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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

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To cite this article: Marianne Young (1989) Heinz Hartmann, M.D.: An Introduction and Appreciation, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 521-525, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927250

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927250

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

HEINZ HARTMANN, M.D.: AN INTRODUCTION AND APPRECIATION

BY MARIANNE YOUNG, M.D.

Heinz Hartmann's *Ich Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem* was published fifty years ago in Germany. Nineteen years later, in 1958, the essay was translated into English by David Rapaport under the title, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*. It appeared as part of the Monograph Series of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*. Heinz Hartmann's essay may be regarded as a quasi-blueprint which Hartmann hoped would be elaborated in subsequent years by way of multidisciplinary research, the results of which would be brought under the umbrella of psychoanalytic theory. The main avenues of approach recommended, in addition to psychoanalysis proper, were observation of children, psychophysics, biology, and sociology.

In his "Reminiscences," Hartman paid tribute to Freud's far-reaching contributions to ego psychology and proposed to follow up on what Freud had tentatively indicated. He thought he was prepared for the task by virtue of his academic background in psychology and biology (Swerdloff, 1963). In Hartman's (1939) words, "At present we no longer doubt that psychoanalysis can claim to be a *general* psychology" (p. 4) and that "[m]any of us expect psychoanalysis to become a general *developmental psychology*" (p. 8).

The essay brings into sharp relief Hartmann's concept of ego autonomy, the correlated conflict-free sphere, and their genetic sources. In his opinion, the ego is an adaptive organ, a biological element in human psychology. The ego and the id develop from an undifferentiated matrix. The ego develops, in part, free of conflict, and it is endowed with primary autonomy. Another part of the ego develops through conflict and acquires a

secondary autonomy. Hartmann indicated, however, that primary and secondary autonomy may be lost and then recovered, depending upon the effects of conflict into which they may be drawn and from which they may once more free themselves. He viewed the infant as possessing inborn apparatuses and a state of adaptedness which exists before the onset of intentional adaptation. Ego development is a differentiation, during which more effective regulatory mechanisms replace the earlier, primitive ones (p. 49).

The monograph was to become one of the most influential psychoanalytic publications since Freud's contributions. It marked the beginning of a new emphasis and organization in psychoanalytic theory and practice. With his main collaborators, Kris and Loewenstein, Hartmann laid the foundation of the American school of psychoanalysis.

Very soon, international interest and intensive debate necessitated the translation of the monograph into Italian, French, Spanish, and Japanese. In 1963-1964 I had the pleasure of doing the translation into Italian (Low-Beer, 1966) from the German original, working on the task in close collaboration with Heinz Hartmann. It was apparent that Dr. Hartmann enjoyed the process of the translation work and the opportunity to become familiar with Italian expressions. Although he did not speak the language, he used his excellent knowledge of Latin and French as a basis for his understanding in order to explain and to elucidate certain passages. He also acquired quite a mastery of Italian. He told me that his interest in the Italian language and his love for Italian art and culture were rooted in his family tradition. In fact, his father had been a professor of history in Vienna and had done archaeological research in Rome.

At times it was difficult to translate Hartmann's rather complex writing, but simplified formulations were not acceptable to him. His view was that while one may assume that things become more understandable if simplified, in fact precision is inevitably lost. One tends to overlook parts of a proposition and to omit important details.

Heinz Hartmann was born into a family that followed a tradition of profound social concern which was combined with brilliant intellectual achievements. His paternal grandfather (1821-1872), born in Austria, was a journalist and a poet. At age twenty-seven he fought in the Revolution of 1848 on the side of freedom against oppression by the Austrian monarchy. He escaped death by execution under the most romantic circumstances. In his later years he held a professorship in philosophy and history at the University of Geneva. There he acquired the Swiss citizenship that he passed down to his children and grandchildren. His last years were spent in his homeland, Austria, as a journalist for the *Neue Freie Presse* in Vienna. Heinz Hartmann's father, Ludwig Moritz Hartmann (1865-1924), was a professor of history and philosophy in Vienna. Besides being a well-known historian and archaeologist, he was noted for having created the Vienna *Volksheime*, which served as adult community education centers and became extremely successful and popular. They gave access to learning and to cultural information for a great many working-class people who had no opportunity to study at a university. In the 1920's he was made Austrian ambassador to Germany (Eissler and Eissler, 1964).

Hartmann's maternal grandfather, Rudolf Chrobak, a famous gynecologist, was considered by Freud (1914) to be "perhaps the most eminent of all our Vienna physicians" (p. 13). Freud mentioned him as having contributed to his theory of the "sexual aetiology in the neuroses" (p. 12).

Heinz Hartmann's mother, an artist and sculptor, had, according to her son, "a brilliant sense of psychology. . . . The easy formulation of psychological thought I suppose I owe to her" (Swerdloff, 1963, p. 67). Unlike his father, she had not endorsed any special principles of education, but she had an intuitive knowledge of it.

In one of his informal communications, Hartman told me that his father had been "immensely liberal," and he mentioned as an example of his father's liberalism the fact that until Heinz was fourteen years old, his father had his two children privately

tutored to protect them from the religious indoctrination that was required by the Austrian school system. Although there was a price to pay for the father's liberalism, it seems the children were well compensated by the fact that their private tutor was Karl Seitz, an educator of stature who later became a social-democratic leader and mayor of Vienna.

Heinz Hartmann was born in Vienna in 1894 and obtained his M.D. degree in 1920 at the University of Vienna. Between 1920 and 1934 he worked at the Psychiatric and Neurologic Institute of the University of Vienna. During this period he published numerous papers dealing with a variety of psychiatric problems. In 1926 he entered his first didactic analysis with Sandor Rado, and between 1934 and 1936, his second didactic analysis with Professor Sigmund Freud.

He became Training Analyst at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute, and later on at the Institute in Paris and the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. At the latter place he also gave courses and conducted colloquia, served as a member of the Educational Committee, and was the first Medical Director of its Treatment Center from 1948 to 1951. From 1952 to 1954 he served as President of the New York Psychoanalytic Society. Between 1951 and 1957 he was President of the International Psychoanalytical Association and became its Honorary President in 1959. He also served as Editor of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* from 1932 to 1945 and of *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* from its inception in 1945 (Hartmann, 1960, p. 111).

He was married to a colleague, Dora Karplus Hartmann, who survived him, as did their sons, Ernest and Lawrence, both psychiatrists, his grandchildren, and his sister, Dr. Elsa Paneth (Arlow, 1970).

Heinz Hartmann was an elegant, charming, and most erudite man. His knowledge of the humanities and of science in general was extraordinary, and in the field of psychoanalysis he was a leader for more than three decades. His passing on May 17, 1970, left a profound sense of loss in the entire psychoanalytic community.

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1085 Park Ave.
New York, NY 10128

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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Hartmann's "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation"

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To cite this article: Lawrence Friedman (1989) Hartmann's "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation", The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 526-550, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927251

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927251


Published online: 27 Nov 2017.


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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

HARTMANN'S "EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION"

BY LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, M.D.

Hartmann's monograph is an argument for the problem-solving value of all aspects of the mind and for the subordination of intelligence to the organism's larger, primarily social purposes. Hartmann proposed that, in psychoanalytic treatment, intelligent reflection serves one's largest purposes by taking respectful account of non-rational but adaptive ways of appraising reality, with a view toward making the best use of non-rational as well as rational propensities. He regarded it as the kind of thinking that the sociologist, Karl Mannheim, had recommended to government planners faced with immensely complicated, incompletely masterable forces. Hartmann's view of the role of the intellect in analytic treatment suggests that therapists should maintain both their demand for intelligent reflection and their hopefulness about other kinds of work that may be going on sub rosa.

It is hard to find a psychoanalytic contribution as corseted by its reputation as Heinz Hartmann's *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (1939). A few indexing labels are made to stand in for Hartmann's work—labels, moreover, that are not little summaries, but bits of his own specialized language, now used (as labels will be used) to give fast access by their common associations. Thus everyone knows that Hartmann's work represents the *biological* option in analytic theory; Hartmann showed that we have to consider the *adaptational* aspect of a psychic develop-

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ment; Hartmann is the theorist of *apparatuses*, of *average expectableness*, of *conflict-freedom*. I will try to show that these labels have distracted analysts from an interesting orientation to therapy which is to be found in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*.

Hartmann's monograph is a treatise on psychoanalytic holism, and its neglect is easily exemplified by Heinz Kohut, who might have used Hartmann's work as his point of departure, but, as it happened, found little to applaud among Hartmann's labels, except his distaste for a health morality.[1] Admittedly, Kohut made it a rule not to look for influences and alliances. But my point is that a senior analyst of central European origin, high in the ranks of psychoanalytic educators, would not have been able to overlook such a revered earlier champion of ambitions, ideals, and overall mental equilibrium if his predecessor had been as famous for this campaign as he should have been.

HARTMANN'S MISLEADING REPUTATION

If Kohut's Hartmann was an off-hand stereotype, that certainly cannot be said of Schafer's (1970) balanced and affectionate portrait. And yet, despite his recognition of Hartmann's larger integrations, Schafer, too, minimizes Hartmann's holism, and gives us an anatomist of mind (p. 432) who, although "aware of challenges emanating from phenomenological and existentialist thought (e.g., with regard to the self and questions of intentionality and meaning) . . . devoted little attention to this challenge . . ." (p. 426, n.):

> Hartmann made it clear that ultimately everything said about the human being can be viewed as a biological proposition. . . . From Hartmann's vantage point what matters is whether a proposition is good biology or bad biology or the only possible

[1] Kohut (1977) noted without comment that his theory was said by Apfelbaum (1972) to be an extension of Hartmann's. Apfelbaum grouped them together as psychologies that minimize conflict and play down the superego.

> biology. It matters, that is, *if one wants to conceptualize man as a biological entity*. That he is also a social entity, a historical entity, a metaphysical entity is also true, and Hartmann was well aware of that fact (p. 438; Schafer's italics).

Taken altogether, Schafer's portrait is as accurate and appreciative a sketch of the familiar Hartmann as we are likely to get, and we can conveniently introduce the very different Hartmann who wrote *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* by observing how immune he is to Schafer's criticisms. After this discussion of how not to think of the monograph, I outline what I take to be its true, central thesis. I then call attention to Hartmann's use of a peculiar, social-organic concept borrowed from Karl Mannheim, and I conclude by examining the implications for treatment that flow from Hartmann's discourse.

Schafer (1970) writes,

> The biological language of functions cannot be concerned with meaning. And Hartmann always bypassed the question of meaning—rightly so, in terms of his vantage point. In functional-adaptational language, looking is looking . . . and defending is defending. The language is behaviouristic, as suits a natural science approach. In contrast, the primary psychoanalytic language is a language of and for meanings and the changes they undergo during development and during the psychoanalytic process (p. 440).

Schafer praises Hartmann for distinguishing among theoretical points of view, for showing that they are a matter of choice, and for helping us to see by his unfortunate example that psychoanalysis cannot afford to choose a biological point of view. In making his case, Schafer attributes to Hartmann an austerity of outlook, an aloofness from human meaning, and a zoological interest in biology that are quite alien to the spirit of *Ego Psychology*.

First, as to purity of perspectives, Hartmann thought that points of view *overlap*, as, for instance, the psychoanalytic point

of view and the point of view of general psychology (p. 5),[2] or psychology and biology (p. 34), or biology and sociology (p. 33). The study of the human species is a good illustration: because human beings are *designed* as social creatures, the fact that they are biological entities *entails* their being social and historical entities.

Secondly, although Hartmann always insisted that psychology must do more than describe meanings, he nowhere suggested that it may ignore them. Some of the confusion about his attitude toward meanings may come from supposing that when he wrote about *functions*, he had in mind something like the action of a machine. That is the wrong way to picture functions. Pointing to a function is simply pointing out a purposeful context. The *function* of a feature of the mind is the *role* it plays in a larger objective. Describing functions does not commit one to an external vantage point. To be sure, a function may lie outside experience because it refers to a context outside of the individual's own objectives, for instance the function of reproducing the species. But that sort of function concerned Hartmann hardly at all (p. 76). The functions that interested him (the contextual purposes he wanted to illuminate) have to do with the need to belong to a human world, or the need to achieve optimum satisfaction. Significances such as these are aspects of personal meaning.

In describing more functions of mental operations, Hartmann was elaborating more meanings than would be unveiled by a casual phenomenology. For example, being propelled by strong emotion may superficially feel like simply being out of control, but, in fact, it also carries with it a feeling of embeddedness in a social world. And on further inspection one notes that being swept away by emotion is partly what it feels like to have firm priorities, purposes, and values. It is true that these implications can be described as behavior and seen from the out-

[2] All Hartmann page references are to his 1939 monograph, unless otherwise specified.

side. For instance, if we view normal, "reflexive" behavior from the outside, we may say that it is more adaptive than obsessional over-thinking because it integrates people with society and within themselves. In that case we are describing functions behaviorally. But people who suffer obsessional indecision report that what they miss is a peaceful confidence that their feelings are appropriate and express their aspirations. And there we see the same functions described phenomenologically. By and large, a function of a meaning is a larger, implicit aspect of the meaning (often a "narcissistic" or "self psychology" aspect).

Thirdly, the biology of Hartmann's biological point of view should not be overemphasized. It is hardly more than the recognition that the human being is a natural creature. A more refined biology is not involved, not even so basic a biology as the mechanism of evolution:

> At this point we encounter the controversies about the relation of phylogenesis to adaptation and the solutions proposed by Darwinism, Lamarckism, and other biological theories. These theories, however, have no direct bearing on our problem. We can even bypass Uexküll's biology . . . (p. 24).

In contrast to the issues of Darwinism, Lamarckism, and Uexküll's theory, Hartmann indicated that what *he* meant by adaptation to the environment was not much different from the organism's own internal integration (its "fitting together"). In fact, the supreme function involved in biological harmony, according to Hartmann, is the establishment of a person's efficient coherence (pp. 40-41). That is a perspective that no version of psychoanalysis can refuse.

Even Schafer acknowledges that the charge of irrelevant biologism cannot be sustained against all of Hartmann's thought; he allows that some of Hartmann's perspective is universal and need not stand for election as just another point of view. And in return for that concession, we must, in fairness, concede that Schafer's picture is based on Hartmann's entire *oeuvre* where there is more discussion of energies and their mixtures than we

find in *Ego Psychology*. In any case the profile that emerges from Schafer's study is the familiar one: Hartmann was *par excellence* the outside observer of biological functioning in an organism that is barely recognizable as human. If that is what we are left with from even so comprehensive and discerning a sketch, it seems likely that Hartmann's ultimate service to the analytic community will be to have provided an eponymous target for humanists to attack. *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* might have been used more profitably, as I shall now try to show.

THE CENTRAL THESIS

At first glance, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* does not seem to be a linear argument. It looks like a collection of brief essays touching on conflict-free functions, adaptation, the will, etc. But through the work runs one implicit connecting theme: the parts of the mind do not cohabit accidentally. They are aspects of a whole, and therefore their pattern of coherence is as ingredient in the mind's constitution as the parts are. And just as the parts are suited to work with each other, so also are they suited to work in the world. There would be no way for experience to bring warring mental parts together into effective action unless the mind was provided with the means to make use of experience. Memory and anticipation are examples of built-in tools. But the means for welding the mind into an effective unity do not consist of just one or two faculties. The world in which we function is a world of human relationships, and such a world demands the service of all mental faculties.

Human beings are special in that they can elaborate their responses rather than having them automatically elicited by the environment. What makes that possible? It is human culture that affords the leeway. Instead of being given a fixed program adjusted to a limited ecological niche, human beings are equipped with a developmental psychology fit for an average

expectable social environment—an environment that we can react to with reflection, imagination, and invention, exploring countless approaches to our aims while at the same time tuning the social world more finely to a wide variety of non-human surroundings. No organism can survive without some peremptory responses to its environment, but most human compulsions connect people not with their physical environment, but with the subtle wisdom of their community, which serves as a stable matrix for more exploratory moves. Culture is a buffering environment of enormous flexibility. Individuals are plugged into that environment by their full dynamic complexity, with every bit of structure, drive, and rationality playing a part. In other words, all human meanings contribute to human efficiency.

These considerations accord well with evolutionary theory. But one needs little Darwin to see that adaptation in its broadest sense—that which a vitalist might call organismic wisdom—is the mind working as an integrated whole. It is a thesis very similar to Piaget's.[3]

WHAT WOULD NOT BE AN ADAPTATIONAL APPROACH?

Like all equilibrium formulas, these truths may seem trivial. What is the use of Hartmann's admonitions? I have suggested that he was not trying to banish subjectivity from analytic theory, nor was he trying to make analysis more like other biological sciences. What, then, was the outlook that Hartmann was correcting by his adaptational approach? It was the error of supposing that the mind is a collection of single interests bound together by a governor. He was saying that it is a mistake to suppose that only a governor can uphold the interest of the

[3] See, for instance, the following passage: "This differentiation within the ego leads to an optimal adaptation and synthesis only if the ego is strong and can use it freely. . . . Differentiation is counteracted by a tendency toward a 'closed world' . . ." (p. 53).

organism (or mind) as a whole; it is a mistake to suppose that we find an instinctual drive here, and an instinctual drive there, and above them a master ego that tames and regulates them and is solely responsible for avoiding disaster and for optimizing satisfaction.

The mistake that Hartmann was correcting is not an error of Freud's. Freud's theory is dialectically layered to take account of holistic aspects of mind (see Friedman, 1988, Chapter 15). But Freud's theory is exceedingly complex, and since it cannot be fully presented in every instance, the kind of error that worried Hartmann appears from time to time in psychoanalytic writing.

Schafer (1970) suggested that Hartmann's theory of the mind was fashioned on the model of government. I believe that government is, on the contrary, an excellent image of the mistaken theory that Hartmann was seeking to correct—the view that atomic drives are ruled by an ego that looks after the interests of the whole person. Hartmann's own image is almost the opposite; it is an image of a collective in which every element has a job to do for the good of the whole. Hartmann's model of the mind resembles a society more than a government.

Much of the blame for this confusion belongs to Hartmann himself. He followed the old custom of abstracting every adaptational (holistic) aspect of the mind into the term *ego* while also using the term to designate various particular functions as well. The term breaks down under the weight. But though he left the term, ego, ambiguous, he did everything else in his power to distinguish between its connotation of thinking and its connotation of mental organization. His monograph makes it plain that when we talk about the ego as though it were the locus of knowledge or the power of rationality, we are not then referring to an ego that rules the mind. And when, on the other hand, we are referring to the mind's ultimate balancing (the superordinate organizing function of the ego), then we must distinguish it from various lower orders of synthesis, such as ordinary intelligence (*cf.*, the "rank order of ego functions," p. 55). Like everything else in the mind, the limited knowledge-

sort-of-synthesis is designed to serve the broader, superordinate organization, and one way for intelligence to serve organization (for instance in psychoanalysis) is by tempering its operation with a sense of its own limited role among non-thinking reactions (p. 73).

Now, that is a task that is easier to say than to imagine. What would it be like to evaluate how things are (intellectually), while at the same time evaluating how useful it is to evaluate them that way (rather than feeling them out irrationally)? For an answer to that question, Hartmann referred his readers to a contemporary work on social planning. He wrote that the sort of thinking he had in mind is described in Karl Mannheim's *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, the first edition of which appeared in 1935.[4]

THE HUMBLING OF INTELLIGENCE

Karl Mannheim was a sociologist who studied the social role of the modern intellectual. His argument in the work cited by Hartmann is that mass society has been replacing the trade customs and folk cultures that formerly regulated life, leaving the state now to decide for everyone, all at once, the arrangements that custom and tradition had worked out for each domain over a period of centuries.[5]

Mannheim saw that the forces that put our lives into the hands of central planners also make it difficult for the planners to foresee the results of their actions. The myriad facets of life which had been subtly adjusted by many local customs are now likely to be defined inadvertently by a single government initiative, designed for a different purpose. Thus, the effects of cen-

[4] All Mannheim page references are to this volume.

[5] Hartmann's explicit use of Mannheim's ideas might be adduced in support of Schafer's judgment that Hartmann took government as his model of the mind. As I mentioned above, I think the parallel in Hartmann's theory is rather between mind and society, with the rational faculty resembling the government planner. But Hartmann provides texts for both readings.

tral initiatives are more difficult to anticipate than they used to be.

Attempting to master this bewildering field, specialized social sciences squint their eyes, draw their graphs, and come up with laws—laws of economics, politics, psychology—only to be confounded by actual events which tie all these abstractions together into particular, unforeseeable knots.

Mannheim's solution is a middle ground which he called *interdependence thinking*. Interdependence thinking is the planner's way of bringing various kinds of abstract thinking (sciences) to bear on particular, evolving, concrete, historical action (administration). These different sciences are not simply superimposed on each other, as they would be in an academic seminar, but are edited to conform with the practical realities of the moment.[6]

Hartmann suggested that people live most effectively when they think about themselves the way Mannheim's planning counselor thinks about society, that is, without the illusion of complete, deliberate control. Was that new to psychoanalysis? Yes and no. On the one hand it has always been thought that the ego was supposed to replace irrational distortions with authoritative, veridical perceptions. On the other hand treatment was supposed to foster tolerance of childishness and irrationality. The two attitudes toward rationality reflect a dialectical ambivalence in Freudian theory, not a contradiction, because the free exercise of irrational mental activity is thought to aid rationality. (Psychoanalysis discovered that fact, and clinicians confirm it daily.) So Hartmann's point is not new.

But Hartmann was spelling out in more detail the relationship between rational and non-rational mentation when he

[6] Mannheim (pp. 217, ff.) commended psychoanalysis as the one psychology that understands outcomes in terms of multidetermined biographical climates, rather than as illustrations of simplified abstract universal principles. Mannheim seems to have felt an affinity between the psychoanalytic effort to grasp the personal significance of life events and his own effort to see beyond blanket ideologies and "scientific" systems to the real, effective meanings printed on events by the temper of their times. One might say that Mannheim was trying to find a way to describe a cultural reality comparable to psychic reality.

seized on Mannheim's notion of interdependence thinking and transposed it from the scene of government to the individual mind. If the kind of science that helps the social planner is one that understands the limits of its vision and knows that unplannable forces will impinge on rational plans, it is no less true, Hartmann reasoned, that the kind of thinking that contributes to our personal welfare is the kind that makes allowance for necessary unthinking reactions. This is a message about health, about education, and about the theory of the mind. And above all, it is a message about psychoanalytic treatment.

THE EGO IS A THEORY OF TREATMENT

The psychoanalytic term, *ego*, has many meanings. Its particular meaning usually comes from a contrast (such as ego and id). But the ego also has a constant significance that needs no contrast and probably dwarfs the others in importance: the ego has always been the therapist's intrapsychic viceroy, except, perhaps, when the therapist is seen as the ego's representative in society. Psychoanalytic treatment does what the ego does. If you ask an analyst what his theory of treatment is, he will waste little time before suggesting that you take up the matter with the ego, whose servant he is. (The really interesting conversation starts—and may also end—when you ask what he does with alterations in the ego.)

THE EGO'S MANY KINDS OF WISDOM

Bearing in mind that a view of the ego is always a theory of treatment, let us review the spin that Hartmann puts on the ego concept in his 1939 monograph. What stands out is that an aspect of the ego is being identified as a general property of mind. We note that Hartmann ranks ego functions, and even synthetic functions, in a hierarchy (pp. 52-56) whose acme is better described as "organizing" than as "synthesizing." At that

point we lose a sense of the ego's separateness. "Synthesizing" is something an apparatus can do to the products of other agents. But "organizing" is the arranging of apparatuses and does not seem to leave room for an additional apparatus.

I do not think that Hartmann worked this out in detail. The notion of a superordinate function *of* anything is an obvious logical teaser; one might argue that if it is a function, it will never be quite superordinate, and if it is superordinate, it is not merely a function. I would not be inclined to say that one of my functions is to be me. There is no escaping the implication that Hartmann used "ego" as a name for mental organization. (Rothstein [Panel, 1989, p. 192] notes that Hartmann's elaboration of the "synthetic function" connotes the qualities that are usually meant by "self.") Hartmann's broadening of the ego concept to extend to the whole integrated mind is unmistakable. Thus he writes that

> even if we entirely disregard affective action, man is led not only by his rational motives, but also by habits, handed-down principles, self-evident propositions rooted in traditions, and the like. In spite of the great biological significance we ascribe to intelligence, we cannot deny that this other avenue is often just as successful. . . . [I]n the individual's adaptive achievements the role of the highly differentiated rational functions is neither general nor absolute.
>
> The failure to recognize the limited role of intelligence in the total personality has occasionally led to a description of the totally rational man (in the just-defined and narrow sense) as the ideal, the paragon of health. . . .
>
> Why then is this picture so distorted? Because in it a particular ability has taken the place of all other mental functions. The picture becomes much more human if we think of intelligence as *organizing* rather than taking the place of all other functions. At a certain level of development intelligence becomes aware of its own role as one function among others. . . . Only after this broadening of awareness has been put at the disposal of action does intelligence serve the highest synthetic and differentiating functions of the ego. However, this form

> of synthesis is not conceptually identical with what is usually called "rational." This inclusion of other mental functions in the ego's plan of thought and action is an instance of its general anticipatory function, which involves knowledge both of man's relations to his environment and of his inner life. Not before psychoanalysis was the function of intelligence *in pure form* on this level possible, and we may say that the evolution of intelligence created in the form of psychoanalysis for the first time the means to do justice to this task (pp. 68-70).
>
> . . . the normal ego must be able to suspend, temporarily, even its most essential functions. . . . [I]n the healthy human being certain superordinate ego functions determine when the ego can make purposive use of automatisms; and . . . in the service of ego regulations even highly developed ego achievements must be temporarily suspended. This superordinate ego function apparently represents what might be called "central regulation" or perhaps "goal structure" . . . (pp. 94-95).

Throughout the monograph, Hartmann moves between three meanings of intelligence. He uses the term primarily to refer to causal thinking, but secondarily, to anticipation in general, and finally, one suspects, to adaptation itself. Hartmann refused to merge these meanings—thought, anticipation, and adaptation. He knew that fudging their difference leads to romantic irrationalism (pp. 72-73), and he was determined to claim psychoanalysis for the camp of scientific rationality. He drew the line at psychological irrationalism in its two forms, opposing both the belief in unmediated intuition (Hartmann, 1927) and (in the case we are considering here) the celebration of non-logical reactions. That is the Hartmann everyone knows, the champion of rationality. But a posterity that remembers Hartmann as chief civil engineer of the autonomous ego should recall that the occasion for Hartmann's defense of rationality in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* is his own regretful subversion of its claims.

As a modality, or style, or separate, inborn apparatus, intelligence is the deliberate deciphering of causal implications. But as an ability, Hartmann implies, intelligence is the capacity to

act efficiently, that is, to consider possible solutions to problems, foresee consequences, and anticipate the future. Once we admit that, we cannot stop short of declaring that everything in the mind contributes to intelligence. We do not need to read Darwin; we do not need to abandon a humanist perspective; we do not need to think of people as flesh and bone rather than as idea and feeling. Looked at any way you please, it is obvious that we solve problems by imagination and fantasy, that we protect ourselves against social disasters by automatic accommodations, that we would be foolish not to abbreviate our work by habits, that we know who we are and where to go and what deserves our attention and allegiance by the very call of our wishes, the imperative of our compulsions, the sense of our values, and the sway of assimilated cultural products.

Moreover, to bluntly set out the great truism that lies behind Hartmann's adaptational perspective, it stands to reason that everything lively within us will help us solve personal problems if only because these livelinesses make it clear what the "us" is that needs to be accommodated. And furthermore, it is almost a matter of logic that if our needs do find a field to work in, then those needs will themselves help to orient and integrate us in that field. It is certainly tempting to go on from there and imagine how these livelinesses were programmed into the developing nervous system by natural selection in order to slip the human being into an ecological niche. But the adaptational point of view per se requires us only to admit that somehow or other all of our aspects are meant to go together, that they all tend in some way toward our purpose.

Adaptedness is Hartmann's word for the potential coherence of all of our aspects and the intelligence each of our aspects can claim in anticipating the moral (social) world we live in.

Where is the ego in all of this? Where is rational intelligence? The second question answers the first. Rational intelligence is where the ego puts it. If, for instance, there is a time when it is wiser to act without thinking, the ego is the organizing principle of which this tendency is an illustration.

That might seem to say only that the ego is a name for what-

ever happens in the mind, or perhaps a name for what happens when it is satisfactory. And, in fact, I think such a tautology does haunt this approach, as it does every equilibrium theory (Friedman, 1988, Chapter 23). But some tautologies help us to work on the holistic side of theory. This one produced a picture of the "superordinate organizing function of the ego," portrayed as wisdom beyond intelligence. It is in this context that Hartmann suggested that we read Mannheim's account of interdependence thinking. We have noted that Mannheim wanted sociologists to foresee the way a policy directed at one goal will ricochet off the many features of life and arrive at unselected targets. Presumably, Hartmann was thinking of a parallel situation in which the ego, rather than using reason to bypass impulse, habit, reverence, and guilt, instead reckons on their inevitable and useful activation. It is a Piagetian notion, according to which we try just as hard not to be thrown off balance by our responses as we would try not to be surprised by the external world; we succeed if we can take advantage of our own libidinal and structural features, just as we would exploit the design of a gardening tool.

WHAT DOES THIS CONCEPT OF THE EGO SAY ABOUT TREATMENT?

As regards treatment, it is easiest to say how these principles apply to the analyst's listening, since they support the standard practice of placing oneself equidistant from all psychic institutions, and they harmonize comfortably with the familiar principle of overdetermination. (Boesky [Panel, 1989] points out that the psychoanalytic structural theory is a systems theory, and we may reflect that a systems theory is what Mannheim and Hartmann are outlining.) But Hartmann's principles apply to analysts' interventions as well as to their listening. Interdependence thinking anticipates an uncontrollable field of forces that always modifies one's studied plans. We have to imagine not

only how analysts formulate their interpretations but what will happen in all corners of a patient's mind when an analyst speaks.

Not much is made in the literature of the interdependence thinking by which analysts anticipate the multiform effects of their interventions. Such wide thinking is usually relegated to the category of tact. And that is fair enough. Whether or not sociologists have mastered the complex art of interdependence thinking (a matter of considerable doubt), honest therapists must admit that they cannot perform these exhaustive calculations in the midst of a spontaneous, intimate personal interaction, even when that interaction is analytically modulated. The vague term, tact, may therefore serve best. Anticipating how an intervention will be received by a patient is more like imagining the agitation of a mobile in a breeze than it is like scanning a list of characteristic responses.

Anyway, we are reminded that Hartmann used Mannheim's interdependence thinking to characterize egos, not therapists. What he asked us to reconsider is the ego that the therapist is addressing and the reality that the analyst represents. In the light of Hartmann's holism, both of these become disturbingly problematic. The ego may be everything about the patient in its intricate dance with everything else about the patient. And reality may include the spiritual claims of the social world (i.e., the human world as guiding values, not just as biographical text). According to this paradigm, being realistic does not mean rising above distorting affect; rather, he is realistic whose shaping affects do not take him by surprise.

But if we are looking at the patient's ego as something like a sense of balance (as we say of an especially sane person that he is well balanced), we cannot invoke that same ego to explain what we are doing in treatment. An inner balance is home port, not the pilot that finds the way. Before Hartmann corrected this picture, the analyst's role was more simply defined. It was easy to imagine an analyst showing ordinary reality (conceived of as facts) to a reality-testing ego (conceived of as syn-

thesizer) which then adjusts mental contents. But it is not clear what an analyst can do to improve a sense of balance.

WHAT CAN THE ANALYST KNOW ABOUT TREATMENT TRANSACTIONS?

