for the appearance of particular images in a dream. One should keep in mind that apparently minor dream details can frequently lead to major discoveries about the dreams in which they appear, the dreamer's life, and her or his psychology.

It is true that our literature includes such concepts as typical dreams and universal symbols which, some may argue, lend

support to the idea that one may understand certain dreams directly from manifest content. Even in these instances, however, the dreams and symbols should serve to orient the analyst to possible or likely themes in the latent content rather than serve as a direct statement of this content. A flight of stairs, a street, and a flying object may all be considered universal symbols, but in order to interpret a dream in which such a symbol appears, one should pay attention to which flight of stairs, which street, or which flying object appeared in a particular dream, and what links the particular elements had with latent content. "Often enough a symbol has to be interpreted in its proper meaning and not symbolically . . ." (Freud, 1900, p. 352). For example, an analysand recently engaged to be married dreamed that he was in some romantic relationship with the wife of the President; he was content to say that it showed that he was attached to his mother. When pressed for associations, however, he recalled seeing the first lady on television in a situation which brought to mind a woman who worked in his office. He had developed a crush on this woman, which understandably created conflict, and he had not mentioned his disturbing infatuation in the analysis.

Dream Interpretations without the Aid of the Patient's Associations

It is not in itself unusual to deal with dreams without the aid of explicit, deepening associations to each element reported. It appears that many analysts rely at times on their knowledge of the patient to select out only a few elements for interpretive comment. Brenner (1976, p. 142) pointed out in this connection that "the more one knows about the dreamer, the more likely it is that one is able to understand the meaning of his dreams even without many further associations." After citing examples from Freud, he went on to observe "When one knows very much about the psychological context in which a dream appears, as is often true in analysis, one can understand a good deal of the meaning of a dream as a patient tells it." Freud, too,

felt that at least some typical dreams could not be interpreted from associations; one had to rely on one's knowledge of symbols and of the patient's associations. Still, when one dispenses with the guidance of the dreamer's associations, one should be cautious and alert to possible additional determinants for the particular form taken by the dream.

Freud (1900, p. 305) believed that some dreams were less disguised than others. At times he went so far as to state that there seemed to be two groups of dreams: dreams in which the wish fulfillment is unrecognizable and disguised by every possible means, and a second group of "undistorted" wishful dreams (1900, pp. 550, 551). However, he never suggested that these dreams were structured differently so that different psychological theories were necessary for their explanation. Rather, he understood that dreams whose meaning was most obvious were, in their structure, exactly the same as more obscure dreams but with less disguise by the displacements prompted by censorship (1900, p. 308). In both groups of dreams, the dream work, characterizing the relationship between latent and manifest dream, is the same, save for less disguise at the behest of the dream censor. As stated before, when one interprets without the dreamer's associations, one should be aware of the possibility that the form taken by a dream contains important additional but successfully concealed determinants.

When we consider the dream reported by Anna Ornstein, to be described below, and the one referred to by Paul Tolpin (in which a ghost town was replaced with a deserted lake resort), we are hesitant to accept the idea that self state dreams can be read directly from manifest content: there are too many elements unaccounted for. The latter dream was reported by M. Tolpin and Kohut (1980); this dream had appeared in a different form in oral presentation (see Levine, 1979) and in *The Psychology of the Self* (Goldberg, 1978). The distortions do not seem to affect confidentiality: the dreamer should have no trouble recognizing the dream as his in all of the presentations, and the distortions do not appear to hide the identity of the dreamer from

readers, since it would not be possible for readers to identify the dreamer on the basis of the manifest content.[1]

We believe that it is not unfair to consider whether the willingness to alter the manifest content in dream reports in this literature is reflective of an a priori belief that associations to these elements are of no utility in understanding the dream. With Levine, we believe that dream elements are determined by the patient's psychology and are not random events. One distortion in *The Psychology of the Self* version changed the younger brother to an older brother. When one recognizes that it was actually a younger brother who was represented in the dream and that the patient's parents had just rented his room to a young college student and seemed cheerful about having replaced him (Goldberg, 1978, p. 379), one arrives at a quite plausible and internally consistent interpretation of the dream and its likely precipitant. While we cannot claim that this treatment of the dream, which relies on an accurate dream report and specific day residue, is beyond any doubt valid, we do feel that it deserves serious consideration when compared to the interpretation made by M. Tolpin and Kohut.

[1] The dream in its unaltered form was presented by Marion Tolpin in her reading of Tolpin and Kohut (1980) before the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis in November 1979, as follows: ". . . the patient was in a ghost town. He was surprised to see his parents there. Their house was different and unusual; it had a special room for his (younger) brother, and he (the patient) felt surprised. Then he noticed that something had happened to his sportscar—it had become ordinary looking. It was underpowered, smaller and he couldn't make it work right." A disguised version had appeared in Goldberg (1978): "... he had a dream about an empty lake resort town and how upset he is to discover his parents there. Their own cottage is different and unusual in that it has a special room for his older brother, and he is surprised at this. Moreover, something seems to have happened to his little fishing launch: it has become an ordinary-looking , underpowered rowboat which he can't make work" (p. 380). The dream then appeared in the published version of Tolpin and Kohut (1980) as follows: ". . . he was in an empty lake resort town. He was surprised to see his parents there. Their house was different and unusual; it had a special room for his (younger) brother, and he (the patient) felt surprised. Then he noticed that something had happened to his fishing launch—it had become an ordinary looking rowboat. It was underpowered, smaller, and he couldn't make it work right" (p. 429).

New data, understandings, and theoretical formulations have evolved from the dream research conducted in sleep laboratories over the past several decades. While these findings are only beginning to be integrated with the corpus of psychoanalytic knowledge, it is nonetheless true that very little of our previous understanding of dreams and dream processes has been challenged. Rather, our knowledge has been enriched. Dreaming is understood by some contributors as a process of the integration of new experience with existing structures. Palombo (1978, p. 12) speaks of current experiences being superimposed on and fused with the past. Hartmann (1973) understands this process of integration to be the principal function of the dream. This dream research would not seem to support the notion of a dream in which the manifest content reflects the distress of healthy sectors of the psyche in response to the threat of disintegration of the self.

Along these lines, it may also be noted that in sleep laboratories subjects awakened during REM sleep produce pertinent memories which are later forgotten and not retrieved through association to the dream elements. Thus, the inability to find meaningful memories and other associations does not conclusively indicate that this material was absent (Palombo, 1978, p. xii).

Representation of Psychic Structures in Dreams

Kohut (1984, p. 113) contended that while the traditional models of the psychic apparatus are sufficient for explaining the majority of dreams, they do not suffice for self state dreams. These latter dreams, as they are conceptualized, have to do with the direct representation of structures and endopsychic perceptions in the manifest dream. In contrast, we are accustomed to regarding dreams as disguised primary process expressions of latent dream thoughts. The manifest dream is made up of perceptions and affects that have been registered from experience.

Clearly, here we have a radical alteration in the theory of dreams and one which so far has not been buttressed by a

searching discussion of the problems it raises. Perhaps we can best explain our concerns on this point by making reference to a similar attempt made by Freud (1911) in the Schreber case:

> Schreber's 'rays of God', which are made up of a condensation of the sun's rays, of nerve-fibers, and of spermatozoa . . . , are in reality nothing else than a concrete representation and projection outwards of libidinal cathexes; and they thus lend his delusions a striking conformity with our theory. . . . these and many other details of Schreber's delusional structure sound almost like endopsychic perceptions of the processes whose existence I have assumed . . . as the basis of our explanation of paranoia (pp. 78-79).

Freud here regarded the "rays of God" in two ways. First they were elements in a fantasy expressive of a conflict involving Schreber's relationship to his father. In addition, Freud saw them as concrete representations of a metapsychological concept. Kohut put aside the opportunity to understand the dream as an expression of fantasies but insisted on regarding the manifest dreams exclusively as reified, concrete representations of hypothetical structures.

The Representation of the Self in Dreams

While Kohut claimed that the self state dream is a different sort of dream and one that cannot be satisfactorily explained by the traditional model (1984, p. 113), he did not provide an extensive dream psychology. Indeed, the only article specifically devoted to the self state dream is one by P. Tolpin (1983), and the literature on the topic is sparse when one considers the challenge it constitutes to our understanding of dream psychology. In Kohut's usage self state dreams were typically brief dreams in which the self is represented by proprioceptive sensations and emotions. However, the self psychologists tend to treat all the dreams they report as self state dreams and include as representations of the self such images as underpowered sports cars and capsized boats. For example, P. Tolpin (1983, p. 260) presents a self state dream which is long and complicated,

is filled with many elements, and has several action sequences. Goldberg's (1974, p. 251) treatment of a dream which he understood to have been precipitated by the patient's reaction to a failure of empathy on the part of the analyst is treated as such a dream.

Kohut's examples of self state dreams frequently contain proprioceptive sensations, although he did not claim that they were pathognomonic. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that there are many references in the literature to dreams which contain proprioceptive sensations but which are understood in the usual way. Freud (1900, p. 394) discussed such dreams as having erotic meaning. Saul and Curtis (1967) and Saul and Fleming (1959) have provided other instances in which these sensations of movement were interpreted as elation or depression.

An unpublished example provided by a colleague appears to be exactly the sort of dream which is classified as a self state dream. The dreamer experienced himself as flying an airplane. At first it was very pleasurable, but he became uneasy with the realization that he was flying solo and this was only his fourth flight—too soon to be flying alone. This dream occurred the night before he was to teach a seminar. The subject of the seminar was one with which he was quite familiar as he had taught it three times before. However, this was the first time he had taught it alone, that is, solo. The dreamer was not in analysis at the time of the dream, but he realized that he was missing the company of his former associate in the seminar, and he did some working on his dream. He recalled that as a child he had enjoyed having his mother dress him in the mornings, and his father had expressed the opinion that he should dress himself. He had responded that he was only three and that he would do it when he was four. His father accepted this.

It would be hard to challenge the idea that the dreamer was longing for the self object relationship with his former associate, but it would be difficult to substantiate the idea that the dream represented a threat of fragmentation to his cohesive self. The circumstances for the dream and the minimal associative mate-

rial do fit with a traditional treatment. The dream was an expression of issues of separation and competition which were being stimulated in the dreamer's life.

We do know that the dreams which are reported by patients constitute only a small fraction of the actual dreaming each night. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the short, proprioceptive dreams described by Kohut are fragments of longer dreams. For example, Anna Ornstein (1983) reported the following dream as a self state dream. This dream has already been alluded to in this paper:

> I was a mate on a ship. The captain wanted to rebuild the inner workings of the ship. We took the boat to a lagoon and undid all the screws holding the hull, the ship, together. That made the ship turn over, but it still kept floating—the screws were rusty, some were missing. The boat began to drift. There were two other boats on a collision course. The waves from that affected our ship. But we were able to get the boat back to shore (p. 143).

Although Ornstein was the patient's analyst, Kohut (1983, p. 405), in his discussion, insisted that the patient's dream "contained no reference to a shore," no reference to "not reaching a shore." He focused on the parts of the ship not being held together firmly and the danger of capsizing as reflective of the patient's insecure self state. He made no mention of two other boats on a collision course which created waves affecting the patient's boat.

SUMMARY

The concept of the self state dream was introduced by Kohut in 1977; he contended that patients suffering with narcissistic personality disorders have dreams in which the manifest content reveals the reactions of the healthy sectors of the psyche to disturbing changes in the condition of the self. Self psychologists maintain that associations do not lead to hidden layers of the mind but that the dream may be correctly interpreted by taking into account the patient's vulnerability and the situation which

led to the intrusion of the archaic material. Thus, in his effort to interpret such dreams, the self psychologist does not search for day residue, nor is he concerned with the sources of various dream details; rather, by virtue of his empathy and his knowledge of the state of the patient's self, he is able to understand the dream directly as a portrayal of the dreamer's dread of threats to the integrity of his self.

Any attempt to assess the validity of this concept is made difficult by the circumstance that self psychologists do not provide associations and other data from the sessions in which dreams are reported when they, the self psychologists, present material to the psychoanalytic community. They omit this data because they believe it does not contribute to their understanding of these dreams. Thus one is handicapped in the effort to determine if these dream specimens can be shown to agree in conceptual detail with dreams as we have understood them.

We have nonetheless examined the concept and some dreams offered by the self psychologists as examples; we have discussed what we see as difficulties with the concept. These include the disregard for psychic determinism and the claim that hypothetical metapsychological components of the psychic apparatus are graphically represented in the manifest dream. We have also examined the proposition that the proprioceptive sensations and affects which appear frequently in Kohut's examples of self state dreams can be interpreted directly as indications of distress being experienced by the self.

Given that self psychologists are arguing for a major revision in our understanding of dream psychology, remarkably little has been published on self state dreams. The authors believe that the self state dream will remain a dubious concept until a more exensive psychology of dreaming from the perspective of self psychology is provided as a basis for further discussion.

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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Rescue Fantasies

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To cite this article: Aaron H. Esman (1987) Rescue Fantasies, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 263-270, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927175

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927175


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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVI, 1987

RESCUE FANTASIES

BY AARON H. ESMAN, M.D.

The concept of "rescue fantasy" is examined as it has evolved since Freud introduced it in 1910. Originally designating the wish in certain men to rescue "fallen women," the term has more recently come to refer primarily to the therapist's conscious or unconscious aims with regard to his patient, particularly in the context of child analysis or therapy. The varying drive elements and defensive operations at work in this compromise formation are discussed, and some recent sociocultural influences and analogues are suggested.

To trace the history of a concept in psychoanalysis can reveal surprising ambiguities, changes of meaning, and shifts in clinical application over the decades. I have found myself pursuing such an odyssey in my survey of the concept of "rescue fantasy." A term, like most in our literature, introduced by Freud, its referents have both altered and broadened in the hands of his successors. A brief review of this evolution may serve to sharpen current usage and to indicate ways in which the concept can be applied in current clinical and theoretical contexts.

The first appearance of the notion of "rescue fantasy" occurred in Freud's (1910) essay, "A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men." Here he referred to the pattern of "rescue of the fallen woman"—i.e., seeking to save her from moral depravity (see Meyer, 1984). To such men, Freud maintained, the woman is seen unconsciously as the mother, attached to another man, and like a whore, sexually active. "Rescue" fantasy, therefore, incorporates both the defiance of the oedipal father ("now I'm quits with him") and the wish to have the mother for oneself and to give her a child. Variant

meanings include, for the man "rescuing" a woman, the wish to make her *his* mother, and for the woman "rescuing" a child, the acknowledgment that she too may be a mother.

As was often the case in this early psychoanalytic era, Freud's report was quickly followed by confirmatory notes by his followers. Reik (1911) cited a dream appearing in one of Flaubert's early novels—a dream Reik assumed had autobiographic significance. In the story the protagonist recounts a dream in which his mother is drowning and crying out to him for help, but he is held fast by an invisible force and thus cannot move to help her. Flaubert, Reik suggested, was a prototypic case of the kind described by Freud.

In the same issue of the *Zentralblatt* Stekel (1911) elaborated on Freud's formulations. He referred to the "bipolarity" of meanings, from which it follows that "a rescue means also a murder." A patient dreams that his sister is drowning, but as an unknown presence approaches, he rescues her and puts her in bed. Stekel interpreted the "rescue" as a reaction formation ("bipolarity") against the patient's hostile murderous wishes toward his sister; the water is blood, the unknown presence is Death. Stekel found a necrophilic wish in the image of "putting her in bed." Many years later, Reider (1976) reverted to this theme (without citing Stekel) in his discussion of physicians he had treated who had seduced or been seduced by female patients who complained about frigidity. In several such cases Reider found that these physicians were acting out a "rescue fantasy" of "raising the dead" or "bringing the dead to life." He attributed this necrophilic fantasy to these men's wishes for magical narcissistic potency and to their contempt for women (expressed explicitly in the fact that they generally charged a fee for the sessions in which this "therapy" occurred).

Thus far the emphasis has been on the "rescue" of women, a theme delightfully elaborated by Meyer (1984) in his psychobiographic study of such men as Dr. Johnson, Gladstone, Mackenzie King, and George Gissing who in one fashion or another devoted themselves to "saving the fallen." Meyer, following

Freud, viewed this activity as the living out of a classic oedipal fantasy, an attempt to transform the "whore" into the "madonna,"or to merge the two. In addition he suggested that it often represents an effort to endow the (debased, castrated) woman with phallic attributes. "When," Meyer concluded, "in the musical play [*My Fair Lady*] . . . Higgins exultingly exclaims, 'I think she's got it! By George, she's got it!,' there is no need to question just what it is she's got" (p. 238).

Abraham (1922), however, wrote about fantasies of rescuing the father. Here too, characteristically, the emphasis is on oedipal meanings. Abraham reviewed the Oedipus myth in light of the "established knowledge" that "king" equals "father" and that "rescue" equals "killing," offering symbolic interpretations along such lines as "horse equals phallus," "running away equals coitus," "road equals female genitalia," etc. The purport of his paper is that, as with Stekel, rescue fantasy is essentially a reaction formation and that the "neurotic" who dreams of rescuing his father or father figure is really expressing an unconscious murderous oedipal wish.

Little else appeared in the early literature on this subject, until Grinstein (1957) described an interesting variant, in which certain male patients express the fantasy of "helping" the analyst, by offering financial advice, referring patients, etc. Grinstein viewed this narcissistic behavior as comparable to a rescue fantasy in which the patient sees the analyst as a weak, helpless person in need of succor. "The aggression concealed in this is," Grinstein asserted, "evident" (p. 129). Thus he concluded that a significant element in at least some rescue fantasies is hostility toward the object.

Veszy-Wagner (1971) also adduced this sort of motive in her analysis of the fantasy/nightmare of some young mothers of "overlying" and smothering their babies. In some cases this fantasy is followed by a second phase in which the mother rescues the baby; "some women dream that they bury the child but later try to disinter it in the course of a rescue action" (p. 60). The "rescue," that is, represents an effort to undo the mother's un-

conscious hostile/murderous wish expressed in the primary phase of the fantasy—a "restitution," displaced to the baby from similar wishes directed to her own mother. In the same vein Niederland (1981) ascribed the archaeological activities of Heinrich Schliemann to his unconscious wish to rescue his dead mother and siblings—to unearth them and restore them to life.

A major contribution to this subject appeared in a paper by Frosch (1959), in which the rescue fantasy is set in the context of family romance fantasies as they emerge in the analytic transference. Just as with the family romance, the fantasy of rescue is a means of regaining or retaining the idealized and omnipotent parent of early childhood. The patient comes to analysis with the fantasy of being rescued by the omnipotent analyst; later, by identification, the patient may evolve fantasies of rescuing the analyst or others. As in Grinstein's examples, these fantasies are commonly heavily freighted with ambivalence and reaction formation, particularly as patients experience disappointment and disillusionment in their magical expectations.

Atwood (1978) sought to explain fantasies of messianic salvation in psychotic patients. Such fantasies originate, he asserted, in early traumatic losses and disappointments which evoke feelings of hurt and/or anger, and wishes to retaliate against the disappointing object. Fear of the consequences of such retaliation (i.e., further disappointment or loss), however, leads to a retreat into fantasies of repair by way of idealization of the object and wishes to be rescued by that person or a surrogate (e.g., fairy godmother, God). Continuing disappointment leads to identification with the idealized object and the assumption of the role of rescuer. A further factor is the need to atone through reaction formation for guilt-laden fantasies of destroying the object.

Glenn (1986) provided an intriguing psychobiographical note in his study of Thornton Wilder, whose literary and lived-out rescue fantasies he ascribed to the fact that Wilder was the surviving member of a pair of premature twins. Thus, Glenn proposed, Wilder was unconsciously preoccupied with fantasies

of rescuing his dead brother, an impulsion reinforced by a powerful identification with his "artistic, self-sacrificing" mother. Glenn described, too, how the rescue fantasies of many analytic patients "encompass desires to save the mother from a cruel sexual father." In Wilder's case, this wish was "integrated" with his urge to resuscitate his defunct twin.

Thus far, we have been describing the fantasies of patients or the subjects of biographic inquiry. It appears that Greenacre (1966) was the first to speak of rescue fantasies on the part of the analyst and thus initiate a turn in the direction of the literature which has continued to this date. "The therapeutic enthusiasm of the analyst is sometimes part of a latent rescue fantasy . . . which is aroused by the analysand's suffering and pleas for help. An intense situation approaching a family romance may then develop. . . . In such rescue operations the analyst's aggression may be allocated to those relatives or previous therapists" (pp. 760-761), who, she implied, may then be seen as guilty of neglect, abuse, or lack of empathy.

It is this theme—the rescue fantasy in the analyst or psychotherapist—that has dominated the field in recent years. Indeed, in the course of an autobiographic statement of his development as a psychoanalyst, Volkan (1985) suggested that this motive is a universal determinant. He cited, with agreement, Olinick's (1980) proposition that there exists among analysts a common predisposing "rescue fantasy having to do with a depressive mother, the latter having induced such rescue fantasy in her receptive child" (pp. 12-13). Volkan described the development of his own "early rescue fantasies" related to the death of his uncle, for whom he was, in the context of a grieving family, a replacement child.

Beiser (1973), in a challenging discussion of the problems involved in the teaching of child psychology in analytic training, saw "rescue fantasies" as an aspect of resistance to such learning and as a reaction formation to a widespread hostility to children. This may lead, on the one hand, to an interest in "prevention" on the societal level, with, as Greenacre suggested, dis-

placement of hostility to society and teachers. In those who actually treat child patients, it may lead, on the other hand, to overidentification with patients, allowing them to manage and to destroy the therapy. Beiser viewed such therapists' attitudes as based on unconscious sibling rivalry and/or displaced mother transference.

Similarly, Palmer, Harper, and Rivinus (1983) described the "adoption process" in inpatient treatment of children and adolescents. This process, they said, is the living out of rescue fantasies on the part of staff—a response to needy children with family romances who evoke overidentification on the part of personnel who have not resolved their own adolescent conflicts or who seek to be surrogate parents because of unfulfilled parenting wishes. The real parents are competitively excluded or ignored, reality factors denied, pathology and internalized problems minimized, with the attendant fantasy that "all this kid needs is a good loving parent."

It appears to be particularly in the treatment of children and adolescents that such rescue fantasies are most clearly evident, both as motivators and as sources of difficulty. The latter arise especially when, as Glenn, Sabot, and Bernstein (1978) pointed out, "The child analyst who sees parents as neglectful, abusive or abandoning . . . react[s] by wishing to replace the 'bad' parents. . . . rescue fantasies in which the analyst identifies with an ideal parent replace a realistic stance" (p. 401).

On a related theme Brinich (1980) spoke about rescue fantasies among adoptive parents. "In adoptive parents who have not resolved their oedipal conflicts, the adoption of a child can mobilize so much guilt [over fantasies of 'stealing' the child] that they are forced into the actualization of 'rescue' fantasies" (p. 125). This may lead, he suggested, to inappropriate parental behavior and potentially damaging consequences for the adopted child.

Thus over the past two decades the emphasis has shifted away from considering the rescue fantasy as a psychopathological curiosity to regarding it as a potentially problematic property of the therapist or of therapeutic systems or of otherwise normal

human beings who happen to be involved in caring for others —especially, for children. In recent years we have seen the rescue fantasy legitimized and elevated to a central position in the theory of pathogenesis and therapeutic technique. With her customary penetration, Greenacre (1966) identified the tendency to ascribe the origin of psychopathological conditions to hostile or "unempathic" external forces, and to confer on analysts/therapists the capacity to redress the effects of these malign forces through their "corrective" or "transmuting" influence. In the claims of those who assign a unique epistemological and ameliorative role to "empathy," one can, I believe, see the derivatives of unconscious rescue fantasies, even as one could identify them in the now-deflated pretentions of the social psychiatrists of the 1960's and 1970's—those who hoped to "prevent" mental illness through manipulation of those social forces they saw as etiological.

It is remarkable that at the same time, the original essence of the rescue fantasy as Freud formulated it—the "rescue of the fallen woman"—has apparently passed from the psychological scene; at least it no longer appears in clinical reports. It would seem to have fallen victim to changing social and sexual mores; the very notion of the "fallen woman" appears to have fallen away in the context of the "sexual revolution" and the "liberation" of women. Perhaps the contemporary counterpart of the classical fantasy can be found among those who seek to "rescue" women from the evils of pornography, the unborn from the evils of abortion, or our children from the curse of Godlessness through school prayer. For the dynamics—oedipal and preoedipal—of the rescue fantasy are surely still with us, finding new forms for their expression—both within and without the analytic situation.

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525 East 68th St.
New York, NY 10021

Routledge
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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

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To cite this article: Stanley S. Weiss (1987) The Two-Woman Phenomenon, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 271-286, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927176

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927176

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVI, 1987

THE TWO-WOMAN PHENOMENON

BY STANLEY S. WEISS, M.D.

A distinct type of phenomenon that has not been previously noted as such is named and described. Men who present a two-woman phenomenon retain a commitment to wife and marriage while loving another woman. Conflict arises only when one of the women has to be relinquished. It is postulated that many men with this pattern of loving have experienced a traumatic childhood and an oedipal conflict which defensively involved two maternal objects in fantasy or reality. One mother was hated, the other loved. This dynamic is one possible determinant leading to the two-woman phenomenon.

In "Contributions to the Psychology of Love I," Freud (1910) pointed out that information about distinct types of object choice may emerge from the analytic material acquired as analysts study the field of human love. He then described men whose objects of passionate feelings are woman from a low social position who have many sexual attachments. These men experience painful feelings of jealousy and a strong desire to rescue the degraded woman. Passionate attachments of this sort are repeated "again and again in the lives of men of this type" (p. 168).

In this paper, I wish to describe another "extreme and sharply defined type," to use Freud's words (p. 174), that has not been noted or, if noted, the dynamic significance has not been brought to a clinical and theoretical level of generalization

I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. William G. Niederland for his many helpful comments and suggestions.

beyond the specific case. These men are strongly attached to and involved with two women—wife and other—at the same time and have difficulty relinquishing either woman; hence the designation, the two-woman phenomenon. This clinical picture needs to be differentiated from the many other situations in which a man is involved with two women at the same time. There appears to be a particular kind of patient who presents a two-woman dilemma. My impression is that this phenomenon is more common than is generally acknowledged.

I will present, first, the general characteristics of these patients, a phenomenological view, as derived from several consultations, supervision, and successfully terminated analyses. I will then present data from the psychoanalysis of one of these patients to help substantiate and clarify the generalizations suggested. The dynamic understanding of this patient's pattern of loving that clearly emerged during psychoanalysis has significance, I believe, for many patients who present a two-woman phenomenon. A commentary and summary will follow the clinical material.

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW

The men suffering from this condition have usually been married young to a woman from a background similar to their own. They remain monogamous and devoted, but following an initial period of sexual passion and love, they become emotionally distant from their wives; at a later time they fall passionately in love with another woman. While they are in love with the new woman, their feelings of responsibility and commitment to wife and marriage remain intact and ongoing.

The intense pleasure and passion that is awakened by and invested in the new love object spreads to all the functioning and activities of these men. They describe life as taking on a special glow and excitement that they had once felt with the wife but then had lost. They emphasize that the new woman

admires and affirms them; she finds their work, interests, and ideas exciting. She appears to enhance creative functioning. The woman usually comes from a different background, and the differences are noted as intriguing and adding to the pleasure and mystery of the re-experienced love. The age of the woman is not of obvious significance. These men do not belong to the group of older men who divorce their wives to begin life over with a much younger woman.

The wife is depicted as a good, devoted, conscientious, and responsible person interested in home and children. She is often described as pretty, but she no longer stimulates passion or excitement. The man believes that she is not interested in his work, except possibly for the money and prestige it provides.

These men can and do have sexual relations with both women. They are not the type, also described by Freud (1912), who suffer from a prostitute-madonna complex and who cannot be potent with the madonna-like wife. However, they describe sex with the wife as routine and mechanical, and they experience impaired desire and orgastic pleasure. They indulge in sex with their wives rather infrequently, especially after they fall in love again. They feel sex is a marital responsibility, and they also do not wish the wife to become too suspicious of the new love. They are frightened that this might happen if they should stop all sexual relations. They do not seriously attempt to hide the relationship but neither do they flaunt it. The woman is not considered to be, or treated as if she were, a mistress. This type of man even expects, rather naïvely, that others will view his new relationship as positively as he does; and for long periods of time, wives, family members, friends, and colleagues often do not question, confront, or apparently even allow themselves to become aware that they are perceiving a two-woman phenomenon. These men are not promiscuous. In fact, they strongly espouse monogamy as an ideal. They possess high standards for themselves and require a high level of functioning in others. Their obvious talents, abilities, and, of course, the choice of women help to maintain the eerie conspiracy of

silence that allows the two-woman phenomenon to continue undisturbed for long periods of time, often for years.

Why and when do these men seek analytic help? While successfully living out a two-woman phenomenon, they do not appear to experience anxiety, guilt, or shame, nor do they show overt evidence of conflict; the ego state is one of satisfaction and pleasure. They consider themselves to be most fortunate and the new relationship without problems. However, when circumstance forces a decision to be made about separation, divorce, or the giving up of the passionately loved other woman, the ego's vulnerability is clearly perceived. As they struggle to make a decision to relinquish one of the women, they may experience confusion brought about by the clash of affects that they seem unable to control. They report a tormenting guilt for what they are inflicting upon the family, and they may brood about and fear that they themselves might develop a severe depression or physical illness following separation and divorce. They worry about the possibility of being shunned by colleagues, friends, and family. They have difficulty in not thinking about ruined careers. They appear to sense that their concerns are somewhat exaggerated, but they cannot seem to free themselves from torment by conscience.

When they consider staying with the wife and giving up the other woman, they speak poignantly of life returning, once again, to the colorless, dull, daily routine, devoid of any pleasure; they also fear that creative functioning will be stifled. Once they decide to follow this course, however, there is no longer the tormenting guilt, since they feel they are taking the correct and proper action; but they must then face the pain of loss of the love object. They may also consider, during the decision-making turmoil, a third frightening possibility—that of giving up both women. They are obviously caught in a painful dilemma. It is often at this time, when a decision cannot be made, when action is paralyzed since all choices are so terribly difficult, that analytic help may be sought.

A DYNAMIC VIEW: THE ANALYSIS OF MR. B

Mr. B, a forty-nine-year-old, highly intelligent, sensitive, and successful executive, was referred for analysis by his internist because of the sudden onset of brooding depression and thoughts of suicide.

Early in the consultation, Mr. B "confessed" that he was married but in love with another woman. With deep feeling, Mr. B stated, "I cannot believe I am in this position. It is so confusing. It has an unreal quality. I'm not the type of man to have an affair. Yet, we have been together for five years. I feel strong and alive, and my life has been wonderful since we met. J is so intuitive and bright. She loves and admires me. I feel I will lose everything good if I have to give her up."

Many times they had spoken of Mr. B's obtaining a divorce but "somehow it was never the right time" for Mr. B to let his wife know about his plans. Now, for the first time, Mr. B was being actively and somewhat angrily "pushed" by J to secure a divorce. J had recently been offered an important position in another city. She was also very aware that Mr. B had recently been offered an opportunity by his company in that same city.

Mr. B stated that recently he has been feeling intensely angry at his wife and would very much like to confront her, but "I become weak and passive in her presence. I cannot understand why I do not just obtain a divorce like so many other men." Mr. B continued, "I am a beaten man. The family will be better off without me." His thoughts of suicide involved a boating accident and a calming thought that no one would know that his "drowning" would be a carefully planned act of self-destruction.

A trial analysis was felt to be indicated, despite what might appear at first glance to be primarily an acute crisis requiring only psychotherapy, not analysis. Mr. B seemed relieved by the suggestion for analysis since he believed that this would give him the opportunity to put off, once again, the need to con-

front his wife, obtain a divorce, and remarry. Mr B stated in a somewhat humorous and superior manner, "I have heard that patients should not make major decisions when beginning an analysis. I hope that J realizes this." However, in addition to Mr. B's wish to undertake analysis to avoid having to make a difficult decision, he was psychologically minded and very aware that he was in a state of conflict that was somehow much more intense than the reality called for. Also, Mr. B was curious about "the unknown mental forces" that led him to his present dilemma, and he appeared sincerely motivated to seek insight and make changes. Mr. B was especially puzzled about why he was now unable to make a decision and take action; he had always been able to face and solve problems.

At the end of the first couch session, while leaving the office and closing the door, Mr. B asked, "Do you want me to leave your door opened or closed?" Before I could answer he left the door slightly ajar and rapidly departed. He continued to leave the door partially opened for many months before he gained insight into this piece of behavior and could, one day with pride, comfortably close the door for that and all subsequent sessions.

The transference neurosis manifested itself early and clearly. Mr. B responded to me as if he had found an idealized, perfect object who had the ability to bestow upon him perfect happiness. He seemed to believe that before long, with my help, guidance, and blessing, he would be able to divorce, remarry, and live in perfect bliss with his new love. In this fantasy, his wife would no longer be angry; she would readily accept the divorce and even be pleased by her husband's happiness. He wanted me to know that analysis was worth all the money, time, and effort. He wondered why he hadn't sought analysis years before.

Mr. B's strong religious upbringing, which he had stressed during the evaluation, was very evident. I was an all-loving, all-powerful, idealized, God-like figure who could comfort and bless him. (He had left the door ajar after the first couch session so as not to lose contact with me.) We were now connected, and Mr. B obviously felt safe and protected. His depression very

soon lifted. At a later time, I learned that he had simultaneously believed that I wished him to give up J and return to wife, home, and church. However, this fantasy was not verbalized at this time.

During this period of the analysis in which the positive transference of an idealizing nature was most prominent, Mr. B presented important history and described the important objects in his life. He and his wife came from a poor, urban, strongly religious background. They had come a long way together to his present position and sophisticated life style. Before coming for analysis, Mr. B had felt a desire to return to the church of his youth, which he attempted, but when he could not find the comfort he wished and the depression and suicide thoughts intensified, he readily accepted the advice of his internist to see me for a psychiatric consultation. The woman he loved was from a wealthy, non-religious background. Mr. B stated that they were both intrigued and surprised that in spite of marked cultural and religious differences they could become so close and loving.

The patient said that rather early in the marriage he had given up a promising research career because his wife belittled his work and salary. He transferred to administrative work and achieved rapid advancement and financial success. He stressed, however, that he resented having submitted to his wife's wishes, although he enjoyed his work and had gained a reputation as a creative and highly competent executive.

Mr. B related to his wife as someone with great power and destructiveness. He believed, in spite of much evidence to the contrary, that his wife wished to extinguish all his pleasure and to control and dominate him. He appeared convinced that his beloved other woman was totally devoted to enhancing his masculinity, autonomy, pleasure, and creativity. It took much interpretive work before Mr. B gained insight with conviction that he had invested both women with fantasies and that his fantasies had distorted his perception and produced the all-negative and all-positive views of his two women.

Mr. B's mother had a complex personality. She had always

considered her son to be someone special and destined for greatness. In the home, she would often scream and rant about sinful behavior, and how God's wrath would soon destroy all sinners. At other times, she was inappropriately seductive, sometimes loving and caring, but always unpredictable. Mr. B emphasized that his mother's highly disturbed behavior took place only in the home. In the outer world she was actively involved, productive, and well respected. Mr. B's father could not control his wife's behavior at home. He, like his son, was obviously afraid of her, and both were passive and quiet in her presence. The father withdrew into work and hobbies, and abandoned and rejected his son. The boy was left to cope with his disturbed mother alone.

Mr. B was confused, frightened, and enraged by his mother's sudden personality changes in the home, which were in such startling contrast to how well she functioned in the outer world. "It was as if I had two mothers. I developed, at some time around the age of five, or six, the belief that I really did have two mothers. I knew that this was not true, but also I somehow did not know it. I truly felt I had two mothers. The split helped control my fear, anger, and anguish, and thank God, I could continue to feel excitement and pleasure."

Mr. B attempted to avoid his mother at home, while outside the home, he was exceptionally close to and involved with her. She introduced him to many intellectual and artistic activities which remained important to him and which he continued to pursue after leaving home.

I interpreted to Mr. B that the two-woman dilemma he was experiencing in the present was connected to the split mother figure he had erected so many years before. The wife who he now feels is angry at him and toward whom he is furious—the wife he cannot confront or leave—appears to be directly connected to the highly religious and yet inappropriately seductive mother of his childhood. His other woman, whom he loves and admires and who also finds him very special, is related to the mother who functioned so well outside the home—the mother

with whom he was so close and from whom he gained so much. It was of interest to both of us that the patient had never made a connection between his two women in the present and his traumatic past history, during which he defensively transformed his mother into two mothers.

The second summer vacation brought about a major change in the idealizing transference. Mr. B came for his session and found the door locked. It was only at that moment, while standing in front of my locked office door, that he realized that we were not meeting. He then remembered having written the vacation dates in his calendar and then just forgetting what he had so carefully recorded. It now became clear that when he was told the dates I would be away, he decided that he would spend several exciting days away with J. This he repressed and forgot to tell me prior to the vacation. Instead, he just managed to forget that an interruption in the analysis was going to take place.

While facing the locked door, Mr. B felt cruelly rejected and humiliated. He banged on the door with both fists; then he left crying and became aware of chest pain, cardiac-like symptoms that he had also experienced not long before he fell in love with J. The chest pain had been carefully worked up medically, and no organic basis had been found. However, psychiatric consultation was not considered or suggested at that time.