We are now contemplating an ego regarded as a sense of balance, a tendency to sort out inclinations in a workable form, the knack we refer to when we say that someone "knows himself" well enough to make wise decisions. Knowing oneself is different from self-control because it includes knowing when to just let go. And it is different from conscious self-understanding because it means recognizing when to be a creature of habit. In this sense, at least, the ego resembles a gyroscope more than it does a perceptual organ. We could say that this ego of balance (or of adaptation, to use Hartmann's term) is a reliable core identity, if we make sure to include in that term a stable repertoire of external world meanings (such as Kohut's selfobjects).

How would it make treatment look if we pictured the analyst's influence as aimed not at a lens (the ego as a perceptual organ), but at an individual's private "culture" of customs (the ego as equilibrium)? I can think of three important consequences.

First, treatment would seem to be a way of inducing culture shock. After all, the mind is designed for an environment (the average expectable environment) which is not found in a psychoanalytic consulting room. Indeed, the psychoanalytic situation is an outstanding example of an exceptional, unexpectable environment. It is deliberately non-responsive to just those expectations that are programmed into people.

Was Hartmann interested in that perspective? The only evidence I find is his account of the sociohistorical role of psychoanalysis. There he implies that analytic treatment constitutes a deliberate disengagement from the environment:

> He [Mannheim] gives a masterly demonstration that industrialization on the one hand leads to increased "rationalization,"

> and, on the other, through "massification," to all the irrationality implicit in mass psychology. It may be surmised that the emergence of psychoanalysis at this very point in history is connected with these developments. . . . Apparently at certain points in history the ego can no longer cope with its environment, particularly not with that which it itself has created: the means and goals of life lose their orderly relation, and the ego then attempts to fulfill its organizing function by increasing its insight into the inner world. When is this condition an expression of a collective ego weakness and when is it due to an above-average environmental burden on the ego, are questions which we will bypass here (pp. 70-71).

That might be taken to mean that psychoanalytic treatment is a spartan exercise in self-reliant, inner balancing, temporarily disengaged from cultural adaptation. Such a view would anticipate theories of therapy that take as their centerpiece new, enforced flexibility.

The image of culture shock, in turn, suggests a second consequence of viewing the ego as an adaptational style: it implies that treatment acts on a broad front rather than in a surgical fashion. Hartmann did draw that conclusion. Many years after the 1939 monograph he wrote,

> While concentrating on the analysis of a resistance, we are actually working on many parts of the field at the same time. But we are not always mindful of the possible side effects if we focus too exclusively on the duality "defense—warded-off impulse" only (1951, p. 151).

And again,

> I return to the problem of the incidental effects of interpretation which frequently transcend our immediate concern with the specific drive-defense setup under consideration, and which are not always predictable. . . . [T]he process set in motion by a stimulus (interpretation being only one instance in question) produces not only, so to speak, "local" reactions. It goes beyond the stimulated "area," changing the balance of

> mental energies and affecting a variety of aspects of the dynamic system. . . .
>
> In considering changes in cathexis less as isolated phenomena but rather as occurring in a "field," we are in agreement with a trend in modern science that has proved its fruitfulness in a great variety of domains (1951, pp. 152-153).

Hartmann was hopeful that analysts would eventually master these complexities. He wrote, "One day we shall probably be able to formulate more systematically the rational element of our technique, that is 'planning' the predictable outcome of our interventions, with respect to these structural implications" (1951, p. 151). (Note Hartmann's deliberate use of Mannheim's term, "planning," and his shared optimism.) But I think Hartmann's observations do not just point to a horizon for research; I think they point to a ceiling on knowledge. If, as I have suggested, the complexity of the analytic task allows the analyst little opportunity for refined interdependence thinking about the patient, while the patient's ego is always "thinking" that way, we must conclude that the analyst's actions are processed more variously than she can ever know. In that case, everything in treatment will have more meanings than can be canvassed (multiple functions being equivalent to multiple meanings).

If the reader accepts Hartmann's suggestion that the ego is a tendency toward equilibrium, and if he ponders these two implications—that treatment is a kind of culture shock and that treatment acts on a broader front than can ever be surveyed—he will not escape a third, most important implication about the problematic role of the intellect in psychoanalytic treatment. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to exploring that implication.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY IN TREATMENT?

I think that Hartmann's monograph is animated by the great riddle of treatment: What role in the procedure is played by the

intellect, with its deliberately chosen, abstract focus, oddly deployed amid silent tides of visceral negotiation? Is the intellect's work overshadowed by the patient's subtle, organic adjustments? How much does treatment count on a gain in knowledge and how much on the rehearsal of new reactions? What has effortful, goal-directed thinking to do with the various sorts of inward poise that just *happen* and make themselves master of the moment?

No wonder Hartmann sends us off to read *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*; the question of the intellect's autonomy is as central to Mannheim's book as it is to Hartmann's. Mannheim wrote to reassure the democracies that a complex society can be directed rationally and deliberately. The reassurance was needed because, even in 1935, humane observers could see many horrifying products of social planning. No matter, wrote Mannheim, we have no choice: the old society is gone; the only options are to interfere partially and therefore ignorantly, or to draw up our plans with informed comprehensiveness.

Hartmann's parallel question in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* is whether we can deliberately and rationally direct our own individual adaptation. His premise is the same as Mannheim's: in earlier days, an integrated folk culture allowed people to achieve inner and outer harmony without too much reflection. Nowadays, with less help from tradition, we have to find our own equilibrium. Both Mannheim and Hartmann regarded psychoanalysis as a way of doing that. But Hartmann knew that patients face the same challenge that confronts Mannheim's social planner: patients must act as though their efforts account for the complex adjustments that follow upon them, whereas, in fact, rational thinking neither can nor should make those adjustments alone. Rational thinking will be thrown into the mix with other automatic, non-rational ways of sorting things out. We can understand how such a belief would lead Hartmann to call for reassessment of the psychoanalytic definitions of intelligence, health, and education. Thus Hartmann and Mannheim found themselves in the same position: they had to reassess the role of conscious rationality, whose ministers

they were, in the light of Reason's limitations, which they had come to respect.

DOES THE PATIENT HAVE AN ASSIGNMENT?

In the consulting room, the question of what role the patient's rationality plays in treatment surfaces as a question of what his responsibility is.

Insofar as every aspect of mind automatically explores adaptive possibilities, we can hardly even ask what responsibility should be assigned to a patient. *Organisms* do not take orders; they react. Set a stimulus before an organism and it organizes it. We must say the same for the superordinate organizing function of the ego. It would seem that whatever a patient is doing is what he should be doing, and it is up to the analyst to set before him a profitable (probably ambiguous) stimulus. Hartmann's reminder that there can be nothing in us that is adaptationally useless squares well with one aspect of the theory of treatment, namely, that the analyst starts a process and the process accomplishes the task.

But psychoanalytic treatment is paradigmatically rational, and although Hartmann burdened that paradigm with more reservations than is generally realized, he was by no means inclined to sacrifice it. He continued to believe that intelligence is specifically called on in analytic treatment, and not merely organic intelligence or adaptive intelligence, but old-fashioned causal, explanatory, correlating, rational intelligence. The patient is summoned to look at his mind as he would look at any useful tool. This intelligence is not the same thing as the superordinate organizing function, since the latter is an expression of the problem-solving nature of the mind as a whole and needs no summons. Rational thought is different, more specialized and less automatic than the organizing function, but Hartmann suggested that it can be put expressly at the service of the superordinate function. In that case the patient will examine him-

self by deliberate choice in the same spirit with which he assesses himself automatically, that is, with a view to accommodating the whole variety of his responses. At such times, intelligence shares with the superordinate organizing function the characteristics of interdependence thinking. It respects the functions it inspects; it elaborates reasons for the unreasoning movements that make us human. This is special duty. It is not the intellect's favorite pastime. A patient who is using his intelligence to assist self-management is at that moment not engaged in the most typical "rational" commitment: he does not hope to "see through" reality so piercingly as to free himself from its compelling power. Instead, he hopes to find an optimum balance of compulsion and detachment, so as to maximize his readiness for opportunities.

Rational activity can be taught. Intelligent self-reflection is something that can be required of an analysand. Should we, then, take Hartmann's long list of universal, non-rational adaptations (fantasy, the play of wishes, the packaging of automated responses, etc.) and simply add a prescribed intellectual chore for use by patients? It is a tempting solution. To the question, "What special effort can be required of a patient whose very nature it is to organize whatever he can?," we could then answer easily: "Although the patient explores himself automatically in many adaptive ways, he must supplement those unsolicited activities with a deliberate, specialized, rational self-scrutiny, which is the job we assign him in treatment."

The trouble with that answer is that Hartmann did not merely call attention to the problem-solving utility of everything in the mind, including (not surprisingly) intelligence. He proposed something more arresting, namely, that everything in the mind is a slave to organic problem-solving, rational intelligence not excepted. No matter how modestly it salutes other types of experience, rational intelligence is never allowed to take the wheel: ". . . the normal ego must be *able* to control, but it must also be *able to must*; and this fact, far from vitiating it, is necessary for its health. Likewise, the normal ego must be able to

suspend, temporarily, even its most essential functions" (p. 94). Intelligence operates in the fashion that suits the overall needs of the organism.

Hartmann taught that intelligence is one tool of adaptation, and adaptation does not necessarily call for the relentless pursuit of truth—certainly not every kind of truth and not at every moment. Adaptation is a higher intelligence; it knits a person's purposes together and assures their imbrication with those of other people. It would seem to follow that the patient's intelligent self-scrutiny has two masters: the analytic compact which hired it as a constant scout, and the superordinate organizing function which wants a malleable servant. Hartmann's remarks leave no doubt about which contract will be honored.

If that simply meant that patients are sometimes irrational, it would not need saying. But the two-masters problem is thornier than that. It implies that we can never be quite sure what patients are up to when they are thinking rationally (which is hardly news) and consequently cannot know what they are really exploring (and that may be disturbing). If we know that a patient is fantasizing, we know that he is using non-rational means of exploration, and that will tell us something about the kind of problem he is working on. But if he is intelligently "working" on himself, he may, for all we know, be using a habitual reflex to hold himself together in a threatening environment, or he may be showing respect for the etiquette of the two-person consulting room society. While, on the other hand, if he flagrantly abandons his inquiry, he may be in the process of learning something important, as he does when fantasizing or dreaming. (For, if Hartmann is right, the value of non-rational exploration is not limited to what the intellect learns from it.) And if we seek comfort in the thought that these various "uses" of rationality and non-rationality can be regularly diagnosed by characteristic behaviors, such as obsessionality or hostility, or by the visible stigmata inflicted on conflict-free functions by unbridled instinct, we will find no warrant for that reassurance in Hartmann's monograph.

The question is whether therapists are justified in expecting

some deliberate help from their patients, or whether what they get from the patient is equally helpful and unhelpful no matter what it is. Both common sense and common experience offer arguments on both sides of this question.

Because the clinical evidence is contradictory, each practitioner will decide by preference whether there is such a thing as a plausible work assignment for patients (and by work, I do not mean behaviors, such as free association or prompt payment, but a deliberate, internal effort on which treatment depends). How would we tend under the influence of Hartmann's monograph? I think we would assign the patient a task, but rather casually so as not to pin our hopes on it. We would encourage rational self-examination while expecting it to serve non-rational, often obscure purposes. Doggedly trying to bring understanding to everything that comes before us, we would yet not be demoralized by inklings that the patient's understanding is a double agent. On the contrary, our determination would be strengthened because we would see that duplicity as multilevel problem-solving.

This is not an anti-intellectual approach to treatment. We would not deny that treatment fails when unknown dangers continue to intimidate patients behind unexposed defenses. The issue is one of degree. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a patient uses the fundamental rule (or any other activity favored by the analyst) as a religious observance which cannot be analyzed because it is a loyalty shared by the analyst. Must we view that analytic "religion" as a limiting factor, a net cost, an unavoidable trade-off for other benefits? That would be discouraging, considering how inescapable such enactments are in every cooperative enterprise. Without slacking in their discipline, analysts might take comfort from Hartmann's observation that religions "are (among other things) objectivations of a value scale. . . . Religions are the most obvious attempt to cope both with these [three intrapsychic] mental institutions and with social adaptation (through forming communities) by means of synthesis" (pp. 78-79).

Of course, that is not technical advice. Analysts will not shrug

their shoulders when they become aware that a patient is expecting analytic fealty to protect him from life's hardships, or is resonating with the analytic ethos in order not to experience some other vitality. Meanings that can be seen can be confronted. What Hartmann helps with is the ever-present possibility—maybe inevitability—that meanings like these are most important to patients even when they are not seen. Hartmann's implicit message is that patients do their work in many ways, and their analytic self-scrutiny is an appraisal of those ways rather than a substitute for them.

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New York, NY 10021

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

On the Origins of Contemporary Structural Theory: An Appreciation of "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation"

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To cite this article: Morris L. Peltz (1989) On the Origins of Contemporary Structural Theory: An Appreciation of "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation", The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 551-570, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927252

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927252

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

ON THE ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURAL THEORY: AN APPRECIATION OF "EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION"

BY MORRIS L. PELTZ, M.D.

Hartmann's monograph was one of four works which produced a major revision of psychoanalytic theory. Following a brief summary of the monograph, this essay assesses its impact on contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. It considers some confusions about and revisions of Hartmann's ideas and explores terrain first broached in this work which has become very influential but which has not yet been fully exploited. Lastly, this essay will consider Hartmann's hope that psychoanalysis would become a general psychology.

Of the quartet of works which lay the foundation for contemporary structural theory—*The Ego and the Id, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, and *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*—the latter monograph by Heinz Hartmann (1939) is probably the least often read. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, Hartmann's monograph has the reputation of being written in dense Germanic prose not helped in its English translation. Second, and more important, this slender volume contained the seeds which germinated and blossomed in Hartmann's writings over the next thirty years. These later essays and the ones he wrote with his colleagues, Ernest Kris and Rudolph Loewenstein, refined and explicated his thinking, and because they are more accessible, they have most likely displaced their progenitor as primary sources. On rereading the original monograph after many years, I was

surprised to find that, in spite of the difficult prose, its ideas still appear fresh and dazzling. I would like to summarize its content so that the reader will know what ideas it did contain—and what ideas were not there but came later.

HARTMANN'S MONOGRAPH: AN OVERVIEW

Hartmann intended that his monograph uphold the claim that psychoanalysis would become a general developmental psychology with a general theory of mental life. To stake this claim, this hope, he adopted the strategy of studying those ego functions which could not be derived from the id and which developed outside the realm of conflict. "I refer to the development *outside of conflict* of perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, recall phenomena, productivity, to the well-known phases of motor development, grasping, crawling, walking, and to the maturation and learning processes implicit in all these and many others" (p. 8).

In no way was Hartmann disavowing the centrality of conflict or that the ego develops as a consequence of conflict. He argued that conflict was not the only contribution to the growth of the ego. To make psychoanalysis into a general psychology, one would have to investigate mental life beyond conflict. He proposed

> the . . . term *conflict-free ego sphere* for that ensemble of functions which at any given time exert their effects outside the region of mental conflicts. I do not want to be misunderstood: I am not speaking of a province of the mind, the development of which is in principle immune to conflicts, but rather of processes *in so far as*, in an individual, they remain empirically outside of the sphere of mental conflict (pp. 8-9).

He affirmed that the study of ego functions not involved in conflict (in defense activity) would shed important light on such concepts as ego strength, ego weakness, and ego restriction. He specifically disclaimed any intention of completely cataloguing

these non-defensive functions of the ego and instead focused his attention on the several functions which he thought best ensured the human being's adaptation to the environment—the ego's relation to reality. These functions included synthesis, differentiation, reality testing, anticipation, action, and ego interests.

For Hartmann, adaptation was reality mastery which included a reciprocal relationship between the human and the environment. "We may distinguish between a *state of adaptedness* which obtains between the organism and its environment, and the *process of adaptation* which brings that state about" (p. 24). Humanity achieves adaptations through the capacity to make changes both in itself and in the environment. Human beings are guaranteed this capacity by their endowment—the ego apparatuses—which include perception, thinking, and motility. Beyond the autoplastic and alloplastic forms of adaptation, there is a third: a change to a more hospitable environment.

Hartmann affirmed that several other forces guarantee the human being's adaptation. Our initial helplessness and later prolonged dependency ensure learning. We grow up in a society which has recorded and codified those forms of interaction which are most adaptive.[1] Furthermore, adaptation depends upon an average expectable environment which allows for the mutual interactions characterizing adaptation. Finally, adaptation can be construed as "progressive" and "regressive." Progressive adaptation "is an adaptation whose direction coincides with that of development" (p. 36). Regressive adaptation, which can be maladaptive or highly adaptive, involves regressive detours, e.g., problem-solving with regressive detours into fantasy.

Of the repertoire of ego functions not engaged in defense, Hartmann considered the synthetic function (also called the integrating tendency) to be of central importance in securing the

[1] Hartmann noted, however, that "the possibilities for development afforded by a given social order may not have parallel influences on the child and on the adult" (p. 32).

fit between the human being and the environment. Nunberg (1932) had written,

> The synthetic function of the ego thus manifests itself in the assimilation of internal and external elements, in reconciling ideas, in uniting contrasts and in activating mental creativity . . . [and includes] the need for causality (p. 151).

To the synthetic function Hartmann added the coordination of the demands between the id and the superego as well as the scanning of the outer world against the needs of the individual.

Closely allied to the synthetic function as one principle of the regulatory functions of the ego was differentiation, stated Hartmann. Differentiation is the factor responsible for the emergence of the distinct agencies of the mind (id, ego, and superego) from their undifferentiated state at birth. "[It also operates] in reality testing, in judgment, in the extension of the world of perception and action, in the separation of perception from imagery, cognition from affect, etc." (p. 53). Differentiation accounts for the progressive unfolding of ego functions—as it does in the serial dominance of libidinal zones.

Following Freud, Hartmann believed that the basic layer of reality testing is the capacity to distinguish perception from ideation. Gross impairments in this function lead to psychotic hallucinations. Hartmann also considered the more subtle compromises in reality testing which occur, for example, in defensive denials in fantasy.

The ego function of anticipation was articulated by Freud when he defined signal anxiety. For Hartmann, "*anticipating* the future, orienting our actions according to it and correctly relating means and ends to each other" (p. 43) serves adaptation to a very high degree. The anticipatory functions involve affective and cognitive knowledge "both of man's relations to his environment and of his inner life" (p. 70).

In formulating a theory of action, Hartmann again began with Freud's conception that thinking is experimental action. This phenomenon, acquired through a process of "internaliza-

tion," permits humans to achieve their finely tuned adaptations. "The inner world and its functions make possible an adaptation process which consists of two steps: withdrawal from the external world and return to it with improved mastery" (p. 58). Causal thinking and the capacity to reflect on one's self frees a person from the need to respond immediately to a stimulus. The "emergence of intelligence is a decisive step in the development of purposive behavior" (p. 61). Intelligence is not a superordinate function, but an organizing function which informs rational action, argued Hartmann. As such, it achieves its greatest synthetic and differentiating capacity when development permits awareness that intelligence is one factor among several which influence a person's perception and judgment of reality. According to Hartmann, this moment occurs when intellect and superego have developed sufficiently to permit a person to distinguish between morally driven imperatives and rational judgments.

"Rational action has goals and means" (p. 67) and serves its three taskmasters: instinctual strivings, moral principles, and reality adaptations. Hartmann wrote that "only the choice of appropriate means to a given goal may be called rational" (p. 67). But he understood that the "completely rational man" was a fiction. The human being is driven by the id and the superego and influenced by habit, culture, and tradition. Nevertheless, the most rational thinking and action (the best fit between means and goals) was a measure of the strength, maturity, and structure of the ego.

Scrutinizing the ego regulation of action, Hartmann distinguished between rationally informed actions and automatisms in which certain tasks are mastered in the same way, or nearly the same way, each time. Automatisms employ learned problem-solving in order to achieve adaptive ends. These automatisms include "not only motor behavior, but perception and thinking" (p. 88). These preconscious processes guarantee a better mastery of reality than would a new adaptation created for each occasion. Too much automatization can lead to ri-

gidity, however. Hence, the "normal ego must be able to control, [as] it must also be *able to must*" (p. 94) and to surrender its musts.

Hartmann distinguished between ego-regulated automatisms and repetitive behavior emanating from the pleasure principle and from the repetition compulsion. He viewed these latter two principles as older and more rigid forms of regulation which attempted to "perpetuate something that was once pleasurable, in that it mastered a task, or removed a disturbance, or the like" (p. 95). Hartmann believed that actions prompted by the repetition compulsion could lead to adaptive mastery, but he preferred "to speak of a partial interaction between the repetition compulsion and the ego-dependent activities of the mental apparatus, rather than of an 'ego aspect of the repetition compulsion' " (p. 98).

Pondering the influence of "will" on action, Hartmann wrote:

> We know much about the dependence of the will on the needs, but little about its independent, specific psychological significance, though we recognize that it is steered by the external world more than the instinctual drives are (p. 74).

Once the role of the external world is considered, values constructed by social units also have to be included. These values are organized hierarchically. Integrating values with aggressive and libidinal demands represents a momentous synthetic achievement for the child. Religion and education are institutionalized examples of such integrations between social values and individual drives, on the one hand, and their restraints, on the other. They are also examples of "social compliance" (analogous to Freud's concept of "somatic compliance").

Ego interests, only named in this essay, received a more detailed treatment by Hartmann (1950) in his paper, "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego." He believed that Freud's concept of the self-preservative instincts should be excluded from considerations of the id. Instead, he proposed that

the ego had its cluster of interests, chief among them the self-preservative. These interests center on the self and its relation to the external world. They enable the human being to manipulate the environment, and they add a layer to motivation. They usually elude analytic observation in the clinical setting because they do not participate in conflict. They may, however, become involved in compromise formations with instinctual derivatives, as in such "useful" ego interests as strivings for wealth and social prestige. Moral values, including love for one's fellow humans, are other examples of ego interests.

Hartmann formulated autonomous ego development, emphasizing the contributions of nature. Ego apparatuses are largely the constitutional givens: perception, motility, intelligence, ego regulation, etc. Because they are not derived from the drives (although they may be molded on instinctual patterns), Hartmann theorized about an "undifferentiated" phase of development from which both the id and the ego differentiate—much as Freud sometimes referred to an "undifferentiated ego-id" operating in the initial stages of mental life. Hartmann proposed that it would

> be useful to distinguish three kinds of developmental processes: those which occur without any essential and specific influence of the external world; those which are coordinated to typical experiences (that is, which are triggered by average expectable environmental situations . . .); and finally, those which depend upon atypical experiences (pp. 103-104).

Adaptation, therefore, does not entirely depend upon experience, but is codetermined by the innate, thus partaking of the complemental series. These apparatuses are primarily autonomous and assure reality relations.

Hartmann believed that his conceptions of the conflict-free ego sphere, ego strength, adaptation, fitting together, rank order of ego functions, and ordering principles in the ego would lead to a more coherent view of what constitutes mental health. The absence of neurosis is simply too narrow a defini-

tion. Nor can the absence of pain and suffering denote mental health, as these phenomena are inherent in the human condition. Implicit in these views is the notion that a therapeutic psychoanalysis not only achieves neurotic conflict resolution but restores ego functions secondarily compromised by conflict, thereby enhancing the individual's ability to adapt.

This synopsis does not do justice to the richness and complexity of Hartmann's monograph. It was first read as a paper in 1936 to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society shortly after Hartmann had discussed the first two chapters of Anna Freud's *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense.* Miss Freud later (1966) described the skeptical response that Hartmann's monograph initially encountered in the analytic community:

> There were many analytic colleagues who took exception to the degree to which he turned his mind away from the problems of psychopathology to contemplate instead the possibility of securing for psychoanalysis the status of a general psychology. Others had misgivings on principle concerning the manner in which, in Hartmann's writings, theoretical thinking took precedence over the clinical concerns of the analyst in practice. But, above all, there were many who feared that the explicit introduction of an ego psychology into psychoanalysis endangered its position as a depth psychology, a discipline concerned exclusively with the activity of the instinctual drives and the functioning of the unconscious mind (p. 17).

By the time the book was published in its English translation nineteen years later, the editors would comment on "the remarkable degree to which Hartmann's ideas have shaped, and become assimilated into, current psychoanalytic thinking" (p. viii). Retrospectively, this assessment seemed prematurely optimistic, as it took another twenty years to integrate the principles of ego psychology into mainstream psychoanalytic theory and technique.

IMPACT ON CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT

There is no question about the profound impact that Hartmann's monograph has had on current psychoanalytic thinking. His greatly expanded view of the ego and its functions put that agency of the mind on a par with the id (and superego) without diminishing psychoanalysis as a depth psychology. In defining the elements of the adaptive and synthetic functions of the ego, Hartmann enunciated regulatory principles conceptually equal to the pleasure principle and the reality principle. The ego is more than its defense function. In its orientation to outer reality, the adaptive function assures a fit between the human being and the environment. In its orientation to inner reality, the synthetic function assures compromise to resolve conflicting pressures from the id and the superego. The synthetic function is responsible for the confluence in thought and behavior of derivative expressions of id and superego. Neurosis could now be viewed as more than a pathological entity embedded in the personality. Neurotic symptoms are maladaptive compromises by the synthetic function—yet an aspect of total personality functioning. Finally, the monograph continues to have a visible and palpable influence on the thinking and writing of child psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic investigators of infancy and early childhood.

Hartmann expressed a hope that observation and study of infants would clarify the unfolding of conflict-free ego function. Anna Freud (1966) openly acknowledged her debt to Hartmann for directing her attention to the nonconflictual growth of the ego (to which she believed the adult analyst only paid lip service):

> In our Hampstead Clinic [the growth of the ego] has been put into action very vigorously in the Diagnostic Profile, used for the assessment of a child's development in general or his psychopathology in particular. With the Profile scheme used as a

> guide, the diagnostician's attention is directed as decisively to "conflict-free," autonomous ego growth, and the irregularities and failures of building up ego apparatuses and functions as it is directed to the ego's defense organization or the vicissitudes of drive development (p. 19).

Of the many essays which honored Hartmann on his seventieth birthday, the two with a personal dedication were written by child analysts. Benjamin (1966) wrote a discussion of the Hartmann monograph, in which he strongly endorsed the concept of the conflict-free sphere of the ego, calling it both dynamic and novel. He further declared that although Hartmann's concepts of primary and secondary autonomy could retrospectively be discerned in the works of Freud, A. Freud, Waelder, and others, these concepts were "essentially new to psychoanalysis" (p. 39).

Two years earlier, Solnit (1964) had asserted that Hartmann's work "and contributions by others . . . have helped to develop psychoanalysis into the general psychology that Freud had envisaged it would be" (p. 475). Applying Hartmann's ideas of the "average expectable environment," Solnit and his co-workers found that depleted mothers could not provide the support "of those ego capacities of the young child (two to four) that enable him to learn from and identify with the protective mother, and which stem from libidinal ties of a satisfying and soothing nature" (p. 482). Such failures are contained in our notion of a "weak ego," whereas the orderly unfolding of ego functions supported by good enough mothering in an average expectable environment are the prerequisites for a "strong ego."

Some current research in infant and toddler development seems to have confirmed Hartmann's conception of a conflict-free ego and early ego differentiation in a way remarkably close to his original formulation. These researchers write about a phase of development prior to conflict, although there are varying opinions about when conflict makes its appearance. Mahler and McDevitt (1980) suggested that conflict emerges sometime during the practicing phase of development (six to

sixteen months). In contrast, Stern (1985) suggested that the first year of life is free of conflict; the infant's perceptions of mother, for example, are free of distorting affects and conflicts. These ideas and their supporting observational data are compelling but await confirmation—a difficult task when investigating mental life during preverbal development. Nevertheless, this aspect of Hartmann's theorizing, the study of ego functions prior to conflict (the conflict-free ego sphere), is of great heuristic interest to investigators of child development.

CONTROVERSIES AND REVISIONS

In the manner of any scientific theory, psychoanalysis has evolved over the last fifty years. Although Hartmann was rigorous and precise in his thinking, subsequent contributors to ego psychology have not always been so scrupulous. Confusing reifications of the ego have appeared in the literature. For Hartmann, the ego was a functional concept, although he described it in vivid metaphorical language. The ego was both "the organ of adaptation" and "the organ of equilibrium." In spite of persistent attempts to show that psychological structures are not material (i.e., psychological structures are functions with slow rates of change), this distinction has always been "more honored in the breach than in the observance." Regarded as metaphors, the words of structural theory do convey in concise and vivid ways what is consensually understood in structural theory. It is hard to imagine doing without them at the present time. Boesky (1988) recently reviewed the value of metaphors as models for theory. He warned of the possibility of confusing such metaphors with realities:

> The use of a noun pushes us linguistically toward reification. To make a "thing" out of a group of systematically related functions by calling these functions "structure" is therefore not only to use a metaphoric transformation, it is also, if only potentially, a concealed reification (p. 119).

Boesky (1988, p. 124) appears to agree with Beres (1965) that "confusion might have been diminished if the structural theory had been named the 'functional theory' from the outset." Another recent example of caution in these matters is Weinshel's (1988) preference for speaking of "psychoanalytic change" over structural change when discussing the therapeutic effects of psychoanalysis. Finally, it is my impression that questionable notions, such as "structural deficit," are a consequence of taking too literally the abstract concept of "ego."

Of all the ideas advanced in the monograph, the concept of a conflict-free sphere of the ego has been subject to the greatest revision, principally by Arlow (1969b) and Brenner (1976, 1981, 1982). In suggesting a "conflict-free sphere" of the ego, Hartmann was attempting to sequester defensive functions from nondefensive functions of the ego. Such distinctions are difficult, if not impossible. As Brenner (1981) pointed out, ". . . ego functions are all-purpose. There are no aspects of ego functioning which are used for defense alone. . . . [The] ego can use defensively whatever lies at hand that is useful for that purpose" (p. 561). Brenner, for me, is persuasive in this matter. The very same ego functions can alternatively be used defensively or adaptively.

Moreover, because of the ubiquitous nature of unconscious fantasy and conflict, it seems unlikely that there are any ego functions which are free from conflictual influences. Take reality testing, for instance. Arlow (1969a) convincingly demonstrated that organized unconscious fantasy continually exerts its power on perception and reality testing which in turn interact reciprocally. He used the following model:

> . . . two motion picture projectors [are flashing] a continuous series of images simultaneously but from opposite sides onto a translucent screen. . . . There are two centers of perceptual input, introspection and exterospection, supplying data from the inner eye and data from the outer eye. It is the function of a third agency of the ego, however, to integrate, correlate,

> judge, and discard the competing data of perceptual experience (p. 48).

Wallerstein (1988) has extended this point by proposing a "constructed continuum" reality in which there is "the interplay of multiple perspectives [and] multiple versions, each its own story, each its own admixture of fusion of drive-dictated fantasy interacting with appropriately selected environmental stimuli or vicissitudes" (p. 319). Because of the ubiquity and power of unconscious fantasy and conflict, it is apparent that we should assess ego functions in terms of their *relative* freedom from conflict, which is not fixed but varies across time.

Functions originating in conflict can also achieve relative distance from conflict. In his essay, Hartmann introduced the phenomenon of "change of function":

> The conception of change of function is familiar in psychoanalysis: a behavior-form which originated in a certain realm of life may, in the course of development, appear in an entirely different realm and role. An attitude which arose originally in the service of defense against an instinctual drive may, in the course of time, become an independent structure ... (pp. 25-26).

What was once a means can become a goal. What once served defense can serve synthesis and adaptation.

Hartmann's conception of psychic energy (amplified in later papers) has also been challenged. Hartmann (following Freud) viewed the mind as powered by psychic energy of the drives. George Klein (1976) questioned the value of these energic theories. For analysts with convictions about structural theory, it would be hard to conceive of human conflict without considering drives and their derivatives, mental forces, quantity, and motivation. Brenner (1982) asserts,

> There is no way at present of measuring the intensity of a drive, however. It is not currently possible to give to psychic

> energy a numerical value. . . . The quantitative aspect of drive theory—the quantification of measurement of psychic energy —is still an area for future exploration (p. 25).

Furthermore, when we consider such clinical phenomena as sexualization and aggressivization, "energic shifts" remain a compelling metaphor.

The term "ego interests" no longer appears in the literature. What Hartmann described as ego interests appear to be what we now call character traits. It was particularly prescient of Hartmann to understand that character traits (ego interests) may add a layer to motivation but remain relatively remote from conflict. In writing about character, Boesky (1983) demonstrated that only when character traits partake of conflict do they enter the transference and lend themselves to analysis. The investigation of character traits currently occupies a conspicuous place in our literature.

IDEAS TO BE EXPLORED

On a rereading of the monograph, several ideas still seem elegant and warrant further investigation. The rank order of ego function is one of the most compelling. In considering how means best serve goals, Hartmann concluded that there was a superordinate ego function which ensures reality-adapted thinking and action. This formulation implies a hierarchy of ego functions which achieves central regulation, thereby assuring the best fit between the human being and the environment. This hierarchical view of psychological functioning can be discerned in the literature of the last fifty years. I will cite from just a very few authors. Rangell (1963), in considering the way the ego resolves intrapsychic conflict, cited the advance and dominance of secondary process modes of thinking and action, and the achievement of order, logic, modulation, and subtlety, as ego functions which assure the ego power and dominance over the id and superego. In the same year, Gill (1963), when

considering the organization of defense, contended, "There is a hierarchical layering of both impulse and defense" (p. 123). "In general, a behavior is a defense in relation to a drive more primitive than itself; and a drive in relation to a defense more advanced than itself" (pp. 22-23). Arlow (1961) described a hierarchy of fantasies which, according to Kramer (1988),

> are grouped around a relatively small number of infantile wishes. These fantasies represent different "editions"—some normal, some pathological—which appear during various stages of development and result in a "final edition" which integrates all of the different elements of the personality—the drives, defenses, superego and reality—into a final "identity" and "personal myth" (p. 23).

Spitz (1959) proposed a developmental hierarchy in which new states of regulation over drives and adaptations were marked by the appearance of specific infantile affects, his "psychic organizers." Recently, Tyson (1988) proposed that the "complex affects (such as anxiety and shame), the emergence of the signal function, and guilt be considered as three further 'organizers' " (p. 83).

Hartmann's hope of a complete psychoanalytic theory of action has yet to be realized. In describing his theory of action, Hartmann suggested that a "genetic psychology of action would be equally important for theories of ego development, intention and object relations" (p. 86). He felt that once intelligence had emerged as an organizing principle, it informed rational action as a means to achieve a goal. This idea implies the close partnership and reciprocal relationship between thinking and acting. If this thought is extended, as certain clinical phenomena suggest, then actions also contribute to thinking—a more circular operation. This seems to be the case the more the action deviates from the (purely) rational. For example, in fetishism the fetish sustains the conviction that castration is not a calamity. In this instance, action is the testament of an unconscious fantasy creating a "spurious reality" as Boesky (1982)

suggested. "Rational" action, like all compromise formations, is invariably influenced by unconscious forces.

PSYCHOANALYSIS: A GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY?

In defending his study of data outside the realm of conflict, Hartmann contended that the "distinctive characteristic of a psychoanalytic investigation is not its subject matter but the scientific methodology, and the structure of the concepts it uses" (pp. 4-5). Brenner (1982) and others have argued that it is indeed the data and how those data are collected and understood that uniquely define psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis proper is a branch of psychology which studies the unconscious and the mind in conflict. Psychoanalysis, like other sciences, generates hypotheses which can be used to investigate other branches of psychology, other sciences, literature, and the arts. These studies, particularly when conducted by experienced psychoanalysts, do generate important data—including data about the unconscious mind. Our literature contains many fine examples of such psychoanalytic applications. About this there is little controversy. What is currently being argued is the value of the data of research applications for clinical and theoretical psychoanalysis.

The data from psychoanalytically informed infant and toddler research has generated such a debate. There is no question that this information has dramatically altered our view of the first year of life, lending a new dimension to Hartmann's conceptions of the ego apparatuses and ego autonomy. The work of Mahler and her colleagues on separation-individuation theory has compelled us to modify our portrait of infants and toddlers. Yet there are many analysts who question the value of separation-individuation theory for the theory and treatment of most neuroses. Shengold (1988), in an extraordinarily rich example of applied psychoanalysis, vividly employed this theory in a biographical study of Kaspar Hauser, a nineteenth century adolescent found abandoned in the streets of Nuremberg.

Mahler and her colleagues are among those who have specified preoedipal trauma in the pathogenesis of the severe character pathologies, the so-called borderline patients. Other authors (Abend, Porder, and Willick, 1983) have noted that while they find evidence of preoedipal trauma, they do not agree that it is etiologically specific. In treating borderline patients, they have found traumatic forces exerting their influence across the span of development.

Arlow's (1988) summary of a recent panel on structural theory is another example of the questioning of the value and utility to psychoanalysis of the study of early development:

> A fundamental question was raised from the floor by Dr. Shapiro, who wondered whether many of the conclusions from direct observation of children may just be trivial, in the sense that subsequent developmental vicissitudes bypass and cover over the influence of these very early developments (p. 291).

There is no definitive answer to this question. One's view on the matter depends upon one's conception of development and on one's view of the impact of preoedipal trauma on development. There is one view of development that asserts that it proceeds continuously, and another that states that it is a discontinuous process. In accordance with this latter conception, some analysts have argued that preoedipal development is subsumed within oedipal organization in such new ways that the preoedipal era loses its unique and distinct properties. In this view, the experience of signal anxiety is forever changed with the advent of oedipal development such that early sources of signal anxiety (object loss, loss of the object's love, and castration anxiety) are experienced in entirely new ways and are not revivals of specific moments of prior development. Even if this view is correct, no one can deny that the way in which the oedipus is engaged and resolved is irrevocably dependent upon prior development. Furthermore, are not the residues of preoedipal development, clearly discernible in character traits, a subject of vital interest to psychoanalysts?

Certainly, the effects of preoedipal trauma may be obscured

by subsequent development; however, this is not always the case. A vivid example is Monica, the girl born with a gastric fistula, who was followed by Engel and his associates for many years. In the report of the twenty-five-year longitudinal study (Panel, 1979), a film was shown in which the "most striking finding was that the position in which she [Monica] bottle feeds her own babies is identical with the position in which she herself was fistula-fed and in which she was filmed bottle-feeding a doll when age four" (pp. 119-120).

The question remains whether infant and toddler research and longitudinal studies, such as the study of Monica, are to be considered within the domain of psychoanalysis or whether they are to be more properly considered as examples of applications of psychoanalytic theory. This is not purely an academic question. Child analysts think of development as both continuous and discontinuous, and contend that such issues as ego strength, vitality, and flexibility can be fully understood only in the context of all development, including the preoedipal.

CONCLUSION

I believe we are not yet at the point of answering the question of whether psychoanalysis can be a general psychology, but I remain sanguine. Psychoanalysis is best characterized as that science which studies the unconscious mind and the mind in conflict in the clinical setting, once language is available to explore these phenomena. Yet psychoanalytic conceptions like the ones Hartmann advanced in his monograph have provided conceptual frames for the investigation of early mental development which have greatly influenced our thinking. At present, we do not have the investigative tools to explore convincingly the earliest origins of the mind, yet it is my hope that psychoanalysis can develop a coherent theory of the ontogeny of the mind, thereby realizing Hartmann's (and Freud's) hope that psychoanalysis could become a general psychology.

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3628-A Sacramento St.
San Francisco, CA 94118

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Contribution of Hartmann's Adaptational Theory to Psychoanalysis, with Special Reference to Regression and Symptom Formation

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To cite this article: Ernest Kafka (1989) The Contribution of Hartmann's Adaptational Theory to Psychoanalysis, with Special Reference to Regression and Symptom Formation, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 571-591, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927253

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927253

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

THE CONTRIBUTION OF HARTMANN'S ADAPTATIONAL THEORY TO PSYCHOANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO REGRESSION AND SYMPTOM FORMATION

BY ERNEST KAFKA, M.D.

My experience of clinical work is consistent with the conclusion that both practice and theory are improved by applying the contributions of Heinz Hartmann. His work provides an important conceptual bridge to understanding the adaptive and pathologic changes that appear in the course of human development. The specific details of those changes are just as much an issue demanding the analyst's attention as is the tracing of patterns of childhood instinctual life. In this paper, I will point to some areas of controversy where renewed attention to Hartmann's ideas might be useful, and I will attempt to illustrate the clinical utility of his theoretical contributions.

Heinz Hartmann is generally acknowledged to be one of the outstanding theoreticians in the history of psychoanalytic thought. The nuclei of his ideas, which he later elaborated, both independently and with his co-authors, Ernst Kris and Rudolph Loewenstein, first appeared fifty years ago in his influential monograph, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*.

In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1920), *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), and other works, Freud had already pointed to connections between individuals' inner psychic arrangements and their social contexts. He applied his analytic understanding to a variety of social questions. Indeed, throughout his work Freud repeatedly

demonstrated the psychological linkages between the personal and the social and between everyday phenomena and those considered to be psychopathologic. Freud's formulation of ego psychology (1923) afforded the possibility of explaining and elaborating on these interdependencies and relationships.

Hartmann took up this task in his work, expressing not only the view that psychoanalytic understanding provides explanations of psychopathology, conflict, and symptom formation, but also the view that psychoanalytic theory constitutes a general psychologic theory, one that can account for psychological functioning in all circumstances. Hartmann's expansion of ego psychology, as he understood it, and his elaboration of the meaning and role of adaptation in psychic arrangements represent his efforts to support this view.

Hartmann's work achieved some of the goals to which Freud's discoveries and theoretical generalizations had pointed the way. Among the more significant proposals Hartmann made were: (1) that ego capacities develop and evolve during the course of maturation, largely independent of conflict; (2) that, like drive derivatives, they should be recognized as constitutionally given, and studied more than they have been before; (3) that psychic arrangements reflect the interrelationships of the innate capacities, the drives, and the social context, the conjunction of which not only permits individuals to arrive at individual adaptive arrangements, but also limits their possibilities; and (4) that careful study of the evolution of adaptive arrangements throughout the course of antecedent development is a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition for arriving at an accurate understanding of those psychic arrangements encountered in the clinical situation.

In this paper, I will attempt to indicate what I think Hartmann contributed in his efforts to make psychoanalytic theory into a more comprehensive, general theory, by comparing his emphases with those of Freud, especially the latter's interest in symptom formation (1926), insofar as this was based upon his ideas about regression. I will point to some areas of continued

controversy where renewed attention to Hartmann's ideas might be useful. I will briefly discuss how I believe Hartmann's work has influenced the work of Brenner, perhaps our leading present-day exponent of psychoanalysis as a general psychology. I will attempt to illustrate the clinical utility of Hartmann's theoretical contributions with clinical data.

FREUD'S VIEWS OF SYMPTOM FORMATION AND REGRESSION, 1926

Freud discovered that when links between unacceptable unconscious wishes and consciousness are interrupted, conscious experiences of unpleasure are reduced. He proposed that repression, which constitutes the active interruption of such linkages, causes the repressed unconscious contents to lose their power to influence action except under certain circumstances, that is to say, when either increased instinctual pressure or diminished defensive capacity permits some version of repressed contents to return to consciousness.

Further, Freud proposed that repressed unconscious contents remain unaltered until their reappearance, as happens when analytic work unearths them or when other conditions lead to neurotic outbreaks. Under such circumstances, the balance between wish and defense is altered in favor of the power of the wish; regression and a return of the repressed follow; and then symptom formation may subsequently take place. This approach reflected Freud's discovery of the degree to which the past is continued into later life, but it did not satisfactorily deal with how the past and later life differ. Freud's use of the word, transference, was meant to underline the fact that something in the past is carried forward and attached to something in a later contextual frame.

Freud was, to be sure, aware of some problems in this line of thinking. For example, in discussing Little Hans, he wrote (1926) that

> the idea of being devoured by the father gives expression, in a form that has undergone regressive degradation, to a passive, tender impulse to be loved by him in a genital-erotic sense. . . . Is it . . . a question merely of the replacement of the [psychical] representative by a regressive form of expression or is it a question of a genuine regressive degradation of the genitally-directed impulse in the id? It is not at all easy to make certain (p. 105)

By and large, Freud favored the idea that the symptom represents a regressive reactivation, but in any event, an earlier state reappears as a consequence of regression.

Freud went on:

> A symptom arises from an instinctual impulse which has been detrimentally affected by repression. If the ego, by making use of the signal of unpleasure, attains its object of completely suppressing the instinctual impulse, we learn nothing of how this has happened. We can only find out about it from those cases in which repression must be described as having to a greater or less extent failed. In this event the position, generally speaking, is that the instinctual impulse has found a substitute in spite of repression, but a substitute which is very much reduced, displaced and inhibited and which is no longer recognizable as a satisfaction. And when the substitutive impulse is carried out there is no sensation of pleasure; its carrying out has, instead, the quality of a compulsion. . . . The substitutive process is prevented, if possible, from finding discharge through motility; and even if this cannot be done, the process is forced to expend itself in making alterations in the subject's own body and is not permitted to impinge on the external world (pp. 94-95).

Thus Freud apparently continued to make use of the first anxiety theory, in which he held that repression causes anxiety as a consequence of the "damming-up of libido" (1914, pp. 84-86).

Freud provided several ways to account for the appearance of change in the course of development. One explanation proposed that socially acceptable behaviors arise when the suppres-

sion of unwelcome wishes brings about a delay of gratification, permitting psychic activity to devise modified, gratifying, sublimated behaviors.

Another change Freud (1926) described is that which results from "a tedious or interminable sequel in which the struggle against the instinctual impulse is prolonged into a struggle against the symptom. . . . The ego now . . . makes an adaptation to the symptom. . . . the symptom gradually comes to be the representative of important interests . . . [secondary gain from illness]" (pp. 98-99). The "adaptation" Freud described was conceived of as a subsequent development and not one that appears coincident with symptom formation. Freud never systematically or extensively addressed the question of how the evolution of the capacity to understand one's inner needs and outer conditions, to enact one's wishes and to anticipate either the advantageous or the doleful consequences of actions, exerts its effects on development.

Freud explained inhibition as a consequence of a need to defer gratification and accept social constraints, and also as a punishment for forbidden unconscious wishes. Behavior that is motivated by the need to avoid the imagined unpleasant consequences of wishes, and that makes use of substituting childlike, passive forms of gratification in order to do so, was said to reflect regressive substitution for, or regressive degradation of, the form in which instinctual wishes emerge. Freud (1920) proposed that severe forms of inhibition, like depression, suicide, and the negative therapeutic reaction, represent the effects of the biological death instinct. The intermediate links by means of which this hypothesized biological determinant was connected to its psychological manifestations were not well described by him.

HARTMANN'S REVISIONS

The essentials of Hartmann's contributions, later elaborated but fundamentally unaltered in subsequent publications (e.g., Hart-

mann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949), were presented in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*.

To briefly summarize the subtle and complex reasoning which characterized Hartmann's work is to do it an injustice. However, it is possible to say that among his chief contributions were the following ideas. (1) Detailed study is required of the interrelationships between thinking on different levels of consciousness and from different periods of development. (2) The maturation of innate capacities needs to be better studied and more thoroughly integrated, in order to enhance our understanding of mental functioning. (3) The capacity to anticipate is particularly important. (4) Mental functioning should be looked at to a greater degree in terms of its adaptational interdependency with the social context.

He recommended that analysts should be more attentive to the changes of function consistent with the maturation that psychic arrangements undergo in the course of adaptational development throughout all phases of life. The individual's understanding of and relationship with the environment from the standpoint of its offering possibilities for adaptational solutions should also be a central interest.

Taken together, these ideas represent a considerable change from Freud's point of view, which concentrated on intrapsychic conditions and emphasized the contextual and adaptational dimensions less, which regarded symptoms and their sequelae as special psychopathological formations that are constructed only after repression and regression have occurred, and which maintained that repressed wishes are not gratified in everyday interactions with the social context.

Hartmann (1939) wrote that "psychoanalytic ego psychology . . . is, and will be, increasingly interested in the details of behavior, in all the shadings of conscious experience, in the rarely studied preconscious processes, and in the relationships between the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious ego" (p. 6). He implied that Freud's attention had not always adequately focused on such linkages.

In addition to recommending that more attention be paid to the details of behavior in the various developmental phases and to the relationships between the levels of consciousness, Hartmann pointed out that we ought to pay attention to "the development *outside of conflict* of perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, recall-phenomena, productivity, to the well-known phases of motor development, grasping, crawling, walking, and to the maturation and learning processes implicit in all these and many others" (p. 8). He wrote: "What we do not yet have is a systematic psychoanalytic knowledge of . . . reality-fears" (p. 9), "of special talents" (p. 10), of the relations between "constitution, maturation of the apparatus, and learning processes" and "those libidinal processes, identifications, endogenous and exogenous (instinctual drive and environmental) factors which may lead to conflicts and to disturbances of function" (p. 11).

Hartmann placed particular emphasis on the importance of anticipation. He wrote about the "*function of anticipating* the future, orienting our actions according to it and correctly relating means and ends to each other. It is an ego function and, surely, an adaptation process of the highest significance. We may assume that ego development enters this process as an independent variable, though naturally the ego function involved may secondarily yield pleasure" (p. 43).

Hartmann's stress on the need to consider the consequences of maturation is further reflected in the following: ". . . we must also keep in mind the phenomenon of 'change of function,' the role of which in mental life and particularly in the development of the ego seems to be very great. . . . The conception of change of function is familiar in psychoanalysis: a behavior-form which originated in a certain realm of life may, in the course of development, appear in an entirely different realm and role" (pp. 25-26).

In addition, Hartmann recommended considering change in the environment in tandem with change in function. "It is often overlooked that the degree of need gratification and particu-

larly the possibilities for development afforded by a given social order may not have parallel influences on the child and on the adult" (p. 32).

In Hartmann's point of view, the concept of regression commands less importance than it had in Freud's view. Regression is one of many phenomena, all of which ought to be considered in the context of the level of development of the individual concerned, as well as in the context of his or her experiential and maturational history. One should also take into account that an individual's environment is both perceived differently and responds quite differently to him or her as he or she continues to grow, develop, and mature, in comparison to the way it did in the person's past.

VIEWS OF LATER CONTRIBUTORS

Peter Blos (1962) has added much to the understanding of adolescence. Blos often cited Hartmann as one who had encouraged him in his interests, for instance in quoting Hartmann's suggestion that "the potentialities for formation of personality during latency and adolescence have been underrated in psychoanalytic writing" (p. 11).

For example, Blos (1965) discussed the significance of the intensification of passive wishes and the consequent return to a hypothesized primal passivity in adolescence. He noted the difficulty adolescents generally have in lessening their childhood attachments to their parents, and their problems associated with reliving oedipal conflicts and disappointments. Blos also pointed out that regression in adolescence brings with it progressive possibilities, by way of "regression in the service of the ego," an idea also important to Hartmann. These ideas have been generally accepted.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that Hartmann's belief that we ought to place more emphasis on ego development in the adolescent period has not been followed with sufficient vigor. Ado-

lescents become aware of their new capability to bring about in reality both destructive and sexual ends, which they had been unable to do more than wish for earlier. The possibility of causing pregnancy, of abandoning lovers and others, of causing physical injury, the awareness of the presence of new powers and of greater opportunities for success as well as for failure, all enter into adolescent conflict and adaptation in important, perhaps insufficiently appreciated ways. The case I summarize below illustrates this point.

Mahler was also encouraged in her interest in observing young children by Hartmann's views. She was especially interested in investigating problems relating to psychosis and those concerning the later effects of separation-individuation phase difficulties. She attempted to distinguish between the psychotic regression of the autistic or symbiotic child and the regression of more normal people. Mahler (Mahler and Furer, 1968) wrote:

> Several formulations about infantile psychosis center around the idea that these pathological formulations represent regressions to very early, yet normal phases of development. . . . The pathological formations, however, whether they are predominantly autistic or symbiotic syndromes, represent grave distortions that take place by way of a pathological intrapsychic process . . . that is, regression in the sense of a psychotic defensive regression of intrapsychic formations [to a pre-existent psychotic state]. . . . the psychotic child [does not regress] to any known phase of development (pp. 54-55).

Instead,

> the pathological regression in psychosis involves a return to the earliest level of preobject and part-object relationships. . . (p. 228).

To what extent regression is a useful concept in understanding psychotic states remains an issue for debate. Willick (1989) has recently argued that many severely ill persons display conditions involving deterioration of cognitive functions

that had developed normally and had never been defective in the past. Willick suggested that the main cause might well be a biological one, as is the case in Huntington's disease, and that no return to a hypothesized previous psychological state is involved.

Mahler's discoveries about infantile development are often misused by the inexperienced—and sometimes by the experienced as well. For instance, a clinician may observe adult reactions to separations and conclude that the adult problems can be explained as re-editions of difficulties from the separation-individuation phase. In such cases, as with efforts to explain psychotic phenomena or in connection with issues involving focal cognitive difficulties (Kafka, 1984), more emphasis on the role of ego maturation and adaptation and more accurate definition of developmental linkages would, in my opinion, lead to more precise conclusions.

Modell (1968, 1988), Loewald (1960, 1978), Anzieu (1983), Basch (1988), and Ornstein (1988) are among respected psychoanalytic contributors who place great emphasis on regression as a factor in their theoretical orientations, and whose views, often in disagreement with Hartmann's, contribute to the continuing dialectic that Hartmann, to a great degree, brought about.

BRENNER'S EXTENSIONS OF HARTMANN'S VIEWS

As Hartmann extended the scope of Freud's formulations of a general psychology, so Brenner has extended Hartmann's legacy. Brenner's contributions have emphasized the ever-present influence exerted by infantile drive derivatives. He has suggested that these drive derivatives, together with defensive and superego forces, are invariably represented in every psychic formation throughout life. Thus, symptoms, character traits, actions, the superego, and many, if not all, other aspects of

mental life of interest to psychoanalysts are to be understood as compromise formations. In this, he went beyond Hartmann's reformulation.

Brenner (1982) wrote:

> The available psychoanalytic evidence indicates that what has been and is repressed does have access to consciousness, even when repression is successfully maintained. . . . Id impulses, including repressed ones, exert an influence on conscious psychic functioning and on behavior, although their tendency to do so is opposed by the ego's defensive activity (p. 113).

Brenner also wrote that compromise formations take into account the need to maintain important relationships that both provide gratification and contribute to instinctual restraints. As Hartmann had noted, social institutions can be essential in helping individuals to restrict impulses; religion and mourning rituals are examples of such organized aspects of the social environment that interact with individuals' unique tendencies toward compromise formation in the service of adaptation.

CLINICAL ILLUSTRATION

The following case example is presented to illustrate that Hartmann's contributions are clinically useful and that some of the data that arose from the patient's several analyses support the general validity of Hartmann's ideas. The material is condensed and incomplete, and conceals or omits many important aspects.

I hope to show the usefulness of applying what I have summarized as Hartmann's views: (1) a correct understanding of the patient required attending to the effects of changes in ego capacities in the course of their maturation; (2) the interrelationships of the patient's capacities, drives, and social contexts both limited the patient in some ways and also accounted for his adaptive arrangements; (3) attention to and understanding of the evolution of this patient's adaptation, especially his adolescent development, was necessary for the accurate and helpful

understanding of his psychic arrangements as they appeared during the analysis; and (4) it was important to find the connections that revealed the unity and consistency as well as the changes that appeared in the evolution of this individual's life.

The patient was a professional who entered a third analysis in his fortieth year. He was successful in his work by the community's standards, but not by his own. He was reasonably happily married and had three children. Of two previous analytic treatments, the first, which lasted a year and a half, had not been helpful, and the second, of six years' duration, had been helpful but incomplete. He continued to feel insufficiently successful at work, and he suffered periods of depression, with feelings of inadequacy and failure.

He reported that similar complaints had led to his first attempt at analysis. At that time, he had doubts about his ability, felt childlike, thought he was performing inadequately in his profession, and had periods of depression and anxiety, with insomnia and outbursts of anger. He thought this threatened his career and marriage. He sought out a prominent analyst who was widely respected as an academic and as an administrator.

He said that he began that analysis with anxiety and enthusiasm, fearful that he might not succeed as a patient, but he felt that he had been able to talk reasonably freely. Several months of that analysis were spent in relating his history and current difficulties and in explaining his relationships with the people in his life. During this period, the analyst, he said, made little response, but seemed interested in listening and could understand the patient's feelings and ideas.

The patient reported that a difficulty arose when he overheard the analyst talking angrily on the telephone, evidently to an unsatisfactory employee whom the analyst fired at the end of the conversation. The patient became anxious, told the analyst what he had overheard, wondered what infraction the former employee might have committed, and expressed fear that he might also be found deficient and dismissed as a patient.

The analyst asked the patient to discuss what historical antecedents might have been connected with this reaction. The patient concluded that the analyst subscribed to the theory the patient had gleaned from reading psychoanalytic works, that is, that current difficulties simply represent continuations of earlier ones, and he related a number of memories having to do with infractions of rules he had committed at various times in the past, to which his father, mother, and teachers had responded with punishments.

Among such childhood transgressions, he recalled being discovered by his second grade teacher fighting with a classmate. He reacted to this event by lying, insisting that he had been the good one who had sought only to defend himself from the other's attack. (This behavior, claiming to be the good victim, remained part of this man's repertoire thereafter.) He failed to avoid punishment and was kept after school. His parents found out and were angry and disappointed with him. Other infractions brought a similar result. The parents said something like, "You're a bad boy; you'll never amount to anything," and the patient felt humiliated, guilty, and contrite but also angry and rebellious.

The analyst did not note the hesitancy the patient felt about continuing to explore the "realistic" thoughts of fear and anger he had in respect to the analyst, and consequently, the links between these childhood memories and current transference conditions were not elucidated. A week or so later, the analyst became ill with what the patient later learned was a life-threatening ailment. This caused a three-month interruption in the treatment.

Upon the analyst's return, the patient found it difficult to talk. He worried about the analyst's health, tried to behave in a way he thought cooperative, suppressed growing doubts about the analyst's responsiveness, which he attributed to the analyst's preoccupation with his own health, and began to consider moving to another city. The significance of health questions in

the patient's current life was not pursued; therefore, no comparison with earlier theories and impressions could be made.

At one point, the patient's anger erupted. He attacked the analyst by talking disdainfully about the analyst's native city and what he assumed was his lack of cultivation, to which the analyst responded that many people, himself included, regarded this background as quite satisfactory. The patient took this remark as a defensive, angry rebuttal. He became consciously more fearful of the analyst, and withheld the information that he thought the analyst also feared him. Subsequently, he reported only on everyday life. Dreams were not remembered, and a stalemate developed. Eventually, the analyst suggested that the patient might be unanalyzable, or at least unanalyzable by him, and the treatment ended.

A year later, the patient found a second analyst. He felt that this treatment went relatively well. The new analyst interpreted much of the difficulty with the first analyst as having to do with the patient's feelings of desertion during his mother's pregnancy and following the birth of his sibling. This reconstruction evoked painful feelings of loneliness and memories of often unsuccessful efforts to be good. Subsequently, the patient recalled feelings of fear and anger that had followed a newly recovered memory of an episode of illness his mother developed. His own health concerns were found to have developed in part under the influence of his disappointed wish to have an important role with his ill mother. Illnesses reminded him of his humiliation when he had felt unimportant to his mother, and he feared the punishments and further humiliations he might experience if he expressed his anger and its associated wishes to hurt her.

Conflicts over his ambivalent wishes toward his mother throughout latency and adolescence continued to affect the patient and later entered into problems he had in his professional life. Interpretations that his anger against his mother had to do with his earlier feelings of rejection by her led to discussion of his guilt about rivalrous feelings toward his less successful younger sibling.

He also achieved a partial understanding of an oedipal period phobia which had involved competitive wishes toward and fears of his father, and frustrated longings to be the most important one to his mother. Similar conflicts had influenced his behavior with the first analyst. The childhood phobia had given way mainly to "goody-goody" behavior and to acting the role of the victim in the attempt to ingratiate himself and to avoid punishment.

A particularly significant piece of work during the second analysis was reported as having taken place around a dream in which the patient, as a child, was taken to see the first analyst by his parents, who asked the analyst to forgive the patient. Interpretations had explained that the patient's wish to deny his hostile feelings toward the analyst for having been sick had been expressed by representing him as healthy and powerful in the dream. The patient's wish to be close to his mother and father and his wish to be forgiven by his parents and helped by them, even though he felt he had been neglectful of his mother during her illness, were seen to have been gratified by their appearing affectionate in the dream. His wish to disavow responsibility for the effects of his provocation of the first analyst was supported by the representation of himself as a child, dependent upon others and thus not responsible.

The patient did something unusual for him: he complained that the analyst seemed unsympathetic and never commiserated with him or explicitly acknowledged how much he had suffered. The analyst commented that the patient wished to be consoled as though he were still a child when, in fact, the analyst would be less than respectful if he failed to point out that the patient was actually a capable adult. At this point, the patient was not able to pursue the question the analyst raised for his consideration, that is to say, why it was that he wished to see himself and to be treated as though he were immature.

The patient told the analyst that significant symptomatic improvement had led him to begin thinking about termination. His desire to terminate was also motivated by a conscious wish

to avoid the reappearance of further painful memories. Further, he wanted to prove himself as an adult. He believed his fear of disappointment and failure could be overcome if he broke away from the dependence he felt in analysis and struck out on his own. He was, however, unable to set a date.

The analyst suggested that a basis for the patient's hesitancy in coming to a decision about termination was that he was achieving some gratification by toying with the analyst, just as he might have offered and withheld stool in childhood. The patient responded by feeling convinced that it was time for him to grow up and control his childlike behavior. He was confirmed in his decision to give up his "passivity." He set and kept a termination date.

Some years later, an intense version of the earlier symptoms, all of which had been much relieved during the second analysis, re-emerged. The patient entered the third analysis.

Initial discussion of the previous termination led to the understanding that one motivation the patient had had for wanting to appear childish at that time was to conceal his wish to hurt his analyst by leaving him, once he had progressed to the point where he felt able to do so. Becoming more adult meant having the capacity to carry out vengeful acts that had been long desired but impossible to enact.

The emphasis in the analytic interpretations, different from those which the patient reported as having been more common in the past, came to be more on his fear of causing real damage and provoking retaliation as a consequence of acting on his wishes, rather than on his fear of helplessness and humiliation.

It soon became apparent that rivalrous feelings toward those colleagues who were succeeding socially and professionally were playing an important part in intensifying his conflicts over his own ambitions. Performance anxiety and self-critical thoughts were seen to be punitive consequences of the patient's fear of the imagined destructive effects of his wishes to outdo others. Interpretation of the impact of past narcissistic humiliations in increasing his hostile wishes, together with demonstration of his

enhanced present capacity not only to cause harm, but also to find other means of satisfaction, led the patient to accept that he was not as dangerous as he had believed himself to be.

Discussion of what the patient regarded as his realistic capacities to harm his analyst by terminating, his children and wife by neglecting them, and his colleagues by outdoing them now became central.

A period of impotence in adolescence that had followed a sexual relationship in which the patient thought he had impregnated his partner came up in the analytic material for the first time. This experience was seen as a transition between childhood, with its sense of impotence, and adulthood, with its awareness of the possible consequences of potency.