Mr. B was very surprised by the intensity of his reaction. He thought about telephoning me but decided against doing so, "since you were on vacation and would be very upset and angry if I disturbed you." When telling me about this later, he quietly but firmly exclaimed, "You must be furious at me since I am still seeing J and I have made no plans to give her up." It was at this point that I learned that Mr. B believed that for his analysis to be successful and for me not to be disappointed with him, he would have to give up J and return fully committed to wife, family, and church. This belief had been present since the time of the referral for analysis but had never been verbalized until now.

Mr. B reported a dream which had taken place the night before he returned for analysis following the vacation.

> A woman with an ugly face and a beautiful body came toward me to seduce me. I was both excited and furious. I didn't know what to do. She undressed. I don't remember what happened next, but later in the dream I slew her with my beautiful new Samurai sword, the one I bought while you were away. I cut her in two. I separated that ugly face from the sensual body. I felt powerful and wonderful. However, soon after that I became very scared, and I then suddenly awakened.

In associating to the woman in the dream, Mr. B presented more details about his mother's seductive behavior. One of the reasons he had married so young was to get away from his mother's advances. He did feel love and passion for his wife when they first met. His wife also responded, and the marriage was considered very happy and fulfilling until the wife began to belittle his work and income. He had angrily blamed his wife for his career change, but it now became clear that he had also felt envy of friends and colleagues who he felt had more money and prestige. Mr. B desired financial success, and this wish he could not acknowledge as his own. His wishes for money and material possessions were repressed, and anger was directed toward his wife for what he felt to be her "un-Christian and sinful wishes."

Mr. B felt that in the blank part of the dream, the part he could not remember, he must have had sex with this ugly-beautiful woman. This led to associations about "the great Caesar," whom he had studied and admired as a child. It was during the analysis of this dream that I learned how much knowledge Mr. B had about Caesar's life, work, and death. He had always been intrigued by Caesar's two dreams of incest with his mother that he allegedly had in 67 B.C. at Gades and in 49 B.C., the night before crossing the Rubicon. The interpretation of Caesar's two dreams by the dream interpreters of the day had always made sense to Mr. B. The seers had predicted that since Caesar could

embrace and mount his mother, he would soon rule the entire world. Mr. B then remembered his passion for his own mother and his wish to have sex with her, a wish which was fulfilled in dreams and fantasy during adolescence. He said that, as in the recent dream, he always felt grand and powerful while sexually overpowering his mother in dream and fantasy, but these feelings were soon replaced by guilt and fear.

Mr. B made an insightful interpretation while associating to his new Samurai sword. He stated that he never before realized that his sword and knife collection must have been acquired to protect him against incest, from feeling too grand, and from attack by his angry father. He began to understand and gain insight into his identification with Caesar.

I interpreted for Mr. B that his mother's seductive behavior had probably involved her own incestuous wishes, and that is what might have motivated her frightening sermons regarding sin and punishment by an angry God. Her seductive behavior also stimulated her son's sexual excitement. During adolescence, Mr. B's excitement was displaced from mother to the young lady whom he wooed and married despite strong disapproval from both sets of parents.

As the analytic exploration moved forward, Mr. B began to gain insight with conviction that he, like mother and wife, possessed a primitive superego that wished to extinguish all sexual pleasure, aggression, and autonomy. Self-sacrifice had been an idealized value taught vigorously at home and in the church. The intense unconscious conflict between Mr. B's wish for instinctual gratification and the prohibition by his superego had led to an external compromise formation. In the home, he tried to remain true to his religious ego ideal, but he mobilized and maintained an anger toward his wife that kept him from total submission, total submission being the actualization of a fantasy of idealized merger with the Holy Family. Outside the home, he could experience both success and pleasure, but he could not escape the fear of devastating punishment if he committed himself fully to the idealized and sexually beloved other woman.

In his fantasies God reigned at home, the Devil outside, and Mr. B had to keep away from total merger with either side of his id-superego conflict.

For several years in the relationship with his love object, Mr. B had felt strong, confident, and fully masculine. This object relationship was also profoundly influenced by an unconscious fantasy (Arlow, 1980). In the fantasy that was uncovered, Mr. B's mother was no longer furious at him for inflicting bodily damage upon her during the birth process. She had in reality often accused her son of cruelly injuring her at birth by what she considered his most unusual size and strength. The birth actually had been a difficult one, and a caesarean had been considered at the time but was not done. During the analysis, Mr. B learned about his birth and early history from parents, family members, and records. In the fantasy acted out through J, he had repaired his mother's body and no longer felt guilty. The mother, in turn, was very pleased with him and encouraged his masculinity to flower.

Toward the end of the middle phase of the analysis, Mr. B's beloved and idealized woman became unhappy with the results of his ego growth and changes. She accepted a position in another city. Mr. B felt "depressed and empty," but he was able to allow her to separate and leave, while he remained to continue and successfully complete the analytic work. In the safety of the analytic situation, the two maternal object representations, the hated and the loved, could be faced, reunited, reality tested, and reconciled as belonging to his traumatic past. Mr. B was then able to take back into the home and marriage the pleasure and love he had externalized and invested in J for so many years.

COMMENTARY

According to Erikson (1950, p. 229), Freud, in his later years, was asked what a healthy person should be able to do well. To

love and to work was Freud's alleged response. Patients who act out a two-woman phenomenon can work well, and many possess creative ability. However, they have problems in loving. They can fall in love and marry but they cannot maintain a physical and emotional intimacy (Kernberg, 1980, pp. 277-281). The developmental currents of love, the sensual, the tender, and the ethical, as well as the integration of love with aggression, become separated and invested in unconscious fantasies that may be actualized or acted out.

The two-woman phenomenon may be triggered by midlife stress, during which such men may feel a heightened awareness of loss, illness, death, lack of appreciation for what they have accomplished, and an upsurge of aggression (Jacques, 1980). Mr. B's falling in love with J was preceded by cardiac-like symptoms, concern about illness and death, and much unhappiness and regret about not having followed a more idealized career path.

During Mr. B's oedipal phase, he was confronted with a frightening and seductive mother who may have struggled with incestuous wishes toward her idealized son. Neither mother nor son had the benefit of an effective husband and father to help contain mother's regressive behavior. Splitting divided the maternal object into two object representations for Mr. B, one all bad and one all good. This helped him to minimize conflict, modulate aggression, and maintain a pleasurable libidinal tie to the actual mother. The term splitting may be confusing because it refers in the psychoanalytic literature to a variety of psychoanalytic mechanisms and processes (Blum, 1983; Glenn, 1983). I am using the term here to refer to a defense mechanism that split the maternal object in childhood into two objects, which allowed the patient to maintain his psychic equilibrium. With the return of the repressed years later, Mr. B lived out a two-woman phenomenon.

The two-woman phenomenon can also involve two "mothers" in a very concrete sense during childhood. Dr. William Niederland (personal communication) shared with me his experience

in successfully analyzing one such individual. During childhood, Dr. Niederland's patient was abandoned suddenly and repeatedly by an unempathic mother who would leave on vacation trips without informing her son. The grandmother, the mother's mother, who lived in the same household, would comfort the grieving youngster with much warmth, hugging, and reassurance that his mother loved him and would soon return. This patient, like Mr. B, entered analysis because of an unhappy marriage and intense conflict about divorce. During his marriage, he would often leave his wife to attend to emergency business matters in another city. However, these trips were primarily excuses to visit an adored older woman with whom he carried on a passionate love affair for many years. In the analysis, it became clear that the wife represented the hated mother who had so often disappeared without warning and whom he now regularly abandoned to visit a passionately loved older woman who clearly represented the caring and beloved grandmother.

Men who present a two-woman phenomenon do not fall into any one diagnostic category, and individual cases may vary to a considerable degree. Some patients may possess significant preoedipal pathology and an archaic superego which interferes with the ego's ability to differentiate fantasy from reality. Actualization of fantasy may take place without awareness of the underlying fantasy. In other patients, this apparent difficulty may represent an analyzable defensive style and does not involve ego structural damage. Even some of those patients in whom ego structural damage is present may still prove to be analyzable. Because of the complex mixture of preoedipal and oedipal pathology that is often present, some of these patients present difficulties for the analyst in evaluating analyzability, process, and change.

SUMMARY

A distinct type of phenomenon was named and described, and a significant dynamic was suggested as one of the possible deter-

minants of the personality of men who present two-woman dilemmas.

Men who suffer from a two-woman phenomenon marry young and, early in the marriage, lose sexual and loving feelings for the wife. However, feelings of commitment and responsibility to the wife remain intact and ongoing. After a significant period of marriage and often during midlife transitional difficulties, these men fall in love with a new woman. While they are in love again, their feelings of commitment to wife and marriage remain. This pattern of loving, which involves two women, may go on for many years, and may become problematic only when the man is forced by outside circumstances to relinquish one of the women. The man with this type of personality may function at a high level: he can be productive and creative, and he deserves our best psychoanalytic efforts. It is hoped that with more attention to and understanding of the two-woman phenomenon, a greater number of patients will seek or be referred for analytic help. It is my impression that too few of these men at present are evaluated or treated by analysts. This is unfortunate, since many of them, I believe, are analyzable and can achieve an integrated and sublimated love with one object.

I believe that a two-man phenomenon, the female counterpart of the two-woman phenomenon, is to be found in certain female patients and is also more common that is generally acknowledged. It is hoped that this communication will stimulate other analysts and investigators to share their findings and help us expand our knowledge about this clinical entity.

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1721 East 19th Ave., #528
Denver, CO 80218

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

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To cite this article: Bernard C. Meyer (1987) Notes on the Uses of Psychoanalysis for Biography, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 287-316, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927177

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927177

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVI, 1987

NOTES ON THE USES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR BIOGRAPHY

BY BERNARD C. MEYER, M.D.

It is the dual aim of this presentation to explore the scope and to define the limits of what psychoanalysis can offer to the field of biography. In pursuit of these goals emphasis is placed upon the influence of the writer's emotional attachment to his subject, which, despite intensive psychoanalytic training and experience, may compromise his objectivity and contaminate his narrative. In addition, attention is drawn to psychological issues in the life of the creative artist which may play a decisive role both in determining the quality of his work and in stimulating its production.

My presentation is focused, albeit unevenly, on three separate issues in the field of psychoanalysis and biography.

First, the effect of the writer's partiality and prejudice in the fashioning of biography,
Second, that aspect of the life of the creative person that I have named "secret sharing," and
Finally, the influence of trauma and loss in stimulating the creative act.

Were these three themes transposed into the language of music, they might be designated serenades, duets, and requiems.

SERENADES

In the preface to his seminal work, *Eminent Victorians*, Lytton Strachey (1918) wrote that it was "not the business of the biog-

The Freud Anniversary Lecture of The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, April 8, 1986.

rapher to be complimentary, but to lay bare the facts of the case as he understands them" (p. vii), a statement that Leon Edel (1957) hailed as "a virtual manifesto of modern biography" (p. 105). Clear and succinct as it stands, however, Strachey's formula is easier to prescribe than to fill.

To begin with, the "facts of the case" are not always readily established. Owing to what might be termed the "Rashomon Effect," the clear show of truth flickers and falters, which suggests that, like beauty, it may reside mainly in the eye of the beholder, rendering its definition illusory and its attainment a chimera. The older he got, wrote Mark Twain, the more vivid was his recollection of things that had never happened.

No less troublesome is Strachey's recommendation that the biographer should avoid being "complimentary" (or, for that matter, antagonistic) toward his subject, a caution which, if followed faithfully, would soon empty the bookshelves in the biography section of most libraries. Drawn to the field of biography in general, and toward selected individuals within it by an affinity and a fascination that he may not always comprehend, nor even wish to, by a hunger for a hero from whose countenance each trace of human fault or foible has been erased, the biographer is often engaged in gratifying a need that cannot be ignored or tamed by the forces of firm resolve. The idolatry that prompted Beethoven's first biographer, Anton Schindler, to refer to his subject as "our hero" (E. and R. Sterba, 1954, p. 15) is no less evident in the introduction to John Mack's (1976) recent life of T. E. Lawrence, where the author acknowledged "unabashedly" that he regarded Lawrence as "a great man."

Such a stacking of the biographical deck cannot fail to influence the shuffling and the drawing of the materials, as well as the interpretation of them. The obligation to defend such laudatory sentiments inevitably forecloses spontaneity and innovation, and puts the writer on guard lest some unforeseen discovery mar the contrived perfection of his portrait. From the point of view of methodology, the pattern recalls the outburst of the Queen of Hearts, who cries out, "No, NO! Sentence first

—verdict afterwards!" Love and reverence, writes Barbara Tuchman (1979) "are not the proper mood for the historian" (p. 143). Perhaps not, but for the biographer, as for the clinician, despite such temptations, it is imperative that he distinguish between an admiration for a man's achievement and an assessment of his character. When Mozart is called "an unearned gift to humanity, Nature's unique unmatched and probably unmatchable work of art" (Hildesheimer, 1982, p. 366), the writer was assuredly not speaking of the composer's personal behavior or his scatological language.

There is nothing new about this problem. In his life of Alexander, Plutarch declared his purpose was not to write histories, but lives (Pachter, 1979, p. 12), a distinction echoed many centuries later by Samuel Johnson, who declared, "If a man is to write a Panegyrick, he may keep the vices out of sight, but if he proposes to write a *Life*, he must represent it as it was" (Boswell, 1791, p. 840). Yet, despite a commitment to a policy of strict objectivity, the biographer is often sorely tempted to compose a panegyric, either to satisfy some inner need or to furnish the reading public with a moral example. "The sacred writers," said Johnson, "related the vicious as well as the virtuous actions, which had this moral effect, that it kept mankind from despair" (see Bate, 1959, p. vii). At the same time Johnson acknowledged that the biographer was not immune to personal preferences that might "allow his interest, his fear, his gratitude or his tenderness to overpower his fidelity and tempt him to conceal, if not to invent" (Boswell, 1791, p. 22). Nowhere are such influences so manifest as in his celebrated life of his friend, the poet Richard Savage (Johnson, 1744, pp. 561-628).

Ostensibly the illegitimate son of the Countess Macclesfield and the Earl Rivers, who died in his childhood, Savage lived in the grip of a violent and inexorable hatred of his mother, whom he accused of subjecting him to a merciless catalogue of "implacable and restless cruelties" (Johnson, 1744, p. 562). Both her alleged maltreatment of him, as well as the question of his true parentage, aroused much controvery and fostered a spectrum

of opinion ranging from viewing him as a hapless victim of a heartless and unnatural mother, to condemning him as an out-and-out impostor (Boswell, 1791, p. 125).

Johnson himself was not oblivious to facets of Savage's personality that might have predisposed him to believe himself victimized. Yet, possessed as Johnson was of such clear-sightedness into his friend's character, it is surprising that he accepted, seemingly without reserve, Savage's lurid account of his mother's conduct and character. Even Boswell remained unconvinced, declaring that about the validity of Savage's claims, Johnson had left the world to "vibrate in a state of uncertainty" (1791, p. 127). In light of Johnson's own dismal childhood, there is reason to suspect that in believing blindly in the villainy of Savage's mother, he possessed a valued opportunity to displace upon her the sentiments he could not bring himself to direct toward his own. Nor was this the only example of the role of identification in shaping Johnson's life of Savage.

While Savage was imprisoned and temporarily under sentence of death for murder, his "great firmness and equality of mind" (Johnson, 1744, p. 578) evoked Johnson's unstinted admiration. That this admirable equanimity may have been occasioned by less praiseworthy considerations, namely, the gratification resulting from his being behind bars, seems to have escaped the notice of Johnson, whose guilelessness is all the more noteworthy, since the prisoner made no secret of the pleasures arising from his condition. "Though my person is in confinement," he wrote, "my mind can expatiate on ample and useful subjects with all the freedom imaginable . . . and if, instead of a Newgate bird, I may be allowed to be a bird of the Muses, I assure you, Sir, I sing very freely in my cage" (Johnson, 1744, p. 621).[1]

[1] Readers familiar with a recent book entitled *Nutcracker* may recall similar sentiments voiced by young Marc Schreuder, who, yielding to the demands of his evidently psychopathic mother, murdered her father. In prison, and now sheltered from her oppressive force, he rejoiced in his newfound privacy: "Now my room is mine. In a way I have more freedom here than I had at home" (Alexander, 1985, pp. 376-377).

It would appear that Savage's praise of incarceration touched too closely on Johnson's own preoccupation with padlocks and fetters, and with what his beloved friend, Hester Thrale, called his penchant for allowing "his fancy to dwell on confinement and severity" (Balderston, 1949, p. 7), to allow him to give Savage's sentiments proper perspective and understanding. All biography, it has been claimed, is autobiography. Whether Boswell would have concurred is conjectural, for he professed to describe Johnson "as he really was," and sought to write, "not his panegyrick, which must be all praise, but his life, which, great and good as he was, must not be supposed to be entirely perfect" (Boswell, 1791, p. 22). When, following the publication of his great *Life of Johnson*, he was chided for his failure "to soften his portrayal of the asperities of our virtuous and most revered friend," he retorted that he would not "cut off his claws, nor make a tiger (into) a cat to please anybody" (Pachter, 1979, p. 3). Though he was determined to tell nothing but the truth, he believed that the whole truth is not always to be exposed. Granted that such a show of tact and loyalty toward a friend is most commendable, there were occasions when his attitude toward both issues was somewhat more flexible.

It has been noted, for example, that while he was vigorously denying that Johnson's estimation of other poets, such as Thomas Gray, had been actuated by envy, the body of Boswell's biography is filled with detailed accounts displaying Johnson's intense competitiveness and his insistent need to have the upper hand (Lichtenberg, 1978, p. 48).

A more subtle example of this artful technique of revealing supposedly unsavory traits in Johnson's character or behavior may be discovered in Boswell's account of the celebrated tour of the Hebrides he undertook with Dr. Johnson in 1773. Tucked away in a quasi appendix, entitled "Corrections and Additions," was Boswell's discussion of one of Johnson's "particularities" which he claimed he had been unable to explain, namely, that Johnson never wore a night cap, but kept a handkerchief on his head during the night. Evidently this practice was quite vexing to Boswell, since he had already mentioned it several times in

the main body of the book. Not until he composed the "Corrections and Additions," however, did he provide the added details that might make Johnson's behavior far less of a mystery, for now, for the first time, he mentioned that Johnson had been seen washing his handkerchief. A servant, moreover, reported that Johnson would never give out his handkerchiefs to wash, but always washed and dried them himself (Boswell, 1773, p. 433).

Now it requires no great powers of detection to conclude that this "particularity" was prompted by Johnson's need to conceal any trace of masturbation, a subject that was evidently a source of great guilt and suffering. At the same time it seems odd that the sexually sophisticated Boswell was truly mystified by his friend's strange nighttime habits. Could it be that Boswell slyly tossed this little vignette into his narrative, leaving it to the attentive reader to decipher it?

Ironically, Johnson asserted that "more of a man's character may be gained by a short communication with one of his servants than from a formal and studied narrative begun with his pedigree and ended with his funeral" (Boswell, 1791, p. 25).

Johnson's observations anticipate Strachey's proposal for a new and "subtler" strategy for the writing of biography. In place of the time-honored tradition in which the narration of a life is spread out "in two fat volumes with which it is our custom to commemorate the dead" (an image recalling the bulky but often shallow anamneses of mental hospital records), Strachey (1918, p. v) proposed that the explorer of the past should "row out over that great ocean of material and lower down into it, here and there, a little bucket, which will bring up to the light of day some characteristic specimens from those depths, to be examined with curiosity."

It is not surprising that Freud was enthusiastic about Strachey's writing, declaring that he considered his book, *Elizabeth and Essex*, to be an exemplar of the psychoanalytic method as applied to biography (Edel, 1979, p. 228). Indeed Strachey's proposal for collecting random biographic specimens resembles

the method employed by Freud in his study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910), in which the exploration of an infantile memory of the artist served as an epitome of Strachey's "little bucket." A more recent example has been provided by Baudry (1979) in a study of *Madame Bovary*, in which, seizing upon an isolated and seemingly minor episode in the novel, Baudry has uncovered subtle insights pertaining both to the fictional world and to the life of Flaubert himself.

Despite his eager endorsement of Strachey's work, Freud, like Strachey, had misgivings about the attainment of biographical truth. Anyone turning biographer, he wrote to Arnold Zweig, "commits himself to lies, to concealments, to hypocrisy, to flattery, and even to hiding his own lack of understanding, for biographical truth is not to be had, and even if it were, it couldn't be used" (Freud, 1936, p. 430). The words are familiar, recalling Johnson's warning that the biographer may be tempted to conceal, if not invent.

The enduring consistency of these opinions ranging over the span of the last two hundred years does not encourage the expectation that the problem of transference in biography is about to change, although in some quarters there has been a suggestion of how this might happen. In search for what Erikson (1975, p. 25) has called "disciplined subjectivity," Mack (1977) has proposed that only through the attainment of self-knowledge, as by undergoing psychoanalysis, can the biographer "appropriately handle exaggerated idealization, devaluation, and other distortions of the subject's personality, psychology and life" (p. 32). Ironically, this recommendation from the author of the idolatrous life of T. E. Lawrence carries a hollow sound. Like other paths, the royal road to the unconscious is paved with good intentions, and while it is not unreasonable to assume that a personal psychoanalysis may heighten the biographer's sense of awareness or provide him with a keener sensitivity to meaningful psychological details as well as to his own bias, it is surely overly optimistic to view psychoanalysis as a sort of mental vaccination guaranteed to ward off the

perilous influence of transference. Even the most thoroughly analyzed person is subject to self-deception (Moraitis, 1985, p. 324).

Yet beyond the distortions and inaccuracies fostered by acknowledged personal partiality, or by the relatively unconscious play of transference, there are perplexing instances in which, for no readily discernible reasons, the analytically sophisticated biographer scuttles his habitual methods and ventures boldly into the treacherous currents of speculation. I propose to offer, as an example, some observations on the chapters dealing with Carl Gustav Jung in John Gedo's recent work, *Portraits of the Artist* (1983).

Learned, and endowed with impressive literacy both in psychoanalysis and in the humanities, Gedo in this work has set out to illumine, with the insights of modern depth psychology, a rich gallery of creative figures, drawn both from his clinical practice and from the pages of art history. Moreover, the work is refreshingly devoid of analytic jargon, nor is it weighed down by restricting formulas or reductionistic theory.

In light of these attributes it is puzzling why, in the final third of the book, focused mainly on Jung and on the vicissitudes of his relationship with Freud, the author appears to have abandoned some key psychoanalytic methods. The careful documentation reflected in the earlier pages makes it all the more surprising to discover his seemingly uncritical reliance on Jung's "autobiography," a work written when Jung was in his eighties which was published in English in 1961 under the title, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. In referring to the work as his "personal myth," Jung warned the reader not to ask whether his "stories" were true. "The only question," he wrote, "is whether what I tell is *my* fable, *my* truth" (p. 3). As if indifferent to this caution, Gedo appears surprisingly credulous when dealing with Jung's autobiographic writings, especially his dreams, which, recorded many decades after their presumed occurrence, and dated with remarkable precision, appear to have been subjected to elaborate revisions. Packed with unbelievable

detail and endowed with mystical, hortatory, and quasi-prophetic significance, they read less like dreams than movie scripts, or better still, like the librettos of grand opera, notably the *Nibelungen Ring* of Richard Wagner. A striking example is the so-called Siegfried dream, which, half a century later, Jung claimed had occurred on the 18th of December, 1913, to the very day:

> I was with an unknown, brown-skinned man, a savage, in a lonely, rocky mountain landscape. It was before dawn; the eastern sky was already bright, and the stars fading. Then I heard Siegfried's horn sounding over the mountains and I knew we had to kill him. . . . Then Siegfried appeared on a chariot made of the bones of the dead . . . when he turned a corner we shot at him, and he plunged down, struck dead (p. 180).

Although in his book Jung did not overtly connect this dream with his problems with Freud, Gedo has not hesitated to do so, pointing out that the alleged date of the dream was on the first anniversary of the crucial letter Jung has written to Freud on December 18, 1912 (McGuire, 1974, p. 534-535), a letter which presumably led to the final rupture of further contact between them. The author advanced additional support for his hypothesis in noting the similarities between the names of the Wagnerian character *Siegmund*, the father of the hero *Siegfried*, and that of *Sigmund* Freud. On the basis of these clues, Gedo concluded that the Siegfried of the dream represented that part of Jung that he wished to abandon, and that the dream "expressed his desperate wish to transcend his longing for Freud" (Gedo, 1983, p. 261).

I concur with Walter Kaufmann (1980) that "at this remove" one cannot be sure about *the* meaning of this dream, nor can one assume that this or any other dream has but a single meaning (pp. 359-360). Yet, in search of a quasi day residue, and perplexed by the remarkable precision of Jung's recollection of dates, I wrote to Aniela Jaffé, Jung's editor and collabo-

rator in Zurich, inquiring by what means Jung had established them with such confidence. She replied that his memory for details was "only approximate." As for the December 18th date of the Siegfried dream, she said that when he mentioned it originally at a seminar in 1925, he claimed it had occurred in November (personal communication). This correction, to be sure, does not invalidate Gedo's opinion that the anniversary of the fateful letter to Freud continued to exert a strong influence on Jung's mind, but whether it lends further support to his interpretation is another matter.[2]

In contrast, and of greater significance, I believe, is Gedo's seeming inattention to the known context of the more proximate "day residue"—the setting in which the dream arose—an element in dream interpretation to which analysts are habitually alert. In the case of the Siegfried dream, such a "day residue" is not far to seek.

In September 1913, a few short weeks before the presumed date of the "Siegfried" dream, an event occurred which could not have lacked importance to Jung: Sabina Spielrein, a former Burghölzli patient with whom he had been deeply entangled emotionally over a number of years, gave birth to a baby girl. In her correspondence with Jung, recorded by Aldo Carotenuto (1982), and which continued long after her marriage in the summer of 1912, she made recurring allusions to her fantasy that together she and Jung would beget a child who would bear the name *Siegfried*.

Nor did she restrict this name to the child she hoped to bear. With no less enthusiasm, she applied it to a scientific paper which she, now having become a psychiatrist under Jung's sponsorship, submitted for publication in the *Jahrbuch* of which he was the editor. "Receive now," she wrote, "the product of our love, the project which is your little son Siegfried. It caused me tremendous difficulty, but nothing was too hard if it was done

[2] For what it may be worth, it has been noted that Freud's father was born on *December 18*, 1815, a claim that Krüll (1979, pp. 88, 254) states is in dispute.

for Siegfried . . ." (Carotenuto, 1982, p. 48, probably early 1912).

Like a man confronted by an unforeseen attribution of paternity, Jung responded with distinctly mixed attitudes toward this out-of-wedlock manuscript. For while he told the new mother that he found her creation filled "with excellent ideas [as well as] extraordinarily intelligent," his comments to Freud about the paper were far less enthusiastic. He complained that Sabina had read too little, that the paper was not thorough enough, and "was heavily overweighted with her own complexes" (p. 183). A hint that his contradictory opinions about Sabina and her literary baby may have been rooted in his own complexes, garnished with more than a generous sprinkling of misogyny, is suggested by a quotation from Horace that he appended to his communication to Freud:

> What at the top is a lovely woman
> Ends below in a fish (p. 183),

a sentiment that suggests that Jung, too, may have entertained some regrets as to how a woman "ends below."

There are other indications, moreover, that in the course of time Jung had become somewhat fed up with Sabina and her Siegfried mania. In a letter to Freud, 10 June 1909, in which she had complained of a number of unpleasant expressions that Jung had flung at her from time to time, there was one in particular that she found especially galling: "Let Siegfried fall!" (p. 92), a toned down version, it may be suspected, of "Let him drop dead," an image that serves as a vivid anticipation of the manifest content of Jung's celebrated dream of 1913.

Heard against the harsh strains of this *symphonia domestica*, Jung's Siegfried dream resounds with something less heroic than Wagnerian grandeur and conveys instead a hint of murderous aggression, directed at some well-concealed target. In this connection it should be noted that during the same year of Sabina's accouchement, Jung's wife Emma was pregnant with their fifth child (Brome, 1978, p. 169), a circumstance which,

together with the birth of Sabina's "Siegfried" and the painful break with Freud, may have contributed to the psychic upheaval that befell Jung toward the end of that year.[3]

That the advent of pregnancy and birth was capable of stirring up unhappy memories of his distant past is strongly implied in the opening pages of Jung's "autobiography." When he was nine years old, his mother gave birth to a daughter, prompting him to state that "once again she had done something I was supposed not to know about." Although he did not go on to explain what he meant by "once again," he added that "subsequent odd reactions on the part of my mother confirmed my suspicions that something regrettable was connected with this birth" (Jung, 1961, p. 25). Whether he questioned his sister's legitimacy is problematical; suffice it to say that in the course of his memoir she is rarely mentioned, and never by name. As for his mother, she is recalled as a "strange and mysterious" being who was hospitalized for a mental disorder sometime between his third and fourth year.

The history of his mother's mental illness may be relevant to Jung's emotional life with Sabina Spielrein. It should also be noted that she was not the only young female patient at the Burghölzli who subsequently became his mistress, and later his protégée. For Sabina was succeeded and evidently upstaged, by an even younger woman, Toni Wolff, who, beginning in 1909, pursued a similar path (McGuire, 1982, p. viii). Hailed as Jung's "supreme anima figure" (*ibid.*), by the fall of 1911 she was a participant at the Weimar Psychoanalytic Congress where, like Emma Jung, she may be discovered sitting in the first row of the group photograph, in which, however, there is no sign of Sabina Spielrein, whose absence was explained by some "psychosomatic pretext" (Carotenuto, 1982, p. xxxiv).

Despite the paucity of confirmatory data, it is tempting to

[3] "One tries every conceivable trick to stem the tide of these little blessings," he wrote to Freud, on 18 May 1911. "One scrapes along, one might say, from one menstruation to the next" (McGuire, 1974, pp. 423, 425).

view Jung's behavior toward these young women as the enactment of a rescue fantasy, rooted perhaps, as is often the case, in a troubled relationship with the mother. Their transformation from mental patient to psychotherapist may have echoed a fantasy of curing his mother of her psychiatric condition.

This conjecture is echoed in Morris West's recent novel, *The World Is Made of Glass* (1983), a fictional elaboration of a clinical vignette mentioned by Jung in his "autobiography." In the novel Jung's patient, a wealthy and beautiful courtesan bearing the appropriate name Magda, makes an unsuccessful attempt to seduce him. After a brief but intense therapeutic encounter, she undergoes a moral regeneration, and in the end, retires to a hospice where, renamed "Sister Mary of the Angels," she dedicates herself to the nursing and redemption of fallen women. Incidentally, depicted earlier as a physician, a breeder of race horses, and an accomplished equestrienne who plots the fatal accident befalling her rival while they are negotiating a difficult jump, Magda is portrayed as the epitome of the phallic woman.

Whether the fictional rendering of biography has heuristic value is debatable. In this case the close correspondence between the novelist's fantasy and my own construction bids me to say:

> *Si non e vero*
> *E molto ben trovato.*
> (If not true
> It is at least a happy invention.)

In contrast to West's sexy story, but like Jung's "autobiography," Gedo's hundred or so pages devoted to Jung are singularly devoid of references to women and to love. It is indeed this similarity of focus of Jung's "memoir" and Gedo's biographical study that may account for the latter's eccentric methodology. Both are drawn to a similar selection and exclusion of material; both approach the subject of dream interpretation in a free-wheeling, revelatory fashion. Indeed, at one point in his discus-

sion of the Siegfried dream, Gedo elaborated Jung's account with a detail of his own invention.

Six days prior to that dream, on December 12, 1913, Jung wrote, he had had a vision of the corpse of a blond youth, bearing a wound in the head, who floated by (Jung, 1961, p. 179). Although Jung failed to identify the youth by name, Gedo unhesitatingly called him Siegfried, as if he himself were a co-author of Jung's vision, and hence at liberty to elaborate it (Gedo, 1983, p. 261).

I have dwelled on these aspects of Gedo's writings on Jung, not to challenge the validity of his interpretations—some of which I do indeed question—but to draw attention to the seductive influence of identification in shaping the biographer's approach to his subject. "A good biography," wrote Julian Symons (1955) in the Introduction to his brother's life of Frederick Rolfe, *The Quest for Corvo*, "is prompted not by the inherent qualities of the subject, but by the biographer's consciously or unconsciously realized opportunity for self-expression. Johnson is in some sort the creation of Boswell as Richard Savage was the creation of Johnson. . . . The features in a biography are all distinct enough, and they are recognizably the features of the subject, but the hunted eyes and hunting nose, the wafer-thin mouth and the rocky chin are the biographer's own" (p. 1). Another writer has referred to the "mysterious alchemy" that takes place between the biographer and his subject (Lebeaux, 1985, p. 225), an alchemy that I have named "secret sharing," an aspect of the creative process to which I will now turn.

DUETS

Borrowed from the title of a short story by Joseph Conrad, the concept of "secret sharer" refers to the important and often seminal role played by the seen or unseen influence of another individual in an artist's life. In the case of Conrad there is

reason to believe that the period of his greatest artistic achievement, 1900-1910, coincided roughly with the years of his intimate friendship with Ford Madox Hueffer (Ford), and that the deterioration of that relationship was accompanied by a phase in his creative work which is generally ranked as relatively inferior Conrad (Meyer, 1967, p. 166). One may discern a similar pattern in Freud's relationship with Jung, who, like Hueffer, was much the younger member of the pair. Just as the latter proposed ideas for fictional plots, rewrote certain sections of the novels, and held long discussions with Conrad about the exact word and the correct order (Hueffer, 1924), so Jung called to Freud's attention the *Memoirs* of Daniel Paul Schreber which led to the writing of Freud's classic paper. "As Freud gradually mastered his affective need for Jung as an extension of himself," wrote Gedo (1983), "he was able to turn his attention to the task of illuminating the genesis of paranoia. On this level, Jung was capable, in mid-1910, of serving as a secret sharer" (p. 240).

At an earlier moment in Freud's career, a somewhat similar role had been played by Wilhelm Fliess, his "comrade in crime," Freud called him (Krüll, 1979, p. 31). In the flush of enthusiasm over the burgeoning of his ideas, Freud wrote to Fliess, "If I could talk to you about nothing else for 48 hours on end the thing could probably be finished," and at the close of the letter he added, as if he were addressing a prospective father, "You will not have any objections to my naming my next son Wilhelm" (Coen, 1985, p. 395). Indeed, as Erikson (1975) noted, "With Fliess Freud could institute that relationship of bipolarization which many creative men need in order to have the courage of their own originality" (p. 56).

The play of secret sharing is a common feature in the history of creativity. Reminiscent of Hueffer's influence on Conrad is the history of the book, *Madame Bovary*. The idea of the story was suggested by Flaubert's friend, Louis Bouilhet, in whose company the novel slowly took shape. Together, wrote Flaubert's biographer, Steegmuller (1939), "they read over sen-

tences, dozens, even hundreds of times; and then, when each sentence seemed right, they read over the paragraphs into which they were combined" (p. 283). Some notion of how this protracted parturition affected those about him may be gauged by the complaint of Flaubert's mother: "Your mania for sentences has dried up your heart" (Barnes, 1985, p. 156). Nor was their sharing entirely secret or confined to literature. In letters to Bouilhet recounting his adventures in Egypt, Flaubert insisted that in encounters with prostitutes his friend was always present (Steegmuller, 1972).

The role of sublimated homosexuality in creativity—at least in males—wrote Glynn (1977), "is a psychoanalytic idea with a long history: the artist, seized by inspiration, surrenders to overwhelming forces, is pregnant with his work, gives birth to his creation after the agonies of labor, views his works as his children, and so forth" (p. 32). E. M. Forster claimed that the spark for the writing of his novel, *Maurice*, was ignited one day in 1913 when his lover "gently touched his backside, an act that caused the novelist to imagine that at that precise moment he had conceived" (Meyers, 1977, p. 106).

A subtler depiction of literary impregnation was conveyed by Herman Melville's account of the seminal influence exerted on him by Nathaniel Hawthorne. In an unsigned review of the latter's *Mosses from an Old Manse*, Melville, posing as "a Virginian spending the month of July in Vermont" (Miller, 1975, p. 31), wrote, "Already I feel that this Hawthorne has dropped germinous seeds into my soul. He expands and deepens down, the more I contemplate him; and further and further shoots his strong New England roots into the hot soil of my Southern soul" (p. 32). The secret sharing of these two American writers was to play a crucial role in the writing of *Moby Dick*.

The final draft of this novel was composed after the author's eventful meeting with Hawthorne on August 5, 1850, at a picnic at Monument Mountain in the Berkshires, not far from today's Tanglewood Music Festival. An idolator who basked in the aura cast by Hawthorne, Melville now rewrote and revised

his novel, and what had originally been conceived as a simple whaling story became transformed into that strange and tragic apocalyptic drama (Arvin, 1950) that has been hailed by Lewis Mumford (1929) as "one of the first great mythologies to be created in the modern world" (p. 193).

And yet, like other examples of secret sharing, this relationship that began in August 1850 with so undisguised a show of warmth and enthusiasm came to an abrupt termination in November of the following year, when Hawthorne left the Berkshires and moved to West Newton, a town located at virtually the opposite end of the state of Massachusetts. Four days before his departure Melville wrote a long and poignant letter of farewell to his friend, who, he felt, was abandoning him—a message replete with melancholy and oral imagery: "Whence come you Hawthorne? By what right do you drink from my flagon of life? And when I put it to my lips—lo, they are yours and not mine. I feel that the godhead is broken up, like the bread at the Supper, and that we are the pieces" (Miller, 1975, p. 221). As if to insure the parent-child configuration of the relationship—Hawthorne was his senior by fifteen years—Melville addressed his friend with the formal "My dear Hawthorne," but he signed the letter "Herman."