The pregnancy he thought he had caused was retrospectively seen by him as having confirmed his assessment that he had a new, strong, destructive potential. He had thought that an abortion might have to be arranged, with possible danger to the woman as well as destruction of the potential child. This situation was unconsciously linked with a past one in which he had wished to harm, or even kill, his younger brother. The childhood wish to impregnate his mother and kill his brother could now be gratified, albeit in a displaced form and one involving innocent victims. The potency disturbance in adolescence, his performance anxiety in the present, and his restraint in attempting to be good in his analyses were seen as having to do with his fear of the consequences, given his adult capacities, should he act on his childhood wishes.

The patient believed that various actions, whether actually performed or merely planned, had caused actual harm. He thought that in his adolescence he had been successful in humiliating his father through personal attacks that led his father to lose control of himself and act punitively toward the patient. His attacks on the previous analysts had reproduced the earlier situation insofar as he had gratified his rage and satisfied his need for punishment—through provoking dismissal in the first case, and by arranging a not quite optimal termination in the

second. The attacks had differed from the earlier attacks on his father in that they also had advantageous aspects; in the first analysis, he was, in fact, able to release himself from an unhelpful treatment, while in the second analysis, he was freed to apply his energies and time in other productive ways.

The immediate precipitant that came to be understood as having led to his entering the third analysis was an increase in the inhibition caused by his rage against his children, who were getting everything that he had not gotten from his own parents. The demonstrated reality of his capacity to lose his temper with or neglect his children influenced him to behave in a good, relatively harmless, though withholding, self-punitive, and somewhat childish manner.

Earlier symptomatic episodes, such as his adolescent depression when he thought he had impregnated his girlfriend and his childhood oedipal, depressive, goody-goody period, were compared with the present version. Other current variants of this pattern were also explored, including his hostile and self-defeating interactions with his siblings and colleagues and his attempts in the transference to be a good, compliant, childlike, but also obstructive, punishing, and self-defeating patient.

The choice of seemingly powerful, healthy analysts came to be understood partly as an effort to reassure himself that he would be unlikely to be able to outdo them or hurt them. The patient realized that he had come to believe that his analysts were angered by his competitiveness and youthful virility and that they could be significantly harmed if he were to fail to improve and then desert them.

The patient came to be convinced that his passive and submissive tendencies had originally developed out of desires to please important adults and thus assure himself of their love and care, and that later, when he came to realize, albeit unconsciously, that he had developed the capacity to put his earlier egoistical and vindictive fantasies into successful action, the same character traits were used by him to conceal his potency.

DISCUSSION

This case illustrates not only the unity and consistency but also the changes of function that the patient's trait of being good reflected during the course of his development, his analyses included. The adaptive, gratifying, and defensive factors that influenced the trait were revealed in their consistencies as well as in their maturational alterations. Both linkages and contrasts were revealed, for instance, in relating the patient's oedipal period adaptation, his latency adjustment, his adolescent experience, and his adult relationships with family, colleagues, and analyst. Common strands were woven through the various stages. His sexual wishes, directed in childhood toward his mother, in adolescence toward girls, in adulthood toward his wife, were associated throughout with wishes to outdo others, including his father, brothers, other men, colleagues, his children, and his analysts, which presents a consistent conflictual picture. Thematic similarities could be described in connection with the childhood attack on a schoolmate rival for his teacher's approval, the adolescent abortion question, the transference complications, and many other situations. Harmful wishes, fears, and being good as a compromise consequence were thematically connected and consistent. To clearly bring out those differences that were consequences of the varied contextual possibilities and of the developmental level of innate capacities, which influenced the patient's ability to understand his wishes as well as his social environment, was also important. The simplistic use of lying in a wishful effort to present an appealing reality in childhood was contrasted with the latency development of the ingratiating character trait of being good; it was also contrasted with adolescent solutions involving conscious decisions and symptoms, as well as with the transferential attempts to use the analyst as disciplinarian, teacher, and gratifier on various levels. In each instance, the consistencies and the changing influence of changing realities and reality evaluations

were discussed. The defensive and adaptive changes that were a consequence of cognitive maturation and of changes in the response of the social context strongly influenced the changing aspects of the adaptive arrangements.

In the third analysis, discussing the changing capacity to actually do injury and to achieve sexual and other satisfactions during and after adolescence was particularly in focus. Although patterns of wishes, superego demands, and conflicts that had appeared in the earlier analyses were further elucidated and elaborated, the attention paid to the development of the patient's actual powers to think, to anticipate, and to enact was particularly important in engendering a level of understanding and conviction about himself that he had not achieved earlier.

The case also illustrates the importance of elucidating the connections between unconscious wishes and anticipations, to "reconstruct upward" toward current reality concepts, in the phrase coined by Hartmann's collaborator, Loewenstein (1957), as well as downward toward what was real in the past and what was part of infantile wishful fantasy life. It illustrates as well the capability that compromise formations have to gratify a number of hidden wishes, while simultaneously participating in a variety of adaptive connections with an always vitally present social context.

I should add that I believe that re-examination of Hartmann's ideas may also help resolve some other active controversies, such as the problem of psychotic symptom formation and some of the difficulties over the theory of therapeutic action, although those topics are beyond the scope of this paper.

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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Hartmann on Adaptation: An Incomparable or Incomprehensible Legacy?

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To cite this article: Ronda R. Shaw (1989) Hartmann on Adaptation: An Incomparable or Incomprehensible Legacy?, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 592-611, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927254

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927254

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

HARTMANN ON ADAPTATION: AN INCOMPARABLE OR INCOMPREHENSIBLE LEGACY?

BY RONDA R. SHAW, M.D.

Hartmann's essay sets forth ideas of incomparable value as well as incomprehensible density. While he developed many important concepts which have far-ranging clinical utility even today, his attempt to extend psychoanalysis into a general psychology backfired because it separated psychoanalytic concepts from analytic data. Because of his lack of clinical material or anecdotal illustration, Hartmann's theoretical scaffolding has been frequently misunderstood and misapplied. This paper re-examines Hartmann's essay in light of current clinical and metapsychological issues, and illustrates some of his more important ideas.

In 1939, Heinz Hartmann published his famous essay, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, in German. While the ideas that originated in it were later elaborated in papers he wrote alone or in conjunction with Ernst Kris and Rudolph Loewenstein, this, the original essay on ego psychology, was not made available in an English translation until 1958. By that time, its most fundamental concepts had come to occupy a central place in the psychoanalytic literature. Today, on the fiftieth anniversary of his paper, it is worthwhile to re-examine the importance of his concepts and our debt to him.

Although the paper is referred to in tones ranging from respect to reverence, the impression remains that few psychoanalysts return to it spontaneously after their mandatory reading of it during training. In contrast to the related theoretical articles

of that decade by Waelder, Nunberg, or Anna Freud, Hartmann's paper is hard to comprehend.

Yet its difficulty is worth confronting. With this work, Hartmann introduced a valuable conceptual scheme which set the stage for psychoanalytic thinking and investigation for the next five decades. While he burdened us with a metapsychology that is removed from clinical work and technical considerations, and is therefore easily misunderstood and misapplied, this essay is more than a historically influential document. It is relevant and insightful in a contemporary context.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

One of Hartmann's main premises is that the most productive path to adaptation often involves or requires a detour in the opposite direction. In that spirit, a careful reconsideration of *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* requires an initial digression into its original historical context. Hartmann's essay was published nine years after Herman Nunberg's "The Synthetic Function of the Ego" (1930), three years after the publication of Anna Freud's *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (1936), and nine years after Robert Waelder published (in German) "The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-Determination" (1930). It was also two years after the publication of Freud's last paper, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," with its pessimistic tone and its emphasis on the death instinct and the repetition compulsion. These contributions set forth the most important new ideas which Hartmann's essay draws upon and to which they are, in many ways, a response.

Ego psychology and the emphasis on structural theory was just beginning. Freud's reformulations in the 1920's of the theory of anxiety and of the instinctual drives laid the groundwork for an increasing focus on the development of the ego, but

Freud himself did not systematically elaborate these ideas. Instead, on a broader metapsychological level, Freud linked aggression and the repetition compulsion to the death instinct. Prior to the 'thirties, an elaboration of the drives and their development had been at the core of psychoanalysis. In 1930 when Nunberg described the synthetic function of the ego, he explained it in terms of a libidinal need for assimilation, binding, and causality (pp. 121-123). At that time "biological" meant id, and "environmental" conjured up ego and superego. Then, in 1936, Anna Freud pivotally redirected the focus of psychoanalytic thinking to the ego with her subtle classification of the mechanisms used by the ego in its defenses against the instinctual drives and outer reality. The ego's defense mechanisms were elucidated primarily from the vantage point of neurosis and other psychopathology. In contrast to Hartmann's essay, however, theoretical issues and clinical illustrations were vividly intertwined.

That same year (1936), Waelder's paper on the principle of multiple function was translated into English. Waelder set the stage for looking at *all* psychic action (not just psychopathology) from the side of both the ego and the id. Originally, anxiety had been understood as unrelieved tension. By contrast, signal anxiety produced by the ego induced the organism to make an adjustment to avoid danger, thus fulfilling a biological (adaptive) function. All action now had to be considered in terms of task-solving as well as instinctual expression. The ego, for Waelder, represented all considered direction, all purposeful activity. The ego is not passive, he postulated, but develops activities of its own. It faces problems from the instincts, the outside world, the superego, and the compulsion to repeat. These are all tasks assigned to the ego. The ego also assigns these tasks to itself. All occurrences within the ego can be described as attempted solutions, and an ego is characterized by a number of specific methods of solution that are chosen. The principle of multiple function which followed asserts that no attempted solution, i.e.,

psychic act, is possible which does not represent an attempted solution of the other problems as well (p. 49).

In *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, Hartmann set out to use psychoanalytic concepts to further our understanding of the non-pathological structures and functioning of the mind, in particular its capacity to negotiate or adapt to its inner and outer environment. In the process, with ideas ranging from biology and psychology to sociology and philosophy, he conceptualized a theoretical scaffolding of enormous magnitude.

When it was translated into English by David Rapaport in 1958, to inaugurate the Monograph Series of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, the editors stated in the preface:

> . . . it was in this essay that concepts such as the undifferentiated phase, the conflict-free ego sphere, conflict-free ego development, and primary and secondary autonomy were developed for the first time. Hartmann discusses the role of endowment and of the inborn ego apparatuses and their adaptive nature. The idea that ego defenses may simultaneously serve the control of instinctual drives and the adaptation to the external world finds its expression in this essay. Hartmann's concept of adaptation is in no way restricted to the "cultural" sense of the term. It is a truly inclusive conception, and he views it as an ongoing process, which has its roots in the biological structure, and with many of its manifestations reflecting the constant attempts of the ego to balance intrasystemic and intersystemic tensions. The implications of his theory for the development of perception and thought processes, the concepts of ego strength, ego weakness, and of normality, are also discussed. Neutralization, and the impact of this construct on the concept of sublimation, evolves quite naturally from this paper (p. viii).

To reassess the value of Hartmann's essay, it is instructive to review it as if it had just come across the desk today, and to do

so in light of the trends in analytic thinking that have taken place during the last fifty years, some of which are themselves attributable to Hartmann.

CURRENT REVIEW

In this 112-page monograph, Heinz Hartmann sets out to expand the purview of psychoanalysis into the realm of a "general psychology." It is of vital importance to keep this goal in mind in appraising this work. He states, "I maintain that it is a psychoanalytic endeavor—in the broader sense—to transfer concepts which were developed in reference to concrete problems of the personality's central sphere to other realms of mental life, and to study the changes in these concepts necessitated by the conditions prevailing in these other realms" (p. 4). He is interested in conceptualizing those "other realms" of mental life, thereby broadening psychoanalysis into a general psychology. His vantage point is the ego and its relationship to adaptation.

The underlying theme of this monograph is that the *ego* is the executive of all human behavior. It interacts with all aspects of experience in bold and subtle ways. It has important qualities which determine its mode of behavior and which facilitate its action. The ego brings about adaptation, and it is affected by it; it is a reciprocal, two-directional pathway. When the "ego" does something, something is immediately done to it.

Adaptation involves processes connected with both conflict situations and with those which pertain to the conflict-free sphere (p. 10). Hartmann stresses the need to investigate how these two spheres facilitate or hamper one another as well as the need to identify those realms of autonomous endowment in order to assess ego strength. He asks us to look at the attributes of various ego tasks (mental functioning or intellectual development, fantasy, knowledge of reality or adaptation to reality, affective action) in terms of their antithetical potential for adaptation. For example, fantasy, as a detour away from reality, can

provide a preparation for and mastery of it (p. 18). Avoidance can result in ego restriction, but avoidance of an environment in which difficulties are encountered and a search for a better one might prove adaptive (p. 20).

This is indeed a rich and interesting approach but there are problems inherent in it as well. Hartmann does not clearly define adaptation, although it is the idea which lies at the center of the work. He talks about "the functions which are more or less closely related to the tasks of reality mastery, that is, *adaptation*" (p. 22). He states, "Generally speaking, we call a man well adapted if his productivity, his ability to enjoy life, and his mental equilibrium are undisturbed" (p. 23). He continues, "The degree of adaptiveness can only be determined with reference to environmental situations (average expectable—i.e., typical—situations, or on the average not expectable—i.e., atypical—situations)" (p. 23). He also says, "The observation underlying the concept 'adaptation' is that living organisms patently 'fit' into their environment. Thus, adaptation is primarily a reciprocal relationship between the organism and its environment"(pp. 23-24).

Adaptation therefore includes notions about reality mastery, the mastery of one's inner environment, and ontogenetic, phylogenetic, developmental, and sociological considerations. Adaptation is different from the processes of adaptation, and is one of several possible criteria for the concept of mental health. This distinction is very important. Hartmann is attempting to elucidate that part of the mental apparatus which *successfully* negotiates an individual's existence, in contrast to the prior historical emphasis on psychopathology and defense.

Thus, Hartmann asks us to look at those aspects of mental life which are not ordinarily the focus of analytic investigation. He has several related agendas. He wishes to introduce the notion that psychoanalytic concepts must be brought to bear on all aspects of the personality for us better to understand mental functioning as a whole. This is joined to his wish to challenge the notion that healthy functioning is the domain of the "sur-

face psychologies." He also wishes to encourage a psychoanalytic investigation of childhood development from the side of the ego, analogous to Freud's earlier elucidation of libidinal stages. The elaboration of these agendas has led to some of the most fundamental underpinnings of current psychoanalytic thinking. As we shall see, it also has led to many problems and controversies.

Conflict Free Sphere

He begins with those other realms, those aspects of the mental apparatus which lead to "adapted achievements" but which develop outside of conflict. He writes,

> Not every adaptation to the environment, or every learning and maturation process, is a conflict. I refer to the development *outside of conflict* of perception, intention, object comprehension, thinking, language, recall-phenomena, productivity, to the well-known phases of motor development, grasping, crawling, walking, and to the maturation and learning processes implicit in all these and many others (p. 8).

He goes on to state,

> I propose that we adopt the provisional term *conflict-free sphere* for that ensemble of functions which at any given time exert their effects outside the region of mental conflicts. I do not want to be misunderstood: I am not speaking of a province of the mind, the development of which is in principle immune to conflicts, but rather of processes *in so far as*, in an individual, they remain empirically outside of the sphere of mental conflict (pp. 8-9).

I quote this at length because this is the first of several vital points which lend themselves to misunderstanding or dispute.

It is true that Hartmann very clearly states that he is not referring to a region within the ego whose development or effectiveness is *immune* to conflict, which is often what is mistakenly attributed to him. Nevertheless, careful reading does lead to the surprising conclusion that, at least in 1939, Hartmann might

not have subscribed to the ubiquity of conflict in the dynamic unconscious as we understand it today. Clearly, later discussions about the relative capacity to withstand destructuralization and re-instinctualization return to a more dynamic and conflictually organized model. Nevertheless, at times it appears that Hartmann does believe that for any individual, certain aspects of mental functioning do develop or exist *outside* of mental conflict. He says, "It is quite possible to state, both for the cross-sectional and the longitudinal aspects of an individual's mental life, what belongs to this conflict-free sphere" (p. 9). Taken at face value, his statement seems to be inherently at odds with Waelder's principle of multiple function. There seems to be a significant difference between what Hartmann is saying and the perspective that it is sometimes possible to understand analytically which ego capacities or developmental achievements are *relatively* conflict free or which compromise formations are *relatively* stable.

One source of confusion has to do with the ambiguity of our terminology, even today. We have difficulty defining or agreeing upon what is meant by "psychic act," or "mental construct." We also have difficulty differentiating between mental structures, mental processes, and mental content. For example, the development of the capacity to think is different from intelligence, which may be different from intellect, which certainly *is* different from intellectualization. Hartmann uses these and other analogous sets of overlapping terms too interchangeably (pp. 13-14). If, by the conflict-free sphere, Hartmann refers primarily to the development of an ego structure, such as the capacity to think, there is no difference between what Hartmann is saying and Waelder's approach. But it seems as though Hartmann would not always regard a thought, fantasy, or perception to be the same as Waelder's "psychic act."

Difficulties of Comprehending Hartmann

Another source of confusion is the difference between the understanding one gets from the essay in its entirety and from

attempting to understand its various parts. Hartmann has an unusual ability to bring together and synthesize many otherwise disparate ideas: 1) Adaptation can be progressive, and coincide with the direction of development, as well as require a detour through regression. Thus in terms of "fitting together," processes of adaptation often require maladaptive regulations. 2) Anticipating the future is an ego function (and adaptation) of the highest significance, and facilitates the regulation of the reality principle. 3) The newborn infant has inborn apparatuses which we attribute to the ego, which serve to master the external world. 4) Differentiation within the ego serves an adaptive function if the ego is strong. It is counteracted by a tendency toward a closed world and must coexist in an equilibrium with integration. 5) Thinking, especially causal thinking, involves not only synthesis and fitting together but also differentiation. Thinking, and the interpolation of the internal world, affords the human being not only a delay in motor discharge, but also greater independence from environmental stimulation. 6) Intelligence serves an organizing function, but its primacy among the ego's regulatory factors depends on its overcoming its overvaluation of rational behavior. "It is crucial for the ego that it can use rational regulations, while it simultaneously takes into account the irrationality of other mental achievements. The rational plan must include the irrational as a fact" (p. 72).

The scope of these ideas is extraordinary. Nevertheless, the problems one begins to encounter are identical to the ones which are inherent in the notion of the conflict-free sphere. Hartmann has asked us to look at the non-conflictual realm of mental funtioning. But he is asking us to look at it outside the realm of psychoanalysis. He is using psychoanalytic theory and concepts, but no longer in the context of a psychoanalytic setting. He states that he expects psychoanalysis to become a general *developmental psychology* and encourages analysts to do direct observation of infant development (pp. 8-10). At this point, and throughout the monograph, he no longer makes distinctions between data which are gained analytically, and those which are

obtained or *surmised* observationally. One cannot determine what is either cross-sectionally or longitudinally conflict-free for any individual outside of a psychoanalytic setting. One can generalize about the ego and its role in adaptation, and Hartmann does so brilliantly. But again and again, his discussion does not distinguish between manifest and latent content (see the sections on will or rational behavior). As an essay on human nature, using a psychoanalytic perspective, it is extraordinary. But as a psychoanalytic document, it is not.

Ironically, Hartmann himself points out, "The distinctive characteristic of a psychoanalytic investigation is not its subject matter but the scientific methodology, and the structure of the concepts it uses" (pp. 4-5). A major difficulty with this monograph is that Hartmann discusses structural concepts without reference to scientific methodology. There are no technical considerations and there are no clinical data. This is a theoretical exposition which deals almost entirely in generalities. The lack of clinical examples, or even of specific anecdotal illustrations, accounts for one of its most severe limitations. Hartmann also states, "Even though Freud rightly declined to regard psychoanalysis as a 'system,' it is nevertheless a cohesive organization of propositions, and any attempt to isolate parts of it not only destroys its over-all unity, but also changes and invalidates its parts. Consequently, psychoanalytic ego psychology differs radically from the 'surface psychologies' . . ." (p. 6).

The irony is that perhaps this pivotal monograph set the stage for the current trends in which data obtained through empathy or early childhood observation are considered equivalent to analytic data gained through the investigation of transference and resistance. (This seems especially to obtain when what is being observed or etiologically reconstructed are preverbal developmental phases.) His attempt to move psychoanalysis into the realm of a general psychology backfired in the sense that for some it has blurred the distinctions between it and the observational, "surface" psychologies. It is not likely that this was Hartmann's intention. Nor is it clear that he would

have supported the trends which have emerged toward deficit theory and the notions of replacing, rather than supporting or analyzing, ego deficits. These schools conceptualize deficit outside of conflict and compromise formation.

This monograph is difficult to read, not only because of its exclusively theoretical discourse stripped bare of anecdotal examples, but because Hartmann rarely defines the terms he is using. For instance, at times he uses "fitting together," "assimilation," "synthesis," and "integration" almost interchangeably. At best he refers the reader to the pertinent literature but without the more usual explanatory orientation.

As important, while any number of his sentences make sense in themselves, collectively, they do not. Rather than state an idea and then elaborate upon it, he cross references to another (albeit analogous) context, contrasts it with its opposite, or makes another (related or parallel) assertion. Often he leaves the reader hanging with such statements as, "We will return to this point [or discuss these things] later" (pp. 30, 50), or "See discussion [of this] below" (p. 46), or "A discussion of [this concept] would be in place here, but I cannot enter on it now" (p. 56). In referring to Hartmann's style, which he attributes to Hegelian philosophy, Holland (1965) pointed out, "No sooner does Hartmann get one thought out than he says, 'more of that later,' shifts his tack, and maneuvers to include the antithesis" (pp. 7-8).

Perhaps his juxtaposing of antitheticals and the opaqueness of his delineations reflect a need to communicate ideas of enormous preconscious density, ideas which have been subjected to a rich interweaving of condensation and displacement. In many ways, Hartmann's essay is like a dream which has been subjected to an enormous amount of dream work. Not surprisingly, certain aspects of his thinking resemble free association (the shifting, wide-ranging diverging and digressing, and the insistence on the examination of all things from both sides). But to borrow from Hartmann, this seeming departure from more conventional linear-type causal thinking, combined with his

great gifts for assimilation and integration, seems far more facilitative (adaptive) than otherwise.

Thus it may be that those very aspects of its content—which in a critical vein make it so difficult to read—also account for its richness, for those insights, discoveries, and formulations which make it a unique contribution, and one which *is* well worth the struggle of reading. Because of the synthetic density of Hartmann's thinking and the complexity of his ideas, the essay has a uniquely brilliant but maddening quality. One is disoriented the way one always is in the presence of an unusually creative work. Hartmann's gift lies in his ability to bring together many complex ideas in such a way as to cause the reader to rediscover or resynthesize crucial aspects of psychoanalytic theory.

CLINICAL UTILITY OF HARTMANN'S IDEAS

There are portions of this monograph which explicate or conceptualize certain issues (or perhaps, as stated above, Hartmann succeeds in getting the reader to rediscover or resynthesize them) more clearly than most contemporary papers.

Interpretation and Reconstruction

One such section is the one which deals with the nature of internalization and thinking in the psychoanalytic situation. Here, Hartmann discusses, in an amazingly succinct and elegant way, theoretical aspects of the ego's role in interpretation and reconstruction. These ideas are not clearly enough understood or sufficiently remembered by many of us today. They seem to form a nucleus for the theory of insight. In this brief "digression" Hartmann does address, at least referentially, clinical psychoanalysis. The preceding pages deal with the "biological usefulness" of the inner world for adaptation, differentiation, and synthesis. By inner world he means perception,

memory, imagination, and most important, thinking (pp. 57-62).

Hartmann says:

> Permit me a digression on the nature of thinking *in the psychoanalytic situation*, in which the predominant object of thought is the subject himself. Since the subject is always the means of action, even when he becomes the object of action, thinking renders basically the same service in the psychoanalytic situation as it does when it is directed to the external world. Psychoanalytic work shows that insight into one's own behavior depends on the assimilation of unconscious tendencies (of both ego and id). Nunberg . . . has convincingly shown that the synthetic function of the ego directs these assimilation processes. Defenses (typically) not only keep thoughts, images, and instinctual drives out of consciousness, but also prevent their assimilation by means of thinking. When defensive processes break down, the mental elements defended against and certain connections of these elements become amenable to recollection and reconstruction. Interpretations not only help to regain the buried material, but must also establish correct causal relations, that is, the causes, range of influence, and effectiveness of these experiences in relation to other elements. I stress this here because the theoretical study of interpretation is often limited to those instances which are concerned with emerging memories or corresponding reconstructions. But even more important for the *theory of interpretation* are those instances in which the causal connections of elements, and the criteria for these connections, are established (pp. 62-63).

These ideas are not so easily understood or kept in mind. In our daily work we analyze the transference and the resistances in order to facilitate the re-emergence into consciousness of memories of those crucial events and experiences which have shaped and distorted our patients' lives. In the process, the critical importance of reconstructing the immature ego is still all too often neglected. Hartmann points out that insight depends on assimilating what was unconscious in both the ego and the

id. (We would now include the superego as well.) In order to lead to insight, interpretations must hold up for re-examination the distorted causal connections and meanings laid down by the childhood ego, by the immature synthetic function.

For example, a highly successful woman suffering from depression, masochism, and bisexual conflicts, recalled during her analysis events surrounding a broken leg which she sustained when she was very young. Subsequently, she spent several months encased in a full body spica with her legs splayed apart. Analytic material suggested that at that time, her newly acquired toilet training was forced into regression both by the impossibility of her physical situation and by the overwhelming trauma. The most notable memories of the event focused on her mother's not staying with her, leaving her instead with a maid while she went with the patient's brother to the beach. In contrast, a short time later the brother developed life-threatening bowel disease and the patient recalled her mother sitting endlessly with him.

Not surprisingly, this woman had life-long feelings of being damaged and cheated. While anal symptoms per se did not predominate, issues over control and phallic envy invaded every aspect of her life. Analysis was prompted by a homosexual enactment following the birth of her son. He was the focus of overwhelming unconscious envy and hostility as well as displaced feelings of being soiled and damaged. She was unable to toilet train him effectively, and he eventually developed encopresis. Throughout the analysis, intense depression and self-destructive impulses attended any disruption in the analytic schedule. The ensuing fantasy would be of lying so severely injured or ill in a hospital that the analyst would have to "break the analytic rules" and come to her side. Manifest dream elements repeatedly included images referring to the cast and to being covered in feces. Frequently she was "immobilized" and unable to extricate herself from difficult, dangerous, or even abusive life situations. Instead, she would remain passive, filled with outrage and despair, longing silently to be rescued.

How might we apply Hartmann's reminder about interpreting the immature ego and the corresponding distortions in causality to this case? Key aspects were revealed in the transference. This patient kept secrets she expected the analyst to intuit. She also held the analyst responsible for her lack of progress and for her chronic feelings of guilt and anxiety, and her fears of being a "destroyer." Her bitterness centered on her disappointment that neither her husband nor her analyst could "rescue her" or give her the sense of primacy or oneness that she wanted.

Interpretations about her phallic envy and sense of castration, as well as the intense unconscious guilt prompted by her hostile and vengeful wishes were only partially helpful. Negative therapeutic reactions were frequent. For a long time the analysis seemed at a stalemate. The slow painstaking task of reconstructing the additional attitudes and assumptions with which the above-mentioned memories and experiences were organized was pivotal in bringing about a change.

First and foremost was her relationship to her mother. Her fractured leg occurred at a time when her thinking and perceptions were organized by intense sadomasochistic conflicts, omnipotent fantasies, and longings for merger. Whatever happened was someone's fault. Either she or her mother caused the fracture. As a child, she thought the fracture was the result of her forbidden wishes to take her brother's penis (and later his secretly enviable bowel disease) and all of their mother's attention.

It was important to clarify that at that time, she assumed that either her mother caused this terrible thing to happen to her or did not protect her from it. This is what she thought about being a girl as well, the derivatives of which abounded in the transference. She also experienced her broken leg and subsequent need to lie in her own excrement as her punishment for wishing to be *active* (she fell while romping on the beach). Hence, she thought she was being punished for her active mas-

turbatory fantasies by being held down and immobilized. (This was a major determinant in her subsequent inhibitions.)

It also seemed to her that her mother deserted her *because* she was damaged and dirty. It was important to reconstruct how the anxiety which attended any loss of her mother's attention during that time was amplified by her very real helplessness, as well as by her awareness of her guilty wishes to control anally and annihilate. This is what she had been reliving repeatedly in the transference, especially around issues of separation.

This clinical example illustrates the importance of reconstructing the infantile ego's (and superego's) contribution to the organization, impact, and meaning of genetic experience. This kind of reconstruction informs subsequent transference interpretations much more effectively than when the interpretive emphasis stays on the manifest narrative of emerging memories.

In contrast, there are currently various trends in psychoanalysis which would overemphasize the patient's relationship to the analyst or to others in the here and now, to the detriment of other, unconscious, instinctual considerations. Perhaps Hartmann's emphasis on the ego's role in adaptation, and by implication the individual's relationship to reality, has inadvertently and mistakenly led to a diminished awareness of the ego's intimate relationship to the instinctual drives.

Nothing could have been farther from Hartmann's intention. Object relations may be one of the most important ego capacities the human infant needs in order to develop adaptively, but effective analytic work requires the interpretation of the reciprocal relationship between the external perception of the object and instinctual life.

Change of Function

Hartmann conceptualizes many aspects of ego development and its consequences for adaptation which deal with the ego's

(and therefore the object's) relationship to and distance from instinctual life. Unfortunately, some of these complicated but clinically relevant concepts are especially difficult to understand because of his lack of illustration. One particularly useful concept is the change of function.

Hartmann states,

> . . . a behavior-form which originated in a certain realm of life may, in the course of development, appear in an entirely different realm and role. An attitude which arose originally in the service of defense against an instinctual drive may, in the course of time, become an independent structure, in which case the instinctual drive merely triggers the automatized apparatus . . . but, as long as the automatization is not controverted, does not determine the details of its action (pp. 25-26).

Through the change of function, what was originally intended to save the organism from overwhelming stimuli will later allow it to engage in adaptive activities. For example, a patient who, during the preschool years, was subjected to repeated primal scene exposure was also told during latency that his mother had life-threatening heart disease. When she died during his early adolescence, he was shocked. Despite her severe physical deterioration, he had not understood she was sick. He had denied her illness, a defensive pattern which he later repeated in an attenuated form in the analysis. Clearly, it was important to analyze the defense and the underlying instinctual conflicts which had joined to these overwhelming realities. In the course of the analysis, however, it became apparent that the denial had taken another path as well. During these same years, this man had developed an unusually effective life-long ability to focus his attention and to concentrate. His capacity to deny had also facilitated or evolved into a capacity to pay attention, to exclude inner and outer distractions. Thus, what had originated in a defensive mode to ward off instinctual bombardment had progressed or further differentiated into a task-solving mode.

Understanding this kind of dynamic has a myriad of important clinical implications.

The change of function has a corresponding relationship to the concept of sublimation in terms of the ego's increased differentiation, autonomy, and distance from the instinctual drives. These are examples of "progressive adaptation," in contrast to "regressive adaptation," which Hartmann also talks about in extremely illuminating ways.

IMPACT ON METAPSYCHOLOGY

What can we say about the importance and impact of this essay on metapsychology? Hartmann's discourse on the principles of regulation comprises one of the most cogent sections of his essay. If adaptation is essentially "reality mastery," what is the relationship to ego development of the reality principle? Hartmann avoids the more obvious correlation and makes it clear that while the pleasure principle disturbs adaptation, it also facilitates a turning to and acknowledging of the external world. It is through the ego function of anticipating the future that the reality principle takes over from the pleasure principle.

He dismisses the repetition compulsion as a common source of adaptation and emphasizes that the development of action from simple motor discharge also marks the transition from the pleasure principle to the reality principle. Hartmann also hypothesizes that the apparatuses of the conflict-free sphere can become secondary sources of pleasure, and he suggests that we distinguish between those with strong somatic connections, i.e., sexual ones, and those more aim-inhibited, sublimated activities.

Most important, he emphasizes that he is attempting to deal with two levels of theory formation. For example, he distinguishes between the reality principle in the broader sense (for the survival of the species) and the narrower sense (in the

mental development of the human being). Hartmann says, "We have here, so to speak, two levels of theory-formation, just as in the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives, where the instinctual drive-processes we deal with in our psychoanalytic work are on one level, and the general biological derivation of the death instinct, the application of the libido theory to the relation of cells to each other . . . are on the other level" (p. 44).

Currently, there are analysts who see adaptation to reality as occupying a primary rather than secondary place in mental life from birth. They postulate that the infant has an innate motivation, independent of drive gratification, toward reality and adaptation (e.g., Sampson, 1989). This is a misappropriation of Hartmann's fundamental ideas. These analysts attribute to the young infant ego apparatuses that have not yet developed, minimize the central role of the instinctual drives, and do not distinguish between the two levels of psychoanalytic metapsychology that Hartmann addresses. Hartmann's thinking does not suggest that adaptation should be elevated to the level of a regulatory principle, superseding the pleasure or reality principles.

While it is not spelled out, there is throughout Hartmann's monograph an underlying theme having to do with aggression, not on the broader level, but on the narrower level of the psychology of the ego apparatuses. Hartmann's discussion of automatisms, their variable role in assessing ego functioning, and their relationship to the pleasure principle and repetition compulsion is particularly interesting in this regard.

These concepts reach across many topics and have had significant impact on the subsequent development of clinical theory and metapsychology. We owe a great deal of our understanding of the ego and current structural theory to Hartmann, in ways that warrant a favorable reconsideration of this essay by many of us. On the other hand, Hartmann's wish to extend psychoanalysis into a general psychology and his idealization of psychoanalysis as potentially the highest of all rank order levels of thinking may also be responsible for some of the misinterpretations and misapplications which have occurred.

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35 East 85th St.
New York, NY 10028

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Hartmann, Health, and Homosexuality: Some Clinical Aspects of "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation"

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To cite this article: Herbert M. Wyman (1989) Hartmann, Health, and Homosexuality: Some Clinical Aspects of "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation", The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 612-639, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927255

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927255

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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Psychoanalytic Quarterly, LVIII, 1989

HARTMANN, HEALTH, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: SOME CLINICAL ASPECTS OF "EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION"

BY HERBERT M. WYMAN, M.D.

Hartmann's theories have experienced a remarkable rise and fall in popularity over the past fifty years. In this paper, an effort is made to arrive at a balanced view. The genetic and economic aspects of Hartmann's ego psychology are found to be problematic, but the dynamic aspect led to a sophisticated psychoanalytic concept of health as yet unsurpassed. Hartmann always called for the clinical application of his ideas. In this spirit, a vignette is offered from a clinical area in which questions of "health" and "illness" are particularly vexing at present.

I

Habent sua fata libelli[1]—books have their own destiny. Such was the philosophy of the ancient Roman authors who would, as a literary convention, address warnings to their books about the uncertainty of their fate, once they were launched into the world.

Surely, Heinz Hartmann would have sympathized with these sentiments, had he the opportunity, as we do, to trace the fate of his classic *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* since the date of its publication fifty years ago (Hartmann, 1939a). In the first twenty-five years of the book's life, its trajectory was straight up. Hartmann's work enjoyed increasing fame and in-

[1] I am indebted to Dr. Bennett Simon for the precise wording of this motto.

fluence, both in itself and through Hartmann's elaboration of its basic themes in his later papers (Hartmann, 1964). By the time of its publication in English in 1958, as the first in the Monograph Series of the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, the editors of this series hailed it as a classic essay which "represents a turning point in the development of modern psychoanalytic theory" (p. vii). The editors spoke of the "tremendous impact" of Hartmann's theories, and observed "the remarkable degree to which Hartmann's ideas have shaped, and become assimilated into, current psychoanalytic thinking" (p. viii).

My own memories of this period, when (as an analytic candidate in 1965) I first encountered Hartmann, fully corroborate these descriptions. I cannot remember reading a psychoanalytic paper of that period which was not replete with references to Hartmann's ideas, most of which were first developed in this monograph, notably the conflict-free ego sphere, the primary and secondary autonomy of ego functions, the constitutional roots of ego functions in the inborn ego apparatuses, and, most especially, the bridge that these concepts were to form between psychoanalysis and a general psychology of the human mind. "At present," Hartmann wrote, "we no longer doubt that psychoanalysis can claim to be a *general* psychology in the broadest sense of the word" (p. 4). Moreover, he confidently announced that "we have the right to expect that all investigations of the problem of adaptation take into account the fundamental facts and relationships discovered by psychoanalysis" (p. 3).

At the time, most analysts shared these enthusiasms, for psychoanalysis was then at the peak of its popularity and influence, particularly in 1958 when the English translation of *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* was published. Then, and for a decade thereafter, Hartmann and psychoanalysis held sway, both among the educated public and among those in the psychiatric profession. It was scarcely possible then to obtain a significant appointment in academic psychiatry without psychoanalytic training. However, the years since Hartmann's death in

1970 have seen the complete reversal of these fortunes. Hartmann's concepts have vanished from the literature. *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* has sunk into oblivion, and with it, the fortunes of psychoanalysis, whose practitioners and theories have disappeared both from public view and from psychiatric faculties, except insofar as they are mentioned with criticism or hostility. Such is the scene recently reported by Reiser (1989) in these pages.

In some quarters, Hartmann himself is held to account for the decline of psychoanalysis, in that his theorizing is said to have blighted the growth of psychoanalysis as a solidly grounded discipline. Edelson (1988), a gifted and brilliant theoretician, goes so far as to say, "I conclude that the example set by [Hartmann's] theoretical essays may have had a pernicious if not devastating effect on the development of psychoanalysis as a science" (p. 121). According to Edelson, whether Hartmann intended this result or not, a generation of psychoanalytic thinkers was induced to neglect the clinical situation as a source of scientific data in favor of the abstract theorizing favored by Hartmann in his influential papers.

It is tempting to try to connect in a causal manner the remarkable rise-and-fall parabolic trajectories of psychoanalysis and Hartmann, so closely do they track each other, both chronologically and geometrically. But to the clinician, another interpretation suggests itself. Both psychoanalysis and Hartmann flew so high and fell so low because both fell victim to the same psychological tendencies of extreme overidealization followed by extreme disillusionment—psychoanalysis at the hands of the educated public, and Hartmann, embarrassingly enough, at the hands of his psychoanalytic colleagues. The public expected panacea from psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis expected a victorious General Psychology from Hartmann. The result: disappointment and oblivion for both. It remains for us, fifty years later, to recognize ruefully that there were elements of shallow faddishness both in the intense enthusiasm for psychoanalysis outside of the profession and, within the profession,

in the uncritical permeation of the literature by Hartmann's ideas.

Perhaps, in the case of Hartmann's work, it is now possible for us to begin to move toward a more balanced evaluation. Efforts in this direction have begun to appear in the literature, though still not free from excesses of admiration and condemnation (Bornstein, et al., 1986).

II

We might begin by assigning Hartmann only that place in psychoanalytic history which he himself, in his natural modesty, might have claimed. He would not, I suggest, have described himself as a creator or discoverer of new ideas. Neither would he have described himself, as Schafer (1970) suggested, as a revolutionary theorist. Rather, he would have proudly placed himself in the vanguard of that group of scientific workers whom he quoted Ernst Kris (1947) describing as "trained clarifiers" (Hartmann, 1964, p. 298). That is, Hartmann placed himself among those whose lot it was, in the history of a science, to clarify, extend, and place in proper perspective the breakthrough discoveries of the previous generation, so that workers in the next generation might proceed on a more solid basis. For Hartmann, this meant, in practice, clarifying and extending the ego psychology which Freud had left in a half-finished state. Hartmann's task was to do this within the framework of psychoanalytic theory, that is, to provide ego psychology with the same genetic, economic, and dynamic framework that had been established for the historically earlier "id psychology." In so doing, Hartmann set off in no theoretical direction which had not first been explicitly pointed out by Freud. This is the process which can be seen well under way in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*.

As to the genetic aspect of ego psychology, Hartmann took as his starting point the place which Freud had established in his

theory for "heredity" or "constitution." Freud had continually emphasized the importance of these factors, from his earliest writings on the etiology of hysteria to his later writings on the ego. Hartmann quoted one of the latter explicitly (pp. 105-106):

> . . . it does not imply a mystical over-valuation of heredity if we think it credible that, even before the ego exists, its subsequent lines of development, tendencies, and reactions are already determined ([Freud, *Collected Papers*] 1937, pp. 343-344).

Hartmann clarified and extended this notion of "ego constitution" to suggest that the functions of the ego (such as perception, intention, motility, intelligence, language, memory, learning) had genetic roots which were present before birth, were "undifferentiated" at birth, and thereafter followed preset maturational timetables as they coalesced into "ego apparatuses" available ultimately for use by the mature ego. Hartmann believed that it would help in the study of the development of these ego apparatuses if they were conceptualized as originating in a "conflict-free sphere," i.e., as developing in an "autonomous" manner apart from the previously described framework of conflicted psychosexual stages. Recognizing that the ego functions were embroiled in and then freed from psychosexual conflict in the course of development, Hartmann subsequently clarified the earliest state of affairs as "primary autonomy," and the later as "secondary autonomy."

Hartmann was quite well aware, and stated often in his essay, that the ego functions he was studying lay outside the main field of psychoanalytic interest and, in fact, comprised the main subject matter of other disciplines, such as psychology and physiology. He expected that progress in the study of these aspects of ego development would not come from data obtained in the psychoanalytic situation, but from academic developmental psychology, from the study of the psychoses, and, in particular, from the direct observation of children. As to the latter, Hartmann's expectations have been more than fulfilled by the work of Piaget, Wolf, Werner, Stern, Mahler—to mention but a few

of the many workers in this field. However, Hartmann also hoped that he had established a theoretical link, through the concepts of the conflict-free sphere and the inborn ego apparatuses, between psychoanalytic ego psychology and non-analytic developmental psychology, and, in so doing, had made out of psychoanalysis the "general psychology" to which Freud had aspired since the days of his *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895). In fact, the whole of Hartmann's work in this area might be subtitled *Project for a Scientific Psychology: Part II*. Although perhaps as sophisticated and as brilliant as Part I, Part II has unfortunately proven to have been just as premature scientifically.

For Hartmann's core genetic concepts, the very concepts which were to form the solid planks of the bridge to General Psychology have inherent in them some serious weaknesses.

The concept of the "conflict-free sphere" has always been regarded with skepticism by those who felt that it de-emphasized in a major way one of the fundamental discoveries of psychoanalysis: the role of conflict in both psychopathology and in normal mental development. Yet this was clearly never Hartmann's intention. On the contrary, he emphasized that "conflicts are a part of the human condition" (1939a, p. 12). Hartmann's aim, rather, was to provide a carefully phased framework for the evolution of ego functions, the more precisely to delineate the reciprocal relationship between conflict and ego development.

A more fundamental objection to the conflict-free sphere came from those who suggested that there was no such thing possible, other than as a hypothetical ideal abstraction of little value. From this point of view, the human organism from the moment of birth is plunged into a maelstrom of conflict in which it remains to one degree or another until the moment of death—death being the only "conflict-free sphere" possible for the human being. Hartmann endeavored to meet this objection by introducing a distinction between conflict and disruption of equilibrium (p. 38). Disruptions of equilibrium, such as those

caused by temperature changes, hunger, drive pressures, and the like, are not yet true conflicts in the psychoanalytic sense of that term. Like many such distinctions drawn by Hartmann, this strikes the clinician as having some intuitive or intellectual merit—and yet its significance remains elusive or unimpressive. One would rather not have developed a concept which would lead to such hairsplitting disputes (a clinician's bias, of course). Hartmann's overall aim, however, still seems admirable: somehow to work into psychoanalytic theory the observable fact that the human organism is not fully formed at birth and develops thereafter on an inborn, biologically determined, maturational schedule that is not wholly dependent upon psychic conflict (for example, the postpartum myelinization of the nervous system). Yet it would seem possible to take cognizance of these biological realities *without* postulating a "conflict-free sphere."

Edelson (1988) approaches another of Hartmann's weak points when he asks, of the "ego apparatuses":

> Why "ego" apparatuses, since such capacities serve other kinds of aims than those subsumed under the term "ego"? (p. 117).

Anticipating such a question, Hartmann stated:

> We may consider as inborn ego apparatuses those apparatuses which, after this differentiation [from the original undifferentiated state] are unequivocally in the service of the ego (1939a, p. 103).

This assertion would seem to beg the question of Edelson and others who have had difficulty connecting Hartmann's complex apparatuses specifically to the ego, and only to the ego.

But the concept of "ego apparatus" has, to my mind, inherent in it an even more fundamental problem: its two components, "ego" and "apparatus," seem to be drawn from two wholly disparate levels of scientific abstraction and hence perhaps cannot really be joined together. The "ego," as used by Hartmann, is a metapsychological construct of psychoanalytic theory at a high

level of abstraction: a mental structure defined by its function. An "apparatus," if we take the "perceptual apparatus" as a model, would seem to be a lower-level, more experience-near hybrid concept involving neurophysiology and neuroanatomy as well as psychology. It is very difficult to picture a metapsychological abstraction, the "ego," "using," or placing "in its service" a bodily apparatus. There is something elusive at the core of Hartmann's thinking in this area, as if he were employing a theoretical illusion, or a conceptual sleight-of-hand analogous to the cinematic techniques whereby cartoon characters interact with flesh-and blood actors.

Careful readers of *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* will notice that this theoretical problem is not as severe in some sections as in others. Hartmann is most successful in employing the concept of "ego apparatus" when he limits it strictly to the psychological sphere, as in Chapter 8, "Preconscious Automatisms." Here an ego apparatus denotes a psychological function, such as reading or studying, or a character trait, such as a particular mode of conflict resolution, which, through repetition, has become a stable formation in the preconscious, and does not have to be created or learned anew at each instance by the ego. The theoretical ground beneath our feet is level here, i.e., the degree of abstraction is the same throughout. However, the concept of inborn ego apparatuses is not limited by Hartmann to the preconscious psychological automatisms, but applies across a broad spectrum of somatic and psychic functions, and hence becomes contradictory and confusing in the manner described above, in which we struggle to picture a metapsychological abstraction directing the activities of the human body. I believe it is because of large conceptual gaps like these that Hartmann's genetic theories have failed to gain acceptance in the world of academic psychology and neuroscience. His bridge to a general psychology has proven to be nothing but a very shaky breeches buoy flung over the familiar mind-body chasm. Hartmann was not unaware of the latter problem. When writing of autonomous ego development, he commented:

> In many cases the ego functions no doubt depend directly on physiological maturation processes. However, to continue this line of thought would involve us in the psychophysical problem, and I would rather avoid that here (p. 104).

Unfortunately, in avoiding the "psychophysical problem," Hartmann avoided dealing with the fundamental difficulty inherent in the genetic aspect of his ego psychology.

As Reiser (1989) points out, in claiming, just as Hartmann did, a place for psychoanalysis among the biomedical sciences,

> [e]ven the (most nearly) pure "psychological" problems we encounter are brought into our offices by, and inextricably embedded in, people's bodies, and vice versa (p. 203).

Yet, even though we know the mind is "embedded" in the brain, we still cannot say exactly how. Perhaps it is best to admit that we have got no further, in regard to theories bridging physiology and psychology, than did Breuer (1893-1895, pp. 250-251), when he said of such theories (quoting Shakespeare), "The best in this kind are but shadows."

III

Turning to the economic aspect of Hartmann's ego psychology, readers will no doubt breathe a sigh of relief to find that this is little dealt with in the monograph under consideration, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*. Hence we find ourselves exempt from deliberating upon Hartmann's theories concerning the transformations, fusions, and defusions of aggressive, sexual, and neutralized energy. These terms were once part of everyday psychoanalytic discourse, and now they comprise virtually an extinct language. No aspect of Hartmann's ego psychology has been more severely criticized, and yet here, too, Hartmann was trying to forge ahead in a direction first indicated by Freud. It was Freud (1923) who first suggested that the functions of the ego were powered by "desexualized" en-

ergy. Therefore, if there are theoretical problems with those theories of Hartmann which attribute different qualities to intrapsychic energies, these problems are Freud's in the first instance.

We should not leave the topic of Hartmann's drive theories without noting his achievement, together with Kris and Loewenstein (Hartmann, 1964; Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949), in detaching the aggressive drive from Freud's death instinct and setting it up on the same metapsychological basis as the libidinal drive. It should be noted that Hartmann and his co-workers based their theories of the aggressive drive not on notions derived from abstract theorizing, but from data obtained from the analytic situation, in which it could be observed that aggression behaved clinically in every respect like its counterpart, the libidinal drive.

IV

We come now to the dynamic aspect of Hartmann's ego psychology, which is, in fact, the core of *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*. For adaptation, as Hartmann described it, is a complex series of dynamic equilibria, whereby the organism achieves a state of inner homeostasis, which in turn enables it to achieve a reciprocal homeostasis with its environment. The one is not possible without the other. The organism can achieve no "fit" with the outer world, if it is out of kilter within itself—and *vice versa*. Adaptation is essentially a biological concept derived from animal studies. The ideally adapted animal is one whose inner parts function together so perfectly as to enable it to form a perfect reciprocal fit with its environment. Perhaps William Blake captured the notion best with "The Tiger":

> Tiger! Tiger burning bright
> In the forest of the night
> What immortal hand or eye
> Could frame thy fearful symmetry.

In the case of animals, the process of adaptation is carried out through a set of inborn instinctual or reflex mechanisms. There is no such set of fully formed adaptive mechanisms inborn as instincts in the human, with a few exceptions, such as the sucking reflex. The human infant is, however, according to Hartmann (and Freud), equipped with the inborn potential to develop ego functions, given the average expectable environment which will allow, stimulate, or release such ego developments. It is the fully developed ego which replaces instinct as "the organ of adaptation" in humans.

Hartmann, in describing how the ego serves as the organ of adaptation, further defined adaptation as comprising four interlocking and reciprocating dynamic equilibria (p. 39). The first is the overall equilibrium between the individual and the environment, which he characterized as "the state of adaptation," also described as involving "the tasks of reality mastery" (p. 22). The other three equilibria are internal, all interdependent on each other and on the first equilibrium. The three internal equilibria are described as: the equilibrium of instinctual drives (vital equilibrium); the equilibrium of mental institutions (structural equilibrium); and the equilibrium between the synthetic function and the rest of the ego (intrasystemic equilibrium). Thus, within the ego itself, Hartmann distinguished the synthetic function as the specific homeostatic or adaptive function, in that it both brought together and reacted reciprocally and in accordance with the disparate parts and principles of the mental apparatus, i.e., the drives, the structures, and the reality and pleasure principles.

The term, "synthetic function," as used by Hartmann in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, however, was never synonymous with the synthetic function described by Nunberg (1930). In fact, Hartmann later clarified this difference by explicitly stating his preference for the term "organizing function" rather than "synthetic function" in the context of adaptation (Hartmann, 1947; Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949). The organizing function was superordinate to the synthetic

function. In this way, Hartmann hoped to include in his theory the clinically observable phenomenon that, in order to achieve certain adaptive aims, the ego must be able to do the opposite of synthesis: it must be able to take itself apart as well as put itself together. For example, to tolerate orgasm, the ego must be able to dissolve itself. To play, fantasize, or imagine, the ego must be able to dismantle certain of its structures. Here Hartmann was aided by Kris's (1934) concept of "regression in the service of the ego." Hartmann emphasized that the shortest path to adaptation, to realistic reciprocity with the environment, was not necessarily through logic, intelligence, or reason, but often involved regression, or "a detour through fantasy." The psychoanalytic situation itself was an example of this. On the other hand, the ego must also be able flexibly to employ its "preconscious automatisms" without having to regress and recreate them on each occasion. The ego "must also be *able to must*" (1939a, p. 94). For Hartmann, it was the responsibility, as it were, of the superordinate "organizing function of the ego" to flexibly employ each and every function of the rest of the ego so as to establish the inner homeostasis among drives and structures which would in turn facilitate the reciprocal homeostasis with the outer environment known as "adaptation."

It is not possible here to trace out fully the many subtle complexities of Hartmann's conception, but a few aspects perhaps should be mentioned. Hartmann's "organizing function of the ego" may seem similar to Waelder's (1930) "principle of multiple function," in that "overdetermination" is involved in both. Certainly, Hartmann's ego performs all the tasks that Waelder required of his ego, in that it reconciles the demands of id, ego, superego, and reality. However, Waelder's "principle of multiple function" is not synonymous with Hartmann's "organizing function." It is rather only one of the devices available to be employed by the organizing function, to which it is subordinate.

Readers familiar with Brenner's work, particularly his recent fruitful efforts to clarify psychoanalytic theory by deriving it more closely from the clinical situation, will perhaps discern the

antecedents of Brenner's (1982) "compromise formations" in Hartmann's concept of the "organizing function." The two do share in common, along with Waelder's concept, the basic psychoanalytic discovery of the overdetermination of mental processes. However, Brenner took care to distinguish his concept from Waelder's in emphasizing that in his (Brenner's) framework, compromise formation is the product of conflict only (1982, pp. 116-119). A similar distinction clearly separates Brenner's concepts from Hartmann's, in that, for Hartmann, compromise of conflict would be only one of the tasks of the "organizing function of the ego." Needless to say, for Hartmann, the "organizing function" could also operate within and among structures derived from the "conflict-free sphere." Moreover, for Hartmann, compromise of conflict would be only one of the complex ingredients of the adaptive homeostasis.

V

Hartmann was quite aware that in developing a psychoanalytic concept of adaptation, he was heading in the direction of a psychoanalytic concept of health. Although in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* he stated that he would forgo an effort to formulate such a concept "for the time being" (p. 81), the "time being" proved to be very short, since within the same year he published his classic essay, "Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health" (1939b). Here, too, he cautioned that the notions he advanced were "prolegomena" which did "not yet enable us to formulate a concept of mental health in simple, unequivocal, definitive terms" (p. 18). Yet he made clear that the foundation of any such future concept of mental health would have to be built upon the complex equilibratory process of adaptation, that is, upon the ego's capacity to provide an "organization of the organism," which he had already described in the previous essay. In fact, Hartmann's "Psychoanalysis and the Concept of

Health" contains no ideas which had not been previously advanced in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* and is in essence a footnote to the latter, or a specific extension of the latter to the concept of health.

For Hartmann, then, at this stage in the development of his ideas, mental health was a concept which clearly belonged in the realm of ego psychology and, in the broadest terms, was itself a function of the ego. In particular, mental health could be provisionally defined as the successful operation of the superordinate organizing function of the ego in establishing a complex series of inner dynamic equilibria, as described above (intrasystemic, vital, structural). In establishing these equilibria, the ego, through its organizing function, had to be able freely to make use of all of its capacities at every level of development. The "healthy" ego could synthesize or desynthesize, reason logically or fantasize—it could, in short, regress or progress among all of its developmental stages. Only if the ego was, in this way, successful in establishing inner homeostasis, was it possible for the organism then to achieve that state of complex reciprocal homeostasis with the outer world which Hartmann previously described as the state of adaptation and now could provisionally describe as the state of health.

Although he considered this concept of health provisional and abstract, it did, for Hartmann, have the considerable advantage of freeing psychoanalysis from its previous value-laden, superficial, and overly constricted concepts of health. For Hartmann, a concept of mental health could not be based on gross behavioral observations—such as the ability to "love, work, and play"—for this omitted any insight into the inner workings of the mental apparatus. Neither could it be tied rigidly to the level of psychosexual development achieved (oral, anal, or genital), for this omitted entirely the state of the ego. Neither could it be tied to the presence or absence of conflict, since "conflicts are a part and parcel of human development, for which they provide the necessary stimulus" (1939b, p. 12). Neither could mental health be tied to the presence or absence of a "split in

the ego" (Freud, 1938), since, as Hartmann was the first to indicate, such "splits" were inherent in the concept of the ego as comprising a multiplicity of component functions. Neither could mental health be gauged by the presence or absence of any particular mental mechanism, such as a specific defense mechanism, for it would be impossible to assess how such a mechanism, taken in isolation from the rest of the mental apparatus, was being employed by the ego's organizing function, i.e., whether it was serving or obstructing adaptation. Neither could a concept of mental health be based on the overemphasis of particular highly developed ego functions (such as intelligence or logical thought) in isolation from others. For example, a capacity to hew strictly to reality through the operation of intelligence and logic might, on closer inspection, reveal an anxiety-driven incapacity to fantasize. Or, conversely, an apparently creative and whimsical imagination might, on closer inspection, reveal an anxiety-generated inability to form correct perceptions of parts of the real world.

Perhaps it should be emphasized here that, for Hartmann, adaptation was a highly sophisticated concept which did not at all imply a passive fitting-in to one or another moral or social system. In fact, Hartmann was quite severe with those analysts who allowed their concept of health to be imbued with any social or political values.

> By skillful conjuring with these kinds of standards it becomes easy enough to prove that those who do not share our political or general outlook on life are neurotic or psychotic or that social conditions to which we are for some reason opposed are to be accounted as pathological. I believe that we are all clear in our own minds that such judgments—whether we personally share them or not—have no right to speak in the name of psychoanalytic science (1939b, p. 14).

Written amid the turmoil of Hitler's Europe, these words convey, as perhaps no others do, the dimensions of Hartmann's intellectual honesty.

If there was, in fact, a sociological aspect to a psychoanalytic concept of health based on adaptation, it lay, for Hartmann, in the basic fact that no judgment of health, or the lack of it, was complete until it considered the individual's relationship with the external world.

> The actual state of equilibrium achieved in a given individual tells us nothing of his capacity for adaptation so long as we have not investigated his relations with the external world. Thus an unhampered "capacity for achievement and enjoyment," simply considered in isolation, has nothing decisive to tell us concerning the capacity for adapting oneself to reality (p. 15).

In Hartmann's highly sophisticated concept, an individual cannot be considered "healthy" if, although he or she is outwardly successful in terms of high accomplishment and the enjoyment of it, on closer inspection it is found that the organizing function of his or her ego has not managed to form an adequate perception of reality and/or a reciprocal relationship with the external world based on this perception. Foremost among the elements of the external world, for the psychoanalyst, are the human objects in it, beginning in earliest infancy with the mother. Hartmann often emphasized that psychoanalytic theory included "object relations" from its inception, and hence by definition was a biosocial theory. By defining the ego as the human "organ of adaptation" analogous to instinct in animals, Hartmann hoped to clarify and solidify the place of psychoanalysis among the biological and social sciences. For Hartmann, psychoanalysis was a basic science of sociology as well as psychology, and all three were aspects of human biology. He would therefore certainly have welcomed Reiser's (1989) recent assertion in these pages that psychoanalysis has a natural and rightful place in the medical curriculum.

Hartmann's conception of mental health, provisional and sketchy though he considered it, has not as yet been improved upon. It is, in my opinion, perhaps his greatest contribution to

psychoanalysis at the clinical level. It has, I believe, permeated the thinking of clinical analysts everywhere. Yet, curiously, it is a contribution not often associated with Hartmann. For, as Hartmann put it, "the concepts of 'health' and 'illness' always exert a 'latent' influence, so to say, on our analytic habits of thought . . ." (1939b, p. 3). It is as if, since the publication of Hartmann's papers, it is Hartmann's own concept of health that has exerted the latent influence on our analytic habits of thought, but detached from the name of Hartmann. Perhaps this is just as well, since he might not have approved of the value-laden terms which have gradually infiltrated our use of his concepts—terms such as "primitive" versus "advanced" ego functions. Yet we remain permanently in Hartmann's debt for his major contribution to a psychoanalytic concept of health unflawed by value or oversimplification.

We also remain in Hartmann's debt for another, less tangible, yet perhaps more crucial contribution to our analytic habits of thought, and that is his truly scientific attitude. Whatever the fate of Hartmann's individual theories or concepts, we have learned from him something about how to think. We have learned to be cautious about psychoanalytic formulations which are simplistic, narrow, or too rigidly specific. We have learned to think in terms of complex reciprocating systems, of different levels of interacting equilibria, rather than in terms of narrow diagnostic categories or simple developmental schemata—schemata which may overemphasize one phase or one mental function at the expense of others. This influence is, I believe, clearly visible in the diverse contributions of the faculty and graduates of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, where Hartmann taught from 1941 until his death in 1970.

VI

Throughout all of his writings Hartmann called for the application of his ideas to the clinical situation. In that respect, *Ego*

Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation is no different. Already on page 10, Hartmann is suggesting a number of clinical investigations having to do with the interaction between conflicted and conflict-free processes, and with the role of special talents in the choice of defenses. In fact, rarely in this volume does Hartmann articulate an idea without calling, in some way, for its clinical testing or application. If psychoanalysis has made insufficient scientific use of the analytic situation, this has not been for lack of overt encouragement by Hartmann, *pace* Edelson. In this spirit a brief clinical vignette is offered in an effort to apply Hartmann's concept of mental health in the area of homosexuality—an area in which questions of "health" and "illness" have become quite controversial of late.

Mr. P, a strapping and talented young professional in his thirties, entered analysis with the stated intent of clarifying whether he was homosexual or heterosexual. "Heterosexual, I hope," was his feeling, because he wished to be able to end his embarrassing state of virginity and to consummate a long-standing asexual relationship with his friend, Ms. T, in order to marry and have children. Ms. T stood by him in this effort. Analysis began with much fanfare and a "gung-ho" attitude on the part of Mr. P, who proclaimed himself finally on the path to heterosexuality. He was immediately disconcerted to find that the analyst, in his neutrality, did not share this enthusiasm. This was unlike the attitude of his one previous therapist of a decade before who not only overtly applauded his every move toward women, but made active suggestions to Mr. P regarding his hair style and choice of sports jackets. Mr. P had made every effort to be a "star patient" in that treatment, making himself over completely in response to his therapist. However, no sooner had Mr. P engaged in some mild petting with a woman than he became severely anxious, was too crestfallen to confess this "failure" to his therapist, and so dropped out of treatment within six months. This sequence threatened to repeat itself almost immediately in the analysis. No sooner had Ms. T, in her own enthusiasm, hinted to Mr. P that she expected imminent

sexual advances from him that he became extremely anxious and talked of breaking off both the relationship and the analysis.

Now it was clear to him, he felt, that he had always been homosexual and that, furthermore, he was being subjected to unwarranted pressure from both analyst and Ms. T, who were socially biased against homosexuality. I told him that while Ms. T would have to speak for herself, he knew already that analysis was neutral on the subject, and had as its purpose the clarification of his sexual conflicts, which we had not yet begun. (Later in the treatment it became possible to point out the transference elements in Mr. P's view of me as his irascible, belittling father whom he would defeat by being homosexual. This had been his unconscious transference purpose in undertaking psychoanalysis. Still later in the treatment it became clear that he *needed* to picture me as a dogmatic heterosexual in order to isolate me from participation in his homosexual feelings and fantasies.) Mr. P reached a decision to table his engagement with Ms. T while continuing the analysis. Although it was clear to both of us that part of the motive for this decision was to make of the analysis a safe haven from Ms. T and a vehicle for the preservation of the sexual status quo, Mr. P had by now also become genuinely interested and engaged in the analytic process, which then continued fruitfully for several years.