Whether he had become alarmed by such threats of intimacy, or whether other motives were involved, Hawthorne, who, in the previous year had been impatient to settle down in his red farm house in Lenox, now began to declare his aversion to the Berkshires, which he now "hated with all his soul and would joyfully see the mountains laid flat . . . here where I hoped for perfect health, I have, for the first time been made sensible that I cannot with impunity encounter Nature with all her moods" (Miller, 1975, p. 245).

There was another occurrence at the time of Hawthorne's departure that may have contributed to the "damp and drizzly November" in Melville's soul. On October 22, a month before Hawthorne's exodus from Lenox, Melville's wife, Elizabeth, gave birth to their second son. How relevant this event may

have been to his own distant past—for Herman was himself the second male Melville child—is hinted by a stunning error he made in filling out the birth certificate. Where he was required to set down the name of the baby's mother, he had inadvertently inscribed not Elizabeth, his wife, but Maria Gansevoort Melville, the name of his own mother (p. 220).

Melville's melancholy under these circumstances is reminiscent of a chapter in the lives of two other literary figures, Coleridge and Wordsworth, whose creation of *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* may surely be regarded as an example of secret sharing. In a scholarly and sensitive essay, Beres (1951) showed how this single poem, jointly conceived, served to convey the emotional needs of each contributor. Of the relationship between them, perhaps the most compelling evidence is a poem, "Dejection, An Ode," written by Coleridge on the occasion of Wordsworth's marriage:

> A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,
> A stifled, drowsy unimpassioned grief,
> Which finds no natural outlet, no relief
> In word, or sigh, or tear—(Beres, 1951, p. 114).

The denouement of these relationships recalls the unhappy fate that has befallen a number of secret sharers. In a work entitled *The Fine Art of Literary Mayhem*, Myrick Land (1963) has written a lively and informative account of the dramatic reversals, the transformation of admiration into hostility, of friendship into feuding, of subservience into contempt, that has characterized the relationship of many pairs of creative figures. Nor is such tergiversation limited to the domain of literature. In a vitriolic book, *The Unmasking of Robert-Houdin*, Houdini denounced the celebrated French magician, Eugène Robert-Houdin, from whom the famous escape artist took his name. Especially ironic was the dedication of Houdini's book to his own father, Rabbi Mayer Samuel Weiss, whom he credited with the degrees of Ph.D. and LLD, neither of which he possessed, nor is there any firm evidence that he had ever been formally

ordained as a rabbi. Thus while Houdini was casting his spiritual father into the mire, poetic and psychological justice bade him rescue his true father from obscurity, raise him to a lofty pedestal, and there deck him out with titles and honors he had never won (Meyer, 1976, pp. 21-23).

Echoes of the quasi-oedipal components in Houdini's *volta face* toward the idol of his youth may be heard in Jung's angry outburst in the celebrated letter to Freud of December 18, 1912, in which the young disciple, who, but a few years earlier, had begged that their relationship be not as one between equals, but as one between father and son (see McGuire, 1974, p. 122-124), now accused his mentor of treating his pupils as "slavish sons or impudent puppies. Meanwhile you remain on top," he continued, "as the father, sitting pretty" (McGuire, 1974, p. 534-535). Who, indeed, was "on top" was evidently a nagging issue for Jung. Writing fifty years later about an occasion when Freud fainted in his presence, Jung described how he had come to the rescue, a role he evidently fancied. "As I was carrying him," he recalled, "he half came to, and I shall never forget the look he cast at me," to which he added the gratuitous and probably wishfully inspired observation, "In his weakness he looked at me as if I were his father" (Jung, 1961, p. 157).

> Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought:
> I stay too long by thee, I weary thee.
> Dost thou so hunger for mine empty chair
> That thou wilt needs invest thee with mine honours
> Before thy hour be ripe? (*Henry IV, Part II*, IV, v, 91-95).

The ultimate fate of the alliance I have termed secret sharing will hinge upon a number of components residing in the conscious or unconscious significance of the relationship, upon the emotional needs of the participants, and the capacity of each to adapt to new developments during the passage of time. What has begun, say, as the legacy of a fruitful and mutually satisfying parent-child configuration may not be able to withstand

the stresses imposed by the growing competence or threatening success of the minor partner, whose autonomy may be viewed as a repudiation of the unwritten rules that governed the partnership from the start.

Yet when Louis Bouilhet died, Flaubert lamented that he felt "as if I had buried a part of myself" (Steegmuller, 1939, p. 405). This sense of oneness attained an almost eerie vividness during the final years of Bouilhet's life, when he was said to have developed so astonishing a resemblance to Flaubert that, together with their mutual devotion, it gave rise to the rumor that the former was the illegitimate child of Flaubert's father. The image anticipates the language of Conrad's Secret Sharer, the Captain, who on first encountering his double, remarks, "It was in the night, as though I had been faced by my own reflection in the depths of a somber and immense mirror" (Conrad, 1909, p. 125). When the two are separated, the Captain declares, "Part of me is absent" (p. 101).

> Property was thus appall'd,
> That the self was not the same;
> Single nature's double name,
> Neither two nor one was call'd.
>
> Reason, in itself confounded,
> Saw division grow together;
> To themselves yet either neither,
> Simple were so well compounded,
>
> That it cried, 'How true a twain
> Seemeth this discordant one!
> Love hath reason, reason none,
> If what parts can so remain (Shakespeare: *The Phoenix and the Turtle*).

In the Introduction to Marie Bonaparte's *Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, Freud (1933) wrote that such studies "are not intended to explain an author's genius, but they show what motive forces aroused it and what material was offered to him by

destiny" (p. 254). Thus, while it may be foolish to attempt to account for the phenomenon called Mozart, surely it is not foolish to recognize the role of secret sharer played by his father, Leopold, nor is it unreasonable to explore those psychological forces that may have determined the vicissitudes of his rich creative life. There may be less truth than poetry in the legend that he composed the celebrated *Requiem* in anticipation of his impending death, writing in a frenzy night and day to complete it before the arrival of the "mysterious stranger," who had commissioned the work. More credible is the claim that two particularly poignant works[4] were expressions of the mood engendered by the death of his mother that took place at the time of their composition in Paris in the summer of 1778. Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that the threat of death or disaster has often played a catalytic role in stimulating the creative process.

REQUIEMS

When, during the spring of 1926, in the throes of adolescence, I had fallen under the spell of Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables* and his *Last Day of a Condemned Man*, and was caught up by such burning issues as crime, redemption, and the morality of capital punishment, it is not surprising that I was emotionally stirred by the dramatic story of Gerald Chapman, a hardened criminal and cop killer who was then in prison in Wethersfield, Connecticut, awaiting his execution by hanging. What stirred my youthful imagination concerning this notorious malefactor, who had spent more than a third of his life behind bars—clearly he was no Jean Valjean—was not merely his colorful career in crime, his daring exploits, and ingenious escapes from the arm of the law. Nor could I have remained indifferent to the precipitous plunge of the fortunes of this man, known in

[4] The *E Minor Sonata for Violin and Piano* and the *A Minor Sonata for Piano*.

some New York circles as "The Count of Gramercy Park" (Alcorn, 1955). For now the entire estate of this former bon vivant, this one-time possessor of valuable oriental rugs, costly rings and watches, precious jewelry, expensive furs, and innumerable pairs of silk stockings, had been reduced to two collar buttons. No, beyond all of this, what touched my then impressionable mind was the report that, while awaiting his death, Chapman had been writing poetry, some of which was published at the time in the daily papers. In his cell his most prized possession, it was said, was a book of synonyms.

Recently, more than fifty years later, I looked up those poems in the files of the newspapers of that distant day. Although his verses do not rank with high art, nor can they compare with *The Ballad of Reading Gaol*, they deserve attention, not merely because of the unusual auspices that witnessed their creation, but because of their very content:

> Comes peace at last! The drums have beat disray.
> No armistice of hours, but ever and ever,
> The slow dispersing legions of decay.
> Under the muffled skies, tell all is over
>
> Returns the husbandman, returns the lover
> To reap the quiet harvest of Alway,
> The bright-plumed stars whose wide fields may not cover
> Though wings beat on forever and a day.
>
> Moves thus the unquickening, the marshalled powers,
> Far swifter from the gathering than they came
> Through doubtful wars, for an uncertain fame
> Forgotten now the toil of thundering hours.
> What plotting thrones have given their faithful this!
> The poor reward that was already his (*New York Times*, March 5, 1926).

Whether Chapman was given to versifying in his salad days, I do not know. In fact, according to one biographer, Chapman

was not even the true author of the poems (personal communication, R. N. Alcorn). Be that as it may, Chapman, or someone in his stead, was moved to salute the inexorable approach of death with a gesture of creativity. In the face of this antinomy, it is interesting to note the recurring allusions to the passing of time and to the cessation of strife. There are hints of an inner tranquility and of a kinship between his poetic efforts and the condition of pregnancy. "One can't conceive in futility," he wrote to his counsel, "and expect to realize a quickened creation" (*New York Times*, March 5, 1926).

How often a creative urge besieges those condemned to die I do not know. Charles Guiteau, the man who assassinated President Garfield, on July 2, 1881, also wrote verses while awaiting his execution, which took place about a year later. Rambling and revivalist in character, his poems have a childlike nature that he himself acknowledged when he stated that "the idea of them is that of a child babbling to his mama and papa." If set to music, he supposed they "may be rendered effective":

> I am going to the Lordy
> Glory Halleluja! Glory Halleluja!
> I'm going to the Lordy
> I guess that I will weep no more
> When I get to the Lordy [etc.] (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 236).

It had been Guiteau's original intention to read his verses on the scaffold, in preparation for which he had his shoes shined. Somewhat earlier he had asked to be vaccinated in order to protect him from being infected by the letters that were being sent to him in prison (Rosenberg, 1968). "I suppose a fellow proposing to cut his throat," observes Conrad's (1913) narrator, Marlow, "would experience a sort of relief while occupied in stropping his razor carefully"—an activity which Marlow believes might provide a means of warding off "reflection, fears and doubts" (p. 340). More precisely, I suspect, what Marlow hopes to ward off is the prospect of disintegration, be it physical

or psychological, in the shape of madness. That creativity may serve such a purpose was eloquently expressed by Tennessee Williams, who wrote, "To me it was providential to be an artist, a great act of providence that I was able to turn my borderline psychosis into creativity—my sister Rose did not manage this—she had a lobotomy" (*New York Times*, March 6, 1983).

There are abundant examples of such "acts of Providence." Art, it would seem, may triumph over death, and like the Taj Mahal, that architectural poem enveloping the dusty bones of an oriental princess, may serve as a denial of the pain and finality of corporeal death and as an affirmation of the enduring vitality of the human spirit. Freud ascribed what he considered his most important writing, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, to the recent death of his father, "the most important event," he said, "the most poignant loss, of a man's life" (1900, p. xxvi).

No less illustrative of the impact of bereavement on creativity is the history of Alfred Wallis, an elderly gentleman whose primitive paintings were discovered by the artist Ben Nicholson (1977) on a visit to the fishing village of St. Ives in Cornwall in 1928. Completely untaught, Wallis had begun to paint for the first time after reaching the age of seventy, in order to drive away the feelings of loneliness he suffered from the death of his wife—"for company," he said. "Death haunts the creations of many artists in dramatic overdetermination," observed Niederland (1976, p. 204), who cited a pertinent comment by the poet W. H. Auden: "Art is our chief means of breaking bread with the dead." An awareness that breaking bread is etymologically related to the word *company*, derived from the Latin *cum* and *panis*, emphasizes the appropriateness of Auden's words to the story of Alfred Wallis.

Thus for the artist, creativity may become a "desperate necessity," wrote Glynn (1977), "solacing, restoring, shoring up, yet only temporary in the relief it brings. The wounds that lie at the root of art are early, hidden, and incurable . . . for the artist remains uncured, a situation much to the world's advantage, since the spur to artistic creativity is likely to be permanent. Art

is not therapy; if it were, artists would cure themselves into sterility" (p. 30). If, like the phoenix, art arises from the ashes of defect and misfortune, a repair of these liabilities might be expected to sow disorder and discord before the muse. Indeed, something akin to that may be discerned in the strange case of the celebrated eighteenth century Viennese musician, Maria Theresia von Paradis. Blind since the age of three or so, she became an accomplished pianist, organist, singer, composer, and teacher, for whom both Salieri and Mozart wrote concertos. Although no organic cause for her condition could be found, efforts to treat her mysterious blindness proved unavailing until late in her teens, in 1777, when she came under the care of Dr. Anton Mesmer. Now, using his method called "animal magnetism," he restored her vision, and for the next two years she could see. Yet this extraordinary cure was not an unalloyed blessing, for after she regained her sight, her playing deteriorated and she became depressed. "Why am I less happy than I used to be?" she asked. "Every new thing I see causes me an unpleasant sensation. I was far more peaceful in my mind when I was sightless." (Ulrich, 1946, p. 230). Now, too, her popular appeal as a blind pianist was in jeopardy, and her parents, viewing with alarm the possible loss of financial security as well as the patronage of the Empress, the girl's godmother, sought to break up her relationship with Dr. Mesmer. Violent scenes ensued, and finally the parents prevailed. Dr. Mesmer was sent packing, and, as if in anticipation of the fate of Freud a century later, he was denounced by his medical colleagues. Now Maria Theresia regained her seemingly precious blindness and with it her former assurance at the keyboard.

How ephemeral may be the relief afforded by the creative act is reflected by the state of melancholy that frequently follows the completion of a work, a condition that may be named "post-artem depression." After *The Interpretation of Dreams* had been sent to the printer, Freud wrote to Fliess, "You describe very aptly the painful feeling of parting with something that has been your very own. . . . In my case it must have been even

more painful because what separated itself was not ideational possessions but my very own feelings" (Krüll, 1979, p. 67). Similarly, after he had concluded the writing of *Hadrian the Seventh*, Frederick Rolfe wrote, "At present, I am undergoing the depression which always follows publication . . . a piece of ME has been taken from me. I have the limpness of a brand new mother. After the usual interval Nature will enable me to replace what I have exuded" (A. J. A. Symons, 1955, p. 157).

Here it may be suspected that the generation of art serves as a reaffirmation of the self, a token of reunion with a long-lost object, a breaking of bread, as it were, with the parents who are so often lost early in the artist's life (Kanzer, 1953, p. 151). Perhaps, too, this may account for the ultimate genesis of the writing of biography, an act in which the writer reaches out to establish renewed contact with his secret sharer.

So far, I have failed to address the question implied in the title of my discourse: the uses of psychoanalysis for biography. It will be noted, too, that both in the title and in the body of my paper I have avoided the term psychobiography, that ill-defined and misleading label which, like its twin-headed verbal sibling, psychohistory, has fostered the unfortunate notion that there are subspecialties in these fields. On the contrary, I propose that such a fragmentation of portraiture is neither useful nor valid, and that ideally the most faithful representation of a life is woven from several discrete strands, among which the unobtrusive but always discernible thread of an informed inquiry into the mind and thought of the subject remains an inescapable necessity. "All history," wrote Peter Gay (1985, p. x), "is in some measure psychohistory," while Erikson (1975) noted, "Such a hyphenated name usually designates an area in which nobody as yet is methodologically quite at home, but which someday will be settled and incorporated without a trace of border disputes and double names" (p. 114).

As writers of biography, we analysts possess no extraordinary qualifications. Few of us can match the literary flair, say, of an André Maurois, nor, despite the rigors of our training and our

professional experience, can many of us boast of a spotless objectivity toward the biographee. Weighed down by theory, which is itself subject to recurring revisions, and confined by a ponderous lexicon of imprecise and obscure definitions, we run the risk of being limited by a constriction of our intellectual visual fields.

Yet, despite these limitations, there is an aspect of our discipline that can prove useful both to the biographer and the historian, namely, the matter of methodology. The psychoanalyst, it has been said, is basically not one who knows, but one who asks, indeed, one who asks questions that few may have thought to ask. The psychoanalytic model may encourage the historian, faced with masses of information, to assume a posture of skepticism, an attitude of vigilance toward seemingly trifling details, inconsistencies, and parapraxes, and most important, to recognize that there are alternative explanations for human behavior to those dictated by so-called common sense, or those that have become popularized by unthinking repetition or common usage. In a word, the historian may borrow from psychoanalysis a rigorous policy of seeking to distinguish good reasons from real ones.

A recent book, entitled *Introspection in Biography* (Baron and Pletsch, 1985), presents a fruitful collaborative exchange between biographers and psychoanalysts, an undertaking that often proved mutually rewarding and that might serve as a model for further interdisciplinary cooperation. Indeed, there is just as logical a reason for the biographer to consult the psychoanalyst in order to better understand his subject's mental make-up, as it is for him to solicit a medical opinion when the biographee is afflicted with somatic illness. The failure to do either has diminished the authenticity of a number of biographical works.

FINALE

Apropos of the injunction to pay close attention, and of the belief that much of biography is autobiography, it might be won-

dered what my own repertoire of biographic subjects says about me. For, beginning with an early fascination with Gerald Chapman, and later Charles Guiteau, and continuing with Dr. Johnson's padlocks and fetters, the criminal escapades of Black Bart, the California Highwayman, the claustrophobia of Poe, and the claustrophilia of Houdini, the great escapologist, there runs a common thread, traces of which may be discovered in some of my other writings. What this signifies I must leave to my own biographer and secret sharer.

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New York, N.Y. 10021

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

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To cite this article: Nellie L. Thompson (1987) Helene Deutsch: A Life in Theory, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 317-353, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927178

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927178


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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVI, 1987

HELENE DEUTSCH: A LIFE IN THEORY

BY NELLIE L. THOMPSON, PH.D.

Evaluations of Helene Deutsch's work on female psychology almost invariably focus on her idealization of motherhood and on her attribution of narcissism, passivity, and masochism to the "feminine" woman. The author suggests that identification plays a more important role in Deutsch's portrayal of feminine development than has hitherto been acknowledged. Deutsch treats identification as a reparative process that enables women to overcome major traumata by allowing them to re-experience the initial bliss of the mother-child relationship. The biographical origins of Deutsch's theory of feminine development are explored, and an assessment offered of how her reliance on personal experience both enhanced and inhibited its explanatory power.

Helene Deutsch (1973) declares in her memoir, *Confrontations with Myself: An Epilogue*, that her writings on feminine development are an attempt to reverse Freud's dictum, "Woman does not betray her secret." In this undertaking she remains loyal to Freud's controversial view that femininity is reinforced by the female's genital constitution. Deutsch's particular contribution is an investigation into how the woman's libidinal dynamics

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The author wishes to thank Elizabeth Capelle, Sanford Gifford, Peter Loewenberg, and John L. P. Thompson for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

govern her reproductive function. She published a short book[1] and several essays on this topic between 1925 and 1933, and a more complete theory of feminine development in her classic two-volume work, *The Psychology of Women* (1945). Most assessments of her work have focused on her contention that narcissism, passivity, and masochism are the three essential traits of the feminine woman, and on her idealization of motherhood (Cavell, 1974; Greer, 1970; Wimpfheimer and Schafer, 1977). While these are certainly major elements in Deutsch's thinking, her work also depends heavily on the notion of identification as a reparative experience.

The first part of this paper provides an integrated review of Deutsch's work which seeks to do justice to this element. The second section reviews her personal history, which was itself characterized by a series of powerful identifications with others. The relationship between her personal history and her theoretical work is explored in the conclusion.

I

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Early Essays

In "The Psychology of Women in Relation to the Functions of Reproduction" (1925b), Deutsch's allegiance to Freud's views is evident in her description of feminine libidinal development: the vagina plays no part until sexual maturity, and the masculine clitoris only relinquishes its libido to the vagina after a strenuous struggle. The activity of the male phallus during coitus enables the woman to accomplish this libidinal transfor-

[1] This book, *Zur Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*, has not yet been published in English, although an excerpt has recently appeared, translated by Eric Mosbacher, with an Introduction by Paul Roazen (see, Deutsch, 1925a). Deutsch drew on this work in the articles she published in English, and in *The Psychology of Women*.

mation, which is signified by her realization that the vagina is an organ of pleasure equal to the penis. The distinctiveness of Deutsch's approach emerges in her claim that the dynamic importance of coitus, parturition, and motherhood for the woman is their efficacy in helping her master primal traumata. For example, during coitus the woman identifies with the male's phallus and regards it as part of her body. Hence "the psychic significance of the sexual act lies in the repetition and mastery of the castration-trauma" (1925b, p. 409). Similarly, during coitus the vagina, through a downward displacement, takes over the mouth's sucking activity:

> In this function coitus signifies for the woman a restoring of that first relation of the human being with the outside world, in which the object is orally incorporated, introjected; that is to say, it restores that condition of perfect unity of being and harmony in which the distinction between subject and object was annulled (p. 409).

The re-establishment of the primal bliss of the mother-child dyad through the incorporation of the partner is also tantamount to a repetition and mastery of the trauma of weaning.

During coitus, the partner, an object of maternal libido through the vagina's sucking role, also becomes the object of the libido originally directed toward the father. In Deutsch's view this signifies that for women coitus ultimately represents the incorporation of the father. The latter is then transformed into the child and "retains this role in the pregnancy which occurs actually or in phantasy" (p. 410). Coitus is thus a paradigm that illustrates the difference between the male and female relationship to the object world.

> The man actively takes possession of some piece of the world and in this way attains to the bliss of the primal state. And this is the form taken by his tendencies to sublimation. In the act of incorporation passively experienced the woman introjects into herself a piece of the object-world which she then absorbs (pp. 410-411).

Pregnancy for the woman is an extension of this experience. The pregnant woman experiences the child as both a part of her own ego and as an extension of early object relations, which are the source of her first identifications. If that initial period of development was marked by intense ambivalence, the woman's body may now repel (through miscarriage) the object that has been incorporated. In normal circumstances the child in the woman's womb becomes for her the "incarnation of the ego-ideal which she set up in the past" (p. 414). Returning to her thesis that the child and the father are synonymous, Deutsch claims that this ego ideal qua child is once again built up by introjecting the father.

Disturbances enter the pregnancy for two reasons. First, via sublimation the child becomes the superego and enters into opposition to the ego; and second, because the child is also an object belonging to the outside world, it stirs up in the mother the ambivalent conflicts she has experienced in her own libidinal development. Women react differently to these tensions, but feelings of ambivalence toward the child result from them. Parturition is the final outcome of the ongoing struggle:

> Every hostile impulse which has already been mobilized during pregnancy reaches its greatest intensity in this decisive battle. Finally the incorporated object is successfully expelled into the outside world (p. 415).

Deutsch regards childbirth as the completion of the sexual act for the woman. It also allows her, through identification with the child, to master the trauma of her own birth. Disappointment and depression invariably follow, however, and are only vanquished by lactation, which re-establishes the unity of mother and child. The act of breast-feeding is another opportunity for the woman to annul the trauma of weaning.

Deutsch's viewpoint in this first essay is thus that the traumas of feminine development are overcome through the reparative identifications which coitus, parturition, and motherhood offer the woman. These identifications enable the woman to return,

or regress, to the period prior to the trauma, and to restore the idyllic unity of mother and child. This perspective is absent in her second essay, "The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women" (1930a), where she explores the genesis of femininity, which she links to the passive-masochistic disposition in women. She takes as her point of departure Freud's proposition that the desire for a child follows the girl's discovery of her castration, but notes a problem with it. Since the female's gratification—the child—cannot be realized until maturity, what happens to the actively directed cathexis of the clitoris in the phase when that organ ceases to be valued as the penis?

The answer, according to Deutsch, is that when a given activity is denied or inhibited by the outside world, it is deflected back onto the individual. In place of the active phallic tendencies of the girl, there arises the masochistic fantasy: "I want to be castrated."

> Analytic experience leaves no room for doubt that the little girl's first libidinal relation to her father is masochistic, and the masochistic wish in its earliest distinctively feminine phase is: 'I want to be castrated by my *father*' (1930a, p. 52, Deutsch's italics).

This turn toward masochism, marked out for the female by biological and constitutional factors, is the foundation of her femininity. The narcissistic loss of the clitoris is compensated for by the desire for a child, which is to be fulfilled through the assault linked to the fantasy of castration. The persistence of the feminine castration complex is thus explained by the fact that this complex contains not only the masculinity complex but also the infantile move toward femininity.

Although the girl's turn toward her father is the occasion for the emergence of feminine masochism, her first, infantile identification with the mother is always masochistic:

> . . . all the active birth-phantasies, whose roots lie in this identification, are of a bloody, painful character, which they retain throughout the subject's life (p. 54).

Deutsch later claims, without elaboration, that

> in the deepest experience of the relation of mother to child it is masochism in its strongest form which finds gratification in the bliss of motherhood (p. 58).

In a third essay, "Motherhood and Sexuality" (1933), Deutsch examines the impact on the female's reproductive function when the girl's unconscious response to the mother's sexual role is that the mother is "besmirched" and "soiled" by it. The girl fears that to identify with the mother will involve her in the same baseness. The co-existence of compulsions both to identify with the mother and to diverge from her makes possible a number of psychic responses. One is that the female wants to have a child, but by herself—an immaculate conception. This fantasy exonerates the mother, since it affirms that she conceived the child without recourse to a sexual relation with the father/male. In a further reaction the female, under the influence of a markedly sadistic conception of coitus which views the mother's position as one of extreme degradation, identifies with an asexual mother. She thereby allows herself to have children but denies the mother's sexual role (p. 194). Finally, there are women who deny themselves children:

> In analysis I have come to know many professional women who were able to satisfy very warm and intense maternal feelings in their work, but who were prevented from having children of their own by a repudiation of their mothers' sexuality together with their own (p. 198).

The Psychology of Women

The themes of the early articles—the surmounting of the traumas of feminine development via regression to the original unity of the mother-child relationship, the foundation of femininity in feminine masochism, and the determination of the nature of motherhood by the girl's identification with her own

mother—each found a place in *The Psychology of Women* (1945), Deutsch's final theory of feminine development.

Volume One, subtitled, *Girlhood*, explores three distinct but related topics: the psychological life of woman; the three essential traits of femininity—narcissism, passivity, masochism; and the non-feminine woman.

The psychological life of woman is treated as coterminous with her identifications. The journey toward womanhood begins in prepuberty (ages from ten to twelve) with a crucial task: the renunciation of infantile fantasy life.

> This is principally accomplished through the search for new object relationships, that is, new objects to love, to hate, and with which to be identified (Vol. 1, p. 6; see also p. 87).

The young girl's choices here depend on earlier developments. However, since the individual experiences a wide range of relationships with each parent, she has no one single consolidated idea of the mother or the father. It is therefore an error to assume that identification with the mother makes for "femininity," and identification with the father for "masculinity": each parent embodies contradictory imagoes.

> There is a beloved mother, and a hated mother; a sublime ideal mother and a disreputable sexual one; . . . one who bears children and one who kills them; . . . there is the rival, and the personification of security and protection. Similarly, there are many different fathers creating a host of possibilities for identification (Vol. 1, p. 7).

There is, however, an impulse to abandon whatever earlier identifications have been made. The girl becomes critical of her parents, although the father, whether loved or rejected, remains in the background. The female's psychological equilibrium and eventual fate depend on how successfully she detaches herself from the mother. In Deutsch's view this stage repeats the preoedipal phase, when the struggle for liberation from the mother was also the central point of the girl's psychological life.

Deutsch argues that the feminine traits of narcissism, passivity, and masochism emerge during prepuberty and adolescence. She uses case histories and examples from literature to illustrate the libidinal vicissitudes of these periods. Narcissism, which protects the individual from a heightened sense of vulnerability and fosters an increased need for self-observation, is common to both sexes in adolescence. It soon dissipates in the boy. The girl, however, experiences a conflict between her sexual tendencies, which are masochistic in character, and that part of her ego which expresses the instinct of self-preservation. Her ego, therefore, protects itself by intensifying its self-love.

Deutsch begins her observations on feminine passivity with an attempt to soften its derogatory implications for women:

> If we replace the expression "turn toward passivity" by "activity directed inward," the term "feminine passivity" acquires a more vital content, and the ideas of inactivity, emptiness, and immobility are eliminated from its connotation (Vol. 1, pp. 194-195).

Her discussion rests on three assumptions: the girl's vagina plays no role in her early sexual development; her instincts are constitutionally less active and aggressive than the boy's; and her genital organ (the clitoris) is an inadequate outlet for them. From these, Deutsch infers that the girl gives up those impulses that require an active organ and, consistently with her constitutional predisposition, makes a turn toward passivity, in which the clitoris is replaced by the vagina, a passive-receptive organ.

It is only much later, during coitus, that the girl becomes aware of her vagina. In the interim, her felt lack of both an active and a passive organ produces her genital trauma. Penis envy constitutes the rationalization of this trauma, not the trauma itself. Deutsch thus rejects as untenable the theory that makes penis envy the basis of the woman's most essential conflicts.

Feminine masochism, the third essential trait of femininity, lacks the cruelty, destructive drive, suffering, and pain inherent

in moral masochism. Like passivity, it is an outcome of the feminine constitution which turns inward the energies directed toward the outer world. Deutsch never explicitly defines feminine masochism, but concentrates on describing its emergence and its functions for the woman. In it, masochism and the exigencies of the reproductive functions are tied up in a mutually reinforcing relationship. If the woman is to be adjusted to "reality," i.e., the labor pains and the whole bloody process of birth, she requires a certain amount of masochism. At the same time, these exigencies themselves further reinforce masochistic tendencies (Vol. 1, p. 283).

Deutsch's account of the emergence of masochism in adolescence again stresses that each phase of development involves the individual in a struggle to escape old dependencies. In childhood the object world that must be given up is the mother. In this struggle the child turns to the father, who is representative of reality and the outside world in which the child wants to live as a grown-up. The resolution of this struggle in adolescence creates the climate for the emergence of feminine masochism in the girl.

While it is normal for the father to support his son's drive for independence, his support for his daughter's active impulses is governed by personal considerations. For example, the father's love for his own mother may find a gratifying sublimation in a close relationship with his daughter. Or the father may choose his daughter to inherit his spiritual values, thereby replacing the son he never had, or who was a failure. This bond often obtains with a third daughter because the father has freed himself of incestuous desires in his relationships with her older sisters. In favorable circumstances, Deutsch claims, such a strong tie between father and daughter does not endanger the girl's femininity.

Whether or not a strong relationship with the father supports the girl's active impulses, the social environment inhibits them, to varying degrees, and also rejects female aggression entirely. It does, however, offer the little girl a "bribe"—the father's love

and tenderness. Through a combination of her own weakness, environmental taboos, and, most importantly, the father's love, the little girl renounces any further intensification of her activity in general and of her aggression in particular. As a result, feminine masochism takes hold of her:

> Here we come to a development that again and again takes place in the woman: activity becomes passivity, and aggression is renounced for the sake of being loved. In this renunciation the aggressive forces that are not actively spent must find an outlet, and they do this by endowing the passive state of being loved with a masochistic character (Vol. 1, p. 257).

Concurrent with the emergence of feminine masochism there is a "normal" regression toward the mother. The conflict between attachment and detachment which previously characterized the mother-daughter relationship is now resolved into a tender and forgiving relationship which is an important prerequisite for psychological harmony in the feminine woman. In her analysis of the non-feminine woman Deutsch divided women into three categories: the feminine, the active (non-feminine), and the homosexual. The feminine woman combines harmoniously the traits of narcissism, passivity, and masochism. As a result, she possesses a heightened eroticism and a facility for identifying with a man. Such a woman is content to leave the initiative to the man and "out of her own need renounces originality, experiencing her own self through identification" (Vol. 1, p. 196). If she is gifted, she preserves her capacity for being original and productive, but rejects entering competitive struggles:

> [These women] have an extraordinary need of support when engaged in any *activity directed outward*, but are absolutely independent in such thinking and feeling as relate to their inner life, that is to say, in their *activity directed inward*. Their capacity for identification is not an expression of inner poverty, but of inner wealth (Vol. 1, p. 196, Deutsch's italics.)

The only danger to these women is masochistic subjection of their personality, which results in a loss of identity.

In the maturation of the "active" woman, aggression and active tendencies predominate. According to Deutsch the masculinity complex often conceals not a protest against but a fear of the feminine functions, especially those of reproduction. She identifies several types of "active" women, but pays most attention to the intellectual type. These women have successfully sublimated their masculinity but, nevertheless, pay a heavy price—the loss of valuable feminine qualities.

> The intellectual woman is not Autonoë the Wise One, who draws her wisdom from the deep sources of intuition, for intuition is God's gift to the feminine woman; everything relating to exploration and cognition, all the forms and kinds of human cultural aspirations that require a strictly objective approach, are with a few exceptions the domain of the masculine intellect . . . against which woman can rarely compete. . . . [T]he intellectual woman is masculinized; in her, warm, intuitive knowledge has yielded to cold unproductive thinking (Vol. 1, p. 298).

In Deutsch's explanation of the development of the masculinity complex, the girl often experiences a disturbance in the identification with the mother. "What is most ominous is not pure and simple rejection of the mother, but a conflict between rejecting and clinging to her" (Vol. 1, p. 303). But if the girl, in puberty, completely rejects identification with her mother, then the only model left for her ego ideal is the father. Since the girl's emotional personality reflects her infantile identification with the mother, a conflict arises between these two identifications. If it cannot be resolved and the motherly part is repressed, masculinity takes over. Deutsch offers an extended treatment of George Sand as "an extraordinarily clear example of the conflict between femininity and masculinity" (Vol. 1, p. 304).

In her discussion of homosexual women Deutsch distinguishes between those who display masculine traits and those whose bodily constitution is feminine. She claims that in the first category homosexuality is the product of biological processes, while in the second, which is a larger group, it is psychologically determined. This latter type is of more interest to

Deutsch. She traces its etiology to the mother-child relationship. Observing that very often homosexual women seek to recreate the gratifications of the infantile mother-child relationship in their affairs with other women, she concludes that a mother's love is a "blessing" in a woman's life. It is only when regressive elements or hatred dominate the picture, and compel the woman to seek a substitute relationship, that love for the mother manifests itself in female homosexuality.

In Volume Two of *The Psychology of Women*, subtitled *Motherhood*, Deutsch's declared aim is to investigate the nature of motherliness

> not only in the direct exercise of the reproductive function, but also as a principle radiating into all the fields of life, a principle innate in woman (Vol. 2, p. 499).

She begins with a series of definitions intended to elaborate the social, biological, and psychological context of motherliness. She then moves to examine the forms motherliness may take, and the factors that may disturb or prevent its realization. A central point here is that a woman may express her motherliness without having children. Deutsch draws a firm distinction between motherhood—"the relationship of the mother to her child as a sociologic, physiologic, and emotional whole" (Vol. 2, p. 18)—and motherliness. The latter embraces two ideas:

> (1) a definite quality of character that stamps the woman's whole personality; (2) emotional phenomena that seem to be related to the child's helplessness and need for care (Vol. 2, p. 18).

Motherliness is itself subdivided into two components, the "maternal instinct" and "maternal love." The former has a biological-chemical source and lies beyond psychology, while the latter is "the direct affective expression of the positive relationship to the child (or his substitute). Its chief characteristic is *tenderness* " (Vol. 2, p. 20, Deutsch's italics.) Whatever aggressive and sexual sensuality the woman possesses is suppressed and diverted by this central emotional expression of motherliness.

In Deutsch's view coitus represents the woman's first act of motherhood. Conversely, the sexual act is completed for her only in parturition. The sexual act, if experienced in a feminine way, assumes an immense, dramatic, and profoundly cathartic significance. Deutsch recounts how the traumas of separation (birth), weaning, and castration are overcome in coitus. Her argument that the birth trauma is only assuaged and never really overcome leads to a powerful metapsychological position:

> Anyone who has gained insight into the deepest layers of the human psyche can ascertain empirically that not only our anxieties but also all our longings and aspirations for perfection and eternity, the flight from death and the yearning for death, the torments of love and the wish for solitude, the symbols of dreams and delirious fantasies, express the idea of the original unity with the mother and the striving to restore it (Vol. 2, p. 111).

When pregnancy occurs, however, the woman is invariably beset by ambivalence because the child in her womb simultaneously represents a disturbance in her life and a promise, an optimistic experience with regard to the future. The woman's reaction to this ambivalence, and her capacity for motherhood, is a direct reflection of her relationship with her own mother. The fate of her pregnancy rests on this identification.

> The ego of the pregnant woman must find a harmonious compromise between her deeply unconscious identification with the child, which is directed towards the future, and her identification with her own mother, which is directed towards the past. Wherever one of these identifications is rejected, difficulties arise. In the first case the fetus becomes a hostile parasite, in the second the pregnant woman's capacity for motherhood is weakened by her unwillingness to accept the identification with her own mother (Vol. 2, p. 154).

To support her thesis on this fundamental point Deutsch draws on the case history of "Mrs. Smith." She was the youngest child in her family, and her birth had been a disappointment to her parents. Their only son was clearly destined to disappoint

their high ambitions for him, and they had hoped for another. Her mother told her: "It would have been better if you had never been born." Fortunately for Mrs. Smith, the environment provided her with two compensations for this maternal rejection. Her father expressed a deep and tender love for her, and a sister, who was twelve years older than herself, showered her with maternal affection. As a result of her close bond with her father, she wished to fulfill the aspirations he had originally held for his son. In this she was successful. Her father's love encouraged her femininity, thereby saving her from the dangers of the masculinity complex, despite frequent conflict between the two tendencies.

Although Mrs. Smith was filled with an almost unconscious horror at the idea of identification with her aggressive mother, the lack of this identification did not initially leave her unable to be feminine. Once pregnant, however, she needed to identify with someone in order to become a mother herself. Identification with the sister who had cared for her in childhood was ruled out because of her realization that this sister's many children were a result of her sexual submission to her husband rather than her motherliness.

Mrs. Smith's fears that she would never be a mother were intensified when she gave birth to a stillborn child one month before term. When she later discovered that she was again pregnant, her joy was mixed with deep apprehension. At this point an old friend re-entered her life. This woman's enjoyment of a tranquil and undisturbed pregnancy gave strength to Mrs. Smith: "In her full identification with her friend she . . . began to feel more hopeful" (Vol. 2, p. 155).

Both women gave birth to healthy infants, the friend's delivery being one month later than anticipated. As Mrs. Smith's psychoanalysis proceeded, she realized that the identification which enabled her to have a successful pregnancy was open to further explanation.

> This friend had a mother who was the opposite of her own. While her own mother was tall, domineering, cold, and ag-

> gressive, her friend's mother was very small and full [of] . . . maternal warmth. She spread her motherly wings both over her own loving daughter and Mrs. Smith, who was thus able to achieve motherhood by sharing in this benign mother-daughter harmony (Vol. 2, pp. 155-156).

The fate of Mrs. Smith's next pregnancy indicated, however, that the protective power of an identification with a loving mother and daughter was, in her case, momentary rather than lasting. Mrs. Smith and her friend again became pregnant, but in the third month of their concurrent pregnancies the friend announced that she and her husband were moving to another town. Mrs. Smith was panic-stricken upon hearing the news and suffered a miscarriage that same day. Although she enjoyed her child and was very motherly, she was never able to complete a second pregnancy. After her friend had failed her, she could no longer chase away the shadow of the mother she had rejected. Psychoanalytic treatment did not eradicate these difficulties.

In describing the first relations between mother and child, Deutsch pays close attention to the conflicts that may overwhelm the woman. She may, for example, experience a conflict between her motherliness and her eroticism, or between her intellectual aspirations and her maternal duties. In psychically healthy women maternal love bridges these conflicts.

> The pride in the child, his dependence upon his mother's love, the still existing identification with him, and the fantasies about his future, are compensations at the disposal of the endangered ego (Vol. 2, pp. 280-281).

If the woman's ego is weak to begin with, however, her defenses and sublimations may be particularly threatened by the demands of motherhood. She may also feel unable to produce the emotions she considers necessary for the well-being of the newborn child. Deutsch claims these women are often greatly disappointed when the birth of a child does not free them from their inner rigidity and coldness. To cover their lack of motherliness, they may seek out a motherly figure with whom to identify.

> Even then they do not have much feeling for the child, but they imitate the attitude of a loving mother so well that they themselves and the persons around them think that their motherliness is genuine. I have called such women the "as if" type (Vol. 2, p. 286).

Deutsch is referring here to her well-known article, "Some Forms of Emotional Disturbance and Their Relation to Schizophrenia," which was published in 1942. This essay traces the "as if" personality to a real loss of object cathexis which arises in individuals who are deprived of the opportunity to experience any identifications with other people in early life. As a result, they are unable to form emotional relationships with others (Deutsch, 1942, p. 265). While these individuals appear normal at first, in every respect their behavior is modeled on identification with another person, and it is this which creates the façade of normality. Further, while such persons are often intellectually gifted and intensely emotional, it soon becomes apparent to the sensitive observer that their intellectual work is devoid of originality and that their emotional responses are formalities which mask an inner emptiness. Those with the "as if" personality are typically unaware of their condition. Some individuals who suffer from this schizoid disturbance, however, comprehend that there is something deeply amiss and associate their inner disturbance with a specific situation or experience.

Deutsch continues her discussion in *The Psychology of Women* with the observation that if a woman fears her emotions toward the child will be unbearably ambivalent, or if she fears intensely for herself, then the outcome will be flight from the child and an inability to nurse. Such women often project their own aggressions onto the child. Their failure to breast-feed is not simply a stratagem adopted for self-protection: it is really designed to guard the infant against the dangers of their own aggressions. Conversely, excessive concern for the child may result and intensify the mother's devotion to her child. A loss of interest in outside sublimations follows, and a disposition to neurotic fears about the child takes hold of the woman. Deutsch

argues that if the birth of a child mobilizes a woman's destructive tendencies against the child and against her own ego, then her turning to other interests (e.g., active masculine sublimations) is a means of salvation for both her and the child. Paradoxically, these women often experience heightened creativity in their chosen field of endeavor (Vol. 2, pp. 282-283.)

In her final chapter, "The Climacterium," Deutsch maintains that mastering the psychological reactions to the cessation of the reproductive function is one of the most difficult tasks of the woman's life. The loss of the ability to bear children is accompanied by a loss of femininity. The woman's beauty and, usually, the warm, vital flow of feminine emotional life vanish. She later claims, however, that the feminine woman remains beautiful for a long time.

The climacterium is characterized by a thrust toward activity which is reminiscent of puberty. Unlike in adolescence, however, masculinity is now a rock of salvation for the woman, for an intellectual sublimation via a profession protects her against the biological trauma of menopause (Vol. 2, p. 497). Since the urge to intellectual and artistic creation and the productivity of motherhood spring from a common source, the one is capable of replacing the other. Deutsch also sees this activity as the woman's protest that she is not merely a servant of the species —"a machine for bearing children." Through her active sublimations the woman affirms that she has a higher brain and a complicated emotional life that is not restricted to motherhood.

Women preserve their motherliness, however, through their role of grandmother. Here Deutsch draws once again on the concept of identification. She describes three types of good grandmothers. For the first, being a grandmother is an extension of being a mother. Her grandchildren are experienced as her youngest children. The second experiences being a grandmother not as a continuation of her own motherhood, but "as a quite new edition of it, through identification with her daughter" (Vol. 2, p. 506). This woman can enjoy motherhood as a personal experience only through identification. The third

type is the grandmother *par excellence.* All she desires is peace and the enjoyment of her grandchildren. She has renounced everything, she does not seek repetitions in her life, and she needs no identifications.

In her closing paragraphs Deutsch asserts that whatever course a woman's life has taken, in old age she will believe that she has fulfilled herself only if she has experienced the essence of motherhood.

> The shortest road to this goal is that of direct biologic function. But woman can also make enormous contributions in the social, artistic, and scientific fields by drawing indirectly upon the active aspirations of motherhood and the emotional warmth of motherliness (Vol. 2, p. 509).

Deutsch affirms that all those who value freedom and equality must wish to see women's social equality with men assured: but she claims to have demonstrated that the realization of this social equality will be beneficial to the woman and to mankind only if she also has the opportunity to develop her femininity and motherliness.

An Assessment

Deutsch's writings on female psychology are distinguished by an emphasis on the constitutional origins of feminine traits, an ambivalent attitude toward masculinity, and an equation of the woman's psychological and emotional life with her identifications. If she is famous, or infamous, for her argument that women find their deepest fulfillment in motherhood, she also displays a sensitivity to and sympathy for women whose capacity for motherliness is disturbed, which has not been as well appreciated. Nevertheless, there are some major difficulties in her account of feminine development.

One problem is her location of the etiology of passivity and masochism in the female's genital anatomy. The young girl, she argues, turns toward passivity and masochism after she experi-

ences the feminine castration complex. Since the gratification of a baby/child must await sexual maturity, the female endows the passive state of being loved with the energies that were once directed outward. Deutsch supports this argument with the controversial theses that the little girl's vagina remains undiscovered until coitus and thus plays no role in her psychological and sexual maturation, and that her clitoris is an inadequate organ of instinctual gratification. But as an early reviewer pointed out, more evidence rather than more argument is required before it can be established whether or not vaginal reactions occur in infancy (see Brierley, 1948, p. 253). It is also by no means certain that the clitoris, compared with the infantile penis, is inadequate as a means of gratification or as a vehicle of pleasure. The foundations of Deutsch's position here are thus of uncertain strength.

A second problem is Deutsch's treatment of the role of masculinity in women. On the one hand she argues that it impairs the emergence of femininity in the woman by facilitating her rejection of passivity and masochism, the two traits which enable her to accept the reality of the suffering and pain associated with coitus and parturition. On the other, she claims that masculinity, in the form of active sublimations, may help the woman who is potentially overwhelmed by the conflicts of motherhood, and she hails it as "a rock of salvation" which permits the woman to overcome the biological trauma of the climacterium. It must be agreed that, in principle, Deutsch's willingness to explore both the advantages and disadvantages of masculinity is a strength of her theoretical analysis. But her discussion of them has some distinctive limitations. She argues, for example, that it is possible for a woman to effectively suppress masculinity in her early life, but later to draw on it as a means for overcoming maternal conflict and the trauma of menopause. This argument seems to rest on her claim that the urge toward creative (i.e., active) sublimations and the productivity of motherhood both spring from a common source. But a claim that two impulses share a common source does not establish

that one is capable of replacing the other. Moreover, the forms which sublimations take are influenced by elements other than their "sources." These difficulties go unexamined in Deutsch's discussion.

Another difficulty is the lack of development of a differentiated concept of inner psychic wealth, which is in fact logically essential to Deutsch's analysis. The feminine woman is held both to renounce "originality," out of her own need, and also to preserve it or the capacity for it. Here Deutsch either simply contradicts herself, or, more probably, is referring to two different aspects of "originality." Without a specification of the nature of the feminine woman's "originality," Deutsch's claim that her distinctive capacity for identifying with a man is a sign of inner richness has little meaning and is impossible to evaluate. It sets up a sterile debate with those who suspect it may be a sign of inner impoverishment.

Finally, Deutsch carries her discussion of how identifications shape an individual's life to extremes. Her tendency to explain all behavior by reference to the individual's identifications distracts attention from the role of the developing structures of the mind—the ego and superego—in interpreting and progressively confronting the vicissitudes of maturation.

II

BIOGRAPHY

Deutsch published her memoir, *Confrontations with Myself: An Epilogue*, in 1973, when she was eighty-nine years old. She comments in her Preface (p. 11) that it was only after completing the work that she realized that "it forms a supplement to the autobiography hidden in my general work *The Psychology of Women*." Given this, her own review of the crucial relationships and memorable scenes of her life offers a starting point for our interpretation of the links between biography and theory in her writings. Helene Deutsch née Rosenbach, the youngest of four

children, was born on October 9, 1884, in Przemysl, a Galician town in Poland. Her parents, Wilhelm and Regina, had hoped for a boy because their only son, Emil, aged ten, clearly lacked the intellectual abilities necessary for a distinguished career. Wilhelm, a prominent lawyer, was absent when Helene was born. According to family legend, when he first saw her, he fell in love with her large radiant eyes before he knew her sex.

As a small girl, and her father's favorite, Helene was allowed to visit his law office and, sitting under his desk, listen to him dispose cases. On other occasions she traveled with him in the countryside. These experiences exposed her to the social problems of Polish society in general, and to the universal tragedies of life. They also led her to identify with her father's ideals. Writing about her work on adolescence she comments:

> . . . I gave marked attention to one feminine type in particular: the daughter who adopts her father's ideals and fights on his behalf, along with him, for these goals. The girl of this type builds her life upon her identification with her father. I was of course such a girl (*Confrontations*, p. 46).

One way in which her gratification in the early relationship was marred, however, was by her terrible fear that an accident would befall her father as he returned, late in the evening, from his club. She would sit up waiting anxiously for him and would fall asleep only after his safe return.

While the overall character of the early relationship between father and daughter was one of love and acceptance, the same could not be said of Helene's relationship with Regina. She writes that "for most of my childhood and youth I hated my mother." Her evocation of her mother is graphic.

> . . . my mother . . . beat me—not to punish me, but as an outlet for her own pent-up aggressions. She let me feel the full force of the grudge she bore me for not being the boy she had wanted and expected (p. 62).

It is thus not surprising when Deutsch declares that her mother had "no influence on my education, and her contribution to my

intellectual values only existed in a negative sense: I reacted against her" (p. 66). She does, however, recall moments of positive feeling:

> These occurred for the most part during the rare times when I was ill. She was the person I wanted to have by my bed when I had pains or fever . . . (p. 62).

On other occasions her mother would travel to Lwów, the nearest city, to buy pretty dresses and treats for Helene. As an adult Deutsch felt that the emotional deprivations of her mother's childhood had left her lonely and isolated. She speculates that her mother's "ambition and willpower" would have borne better fruit if she had been able to find appropriate outlets for them. As it was, her ambition focused on the reputation of her daughters. Deutsch admits that, although her mother made the normal process of identification difficult, she still kept in her heart a yearning for her love.

The general legacy of this relationship left Deutsch, as a child and young adult, with an intense desire to turn away from her mother. In her paper, "Melancholic and Depressive States" (1930b), in which she describes cases of melancholic depression, she gives an illustration which may be autobiographical.

> In conscious hatred against her mother this patient had turned her whole life into one long protest against her. One may say that every gesture of her life betokened a vindictive triumph against the mother. Her love life, her intellectual interests, her choice of profession, in short, the whole content of her existence, had been built up on this undying hostility. From time to time she suffered from severe depressions, which signified an obedient surrender to the mother, a renunciation of the values which had been erected against her, a penance for the constant transgressions of the maternal commands. On each occasion the depressions were succeeded by a period of peculiar intensification of joy in life, efficiency in her work, and capacity for love (Deutsch, 1930b, p. 155).

Helene's relationship with her mother may be contrasted with those she enjoyed with several other female relatives, whose

lives made a lasting impression on her. She portrays her sister, Malvina, eleven years her senior, as the source of the positive maternal imago that saved her, the "good" mother who provided succor from Regina's wild and uncontrollable outbreaks of temper. Malvina was also an "object of identification and my superego built itself around her ways" (*Confrontations*, p. 48). Older relatives provided powerful models of social and intellectual independence. Her maternal grandmother Fass, for example, many years earlier had left her husband and their four children and run away to Vienna with the young clerk who worked in their fabric shop. She divorced her husband and married the clerk: the newly married couple opened their own shop with money she had hoarded over the years. Deutsch regarded this behavior as an act of social revolution (p. 71). Her imagination was also captured by two of her grandmother's sisters. One, Aunt Leika, was a wealthy, eccentric moneylender who pretended to be poor. The other, Aunt R. F., dressed elegantly, was held to be an authority on Schopenhauer, and smoked cigars. Her circle included many distinguished men. It was whispered that her husband had left because she "behaved like a man and not like a decent woman." She communicated to Helene what this charge signified:

> . . . enjoyment of the sexual act was then considered to be for men only; women were designed by nature merely to be passive objects of their sex partners' drives. . . . It was during my friendship with her that I learned that respectable women of her generation normally were frigid (p. 75).

At fourteen, after finishing school, Deutsch rebelled against the expectation that she remain idly at home until a suitable marriage could be arranged for her. She wanted to pursue her studies, but knew that, given her poor schooling, she would certainly fail the examination for the *abitur*, the document which would allow her entrance into almost any European university. Her parents refused to provide tutoring, her mother being vigorously opposed and her father passive in the face of her opposition. The realization that her beloved father would not sup-

port her against her mother was a crushing disappointment. Deutsch secured his help by running away and returning only on condition that he sign a contract wherein he promised to help her attain an *abitur*.

> My insistence on a written guarantee meant, implicitly, that I didn't trust him not to retract a spoken promise under the influence of my mother. He never did free himself from that influence and in spite of the contract our conflict could never be truly resolved . . . (p. 82).

During the five years it took Deutsch to secure her *abitur* she began an affair with the Polish Socialist leader, Herman Lieberman. He was sixteen years older, and he was married. They remained together for ten years. While her mother raged, her father understood: "When you think it over, what other man could she fall in love with in this dull town?" (p. 86).

Deutsch characterizes their relationship as a pure oedipal situation:

> . . . the man much older than I; the older, unloved wife; and the impossibility of dissolving their marriage. I could not marry my father; I could not marry L. And therefore I sustained the ambivalent situation, in effect a stalemate, frustrated my own desire for happiness, and nourished L.'s fantasies of self-sacrifice (p. 91).

The lovers' mutual unhappiness with this fate was sublimated in a shared political commitment to the Socialist cause. Deutsch maintains that it was difficult for her to accept the secrecy that surrounded their relationship (p. 90). Nonetheless, when Lieberman was elected to the Parliament in Vienna in 1910, she accompanied him there with plans to study medicine.

Deutsch recounts in detail a trip which she took with Lieberman in 1910 to the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen, and which marked the beginning of the end of their relationship. She was profoundly affected by the respect and influence accorded several of the women revolutionaries.

> Never had my inner frustration struck me as hard as it did at this Congress! I asked myself why I was not a leading woman like Rosa Luxemburg or Angelica Balabanoff. With my temperament, talent, and ambition, why hadn't I attained their status? (p. 102).

Further reflection compelled Deutsch to admit that her love for Lieberman was in conflict with her aspirations. More importantly, she was now twenty-six and wished to have a child: "I was ripe for motherhood, and the nature of our relationship made it out of the question" (p. 104). She ended the affair with Lieberman and, desolate, decided to spend a year in Munich. There she met her future husband, Felix Deutsch (1884-1964), whom she married in 1912. Felix combined interests in psychoanalysis and internal medicine and during his career published numerous papers on the psychosomatic origins of illness. In Deutsch's account he was already a brilliant physician when they first met. She asserts that after meeting him, she felt "free" for the first time in years (p. 107). Deutsch presents their life together as idyllic and attributes their happiness to Felix's goodness; the storms were her fault. Her idealization of Felix is forceful:

> Felix [published] numerous books and articles on internal medicine, which were highly regarded in the medical community. He lived in the ecstasy of the discoverer. . . . His tenderness for me was never reduced by the press of his work or lack of time. I might be able to give many, many examples of it, if an almost unconquerable inhibition were not holding me back. . . . Even after the storms of erotic love were behind us, our deep love never diminished. Felix never resented the fact that I sometimes interrupted his work. He played the piano, composed, painted, and wrote poems for children to express his love for them. . . . He was the most mature man I have ever known, and one of the few who could have claimed the superiority of the wise man (*Confrontations*, pp. 117, 119, 126).

In 1916 Deutsch became pregnant. She had been apprehen-

sive that she would never have a child, and the expectation of future happiness was mingled with panic that "long buried forces could still have their old destructive power" (p. 121). Although she does not explain the content of this anxiety, it presumably refers to her deeply ambivalent love-hate relationship with her mother. Her wish to have a child threatened her resolution not to be like her mother, since it raised the possibility that she might be the same kind of aggressive mother as Regina. She was "saved" by identification with a friend whose serene enjoyment of her own pregnancy reassured her that all would be well (p. 121). Toward the end of Deutsch's memoir she reveals that she had described this pregnancy in her treatise on women, as the case of "Mrs. Smith."

The birth of her son did not free Deutsch from the spector of old anxieties.

> My motherly feelings . . . were disturbed by anxieties of a deeply neurotic character concerning my little son. It became clear that they were rooted in the infantile neurosis that had made me wait up at night for my father's return, convinced that something horrible had happened to him (p. 123).

The relationship between father and son was, by contrast, serene and untroubled. Deutsch describes Felix as a "miraculous" father who from the beginning enjoyed Martin's exceptionally strong love for him. Moreover, in situations where a child normally turns to his mother, Martin would turn to his father.

Helene and Felix engaged a full-time nurse for their infant son. She explains this as necessitated by the strenuous scheduled which she and Felix maintained as wartime doctors, and by the demands of motherhood. A silent agreement with the nurse enabled her to pursue her work: "I could work on the condition that in effect I abdicate my role of mother in her favor" (p. 133). The consequences of turning her infant son over to the exclusive care of a nurse were distressing.

> I always had the painful suspicion that I was depriving both my son Martin and myself of a rich source of happiness, the mother-child closeness that is most significant to a baby during the first two years. I loved my child deeply, but the two of us could only occasionally experience the blessing of the mother-child bond with all its tenderness and care (p. 123).

In 1919 Deutsch published a short article, "A Two-Year-Old Boy's First Love Comes to Grief," which describes the behavior of a small boy named Rudi after the abrupt loss of the nurse who had cared for him since birth. The autobiographical nature of this essay is revealed by the facts that the Deutsches' nurse also left their household at the end of two years; her role in caring for Martin paralleled that of Rudi's nurse; and both were named Paula.

Rudi's nurse left him without saying good-bye. She had been his first object choice, and he had received signs of tenderness from his mother with stolid indifference. She was replaced by a young and lively nursemaid, and the initial transition between caretakers appeared to be smooth. Signs of disturbance emerged on the evening of Paula's disappearance. Rudi had a sleepless night and demanded that his mother remain with him. The following morning Rudi, toilet-trained, had a soiling accident. Several more followed in the ensuing days. After these he allowed only his mother to tend his needs.

Rudi also refused to eat, and only with great reluctance permitted his mother to feed him. His tenderness, however, increased, and he had embraces and kisses for everyone around him and his dolls. The soiling accidents stopped, although the refusal to eat persisted. Finally on the ninth day of his ordeal Rudi returned to reality. His personality had undergone a change.

> . . . he had become socialized; he was more tender and more in need of tenderness. His erotic needs appeared to be greater and he showed a greater interest in people around him,

> treating them with a certain respect and considerateness (Deutsch, 1919, p. 160).

In her conclusion to this short essay Deutsch acknowledged that it contained nothing new, but justified its publication on the grounds that it demonstrated how the small child's autoerotic sexuality is gratified through the organic needs of its own body. One of her underlying motives was presumably to assure herself that Martin (Rudi) had not been psychologically harmed by being turned over to a nurse who departed abruptly after two years. Indeed, the loss of his nurse had the effect of deepening his relations with others.

Deutsch had been unable to explore her conflict over motherhood in her analysis with Freud, which had begun in 1918. In her account, she was beset by this when she approached Freud about the possibility of undergoing an analysis with him. (Martin was then nineteen months old.) But either because she was reluctant to mention this problem to Freud, or because of the didactic nature of the analysis (Deutsch gives both explanations), their work focused instead on the oedipus complex and the feminine castration complex.

Freud ended Deutsch's analysis after a year, giving two reasons: since she was not neurotic, she did not require further analysis, and he needed the hour to resume his treatment of the "Wolf-Man." Deutsch attempts a measured reaction:

> I knew of this patient and realized that he was the source of important discoveries for psychoanalysis. I considered myself mature enough then to react to the situation objectively, without bringing my transference problems to bear on it. Certainly it would have been irrational for me to expect Freud to give up for my sake the time he needed for his creative work (*Confrontations*, p. 133).

Deutsch also wrote, shortly after Freud's death, that "Everybody around Freud wanted to be loved by him, but his intellectual accomplishment meant infinitely more to him than the people around him" (Deutsch, 1940, p. 191).

Despite this disappointment, Deutsch went on to gain great satisfaction from her participation in the psychoanalytic movement. In 1924 she became Director of the Training Institute of the Vienna Society and was one of its leading teachers. In 1930 her clinical lectures were published as *The Psychoanalysis of the Neuroses*, and quickly became a standard text. Many of her contemporaries were women, who were also making distinguished contributions to psychoanalysis. Her relations with them varied: she describes close friendships with Mira Oberholzer and Beata Rank, reports that she often identified with Anna Freud, and admits to "feelings of competition and jealousy" with Ruth Mack Brunswick and Jeanne Lampl-de Groot (*Confrontations*, pp. 138, 142). After her emigration to the United States in the 1930's she played a leading role in the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute for many years. The length of her career is a testament to a remarkable energy, ambition, and capacity to find fulfillment in work. One has the impression that her essential character and personality did not change over the years. This was certainly her view. At age eighty she answered the rhetorical question, "What is going on in old age?" by declaring, "It is the *same* what was before, *only more*! When you were clever, you are more clever, that's all . . . when you were aggressive, you are more aggressive . . ." She went on to say: "I have no troubles at all, but people who like me . . . they say 'Why is she so active, so ambitious, so narcissistic?' " (quoted in Gifford, 1983, p. 9).

III

INTERPRETATION

Deutsch's personal life may be characterized by the three interrelated themes of identification, disappointment, and idealization. Her birth was a disappointment to her mother, with whom she consciously refused to identify. Her life became a series of powerful, active identifications with other individuals and their ideas. These were often men: first her father, then the

socialist Lieberman, and finally Freud and his psychoanalytic discoveries. Each of these figures, however, also proved a disappointment to her. The close bond she shared with her father was frayed when he initially refused to support her educational ambitions, and further damaged when he withdrew from her after capitulating to her demands. She quickly replaced him with Lieberman, but he proved reluctant to acknowledge their affair and to legitimatize it so that she could have a child. And her analysis with Freud also ended in disappointment.

Deutsch also identified with women, from her sister Malvina to Anna Freud. Between these two came the friend who supported her through her pregnancy, whom she later named as Marianne Kris (Gordon, 1978). Given the discrepancy in ages between her son Martin (born 1917) and Kris's son Anton (born 1934), this cannot be correct: but when this was pointed out to Deutsch, she made no attempt to rationalize her mistake, which she reiterated on several occasions in her later years (personal communication, Dr. Sanford Gifford). Paul Roazen (1985, p. 133) names the friend as Marianne Bauer, but does not discuss Deutsch's error in naming Kris. Deutsch's refusal to correct it suggests that at some level it was a reality for her. Given the dénouement of her own analysis with Freud, Deutsch's jealousy may have been aroused when Freud took Kris into analysis in 1931. (He accepted no fee for the treatment [Kris, 1972, p. 27]. Deutsch, who paid about ten dollars an hour [Roazen, 1985, p. 153], may or may not have been aware of this.) Moreover, Kris and her husband Ernst enjoyed an intimacy with Freud and his family; Deutsch did not, despite her position as Director of the Training Institute of the Vienna Society. I suggest that Deutsch's refusal to rationalize or correct her mistake in naming Marianne Kris as the woman she identified with during her pregnancy is rooted in the fact that she had, at some point, identified with Kris, whose relationship with Freud she envied. She was in error about the circumstances, but not the reality, of this identification. Idealization is a major element in Deutsch's life and her portrayal of it. Thus she presents herself as the preferred daughter of a wonderful father; a favored pupil of

Freud; and, most poignantly, the beloved wife of a perfect husband, in a deeply satisfying union. Roazen, however, presents Felix as a sweet-tempered but ineffectual figure who failed his wife both sexually and intellectually, and whose accomplishments and contributions within psychoanalysis are inconsequential beside hers. Roazen contends that Deutsch was disappointed in Felix, and explains her idealization of him an an expression of her regret that she had not done more for him. Another possible interpretation, however, is that Deutsch was expressing a powerful fantasy that she had never disappointed a loved one. The ultimate origin of this is probably the cruel knowledge that her birth had been a disappointment to her mother. Given this, her subsequent disappointments with her father, Lieberman, and Freud may have aroused in her an anxiety that she was, in some way, responsible because *she* had been a disappointment to *them*. Thus her affirmation that Felix met all her expectations may well have been a way of reassuring herself that she had never disappointed him.

The parallels between Helene Deutsch's life and her portrayal of feminine development in general are pervasive, and it seems impossible to deny that the latter is a fairly direct reflection of the former. When discussing the girl's identification with the father, she presumably relies on her own experience for the distinctive proposition that the father usually chooses his third daughter to inherit his spiritual values, after having been disappointed in a son. The case of "Mrs. Smith," used to establish the thesis that the girl's most important identification is with her mother, is her own. Her identification with her father's activity, and rejection of any identification with her aggressive mother, seems to have played a part in determining the ambivalence toward the traits of masculinity and their role in the woman's life which is a feature of her writings. Her own life was built around her identifications with three men; and she argues formally that the feminine woman not only has a distinctive facility for identifying with a man, but can only truly experience herself by doing so.

Deutsch's greatest clinical contribution, and one of consider-

able power, is her delineation of the "as if" personality. Because she had a continuing stable identity as a productive psychoanalyst and effective clinician who inspired friendship and affection in others, she does not fit the extremes of the "as if" personality; however, she does display some of its features. Her own pregnancy had been possible only because of an identification with a friend; her own development taught her that a disturbance in the daughter's identification with the mother could undermine a woman's capacity for motherliness and motherhood. These experiences, and her own intense awareness of them, are personal antecedents which must have enabled her to recognize the "as if" personality as a clinical type in whom the absence of identifications in early life creates profound affective disturbances.[2]

Some of the weaknesses and omissions in Deutsch's theory also seem to be to some degree reflections of her own personal difficulties. One problem area concerns the role of the mother in feminine development. Narcissism, passivity, and masochism crystallize within the female as a result of the erotic dangers which threaten her in the wake of the oedipal father-daughter relationship and the feminine castration complex. Moreover, the girl is reconciled to her femininity because she wishes to retain the father's love. But given Deutsch's initial emphasis on identification with the mother, we might well ask why it is not the character of the mother-daughter relationship which accounts for the path of feminine development. In Deutsch's own case it seems likely that it was her relationship with her mother, as much as the one which she enjoyed with her father, which called forth these traits. It is not hard to imagine that as a small child, Helene struggled with her mother's rage and disappointment by intensifying her narcissism. Moreover, Regina's ambiv-

[2] Deutsch herself noted that "various forms of neuroses and clinical phenomena may use 'as if' attitudes in their expression. All these processes may show to a greater or lesser degree the mechanism of 'as if' in which the identification with an external object for a longer or shorter period of time involves the personality in toto" (Panel, 1966, p. 581).

alence held psychological dangers for Helene, since moments of tenderness were outnumbered by painful episodes of rejection. Helpless in this situation, she may have retreated to passive acceptance of her mother's anger in the hope or knowledge that it would be followed by expressions of love. This situation, however, threatened a masochistic abnegation of her self-esteem, since it encouraged feelings of unworthiness and guilt. In short, one way in which Helene could obtain the love from her mother for which she yearned was through a passive and masochistic identification with Regina's treatment of her. And although she herself emphasizes that her relationship with her father reinforced her active strivings, she may also have been seeking to gratify her mother's ambitions, and to gain her love, through her own achievements. The difficulties she encountered in her relationship with Regina may have prevented Deutsch from acknowledging these phenomena in herself and from investigating them overtly at the theoretical level.

At bottom, then, although the overt theme of Deutsch's life was her rejection of her mother, at a deeper level she also sought a reunion with her—and nowhere more so than in her theory of feminine development. If my interpretation is correct, then Deutsch's claim that her identification with her father did not injure her femininity is justified, but only because the roots of her narcissism, passivity, and masochism were really laid down in her relationship with her mother. Deutsch's conscious desire was not to identify with her mother, but her writings reveal another wish, in that the reparative identifications of coitus, parturition, and motherhood allow the woman to experience the sense of original oneness with the mother and thereby surmount early traumata. Her conception of femininity commemorates a repressed, not a repudiated, relationship. As a closing illustration, we might draw on Deutsch's portrayal of George Sand, whose life she describes as "a perfect illustration" of her theoretical views on the masculinity complex. She portrays Sand's disappointment in her mother as "the really disastrous factor in [her] life," and argues that Sand later made futile

efforts to restore her mother ideal and save her femininity. Her comments on Sand's heroines and her relationship to them seem applicable to her own accounts of the feminine woman and motherhood:

> How is it that George Sand's heroines are so womanly, maternal, and sweet, while she herself was their antithesis? The fact is that Aurore [Sand] tried to achieve in fiction the feminine ideal and the model mother she had been deprived of in real life (1945, Vol. 1, p. 310).

SUMMARY

Part I of this paper provided an exposition of Helene Deutsch's writings on feminine development, emphasizing her reliance on the notion of identification. Part II contained an account of her life and career, and Part III offered an interpretation of how her personal history shaped her psychoanalytic writings.

The review of Deutsch's writings began with her essay (1925b), "The Psychology of Women in Relation to the Functions of Reproduction," in which she argues that the traumas of feminine development are overcome through the reparative identifications which coitus, parturition, and motherhood provide. In "The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women" (1930a), femininity is linked to the passive-masochistic disposition: biological and constitutional factors dictate the female's turn toward masochism. In "Motherhood and Sexuality" (1933), Deutsch examines how the girl's unconscious identification with the mother is effected by her unconscious response to the mother's sexual role.

All of these themes recur in *The Psychology of Women.* Volume One explores three topics: the psychological life of woman, which is equated with her identifications; the three traits of femininity—narcissism, masochism, and passivity; and the nonfeminine woman. Throughout Deutsch argues that the nature of the girl's identification with her mother is of paramount im-

portance. A related argument is that the girl's identification with her father does not necessarily endanger her femininity. Volume II begins with an amplification of Deutsch's thesis that the girl's most important identification is with her mother and continues with an analysis of the demands of motherhood. These pose a threat to some women, who feel unable to produce the emotions they consider necessary for the well-being of the newborn child. They often cover their lack of motherliness by seeking out a motherly figure with whom to identify. Deutsch calls these women "as if" types. For other women, who experience an upsurge in destructive tendencies against both their own ego and the child, active sublimations may be a means of salvation for both woman and child. Intellectual sublimations may also protect the woman against the biological trauma of menopause.

The critical assessment of Deutsch's writings found, on the positive front, that she displays a sensitivity to and sympathy for women whose capacity for motherliness is disturbed that has not been well appreciated by her critics. More negatively, further evidence is needed to support her views that the female's vagina remains undiscovered until sexual maturity and that the clitoris is inadequate as a means of gratification. In addition, her argument that the feminine woman's distinctive capacity for identifying with a man is a sign of inner richness rather than impoverishment lacks an adequate theoretical foundation.

The biographical sketch of Deutsch's life showed that she identified with her father and overtly rejected any identification with her mother, although she retained a yearning for her love. She also developed strong identifications with the socialist ideals of H. Lieberman and with Freud's psychoanalytic discoveries, she idealized her husband Felix, and she experienced severe conflicts over motherhood.

The interpretation suggested that Deutsch's personal life may be characterized by the three interrelated themes of identification, disappointment, and idealization, and that the impact of her personal experiences on her theoretical formulations was

profound. Her identification with her father's activity and her rejection of any identification with her aggressive mother seem to have played a part in determining the ambivalence toward the traits of masculinity and their role in the woman's life which is a feature of her writings. Just as identifications were central in her own personal development, she gave them a preeminent position in her theoretical formulations, neglecting other factors such as ego and superego formation. Her delineation of the "as if" personality, a major clinical contribution, was also facilitated by her acute awareness of the importance of identifications. Omissions and weaknesses in her theory of feminine development, notably in her treatment of the mother's role, are also linked to her conscious rejection of her own mother. Nevertheless, since in her theory the reparative identifications of femininity allow the woman to return momentarily to the primal bliss of the original mother-child relationship, her conception of femininity commemorates a repressed, rather than a repudiated, relationship. In this respect Deutsch achieved in her theory a mother-daughter relationship which was denied to her in life.

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400 West 119th St., #9H
New York, NY 10027

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Transference and Its Context. Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis. By Leo Stone, M.D. New York/ London: Jason Aronson, 1984. 451 pp.

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To cite this article: Alan Z. Skolnikoff (1987) Transference and Its Context. Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis. By Leo Stone, M.D. New York/London: Jason Aronson, 1984. 451 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 354-408, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927179

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927179

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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BOOK REVIEWS

TRANSFERENCE AND ITS CONTEXT. SELECTED PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Leo Stone, M.D. New York/London: Jason Aronson, 1984. 451 pp.

This volume is a collection of papers written by the author over a span of more than thirty years. They focus predominantly on the psychoanalytic situation, with particular emphasis on transference and resistance.

Stone's thinking outlines a major trend in psychoanalysis during this period. Through a description of his technique and philosophical understanding, he brings to our attention the relativity of the rules governing classical technique. With his close look at the psychoanalytic situation, he reminds us of the myriad of elements that constitute the therapeutic interaction.

Reading this volume of essays is not easy. The author develops his hypotheses in a discursive, detailed manner. The reader is frequently left confused and perplexed, as Stone digresses or speculates about what appear to be peripheral matters. However, a slow and patient reading of these papers is more than rewarding. One finally recognizes that his discursions correspond with a complex, multifaceted, nondogmatic thinking about psychoanalysis.

The book is divided into two parts, with a total of sixteen chapters. All the papers are based on previous articles, with a considerable reworking and integration of linking ideas. I will focus my discussion on Part I, which concerns the psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic situations, and the last three chapters, which cover questions of training and problems in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The other chapters (9 through 13) are of interest from a more academic, philosophical perspective, especially those which deal with theories of aggression.

What is particularly appealing about Stone's thinking is his ability to shift back and forth between theory and practice. He finally compares what actual clinical practice is with the way it is conceptualized theoretically. Although he mentions his subjective biases in a variety of directions, he often argues against his own ideas, attempting to maintain the role of a neutral investigator. This makes for stimulating reading in terms of the questions that

are raised, but also some confusion for the reader in following his arguments. Never does this lack of clarity have to do with a failure to explain, but rather with the complexity of the ideas that he is describing.

Although the author states that certain of the papers are dated, the reader finds a remarkable timeliness to the controversies that are covered. One can see how Stone's interest in the wider application of psychoanalysis leads him to his theories of the primordial transference that he describes in "The Psychoanalytic Situation" (Chapters 3 and 4). In a subchapter, "Separation, the Primordial Transference, and the Oedipus Complex" (p. 78), he systematically weaves theories of infant development and pregenital attachment to the mother with the regression associated with the deprivation of the psychoanalytic situation. Here the role of speech is seen as the bridge to the more mature, "rational," oedipal phase of the transference. Those readers who would like to assign Stone to a specific brand of psychoanalysis (developmentalist, humanist, classical, etc.) will be disappointed. When he is describing his understanding of the psychoanalytic situation, you sense a constant shift in his thinking. Here, then, is not a theorist with either a pregenital or an oedipal focus, but rather a clinical theoretician who attempts to describe what he sees and then theorize.