For Mr. P the sexual status quo in his thirties was what it had been in his teens and for some years before that: almost nightly masturbation, with fantasies of sex with young boys ages thirteen to fifteen. These boys had been his contemporaries when the fantasies began; they remained the same age while the patient kept pace with his actual age. In later years Mr. P would sometimes fasten on boys of his acquaintance, on whom he would develop "crushes" from afar. The masturbatory scenarios would most often comprise a striptease in which Mr. P would arouse and slowly disrobe the boy, reaching orgasm on sight of the boy's erect pubescent penis. Although he had never once acted upon any of these fantasies, nor upon any of the other

homosexual daydreams he would sometimes have regarding male associates and the potential sight of their large penises, Mr. P had long since concluded that he was homosexual by nature. He was helped toward this conclusion by his self-observation that he did not seem to be attracted to women in the least, especially not to Ms. T. However, he also had an aversion to "homosexual behavior," which repelled him in a way that his masturbatory fantasies did not. Moreover, he did wish to be married and have children, and he did have great affection for Ms. T, even though he became severely anxious at the least touch of her body. The result had been a decade-long, stalemated status quo, comprising nightly masturbation along with endless cycles of rapprochement with and flight from Ms. T. Meanwhile, professionally, Mr. P had progressed by virtue of hard work and exceptional talent to a very high station in life.

As the analytic anamnesis gradually unfolded, memories emerged which Mr. P had never really forgotten but somehow had never connected with the question of his sexuality, which he took to be biologically innate. Mr. P was the youngest of two children, his sister being several years older. A bright and charming boy, he was initially doted on by all three family members, but in early adolescence he had become estranged from his father because of the latter's explosive temper tantrums, in which he would berate and belittle Mr. P unmercifully. His father was also uneducated and socially withdrawn, in contrast to his mother, an outgoing intellectual. Mother, however, was also overintimate and smothering, seeking to control and participate in Mr. P's every activity and to have Mr. P share in hers, including the bathroom where Mr. P remembers seeing her bloody menstrual napkins. Mother was uninhibited in regard to nudity. Mr. P had no clear memory of her genitals, but he did retain a clear picture of her very small breasts which, at some point as a very young boy, he began to compare with his own very small penis, wondering if the size of the two weren't somehow connected by inheritance. In fact, he worried if he himself were somehow part woman like his mother, so that his

penis would never grow any bigger. This anxiety remained with him until his genital growth spurt at puberty, when he was vastly relieved to note the sprouting of pubic hair and the enlargement of his penis. All the same, he continued to worry whether his penis was too small. It was at this time that he became preoccupied with visually inspecting, whenever possible, the pubescent genitals of his contemporaries, then masturbating with exciting fantasies of physically conducting such inspections upon them (which, as mentioned, he never acted upon, not even when his friends were at an age when many of them were actually doing so).

The one penis in the world in which the patient seemed totally disinterested, and never mentioned, was his father's. When I brought this omission to his attention, Mr. P scoffed at the notion that this had any psychological import. To the best of his recollection, he had never even seen his father's penis. This amnesia gave way to an adolescent recollection that he had once walked in on his parents as they were making love one New Year's Eve. A screen memory ensued, in which Mr. P, as a small boy sharing a motel room with his parents, wet the bed three times in one night. Each time, uncharacteristically, it was his father who got up to change his bedclothes and dry him off. There was no belittlement by father on this occasion—except in the morning when father made jokes about Mr. P's habit of bouncing on his bed. When asked in the analysis to describe this habit, Mr. P realized that what might have been comical about it was that he was clearly imitating coital movements in his bouncing. Now Mr. P remembered not his father's erect penis, but that of his counselor in summer camp which impressed him with its enormity. "How can it be," he remembered thinking to himself (age twelve), "that one person could stick that huge thing into another person?" This led to some memories of enemas, administered by his father with his mother watching while Mr. P made great efforts to "hold it in" until he nearly exploded and cried "no more!" To his great embarrassment, Mr. P now remembered getting an erection while being given

an enema in the hospital as a teenager prior to a minor surgical procedure. It was clear from all of this that Mr. P was dreadfully afraid of his negative oedipal wish, powered by an exceptionally strong identification with his mother, to be anally penetrated by his father. This was an interpretation that could be made only gradually, with great tact and timing, over several years. Now it could be seen that Mr. P's intense preoccupation with his pubescent penis served, in part, the function of reassuring himself that he had not lost his penis as a result of such wishes.

Mr. P, at ages twelve and thirteen, was already struggling with such conflicts when his mother called him in for his official sex education lecture. (It was characteristic of the family that mother, not father, first performed this function.) Mother lectured Mr. P on the facts of life with a full complement of visual aids. Mr. P had an unusually severe reaction: "My hair stood on end . . . I blushed . . . I was dizzy. . . ." He could not wait until the lecture was over so he could rush from the room. His masturbation increased, along with his guilt over it, for he now began, on occasion, to picture masturbating in front of his mother. Also, he was now disobeying her sex education lecture by "fooling his penis into thinking it was having intercourse." The sex education lectures were repeated several times thereafter, once by his father and twice in a classroom setting. Each time, Mr. P experienced dizziness and faintness. In fact, on one occasion in school, during the most graphic of such lectures, Mr. P actually fainted and had to be taken from the classroom to a nurse's station. He struggled against this anxiety and made some abortive efforts to keep up with his peers in their contacts with the opposite sex. He went to seventh grade boy-girl parties but became horrified at the kissing games. He could not bring himself to touch lips with a girl. Instead, he fantasized about the penises of the boys who could do this. He engaged in some mild sex play with his teenage sister (who participated because she was herself unpopular and could not get dates at the time). The sex play consisted of back-and-buttocks-massage. A particular feature was a competition in the gluteal strength arena: each

would try to pry apart the other's buttocks while the partner tried to keep them squeezed together. This, Mr. P enjoyed. However, when sister showed him her breasts and boldly asked to see his erection, Mr. P fled. Eventually, as has been described, he gave up all such efforts and "accepted the fact that I was homosexual." It was only during several years of analysis that Mr. P was able, bit by bit, to bring to bear on the question of his sexuality some of the above information. The data led to the conclusion that, whatever the state of his biological givens, he was also extremely afraid to come into contact with a penisless female because this would remind him of the possibility of his castration through the realization of his wishes to be passively penetrated.

It is worth pausing here to observe, in connection with Hartmann, how closely the above analytic process resembles Hartmann's description of analysis in *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (pp. 62-64). For Hartmann, the process of analysis involved not simply the passive remembering of forgotten knowledge, but the creation of "new knowledge" through the making of new connections between old facts. Such clinical comments by Hartmann are unfortunately few and far between in his writings, and about this we can share Edelson's regret. Yet Hartmann, in fact, was widely known for his clinical acumen (Loewenstein, 1970), on the basis of which he was chosen to be the first Medical Director of the Treatment Center of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. It is unfortunate that more of Hartmann's clinical wisdom was not put into transmissable form. Some of it may be found in his first German book, *Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse* (1927). This has not, to my knowledge, ever been translated. It would make a worthwhile project.

Returning to Mr. P, it was noticeable, after the four years or so required for the above elucidation (and for much more that space limitations preclude mentioning) that his analysis had stalled. Various defenses and resistances were at work, chief among them a transference notion that analysis would rob him of his penis, because if it now became an effective sexual organ,

this would be due to analysis, and hence the analyst would hold the patent to Mr. P's erections. He would not, so to speak, be his own man. As this was being worked through, he acted out the conflict in a characteristically ambivalent manner: he sought out and enrolled in a sexual surrogate clinic. This combination of transference resistance plus actual re-engagement with female anatomy was the subject of much analytic work. The topic of concurrent analysis and surrogate "therapy" will necessitate a separate paper as to its analytic implications. But for purposes of our immediate discussion, Mr. P's move did set the stage for a natural experiment. What would happen when the "sex education lecture," which had previously caused him to faint dead away, was resumed thirty years later? As expected, the same thing happened. Mr. P became extremely anxious at the sight of the nude surrogate and had an impulse to flee. On this occasion, however, he persisted. A synergy, as it were, of analysis and behavioral conditioning (surrogate) seemed to enable Mr. P to overcome his anxiety—or at least to push it further and further along the sequence of the sexual act until it impeded only his ejaculation *in vaginam*. At first, he would lose erections on sight of the surrogate's genitals, then at the point of penetration, then at the point of ejaculation. For a long time, it remained the case that Mr. P could ejaculate intravaginally only if he closed his eyes, blotted out the presence of the surrogate, and pictured the erect penis of one of his boys. (Such was Mr. P's delicacy that he felt guilty about "doing this to" the surrogate, with whom he had developed a friendly relationship.) Most fascinating during this period were Mr. P's dreams. In his dreams, his mind seemed to be trying to undo whatever perceptions of female genitals had somehow filtered through the barrier of his penis images. For example, in one dream, the surrogate woman had an abundance of pubic hair, but no visible genitals. The pubic hair curled up into a prehensile organ, like the fingers of a hand. Into this organ, in the dream, Mr. P was able to insert his penis and ejaculate.

At this point, we must break off the story of Mr. P, although

much more could be told. It seems fair to say, however, that in Hartmann's terms, something major seems to have gone awry with Mr. P's perceptual apparatus. His castration anxiety has been such that he has been unable to "perceive"—in the comprehensive psychological sense of that term—the absence of a penis. As an adolescent, he fainted dead away. As an adult, he shut his eyes and imaged a penis. In his dreams, his mind plastically reconfigured the female genitals so that they resembled a masturbatory hand. In order to have an orgasm, he needed to picture a penis of such vintage as was most reassuring to him, i.e., the burgeoning penis of the pubescent boy. Perhaps this is the reason that Mr. P, as well as other individuals with his syndrome, fixates on boys of this age.

In any case, in terms of Hartmann's criteria for mental health, it would seem that Mr. P must be classified as neurotic. And this is not because of his overt behavior or his "homosexual orientation." Indeed, many analysts would contend that homosexuality is not a diagnosis but a descriptive term covering a heterogeneous group of syndromes. Others would contend, myself among them, that even if there were a specific diagnostic entity, "homosexual," Mr. P could not be so classified, for he had never in his life had one single homosexual experience, all of his fantasies notwithstanding. In this sense, Mr. P might qualify for a diagnosis among the various masturbatory perversions. Other analysts would no doubt feel that the diagnosis must hinge on the fantasies required for orgasm—but how can we make a diagnosis on the basis of the manifest content of fantasies? Hartmann's framework frees us from these vexing questions and enables us to classify Mr. P as neurotic for one clear reason only: on close examination and analysis of the workings of his mental apparatus, it is found that he cannot form a clear perception of the female genital—i.e., he is blocked from a basic reality pertaining to half of the human species. I would be inclined to believe that this is one of the basic disabilities of the "organizing function of the ego"

common to the perversions, but this remains to be determined by careful analytic research.

SUMMARY

Since the publication of *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* fifty years ago, Heinz Hartmann's theories have experienced a rise and fall in popularity remarkable in the extremes at either pole. This has paralleled, in trajectory and time, the rise and fall in popularity of psychoanalysis itself. Both are seen to be influenced by the same psychological phenomenon: overidealization—Hartmann by his colleagues, and psychoanalysis by the public—and then disillusionment.

In this review article, an effort was made to arrive at a more balanced view. Hartmann, in his work, endeavored to provide ego psychology with the same genetic, economic, and dynamic framework as Freud had for the previous "id psychology." In this way, Hartmann functioned not as a creator but as a "trained clarifier." Hartmann's genetic and economic theories met with poor results, unlike his dynamic theories, a major part of which was the concept of adaptation. Adaptation is a biosocial concept involving two equally important aspects: the equilibrium of the organism within itself, and the equilibrium of the organism with its environment. Inasmuch as inner equilibrium is an ego function, Hartmann identified the ego as the human "organ of adaptation" analogous to animal instinct. Within the ego, Hartmann singled out the "organizing function" as the agent responsible for establishing the inner equilibrium of drives and structures, which in turn made it possible for the overall equilibrium with the environment to be sustained. This led Hartmann to a sophisticated concept of mental health which emphasized the flexibility of the ego's organizing function in using all of the organism's mental apparatuses either regressively or progressively in order to create a series of complex reciprocating equilibria within the organism, and between the organism and its

environment. Hartmann's concept of health freed psychoanalysis from its previous value-laden or oversimplified notions, and trained a generation of analysts to avoid rigidity and oversimplification in their thinking. In this paper, an effort was made to apply this concept to a case selected from the area of the homosexualities—an area in which questions of "health" and "illness" have become particularly controversial of late.

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200 East 89th St.
New York, NY 10128

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Forty-two Lives in Treatment: A Study of Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. By Robert S. Wallerstein, New York: The Guilford Press, 1986. 784 pp.

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To cite this article: Sherwood Waldron Jr. (1989) Forty-two Lives in Treatment: A Study of Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. By Robert S. Wallerstein, New York: The Guilford Press, 1986. 784 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 643-681, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927256

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927256

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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FORTY-TWO LIVES IN TREATMENT: A STUDY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. By Robert S. Wallerstein, New York: The Guilford Press, 1986. 784 pp.

This book is a labor of love, Herculean and Promethean. It reports on the only comprehensive study of outcomes of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy from a perspective largely spanning the life cycle. The Psychotherapy Research Project of the Menninger Foundation and this book, its final accounting, deserve our most earnest study and appreciation.

The study is Herculean in its data accumulation and analysis. It was conceived by Wallerstein as an effort to gather data about differences between the methods and the results of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. From a small beginning in the mid-fifties, it expanded into a $100,000-a-year project involving scores of researchers working for a dozen years or more. A very extensive initial work-up was followed by collection of detailed information about the patient's treatment at termination. At that time both the patient and the therapist were extensively evaluated. Two years later the patient was brought back to Menninger for an extensive follow-up evaluation. The research team was able to obtain substantial follow-up information on 100% of the patients, and then continued to collect information on many of the patients for spans of time reaching nearly thirty years, an extraordinary achievement.

The huge amount of material collected on each of twenty-two patients who had started in psychoanalysis and twenty who had started in psychotherapy, running usually to hundreds of pages on each, was studied and summarized by Wallerstein during a sabbatical year. He produced a clinical summary of each case that averaged sixty double-spaced, typewritten pages. During a second sabbatical year, this data and, in addition, all the other publications stemming from the project were summarized and analyzed.

The resulting book contains 746 pages of text, divided into nine sections and forty chapters. This makes it a large task to digest fully. Since the primary focus is a clinical accounting and analysis of what took place, the role of the patient reports is vital. The way in which Wallerstein organized such a huge mass of data is inge-

nious: the principal clinical findings serve as the organizing points for the various chapters. It is in this context that each patient is described for the readers, so that sections and chapters are enlivened by case descriptions. The forty-two patients are each designated by a descriptive name (e.g., "bitter spinster"), and because they are thus referred to repeatedly throughout, they can be remembered by the reader. Appendices provide access to the materials on each patient, as well as comparing their responses to treatment. It is the extraordinary quality, and what seems to this reader the balance and penetration of the clinical descriptions, that, among its other high qualities, make this book, with all the travail of its length, stand out as an extraordinary contribution, enriching and broadening our experience. The vignettes are also ideally suited for teaching, since they serve so well to illustrate many different points about the problems encountered in working with a great variety of patients.

This brings me to the next essential point to be made in this review: the great richness of the clinical discussions of important issues in our field which these cases and their courses stimulate. Virtually every one of the issues merits a discussion, which would put this review in danger of growing forty-two lives of its own. To discuss a few of these issues would be too arbitrary. As an alternative, I shall simply mention a number of subjects that are addressed in the chapter or subchapter headings, although each is worth attention in its own right. I leave it to the reader to imagine and, I hope, discover, how this rich trove of cases with their treatment and follow-up data provides a springboard for Wallerstein's scholarly clinical discussions.

Important discussions relating to initial evaluation and suitability for psychoanalysis are given such headings as "misdiagnoses and wrong treatments," "heroic indications for psychoanalysis reconsidered," and "the analysis of the hysterical patient: limitations?" Findings in regard to psychotherapeutic technique include: "varieties of the transference neurosis," "turning points in treatment," "the transference psychosis," "treatment failures and 'untreatable' patients," "the expressive supportive dichotomy reconsidered," and "the therapeutic lifer." Issues relating to outcome include: "the relationship of achieved insights to structural changes," "rescue by factors other than psychotherapy," "post-treatment re-

turns for help," and, lastly, "the impact of follow-up upon treatment termination and resolution."

There are two specific limitations of the study which I wish to discuss briefly. The first is that the patients generally were more ill than the average patient taken into analysis in private practice. This is a consequence of their having sought help at Menninger, usually coming from other parts of the country and most frequently after the failure of other efforts at treatment. Drug and alcohol abuse, problems involving aggressive actions, seriously disrupted families and lives, all varieties of narcissistic and borderline disturbances, were present in the patient group. In other words, these were by and large patients any intake committee would have serious reservations about taking into analysis, and half of them were not even taken into analysis at Menninger. Furthermore, the analysts treating them were mostly in analytic training and hence relatively inexperienced. Despite this limitation, the course of illness and treatment of this patient group is very relevant to today's practice, because so many people do take sicker patients into therapy and analysis these days (the widened scope), and heroic indications are still widely accepted for analysis. From a practical point of view, we practicing analysts need to have intelligent ways of dealing with the large proportion of patients coming to us who are not "good analytic patients." Furthermore, Erle and Goldberg[1] have documented the large proportion of patients in private treatment with experienced analysts, in which the analysis is substantially modified. Learning how to work with patients who are not so suitable for analysis is an essential skill for practicing analysts.

A second limitation in the study derives from its original design. In order to preserve as natural a course of treatment as possible, the selection by the research team of a given case for participation in the study was not made known to the therapist/analyst until termination! As a consequence, the data collected on the course of therapy consisted of process notes, reports from supervisors, and retrospective reports from the patient and the therapist at termination. There were no studies of the ongoing *process* of psycho-

[1] Erle, J. B. & Goldberg, D. A. (1984): Observations on assessment of analyzability by experienced analysts. *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 32:715-737.

therapy or psychoanalysis, except as Wallerstein, an experienced analyst and supervisor, was able to reconstruct it at some remove from the actual process. He did not have access to what would have been observable if the treatments had been tape recorded, for instance. This limitation means that the study does not significantly advance our capacity to systematically study the analytic process, or to assess the contribution of a particular analyst to a particular treatment. This kind of study is what our field needs in order to advance our systematic knowledge. The need for such studies is indirectly supported by Wallerstein's case reports. They support the impression that there is a high degree of variability in how individual analysts work.

The most important, and no doubt controversial, findings of the study, as Wallerstein views them, can be indicated by citing his concluding summary (p. 730, slightly abbreviated).

> 1. The treatment results, with patients selected either as suitable for trials at psychoanalysis or as appropriate for varying mixes of expressive-supportive psychotherapeutic approaches, tended with this population sample, to converge rather than to diverge in outcome.
>
> 2. Across the whole spectrum of treatment courses in the forty-two patients . . . the treatment carried more supportive elements than originally intended, and these supportive elements accounted for more of the changes achieved than had been originally anticipated.
>
> 3. The nature of supportive therapy—or, better, the supportive aspects of all psychotherapy, as conceptualized within a psychoanalytic theoretical framework—deserves far more respectful specification in all its forms and variants than has usually been accorded in the psychodynamic literature. This entire volume reporting the PRP experience can be read in one way as an effort to spell out some of these forms and variants in more detail. . . .
>
> 4. The kinds of changes reached by this cohort of patients—those reached primarily on an uncovering, insight-aiming basis, and those reached primarily on the basis of . . . varieties of supportive techniques—often seemed quite indistinguishable from each other in terms of being so-called "real" or "structural" changes in personality functioning. . . .

He follows with a discussion of how these findings have been adumbrated in the works of Freud, Glover, Rangell, etc.

These broad conclusions are much more ground-breaking than one might have expected, hence my reference to Prometheus. It is this reviewer's opinion that we have much to learn from these conclusions in regard to central considerations in well-conducted analytic practices. It may be timely to think of a continuum of expres-

sive and supportive elements, each shaped by the particular conflicts, transferences, and ego distortions of each individual patient. Of the twenty-two patients started in analysis, six had to be converted to psychotherapy, and another six required substantial modifications in their analyses. Furthermore, as Wallerstein describes in the summary, study of the cases shows such a blend of supportive and insight elements in the ongoing work that our ordinary ideal of how analysis ought to be conducted may need, for most patients, significant alteration. And we may find that some of the differences between various analytic groups become more understandable as related to effects of different supportive techniques. For instance, some of the reported therapeutic success of the Kohutian approach in engaging certain sicker patients in treatment may really be understandable as a reflection of a much more supportive approach. This would in turn help account for some of the fervor with which some Kohutians espouse their particular view of psychoanalysis. This major work can help to stimulate further thought and systematic study of this dimension, both in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.

SHERWOOD WALDRON, JR. (NEW YORK)

MASOCHISM. CURRENT PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Robert A. Glick and Donald I. Meyers. Hillsdale, NJ/London: The Analytic Press, 1988. 238 pp.

Readers of collections of articles by many authors on a single subject face daunting challenges and difficult questions. How can they adapt to the shifting definitions and emphases? Does the book deal with a single phenomenon or a host of clinical conditions? Are the different authors applying their own biases to a uniform diagnostic category when they describe the dynamics of a particular condition, or are they describing the dynamics of only a small subgroup of that condition? The editors, eager to provide some unity for the reader, will have difficulty coordinating and sorting out the divergent points of view and showing how they interrelate.

These issues are particularly relevant to a volume on masochism. As Maleson has demonstrated,[1] authors have defined masochism

[1] Maleson, F. G. (1984): The multiple meanings of masochism in psychoanalytic discourse. *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.*, 32:325-356.

in numerous ways, broadly and narrowly, deeply and superficially, clinically and metapsychologically. We can hardly expect the editors of *Masochism: Current Psychoanalytic Perspectives* to rein in their contributors and maintain a single definition. We may hope that the writers will state openly that they are concentrating on a particular set of determinants while others are dealing with an overlapping set. We may hope that each author will define the population studied. But we know that most authors will not satisfy our wishes. Most will be the captivated captives of their own point of view and will, for the most part, think that perspective the central issue. Some authors will even stray from the topic and deal with peripheral subjects.

Robert A. Glick and Donald I. Meyers do an excellent job of attempting to integrate the unintegratable. Their introduction provides their readers with a historical summary and then with an excellent road map to which they can refer as they travel over the interesting and stimulating terrain. But the readers will still have to do a great deal of work as they wend their way. They will have to engage each chapter on its own terms, delineate for themselves the author's theoretical bias and clinical arena.

The variety of dynamics described is, in part, a function of the differing definitions. In a broad definition one conceives of masochism as pleasure in pain or the pursuit of suffering, with the understanding that the phenomena and connections may be unconscious. A narrower definition links the conscious or unconscious sexual (genital) pleasure and pain. In either case the determinants are numerous and the dynamics profuse. Some authors (including this reviewer) have suggested that there is no single road to masochism, no single set of dynamics, that masochism is a clinical syndrome and not a metapsychological construct. This book, with its numerous and sometimes contradictory viewpoints, supports that proposition. However, the authors of this volume do not totally agree on the nature of the clinical syndrome.

The points of view include a libidinal orientation, an emphasis on defense, narcissistic studies, self psychology, developmental issues, and Kleinian constructions. A chapter by Robert S. Liebert on the concept of character deals with masochism only briefly. I will summarize some of the points made by a few of the thirteen contributors.

Stanley J. Coen emphasizes the sexual excitement that lies behind sadomasochistic object relations, sexual excitement that is manifest in perversions but hidden in other cases. He asserts that "once defenses against acknowledging that excitement have been interpreted, patients with masochistic character disorder are often found to have a sadomasochistic infiltration of their sexuality" (p. 58).

Otto Kernberg, while acknowledging overlap, attempts a classification of masochistic phenomena which may be concisely outlined as follows:

Masochistic character pathology
"Normal" masochism
Depressive-masochistic personality disorder
Sadomasochistic personality disorder
Primitive self-destructiveness and self-mutilation
Syndromes of pathological infatuation
Masochistic sexual behavior and perversion
Masochistic perversion at a neurotic level of personality organization
Sexual masochism with severely self-destructive and/or other regressive features

Roy Schafer's chapter on those wrecked by success is tangential to the central focus of the book. He differentiates this condition from masochism while recognizing overlap. Following Freud, he reserves the term masochism for those patterns of action in which suffering seems self-induced, repetitious, and sexualized. In discussing the syndrome of being wrecked by success, Schafer emphasizes the role of the ego ideal (which he calls the ideal self), as well as envy, grandiosity, and the feeling that one is defective. Many levels of conflict are involved. If the analyst allows the treatment to proceed beyond self psychological issues, Schafer declares, the "unempathic mother" often proves to be an oedipal rival or rejecting oedipal object, and the feeling of defect oedipal in its force.

John Gedo argues for the existence of a variety of determinants which vary from individual to individual. His examples illustrate the complexity of motivations in each individual. Gedo differentiates masochistic behavior from self-punishment. In masochism the patient compulsively repeats behavior that brings about pain or loss. The individual may identify with someone, generally a primary caretaker who served as a model. The genesis may be in the

preverbal period or later. It may be preoedipal or oedipal in nature.

Arnold M. Cooper offers sweeping generalizations in his chapter. He suggests that narcissism and masochism achieve their particular individual character in the preoedipal stages. "Narcissistic tendencies and masochistic defenses are intimately . . . interwoven in the course of development" to the degree that "the narcissistic character and the masochistic character are one and the same." There is, he says, a "structural unity and mutual support" of the narcissistic and masochistic characterological modes (p. 137).

The book demonstrates that, as Helen Meyers states in her chapter on treatment techniques, "Masochism . . . is a complex configuration, multiply determined from different developmental levels, and serves various functions" (p. 179). It also shows that the ingredients that enter into the configuration vary from person to person even if the superficial clinical pictures appear uniform. Sexual pleasure, defensive erotization and control, guilt, narcissism, attempts at completion of a defective self-representation, maintenance of object relations, and aggression turned against the self are but a few of the pieces of the complicated jigsaw puzzle that masochism is.

Readers will find themselves sensitized to the conceptual issues essential to successful analytic treatment of masochists. They will benefit from reading about the multiple facets and will enjoy the creative individual integration of accomplished and illustrious analysts, even if an overall synthesis is never achieved. Such an impressive array of clinical data and theoretical approaches may be a step toward the elusive synthesis we seek.

JULES GLENN (GREAT NECK, NY)

PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY OF CHILDREN. An Introduction to the Art and the Techniques. By Henry P. Coppolillo, M.D. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., 1987. 414 pp.

This contribution to the literature on the psychotherapy of children is, in fact, a comprehensive treatise on the subject. It presents, in clear and concise language, and in step-by-step progression, the theoretical and technical foundations on which a disciplined and effective psychotherapy of children can be carried out. While

aimed primarily at those who have recently decided on a career of treating children, its level of sophistication in the more complex and thorny problems of diagnosis and treatment of difficult cases makes it a valuable reference source for the experienced therapist as well. The book furnishes the beginner those essential elements on the subject of children, involving their development, both normal and aberrant, which he or she must command in order to achieve an acceptable level of competence in the field of child psychotherapy. Coppolillo's long experience as theoretician and teacher is here distilled, in a felicitous and well-organized form, into the art and discipline of treating the child in psychological distress.

The volume is divided into five sections, each section in turn being divided into three or four chapters. The beginning sections are concerned with establishing an appropriate physical setting and psychological atmosphere conducive to treatment and affording minimal interferences to the development of a therapeutic relationship. Coppolillo proposes the idea of an explicit verbal contract with the child so that the child can be given a "fair and honest description of the relationship" at the outset. He acknowledges that this contract may have little meaning to the child at such an early phase of the treatment, but suggests that in order to facilitate and maintain the therapeutic alliance, the therapist should return at appropriate moments to the discussion of the initial agreement. Coppolillo's contractual points are especially pertinent for the new child therapist, and they serve as useful reminders for experienced clinicians, teachers, and supervisors. He includes the important issues of the children's right to confidentiality and their role as *active* participants in the process of understanding their conflicts and their ability *to choose* to solve the problems from which they suffer. I find the notion of introducing the child's role as "active participator" at the outset of therapy well put by Coppolillo: "This will involve the child not only as he reveals his inner world, but also as he helps to formulate the conclusions that the therapist reaches. The therapist should tell the child, by word, and later by attitude and deed that he will not reach conclusions about the child without the participation of the child, or at least the child's awareness" (p. 135).

The middle part of the book deals with the more usual types of

neurotic and behavioral difficulties which bring children to treatment. With impressive detail and sensitivity, Coppolillo covers the various phases of treatment, the technical difficulties, the management problems; and he offers different and flexible approaches for each situation. Again, these are familiar areas of work for clinicians with years of experience, but they are invaluable for the novice, who so frequently feels at sea, looking for "rules" to guide him or her in conducting a child's therapy.

The final chapters of this book are devoted to considerations of the more complicated and troublesome cases involving children suffering from the effects of physical and sexual abuse or involving seriously disorganized children.

The author is straightforward in expressing his view regarding the current tendency of "resorting to medication to control children's behavior or misbehavior" (p. 16). Consistent with this attitude of putting the child first is the importance Coppolillo attaches to respecting the confidential nature of what the child had divulged to the therapist (especially secrets), whether in the initial contacts or during the course of treatment. He says, "If the information can remain confidential without endangering the child's welfare, and without misleading the parents, it should not be mentioned" (p. 141).

The text is enhanced by the many illustrative clinical examples and vignettes, all reported with brevity and clarity. They lend a live and lively quality to the theoretical and technical explanations and discussions throughout the book. Clinical extracts one frequently comes across in the literature seldom present the pared-down essence found here. This book should serve as a standard for those writing on the subject of the psychotherapy of children.

Among the many clinical illustrations given, of particular interest are Coppolillo's descriptions of those instances in which children are acutely aware of a parent's attitudes and feelings—even while the parent tries very hard to conceal or at least not to openly convey them to the child:

> As a mother was being interviewed in connection with problems she was having with her nine-year-old daughter, she revealed that she had a twelve-year-old son who had suffered from chronic leukemia for the past six years. As she spoke of her daughter, she tearfully confessed that the girl's excellent health and exuberant spirits were sometimes felt by her to be constant reminders of

> the catastrophic unfairness that her son had suffered. She was fairly certain that she had not revealed this to her daughter. In her own interview, the angry and depressed nine-year-old said: "Sometimes I think Mom wished I was sick instead of Dick. She acts like it's bad for me to feel good" (pp. 179-180).

Another example, poignant and of great pedagogical import, concerns the acquisition of a seasoned and attuned clinical judgment, which involves the ability to discern when adherence to rigid theoretical principles must give way to a humane, though no less therapeutic, response to the patient. Therapists, especially beginners, often take refuge in the elevation of the rule of abstinence to the point of its becoming an inviolable ideal. One comes across this notion so frequently while conducting supervision that it cannot be reiterated enough.

> Tessie was four when her mother died. In the course of her treatment, previously suppressed grief began to be mobilized and expressed. With it came fears that the people she loved would become lost to her forever, as she had begun to feel her mother was. In one session in which she expressed grief and rage at her loss, she suddenly asked the therapist if he had a phone at home and if his children used the phone a lot like her older brothers did at her home. She was told that the therapist did have a phone and, although there were young people who used it often, it was free often enough that a young girl could reach the therapist if she needed to do so. Tessie was supplied with a piece of paper with the therapist's number, which she solemnly put into her jumper pocket. Although she never called, she showed it to the therapist when treatment was terminated, and told him she was going to keep it in case she needed to call him in the future. Rather sadly she added that she knew she could never call her mother (p. 285).