An example of this complexity can be seen in his writing about the technique of transference interpretation. On the one hand, he appears to agree with Gill (p. 138) that resistance to the awareness of the transference should be interpreted as soon as the analyst believes that the patient's investment in the analysis is sufficient to influence his dynamics (p. 139). He also feels that truly effective insight requires validating emotional experience in the immediate transference. Both of these statements appear to agree considerably with Gill's position. And yet, there appears to be considerable disagreement with Gill's view (p. 158). With respect to the interpretation of the here and now, he qualifies Gill's emphasis, feeling that the genetic past remains the key to the distortions of the present. In Chapter 7, he responds further to the controversy of whether to interpret the transference in the here and now. As we read this chapter, we recognize that he enlarges the scope of our thinking rather than taking sides. Although he explicitly criticizes Gill for neglecting the past, he also emphasizes the importance of

understanding the patient's attitude about the "reality relationship" with the analyst as a determining factor in the choice of interpretations. I believe this is an idea with which Gill would agree.

In Chapter 6, "Noninterpretive Elements in Psychoanalysis," he provides an antidote for excessive addiction to the "rules" of psychoanalytic technique. His thoughts on the abuses (resistance) of free association (p. 157) are refreshing. He reviews how the relative deprivation associated with the use of the couch and with not seeing the analyst is connected with the rule of abstinence. This must not, however, be associated with coldness or arbitrary withholding. When the ego of an intelligent adult cannot understand certain rules which are perceived as depriving or rejecting, a transference regression can be created that does not lend itself to interpretation unless the analyst becomes aware of what he has done to cause this and then does something to remove it (p. 162). In choosing a professional stance regarding practice, we should, Stone recommends, steer between overstimulation and excessive gratification and irrational deprivation.

Chapters 14 through 16, which deal with issues of training, the influence of psychotherapy on psychoanalysis, and problems in present-day psychoanalysis, are more clearly position papers. Here we see a strong plea for nonreporting of candidate analysis in order to maintain the necessarily exclusive, mutually trusting relationship between analyst and patient. He also argues positively for a more mutually influential relationship between theories of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, and expresses a desire for more open and affirmative assessment of new theories in psychoanalysis. This paper, written in 1975, he saw as an antidote to the sense of crisis and stagnation in our field. Certainly, these ideas are as important today as they were ten or twenty years ago. Because of the clear stance he has taken in these chapters, his style of writing seems much less obscure and is therefore easier to understand.

The reward in reading this volume is that we can come away with more sophisticated questions about the clinical situation rather than simpler answers.

ALAN Z. SKOLNIKOFF (SAN FRANCISCO)

STREIFZÜGE DURCH DAS LEBEN VON ANNA O./BERTHA PAPPENHEIM. EIN FALL FÜR DIE PSYCHIATRIE—EIN LEBEN FÜR DIE PHILANTHROPIE. (An Examination of the Life of Anna O./Bertha Pappenheim. A Case for Psychiatry—A Life for Philanthropy.) By Ellen M. Jensen. Frankfurt/Main: ZTV-Verlag, 1984. 257 pp.

Ellen M. Jensen, in this book, calls Bertha Pappenheim the mother of psychoanalysis, Breuer the father, and Freud the stepfather. One may disagree with this, but one cannot dismiss the value of the book as a contribution to the study of the development of psychoanalysis.

Who, exactly, was Anna O.? Bertha Pappenheim was the daughter of a well-to-do Jewish family in Vienna. Her father was a businessman, and her mother, Recha Goldschmidt, was from a wealthy Frankfurt family.

Not much is known of Bertha's early life in Vienna. Apparently, her daily routine did not differ much from that of other *"höhere Tochter."* It was expected that they be well dressed, frequent the theater and concerts, and be able to dance and play the piano. Bertha wrote that girls from wealthy families were shielded from learning about the seedier aspects of life. Poverty, disease, and crime were forbidden subjects of discussion.

Bertha Pappenheim and other daughters of well-to-do Jewish families in Vienna were educated in Catholic girls' schools. They were not accepted into the *Gymnasium,* the European equivalent of high school, and because of that restriction, their academic training was severely limited. Bertha often complained about her inadequate education, in fact.

The first signs of Bertha's emotional disturbance emerged during her father's illness. Conflicted in her feelings about having to take care of him, Bertha manifested ambivalence in her physical symptoms. Her family was not immediately aware of the severity of her illness. Her mother, however, soon became alarmed over Bertha's chronic coughing spells. Fearing tuberculosis, the family consulted Josef Breuer.

Breuer, thirty-eight years old at the time, was physician to many upper middle-class Viennese families. In addition to his medical

practice, he worked in the laboratory of the well-known physiologist, Ernst Brücke, where he made the acquaintance of Brücke's young assistant, Sigmund Freud. In his obituary of Breuer, Freud wrote, "Nothing in Breuer's training would have led to the expectation that he would be the first one to gain decisive insights into the mystery of hysteria."

Breuer first examined Bertha Pappenheim at the end of November 1880. An excellent diagnostician, he could see no somatic basis for her illness and recognized that Bertha's bizarre symptomatology must have an emotional origin. In accordance with the nosological categorization of the time, Breuer diagnosed hysteria.

Breuer decided to listen to Bertha and learn more about the factors at play in her inner life. In those days, it was most unusual to dedicate to a patient the amount of time and attention that Breuer gave Bertha. He visisted her daily and encouraged her to talk about her thoughts and feelings. After such conversations, she would become much quieter. When her father died on April 5, 1881, Bertha had been well on her way to recovery. After his death, however, she became more disturbed. As a consequence, Breuer asked Krafft-Ebing for a consultation, but Bertha turned him down; she only wanted contact with Breuer.

On the days when Breuer was unable to visit her, Bertha became worse. He also observed that during the space of a day, Bertha went through two different phases. In one, she would not eat, and she spoke poorly or in a foreign language. She was aggressive and would throw pillows at anyone who entered her room. She became particularly agitated when her mother and brother visited. During the afternoon Bertha appeared to be in a dreamlike state. Breuer guessed that this state corresponded with the time when she had taken care of her father. It was at this time of day, with the dreamlike state that Bertha described as feeling "surrounded by clouds," that Breuer would come to visit. Bertha told him how her father's illness had frightened her and how she mourned him. She also invented little poetic stories which reminded Breuer of Han Christian Andersen's "Picture Book without Pictures." When Bertha had some difficulty concentrating on the treatment, Breuer would hypnotize her and give her a word with which to associate. Bertha called this form of treatment "chimney sweeping" and referred to it as "the talking cure."

Even in her dreamlike state, Bertha's observing ego was vigilant. When she neared thoughts she did not want to reveal, she would suppress her associations. The topic of sexuality was probably one that she wanted to avoid. Breuer thought that Bertha's sexuality was underdeveloped, but it is possible that he simply did not recognize the resistance which forced the repression of her sexual fantasies.

Breuer described one episode that he found particularly revealing during the course of Bertha's treatment. She had been given a large dog to which she was deeply attached. One day she saw the dog attacking a cat. Bertha grapped a whip and beat her dog, thereby letting the cat escape. Breuer noted how impressive it was to see the weak young girl intervene to rescue the cat. The episode is even more meaningful in light of Bertha Pappenheim's subsequent activities. I believe it is paradigmatic of her philanthropic work, and it perhaps also provides some insight into her eventual self-cure. The rescue commitment, which became a leading force in Pappenheim's later life, gave her a double identification: with the helpless victim, on the one hand, and with the strong, protecting, probably male figure, on the other. That commitment and identification undoubtedly contributed to her ability to overcome her emotional disturbance.

In the *Studies on Hysteria*, Breuer asserted that by the end of her treatment Bertha was cured. This was incorrect, however. From a letter Freud wrote to Stefan Zweig, one learns that on the very evening that her symptoms disappeared, Bertha again became ill. Her family summoned Breuer, and when he arrived, he found Bertha having severe pelvic cramps that resembled labor pains. When Bertha saw Breuer, she called out, "Here comes Dr. Breuer's baby." Clearly, the childbirth fantasy indicates Bertha's transference love for Breuer.

In his biography of Freud, Jones wrote:

> Freud has related to me a fuller account than he described in his writings of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the end of this novel treatment. It would seem that Breuer developed what we should nowadays call a strong counter-transference to his interesting patient. At all events . . . his wife became bored listening to no other topic, and before long jealous. She did not display this openly, but became unhappy and morose. It was a long time before Breuer, with his thoughts elsewhere, divined the meaning of her state of mind. It provoked a violent reaction in him . . . and he decided to bring the treatment

> to an end. He announced this to Anna O., who was by now much better, and bade her good-by. But that evening he was fetched back to find her in a greatly excited state, apparently as ill as ever. The patient, who according to him had appeared to be an asexual being and had never made any allusion to such a forbidden topic throughout the treatment, was now in the throes of an hysterical childbirth. . . . Though profoundly shocked, he managed to calm her down by hypnotizing her, and then fled the house. . . . The next day he and his wife left for Venice to spend a second honeymoon, which resulted in the conception of a daughter. . . .[1]

That scenario, third-hand as it is, may not be entirely accurate, however. In the 1970's, some new material pertaining to Anna O.'s illness was discovered. A Canadian psychiatrist, A. Ellenberger, found that Bertha, after her treatment ended, was hospitalized in the Sanatorium in Bad Kreuzlingen. Albrecht Hirschmüller, a German psychiatrist, studied the Bertha Pappenheim documents from the Sanatorium and published his findings in a book.[2] Hirschmüller's book casts some doubts on Jones's account. According to the Kreuzlingen documents, it is unlikely that Breuer would have used hypnosis to calm his patient. A much more likely approach would have been to administer chloral or morphine. Furthermore, in the summer of 1882, Breuer and his family were at Gmunden am Taunsee—not in Venice. And the birth date of his daughter Dora—November 3, 1882—does not fit the time scheme Jones outlined.

On the other hand, the Breuer-Pappenheim relationship was certainly a special one. Breuer was clearly very involved in the treatment of Anna O., and the case history reveals a strong empathy for the patient. Pappenheim experienced a deep emotional crisis during treatment. After her father's death, her feelings for other members of her family were so disturbed that she shifted her attachment to the physician who showed her so much interest. Hirschmüller finds the real nature of the transference somewhat unclear, however. In addition to a libidinal father transference, there are hints of an aggressive transference.

[1] Jones, E. (1953): *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 1. The Formative Years and the Great Discoveries, 1856-1900.* New York: Basic Books, pp. 224-225.

[2] Hirschmüller, A. (1978): *Physiologie und Psychoanalyse im Leben und Werk Josef Breuer.* Bern: Verlag Hans Huber.

In 1907, Breuer referred to Bertha's therapy as an "ordeal." Personal and scientific curiosity conflicted with the fear of too strong an involvement. It is also likely that Breuer's wife reacted to the involvement along the lines that Jones described.

Hirschmüller's conclusions, based on documents that were discovered later, suggest, however, that the Freud-Jones version about the termination of Bertha's therapy should be regarded as a legend comprised of mistakes, half truths, and some correct assumptions. Breuer did not flee from or abandon his patient. He supervised her transfer to the Sanatorium Bellevue in Kreuzlingen. The communication Breuer sent to Robert Binswanger, Director of the Sanatorium, about Bertha's case history was ten to twenty times longer than the usual report; and it reveals a strong empathy with the patient. Looking back, it appears that the partial success of the therapy derived from a transference cure. Bertha's neurosis was not cured.

Jensen concludes, on the basis of what we know today about the patient's subsequent life, that Bertha Pappenheim finally succeeded in freeing herself from her mental crisis at the end of the 1880's or the early 1890's. Her literary work may have been helpful in this regard. In a collection of stories called *In the Junkshop*, she describes various articles that are defective or damaged. She may well have been alluding to her own self-image and warning her readers to be careful about judging another's imperfections; even such a person might have a purpose in life.

Another revealing story she wrote is about a "*Weihernixe*," a water fairy. The fairy is not allowed to leave her pond, but one day she hears in the distance some dance music which attracts her with such force that she cannot resist it. She goes to the dance hall, where she finds a man with a long beard and deep blue eyes reflecting love and tenderness. She dances with him in ecstasy. When she starts to thank him, the man looks at her and realizes by her green eyes that she is a water fairy. He turns away from her, and she goes back to her pond. The story recalls the part in Breuer's case history about Bertha's wish to dance while she was taking care of her sick father, her self-reproaches for this wish, and the chronic coughing spells that resulted from this conflict. The description of the man in her story fits her father as well as Breuer, who resem-

bled her father. One could well interpret this tale as Bertha's attempt to master the separation from both Breuer and her father.

Hirschmüller, too, offers some convincing insights into the psychological meaning of Bertha Pappenheim's literary productions. He notes that one repetitive theme is that of taking care of strangers' children as a substitute for having one's own family. That preoccupation, in fact, was a pivotal force in Bertha Pappenheim's life. She once said, "For a woman there are no strange children," and added that women who are deprived of the happiness of biological motherhood can develop a talent for mothering children whose natural mothers are unable to take care of them. Looking at the collection of short stories, *In the Junkshop*, Hirschmüller also comments that there are many objects that have some defect. Bertha Pappenheim, he suggests, felt that she had some defect and that she could compensate for this defect by helping others, particularly children.

Another repetitive theme in Pappenheim's stories is an imperfect relationship between men and women. She describes the destruction of one relationship after another—either because of the guilt of one of the partners or because of some tragic turn of destiny. The connection with Bertha's own inability to establish a healthy relationship with a man is obvious. Closely related to these problems in her life—the flawed self-image and the unattainable union—is Pappenheim's fight for women's rights.

In her treatment with Breuer, Pappenheim used to tell fantastic stories that helped free her affects. After the acute phase of her illness was over, she continued to do so through the publication of these stories, thereby achieving a literary mastery over her conflicts. Around 1895, she began to work, and her writing gradually became more directed; while before, she had been fighting her own health, she now began to fight for others. According to Hirschmüller, "We can assume that Bertha Pappenheim managed a grandiose defensive process. She succeeded in freeing herself from some possibly psychotic ego defects and in controlling other neurotic conflict situations through appropriate defenses. That she was such an impressive personality and was able to solve such important projects reflects the genius of the woman."

The major thrust of Jensen's book is an account of Berth Pappenheim's philanthropic activities. Her most important achieve-

ment was the creation of a home for young Jewish girls who were either orphans or lived under difficult, often life-threatening circumstances. Pregnant, unmarried young women were also admitted.

With the help of friends and relatives, Pappenheim bought first two houses and later on two more, in Neu-Isenburg near Frankfurt. In 1908, there were ten people in the house, including infants, several small children, an older child, and four pregnant women. They formed a family, with each member responsible for a particular task; no domestics were engaged. The goal was to provide a safe, secure environment so that these girls and young women might find their way back to life.

Until her death, Bertha Pappenheim dedicated herself to the home. When she came to the home, she would visit with the small children first. Much to their delight, she sat down at the table and ate with them. In the evening she spent time with the older girls. A co-worker wrote that she was always full of ideas, always "stimulating and caring."

Pappenheim witnessed the harassment of the home during the first years of the Nazi takeover. The worst part, however, she did not experience. Bertha Pappenheim died on May 28, 1936. On November 10, 1938, the Nazis burned down the house.

Jensen's book gives a lively characterization of Bertha Pappenheim's personality. Perhaps the most interesting comments are those that Breuer made about her. He wrote that she was very intelligent and showed a combination of keen intuition and good judgment. She had a particular talent for poetry and a rich fantasy life. She was energetic and tenacious, with a penchant for compassion, for caring for the sick and the poor. Jensen comments that these attributes—intelligence, intuition, talent for poetry, strong will, and empathy—were features both of Bertha Pappenheim's life and of her vocation.

It is interesting (and somewhat ironic) to learn from Jensen's book that Pappenheim was opposed to any sort of psychoanalytic treatment in the children's home in Neu-Isenburg. Jensen observes that this was because she knew how much ego strength was required for such treatment. Be that as it may, the remarkable partnership of an extraordinary physician, Josef Breuer, and an equally extraordinary patient, Bertha Pappenheim, played a piv-

otal role in the history of psychoanalysis. It was their work together that stimulated Freud's curiosity about the puzzle of hysteria and sent him on a voyage that led to undreamed of discoveries.

GEORGE GERO (NEW YORK)

THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH. FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY. By Jeffrey Moussaief Masson. New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1985. 316 pp. (Originally published by Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1984.)

As time passes since this work first appeared in early 1984, it becomes increasingly curious that Masson could have been convinced that the new material he reveals in it would persuade other than committed Freud detractors that the abandonment of the seduction hypothesis bespoke a lack of courage and integrity on Freud's part. The arguments he adduces are speculative at best. They are connected in part with what was previously published by Schur[1] about Freud's emotional need to defend Fliess and absolve him of culpability in his bungled surgery (and its sequelae) on Freud's patient, Emma Eckstein. Using a polemical style, and at times fanciful reasoning, Masson asserts that Freud's denial of the significance of Emma Eckstein's traumatic experience with his idealized friend laid the groundwork for his renunciation of his ideas about external trauma, particularly childhood seduction, in the etiology of hysteria.

In the course of his argumentation, Masson presents as evidence some previously unpublished letters sent to Fliess in December 1897. These followed the famous letter of September 21, 1897, in which Freud told Fliess that he had relinquished the seduction hypothesis and listed his reasons for doing so. The deleted letters allude to the treatment of a woman patient by Emma Eckstein. Eckstein was apparently consulting with Freud about her patient, in whose case reports of "scenes" of seduction by the father were elicited. There is ambiguity in Freud's use of the word "scenes," as well as in his statement, "My confidence in the father-etiology has

[1] Schur, M. (1966): Some additional "day residues" of "the specimen dream of psychoanalysis." In *Psychoanalysis—A General Psychology. Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann*, ed. R. M. Loewenstein, et al. New York: Int. Univ. Press, pp. 45-85.

Schur, M. (1972): *Freud: Living and Dying*. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

risen greatly" (p. 114), but they provide Masson with shaky evidence that Freud may have had some lingering doubts about his abandonment of the seduction hypothesis. It is more likely that Freud continued to believe in the importance at times of actual childhood seduction and abuse, as ongoing clinical experience led him to a new thesis about the importance of fantasy, about the *intrapsychic* consequences of external events, with fantasy elaboration and defensive distortion.

Masson chooses to believe that this advance constitutes a total retraction by Freud of his first impressions—about external trauma in the etiology of hysteria—when he went on to his observations of the significance of internal fantasy, although the latter does not preclude real seduction or abuse from playing a role. Masson indicts the editors of *The Origins*[2] for considering these letters irrelevant and omitting them, and he accuses them of attempting a "coverup." He does this despite all the evidence that Freud never relinquished his awareness of actual seduction and abuse of children, even though his views on the etiology of hysteria changed radically when he began to appreciate the significance of fantasy.

Masson argues that Freud wanted to assuage criticisms of his earlier theory in order to overcome his professional isolation and loneliness. This speculation is not well supported, and Masson overlooks the fact that Freud did not relinquish his ideas about a sexual etiology of neurosis, but rather elaborated them in a new and fruitful direction. That psychoanalysis was truly born and took wings after this monumental step is denied by Masson, who, curiously, sees it instead as a step backwards, away from the truth. He denies the constructive impact of Freud's recognition of the role of fantasy, despite understanding it intellectually. He appears to be blinded by his dedicated campaign to indict Freud for his supposed crime and his literary executors for holding back alledgedly damning materials.

Throughout the book, Masson also attacks present-day analysts as a group for their alleged failure to acknowledge and treat all the noxious consequences of physical and sexual abuse in today's so-

[2] *The Origins of Psychoanalysis. Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes: 1887-1902*, ed. M. Bonaparte, A. Freud & E. Kris. New York: Basic Books, 1954.

ciety. The book, from this standpoint, is a polemic about the prevalence and seriousness of child abuse, and it takes a predominantly sociological focus. Masson strains in a ludicrous way to support his thesis that Freud was dishonest and lacked the courage to maintain a psychological perspective that focused on the inner consequences of real as well as imagined external events.

The background to Masson's writing of this book has been described by Janet Malcolm.[3] Masson addressed Malcolm's critique of him in the Preface to the Viking Penguin edition of his book. He states that his book is an extended answer to what Malcolm terms Masson's "sudden virulent anti-Freudianism" (p. xviii), and he claims that his change in attitude resulted from his research and scholarly endeavors. Later, in the Introduction, Masson relates that he originally believed in Freud's fearless pursuit of truth, but that "my analytic training taught me early on that these ideals were not shared by the profession at large" (p. xviii). His disillusionment with Freud himself apparently followed his reading of the larger Freud-Fliess correspondence and the other materials to which be became privy in his role as Projects Director of the Freud Archives. He tells about being deposed and rejected by his sponsors and the psychoanalytic establishment for raising what he feels are legitimate questions and speculations about Freud's character, particularly Freud's motivation for relinquishing the seduction hypothesis.

Masson, however, persistently misinterprets Freud's and other analysts' continued acknowledgment in their work and in their writings of the significance of actual traumatic events and pathogenic experiences in normality as well as in psychopathology. His view holds that Freud's discoveries of and insights into the role of fantasy and of the oedipus complex, which became central in psychoanalytic work, are at odds with full appreciation of the actual prevalence of child abuse, which, he doggedly maintains, is being ignored. Spitz's work[4] on the effects of child neglect and the work

[3] Malcolm, J. (1984): *In the Freud Archives*. New York: Knopf.

[4] Spitz, R. (1945). Hospitalism: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood. *Psychoanal. Study Child*, 1:53-74.

Spitz, R. (1946): Anaclitic depression: an inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood, II. *Psychoanal. Study Child*, 2:313-342.

of Steele[5] on parental abuse, as well as Bergmann and Jucovy's collection of papers on the Holocaust,[6] for example, are completely overlooked. Masson's view grows out of extensive bias, manipulation of data, and confusion of inference, speculation, and evidence.

For example, Masson appears to have no understanding of the psychoanalytic concept of trauma or of the validity and clinical utility of the concept of unconscious (repressed) fantasy. He deals with fantasy and memory as though they are diametrically opposed rather than mingled, merged, and mutually influencing one another in human psychology. He also equates hysterical distortion with conscious and deliberate lying, and he attributes this view to analysts at large, whom he alleges harbor cynicism and mistrust of their patients and what they say. His essentially sociological focus is curious, coming from an individual who has had psychoanalytic training.

At one point, Masson does give lip service to the fact that much of what he has been indulging in is speculation and conjecture (p. 134). It does not impede him, however, from forging ahead with gross and malicious sounding inferences, innuendoes, and conclusions. An example of this is a chapter on Ferenczi's last paper, "Confusion of Tongues between Adults and Child," which is published as an appendix to the book. In that paper, Ferenczi dealt with instances of actual child abuse. Masson makes use of the paper to support the tendentious argument that Freud relinquished his friendship with this loyal disciple because of Ferenczi's potential threat to Freud's theoretical position regarding childhood trauma that had led to his abandonment of the seduction hypothesis some thirty-five years earlier. One is inclined to feel that Masson himself has betrayed a trust in invoking this paper, together with various items from Freud's late correspondence with Ferenczi and some ambiguous diary entries of Ferenczi's, to pro-

[5] Steele, B. F. (1970). Parental abuse of infants and small children. In *Parenthood: Its Psychology and Psychopathology*, ed. E. J. Anthony & T. Benedek.

Steele, B. F. (1982): The effect of abuse and neglect on psychological development. In *Frontiers of Infant Psychiatry*, ed. J. D. Call, E. Galenson & R. Tyson. New York: Basic Books, pp. 235-244.

[6] Bergmann, M. S. & Jucovy, M. E., Editors (1982): *Generations of the Holocaust*. New York: Basic Books. Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1984, 53:466-473.

vide the pieces and bits he needed for a specious argument and interpretation.

Masson is either unaware of or chooses to ignore the fact that in every instance memory is inevitably imbued with fantasy and defensive distortion. Whether or not a recalled "seduction" has been verified or has been analyzed as the product of defensive distortion related to the child's emotional needs during early development is of no concern to Masson. He ignores the fact that no competent analyst discounts the importance of cases of actual seduction or child abuse that come to his attention. Freud did not ignore the importance of sexual or other external trauma in his theoretical papers or in his case histories, and Masson acknowledges this in certain places, only to assert the opposite in the main. He does not present the facts fairly when he ignores that an adult patient's memory of seduction, real or imagined, is not more relevant than having grown up with the actuality of a psychotic or inadequate mother or father or with abandonment by or death of a parent, and so on. A myriad of other external events, of great psychological meaning and consequence, are frequent features in our patients' pasts.

The book contains five chapters, preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion. The Penguin paperback edition has, in addition, a special Preface as well as an Afterword. Both editions contain the appendices already mentioned, as well as one about the author's research into the life of Emma Eckstein. There is also an index. The scholarship demonstrated in such areas as the appendix on Emma Eckstein and the chapter on the Paris morgue at times is impressive, but this is outweighed by Masson's tendentious argumentation and shaping of the material. What might have been a unique contribution to the early history of psychoanalysis is turned instead into a polemical diatribe against Freud and the entire world of psychoanalysis that does not do the author credit.

GEORGE H. ALLISON (SEATTLE)

SUCCESS AND THE FEAR OF SUCCESS IN WOMEN. By David W. Krueger, M.D. New York: The Free Press, 1984. 180 pp.

This book is an exploration of the internal forces that prevent women from reaching their full potential despite living in an in-

creasingly facilitating environment. The author's observations on the achievement of women and on the various types of conflicts that preclude it have been gleaned from his clinical experience with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The book is replete with case examples. Krueger points out that more work has been done thus far in defining inhibitions of achievement in men and that there has been relative neglect of the unique developmental situations of women. This book attempts to redress the balance.

In the first section, "The Biological and Social Variables," there is a brief review of the biological differences between men and women. Little attempt is made to relate biology to psychology, except to point out that pregnancy and breast feeding decrease the mobility of women. Krueger concentrates more on the social variables. He emphasizes that parents generally make the greatest distinctions between boys and girls in their teachings regarding aggression. The inhibition of natural aggression in girls begins at an early age. In several studies, parents were seen to emphasize achievement and competition to a greater degree in their sons than in their daughters. Also, both the mothers and the fathers encouraged their sons more than they did their daughters to control the expression of affect, to be independent, and to assume greater personal responsibility. Mothers tended to restrict greatly and to supervise closely the activities of their daughters. Without her mother's support, a daughter's striving toward independence may be unconsciously equated with aggressive and competitive impulses, which produces guilt and anxiety. The differential response to sons and daughters has obvious implications for later development.

The social variables in adulthood that currently exist in our society are also reviewed. Krueger comments that "it has been difficult for society to reconcile the fact that there is no intrinsic masculinity in medicine, business, and law, just as there is no necessary departure from femininity attached to ambition, accomplishment, and success" (p. 12). He points out that while overt sex discrimination has diminished, it may have gone underground, to emerge in more subtle ways. More controversial, however, is Krueger's denial that the lack of a penis has a profound effect on the emotional organization of women. He believes that Freud made women feel insufficient, rather than that Freud observed that women them-

selves had these feelings. Few, however, would doubt Krueger's assertion that "creative, competitive and successful women can also possess 'feminine' qualities of gentleness, serenity, receptiveness and gratifying sexuality" (p. 20).

The second section of the book is devoted to the developmental aspects of achievement. There is a review of the concepts of gender and of femininity and a chapter on separation-individuation issues. Krueger shows how "success phobia" can be the result of unresolved separation issues. These issues, I think, would be as valid for the male as for the female. When parents prevent the possibility of emotional separation, the girl may have to settle for a compromised success rather than face the loss of love of her parents. The child also begins to see herself as inadequate when the mother continues to provide functions for the child which are no longer appropriate or necessary and thereby inhibits independent assertion. Women with this type of background may come into treatment in a panic after the loss of a relationship with a need-meeting person. Krueger states that one form of "success phobia" is based on the fear of abandonment, with phobic ideation and consequent avoidance of the phobic situation.

Krueger is not convincing in his assertion that something has gone wrong in the girl's development when penis envy exists as a manifest phenomenon. Most analysts are confronted daily by evidence that their female patients feel that something is lacking in themselves, and it is not clear whether these feelings develop even when the girl grows up in a family in which she is valued by both parents and in which the mother is also a valued object. On the other hand, few would disagree with Krueger's discussion of oedipal issues and his assertion that success at winning the father's exclusive love may be unconsciously generalized to other successes such as vocational or work performance.

In the third section of the book, there is a discussion of the development of self-esteem, as well as of other psychodynamic issues involved in the formation of a work identity. The "Impostor Phenomenon," in which high-achieving women feel that they have "fooled everybody," is linked to ambivalent relationships with their fathers as well as to deeply rooted dependency needs. There is no attempt to link this phenomenon with the woman's feelings about

her lack of a penis. Krueger states that "most evidence indicates that girls who have the most difficulty achieving self-esteem have unresponsive fathers and mothers who fail to act as suitable models for feminine identification" (p. 102). Interestingly, it was found that both sons and daughters of women in high status positions achieved similar positions with much greater frequency than did sons and daughters in families where only the men had high status positions. The author also discusses Freud's point of view on the comparative weakness of the female superego in light of the impact of parental values on its formation.

In discussing marriage and success, the author points out how the fantasy that abandonment will result if full self-expression is realized may be insured by the choice of a mate. Most frequently, this dilemma is experienced as coming from external circumstance, and the woman does not recognize the internal conflict that colors her perceptions. The chapter, "Success Inhibition," is repetitious of observations earlier in the book about interference with achievement. The following chapter, "Work Compulsion," deals with defense against concerns involving inadequacy, guilt, and worthlessness, and compulsive attempts to reverse feelings of diminished self-esteem.

The final and briefest section is "The Treatment of Women with Success Phobia." There is nothing really new or enlightening here about specific treatment approaches for women who are fearful of success. Rather, Krueger points out that therapists must be aware of their own biases and values in order to understand their patients and not contaminate the treatment with their own personal values and conflicts. He reiterates that professionals may have different concepts of mental health for female and male patients and that culturally accepted viewpoints may find themselves infused into the treatment. In a section on the sex of the therapist, Krueger notes, in an optimal treatment, all the important issues will emerge and be scrutinized regardless of the sex of the therapist.

In sum, *Success and the Fear of Success in Women* offers little new to the competent, well-informed psychoanalyst. It does, however, pull together in one volume the various intrapsychic mechanisms involved in the failure of women to fulfill their potential, and it does point out the countertransference difficulties certain male analysts

may encounter in treating their female patients. There is no discussion of the difficulties female analysts may have. Krueger also has some disagreement with classical Freudian theory.

RUTH K. KARUSH (NEW YORK)

TAKING CHANCES: DERRIDA, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND LITERATURE. Psychiatry and the Humanities, Vol. 7. Edited by Joseph H. Smith, M.D. and William Kerrigan, Ph.D. Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 191 pp.

Jacques Derrida is difficult to introduce. He is a writer who puts into question the various terms one might use to introduce him, terms like "writing" and "philosophy" and "meaning." He is in his mid-fifties; he is one of the most celebrated French intellectuals of the day; his voluminous writings include several hundred pages of close textual analysis of Freud; and he is essentially unknown in the American psychoanalytic community. While a number of his books have appeared in translation in the past several years, his largest work on Freud, *La carte postale,* a 1980 publication, has not yet been published in English; those parts of it that have been translated have been disseminated—a Derridean key word—among various journals of literary criticism and theory. All this is to say that Kerrigan and Smith face a tough assignment. They must introduce Derrida to a new readership, translate him, and arrange for well-annotated essays about him which are engaging, informative, and assume no prior acquaintance.

By these criteria, *Taking Chances* poses a problem. It is not an uninteresting or unreadable book, but it does assume too much. To become accessible to the interested non-specialist reader, it would need a clearer and more basic introductory chapter by the editors, an annotated bibliography showing which of Derrida's texts have been translated and where they are available, and editorial introductions to the separately authored seven chapters. Since it does, however, contain a masterful if inadequately translated essay on Freud by Derrida, and several chapters on Derrida himself which are informative as they stand, I will try here to introduce him, in hopes of increasing the chances that readers will take their chances with the book.

A philosopher by training, Derrida has over the past twenty

years written out his vision of a radical method of textual analysis, "deconstruction," which undertakes to decenter taken-for-granted notions of how texts work, that is, of how they mean. This is to suggest that in many ways, deconstruction and psychoanalysis might be taken to be parallel enterprises. Both elaborate a theory of irresolvable conflict. Both, as they first introduced themselves on the intellectual scene, refused membership in any of the traditional "fields" of knowledge. Both nonetheless claimed to be applicable to many of these fields, in fact deeply to alter them. Pursuing this line of thought, one could plausibly argue that without psychoanalysis, there would have been no deconstruction.

Derrida's opening move, in his essays from the late 1960's, is to apply a repression-like concept to the history of Western philosophy. He contends that writing, as opposed to speech, has consistently been demoted to inferior status and conceived of as a mere method of recording, an aid to memory. From Plato on, speech would conventionally be associated with notions of presence, unity-with-self, and authenticity. Writing, by contrast—and this contrast, according to Derrida, was necessary to the establishment and maintenance of a whole tradition of meaning—would be associated with absence, self-deception, and artifice. This symptomatic behavior, Derrida claims, is evidence of Western philosophy's deep fear of writing, a fear the basis of which he sets out to uncover. His radical enterprise is developed through old-fashioned erudition and sheer productivity, as he applies his meticulous analytic procedure to (among others) the pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Freud. It is a massive project of reinterpretation which in stance and scope bears a compelling resemblance to psychoanalysis.

Derrida further draws attention to the resemblance between deconstruction and psychoanalysis by choosing to make an encounter with Freud one of the opening gestures of his dramatic appearance on the intellectual scene. The paper in question, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," was published in his 1967 book, *Writing and Difference*. It had been first delivered in psychoanalyst André Green's seminar at the *Institut de psychanalyse*. The paper traces the proliferation of metaphors of writing and printing throughout Freud's texts. Its central argument—to stay with the question of resemblance or influence—has a rather Freudian ring: in Der-

rida's analysis, images of writing are essential to Freud's theoretical constructions of a psychical apparatus not at one with itself, but Freud backs off from the disturbing insight this implies. That insight is that writing, an external, artificial, unconsciously determined and largely uncontrollable product, constitutes a threat to conventional views of selfhood. Freud is still caught, argues Derrida, in the tradition that had its origin in Plato's defensive devaluation of writing.

The insight thus abandoned by Freud becomes Derrida's to adopt, but not without incurring a debt and an anxiety of influence. In the preface to "Freud and the Scene of Writing," Derrida highlights this anxiety of influence by denying it: "Despite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism [i.e., the Western metaphysical tradition] is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy."[1] This is not to suggest that we must decide whether Derrida does or does not acknowledge his debt to Freud, or does or does not succeed in going beyond Freud. (It is worth noting that debt and "undecidability" are favorite and not unrelated terms in Derrida.) It is rather to suggest the complexity and importance of Freud's acknowledged/unacknowledged presence/absence in Derrida, not least as it bears on his concern with the presence/absence distinction itself.

Tracing the vicissitudes of influence, we follow Derrida's footsteps and turn from "Freud and the Scene of Writing" to the 1968 "Plato's Pharmacy." This major Derridean manifesto, published in *Dissemination*, examines Plato's devaluation of writing in the *Phaedrus*. The distinction between speech and writing is derived, in Plato, from the distinctions good writing/bad writing, or writing on the soul/writing on paper. Searching for what motivates these distinctions, Derrida uncovers in the *Phaedrus* the equation (obscured by translation) of writing with *pharmakon*, a word that means both remedy and poison. Plato's move, as Derrida reads him, would be to stabilize this ambivalence within the conceptual pair, speech/writing, from which would follow a series of other distinctions crucial to Western philosophy, e.g., presence/absence, life/death, father/son, soul/body, inside/outside. As he proceeds with the com-

[1] Derrida, J. (1967): *Writing and Difference*. Translated by A. Bass. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 196.

plex elaboration of his argument with Plato, Derrida turns to Freud for help. He summarizes Freud's anecdotal illustration of the illogic of dreams (the "kettle-logic" passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams*), and then attributes to Plato three similarly contradictory arguments about writing:

> 1. Writing is rigorously exterior and inferior to living memory and speech, which are therefore undamaged by it. 2. Writing is harmful to them because it puts them to sleep and infects their very life which would otherwise remain intact. 3. Anyway, if one has resorted to *hypomnesis* and writing at all, it is not for their intrinsic value, but because living memory is finite, it already has holes in it before writing ever comes to leave its traces. Writing has no effect on memory (quoted by Alan Bass in *Taking chances*, p. 71).

In 1967, Derrida had engaged a dialogue with Freud, only at the end to leave him behind for having defensively aligned himself with the Platonic tradition. In 1968, engaging a dialogue with Plato, Derrida brought Freud back to support the central argument of his text. These are the basic moves of the *fort:da* game with the spool, from *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: throwing the object away, bringing it back. And over the years, after writing again and again about Freud, Derrida does arrive at the repetition compulsion, in the as yet untranslated *La carte postale*. The central essay in that book, *"Spéculer—sur Freud,"* is a reading of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* through the lens of Freud's family romance.[2] The argument is that Freud's text enacts in its own structure the *fort:da* of the little boy's game with the spool; Freud is playing *fort:da* with the pleasure principle, throwing it away, only to, or in order to be able to, pull it back. The little boy, of course, is Freud's grandchild, Ernst, son of Freud's favorite daughter, Sophie.

In Derrida's analysis, the scene of grandfather watching grandson play *fort:da* evokes questions of ambivalence about transmission, whether between generations in a family or between generations of psychoanalysts. Freud wants and does not want to pass beyond the pleasure principle, as he wants and does not want to pass on his theories, as he wants and does not want to make room for new generations—to pass on. "Coming into One's Own" traces

[2] Two large sections of this essay have been translated: "Speculations—on Freud," in *Oxford Literary Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1978; and "Coming into One's Own," In *Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text*, ed. G. Hartman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978.

out a line of argument from Ernst to Sophie (and her death); to Heinerle, Sophie's younger son (and his death); to Freud's letters about his reaction to Sophie's and Heinerle's deaths; to the death of Freud's younger brother, Julius, when Freud was "the same age that Ernst was at the time that the *fort:da* was observed, one and a half."[3] And what of Freud's transmission to Derrida? We turn to the concluding lines of "Coming into One's Own," which concern the role of identification in theory-building: "If Freud's guilt is related back to the person whose death Freud experienced as his own, *that is*, that of the other (the death of Ernst's young brother as the death of his younger brother, Julius), then we have some (and only some) of the threads, some of the strings in the snare of murderous, bereaved, jealous, infinitely guilty identifications, that catches speculation in its trap. But as the snare constrains speculation, it also constrains *to* speculation with its rigorous stricture."[4]

It is Derrida's originality in working through, or writing out, his identification with Freud that claims our attention. He has given psychoanalytic literary criticism a new definition by integrating his interpretation of Freud into a reinterpretation of the entire Western tradition of writing. Whatever the force of such considerations, however, the uninitiated reader who picks up *Taking Chances* is likely to become quickly discouraged as a result of feeling treated with indifference or even insider-to-outsider hostility. Kerrigan and Smith's introduction begins by asserting: "We are arriving at a post-Strachean, post-Rapaportian vision of Freud and of experience, not altogether different from Derrida's interpretation" (p. viii). This is a good start, but it is not followed by enough clear development and demonstration. Still, the book will repay the effort of a determined reader. I advise beginning with Alan Bass's chapter, which does helpfully summarize the arguments of a number of Derrida's major essays. Next, turn to William Kerrigan's elegant and accessible "Atoms Again: The Deaths of Individualism," which locates Derrida in a tradition of concern in Western culture about atomism, disintegration, and the fate of the corpse. Then, try Derrida's "My Chances," which builds around a complex, vertiginous analysis of the expression "to believe in chance,"

[3] *Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text*, p. 145.
[4] *Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text*, p. 146.

starting with atoms falling in the void (Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius), and ending up at Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, after touching on Heidegger, Lacan, Poe (Democritus figures in the opening paragraphs of "The Murders in the Rue Morgue"), Baudelaire, and Sterne (*Tristram Shandy*). Our two basic attitudes toward chance, rationality and superstition, are distinguishable, argues Derrida, only from within "the culture of common sense that is marked by a powerful scientifico-philosophical tradition . . ." (*Taking Chances*, p. 25). The repression of writing pointed to in "Plato's Pharmacy" is now, following Derrida's encounter with *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, more clearly situated in a line of intellectual transmission: "Through several differentiated relays, this culture goes back at least to Plato, where the repression of Democritus perhaps leaves the trace of a very large symptom" (p. 25).

The other chapter I recommend is David Carroll's "Institutional Authority vs. Critical Power." Carroll examines Derrida's relation to American departments of literature and argues that they have enthusiastically taken him over in order to repress what is threatening about *his* writing. The remaining chapters tend toward obscurity, esotericism, and cuteness, and frequently assume knowledge of untranslated texts. For the purpose of this review, they do, however, raise a pertinent question. It has to do with the psychology of the in-group, and it poses itself via the symptoms of imitative pseudo-Derridean style: solipsistic wordplay, coy ellipsis, exhibitionistic intricacy. What are the repressed correlates of such parodistic tendencies? We are left musing about writing as *pharmakon*, both remedy and poison.

HUMPHREY MORRIS (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO. By Stuart Schneiderman. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 1983. 182 pp.

It is easy to dislike this book—to object to its style, which is irritating in its false informality and self-conscious preciosity, to object to its structure, a rambling "reminiscence," and to object to its content, which borders on hero worship and falls into criticism of perceived enemies. Indeed, the first chapter in particular seems to challenge the reader to stop reading. It is subjective with a ven-

geance, suggesting that the book may reveal more about Schneiderman than about Lacan. It also abounds in the associative leaps that are among the more annoying features of the book. An example is: "I have just said that the empty set, whose name is zero, corresponds to the empty grave. I could also have said that it represents the mother's lack of a phallus . . ." (p. 7).

However, the book does offer rewards to the reader who persists. One is a feel for the experience of the "Lacan phenomenon" in the Paris of the 1970's. Schneiderman does not offer a systematic history of the movement, such as is provided in Sherry Turkle's *Psychoanalytic Politics*,[1] but rather a vivid portrait of the mood in a city whose intellectual life revolved around psychoanalysis for a decade, replete with a "seminar" with five hundred in regular attendance, a new university offering diplomas in clinical psychoanalysis, and struggles between psychiatrists and philosophers for control of an institute whose founder was the subject of coverage in the mass media. The account, though it is somewhat nostalgic, does not idealize the events. For instance, Schneiderman is very frank about the divisive impact that a developing shortage of analysands had on the movement. He also includes anecdotes which provide easy ammunition for anyone predisposed to dismiss Lacan: "One of his more interesting and exasperating gestures [during sessions] was arranging piles of banknotes on his desk, to sort and count them" (p. 123). Schneiderman sees a useful symbolic meaning behind this gesture, yet he is surely aware that the gesture will scandalize some. But then, as he puts it, "The image of the psychoanalyst as Lacan embodied and cultivated it was that of a disciplined madness, a divine but controlled lunacy" (p. 110). This stance opposes the analyst to the social conventions that keep the subject alienated from his own desire.

Perhaps the most central theme of the book is the focus on the death drive. Schneiderman states that most Freudians, in particular the Americans, abandoned the notion of a death drive in favor of emphasis on libidinal drives. He relates this to what he feels is the ill-advised association between analysts and physicians promoted in particular by the American Psychoanalytic Association.

[1] Turkel, S. (1978): *Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution*. New York: Basic Books. Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1980, 49:167-168.

The physician acts and cures, and is therefore "on the side of life and love" (p. 74). Schneiderman questions the notion of "cure" in psychoanalysis, finding it aligned with a medical model: "Perhaps the analyst's expectation about cure is a fundamental obstacle on the path to any therapeutic result. . . . Psychoanalysis ought to get out of the business of thinking about how people live their lives, about how they behave . . . analysis has as its major task the repairing of the relationships people have, not with other people, but with the dead" (p. 57). There is an interesting discussion of Lacan's work on *Antigone*, which is seen as taking the oedipus complex one step further in its clear expression of man's relation to and debt to the dead. Schneiderman thus views Lacan as having challenged the repressions of the psychoanalytic establishment.

This formulation, which turns on whether one focuses on libidinal drives or the death drive, lends itself to a discussion of who is most able to further the theory and practice of analysis, physicians or philosophers. Schneiderman argues, somewhat condescendingly, in favor of the latter: "They were masters of complex theoretical elaboration, and in a head-to-head rhetorical battle with a psychiatrist there was no contest" (p. 40). This preoccupation with death indeed recalls such French philosophers as Montaigne, who, in his early work, felt that "to philosophize is to talk about death," and Pascal, who wrote that all human activity serves mainly to distract one's thinking from death. It is the relation to clinical practice which is debatable.

A detailed discussion of these propositions is beyond the scope of this review. However, an initial response to Schneiderman's argument is to wonder if it is based on a simplistic view that sees established psychoanalysis as reducing everything to oedipal conflict. Here Schneiderman appears to be guilty of one of the characteristics of the Lacanian school that he criticizes: "In making the [International Psycho-Analytical Association] into a monolith directed from New York, the French analysts were obliged to overlook some interesting and useful discoveries made on the other side of the Atlantic" (p. 87).

Part of the interest of this book is its discussion of some of the technical aspects of training and practice within the École Freudienne. The examples offered serve as windows into the life of that institution. A chapter devoted to "the pass," the École's process for

deciding upon a candidate at the end of his training, is an interesting study of how Lacan's theory influenced the institutional system. Schneiderman presents the pass as an elegant failure, a case of rigid adherence to theory leading to major stresses in the system.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter for many readers will be the one on the short session. The author argues that the usual fixed-time session is used by obsessional analysands in the service of resistance; they learn to time their associations in order to keep defended-against material out of sessions, or perhaps on the edge of sessions. While this argument is of some interest, it is not clear that the solution to this problem is a Lacan-style short session in which the analyst decides when to end the session according to how productive he feels it is. Analysands might well develop the ability to provoke a short session when they wish to.

Schneiderman ends his book by offering a sociological view of the "Lacan phenomenon" as an effort to insert Lacan into social and intellectual history. He speaks of Lacan's career as a response to the devastation of World War II. On one level, Lacan's work was an affirmation of a very French style of thought that "rendered a service to his society which it would be hard to overestimate" (p. 159) during a period of national defeat and humiliation. On another level, Lacan, by his method of alluding to and integrating the "luminaries" of Western intellectual history into his writings, was attempting to salvage what could be salvaged from a civilization whose sophistication seemed intermingled with its greatest debacle.

A reading of Schneiderman's book on Lacan is an uneven experience; it is aggravating, but also provocative and intriguing. At the very least, it presents a vivid portrait of a psychoanalytic community that is very different from anything to be found on these shores. Whether it will survive without its charismatic leader is not clear.

FRANK YEOMANS (NEW YORK)

THE NIGHTMARE. THE PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY OF TERRIFYING DREAMS. By Ernest Hartmann. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984. 294 pp.

Do different kinds of people dream different kinds of dreams? Information is sparse on this important question. With the possible

exception of Harold L. Levitan's work on the dreams of psychosomatic patients, attempts to correlate psychopathology with dreaming have not been conclusive. In *The Nightmare*, Ernest Hartmann approaches the issue from another direction. His results are surprising and interesting.

Hartmann's population of nightmare dreamers is a self-selected group recruited through newspaper advertisements. In the laboratory, they are clearly distinguishable from normal controls and from another control group that reports unusually vivid dreams that lack the frightening quality of the nightmare. As a group, the nightmare sufferers see themselves as especially creative people and try to live creative lives. They tend to be writers, artists, teachers, and therapists, often quite successful in their work.

They report having had frequent nightmares since childhood and continuing to have at least one per week as adults. They have more psychopathology than the control groups, usually of a schizoid rather than neurotic type. They have few defenses, seem to be unusually sensitive in a variety of ways, and demonstrate a characteristic that Hartmann calls *thin* or *permeable boundaries*.

Hartmann's description and interpretation of the thin boundaries concept is one of the major contributions of the book. The permeable boundaries of the nightmare sufferers permit them to identify with the experiences of others who are quite different from themselves, and to experiment imaginatively with otherness of time and place as well as person. They have the "negative capability" that Keats ascribed to the poetic sensibility. On the other hand, they are vulnerable to psychological and even physical dangers from which ordinary people can usually defend themselves more easily.

If nightmare sufferers are really typical of people with creative minds, then some ancient stereotypes about the creative personality have received at least tentative scientific confirmation. But the self-selection of the group and the lack of outstanding success among its members invite caution. Hartmann explores the issue with tact and thoroughness, mentioning but disputing Albert Rothenberg's[1] finding that professional artists and writers who receive public recognition for their work are not frequent nightmare sufferers.

[1] See Rothenberg, A. (1971): The process of Janusian thinking in creativity. *Arch. Gen. Psychiat.*, 24:195-205.

Hartmann concludes, "Scientific as well as artistic creativity requires 'regression in the service of the ego,' implying an ability to regress to a point where different realms of thought are merged, to temporarily ignore boundaries in order to put things together in a new way. This regression may be easier for people with thin boundaries" (p. 168).

I would have liked to see Hartmann apply his ideas about the personality of the nightmare sufferer more directly to the phenomenology of the individual nightmare. In the mechanism of condensation, all dreams "ignore boundaries in order to put things together in a new way." Is the nightmare different from other dreams, either in the way it puts things together or in its selection of things to be put together? He mentions that, biologically, the nightmare has some of the characteristics of an intensified normal dream, among them that it often occurs at an unusually late stage of a late REM period when very early memories are apt to be incorporated into the dream imagery.

Hartmann notes the high frequency of nightmare imagery derived from very early experience and attributes the frightening quality of nightmares in part to their tapping of very early events in the dreamer's life. Is the nightmare itself a more creative dream because it regresses further, bringing together more distant and disparate elements in the dreamer's history? Is the creative aspect of the nightmare overwhelmed in the dreamer's experience by anxiety? Does the nightmare sufferer have other dreams in which the creative aspect remains dominant? Of course, these questions are moot if the nightmare sufferer is a would-be creator and not a real one. But Hartmann's evidence is extremely suggestive.

Besides a clearly written description of the methods and findings of this major study, *The Nightmare* contains chapters reviewing the clinical and biological issues relating to nightmares and night terrors, including the nightmares of post-traumatic stress disorder. Once again, we are in debt to Ernest Hartmann for the rare kind of book that bridges the worlds of psychoanalytic and laboratory observations, bringing the two together in a new, surprising, and stimulating way.

STANLEY R. PALOMBO (CHEVY CHASE, MD.)

THE BORDERLINE SPECTRUM. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES. By W. W. Meissner, S.J., M.D. New York/London: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1984. 499 pp.

The author of this book attempts a conceptual and diagnostic reassessment of borderline phenomena as he understands them. He frankly admits that the results do not fully satisfy him. This is totally understandable, in view of the complexity of the subject.

In very scholarly fashion, Meissner has performed an extraordinary feat in reviewing the extensive, multifaceted literature relevant to the borderline personality. He places considerable emphasis on the ideas and works of Kohut, Kernberg, and Mahler. One important focus seems to be to synthesize their observations and to coordinate them with some of his own ideas to produce a relatively unified conceptual understanding of what he terms the "borderline spectrum." Meissner's substitution of the term "spectrum" for "syndrome" is acceptable, since it is more compatible with a developmental perspective and supports the viewpoint that the concept of "borderline" embodies heterogeneity phenomenologically, developmentally, etiologically, and structurally. The "spectrum" is viewed by Meissner as "disorderly" and labile, undergoing changes in the course of therapy which alter internalized representations, drive derivatives, and ego and superego structures.

Meissner is quite frank in pointing out that there are divergent opinions concerning not only the behavioral phenomena characterized as borderline, but also the structural and developmental considerations that pertain. There have been numerous attempts to define "borderline personality," but its distinction from other diagnostic categories remains ambiguous, although there is general agreement that borderline psychopathology lies somehow between neurosis and psychosis. I personally feel a certain uneasiness about this "geographical" positioning of "borderline," though there is widespread adoption of this view in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic literature. At this time, however, there does not appear to be a better way of characterizing these conditions, unless we adopt the view of those who feel that no such clinical category should be used. This would be an extreme viewpoint, perhaps in-

compatible with clinical evidence, and at variance with Meissner's views.

Part I of the book contains an excellent survey of the relevant literature. Part II is devoted to a discussion of differential diagnosis. There are chapters on the narcissistic disorders, variations in the borderline spectrum, the borderline child and adolescent, and questions of analyzability and assessment for classical psychoanalysis. Part III is on etiology. Meissner divides this section into four parts, dealing with biological, genetic factors; organic factors, including minimal brain dysfunction in childhood and adulthood; developmental aspects, including deficits originating in the separation-individuation process; and family dynamics. In Part IV, Meissner presents a "wind-up" summary of the concept of the borderline spectrum, incorporating his own frame of reference about borderline psychopathology. He invokes much of his past thinking, presented in earlier publications, on internalization and projective identification.

Shakespeare, in *As You Like It*, wrote that a good play needs no epilogue. It might have been easier to review Meissner's book if he had not added the last chapter as an "Epilogue," in which he chose to expand his own views on borderline psychopathology at the same time that he attempted to integrate them with the observations of Mahler, Loewald, Schafer, Kohut, Kernberg, Jacobson, Winnicott, and others. I found his ideas quite difficult to follow. At times it was also difficult to understand his exposition of the developmental concepts of the other authors. This was particularly evident in his references to Mahler's ideas about the separation-individuation phase. For instance, I am not sure what he means by "the emergence of object-constancies" in reference to the "gradual building-up, differentiation and organization of object-representations" (p. 433). Mahler, following Anna Freud, employed the term "object constancy" to refer exclusively to the building up of a representation of the "good mother" that persists throughout life as a highly cathected core maternal representation despite superimposed modifications and ambivalent trends.

It is also questionable whether it is appropriate to speak of a person as "maintaining a sense of object constancy or not," as Meissner does (p. 451), without defining this term more clearly. It is to be noted that Mahler viewed "object constancy" as becoming

relatively established during the immediate post-rapprochement subphase of the separation-individuation phase, roughly after the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth month of life. The internalization of the "good mother" leads to the establishment of a stable unconscious representation of the nonambivalent maternal or caretaking object that continues throughout life to exert a dynamic influence on object relations.[1]

There is much to say in support of Meissner's prodigious effort to review and summarize past and current reflections on the borderline individual and of Meissner's own serious efforts over the past fifteen years to clarify the concepts of internalization and projective identification. He has attempted to arrive at an understanding of the borderline spectrum from a developmental perspective. I find it difficult, however, to absorb or to clearly understand a number of his theoretical formulations. It is understandable that an attempt to synthesize and unify the disparate ideas of Kohut ("the grandiose self"), Kernberg (object relations theories), and Mahler (separation-individuation), and then to "Meissnerize" this mixture is likely to create a product that is difficult to digest.

This book can serve as a useful reference text for the more sophisticated psychoanalytically oriented professional, despite the fact that there is a certain unevenness in the treatment accorded different authors and ideas. Although Meissner presents some views accurately and clearly, at other times he is much more difficult to understand. Nevertheless, he deserves appreciation for taking on very difficult subject matter and approaching it with seriousness, scholarship, and thoroughness.

BERNARD L. PACELLA (NEW YORK)

WHAT DO YOU GET WHEN YOU CROSS A DANDELION WITH A ROSE? THE TRUE STORY OF A PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Vamik D. Volkan, M.D. New York: Jason Aronson, 1984. 281 pp.

Written accounts of psychoanalytic work are, like the psychoanalytic endeavor itself, beset with conflicts and compromises. Brief

[1] Pacella, B. L. (1980): The primal matrix configuration. In *Rapprochement. The Critical Subphase of Separation-Individuation*, ed. R. F. Lax, S. Bach & J. A. Burland. New York/London: Aronson, pp. 117-134.

clinical vignettes, illustrative of a theoretical or clinical point, suffer from oversimplication. Extensive presentations, such as those heard in study groups or in supervised analyses, are time-consuming, and unless there is some research goal in mind, they can become tedious.

It was in response to preparing for participation in a symposium on the therapeutic process that Volkan read a colleague's verbatim transcript of a complete analysis. He reflected on the paucity of such accounts in the literature and put together the work under review for the "nonprofessional interested in learning more about the psychoanalytic process" (p. 277).

The book is an account of a successfully completed, four-year analysis of a thirty-five-year-old physician, from initial consultation through termination. The book's sections are organized to represent each of the four years of the analysis, and the individual chapters are harmoniously arranged according to predominant analytic themes. An epilogue contains the patient's reaction to the manuscript.

The title of the book derives from the patient's either-or view of people. Had his mother, adopted as a child, been of noble birth or the child of gypsies? His attempts to "cross" roses and dandelions, to integrate the grandiose and the degraded, in himself and others, were elaborated in the analytic work. We are introduced in the preface to a recurrent childhood dream which held kernels of the infantile neurosis: "The panther leapt onto a branch . . . just outside the child's window. She spread her legs. . . . The child could see the panther's eyelids flutter in the moonlight, and he felt their alluring, seductive power. . . . He could not get enough of looking at the animal in her tree; his heart pounded with . . . excitement. . . . He looked until he thought he would go blind. . . . Suddenly [the panther] appeared before him in his room, her mouth open wide . . . it was moist and pink, with thick lips . . . [he felt terror, certain that he would be snatched up and consumed by her sharp teeth] . . . he felt hypnotized by her glowing seductive eyes. . . . he caught her scent, became aware of her warmth. . . . wanted to unite with her, no longer afraid of being consumed" (p. 2).

While the experienced analyst may feel thrust prematurely into the preoedipal and oedipal drama by so early a relevation of this

pivotal dream, it is unlikely that the nonprofessional audience for whom this book is intended will feel that the author has "telegraphed the ending." Rather, such a reader will be intrigued by and will delight in the opportunity to witness, over the analyst's shoulder, if you will, the gradual, systematic unfolding of the patient's neurosis, and the paths of discovery shared by patient and analyst.

The patient took readily to the analytic task, to which both reader and patient are introduced. The author narrates from his perspective as the clinical material emerges, which permits the reader a glimpse into the work as it proceeds. Throughout, Volkan is candid. He delights in his coups, confesses his blunders, and conveys to the reader the struggle and the exploration that are at the heart of psychoanalytic work.

The practitioner, envious of the smoothness with which the analysis progresses, as interpretations are rapidly confirmed and followed by productive new associations, must be constantly mindful that this is, after all, a condensation of the analytic work and not a verbatim account. The analyst is gentle and tactful. "Let us be curious about that," a favorite expression, is more felicitous than "What are your associations?" or "What ideas come to mind?" Analytic principles and their translation into technique are elucidated without pedantry. In returning an article, the author says, "I suggested that he take it back because if I kept it, I might be helping him to express himself in action instead of talking about his feelings, and interfering with any fantasies that might develop" (p. 135).

The reader is rewarded with the immediacy of seeing how the working analyst translates theory into practice. Transference, countertransference, interpretation, tact, and timing are repeatedly illustrated, so that the process of psychoanalysis becomes as engrossing as the "story line" itself. Even a discussion of the technical handling of a chance meeting with the patient outside the treatment situation does not escape Volkan's vigilant effort to present the essentials of the analytic work.

To say that Volkan's book does not hold the suspense of a mystery thriller or supply sufficient data for a research effort is only to say that it is not the book that Volkan did not intend it to be.

I would heartily recommend this book to anyone who wishes to

get a glimpse of the process of a psychoanalysis (and perhaps of the analytic process as well). Considering the drubbing that psychoanalysis has been taking in the popular press of late, we should be thankful for Volkan's candid and sensible contribution.

KENNETH I. GOTTLIEB (SAN FRANCISCO)

BEYOND CASE HISTORIES. BETTER TO KNOW THYSELF. By Sumner L. Shapiro, M.D. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1984. 255 pp.

Sumner L. Shapiro has written a book of "stories" that are hard to characterize. They are not case histories in the classical sense, and yet they are drawn "from true experience." In his introduction, he tells us that he has written these stories "to teach. Painlessly, through the anecdotal mode. And entertain as well" (p. vii). He admits that he has an axe to grind. He wants "to demonstrate the power and refinement of the analytic tools, and what respect they earn" (p. vii), especially in the face of the claims of anti-analytic practitioners. He states that he tries to "add new depth and also to illuminate some long neglected areas; latent homosexuality, the common phobia, instinct theory, and traumatic war neurosis" (p. vii). So saying, he sets himself a large task.

The book is composed of ten stories and vignettes, ranging in length from 2 pages to 132 pages. The author as analyst (and perhaps as patient) is omnipresent. Sometimes he is doing therapy, sometimes analysis; sometimes he is helping friends to understand their daughter. He is always teaching. In fact, part of the pleasure in reading this book is the opportunity to see another analyst's mind at work, something that is rarely captured in a more traditional case history. Shapiro is to be commended for his courage in exposing himself in this way.

Shapiro is clever, quick, erudite, and well grounded in analytic theory. His writing is not always easy to read, however, partly because his cleverness and erudition sometimes get in the way of his point, rather than clarifying it. In one of his stories, a friend comments that he writes "like a crab. Too much sideways and too little forward. Like a painter with little splotches all over the place. Later they congeal into a picture" (p. 27). Shapiro agrees, but prefers a metaphor from Melville's *Redburn*, in which he views his stories as

being like a "liquid braid," drawing from many sources but coming together in the end. He seems to be trying to give us a feeling for the analytic process as non-linear, yet headed in a direction. If persistent readers can keep this perspective in mind, they will be rewarded for their efforts more often than not.

"Pagoda Bell" is a story meant to demonstrate the workings of a fugue state in a war veteran. It is constructed something like a mystery story, with the unconscious secret a mystery to be solved. In "Dance Ballerina," the author demonstrates "the proper way to treat a phobic person using analytic tools" (p. vii). He claims it is an "argument against the here-and-now practitioners" (p. vii). My favorite story (as well as Shapiro's) is "Lost and Found," in which the author uses analytic principles (though with a very nonanalytic approach) to help a patient understand and deal with some of the conflicts surrounding adoption. Of the other stories, "Cindy," an exposition in which the author demonstrates something about the instincts and their vicissitudes, is interesting but long. My least favorite story is the last, "Damon and Phintias." It is more a novella than a short story and, to my mind, is too long and somewhat self-indulgent. It is, however, a novel exposition of some of the manifestations of the latent homosexual issues present between two friends.

One problem this book might have is finding an appropriate audience. For analysts, I fear, the insights will not be new; for the lay public, they may be too filled with material from the id. Perhaps analytic candidates, receptive to analytic ideas, yet still untrained enough to find Shapiro's forays into the unconscious filled with new revelations, would be the group most likely to learn from and be entertained by these tales. To them, I would heartily recommend the book.

MELVYN SCHOENFELD (NEW YORK)

LATE ADOLESCENCE: PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES. Edited by David Dean Brockman, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1984. 367 pp.

In his Introduction to this collection of fifteen essays, David D. Brockman reviews psychoanalytic and psychosocial data from college youths to persuasively argue that late adolescence is a specific

developmental phase. He adds that current views of late adolescence can be enriched by the recent contributions of Kohut's psychology of the self and by Mahler's developmental theory of separation-individuation.

Brockman observes that college students frequently complain of depression, while to the clinician they appear narcissistically preoccupied and withdrawn. The task of object removal, with its attendant mourning and regression in the service of defense, does not adequately account for these clinical phenomena, according to Brockman. In addition, one needs to consider selfobject failures in mirroring and idealizing. These may precipitate not only depression, but sexual perversion, hypochondriacal preoccupation, or more severe fragmentation. Perhaps a third of the contributors to this anthology are of this persuasion, but authors with different points of view have also been included. For some readers this editorial decision may make for theoretical and clinical richness and diversity; for others it may seem to lead to an unwarranted eclectic pastiche. Just a few papers, from representative points of view, will be reviewed.

In "Continuities and Transformations between Infancy and Adolescence," Joseph Lichtenberg makes the discerning observation that "a recent trend . . . to apply patterns of early development to later stages" (p. 7) may obscure the often momentous transformations which occur along the way from infancy to adolescence. Using clinical data, Lichtenberg illustrates a dual view of development as both continuous and subject to periodic transformations. Yet a couple of his vignettes seem to be at variance with this important observation. For example, sixteen-year-old Stanley was brought to treatment by his warm and caring parents because he was a solitary teenager with strained, superficial friendships. Lichtenberg was at a loss to account for these character symptoms until he saw home films of Stanley as a baby. On his back on a diapering table, Stanley was being bottle fed as his mother sat a full arm's length away. There was no observable pleasurable interaction between mother and infant. Lichtenberg concludes, "Stanley's infancy was deprived of an essential beginning for optimal social interactional development" (p. 15). Indeed, this seems to me to be an instance of applying patterns of early development to later stages without sufficiently accounting for the wide-ranging transformations of intervening development.

Robert M. Galatzer-Levy asserts that Kohut's theory accounting for the development and maintenance of the cohesive self enlarges and alters our understanding of "Adolescent Breakdown and Middle-Age Crisis." He presents clinical material to illustrate the thesis that breakdowns or impending breakdowns in parents may precipitate breakdowns in their adolescent or young adult children, and vice versa. In one of his vignettes, a twenty-four-year-old woman law student sought treatment because of "intense anxiety states accompanied by compulsive thoughts of seducing her clients" (p. 30). Implicated as the precipitant of this woman's symptoms was the gradual breakdown of her mother's character. Abandoning her former crusading law practice, the mother had become a divorce lawyer who seemed to be providing clients with new sexual contacts. More recently, the mother had confessed to her that she had had long-standing, suppressed homosexual wishes which were now being enacted with a woman the patient's age. In explaining the breakdown of his patient, Galatzer-Levy rejects the notion that, for parents, children are experienced as conscious love objects and unconscious transference objects and that this is perceived by the children. In that view, the patient's extreme anxiety and obsessional symptoms would be seen as being triggered by the mother's blatant seductions. Instead, Galatzer-Levy favors a view that the patient became symptomatic because of the failure of defensive idealizations. These idealizations had been employed to ward off feelings of rage and emptiness as a consequence of real and symbolic maternal abandonments.

In "Fixation in Late Adolescent Women: Negative Oedipus Complex, Fear of Being Influenced and Resistance to Change," Barbara S. Rocah theorizes about "bedrock resistances" revived in the maternal transference and manifested as a fear of being influenced by the analyst. Rocah describes a line of development for this resistance. She speculates that it originates in earliest infancy, before there is a capacity for differentiated self- and object representations, but that it can be known only retrospectively, after one acquires the capacity for symbolization and internalizations. She states, "The fear of loss of omnipotence and effectiveness constitutes the earliest anxiety in this series" (p. 86). When this anxiety is revived in analysis, it is "experienced as a fear of being influenced by impersonal reality (of sexual differences) and/or the fear of submission to necessity" (p. 87).

To illustrate this thesis, Rocah describes the analyses of two young women who both interrupted their treatment prematurely amid paranoid anxieties. Although Rocah discusses the conflicted sexuality of both women, her conviction is that the paranoia of these patients was the product of regression to a very early mother/infant phase of development. The problem with such a formulation is that it is speculative and cannot be verified from the clinical situation. Yet Rocah's paper is a long and closely reasoned one, and it deserves a careful reading.

For those readers who have not had much experience (but also for those who have), there are a couple of papers in this book's section on therapy which are a must. "Psychoanalytic Treatment of the Young Adult: Technical and Theoretical Considerations" by Theodore J. Jacobs lucidly and concisely fulfills the promise of its title. Jacobs persuasively argues that even late adolescence may not be the terminus of psychological development, which he believes often continues into college and post-college years. Because of the uneven development of this era, the clinical picture may indeed be confusing. For some young adults analysis may not be possible because stable compromise formations have not been achieved, an instability which compromises a capacity to form a stable transference. For those who are analyzable, the analyst's awareness of developmental issues can significantly inform and enhance technique. Often a preparatory period is necessary to demonstrate to the late adolescent or young adult the complexity of mental phenomena, a complexity which eludes quick solutions. Brief consultation with parents may be required, a parameter which does not preclude a full analysis but which may complicate countertransference reactions. Because oedipal renunciations have been so recently acquired, strong resistance to the awareness of the transference is a likely occurrence. Action is an important issue and needs to be understood from at least two points of view: as a resistance expressed in acting out; and as a newly enhanced capacity to explore, test, judge, and learn about the world and the people who populate it. Remembering, working through, and termination have special colorations in these analyses. Jacobs illustrates these ideas with a persuasive clinical example.

Should an analysis be undertaken with college students when external time constraints are known in advance? Brockman attempts to address this question in "Focal Analysis of a College Freshman."

His answers are curiously and largely devoid of self psychology references. The patient, an eighteen-year-old college freshman, dropped out of school because he was being overtaken by severe anxiety, depression, and drug-enhanced regression. Six months later he was back in school after a "focal" analysis. Brockman asks, was it analysis? He raises additional interesting questions. Was it a transference cure? A corrective emotional experience? A cognitive/intellectual exercise? Did the patient merely have self-limited, defensive regression which might have receded without intervention? The analytic script which Brockman provides to answer these questions is indeed quite persuasive. There is no question that an analysis had taken place, albeit an extremely brief one. Brockman, pursuing a standard technique, meticulously and sensitively interpreted the resistances and transferences as they emerged. Analysis of dreams permitted unconscious conflicts to become conscious. The man's unconscious view of competition as murderous oedipal rivalry was worked through in some detail. Brockman acknowledges there was no termination process—but that does not, for me, negate the significant analytic accomplishment. I believe this case report should lead all of us to rethink our views of what analysis can accomplish in a brief period of time, with selected patients. It may be that late adolescents and young adults are prime candidates for brief analyses because of the flux of their psychological organization. Brockman seems to have some trouble (as I do) with the "focal" part of "focal analysis," but this is a very small quibble about an otherwise sterling paper.

This collection of papers constitutes a very useful contribution to the study of a relatively neglected population of patients. It should be read by all. That some of its contributors employ a self psychology model for understanding data may make it more useful for some, less useful for others.

MORRIS L. PELTZ (SAN FRANCISCO)

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY: A MANUAL FOR SUPPORTIVE-EXPRESSIVE TREATMENT. By Lester Luborsky. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984. 270 pp.

A small revolution has been occurring within the psychotherapy research field during the past decade. A consensus has grown among psychotherapy researchers that an adequate formal study

of the outcome or process of psychotherapy must include, preferably in manual format, a clear description of the prescribed techniques that are applied in the treatment. It is not simply enough to label one's treatment as psychoanalytic, behavioral, or cognitive. One must specify the rationale, objectives, and techniques of the treatment as well.

Lester Luborsky, a leading psychoanalysis and psychotherapy researcher, has produced the first manual on psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and it offers considerable promise both as a research tool and as a teaching instrument. The difficulty in undertaking such a task should not be underestimated. In contrast to other therapies, such as behavioral treatment which has a clear-cut set of procedures, the psychoanalytic approach is dependent upon the kinds of communication the therapist receives from the patient, and hence, a succinct statement of procedures and responses is no easy task. Luborsky has been able to capture the spirit as well as the specific components of supportive-expressive psychotherapy in a brief, yet comprehensive form. The principles he elucidates are broad enough to encompass a wide spectrum of treatment situations and patient types while they are specific enough to offer concrete suggestions, particularly to the novice.

This manual was originally prepared by Luborsky for use in training psychotherapists in the University of Pennsylvania Department of Psychiatry. It has been used over a period of several years, and it appears to have become a valuable adjunct to the teaching of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in other training programs as well. Luborsky, in particular, acknowledges his mentors at the Menninger Foundation for introducing him to the supportive-expressive approach. Basically, it is a broad-spectrum treatment method that may be applied to a wide scope of psychopathology, from simple maladjustment reactions to the most severe characterological defects. Both supportive and expressive methods are elucidated in detail, and, depending upon the patient and the immediate situation, one aspect or the other is emphasized.

A unique feature of the book and one of Luborsky's important contributions to psychotherapy research, is his method of assessing the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme (CCRT). It is a formalization of what every therapist listens for and works with in his therapeutic endeavor. It is often referred to as the theme of the session, the "red thread" running through the patient's produc-

tions, the therapeutic focus of a given sesssion. Luborsky has provided us with a framework within which to identify the CCRT: whenever a patient describes a relationship episode, the therapist should listen for the *wish* expressed and the *consequences* to self and others, positive and negative, which are expected and, often, feared. The more expressive the treatment, the greater is the emphasis on exploration of the relationship episodes vis-à-vis the therapist, i.e., transference work. The conception embodied in the CCRT explicates nicely the central elements of therapeutic work. This should prove particularly useful to younger therapists embarking upon a psychotherapeutic career.

Luborsky very clearly emphasizes that this manual is not intended for use independently of supervision by a qualified teacher. In fact, he offers some valuable suggestions regarding the supervisory process that could be profitably read by experienced supervisors as well as by their students. What is also implied, though it is not explicitly stated in the book, is that the therapeutic task rests squarely on a foundation of knowledge and skill in psychodiagnosis and psychopathology. Thus, the diagnosis of the CCRT depends largely upon the therapist's background and sophistication in understanding the oedipal and preoedipal dynamics that become the determinants of conflictual relationships.

The use of manuals in psychotherapy research seems to be clearly indicated for particular kinds of research problems. But one wonders whether enthusiasm for writing manuals for research purposes may not have swept aside limitations in their applicability to certain types of research problems. When a researcher is engaged in a comparison of two or more treatment methods for dealing with a particular class of patient, manuals are clearly needed. The best example is the National Institute of Mental Health collaborative depression study, which investigates the comparative effects of interpersonal psychotherapy, cognitive-behavior psychotherapy, and psychopharmacotherapy. A comparison of these three approaches would not be possible without a clear stipulation of what each method consists of and without clear evidence to show that the prescribed treatment method was indeed rendered by the therapist.

However, when one is doing research *within* a given framework and when one is interested in the differential effects of, for example, a more supportive approach as opposed to a more expres-

sive approach with a particular type of patient, presentation in manual form becomes more problematic. Where the researcher is engaged in exploratory work and may not wish to prescribe a given set of procedures or where the interest is in a more naturalistic study of how a therapist performs in a given situation and what the effect may be, the manual would seem to have little or no place. The closer one gets to hypothesis testing, the more applicable is a manual, but exploratory work, particularly on the finer nuances of the psychotherapy process, would preclude the use of a manual.