In his book Coppolillo has truly achieved a happy synthesis of a rigorous scientific approach coupled with a kind, humane, and compassionate attitude toward children and their psychotherapy.

LAURIE LEVINSON (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING FROM EARLY CHILDHOOD THROUGH ADOLESCENCE. A Developmental and Psychodynamic Approach. By Miriam G. Siegel, Ph.D. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., 1987. 529 pp.

Miriam Siegel has made a real contribution toward the comprehensive psychological evaluation of children and adolescents. This is not just another book on psychological testing. It is not a cookbook presentation on how to administer, score, and interpret tests;

nor is it simply a reporting of various interesting cases. Most important, it is not a book jammed with experimental/research findings of little relevance to the practitioner. Instead, Siegel shares with the reader, in a very practical way, her vast knowledge and experience in testing children and adolescents.

The word *practical* cannot be overemphasized in describing this book. For example, at one point Siegel advises some modification in the standard (or traditional) administration of the Rorschach. In testing young children, she recommends that the inquiry immediately follow the child's response so that the patient's reasoning is not lost. By this method, the emphasis is on understanding the child, as opposed to rigid adherence to strict test procedures, which is so often done by the inexperienced evaluator with a psychometrician mentality. At another point, the author aptly warns the psychologist that there is no need to explain everything: "Each twitch and giggle cannot be endowed with deep dynamic significance; fleeting moments of sadness or suspicion do not necessarily signify a depressive or paranoid reaction" (p. 15). In conjunction with Siegel's practical approach, a very sophisticated psychodynamic and developmental framework serves as a common denominator throughout all of her analysis and interpretation of test findings.

The volume is divided into two major sections. The first part, consisting of eleven chapters, reviews the "time honored" and most widely used psychological tests, such as the intelligence tests (Wechsler Scales), Rorschach, the apperception tests, projective figure drawings, Bender Gestalt, and the like. Chapter 10 is devoted to an integration of test findings, with practical suggestions on how to organize a report. The second part of the book consists of various case studies, with a lot of raw data, so that the reader can clearly follow Siegel's thinking and how she draws her conclusions. The cases chosen represent relatively common, yet quite challenging psychopathological conditions, such as elective mutism, mild mental retardation, the impact of disturbed environments, incipient psychosis, anorexia nervosa, and adolescent adjustment difficulties.

It is very difficult to criticize such a solid, thoughtful, and complete book as this. A few comments, however, may be helpful to the prospective reader. The diagnostic categories used by Siegel do not follow the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (DSM III). This will

probably not be a problem for the psychoanalyst, but not every reader may know exactly what the author is referring to when she speaks of "incipient psychoneurosis," "the verge of a psychotic episode," "normal adolescent disturbance," and the like. In addition, not a great many pages are devoted to differentiating the important constructs of personality structure and dynamics. Psychological testing, especially the Rorschach, can be quite helpful in describing the underlying structure of the personality. The psychotherapist or analyst would be very interested in knowing just how strong or weak the underlying framework of the personality is, as well as where the patient's areas of vulnerability are located. Just as the structural engineer inspects a building, not by examining the color or type of siding, but by evaluating the strength and composition of the beams and underpinnings, so must the psychologist accurately and inclusively describe the underpinnings of a patient's personality. In the melding of a psychodynamic and structural assessment, important information that could easily be gleaned from testing is lost. Finally, Siegel spends considerable time discussing organicity and neurophysiological dysfunctions, but there is not much attention paid to learning disabilities and to more recent advances in the assessment of organicity through neuropsychological measures.

For the psychodynamically oriented psychologist who tests children and adolescents, this book is well worth reading. While I do point out some areas of slight weakness, they are only minor in comparison to the book's overall contribution. In my judgment, Siegel's practical advice cannot be overemphasized as an outstanding feature of her text. In addition to psychologists, child analysts and child therapists will find this book very useful; it provides such a good overview of testing that it could help lead to a better appreciation of psychological reports and to a better framing of referral questions.

LOUIS B. SCHLESINGER (MAPLEWOOD, NJ)

THE ANATOMY OF LOVING. The Story of Man's Quest to Know What Love Is. By Martin S. Bergmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 302 pp.

This book tells "the story of man's quest to know what love is." As befits such a tale, it roams the centuries, explores many cultures,

and visits in them the literature, mythology, songs, and other products of human creativity, looking always for love. It is an encyclopedia of love. The author aims it at Egyptologists, classical scholars, Biblical scholars, Shakespearean scholars, historians, philosophers, humanists, mental health professionals, including, of course, "those who value psychoanalysis," all in addition to the general reader, a mighty scope. But the author's grasp equals his reach; there is something here for all of these groups.

The first of two sections of the book is devoted to tracing "The Growth of the Vocabulary of Love." It examines love in Egypt, Sumer, Greece (next to Freud, Plato contributed most to our understanding of love), Rome, the Hebraic culture, the Old and New Testaments, and Western culture from the middle ages through Shakespeare and Milton to the disenchantment of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. All of this is done from the vantage point of psychoanalytic enlightenment, but a detailed discussion of psychoanalytic views on love is saved for the second section. In this are discourses on what Freud learned from Plato, on Freud's own discoveries about love, on Freud's own loves, and on love and genitality, homosexuality, the transference, and a multitude of other connections and interdigitations of love and human psychology.

There is much for the psychoanalyst in this book, so much that I can only illustrate with a few selected points. The analyst looking for literary and mythical references related to love and sexuality will find them galore. For example, the four pages devoted to bisexuality contain references to Ovid (the story of Salmacis and Hermaphroditus), Greek customs, Aphrodite, Iphis, Tiresias, Jan Sibelius, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Sigmund Freud, Helene Deutsch, Lawrence Kubie, Virginia Woolf, and Joyce McDougall. This list is typical. The author's erudition is astonishing, as is his ability to pull together widely disparate sources and references.

One might think that a major task of anyone writing about love would be to define it, but the author's whole point is that love is multidimensional. There is romantic love, courtly love, aim-inhibited love, anaclitic love, divine love, infatuation, and a million other shades and variations. Bergmann is too wise to attempt a single definition, but he does feel that psychoanalysis can say what the *process* of love is: a refinding of some aspect of a repressed relation-

ship with a parent, a dim recalling of the very early symbiotic phase, the inclusion of the other within the bounds of the self and thus some undoing of separateness, and the transfer of some degree of idealization of the self or the parent onto the new love object.

As love in various cultures and at various times is considered, specific questions emerge and are discussed from a variety of viewpoints, not just the psychoanalytic. Why did the Greeks need more than one god of love? (Bergmann gives both psychological and historico-anthropological reasons, and synthesizes the two.) What is the relationship between love and narcissism in Shakespeare? (He provides a superb discussion.) Who in the nineteenth century contributed most to our understanding of love? (Stendhal and Schopenhauer, says Bergmann.) How do Greco-Roman ideas of love contrast with Hebraic-Christian ones? These and many other questions are dealt with at length. Psychoanalytic questions are not neglected. How does love relate to mourning? What is the current status of the controversy about love and genitality? What is the relationship between transference love and love in real life? How would a psychoanalyst interpret Hippolytus, Dido and Aeneas, The Song of Songs, Shakespeare's Dark Lady? One could go on and on.

No good thing is without a flaw, however, and a major one here arises out of one of the book's virtues. I have mentioned the encyclopedic scope of the contents and the awe inspired by the author's ability to pull things together. Unfortunately, it also inspires (at times) a sense of clutteredness. It sometimes seems as if we are reading a compilation of every clipping and jotting that the author collected over the past twenty years, arranged, it is true, by topic, but often relatively unsynthesized. The story of Joseph, for example, is introduced to illustrate that the Bible knows the dangers of narcissism. It is then recounted in several different versions, including one from the Koran which I find very difficult to relate to the theme of narcissism under which it is introduced. This failure of synthesis is not ubiquitous, but when it occurs, it is distressing. For example, in the midst of an otherwise coherent discussion of sublimation, the author introduces the topic of difficulties with the concept, turns to Melanie Klein's ideas, interjects a paragraph de-

scribing sublimation in a chimpanzee, and goes on in a rather hit-or-miss manner for several pages before giving his usual, very nice summary. This clipboard compilation style is uncomfortable, as is the author's occasional adulteration of psychoanalytic erudition with simplistic conclusions, as, for instance, in the idea that "when too great a portion of love and the sexual drive is directed toward the love for God, aggression finds an outlet by persecution of those who worship another variant on the monotheistic theme" (p. 83); this is an economic explanation of prejudice and scapegoating which few would find sufficient. Finally, encyclopedic as he is, the author leaves at least one developmental event related closely to the development of love relatively untouched; separation-individuation, which is treated very skimpily. But these are minor faults. For anyone interested in love (and who is not?), this book is recommended reading.

SYDNEY E. PULVER (PHILADELPHIA)

A MIND OF HER OWN. THE LIFE OF KAREN HORNEY. By Susan Quinn. New York: Summit Books, 1987. 479 pp.

Susan Quinn, who is primarily a journalist, has written an interesting and, for the most part, sympathetic account of the life of Karen Horney. It seems that the author became interested in Horney after reading her 1926 essay, "The Flight from Womanhood," where she "found it so remarkable that in the 1920's Horney was saying things that women rediscovered in the 1960's."[1] There is no doubt that the author did an extensive amount of research in Germany, in the United States, and finally in Japan, where Karen Horney traveled in the final year of her life to pursue her interest in Zen Buddhism. Quinn also had access to Horney's personal diaries, which she had kept up from childhood through young adulthood. Using this material, along with the material obtained from interviews with numerous individuals who had known Horney during her lifetime, Quinn has been able to present a portrait of a very intelligent, fiercely competitive, and independently thinking woman who was incapable of accepting someone else's ideas unless, as she stated in an early diary, she had measured

[1] *The New York Times Book Review*. November 29, 1987, p. 4.

them and seen if they resonated with "the delicate vibrations of my soul." Quinn has carefully tried to place Horney's life in its historical context. She also seems to have made a valiant effort to master psychoanalytic principles, which was necessary in order to understand Horney's challenges to Freudian theory. The author, however, has remained even-handed. She presents Horney's lifelong conflicts and poor judgment, especially in her relationships with men, in a forthright way.

Karen Danielson was born in 1885 outside of Hamburg, Germany, to parents who were quite unhappy and mismatched. She had an older brother who was very handsome but perhaps not as smart as she was. For most of her childhood, Karen's father, a ship's captain, was away at sea, and, in fact, he was probably not in Germany at the time of her birth. This was perhaps the most significant determinant in Horney's development, and I think Quinn has failed to appreciate the devastating effect of this early abandonment by the father. Rather, Quinn concentrates on the unhappiness of her parents' marriage and on the fact that her mother ultimately left her father when Karen was twenty. Horney was involved in sexual relationships with numerous men throughout her adult life and seemed incapable of sustaining a long-term intimate relationship with any one of them. Quinn discusses how critics of Horney have always pointed to her unresolved anger with her father as the basis for her lifelong pattern of disagreement with authority figures, such as Freud and Abraham, who was her first analyst. The author concludes that Horney's ideas transcended personal issues, but her argument lacks conviction and, in fact, is contradicted by her point that Horney looked at every theory through the lens of her own life experience.

It is easy to see why Horney's 1926 paper excited Quinn. It was there that Horney questioned "how far has the evolution of women, as depicted . . . by analysis, been measured by masculine standards and how far therefore does this picture . . . fail to present quite accurately the real nature of women?"[2] In fact, Horney wrote fourteen papers between 1922 and 1935 on the psychology of women. She emphasized the disappointment the young

[2] Horney, K. (1926): The flight from womanhood: the masculinity-complex in women, as viewed by men and by women. *Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 7:326-327.

girl experiences when the oedipal wish cannot be fulfilled. She was the first to understand the importance of the girl's primary attachment to her mother. Horney never denied that women can envy men, but she concentrated more on what she believed to be the even more profound male envy of pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood. These early papers on female psychology were extraordinarily original, and they influenced other analytic thinkers, including Freud, to reconsider female development. But, for some reason, perhaps because of her late departures from accepted analytic thought, Horney's papers on female psychology were largely neglected, and Helene Deutsch became the authority on the subject at the time.

When Horney came to the United States in 1932, she first settled in Chicago, where she became the Associate Director of the newly founded Chicago Institute. She remained there for only two years, because she was never well suited to playing a supporting role; there she was second to Alexander, who was younger than she was. In Chicago, she was lonely and depressed, but she mastered English and became an American citizen. Allegedly, Horney had an affair with a candidate she was supervising who was sixteen years her junior and an analysand of Alexander's. She wrote her first American paper, "The Overvaluation of Love,"[3] about the insecure woman's addiction to a man in her life. Here Quinn suggests that Horney was writing about her own problem. In 1934, Horney moved to New York and became a member of The New York Psychoanalytic Institute.

Over the next seven years, Horney became even more outspoken and self-confident. She published two books that became enormously popular, but which contained very basic revisions of Freudian theory. In 1937, in *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Horney contended that the oedipus complex is not universal and that neurosis grows out of a lack of genuine warmth and affection in parenting. In this book, infantile sexuality receded to the background. But it was in *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, published in 1939, that Horney was even more directly critical of Freud and abandoned the theory of instincts. She believed that neurotic behavior

[3] Horney, K. (1934): The overvaluation of love. A study of a common present-day feminine type. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 3:605-638.

had its origins in "basic anxiety"—a deep feeling of helplessness toward a world conceived of as potentially hostile.

In 1941, Horney resigned from The New York Psychoanalytic Institute after having been demoted from Instructor to Lecturer. Quinn presents this split in the ranks of The New York Psychoanalytic in primarily political and personal terms. She states that both Rado and Horney were anathema to Lawrence Kubie, who had become the President of the Institute in 1939, because "of their tendency to resist control and regulation" (p. 329). But one of the biggest failures of the book is the author's inability to consider the importance that Horney's ideology played in the reasons for her being removed as an Instructor at the Institute. It was not just that Horney was expanding psychoanalytic theory, but that she actually did not believe in basic psychoanalytic principles.

When Horney left The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, she set up a new institute with Erich Fromm, who was her lover at the time. There was a great deal of internal quarreling, and that institute, in fact, underwent two splits itself. Quinn portrays Horney in those years as someone who liked to get her own way and who was not easy to work with. She was still very popular with the public and wrote three more books which sold well. She continued to show poor judgment in relationships with men and had an affair with a young candidate who was her own analysand. The year before she died, she traveled to Japan to pursue her interest in Zen Buddhism. In adolescence she had written in her diaries about her yearning for religious understanding. This yearning apparently persisted until her death.

This biography of Karen Horney is interesting reading. Feelings of sympathy are aroused for this obviously brilliant but troubled woman. The biggest problem with the book is Quinn's assumption that any criticism of Horney's ideas can be dismissed as a typical male put-down of women. I think that by the time Quinn had fully researched Horney's life, she herself must have felt disillusioned with the woman who showed so much promise in her papers on female psychology but then proceeded to undermine her contributions by rejecting the theory on which they were based.

RUTH K. KARUSH (NEW YORK)

ACTS OF WILL. THE LIFE AND WORK OF OTTO RANK. By E. James Lieberman, M.D. New York: The Free Press, 1984. 485 pp.

This is a thoughtful and stimulating biography of Otto Rank. Lieberman sensitively traces his subject's life from his youth to his death on October 31, 1939, at the age of fifty-five, a little over one month after the death of Sigmund Freud. He utilizes Rank's unpublished diaries and correspondence, as well as interviews with family members, patients, students, and other contemporaries. While the scholarship cannot be faulted, at times Lieberman sets up a straw man in his attack upon classical psychoanalysis. The device is unnecessary and diminishes an otherwise excellent study. Fortunately, the author gives the reader sufficient data so that conclusions different from his can be reached.

According to a childhood friend, Rank was particularly close to his mother. His father was an alcoholic Jewish locksmith. Rank was born Otto Rosenfeld in 1884. He had an older brother, and there had been a sister who had died just a few months after her birth. His brother was given an academic education and eventually became an attorney, while Otto was sent to a technical school. At age nineteen, he adopted the name, Rank, after a character in Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, and he changed his official religious registration to "unaffiliated." In the spring of 1905, he met Sigmund Freud, bringing along an introduction from his physician, Alfred Adler, and his own manuscript, *The Artist*. Freud and Rank established a relationship which lasted two decades and, according to Lieberman, was the closest professional relationship either man had. At their introduction, Freud was forty-nine and Rank twenty-one.

In 1906, Rank became the salaried secretary of the Wednesday Psychological Society, which was to become the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In 1908, he graduated from *Gymnasium* and entered the University of Vienna to pursue a doctorate. At this time he formalized his adopted name and converted to Catholicism. He converted back to Judaism before his marriage. Although Rank never denied his Jewish roots, Lieberman feels his change of name represented a separation from his family of origin and a self-redefinition. In his diary, Rank described his capacity for accommodation. Lieberman notes that Rank's view of truth as a subjective cre-

ation set him apart from Freud, who viewed it as something to be investigated rather than invented, to be objectively proven rather than subjectively lived.

In 1912, Rank became a member of a secret inner circle that included Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones, and Sachs. In 1913, Freud presented the members with antique Greek intaglios which each had mounted in a gold ring; hence they became the "Ring" Committee. Also in 1912 Rank obtained his doctoral degree. Following graduation, his activity at the Vienna Society increased. In addition to publishing *The Artist* and *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, he wrote many articles. He also helped Freud edit the fourth edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and he contributed two chapters: "Dreams and Creative Writing" and "Dreams and Myths."

During the First World War, from 1916 to 1918, Rank was assigned to Krakow, where he met Beata Mincer, a student of psychology and a lover of music. They were married on November 7, 1918, four days before the armistice. The bride of twenty-three and the groom eleven years her senior returned to Vienna to face the difficult post-war period. A year later, when Rank was thirty-five and Freud was sixty-three, in Lieberman's opinion Rank became Freud's virtual partner. Rank served as publisher and editor, began an analytic practice in Vienna, established a training program for foreign visitors, and traveled as Freud's emissary. He usually wrote to the other "Ring" members on behalf of Freud and himself, and, among his papers, kept a file of three hundred and twenty-seven *Rundbriefe*, or circular letters, sent and received by Committee members over the next five years.

In 1921, Rank and Ferenczi began to share an interest in "active therapy." Rank said: "I allowed the patient a much more active part not only in the analytic situation but also in life, by putting the whole emphasis on an emotional, instead of an intellectual experience" (p. 173). According to Lieberman, "Active therapy meant that the analyst made suggestions, emphasized the time limit, and otherwise used reality factors to increase tension therapeutically while also giving support" (p. 173).

In April 1923, Freud had the first of his many operations for cancer of the palate. In June, Heinz Halberstadt, the youngest son of Freud's daughter Sophie, who had died the previous year, also

died. Freud commented that while other losses had caused pain, this one killed something in him for good. That summer, Freud wrote that he was suffering from the first depression in his life. He underwent two additional operations in the fall, after which he needed a prosthesis for the right upper palate in order to eat and speak. In addition, his speech became nasal and thick, similar to that of someone suffering from a cleft palate. Max Schur, later Freud's physician, expressed the view that Rank reacted to Freud's illness with revolt and defection.

Lieberman describes in great detail the estrangement that developed between Rank and psychoanalysis. In *The Trauma of Birth*, Rank elevated the mother's role at the expense of the role of the father, and emphasized birth anxiety, while de-emphasizing the oedipus complex. Lieberman feels that Rank's theory established the first separation as the prototype for all anxiety. Mother was identified as the original locus of comfort (the womb) as well as of distress (the birth). Since birth is not part of conscious memory, "working through neurotic conflict in analysis meant experiencing some feelings for the first time, notably primal separation anxiety" (p. 222), according to Rank.

The estrangement between Rank and Freud continued to grow. In February 1924, Rank and Ferenczi declined to be part of the program at the April Salzburg Congress. During the Congress, on April 22, Rank turned forty. Five days later, he left for New York. Soon after his arrival he introduced a new theory, involving an "embryonal unconscious," which he defined as the nucleus that is never repressed because it is never conscious. He referred in this theory to a state occurring during the intrauterine period and ending in the trauma of birth. He claimed that the embryonic "memory of Paradise" constitutes the "physiological nucleus of the unconscious." He concluded that neurotic and even organic conditions can be traced to expulsion from the womb and an ensuing terrible unconscious conflict about whether and how to return. Notwithstanding his idiosyncratic ideas, on June 3, 1924, he was elected an honorary member of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

Concurrently, Freud was moving farther from the positions Rank was promulgating. He wrote to Rank and expressed his concern, noting that "the exclusion of the father in your theory seems

to reveal too much the result of personal influences in your life . . ." (p. 240). In another letter, Freud wrote, "I cannot, as yet, give up hope that you will return to a better knowledge of yourself" (p. 244). Rank wrote to Ferenczi in August 1924, "Actually, I have saved psychoanalysis here, perhaps the life of the whole international movement" (p. 245). In late September, Ferenczi renounced Rank. Rank returned to Vienna in October, and the rift deepened. In November, Freud wrote to Jones that he "found it very hard to regard him [Rank] as honest and believe his statements" (p. 246). Rank resigned his official positions and was planning to return to the United States, again without his family. He appeared to be in the midst of an emotional crisis, and by mid-December was consulting Freud daily. On December 20, he wrote a contrite letter to the Committee, stating that his behavior was neurotic and asking for forgiveness. Lieberman wonders how the angry Rank of New York changed to a "pleading miscreant" and suggests that his "contrite submission was at least partly an act" (p. 250).

Rank returned to New York, and during the next few years he went back and forth between Paris and the United States before settling there. In September 1925, Rank presented "The Genesis of Genitality" at the Ninth Congress in Bad Homburg, Germany. Lieberman writes that listeners felt it was read at a terrific, machine-gun-like speed. Rank talked excitedly of plans for the future. Colleagues were concerned about his rapid speech, unscientific statements, and euphoric mood. He paid his last visit to Freud on April 12, 1926.

In May 1930, Rank spoke before the First International Conference on Mental Hygiene, in Washington, D.C. The American Psychoanalytic Association had its annual meeting in conjunction with the Conference. He lectured on "The Training of the Will and Emotional Development." In his talk, he said that he was no psychoanalyst and charged that the science of psychoanalysis stigmatized the human side of behavior and personality as "transference." His only supporter among the discussants was his former patient, the psychologist, Jessie Taft. Later that day, Rank was expelled from honorary membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association.

During the next two years, Rank published three works, including *Art and Artist*, suffered a personal crisis involving separa-

tion from Beata, and had an episode of depression. Following the Washington Conference, he was increasingly estranged from psychoanalysis. In *Art and Artist*, Rank said that "the creative type who can renounce his protection by art and can devote his whole creative force to life and the formation of life will be the first representative of the new human type and in return for this renunciation will enjoy in personality-creation and expression, a greater happiness" (pp. 301-302). The creative type, he believed, becomes the creator of a self. Rank's lonely course continued. He treated Anaïs Nin, who eventually became colleague, secretary, and therapist. Henry Miller became a "therapist," through his relationship with Nin. After reading *Huckleberry Finn*, Rank began signing his letters "Huck." Rank's non-medical status, maverick ideas, and personality problems led to increasing isolation. His teaching was confined to social work schools, primarily the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, to which he was invited by Jessie Taft. His final separation from Beata occurred in 1934, and he officially emigrated to the United States in 1935. The last years of Rank's life were plagued by illness. He was divorced from Beata and, in July 1939, married Estelle Buel. On October 31, 1939, he died from acute agranulocytocis, a side effect of sulfanomide used to treat an infected throat.

Lieberman has made an important contribution to the history of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy with this biography of Otto Rank. His diligent research, scholarly attitude, and lucid writing style help the reader understand one of the neglected psychoanalytic pioneers. Unfortunately, Lieberman has not succeeded in his wish to present Rank as a major figure in his own right. Following his departure from psychoanalysis, Rank became increasingly troubled and isolated, a minor figure, of interest primarily to students of the history of psychoanalysis.

DANIEL S. PAPERNIK (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT. AN INTERSUBJECTIVE APPROACH. By Robert D. Stolorow, Bernard Brandchaft, and George E. Atwood. Hillsdale, NJ/London: The Analytic Press, 1987. 187 pp.

This short book (172 pages, plus index) is Volume 8 of the Psychoanalytic Inquiry Book Series. It is dedicated to the memory of

Heinz Kohut. All or portions of five of the eight chapters were previously published elsewhere. This does not result in any sense of fragmentation, however, because of the single-mindedness with which the authors reach the same formulation in each chapter, no matter the starting point, and because of good editing.

The book is written from the vantage point of self psychology, which, usefully or not, and with validity or not, is distinguished in much of the psychoanalytic literature from the mainstream of psychoanalysis as it has evolved in the thinking and writing of those who regard themselves as adhering to the tenets of Sigmund Freud. This reviewer identifies himself as a member of the latter category, a position modified to the extent that he has followed the burgeoning literature on self psychology, albeit from a distance.

The authors' aim, as they state in the preface, is to "apply our intersubjective approach to a broad array of clinical issues and problems that are critical in the practice of psychoanalytic therapy" (p. ix). And this they do. However, it is my opinion that there is little of substance for psychoanalysts as a result of the authors' efforts, for the reasons outlined below.

The authors express their belief (p. ix) that the central explanatory construct guiding psychoanalytic theory, research, and treatment is the concept of an intersubjective field. In fact, they state that the only matter that is relevant to psychoanalysis is what arises in the intersubjective field in analysis, i.e., in the space/time created by the relationship between analyst and patient. They indicate that the locus of pathology and health is the intersubjective field and that the patient has no pathology except as it emerges in the intersubjective field.

In coordination with the traditional psychoanalytic assumption that psychological difficulties have their origins in childhood, the authors believe that failure on the part of the child's significant caretakers is the ultimate source of pathology. This, of course, occurs in the intersubjective field of the infant/child and caretakers, when the caretakers fail to be empathically attuned to the selfobject needs of the infant/child, leaving the child fragile, vulnerable to fragmentation of the self, and ever after subject to fragmentation in the face of inadequately attuned others.

The authors offer no explanation for this presumably widespread failure of attunement of parents to their children. One

might infer that it would result from failure of attunement on the part of the parents' parents, and so on, back through the generations, ultimately amounting to an interesting redefinition of original sin.

From the authors' point of view, there are absolutely disqualifying problems with Freudian analysis. The preeminence of drives, defenses, and other concretizations are taken to be beyond the proper realm of psychoanalysis since, being biological at base, they are excluded from the subjective and, perforce, from the intersubjective. The fact that Freudian psychoanalysts are primarily interested in the psychological and emotional effects of whatever has an impact on the individual is nowhere given recognition by the authors.

Human behavior is determined by a single motivating force, in the view of the authors, namely, a drive to integrate various aspects of the self. Such integration requires absolute acceptance by the emotional "surround," intersubjectively experienced as selfobject attunement. Anything less leaves the person vulnerable to subsequent fragmentation of the self, and eventually necessitates a recreation of an absolute acceptancce of the person's selfobject needs, in order to allow integration to resume.

The only psychological conflict recognized by the authors is the clash between emergent affect states, rooted in developmentally imperative self-differentiation processes, and the equally imperative need to maintain vital ties that are inimical to such differentiation.

The "traditional" psychoanalytic concept of regression is rejected in favor of the notion of the persistence of an injured and vulnerable state, always subject to immediate reactivation when the individual is confronted with an unattuned surround. The authors prefer "protective" over "defensive": a person is protective against the fear of fragmentation, not defensive against an impulse, drive, or instinct.

Development is healthy and the affect is elation when self-differentiating processes are engaged. Depression is preeminent when these processes are obstructed. The infant's feeling of omnipotence must not be punctured: this would result in fragmentation. The authors reject the possibility that when there is obstruction of the infant's sense of omnipotence, a gain in mastery may ensue.

The necessary and *only* psychoanalytic technique propounded by the authors is sustained empathic inquiry, which means participating in the creation of an intersubjective field in which the patient can expect the unquestioning acceptance of his/her archaic selfobject needs. When these needs are satisfied in this way, the innate tendency toward organization of self experience and toward self-differentiation is nurtured. Resistance in analysis is always, and is only, evoked by some quality or activity of the analyst that, for the patient, heralds an impending recurrence of traumatic developmental failure of attunement.

Straw men pop up with regularity throughout this work, apparently to buttress assertions about which the authors have some doubt. For example, they describe the "traditional" (that is, Freudian) analytic position as one in which the analyst knows what is real and what is not and in which the analyst's view is the correct one while the patient's view is distorted or wrong. This assertion can derive only from a naïve and superficial acquaintance with psychoanalysis. Similarly, the authors speak of a "traditional" psychoanalytic view that recognizes only the patient's contribution to the transference. Such hyperbole suggests defensiveness. Other examples include the statement that traditional psychoanalysis had only cognitive insight as a goal, and the inference that in traditional psychoanalysis, the cause of psychological troubles is held to be unconscious instinctual viciousness.

Particularly noteworthy is the presentation of the idea that delusions, hallucinations, and related phenomena have symbolic significance, as though the authors were the first to advance this formulation. The fact that such formulations can be found in the literature of the nineteenth century and have become general psychiatric knowledge makes it appear that the authors are guilty of poor scholarship. In any case, what is "symbolized" by the various phenomena referred to as psychotic, according to the authors, is always the same: the patient has undergone severe interference with empathic attunement from those participating in necessary selfobject structuring during the formative years.

In all the clinical material presented, there is an unquestioning acceptance of the patients' portrayals of their caretakers as unattuned, inadequate, and subordinating their children's needs to their own. It appears that this belief is necessary to the creation of a

curative intersubjective field. In fact, in one reported case, the analyst "repeatedly clarified for the patient" how the patient's mother reacted to her (p. 94). That is, the analyst analyzed the patient's mother in absentia. Apparently, the patient needed reassurance that the source of her problems was her mother.

The case of Jeff establishes the analyst as accepting at face value not only the patient's right to feel as he does, but the patient's portrayal of his father as the pathogenic agent. This precludes the possibility that the patient's views of others and of himself can evolve as repressed material emerges in the treatment. It especially precludes the development of a sense that the patient has any responsibility for himself.

The authors state that borderline personality disorder is not a "pathological condition located solely in the patient" (p. 130). They subsequently take pains to refute the claims of others that self psychologists regard borderline conditions as iatrogenic. The authors' point seems to be that any condition (all human behavior?) must be understood as existing only in the intersubjective field.

In the case of a borderline patient (although nowhere are data presented establishing the diagnosis), at first the (inadequately attuned) analyst is "disappointed in the patient," which leads to a stalemate. The analyst finally realizes that he must bring himself to be pleased with the patient in order for treatment to progress. The "traditional" point of view would hold that if the analyst finds him/herself disappointed *or* pleased with the patient, analysis of the reasons is the approach of choice. Since, however, in the view of the authors, the intersubjective field is the hero/culprit, being pleased is the desirable and, in fact, necessary condition for cure.

In the case of Jane, delusions of grandeur and omnipotence abound. When the analyst tells her that she will get well, through him and only him, it appears that the omnipotence has come to encompass both parties.

The case of Malcolm has the analyst confirming the validity of the patient's report of the sequence of events. How does the analyst know? If the analyst is only affirming the patient's right to have whatever thoughts, feelings, and beliefs he wishes, this important distinction is not made by the authors.