Luborsky's extensive research experience is nicely applied, in various sections of the book, to bolster and enrich the author's prescriptions. He is able to bring empirical findings to bear on curative factors, countertransference, the matching of the patient and the therapist, and a host of other issues. I would like to offer a different perspective from the one taken by Luborsky, with regard to the relationship between supportive psychotherapy and the therapeutic alliance. His view, based upon his own pioneering research in this area, is that the alliance is bolstered by supportive measures alone. My colleagues and I at the Menninger Foundation have begun to accumulate research evidence that the therapeutic alliance may be strengthened by expressive, uncovering work, in particular by transference and interpretations, and that the more sucessfully one deals with the distorted relationships within the transference, the more strengthened the alliance becomes.

The book is written in clear, straightforward prose, lightened with occasional parables or anecdotes that provide humor and wisdom. There is little doubt that this pioneering manual will become a useful instrument for the psychotherapy researcher. It is likely to be even more widely used as a basic text by teachers and supervisors of psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

LEONARD HORWITZ (TOPEKA)

TRANSFERENCE IN BRIEF PSYCHOTHERAPY. AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS. By Stanley Grand, Ph.D., Joseph Rechetnick, Ph.D., Dinko Podrug, M.D., and Elaine Schwager, Ph.D. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytical Press, 1985. 146 pp.

The aim of this slim volume is to develop a sense of conviction that psychoanalytically informed brief psychotherapy can be meaning-

fully employed as an analogue for the study of psychoanalysis. Specifically, the contention is that "a time limited psychoanalytic psychotherapy organized around a neutral therapeutic stance could serve as a model for studying the emergence, development and working through of the transference neurosis" (p. 30). It is the first publication of a research project attempting to forge new methods for making psychoanalytic processes more accessible for study.

The book begins with three chapters dealing with brief psychotherapy in general, the management and analysis of transference in brief psychotherapy, and the research strategy. The authors argue that if a transference paradigm can be shown to develop in the course of brief psychotherapy conducted in a technically neutral manner, it might be possible to employ brief psychotherapy for the study of the psychoanalytic process, especially the transference. They use the single case study method to explore this hypothesis and present extensive data from multiple perspectives (an overall case report, a session-by-session analysis, and psychological testing) on a single case. This takes up about two-thirds of the book. The authors feel that the presentation of extensive clinical data is necessary to develop a sense of conviction and to permit readers to draw their own conclusions. The remaining two chapters of the book are devoted to a discussion of technical neutrality and its consequences for brief psychotherapy, the reasons they feel their aim has been achieved, and comments on future research directions.

The crux of the argument is that if a methodological correspondence can be shown between brief psychotherapy "conducted according to classical lines" (?) and psychoanalysis, and if it can be shown that comparable processes emerge, then brief therapy can be used as a laboratory analogue for the study of psychoanalytic processes. It is the therapist's neutrality and the imposition of a time limit that telescopes the therapeutic process and leads to such a correspondence, they suggest.

Here is a context of the treatment from which the data are drawn. The patient was a depressed, quite ill, middle-aged businessman referred to the research project from a cardiac rehabilitation program after a myocardial infarction three months earlier. He was seen without fee once weekly for fourteen weeks in an audio-recorded, psychoanalytically informed brief psychotherapy. The therapist and a member of the research team discussed each session and planned specific interventions for the following ses-

sion. A third member of the team administered a battery of psychological tests at the beginning and the end of the treatment, and in an eight-month follow-up. A fourth member of the team listened to all of the recorded sessions and wrote a process formulation for each session. Subsequently, all four members of the team met to discuss the case to obtain a consensus regarding the quality of the transference and its resolution. The clinical data do suggest that the therapist remained manifestly neutral, and a transference paradigm did emerge in the treatment that was similar to a paradigm that could be inferred from the psychological tests.

Are the data sufficient to confirm the author's thesis? Questions may be raised. For example, the authors' view of neutrality is one that separates listening from intervention. As they see it, if one listens with freely floating attention in an analytically neutral manner, proper interventions will follow empathically and transferences will emerge naturally. Many analysts, I think, would seriously question this view. It could be argued that while one can attempt to remain manifestly neutral in brief psychotherapy, technical neutrality implies an equidistance from conflict whose components are not readily apprehensible in the course of fourteen weekly sessions. Simply pursuing one line of questioning or intervention over another may unwittingly be siding with one of the components of conflict. The data needed for the maintenance of a truly neutral stance (as well as for conjecture, interpretation, and validation that is based more upon data than upon theory) are not likely to be available in so brief a period of time.

Similarly, one might raise questions about distinctions among transference manifestations, transference paradigms, and transference neurosis. The last involves a qualitative, highly specific importance of the analyst to the patient that is not likely to be achieved in fourteen visits. Without achieving such a level of involvement, how can one arrive at a correspondence between transference interpretation in brief psychotherapy and what takes place in psychoanalysis? Can selective, interpretative clinical activity be used to confirm a thesis, or can it be used only to *illustrate* a thesis? The case, as it is presented, can be understood in a number of different ways. These are the kinds of questions with which one must grapple in connection with this book. The extensive clinical data that are provided help in this regard.

The authors state that they are not proposing that the actual processes of psychoanalysis can be investigated through a study of brief psychotherapy. Rather, they see possibilities for the study of analogues, i.e., correlates and similarities that might lead to inferences about the actual processes. As clear as they are about this, their clinical and theoretical discussions are cast according to the classical model to a degree that leaves one wondering whether they may have been overly zealous in attempting to graft concepts applicable in one realm (psychoanalysis) to another one (brief psychotherapy) where they apply only in a limited and distant way. The book would have been strengthened by a more extended and precise discussion of the meaning of analogue research, of the processes of brief therapy at a level more attuned to the data, of the correspondence between the processes of psychoanalysis and those of brief therapy, and of which psychoanalytic processes can be studied to what degree by the use of brief therapy analogues.

Insofar as the authors' intent was to show that psychoanalytically informed brief therapy provides access to the study of transference, they have succeeded. The discussion of brief psychotherapy is most thoughtful and informative. An added bonus is that the book helps one think carefully and precisely about psychoanalytic concepts.

HENRY M. BACHRACH (NEW YORK)

THE I. By Norman N. Holland. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1985. 390 pp.

This is a giant of a book. Holland has successfully undertaken the task of writing a psychoanalytic psychology of identity. In it, he cuts through the vulgarized acceptance of that concept by pop culture, taking it as a unifier of personality, a cybernetic set of themes and variations. In doing so, he synthesizes data from clinical psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory, from neurophysiology, anthropology, and experimental psychology. He exemplifies his points through the lives of Shaw, Little Hans (Herbert Graf), Fitzgerald, and others.

Holland's qualifications for this ambitious task include training in clinical psychoanalysis coordinated with his career as a professor of literature, including the Chairmanship for many years of the

Center for the Psychological Study of the Arts at the State University of New York, Buffalo. He is now Professor of English at the University of Florida, where he founded and directs the Institute for the Psychological Study of the Arts. As he says of himself, he is addicted to ideas; this work is a frolic of ideas, for all of its serious import and conclusions. In truth, nothing human is foreign to the formulation and demonstration of his thesis.

He begins on a philosophical level, with a discussion of "holistic analysis," the convergence of thinking about a problem through the unification of meanings in symbolic and verbal actions, which bears resemblance to aspects of structuralism. Freud's famous archaeological analogy, summed up in "*Saxa loquuntur*!" or "Stones talk!,"[1] illustrates this familiar way of thinking that, carefully monitored, is internally consistent and logical, and scientific. Themes converge into a process yielding a new theme, each comprised of content that falls into further patterns; these in turn issue into the pattern explanations of the social scientist. This can stand as analogy to the experience of observer or subject in the recognition of the unity of personality and identity.

In discussing the identity theme and variations—the "I" of the title—Holland draws upon Heinz Lichtenstein's extensive work on identity as the style of being, the core of self that is temporally persistent and phenomenologically consistent.[2] The identity theme is a way of representing a person to himself and to others in telic, intrapsychic, and interpersonal modes of relatedness. He is careful to point out that one's view of another's self-identity is predicated upon the observer's own thematic identity style as well as upon that which is observed.

As I have suggested, Holland's work will be familiar to readers of this *Quarterly* through his important studies of readers' reactions to literary texts.[3] In setting forth the factors that universally enter

[1] Freud, S. (1896): The aetiology of hysteria. *S.E.*, 3:192.

[2] Lichtenstein, H. (1977): *The Dilemma of Human Identity*. New York: Aronson.

[3] Holland, N. N. (1973): *Poems in Persons. An Introduction to the Psychoanalysis of Literature*. New York: Norton.

Holland, N. N. (1975): *5 Readers Reading*. New Haven/London: Yale Univ. Press.

into readers' responses to texts, he had employed a less comprehensive version of this theory of identity. A reader reads by means of combinations of "defense, expectation, fantasy, and transformation" (DEFT). These are at the same time dimensions of meaning for the reader, perspectives of personality at work, and instances of relatedness to the text—or, we may add, to the other person—as part of one's own identity. He now adds that one "DEFTs" people as well as novels and the other arts, news stories, and other artifacts. Indeed, the arts work as does sex, and vice versa, simultaneously gratifying drives and defending against anxiety, indulging fantasy and devising transformations.

Another acronym, ARC, defines identity as "action, representation, and consequence," so that one may be said to ARC DEFTly. Thus, Holland constructs the thesis that "identity theory says we take in the other—literature, people, society, politics, culture, even our own genders and selves—through our identities, which are themselves representations" (p. 287).

Advantages of this theory of the "I" include all the advantages of holism, particularly the absence of reductivism. Identity theory, insofar as it does encompass all that is human and explicitly includes the progressive and epigenetic as well as the reductive, is not vulnerable to this logical fallacy. Holland's views are relativistic and pluralistic, relevant to clinician and theorist as well as literary critic and professor of literature.

I must reluctantly express some reservations, limited ones consistent with this necessarily limited review. Not many analysists will forsake their hard-won working principles for a theory of identity whose operational utility is not readily apparent. Moreover, the book is repetitive, only in part because of the wealth of material the author has drawn upon in enunciating his ideas. Though it is written clearly, with a joy in the language and lively views throughout, it reviews much familiar material. Those for whom it may primarily have been written, and who are likely to find it expressive of a useful operationalism, are the students and instructors of literature who seek a psychoanalytic viewpoint. For them, it should prove a stimulating discovery.

STANLEY L. OLINICK (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

FREUD FOR HISTORIANS. By Peter Gay. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 252 pp.

There are at least three main aspects to this book. It is a psychoanalytic primer intended for the edification of historians. As such, it presents mainstream psychoanalytic views succinctly and pleasingly, in relatively jargon-free, straightforward language. Secondly, the book serves as a vessel to contain reviews and asides that comment on the work of many authors, both historians and psychoanalysts. Gay's comments, some brief and some more extended, include appreciations, chidings, analyses, and suggestions. Some are stimulating and very worthwhile; all are of interest. Thirdly, the book raises a number of questions of general intellectual interest, often without providing answers.

Gay discusses the tendency of many historians towards reductionistic thinking. They prefer to limit their view of motivation to self-interest in a narrow sense, omitting consideration of such factors as sexuality, aggression, guilt, and defensive trends. Analysts, on the other hand, and Gay quotes Hartmann in support of his point, often omit self-interest from their consideration, and they neglect practical, realistic factors in their historical explanations. Analysts could perform a very useful function if they were to contribute an understanding of how libidinal, aggressive, moral, and defensive wishes interrelate with contextual, historic reality. Such a contribution would help historians to enlarge their view of self-interest and of conflicts among multiple interests. Gay chides analysts who fail to provide connections between such "hard realities" as food scarcities and technical innovations, conflicts in which the mind clearly has an important share, such as class antagonisms, and the "murky underworld of the concealed and contradictory emotions that are the psychoanalyst's chosen playground" (p. 119). Neither the rational nor the irrational, neither fantasy nor the real, should be slighted.

Gay proposes a second problem issue. This relates to the understanding of the connections between individual biography and group behavior. He believes insufficient work has been done in furthering the understanding of interrelationships between crowd psychology and the functioning of institutions and individual psychology, between what he calls "the stubborn self" and "indispensable and stifling culture."

Gay's predominant message as revealed in this book is his belief that historical and psychoanalytic understanding can and should further develop interconnections that have, until now, been only indicated. He commends the work of Crews and Hawthorne on Woodrow Wilson, and Demos on Salem witchcraft, among others, as pioneering efforts tending in what he sees as a desirable progress toward "total history."

The book is urbane and wide-ranging. It reflects an interesting and educated mind, and reading it is certain to be rewarding to those with even a modest interest in the subject.

ERNEST KAFKA (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES ON ART. Edited by Mary Mathews Gedo. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press, 1985. 322 pp.

The future of psychoanalysis resides—or so many believe—in its ability to contribute to interdisciplinary study, whether it be with neurobiology on one hand or with the humanities on another. Emerging from its long isolation, psychoanalysis is increasingly finding its place in the scholarly and academic communities. It is, as I have written elsewhere, "seen by many students of the humanities not so much as an obscure therapeutic process but as a body of thought available, like others, for use in scholarly investigations about the human mind and its products."[1]

The appearance of this new annual represents another manifestation of this growing trend. A truly interdisciplinary project, it seeks to join scholarly efforts of psychoanalysts and art historians to explore meanings, motives, and methods in the interface of the study of cultural artifacts and that of those who have created them. The outcome of this labor is a beautifully designed, lavishly illustrated, and elegantly produced volume that represents, I believe, a worthy, if not entirely successful, beginning.

The book is divided into four sections, dealing respectively with aesthetics and "art history"; "self-portraiture"; sculpture; and book reviews and authors' responses. A wide range of material is covered, from Michelangelo to Delacroix's *Michelangelo in His Studio*,

[1] Esman, A. H. (1984): Review of *Psychiatry and the Humanities, Vols. 1, 2, 3*, ed. J. H. Smith. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 53:193.

from Impressionism to Expressionism, from the Renaissance to Klee and Moore. In the main, the set-pieces are by art historians with varying psychoanalytic orientations, while the analysts seem to be limited to the book review section and to critical response to the primary essays. Perhaps in future volumes they will show more temerity (if less prudence).

The lead essay, a somewhat attenuated version of the key chapter in her recent book, *Art and Psyche*,[2] is Ellen Handler Spitz's masterful critical review of pathography—"Freud's original psychoanalytic approach to art." Spitz ranges widely through the literature of psychoanalysis and aesthetic theory to demonstrate the origins of Freud's method in the Romantic theory of art-as-expression. She judiciously sets forth both the limitations and the potential merits of pathographic analysis and the need for what she calls "a serious dialogue with contemporary aesthetics" to fulfill its heuristic potential.

Such a dialogue follows: a discussion by Steven Z. Levine on the relationship between Monet's imagery (especially in the *Nympheas*) and Freud's conception of the roots of art in unconscious fantasy, with a thoughtful response by Gilbert Rose which, characteristically, emphasizes the formal issues in Monet's work and challenges the hitherto popular notion of regression in creative activity—"less a regression in the service of the ego than a progression in the service of the id" (p. 60). Donald Kuspit contributes a typically dense but challenging Kohutian essay on the Expressionist "cry" as a "narcissistic act"—a protest of the "self" against the sense of the world's chaos and its reflection in self-disintegration.

Mary Gedo, the editor, offers her own penetrating study of the autotherapeutic role of a group of small paintings in Goya's response to the near-fatal illness which deafened him but left him "transformed from a painter of pretty Rococo pictures into an artist of dark expressionist powers" (p. 100). Jack Spector's speculations on the psychogenesis of Delacroix's Michelangelo portrait, not entirely convincing, are followed by Michelle Vishney's imagi-

[2] Spitz, E. H. (1985): *Art and Psyche. A Study in Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics*. New Haven/London: Yale Univ. Press.

native, affecting, and persuasive treatment of the changes in Klee's self-representation as it appeared over the span of his life's work.

Probably the most ambitious and least successful paper in the book is Francis O'Connor's attempt to apply a curious blend of Jungian analysis and a quasi-mystical, cyclical theory of the life cycle to the history of frontal self-portraiture in European art. Its pretentions are not equaled by its achievement, though the range of scholarship is impressive. His conclusion that "the artistic process is essentially psychodynamic . . . [and] the making of a frontal self-portrait . . . can sustain an act of self-confrontation and self-renewal even in the face of death" (pp. 212-213), while doubtless true, could have been supported by a less grandiose explanatory system.

Space does not permit a thorough review of Laurie Wilson's sensitive attempt to root Louise Nevelson's ostensibly non-figurative images in the events and conflicts of her colorful life history, or of Laurie Schneider's essentially descriptive essay on the mother and child theme in Henry Moore's art. The final section is dominated by John Gedo's brilliantly contentious review of Robert S. Liebert's "Michelangelo" book,[3] and by Liebert's measured response. Gedo offers a very different view of Michelangelo from that of Liebert, and, like such art historians as Leo Steinberg, he offers some acute challenges to certain elements of Liebert's scholarship and to his reconstruction of Michelangelo's early life. He and Liebert agree, in the end, that each has discovered his own Michelangelo and that the "true" Michelangelo, like all absolutes, will forever elude us.

For the analyst who cares about the place of art in human existence and who believes that psychoanalysis can help to elucidate and enrich the aesthetic experience, this first volume of an integrative annual will be welcome and rewarding. The level of scholarly achievement demonstrates, I believe, the possibility of true collaborative work in this as in other areas of mutual interest to psychoanalysts and humanist scholars.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

[3] Liebert, R. S. (1983): *Michelangelo. A Psychoanalytic Study of His Life and Images*. New Haven/London: Yale Univ. Press. Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1985, 54:311-316.

SYMBOLIZATION AND CREATIVITY. By Susan K. Deri. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1984, 364 pp.

In this difficult, ambitious book, Susan Deri attempts to revise Freudian metapsychology. Her language and concepts are taken from philosophy, Gestalt psychology, and Kurt Lewin's field theory, as well as from psychoanalysis. At first reading, the book appears dense and impregnable, but subsequent examination reveals an underlying cohesiveness and many nuggets of creative perception.

Deri places the "organismic urge" toward creativity, defined as meaningful "form creation of any kind" (p. 3), at the heart of her system. She considers psychoanalysis to be a subspecies, generic theory of structural development which follows the laws of Gestalt psychology (e.g., closure, figure-ground, and symmetry). Within it, percepts are inherently organized into more or less veridical patterns. Thus Deri places psychoanalysis within an overall biopsychological framework.

Deri agrees with the philosophers, Ernst Cassirer and Suzanne K. Langer, that man shapes his world by creating symbols out of percepts. She defines symbols as formed gestalts which carry meaning. They create bridges between the individual and the outer world and between different regions of the self. They transform chaos into order by selectively articulating resemblances between raw percepts, thereby allowing us to move beyond concrete reliance upon the present and the specific. Deri hypothesizes that, ontogenetically, symbols originate in the infant's wish to bridge the gap to the absent mother. These protosymbols are the wishful hallucination of the breast and the first transitional object. Symbols act as mediators and energy binders, delaying the push toward immediate drive discharge and thereby safeguarding organismic wholeness. According to Deri, the true function of symbolization is communication. She takes issue, therefore, with the narrow approaches to symbolism in traditional psychoanalysis that limit it to a disguise for or indirect representation of a repressed image or fantasy.

Deri finds Freud's topographic theory, with its emphasis on the transformation of primary into secondary process, most congruent with her interest in form creation and structure building. She particularly draws upon Freud's 1915 paper, "The Unconscious," in

which he stated that the unconscious is capable of development and that preconscious does not originate solely from external perception. Deri's major focus is on harmonious energy transformations, both from the formless unconscious and from perceived external reality, into the symbolic map of the preconscious. She stresses the importance of the preconscious for symbol formation, form development, and creativity. To the extent that the repression barrier is operative, she states, the preconscious, impoverished by its lack of connection with the energy of the id, loses its ability for creative symbolization. In her emphasis upon the necessity of unity and connectedness between the different regions of the psyche, she finds the structural theory's focus on conflict and dichotomization particularly uncongenial.

Deri also rejects the traditional explanations of creativity as the expression of sublimated instinctual energy, as a result of neutralized energy, or as regression in the service of the ego. Any attempts to explain creativity in terms expressive of pathology or of instinctual displacement are alien to Deri, who views creativity as the normal result of a biopsychological drive toward structured gestalt formation.

Deri's stress on connectedness between the individual's inner life and his or her surrounding environment, as well as her view of culture, made up of meaningful symbols as a potential source of fulfillment, leads her to embrace Winnicott's concept of "transitional space." She views this intermediate territory between private illusion and outside reality as performing an essential bridging function. Developmentally, enjoyment and love of reality are seen as mediated for the infant through the internalization of the good mother's image, which contributes to "the creation of the preconscious as an internal 'playground' for symbolic creativity" (p. 265).

In keeping with her emphasis on the communicative use of symbols in mental health, Deri views the analytic situation as a second chance at utilizing a creative play space. Within this transitional arena patients with developmental deficiencies in symbolization and those who suffer from repression or splitting can develop or repair missing or distorted communication between regions of the self.

There are a number of clinical illustrations in the book. They demonstrate the work of a gifted clinician and contain several illu-

minating therapeutic suggestions. However, while aspects of her therapeutic work—for example, her focus on authentic dialogue between patient and therapist, her treatment of development deficits by non-interpretive methods, and the use of empathy as a curative tool—can certainly be seen as being informed by her theory, they might as easily have been derived from other theoretical models. This is a minor caveat, but I have a more serious one.

Deri assumes that, in the pathology of the "missymbolizing" patient, the lack of a specific form of maternal deprivation can be discerned, e.g., the apathetic, "empty" patient has had a mother with "vacant eyes." This direct attribution of the characteristics of a type of adult patient to an assumed quality in a parent has frequently been criticized as fallacious. In addition, such one-to-one linkage leaves little room for the elaboration of an individual, creative fantasy life. I suspect that Deri's relative neglect of this form of creative endeavor is due to its organization around conflictual issues. In her preoccupation with unity and connectedness between intrapsychic regions and between the individual and the outer world, Deri minimizes both the role of separateness and the place of conflict in normal functioning, thus excluding aspects of psychic processes necessary for both symbolization and creativity. A distaste for the dichotomizing, differentiating dimensions of psychic reality is perhaps one reason for a certain lack of conceptual clarity in Deri's presentation.

Deri is among those who are attempting, through their unique configurations, to reformulate psychoanalytic concepts in order to accommodate new perspectives about human nature. There are difficulties with a number of her theoretical and clinical positions. Nevertheless, her efforts to direct attention to the central, nonpathological role of symbolism and creativity in human development, to reconsider the importance of preconscious processes, and to place psychoanalysis in a broad-based, biopsychological framework are thought-provoking and make this book worth reading.

DALE MENDELL (NEW YORK)

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. XXXVIII, 1983.

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To cite this article: David A. Lake (1987) Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. XXXVIII, 1983., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 409-425, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927180

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927180

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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ABSTRACTS

Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. XXXVIII, 1983.

Abstracted by David A. Lake.

On the Process of Mourning. Jeanne Lampl-de Groot. Pp. 9-13.

In honoring the late Marianne Kris, Lampl-de Groot reconsiders the concept of mourning and advocates restricting it to the gradual process of coping with the pain caused by the death of a loved one and finally reinvesting another object with libido. The cognitive notion of future is necessary for mourning. For the young infant, who cannot understand the finality of death, such loss is indistinct from experiences of loss during the mother's temporary absence or from the sense of loss created by her incomprehensible affective changes (prior to establishment of libidinal object constancy). Two factors are crucial to the outcome of mourning: the mastery of guilt based on both unconscious infantile death wishes and feelings of triumph, and a capacity to sublimate destructive impulses. Age-specific life crises (such as the departure of grown children from home, retirement from work, and the physical effects of old age) may reintensify neurotic conflict and depressive affect, but these processes should be distinguished from mourning. In old age, just as opportunities for finding new love objects are declining, mourning often involves the loss of many beloved persons, and parts of the self, including memory; certain psychological functions and the image of a vigorous, reliable body may be irretrievably lost as well. The author suggests that in their place older people recathect memories of past satisfying relationships. She is thankful for her own memory of Marianne Kris.

Freud's Use of Metaphor. Jonathan T. Edelson. Pp. 17-59

Edelson addresses Freud's scientific use of metaphor, studying his writings in the light of modern philosophical reflections on the structure of metaphor. Metaphor is the essence of scientific theory, an approximate representation of the unknowable structure of reality, an approximation to the reality of mind. A metaphor expresses an interactive analogy, a structural correspondence between two subjects. The primary subject and the ideas evoked by it (its implicative complex) contribute to our sense of the meaning of the secondary subject, which in turn enhances the meaning of the primary subject. Edelson traces the role of metaphor in unifying and differentiating the central theories of psychoanalysis, themselves metaphors. Metaphor is uniquely related to the dream: condensation, displacement, and considerations of representability create "fresh parallels," acceptable to censorship. Edelson discerns three central types of metaphor in *The Interpretation of Dreams*: language and textual, weaving and tapestry, and pathway, each an aspect of the central metaphor of mind as a woven network of thought. In analyzing a dream, we progressively replace inadequate metaphors, those that are highly disguised and condensed, with a series of less disguised and, temporarily at least, more adequate metaphors as we proceed toward the dream's latent content. This dynamic use of metaphor can be characterized as syntonic if each succeeding metaphor adds to the previous body of metaphor without replacing it, and as diachronic where the new metaphor is discontinuous with the old, subsuming or replacing it. In psychoanalytic theory-building, the

structural model diachronically supersedes the topographical model, while syntonically coexisting with it over different domains of mental life.

Is Testing Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Psychoanalytic Situation Really Impossible? Marshall Edelson. Pp. 61-109.

The author argues against the recent trend—following Grünbaum—to redefine psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic discipline because its hypotheses are not scientifically testable in the psychoanalytic situation. Is psychoanalysis a natural science? Three ways to support a hypothesis are: enumerative inductivism (a hypothesis is supported if a number of instances of its applicability can be described), falsificationism (a hypothesis is corroborated if a rigorous, empirical test to falsify it fails), and eliminative inductivism (a hypothesis is supported if evidence shows it preferable to rival hypotheses and if the evidence has been obtained in a manner that eliminates other plausible explanations). Edelson traces Freud's 1917 statement that interpretations are rejected if they do not tally with the patient's psychological reality. This "tally argument" has been attacked by Grünbaum, who believes that data obtained in the psychoanalytic situation are inevitably too contaminated to provide validation of theory. Edelson rejects the restrictiveness of current scientific methods of validation. He favors consideration of less powerful, supplementary means for obtaining support for hypotheses. Citing some of Freud's case examples, he argues that hypotheses can be scientifically tested in the non-experimental, non-quantitative, single case study, but he urges a greater regard for disciplined scientific reasoning within the psychoanalytic community.

Development. Samuel Abrams. Pp. 113-139.

Abrams examines psychological transformations—the progressive differentiations of constituent elements of the psyche which become integrated in increasingly complex organizations. Experiences are organized as hierarchical phase organizations. These are complex structures that mediate psychological function, which is thus experienced as continuity in the midst of discontinuity. Development, a matter of transformation rather than linearity, is characterized by regression, arrest, and overlap of phase organization. Abrams reconsiders the major psychoanalytic developmental theories in terms of scope, focus on constitutional or environmental aspects, approach to defining developmental phase sequence, type of observational data systematized, and level of abstraction of that data.

Adoptive Parents. Generative Conflict and Generative Continuity. Harold P. Blum. Pp. 141-163.

Adoption influences the fantasy systems and the unconscious communications of each member of the family. Identity integration is influenced in the adopted child, his adoptive parents, and grandparents. Blum examines the conflicts and crises that accompany each stage of adaptation to the adoption process. The infertility which usually precedes adoption can be associated with a sense of castration, punishment, narcissistic injury, anxious over-investment in biological techniques, and marital crisis. Adoptive parents may tend to blame the child for not providing narcissistic

compensation, often fearing that the child is a "bad seed." Such children may see themselves as having been abandoned or as the survivors of parents whom they have killed or alienated; their family romance fantasies often denigrate everyone. There are fantasies of child-stealing and talion kidnapping. Adoption may violate family narcissism—the wish of parents to relive an idealized version of their own childhood and to renew symbolically their own parents' procreativity. The atmosphere around the child can be one of mourning and intergenerational ambivalence.

The Prerepresentational Self and Its Affective Core. Robert N. Emde. Pp. 165-192.

Infants at eighteen months recognize their own images in pictures or mirrors, respond with personal pronouns, and exhibit self-awareness in organization of cognitive tasks. Emde argues for a view of self as process, referring to synthetic functions that predate cognitive self-awareness (the representational self) and continue to develop throughout life. He cites three biological principles that organize early development and are fundamental attributes of all later versions of the self: self-regulation (beginning with the neonate's regulation of state), social-fittedness (self-definition developing in a social matrix and inaugurated during mother-infant eye-to-eye interaction), and affective monitoring between mother and child. Current research points to the centrality of affective experience within an interactive matrix; organization of this experience forms a core experience of self. Perception by the child of the social situation and the caretaker's emotional availability are of great importance; by fifteen months, infants should exhibit a long-developed and coherent affective self.

The "Stimulus Barrier": A Review and Reconsideration. Aaron H. Esman. Pp. 193-207.

The infantile stimulus-barrier, a concept derived from Freud's hypothetical *Reizschutz*, has at least two interpretations: as a non-selective passive shield and as an active proto-defense mechanism. It serves to limit external stimuli so as to minimize overstimulation. Stages of neurological maturation are cited to demonstrate its existence. Recent infant studies, however, strongly contradict this: neonatal avoidant responses do not act categorically to minimize internal states of excitation, but are selective. Alternative formulations to the barrier-against-penetration model of stimulus processing propose that infants regulate perceptual experience within a framework of object attachment and information processing. Infants seek out stimuli they can assimilate and accommodate to; the mother provides appropriate stimulation and protects the child from inappropriate sensory experiences at each level of development.

Self-Preservation and the Care of the Self. Ego Instincts Reconsidered. E. J. Khantzian and John E. Mack. Pp. 209-232.

Going beyond exclusive emphasis on aggressive drives and their vicissitudes, the authors define self-care as including libidinal investment in self, capacity to anticipate danger, ability to regulate unsafe impulses, appreciation of mastery, knowledge of the world and of one's limits, capacity for aggression in the service of self-

protection, and object-related tendencies to choose non-destructive, non-threatening others. Self-soothing is distinct from self-care and precedes it; adequate self-care requires representational learning and develops in the context of highly attuned reciprocal interactions involving comforting, limiting, anticipating, and renouncing. It becomes internalized when integrated with self-esteem. Self-care is in dynamic interaction with other developing structures and is especially vulnerable to regression with disruption of parental attachment.

Struggling against Deprivation and Trauma. A Longitudinal Case Study. Sally Provence. Pp. 233-256.

Provence describes in detail the first fifteen months in the life of Anne, to examine the interrelatedness of drives and ego development and object relations. During Anne's first year, her mother largely avoided holding, cuddling, and comforting her, and only rarely initiated affective play. The mother habitually postponed feeding her until her crying was prolonged and intense. By eight months all goal-directed behaviors were retarded, including language and motor competence, and she displayed anxiety and crying at her mother's approach. By eleven months she appeared fragile, withdrawn, and hardly able to play. Her entire first year showed disturbance in body ego and autonomous functioning, as well as a diminished investment in self and object. With the onset of walking and renewed involvement of her father, her apathy lessened; she became less socially detached. Her object relations, however, were characterized by anger, rage, and protest (in sharp contrast to institutionalized infants), and she showed signs of disturbance of ego development as well as drive development and integration.

Infants of Primary Nurturing Fathers. Kyle D. Pruett. Pp. 257-277.

Pruett studied seventeen two-parent families of firstborn children whose fathers bore primary responsibility for caretaking. The infants proved to be vigorous and competent, without apparent gender identity disturbance, and their fathers capable of intensely nurturing, reciprocal attachments. The fathers' caretaking styles reflected their selective identifications with their parents and spouses and their needs to nurture and be nurtured. The infants showed heightened appetite for novel stimuli, possibly as a consequence of fathers' more active styles, and possibly due to the heightened libidinal commitment of two parents. The author challenges the usual theoretical distinction between primary and secondary love objects and suggests that the infants thrived in consequence of their integration of distinct and more balanced parental attachments and their stimulus-rich experiences of mutual regulation.

The Sibling Experience. Introduction. Albert J. Solnit. Pp. 281-284.

Introducing the five papers which follow, Solnit delineates the research method of the Sibling Study Group of the Child Study Center at Yale. What aspects of the sibling experience promote development? Hypotheses were initially generated from longitudinal observations of a relatively stable family with little overt pathology.

The Psychoanalytic Literature on Siblings. Alice B. Colonna and Lottie M. Newman. Pp. 285-309.

Colonna and Newman thoroughly review Freud's observations on siblings, as well as those of Klein, Winnicott, Jacobson, Greenacre, and others. They recommend that investigators study sibling transferences in analysis; the development-enhancing effects of characteristic sibling play, sibling admiration, and social modeling; and atypical variations of the sibling experience, such as the effects of separation from and loss of a sibling and the experience of the physically ill or handicapped sibling.

Parents and Siblings: Their Mutual Influences. Marianne Kris and Samuel Ritvo. Pp. 311-324.

The relationship between siblings is profoundly affected by and profoundly affects other aspects of family life and development. The second pregnancy affects the firstborn. Parents' idealized expectations of the sibling relationship bring disappointment. There is increase in caretaking responsibilities; they must help the firstborn accept the permanence of the newborn in the face of his or her wish to get rid of it. Problems may arise when parents transfer ambivalent attitudes toward their own siblings onto their children. No less troublesome are parental tendencies to split and to project ambivalent character attitudes onto their children. The child's oedipus complex often uses a sibling in a displacement from a parent. Siblings mutually alter the timing and quality of their psychosexual development. Libidinal development is shaped in mutual play characterized by rapid shifts from one modality and erogenous zone to another. For the older child, stages may be intensified regressively or prolonged as the younger develops; the younger child, on the other hand, may be stimulated precociously or be forced into passive roles in play. Aggression is a problem for the older child, to be dealt with by identification with the parents and the wish to be loved by them.

The Importance of the Sibling Experience. Peter B. Neubauer. Pp. 325-336.

Rivalry, jealousy, and envy are the core factors in the sibling experience. Neubauer discusses this and points out the interpersonal and intrapsychic developmental variables that influence the sibling experience in personality organization and pathogenesis.

Development-Promoting Aspects of the Sibling Experience: Vicarious Mastery. Sally Provence and Albert J. Solnit. Pp. 337-351.

The authors propose that the sibling relationship offers the child a potentially rich opportunity for experiencing social exchange and solution of interpersonal conflicts. They illustrate this with the example of the development of a four-and-a-half-year-old boy and his two-and-a-half-year-old sister. The older child initially viewed the new baby as one who takes away what he values, but he gradually moderated his aggression. The authors show how this came about. He gradually identified with his parents as caretakers and through a process of expanding empathy

(and projective identification) became an expert on what the baby needed. When the older child ridiculed, scolded, and pushed his sister, he was regressing and experiencing castration anxiety. For the younger child, on the other hand, a sibling was a part of the given environment. The authors trace her attachment to her brother, her fascination with him, and her vigorous attempts to imitate him. Ambivalent tendencies evolved in association with her envy of his bodily skills, penis, and toys, all of which she actively tried to possess for herself. When her brother began school, she displayed a marked separation reaction. Where there are relatively unambivalent parent-child relationships, the sibling experience of developmental closeness enhances empathic communication and vicarious experiencing of the other; practice mastery and the development of a community of interests further self-definition and confidence in the strength of self and family.

The Revival of the Sibling Experience during the Mother's Second Pregnancy. Janice Abarbanel. Pp. 353-379.

To illustrate how a mother's own childhood sibling experience organizes her relation with her firstborn and affects her capacity to prepare the child for the change in family structure, Abarbanel compares two mothers during their second pregnancies and postpartum periods. One recalled her own intense rivalry with her sister, fourteen months older, for the limited attentions of her distant, hypochondriacal, career-preoccupied mother. She felt she and her sister were poorly differentiated in her mother's eyes, and to distinguish herself, she came to see herself chiefly in opposition to her sister. Vowing not to lose herself in her own children, she withdrew from her daughter, enrolled her in a series of distracting outside activities, and did not prepare her for the new baby. She reversed her experience with her own mother and treated her daughter as a representative of her older sister, a hated, dangerous rival. Her daughter developed a sleep disorder and became oppositional, regressed, and depressed. By contrast, the other mother had experienced reciprocal closeness with her parents and older sister. She was therefore attuned to her own daughter's reactions in anticipation of the birth. Her daughter, in close interaction with her mother, was able through play to try out for herself roles of proud big sister, pregnant mother, guardian of her own possessions, and infant. She greeted the birth of the new baby largely with pleasure. Sibling constellation in a mother's nuclear family may be powerfully recreated in her experiences with her own children.

Problems of Pathogenesis: Introduction to the Discussion. Anna Freud. Pp. 383-388.

Anna Freud introduces the discussion by calling attention to the trend to identify the unempathic mother of early infancy as the principal agent of (seemingly irreversible) pathogenesis, and to the absence of data in support of the currently popular hypothesis that the unempathic mother solely determines pathogenesis in her children. An early empathic mother-infant relationship does not safeguard against the loss of early gains and the development of pathology. We must also consider traumatic separation and inadequate caretaking, the mother's resistance to object-differentiated separation and individuation, the infant's vulnerability to diminution

of intimacy as it attempts to moderate the exclusive bond with mother and turns to father, and the persistence of primitive characteristics and early object relations into later phases of development.

Clinical Notes on Developmental Pathology. Clifford Yorke. Pp. 389-402.

Yorke focuses on the array of developmental disorders in childhood. He illustrates the variety of pathogenic conflicts in three children who experienced very early and quite similar disturbances in their relationships with their mothers. Developmental deviation in one child, developmental disharmony within the developing ego in a second child, and ego inhibition in the third, resulted from these similar causes. Yorke urges investigators to differentiate among preconflictual states of mind, expectable developmental conflicts, modes of conflict resolution, inadequate synthesis of conflict, and neurotic and adaptive synthesis. He also suggests that structural regression, developmental line reversion, and developmental deviation, disharmony, and arrest be distinguished when hypotheses are formed.

Determinants of Free Association in Narcissistic Phenomena. Anton O. Kris. Pp. 439-458.

Anton Kris studies free association of adult analysands. The central determinant of narcissistic associational patterns is the cycle of unconscious punitive self-criticism projected onto the analyst, self-deprivation, and insatiable demand. The patient's wish for the analyst's love leads to insatiable demandingness, which further heightens the sense of guilt. The externalization of unconscious guilt results in a conflict of ambivalence: the patient's desire to freely express associations is coupled with fears of criticism, of loss of the good relationship with the analyst, and of shame. Kris challenges the developmental formulations of self psychology, which view the characteristic attitudes of the narcissistic analysand as self-object transferences, versions of very early memories of past relationships. This minimizes the role of unconscious guilt, externalization, and conflicts of ambivalence.

The Fate of Screen Memories in Psychoanalysis. Eugene Mahon and Delia Battin-Mahon. Pp. 459-479.

The authors argue that screen memories undergo transformation in psychoanalysis and that the analysand's sense of this change, near analytic termination, is an index of structural change. Freud believed screen memory is related to repressed memories of childhood guilt, as the highly condensed manifest content of a dream is to the latent dream thoughts. Four clinical cases illustrate the authors' thesis that the transference neurosis can function as if it were a newly created screen memory. As the transference neurosis is analyzed, the meaning of the screen memory becomes altered and decathected.

The Contribution of Psychoanalysis to the Psychotherapy of Adolescents. Peter Blos. Pp. 577-600.

Blos combines theoretical discussion of adolescent development and psychotherapeutic aims with presentation of the once-weekly psychotherapy of a fourteen-year-old agoraphobic girl over a period of five months. He proposes that psychotherapy

aims to bring tolerance of anxiety and depressive affect. The therapist reacquaints the adolescent with inner conflict and self-illusion, thus helping him or her to deal with the most difficult task: de-idealization of self and object. This process frees the adolescent from infantile object relations. Blos also discusses assessment of normality in adolescents. He offers a clinical illustration to make clear his view.

Hans Christian Andersen and Children. Phyllis Greenacre. Pp. 617-635.

Greenacre presents a fascinating sketch of the life of Hans Christian Andersen and discusses his relationship to children, which was permeated by extraordinary ambivalence, pervasive anxiety, and a phobia of bodily contact. She surmises that Andersen, the son of a prostitute who married only two months before his birth, was neurotically preoccupied with the uncertainty of his paternity (and consequently tended toward family romance), with his relationship during his first year of life with his illiterate and superstitious mother, with his bisexual identification, and with rage. He was never able to marry and become a father, but sustained himself with a conviction of his own greatness as a gift from God. From her analytic experience with individuals susceptible, like Andersen, to explosive wishes to kill, Greenacre surmises that he suffered from unalleviated infantile distress.

Journal of Child Psychotherapy. IX, 1983.

Abstracted by Asher Rosenberg.

Thoughts on Autism with Special Reference to a Paper by Melanie Klein. Frances Tustin. Pp. 119-131.

After demonstrating Melanie Klein's developing awareness of the syndrome of early infantile autism thirteen years before Leo Kanner's paper on the topic, the author discusses some of her own extensive analytic experience with autistic children. Of special interest is her formulation of the "pathological autosensuous object," the hard objects (such as a toy car) which autistic children characteristically carry about and to which "they cling tenaciously." The author believes she has discovered the phenomena antecedent to these objects from those autistic children who have come to trust her enough to reveal their surreptitious body manipulations (tongue, cheek, regurgitated food, anus). These objects can be relied upon to "provide the sensations the child wants, just when and where he wants them," like the internal, controlled, precursor body sensations. Both the body manipulations and the hard objects are used by the child to ward off the dreaded experience of "not-me" which is the basis of the autistic pathology. Soft transitional objects, the bridge to the "not-me" experience, are rejected.

Brief Intervention with the Mother of a Congenitally Damaged Newborn Infant: An Application of Psychoanalytic Principles to Infant Psychiatry. Robert Garwood, Ivan Sherick; Antal E. Solyom. Pp. 185-196.

The mother of an infant born with transposition of the great vessels was started in weekly psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy after observation indicated that she was becoming increasingly withdrawn from her infant boy. Feelings of guilt and shame from various periods in her life were revived and focused by her current life

situation. She expressed fear of her death wishes toward her infant. As these feelings emerged and were partially worked through in psychotherapy, the longed-for perfect child could be mourned, and the patient was able to assume a loving, maternal role which promoted her child's adaptation. The relative availability of the patient's fantasy life in this therapy is presented and viewed as supporting the theoretical position that pregnancy and the postnatal period predispose to a greater accessibility to otherwise unconscious aspects of mental life. The broad and important implication of the article and the theory is that a psychoanalytically oriented consultant-therapist is strategically placed for achieving wide-ranging and long-lasting results with brief interventions in obstetrical and neonatal settings.

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XLVIII, 1984.

Abstracted by Sheila Hafter Gray.

The Interpretive Moment: Variations on Classical Themes. Fred Pine. Pp. 54-71.

The author suggests ways to present an interpretation to a very fragile patient. While the psychoanalyst may need to employ a style of presentation that tends to enhance the patient's experience of the therapist as an understanding and participatory presence, the aim of the work remains identical to that of classical psychoanalysis, to promote insight. There is no expectation that the patient will reply to an interpretation with further associations. The timing of the interpretation is shifted away from the moment of heightened affectivity to one that tends to minimize the possibility of affective flooding. The psychoanalyst may thus delay offering the interpretation until the strong affects have abated somewhat, in order to prevent disorganization and to maintain the patient's defenses at their optimal level. Also, the patient may be asked to indicate whether he or she is ready to listen to the analyst's comments; and the extent and duration of the interpretation is left within the patient's control. This technical variation, offering an interpretation in a context of support rather than of abstinence, makes classical psychoanalysis available to patients with serious personality disorders.

The Effect of the Sex of the Analyst on Transference: A Review of the Literature. Nancy Mann Kulish. Pp. 95-110.

This comprehensive survey of the psychoanalytic literature is organized under four headings: selection by the referring psychoanalyst, choice of analyst by the patient, attitudes toward sex roles in the therapeutic relationship, and the effects of gender on transference.

Scales to Assess the Therapeutic Alliance from a Psychoanalytic Perspective. Jon G. Allen, et al. Pp. 383-394

Therapeutic alliance is defined by the authors exclusively in terms of the patient's activity in psychotherapy. Their study was designed to distinguish the therapeutic alliance, as they defined it, from transference. From this perspective, the relationship between the therapist's technique and the therapeutic alliance and that between the patient's transference and the therapeutic alliance become questions

open to empirical research. The authors devised a "collaboration" scale of several independent variables which they believed would reflect the patient's contribution to the therapeutic alliance. Trained raters evaluated typed transcripts of psychotherapy sessions according to these criteria. The component scales most highly correlated with overall collaboration ratings were: "makes good use of therapist's efforts" (.96); "works actively" (.92); "shows resistance" (−.89); "reflects" (.88); and "is motivated to change" (.87). Because the transcripts had eliminated vocal and nonverbal cues, it proved difficult to assess affect. These findings appear consistent with those of earlier investigators. The authors hope to identify in subsequent studies those interventions that may enhance or detract from collaboration at the lower levels of trust and acceptance.

Psychic Seizures: A Diagnostic Challenge. Michael Hopping. Pp. 401-417.

Psychic seizures may be segregated from the psychomotor variety of temporal lobe epilepsy by their lack of behavioral automatisms and by incomplete or absent amnesia and loss of consciousness. Moreover, these episodes may result from focalized, circumscribed discharges undetectable without recourse to implanted depth electroencephalograph leads. The diagnosis must therefore be made on the basis of clinical observations. Without these usual diagnostic hallmarks, psychic seizures are readily confused with a wide variety of "functional" complaints. Patients who suffer from psychic seizures therefore frequently come to the attention of dynamic psychiatrists. It is useful to remember that these patients frequently present with a deepening of the emotional life so that nothing seems trivial to the patient; an increased concern with philosophical or religious matters; a marked change in sexual interest or behavior; a humorless sobriety; increased aggression, which is often denied despite direct evidence, or self-righteously defended as appropriate to the situation; and dependency. Hopping emphasizes the importance of suspecting the diagnosis and offering the patient an adequate clinical trial of specific anticonvulsant medication.

Clinical Notes on Anorexia Nervosa: A Grand Rounds Consultation. Joel Yager. Pp. 427-442.

The case of a nineteen-year-old man who had suffered for five years from anorexia nervosa was presented by Raymond Poggi. The patient was hospitalized when, during his first year at college, his symptoms interfered not only with his social functioning but also with his academic achievement. A long and stormy course in a secure therapeutic facility did not abate the patient's socially unacceptable, aggressive behavior, and he was discharged from hospital. Subsequent outpatient psychotherapy seems to have helped the patient control his symptoms adequately. The consultant noted that this patient was typical of the group of male patients who suffer from anorexia nervosa. They tend to be well educated, relatively affluent young men who are isolated, lonely, socially peripheral, and sometimes schizoid. They usually wish to be strong, athletic, and vigorous; compulsive exercise is often an important symptom. Their dietary patterns are remarkably similar to those of their female counterparts. They also evidence decrease in libido during the illness, often with the cessation of erections and masturbation. If they have used diet

pills, they may also present with obsessionality, anger, and delusional thinking, which is consistent with the amphetamine abuse. The article contains a comprehensive review of the literature on this condition, and a focused discussion of treatment opinions.

Narcissistic Disorders in Children: A Developmental Approach to Diagnosis. Efrain Bleiberg. Pp. 501-517.

Narcissistic injury is an inevitable part of any child's normal progress toward establishing a sense of personal identity, boundaries, and autonomy. Latency-age children who suffer from narcissistic disorders tend to have failed to deal appropriately with these ordinary stressors and will present with diverse clinical pictures. The author suggests that they may be evaluated according to their progress in negotiating certain specific developmental tasks: (1) identity formation; (2) relinquishment of omnipotence; (3) acquisition of stable internal self-esteem and the attenuation of reliance on external approval; (4) the capacity to tolerate stress and conflict without undue regression; (5) the construction of internal goals and ideals; and (6) the integration of language and cognitive development. Bleiberg indicates how this scheme, which integrates the findings of a large number of psychoanalytic investigators, provides a uniform background for assessment and treatment planning.

Borderline Personality: DSM-III versus a Previous Usage. N. Gregory Hamilton, et al. Pp. 540-543.

Before the introduction of DSM-III, the Menninger Clinic diagnosed borderline personality on the basis of dynamic manifestations of splitting, denial, lack of sublimatory capacities, transient lapses of reality testing, problems of separation-individuation, and projective identification. The records of twenty-seven patients who had been so diagnosed were reviewed, and the cases rediagnosed according to DSM-III for borderline personality disorder. Twelve patients (44%) met these new criteria. Therefore, the authors conclude, the pre-DSM-III literature based on the Menninger patient population remains a potentially useful source of information on this condition.

International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. X, 1984-1985.

Abstracted by Luke F. Grande.

The Role of the Analyst's Facial Expressions in Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Therapy. Harold F. Searles. Pp. 47-73.

Noting that little has been written about this aspect of psychoanalytic work, Searles offers reflections on his clinical experiences to demonstrate the importance of paying attention to facial expressions and appreciating, understanding, and accepting the messages and feelings that are being experienced and transmitted, whether they be loving or hostile. He illustrates and discusses aspects of analyst-patient relatedness with particular emphasis on the role of the analyst's facial expression and the dynamic function it serves.

The Use of Consultation in the Treatment of Suicidal Patients. Michael Bond. Pp. 117-130.

Bond discusses the need for consultation in the treatment of suicidal patients and describes the two types of consultation used, indirect and direct. Citing clinical cases, including actual suicide, he demonstrates the advantages of the indirect and the disadvantages and dangers of direct consultation. He describes the intrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts behind suicide and explores the dynamics of the consultative process.

Discussion Paper: Consultation in a Suicidal Impasse. John T. Maltsberger. Pp. 131-158.

Maltsberger discusses Bond's paper, and offers ideas and suggestions regarding suicidal patients and the utilization of consultation. In doing so, he describes the dynamics of suicide and stresses the need for the consultant to assess the problems the therapist might be having, whether they be due to inexperience, to lack of knowledge, or to countertransference difficulties. He also emphasizes the importance of developing an adequate dynamic formulation of the case to ensure proper treatment and management, and he offers guidelines for doing so.

Narcissistic Issues in the Training Experience of the Psychotherapist. Baird K. Brightman. Pp. 293-317.

Drawing primarily from concepts developed by Kohut and Bibring, Brightman develops ideas about narcissistic issues in the development of psychotherapists, and how they interfere with or enhance progress. He focuses on conflicts caused by the ideal of the grandiose professional self, defensive styles, the role of the supervisor, and phases of professional growth in the training situation, including the modification of the professional ego ideal so that trainees can apply themselves realistically to the task of becoming competent psychotherapists.

The Transferable Penis and the Self Representation. Maxwell H. Soll. Pp. 473-493.

Citing material from two cases and reviewing the literature, Soll describes women who have, in addition to a female self-representation, a male self-representation. Instead of being resolved as usually happens, in these cases the fantasy of bisexuality persists because of an early pregenital relationship with an unempathic mother, and then a prolonged relationship with a father who seduces the girl into believing that his penis is shared by the two of them.

Father-Daughter Incest. Alan J. Eisnitz. Pp. 495-503.

In this discussion of the paper by Soll, Eisnitz points to the paucity of psychoanalytic studies of incest, reviews the literature on the subject, and offers his ideas on the factors involved in incest and the effects it has on the child, particularly as it affects the self-representation.

The Use of Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique on the Medical Ward. Stanley Grossman. Pp. 533-548

Using case vignettes, Grossman demonstrates the importance of understanding the psychodynamics of the physically ill patient as well as having an appreciation of the pre-existing transference between the patient and the primary physician, and of the attitudes of ward personnel working with the patient. He posits that the analyst, although working in a clinical setting that is different from his office, can be of great help in facilitating the medical-psychological treatment of the patient. This requires an understanding and delicate handling of the patient's ego strength, conflicts, and defenses.

Psychoanalytic Concepts in the General Hospital and the Transference Cure. Stephen M. Saravay. Pp. 549-566.

In this discussion of the paper by Grossman, Saravay stresses that psychoanalysts have much to learn as well as to contribute by working in the setting of a general hospital. He discusses concepts of transference, transference neurosis, and cure by resolution of the latter, as compared to transference and cure brought about by a positive and continuing identification with the analyst. He compares transference and transference cure in psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic psychotherapy, group therapy, and crisis intervention in the general hospital setting. Transference cure is facilitated in the hospital because the patient is in a state of transference readiness with infantile conflicts already mobilized. Citing clinical examples, the author demonstrates how a positive transference is fostered and a transference cure is effected in a brief crisis intervention.

American Imago. XXXIX, 1982.

Abstracted by George G. Fishman.

Marx and Freud: A Socratic-Aristotelian Symposium on the Platonic Theme of Desire. Harry Slochower. Pp. 285-342.

This is a very long dialogue among Socrates, Freud, Marx, Ricoeur, Marcuse, Aristotle, Reik, et al. Its central theme is Marx versus Freud, but many subthemes emerge. Among these is the desire to deal with Joel Kovel's book, *The Age of Desire: Reflections of a Radical Psychoanalyst.* Important questions are raised on every page. Are all desires desirable? Does psychoanalysis serve capitalism? Does it give enough credit to determination by history? Is the classless society an endpoint or a way station in further social evolution? How is neurosis to be viewed in a socialist state if unhappiness by definition can no longer be blamed on society? Can there be a Marxist psychoanalysis? Unfortunately, so many authorities are represented and quoted in the paper as to render it superficial; too much effort is expended on who said what on a given issue and not enough on how to go more deeply into the issue. Nevertheless, Slochower still manages to be enlightening, scholarly, and humorous.

American Imago. XL, 1983.

Abstracted by Edward L. Greene.

Helene Deutsch (1884-1982). Tributes: Sanford Gifford; Bernard Bandler; Gregory Rochlin; Victor Weisskopf. Pp. 1-27.

A Note on Rosa Luxemburg and Angelica Balabanoff. Helene Deutsch. Pp. 29-33.

Four eulogies to the memory of Helene Deutsch range from general professional overview to intimate personal reminiscences. Gifford presents a brief biographical sketch of Deutsch's monumental achievements and contributions to the field of psychoanalysis. Bandler describes his memories of Deutsch as a mentor during his formative years as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. Gregory Rochlin, who had the privilege of knowing her both professionally and personally for fifty years, writes of her sensitivity, humor, warmth, and love of life and indicates how all of these elements contributed to the enrichment of her personal life and her work. Victor Weisskopf presents a picture quite different in emphasis from the others. He describes Deutsch through the lens of their common "Judeo-Austrian" background. Through an identificatory model he is able to describe what may have been the mental substrate underlying the achievements of this impressive woman.

A final tribute to Dr. Deutsch is given appropriately by her own words written about three great female contributors to the cause of peace in the world. The first of these was Bertha von Suttner who influenced Alfred Nobel to direct his interests toward world peace. The second, Rosa Luxemburg, was a powerful force for peace and played an important part in the development of the Socialist movement in Europe. Angelica Balabanoff, the last described, struggled throughout her life to organize the unprotected masses of exploited labor in Italy, and her involvement in the Socialist movement in Europe was at all times dedicated to peace. This work can be viewed as a tribute to Dr. Deutsch, in that we can see in her description of each of these women the elements of her own life: her quest for individual freedom, her dedication to the welfare of those less privileged, her intellectual and cultural wealth, and finally her lifelong dedication to constructive peaceful goals. These works leave a powerful impression of a dynamic individual of great substance, gone, but not lost.

Virginia Woolf's "To the Lighthouse": Syntax and the Female Center. Martin Gliserman. Pp. 51-101.

Following the suggestion of Bateson that "redundancies at different levels . . . in works of art . . . are a necessary aspect of communicating information," Gliserman carefully examines Woolf's masterpiece and suggests the presence of an almost ubiquitous syntactic pattern. He further indicates that this pattern, in conjunction with the choice of specific language selected by the writer, becomes another unit of meaning directing the reader to a concern with "centers and middles." The meaning Gliserman reads into this abstract pattern concerns the relationship between and within males and females. By means of extensive textual references Gli-

serman demonstrates the frequency of these patterns throughout the work. He then brings into consideration historical and autobiographical facts about Virginia Woolf herself in which these same concerns, patterns, and language emerge quite clearly. The message couched in these patterns is, first, that the writer's feeling of emptiness is ascribed in part to the male who has "violated/stolen/damaged" her insides; second, that females are open to others, embracing and neutralizing the negative destructive force of males; third, that creative endeavor has the function of "converting pain into harmony and beauty" in an attempt to repair the damages experienced earlier in life. And finally, Gliserman sees the message of the entire novel as a kind of "female bravado: proclaiming the power of the female to surround, protect, nurture, create and finally 'surmount the male force.' " This lengthy and detailed work gives care and close attention to precise textual references. This type of linguistic and syntactic analysis might be a useful adjunct to the various recent attempts at more scientific analysis of analytic data.

Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*: Narrator-Reader Complicity. Wolfgang E. H. Rudat. Pp. 103-113.

In Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde* intimations of an incestuous involvement between Pandarus the uncle and Criseyde the niece appear repeatedly. However, Chaucer is not explicit about this. Rudat refers to a 1979 "standard-setting article" by Evan Carton which states that the reader of this work takes on the responsibility of making explicit what Chaucer cleverly leaves only implied though sexually suggestive. Rudat then attempts to demonstrate that the narrator's complicity in the author-reader interaction does indeed give us a scene of incest, though not in the literal sense Carton suggests. Through careful examination of the text itself, with intensive analysis of the mythological references which abound in the work, Rudat builds a case to suggest that incestuous feeling and fantasies are abundant. It is quite clear from the text that Troilus and Criseyde's sexual encounter is the vicarious actualization of Pandarus' own incestuous fantasies. Furthermore, the verbal play between niece and uncle is replete with sexual innuendo and may very well have functioned as a symbolic intimacy, carrying the fantasy to a level of reality one step closer to actuality though never crossing the line. This is a good example of how unacceptable impulses frequently are partially gratified through symbolic expression in polite society by verbal banter and teasing, but always within the bounds of propriety.

***Uncle Tom's Cabin* and Harriet Beecher Stowe.** Alexander Grinstein. Pp. 115-144.

Grinstein directs his attention to the underlying psychological themes in Stowe's novel and their relationship to her history and character. Of particular interest is the report of a drama, *Cleon*, written by Stowe at age twelve or thirteen (1822), which contains many elements of similarity to the work published thirty years later. Complex developmental factors are associated with beating fantasies in general and, in particular, to those rarely occurring fantasies in which the individual beaten dies (as in both the early drama and the later novel). The death, before her own birth, of a sibling, after whom she was named, coupled with the death of her mother when

she was four, associated with the family's idealization of both the deceased, contributed greatly to the artist's chronic depression and longing for death as salvation. Biographical and autobiographical materials clearly illuminate the profoundly masochistic character of this creative artist. The demonstration of the close connection between the writer's character and her artistic production, through the use of precise references, makes this work one of the more convincing examples of this type of study.

Samuel Johnson's *Lives*: Its "Nice Doubtfulness." Martin Maner. Pp. 145-157.

Through the examination of this major work of Samuel Johnson, Maner is able to demonstrate how intrinsic characterological qualities of a writer are revealed in his works. An artist's work embodies an attitude about people; behind this lies a style of thinking, and behind that is a style of character. Defining character as that "something" that typifies an individual at his sickest and healthiest, Maner is able to identify a habitually skeptical, argumentative, and dialectic manner everywhere in Johnson's work, and especially in his *Lives of the English Poets*. This style is simply described as a perceptual, cognitive, and affective "double take": looking, followed by doubting and looking again. Maner illuminates the "niceness" of Johnson's doubting style. While Johnson relished opportunities to display his skepticism, he regularly tempered his judgments with the recognition that misperception and self-deception are typically understandable human traits.

Oedipus in Kansas. A Version of Aarne-Thompson 569. Mahmoud Omidsalar. Pp. 159-174.

The author indicates the similarity of an American Indian folk tale to a classic French tale classified as Aarne-Thompson 569. The various actions depicted in this tale are elaborately interpreted as symbolically representing the transition from pregenital to genital organization of the libido. It is further suggested that one can find in this story representation of the passing of the oedipus complex. This type of psychoanalytic interpretation of artistic works is a common practice, but it seems more akin to the not-so-free associations of an obsessive patient than to serious criticism.

William Turner's Late Style: Speculation on Its Development. Joseph William Slap. Pp. 175-187.

Examining the life and works of the painter Turner, the author notes that a major change occurred in the artist's work around 1830. During the last twenty years of his life, forms became blurred and details disappeared behind washes and hazes of light and color. Slap attempts to explain this change, using the concept of "waking screens," defined as walls of denial built to restrain uncontrollable impulses and to defend against intolerable stimuli. Turner, low born, uncultivated, and without formal education, was from 1830 to 1837 the frequent guest of Lord Egremont at the latter's palatial estate. Slap suggests that the glamour and beauty of this life of frequent parties and distinguished guests was highly stimulating to Turner who could only look, envy, feel inferior, and withdraw to solitude, sleep, and work.

The desire to depict artistically this eroticized life-style reawakened early, conflict-filled, primal scene experiences which had to be "screened" or blurred. Slap makes fascinating use of the sketch pads of the artist, which clearly indicate the gradual obfuscation of erotic images in Turner's work of that period.

Camus' *The Stranger*: The Sun-Metaphor and Patricidal Conflict. Stephen Ohayon. Pp. 189-205.

This major work of Camus has been variously interpreted over the years by numerous scholars. Ohayon suggests that the thematic axis running through the works of Camus is the "homicidal insurrection against a patricidal superego." The author points out how, particularly in *The Stranger*, the sun metaphorically represents the malevolent, assaultive, absolutist patriarch against whose rage (projected) the hero must defend himself by murdering a faceless, nameless male. By linking Meursault, the hero, to Camus through quotations from his other writings, Ohayon shows that *The Stranger* becomes somewhat of an expression of an inner crisis of the writer's mid-twenties. Ohayon then turns to a well-presented examination of the work itself, easily demonstrating the use of the oppressive sun as the metaphoric representation of the missing father, imagined as dangerous and threatening. Deprived of a father early in life, Meursault/Camus attempts to deal with his guilt over poorly resolved patricidal impulses by sacrificing himself to father surrogates in the form of judges, jury, state. We are able to recognize in this work an example of Freud's thesis that whenever actual experience fails to fit the "phylogenetically" endowed schema of development, the imagination fills in, often in the most primitive and unsocialized ways. This study is a fine example of how, through careful examination of the life of an artist and of his writings, one can clearly observe the elaboration of certain classic psychoanalytic theories.

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Sherwood Waldron Jr.

To cite this article: Sherwood Waldron Jr. (1987) Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 56:2, 426-430, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1987.11927181

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1987.11927181

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

February 26, 1985. THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE EGO. The Heinz Hartmann Award Lecture. Leo Rangell, M.D.

Dr. Rangell introduced his subject by commenting that his presentation would comprise an extension of one important aspect of Hartmann's contribution to our understanding of ego autonomy and the conflict-free sphere of the ego. The primary emphasis of Hartmann's work in relation to ego functions was in regard to adaptation to the demands of id, superego, and the external world. Dr. Rangell delineated how Freud, Anna Freud, Hartmann, Rapaport, and many others made incidental references that acknowledged the role of initiation, not simply reaction, by the ego in human life. A more extensive psychoanalytic investigation of initiation and ego autonomy has not yet been made, partly because of the close relationship between the concepts of autonomy and free will. Dr. Rangell suggested severing the notion of "free" from that of "will," and with this beginning, he brilliantly outlined the problems of the concept. One important stumbling block has been the failure to recognize the role of choice and decision making as ego activities, often outside of awareness. The failure to focus upon this important aspect of ego functioning—"the executive function of the ego"—has interfered with the development of an adequate psychoanalytic theory of action. This is also reflected in a failure to appreciate the importance of decisions made by the ego. Symptoms "are as much a choice as normal behavioral outcomes." Dr. Rangell showed how this relatively neglected area served as a stimulus for Kohut's rejecting Freudian metapsychology as inadequate, although this rejection itself was accomplished by setting up a straw man.

Dr. Rangell then expanded his discourse into the conflict between the concept of autonomy and that of determinism. He made a clear exposition of the difficulties stemming from an either-or approach and presented a strong case for including both concepts to encompass ego functioning. His description of autonomy and individuality, as they are actually observed, was followed by a description of their relation to resistance to change by patients. Often there is a "reluctance to assume the responsibility which comes with the autonomy which insight could produce." The failure to see the relativity and reciprocity between autonomy and determinism has limited our ability to think clearly about the causation of psychological phenomena. "Behavioral outcomes are as much determined by the role of the final autonomous inputs of the ego as by the underlying formative pressures of the drives and superego." An understanding of this concept makes it possible to understand the appropriateness of psychoanalysis itself as a potentially mutative procedure in its impact upon the active choices made by the patient. Dr. Rangell also described how the usual defenses are often operative when patients keep from awareness or rationalize the reasons for the decisions that they are actively making. By bringing about

an awareness of such purposes, psychoanalysis creates "*a possibility* of working out a viable, non-neurotic solution."

SHERWOOD WALDRON, JR.

September 30, 1985. ANALYSTS WHO WRITE, PATIENTS WHO READ. Martin H. Stein, M.D.

The writing of psychoanalytic papers, especially those which include clinical data, presents difficulties which are special, if not unique, to the profession. The need for discretion is only the most obvious of these. The use of brief clinical vignettes, rather than extensive case reports, allows writers to illustrate the derivation and application of their theoretical ideas without giving the kind of information that would reveal the identity of their patients. Even so, many very competent, even distinguished, analysts write little or nothing. This is no reflection on their clinical or theoretical capacities. There are many reasons why they may refrain: some lack writing skills; others are too diffident; many are too busy with other demands on their time. Some have never overcome their sensitivity to being subjected to criticism in public. Perhaps a large number value spoken exchanges, especially the art of interpretation, so highly that they feel hampered in subjecting their ideas to the limitations of a written text. A text allows for no immediate response or further qualification, and they fear that it is subject to misunderstandings for that reason. Another factor that may operate either to encourage or to inhibit is the writer's residual conflicts about his or her clinical experience. This may, as in the case of Dora, lead to the production of a classic; or it can result in self-justifying but otherwise valueless work. Much will depend upon how successful the writer has been in achieving self-understanding. The best writing takes the conflicts of the author into consideration, permitting the reader to follow the processes of the writer's thought as he or she delivers a clinical judgment or supports a hypothesis. Allowing the reader to become privy to the author's search for solutions, some to be discarded, others to be accepted as valid, carries, in the long run, a more convincing message.

Whenever analysts decide to write, they are inevitably influenced by their concern that their patients will become aware of what they have written and react to it. This will affect their writing; it may distort it or even inhibit it altogether. Many patients do in fact become aware of their analysts' lectures and publications, identify themselves with them, correctly or not, and think of themselves as collaborators. This may result in various forms of acting out, which must be looked for and subjected to analysis. Sensitive patients may pick up the fact that their analysts are focusing on a particular phase of the analysis long before the analyst has written at all, and they may react to that awareness in subtle and complicated ways. The transference is profoundly affected, a fact which must be taken into account.

Analysts who intend to write are themselves deeply affected. Their attitudes toward their patients, their increased interest in certain phases of an analysis, at the cost of decreased attention to others, may lead to therapeutic distortions and may even induce patients to comply with analysts' desires for clinical confirmation. This can present significant dangers to the outcome of the analysis, as well as to the

authors' conclusions. If analysands themselves have ambitions to write, especially if they are colleagues, special complications arise in the analysis of transference. Nevertheless, the need for psychoanalytic writing and publication makes it imperative that these problems be faced and solved. They can be, given sufficient awareness on the part of analytic writers of the nature of the resistances they are likely to encounter, the need for meticulous analysis of the transference, a continuing effort at self-understanding, and the maintenance throughout of a high degree of regard and respect for the patient and the process of analysis itself.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Charles Brenner was in agreement with the main points of Dr. Stein's paper and limited himself to discussing two aspects of it: how best to present psychoanalytic ideas in a paper; and the effect on patients' analyses of their analysts writing or presenting papers. As to the first, while appreciating excellence of style and liveliness of method of presentation, Dr. Brenner suggested that focus (knowing what one wants to say) and concern for one's audience (keeping in mind who it is one is addressing) are essential while style and form are merely desirable. As to the second point, Dr. Brenner agreed that whatever a patient's reaction may be should be analyzed. In addition, he emphasized that in writing a vignette, one should always ask of each fact about the patient which one proposes to include, "Is this fact essential to my purpose in presenting this vignette?" Eliminating unnecessary facts about a patient is extremely important in fulfilling the criteria of discretion and anonymity.

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND, EAST

October 28, 1985. PSYCHOANALYTIC AND NEUROBIOLOGIC VIEWS OF ANXIETY AND PANIC: ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS? Morton F. Reiser, M.D.

Dr. Reiser discussed his book, *Mind, Brain, Body: Toward a Convergence of Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology*. Our present challenge in science, he stated, is in determining whether psychoanalysis and neurobiology, each with its own language, concepts, and methods for understanding mental and behavioral processes, have something to say to one another. The challenge rests on the creation of a new "Rosetta Stone" which can articulate the questions and answers of brain function investigators (whose subjects are the body, matter, and energy) with those of psychological explorers (whose subjects are the mind and meaning). Such articulation requires rules of translation to map necessary, sufficient, and exclusive correlations at each level. Only then will science benefit from an empirically developed "dual-track approach" that follows data in each domain separately and in its own terms; only then will we be able to realize the potential that each discipline has to stimulate the other. The goal is to evolve more constructive methodologies and to ask yet more relevant questions in the process of exploring the age-old dilemmas of the mind/body dichotomy. Neither field supplies completely satisfactory explanations; each should work to complement and enrich the other.

Dr. Reiser presented material from the psychoanalysis of a patient suffering from panic states and disordered sexual functioning. Then, following the biological track, he presented what is known today about the psychophysiology of stress. This type of double presentation served as a paradigm with which to demonstrate how his dual-track approach could highlight possible points of convergence of the two disciplines and also delineate gaps in our present state of knowledge. He emphasized the importance of using first-order clinical data and observations ("crude ore") in preference to metapsychological concepts. He believes that such concepts have "led psychoanalysis away from natural science, thereby impeding the field from attaining the kind of depth and precision of understanding that neurobiology has achieved."

The clinical material was from the analysis of a young man who had sought help for a long-standing neurotic character disorder, with symptoms of premature ejaculation and panic states associated with spontaneous (paradoxical) ejaculation without erection or conscious sexual thoughts or feelings. Dr. Reiser detailed the work of analysis in tracing the roots of these symptoms to the intensely upsetting circumstances of the patient's mother's protracted illness and death when the patient was a child. Separation panic at her bedside during the height of the sexual excitement of the patient's oedipal period had become fused with the reeking odors of his beloved mother's physical deterioration. He feared that there was within himself something equally sick. To this was added the combined wish and fear that he would be sent away to an orphanage to escape her terrifying clutchingness. The fusion of such experiences, thoughts, and feelings could explain the persistence throughout this patient's life of feelings of fear and terror returning at moments of sexual excitement. Through analytic untangling of transferences and realities, Dr. Reiser was able to outline a hypothesis of an interweaving of sexual excitement with fearful affect. He reasoned that such "exciting unpleasurableness" in a childhood filled with fear and rejection on the basis of enuresis was linked to the patient's present-day symptom of paradoxical ejaculations in situations also associated with fear of rejection, i.e., job interviews or relationships with women. The link was through a "hypothetical spread of excitation" around a shared experience of wetness.

Dr. Reiser then turned to the neurobiological aspects. He outlined the four steps involved in the psychophysiology of an organism's response to stress: 1) recognition and evaluation of danger; 2) transduction of a nonphysical stimulus of meaning into physical events in the body; 3) activation of central nervous system stress mechanisms with special attention to self-sustaining norepinephrine mediated feedback loops; 4) sequelae in organs and tissues (this last idea being based on the novel conceptualization of the brain itself as a target organ of stress). He then discussed Mishkin's work on memory and recall and Redmond's studies on anxiety responses and potential mechanisms of panic states. This served to outline a theoretical neuroanatomic structure that might account for the modulation of physiologic response to pain into the emotions generally experienced as fear or anxiety. This hypothesis draws heavily on the role of the locus ceruleus and on the central noradrenergic systems, structures postulated to be involved in another condition associated with spontaneous ejaculation, opiate withdrawal states. Thus Dr. Reiser moved closer to an explanation of a neurophysiologic substrate for spontaneous ejaculation during a state of excitement or panic as seen in his patient.

Dr. Reiser emphasized that he had in no way achieved "full convergence" by his extrapolations from "each side in its own terms." However, the psychological associative spread connecting the idea of the wetness of enuresis with the wetness of ejaculation through the fear of separation and rejection could find a certain bridge in the physiology of fear and anxiety. This dual-track exercise, as applied to the paradigm of anxiety and stress, highlighted areas where probes might lead to future bridges between psychoanalysis and neurobiology. The audience presented Dr. Reiser with questions ranging along many divergent tracks: neurobiology, psychopharmacology, psychoanalysis, metapsychology, philosophy, and even religion. Dr. Reiser's presentation demonstrated the value of dialogue between people and fields quite different in orientation, but all with much to say about mental processes—and, evidently, to one another.

JONATHAN SCHINDELHEIM

The Sigmund Freud Professorship of Psychoanalysis, an endowed chair at THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM, will become available for the 1988/1989 academic year following the completion of a two-year term by Professor Albert J. Solnit. The Freud Professor is also the Director of The Sigmund Freud Center for Psychoanalytic Study and Research. The Hebrew University wishes to make a tenured appointment, but applications for interim appointments will be seriously considered. Inquiries should be addressed to Professor S. Kugelmass, Department of Psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905 Israel, with a copy to Professor Albert J. Solnit, c/o The Sigmund Freud Center, at the same address.

ERRATUM: In the October 1986 issue of *The Quarterly* (Vol. LV, No. 4), a typographical error occurred in Charles M. T. Hanly's review of the book, *Freud and the Mind* by Ilham Dilman. On page 680 of that review, the last sentence of the second paragraph was printed as follows: "In a successful analytic process, the fixated incest wish undergoes a process of attrition by means of a great deal of working through, until the memory of having had the incest wish *can* become unconscious." The word "unconscious" in that sentence should have been "conscious."