The chapter entitled "Treatment of Psychotic States" is rife with

misleading statements. For example, the quotation from Kohut to the effect that he had learned that what his patients tell him is true, as though all others hold the utterances of patients to be false, is simplistic. "Traditional" psychoanalysts would maintain that the utterances of patients are true *for them at that time, and for specific reasons*. It is the so-called, and in this book, the castigated neutral stance of the analyst which offers the patient an opportunity to explore his/her thoughts, feelings, and beliefs. This is the essence of psychoanalysis, not the uncritical, wholesale acceptance of the validity of expressed thoughts, feelings, and beliefs. The approach advocated by the authors forecloses any possibility of analysis of the *reasons* for the disjunctures, or failures of attunement, which might have befallen the patient, and, more important, the ways in which the patient may have passively or actively, consciously or unconsciously, participated in the development of these disjunctures. The overall impression conveyed is that of a reductionistic view of human development and of psychopathology. All neurotic, borderline, and psychotic symptomatology becomes epiphenomenal. All psychopathology is taken to symbolize a failure of the caretaking surround in infancy and childhood. There is thus no need for analysis of defense, resistance, and drives in all their rich interplay; the only significant perturbation is to have had an environment in which attunement was inadequate. The necessary and sufficient treatment is replacement.

Of particular interest is the issue of responsibility. Nowhere is the patient regarded by the authors as having any responsibility for his/her situation or condition. The only responsibility appears to rest with the caretaking surround, of which the psychoanalyst is one member, for maintaining empathic attunement to the immediate affective needs of the person.

The book provides a succinct exposition of the ideas of self psychology. The importance of "starting where the patient is" is emphasized, that is, of accepting what the patient has to convey about him/herself. This is central to any psychoanalytic endeavor. While for the authors this is the be-all and end-all of psychoanalysis, for this reviewer it is the beginning.

JOHN HITCHCOCK (PITTSBURGH)

THE FAMILY ROMANCE OF THE IMPOSTOR-POET. THOMAS CHATTERTON. By Louise J. Kaplan, Ph.D. New York: Atheneum, 1988. 301 pp.

Thomas Chatterton (1752-1770) was a precociously talented, brilliantly creative English literary impostor, who fabricated medieval parchments and manuscripts of poetry, prose, and architectural sketches. These he successfully passed off for a time as authentic. When the forgeries or impostures were exposed, he fled his native Bristol for London, where he wrote political, satirical poetry and prose, imitating the works of more successful radical pamphleteers. These ventures also failing, he is presumed to have taken arsenic, a lonely, impoverished suicide. Less romantic versions of his death are that he ate contaminated oysters or that he overdosed himself with medications administered by his apothecary for syphilis. All is enwrapped in ambiguity, rumor, and conjecture, which pursued him beyond his death at the age of seventeen. Controversy swirled around him during his life and after his death, disputing the factual evidence of his impostures and the manner of his death and place of burial, and accepting at face value the tendentiously favorable reports of the youth given by his adoring sister. Several biographies have been written. Hardly a literary personage of the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries failed to write or pontificate aloud about him. He became the resurrected darling of the later Romantic movement in literature, eulogized by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Browning, and others.

Kaplan's monograph presents documented facts about this brief, tragically wasted life, and offers an explanation of his motivation toward literary imposture—strictly, forgeries, since the young poet did not pretend to be other than who he was, except through his writings; that is, in inventing his writings, he was essaying the inventing of himself and his family. Importantly, the dividing line is thin and unclear. Kaplan is a child analyst who has published a well-accepted book on adolescence. She presents the view that the impostor generally, and Chatterton in particular, engages in the actualizing of a family romance to compensate for the father's absence by death or abdication. Similar views were advanced in

broader clinical detail by Phyllis Greenacre in 1958.[1] Chatterton's father had died before the child was born, and he was raised by his mother and sister.

Other literary impostor-forgers of approximately the same period as Chatterton are briefly discussed, but few clinical facts are added to strengthen the etiologic hypothesis that is offered. Nor can I agree with the author that the eighteenth century was unusually endowed with impostors. The present time, for instance, perhaps in part owing to a much larger population, perhaps also to increased journalistic coverage, displays a variegated assemblage in all of the arts, as well as in police work, espionage, politics, and journalism (e.g., *The Washington Post* recently returned a Pulitzer Prize won by a reporter who had fabricated her story). Con games, stings, and scams are great favorites on television and in the movies. The role of the trickster-impostor is in many ways institutionalized, every society in every age offering channels of activity for its aberrant and deviant members. In our own time of rapidly changing morality and morale, such fringe lives are facilitated and augmented.

Kaplan, this is to say, adduces many of the *necessary* facts but does not offer *sufficient* evidence to bolster a theory of the family romance as specific to all cases and fully explanatory, although surely it is instrumental in at least some instances, such as Chatterton's. Not all children of abdicated, deceased, or absent fathers become impostors even when, like Chatterton, they may be exposed to emotional engulfment by feminine indulgence and the expectation that they must fulfill the women's fantasies of the strong male provider. Nor are forger-impostors necessarily males, as Kaplan seems to propose. With continuing emancipation of women, we can expect that even more women will be enabled to enter the fields of forged art, crime, and other organized deception and imposture in numbers at least equaling those of men. That we

[1] Greenacre, P. (1958): The impostor. In *Emotional Growth. Psychoanalytic Studies of the Gifted and a Great Variety of Other Individuals, Vol. 1*, pp. 93-112. The family romance of the artist; The relation of the impostor to the artist. In *Emotional Growth, Vol. 2.*, pp. 505-532, 533-554. New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1971.

all invent ourselves to some degree, notably so but not exclusively in external appearance, attests to probable multiple causation.

Illustrating the individual and social complexities inherent in these universal oedipal matters, perhaps the earliest recorded instance of imposture is that of Jacob's disguising himself as his brother, Esau, in order to dupe their father, Isaac, thereby swindling his brother of his father's blessing and patrimony. The ruse was urged on Jacob by his mother, Rebecca.

The partial, provisional theory proposed by Greenacre and by Kaplan is partly favored by the fact that Chatterton did fabricate in his writings an imaginatively conceived family romance, which even included a perfected medieval city of Bristol, changing it to a radiant fifteenth century metropolis whose cultural center was the very church in which generations of Chattertons had been the sextons. Written at what must often have been white heat, in an ostensible Middle English which was really his own neologistic invention, he idealized and fictionalized an actual fifteenth century Bristol merchant and mayor into a saintlike philanthropist, warrior, and humanitarian, a man of the world who lived an exemplary religious life and who commissioned a priest-poet, Rowley, to write the chronicles and to eulogize the city's history. The evidence suggests that Rowley was a perfected projection of Chatterton himself, while the saintly merchant, Canynge, was his father. The impostures swindled many, even after they were denounced by Horace Walpole, himself a literary impostor in later years with his Gothic novel, *The Castle of Otranto* (1764).

Kaplan discusses the connections of imposture with art and crime, creativity, falsehood, perversions, sexuality, and morality. She attempts to unify and encompass the whole in the powerful fantasy of the family romance as protean and universal, with corresponding universal appeal. As I have indicated, the clinical data are meager. Greenacre's papers, previously cited, include clinical abstracts that are useful. Incomplete examples are also at hand among those occasional patients, not themselves swindlers though often controlling or manipulative but within the bounds of sound ethics, who at critical times refer to themselves as "shams," "bluffs," and "impostors." My impressions of them, reflecting on the present question, is that they were raised in an atmosphere of duplicity and secrecy about the family, that they were used and exploited by one or both parents in contradictory ways, and that they

were left with uncertainty as to sense of identity, including gender identity. They are extraordinarily sensitive in their struggles against feeling invaded, controlled, or intruded upon, and losing their hard-won sense of who they are and aspire to be. In response to accurate interpretations, there may be negative therapeutic reactions, the interventions being experienced as the assaults of an unwelcome, intrusive empathy and understanding. Regressive, dependent, and identificatory conflicts are prominent. In such contexts the patient's sense of imposture seems to arise from an injured narcissism requiring sustenance in the face of a habitual withdrawal from dependence. The patient oscillates between self-idealization and self-debasement, with fluctuations in self-esteem initiated by these felt, conflicted dependency needs. Family romance fantasies, when apparent, have not been so central as with Chatterton. I venture the speculation that such overt and magnified fantasies may be artifacts that surface in the work of writers and other artists.

Many commentators on imaginative fiction, including authors themselves, have pointed out that fiction engages in benign imposture, inducing reader and writer into a mutually fabricated deception. This exemplifies an essential part of any imposture—the conniving and colluding of at least two persons in a shared fantasy along an axis of dominance-dependence or -submission. In W. C. Field's astute observation, "You can't cheat an honest man," we are given a broadened view of imposture and confidence scams. Fraud and deception are doubled, sometimes even involving a double. Confidence must be inspired by the impostor, in order to confirm his sense of worth and identity. So with Chatterton. We are not far from the dynamics of the sexual perversions in these matters.

To know a person psychoanalytically other than through the prism of the transference is difficult and perhaps a contradiction in terms. To attempt knowing a person at the distance of two centuries can be dismaying. Understanding an impostor requires trial identifications with him, and this intimacy carries conflict about lending oneself to unsavory morals and the dominance-submission of manipulation. I think it apposite that Chatterton's motives were almost wholly narcissistic: little social or altruistic purpose was served by his imposture-forgeries. So far as we can tell, he was determined to have the world serve him. Surely this was neither a unique nor a valued ambition, nor did it prevent this youth from

becoming an emblematic Everyman for long years after his death. And his mysterious appeal continues.

Kaplan is to be commended for bringing this life to psychoanalytic attention. It warrants study for the insights it may directly and indirectly give concerning those of our patients who represent incomplete forms of this disorder and for those in society whose breaches of ethics, with their underlying narcissistic, perverse (and perverted?) implications, leave us questioning and fascinated.

STANLEY L. OLINICK (WASHINGTON, DC)

PARSING THROUGH CUSTOMS. ESSAYS BY A FREUDIAN FOLKLORIST. By Alan Dundes. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 216 pp.

Freud and his early co-workers were glad to find in the imagery and rituals of folklore convincing external confirmation of psychoanalytic interpretations of symbols and symptoms. They reciprocated by offering interpretations of myths and folktales based on psychoanalytic insights. Alan Dundes, in this well-written and entertaining book, reviews the history of the relationship between psychoanalytic and folkloric scholarship and brings us up to date on the subject with a collection of his state-of-the-art essays.

In his first chapter, "The Psychoanalytic Study of Folklore," Dundes offers a concise chronological review of the contributions of the major psychoanalytic writers in this field, from Freud to Bettelheim. As this informative review proceeds, it comes as somewhat of a jolt to the psychoanalytic reader to realize that the interest of psychoanalysts in folklore has rarely been reciprocated by the academic folklorists, who, for the most part, have continued to view psychoanalysis as outlandish or reductionistic. Dundes inculpates the analysts for failing to develop a research methodology for validating psychoanalytic interpretations of folklore. It is partly to remedy this situation that he offers these essays, in which he develops his own methodology. It may be summarized (perhaps too briefly) as follows: a folkloric custom is described in detail; a psychoanalytic interpretation of the custom is offered; and validation of the interpretation is sought both internally (analytically), through genetic connection with the child-rearing practices of the culture in question, and externally (non-analytically), through

comparison with other customs and symbols of the culture in question.

Dundes offers examples of this methodology. Chapter 2 is an essay on the mystifying Potlatch ritual of American Indians, in which the protagonist shames his enemies by destroying his own wealth and distributing his own possessions. Dundes interprets this as an anal ritual in which the opponent is smeared with feces (wealth) and reduced, in effect, to an anus. There is an abundance of corroborating detail from adult Indian customs, though Dundes admits here that the data on toilet training is scanty. The situation is clearer in Chapter 3, on the verbal dueling games of Turkish boys. Here the language overtly indicates that the purpose of the verbal phallic thrust is to reduce the opponent to the lowly status of feminine, or anal, receptacle. The unusual degree of castration anxiety implicit in this game is traced by Dundes to the Turkish practice of circumcision at age eight.

If these "analyses" seem a bit mundane to the psychoanalytic reader, Dundes offers us a glimpse into a more sophisticated aspect of his methodology in Chapter 6, "The Symbolic Equivalence of Allomotifs in the Rabbit Herd AT-570." Here Dundes outlines the basic structural components (or motifemes) of a common myth: the Hero performs an ordeal (herding rabbits together) with the help of a magic tool (whistle or wand) and wins the hand of the King's daughter. By collecting and collating from various cultures the multiple variations (allomotifs) of these basic components, Dundes is able to distill interpretations of the symbols (e.g., the magic tool is a penis) while at the same time demonstrating that the interpretation has been developed entirely without reference to psychoanalysis. This essay is perhaps Dundes's most valuable contribution, bearing out his conclusion that "from folklore we may find data essential for the necessary validation of psychoanalytic anthropological hypotheses" (p. 194).

Chapter 5, "Couvade in Genesis," is an interesting excursion into applied analysis of the Bible. After a useful review of the concept and practice of couvade (ritualized male imitation of childbirth), Dundes theorizes that the description of the creation of the world in Genesis represents a couvade performed by the Male Deity. The male authors of Genesis in this way ward off, by reversal and projection, their envy of the female role in childbirth. Moreover, the

birth of Eve from Adam's rib (penis) likewise reverses the natural male-female order of penetration, conception, and parturition. It is only later in Genesis, and then only as a severe punishment, that woman is assigned the role of giving birth. To Dundes's mind, this gives further proof of the intensity of male birth envy, which he finds amply expressed by the inexhaustible variety of couvade rituals and symbols to be found throughout folklore. By way of contrast, he reports that he has found no evidence of penis envy themes in folklore. This announcement produces a quizzical mood in the psychoanalytic reader, who has to wonder here whether Dundes has accomplished what Freud referred to as a major achievement by way of overlooking. One thinks immediately, for example, of the myth of Diana, the tomboy sister of Apollo, who still lopes through the forests of mythology, bow and arrow in hand.

More serious questions are raised by Dundes's last chapter, "The American Game of Smear the Queer and the Homosexual Component of Male Competitive Sport and Warfare." This chapter is a defense and elaboration of previous work by Dundes in which he delineates the homosexual underpinnings of male competition, whether in sport or warfare. Thus football, basketball, soccer, and hockey all represent the struggle to avoid anal penetration. The "end zone" must be protected. To Dundes's mind, common athletic metaphors prove the point: "back-door-play," "rim-shot," "slam-dunk," "swish," "lay-up." Similarly, in warfare the victor penetrates the perimeter of the vanquished, establishing dominance, as in the anal buggery rituals of male baboons.

Dundes reports that there has been a strong emotional reaction to his work, up to and including death threats, which to him further proves the point. No doubt Dundes has touched a nerve here among the sports-loving American public, a group which includes this reviewer, for example, who can find great obscurity in the application of Dundes's theories to the Boston Red Sox, but can perceive with scientific lucidity how perfectly they fit the New York Yankees. Be that as it may, Dundes's work does invite a serious question: Just how much does the perception of psychosexual genetic roots—accurate though it may be—contribute to an understanding of sport, warfare, or, for that matter, of any human creative activity, be it bassoon-playing, sculpture, physics, painting,

for folklore? The contribution, to this reader, seems modest indeed, because, by plunging so directly from manifest surface phenomena to the deepest of infantile psychosexual origins, Dundes and his co-workers in applied analysis have entirely bypassed the complex levels of filtering intrapsychic multiple functions that constitute "sublimation" —and precisely in *that* area lie the psychological secrets we have been struggling to comprehend regarding human creative activity.

In any case, when he focuses on contemporary American culture, Dundes becomes entirely too facile and suffers a slippage in his methodological rigor. For example, in interpreting the NASA space program as the expression of wishes for phallic exhibitionism and penetration, Dundes cites the phallic shape of the rocket and the name of the first penetrator (Armstrong). Here the sophisticated laws of aerodynamics which determine the configuration of rockets are disregarded in favor of glib symbol-reading. It is the same in his discussion of warfare, where the economic and political determinants are scanted in favor of the homosexual imagery— and this, in spite of Dundes's own warning that "it is dangerous to speculate about the underlying psychology of so complex a phenomenon as war which clearly has economic and political factors" (p. 192). Dundes here joins an unfortunately growing group of workers in applied analysis who employ psychoanalytic concepts in the service of political commentary, overriding their own scientific better judgment.

However, these caveats aside, Dundes's essays are thoughtfully composed and stimulating. They may be read with enjoyment by those colleagues interested in the application of psychoanalysis to folklore.

HERBERT M. WYMAN (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOTHERAPY. PORTRAITS IN FICTION. Edited by Jesse D. Geller, Ph.D. and Paul D. Spector, M.A. Northvale, NJ/London: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1987. 302 pp.

The title of this book somehow elicited the expectation that it would consist of more than a collection of excerpts from nineteen stories about psychotherapy by seventeen different authors. In their very concise two-page introduction, the editors note that

there is a dearth of good descriptions in the professional literature of the unique nature of psychotherapy. They have turned to the fiction writer to "make palpable the atmosphere, rhythm, nuances and tensions of the psychotherapeutic experience" (p. ix). They thus rely upon sensitive professional writers to capture what seems to elude more technically knowledgeable authors.

The editors state that the idea for this anthology was prompted by reading "My Love Has Dirty Fingernails" by John Updike. They then sought out other stories capturing "the feel" of an actual therapeutic relationship. They found that hundreds of such stories had been published. Despite the variety of therapies heralded in the media, almost all the published fiction describing ambulatory therapy in their survey concerned psychoanalytically oriented office practice. They note that their selections neither make a case for the effectiveness of therapy nor present an idealized image of the therapist. Although some excerpts depict successful therapy, some reflect difficulties and failures, as well as the potential destructiveness of psychotherapy, while some describe the shortcomings of therapists. They point out that the stories focus on neurotic and character problems of patients seeking treatment and do not deal with such things as psychotic symptomatology.

The editors' prefatory remarks about each story, no more than one-third to one-half page in length, are meant to be "evocative rather than exhaustive." The stories themselves are exciting and convey a descriptive picture of the therapeutic interaction. The excerpts selected are uniformly excellent. They invariably capture the reader's interest and manage to make the characters' interaction come alive within a few pages. Some of the authors selected were already known to this reviewer, i.e., John Updike, Judith Rossner, Judith Guest, Robert Lindner, Lillian Ross, Joyce Carol Oates, and Bruce Jay Friedman. I also had the pleasure of being introduced to Sallie Bingham, Helmuth Kaiser, Elizabeth Brewster, John Logan, Ann-Marie Wells, H. L. Mountzoures, R. K. Narayan, Crystal Moore, Barbara Lawrence, and Nancy Huddleston Packer.

Although some accommodation must be made by the reader while moving from the style of one author to the next, the adjustment is easily achieved. This only serves to accentuate the variety of styles and stories which might be used in place of the almost

lifeless and frequently boring and mechanical-sounding case histories written by many therapists. Each story is well written and demonstrates one or more dynamics of a relationship. Most stimulate additional interest in the characters as well as in the dynamics of the situation described.

The question that remains is why these perceptively written, already published works have been excerpted and assembled for publication as a book at this time. Although psychotherapy is the overall title and is the consistent subject of each of the pieces, very little is actually written about it. No common element has been identified from the assemblage, nor is any element singled out for further study. A curious point is that the two editors are psychologists who have selected excerpts almost exclusively about psychotherapy provided by psychiatrists, whenever the professional discipline of the therapist can be specifically identified in the writings. The editors never use the words "psychiatrist" or "psychologist" in their comments, but only "therapist," as if no difference exists between the two. I believe that blurring the distinction between these professions does a disservice to each. There is something unsettling about professional psychologists turning to writers for "descriptions" that capture the psychotherapeutic experience, and essentially leaving it at that. By first blurring the distinctions between professional disciplines and then eliminating any technical and/or professional considerations, they almost imply that it is not necessary to be a trained professional to do psychotherapy!

What the editors have not done is to provide a list of the essentials drawn from their selections (if such essentials exist) that play a role in the psychotherapeutic relationship and its outcome. The approach taken in the book is an interesting one. Too bad it wasn't carried further. It is almost as if the readers are presented with a figurative T.A.T. of "literary psychotherapist stories," to which we are expected to associate. Someone should study what such an undertaking would produce. That might yield a book of greater professional interest.

SEYMOUR GERS (NEW YORK)

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Adolescent Psychiatry. XIV, 1987.

Marianne Makman

To cite this article: Marianne Makman (1989) Adolescent Psychiatry. XIV, 1987., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 682-687, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927257

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927257

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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ABSTRACTS

Adolescent Psychiatry. XIV, 1987.

Abstracted by Marianne Makman.

The Mystery of Adolescence. Daniel Offer. Pp. 7-27.

The author, long a demystifier of "normal adolescent turmoil," presents more data from his own and others' research confirming that a great majority, perhaps eighty per cent, of adolescents from all social, economic, and national backgrounds go through adolescence with healthy self-image, strong goals and values, and good mastery of inner and outer worlds. On the other hand, the twenty per cent in distress are often overlooked as "going through normal turmoil," and thus receive grossly inadequate help with their psychological problems. Offer suggests that the dramatic increase in adolescent suicides noted through the 1960's and 1970's is now actually beginning to decline as the baby-boom generation has reached adulthood and some of the social and economic pressures of this adolescent overpopulation have declined.

Arthur Rimbaud: The Poet as an Adolescent. David A. Halperin. Pp. 63-81.

For those with both psychoanalytic and literary interests, this essay offers reflections on the adolescence of the nineteenth-century French poet, Arthur Rimbaud, with emphasis on his use of poetry as a vivid expression of his childhood and adolescent feelings. The author suggests that Rimbaud, who ceased writing poetry at the age of nineteen, may have utilized the poetry in the resolution of his rather severe adolescent depression and his identity conflicts.

When Adolescents Write: Semiotic and Social Dimensions of Adolescents' Personal Writing. Bonnie E. Litowitz and Robert A. Gundlach. Pp. 82-111.

In this fascinating, thoughtfully written paper, the authors challenge past assumptions that writing thoughts and feelings instead of speaking them represents a resistance or acting out in analytic therapy. On the contrary, they view unsolicited adolescent writings, such as journals, poems, and plays, as facilitative to the therapeutic process. The authors examine the many functions these writings serve for the adolescent. All writing is social in that it arises out of and embodies interpersonal relationships even when private. Also, it can serve a semiotic function, a means of representing who one is, just as dress, facial expression, and speech do. Writing is used by adolescents to "externalize and objectify an inner feeling," to experiment with self-other relationships, and to gain control of affects, as well as in other ways. The text is richly illustrated with excerpts from the writings of three boys and one girl, with comments about these writings.

Adolescent Film Preferences: The World of *Purple Rain*; A Psychodynamic Interpretation. Lucia Villela and Richard Markin. Pp. 119-132.

Villela and Markin surveyed 296 adolescents and 160 adults, each group divided into three different socioeconomic groups, about their contemporary film prefer-

ences. The only movie which was listed as a favorite by all three adolescent groups was *Purple Rain*. This paper contains a fascinating analysis of the film, demonstrating that it deals both with the promise of successful oedipal resolution and with the wishes and conflicts fueling and frustrating this resolution. It thus offers an encoding of inner experiences, making it highly appealing, especially to younger adolescents.

Family Dynamics of Adolescent Suicide. Edward R. Shapiro and Judith Freedman. Pp. 191-207.

The cases of two fifteen-year-old girls who attempted suicide, one successful, the other saved at the last moment, are presented for discussion. The authors note the family dynamics in each case and suggest that the suicides represented solutions of inner conflicts. The girls in each situation had introjected the unexpressed ambivalence of their parents toward their existence. The children were overtly loved and appreciated, but covertly neglected, in one case by narcissistically invested parents, in the other by parents who failed to protect their child from her own aggressive and sexual impulses. Suggestions are made for preventive work with similar families through combined individual and family therapy.

Identify Diffusion: A Long-Term Follow-Up. Ruthellen Josselson. Pp. 230-258.

The author contrasts Erikson's and Kernberg's differing views about the long-term implications of "identity diffusion" in late adolescence, and then offers some long-term research data of her own in an effort to determine which view may be correct. Erikson has described identity diffusion in late adolescence as a prolonged phase of instability, a passing crisis on the road to adulthood. Kernberg believes the identity diffusion represents a pathological phenomenon, most likely a manifestation of borderline personality organization. The author studied eight women with problems of identity diffusion in college and then at twelve-year follow-up. The cases are described. On the basis of her findings, Josselson concludes that "identity diffusion in college is neither a unitary syndrome nor predictive of early adult functioning in any linear way."

Depressive Adolescents, Pathological Narcissism, and Therapeutic Failures. François Ladame. Pp. 301-315.

Ladame presents several cases of the difficult, usually failed treatments of depressed, narcissistically disturbed older adolescents. The need to maintain the illusion of control over themselves and their environments as well as maintaining "the idealized image of an omnipotent loving object fused with a partial self-image" caused these patients to flee treatment. The author discusses his findings and speculates about the efficacy of the analytic method in these and similar cases.

Underachievement and Failure in College: The Interaction Between Intrapsychic and Interpersonal Factors from the Perspective of Self Psychology. Howard S. Baker. Pp. 441-460.

After providing an unusually clear, succinct, comprehensible summary of the basic elements of Kohut's theoretical perspective on personality development, the

author discusses the usefulness of this perspective in the treatment of some college students with academic underachievement. He offers useful case examples showing that self psychology can "provde a basis for interventions that range from psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy to cognitive psychotherapy."

Contemporary Psychoanalysis. XXIII, 1987

Abstracted by Steven H. Goldberg.

Language and the Self. Patrick de Gramont. Pp. 77-121.

According to the author, all people must develop an awareness of themselves as creators of meaning and of language as the principle medium for the realization of meaning. The reality established by language is viewed as essential for symbolic communication, but this is accomplished at a cost. That is, verbally structured experiences reify reality in a way that may create gaps and distortions that become focuses of psychoanalytic inquiry. The author refers to these as "capturings," which constitute gaps in the fabric of meaning. The reified meanings that occur with language should optimally be open to challenge, in order to realize the benefits and to lessen the costs of verbal expression. Language has a "meta" function, which allows it to reflect upon its own meanings, and which allows the meanings conveyed by language to remain open and metaphorical. In certain forms of psychopathology, this meta function is lost. In analysis, analysands come to understand themselves as the creators of meaning. This occurs as reified capturings of meaning are reversed, and lost aspects of the self are re-owned and thus able to participate in the reflective realization of the self. Capturings of meanings are most likely to occur, and are most inaccessible to subsequent correction, during early childhood when language functions are first developing.

Clinical Innovations and Theoretical Controversy. Earl G. Witenberg. Pp. 183-198.

The author notes that changes in psychoanalytic theory are founded upon new clinical experiences. He raises questions about the reciprocal relationship—that is, whether advances in theory have led to advances in clinical practice and technique —and doubts its existence. He feels that current psychoanalytic theory is minimally related to practice, and that few technical guides may be deduced from it. He attributes the separation of theory and practice to several factors. There is a disparity between the abstract language of theory and the ordinary, everyday language of personal analysis and supervision. There continues to be an insistence that, no matter what the clinical and theoretical findings, psychoanalysis as treatment remains the same. And there is continued emphasis in our theory on patients less severely regressed than are many of the patients treated by psychoanalysis today. Witenberg lists several features which he feels should characterize a modern clinical theory. It should be more concerned with how patients are than with how they came to be that way; it should account for the fact that explaining people is not the same as helping them; it should consider countertransference on an equal basis with transference; and it should say as much about the psychology and behavior of the

analyst as of the analysand. Finally, clinical theory should be stated in ordinary language and be testable in the consulting room.

Sullivan's Conceptual Contributions to Child Psychiatry. Leonard I. Siegel. Pp. 278-298.

This paper reviews some of the major theoretical and clinical contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, with particular emphasis on those contributions of direct relevance to child psychiatry. For Sullivan, anxiety and its avoidance are central motivating forces; the self-system evolves to minimize anxiety by the use of security operations and selective inattention. There is a drive toward relatedness with other people and toward seeking their approval and avoiding their disapproval. Mental illness is seen as an attempt to solve interpersonal problems, especially those created by pathology in parents and in the larger social surround. Sullivan delineated an epigenetic theory of development, which outlined major phases of development in terms of interpersonal milestones. The infant experiences both good mother and bad mother and counterpart good self and bad self. These are merged into unitary personifications, which are predominantly satisfactory or predominantly not. In the latter case, interpersonal warps develop which, if uncorrected by later experience, lead to psychopathology. Childhood, the juvenile era, pre-adolescence, and adolescence are similarly described in terms of the major interpersonal processes expected and the sequelae of their successful or unsuccessful integration. An important notion is that earlier failures in interpersonal processes can be corrected at later phases. Many of these ideas are seen as precursors of object relations theory, self psychology, and family and systems theories. The role of successful psychotherapy is to enlarge the scope of the self, as previously dissociated and selectively unattended aspects of self can be reintegrated. The author believes that Sullivan's emphasis on participant observation in the therapy situation and his emphasis on communication within families and larger social systems have been extremely significant contributions to psychoanalytic theory and therapy.

Experience, Interpretation, Self-Knowledge: The Lost Uniqueness of Kohut's Self Psychology. Benjamin Wolstein. Pp. 329-349.

In this paper, an essay review of Kohut's posthumous publication, *How Does Psychoanalysis Cure?*, Wolstein criticizes Kohut for de-emphasizing the psychic self as a source of its own uniqueness, emphasizing the "self-object" as opposed to the "self-subject." He also finds a unidirectional interpretive slant to Kohut's formulations, which may fit certain patients but would be unlikely to fit others. A second sense in which Wolstein finds a lost uniqueness in Kohut's self psychology is that it fails to recommend a technique different in any significant way from that of traditional psychoanalysis. Kohut's technique moves the clinician no closer to the immediacy of directly felt experience than does the technique of traditional ego psychology. The author goes on to point to what he sees as a contradiction between the recommendation to be empathic and the recommendation to be sustaining. Empathy, he argues, is neither confirming nor disconfirming; sustaining is an act of sympathy, not empathy. Wolstein argues that interpretive myths cannot be borrowed whole-

sale from theory, but must arise from the direct experience and introspection of analyst and analysand.

Psychoanalytic Study of Society. XII, 1988.

Abstracted by John J. Hartman.

Irma's Rape: The Hermeneutics of Structuralism and Psychoanalysis Compared. H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen. Pp. 1-36.

The relationship between psychoanalysis and linguistic structuralism as hermeneutic systems is discussed. The author takes as his point of departure Kuper and Stone's structuralist interpretation of Freud's dream of Irma's injection. This interpretation purports to be superior to Freudian dream analysis. The paper argues against the structuralist approach by means of a careful critique of Kuper and Stone's work. Van Velzen concludes that psychoanalytic hermeneutics, corroborated by historical evidence, is superior.

Prophetic Initiation in Israel and Judah. Daniel Merkur. Pp. 37-67.

Hypnotic dreams induced by suggestion are discussed in this psychoanalytic exploration of ecstatic visions. The call of Isaiah and Ezekiel's vision of the chariot are cited as examples of a process of initiation into the role of prophet in ancient Israel and Judah. The author argues that the study of these visions reveals both culturally stereotyped as well as idiosyncratic versions. He views the former as due to regression in the service of the ego and the latter as derived from unconscious conflict. He concludes that a similar distinction can be made for religiosity in general. In contrast to Freud's view, Merkur's argument is that there is an adaptive as well as a superego religiosity.

The Cult Phenomenon and the Paranoid Process. W. W. Meissner. Pp. 69-95.

Meissner discusses the interplay between structural aspects of the organization of religious movements and the intrapsychic processes generated by what he terms the paranoid process. By noting various religious typologies, he distinguishes cults from other kinds of religious organizations. He then describes the analogy between the cult social organization and the paranoid process in individuals. The paranoid process dissociates and externalizes pathogenic introjects by projection. Participating in cult phenomena enhances the individual's distorted sense of self-esteem at the expense of independence and autonomy.

The Ego and the Mechanism of Adaptation. Paul Parin. Pp. 97-130.

This paper continues Heinz Hartmann's study of adaptation by utilizing the framework of mechanisms elaborated by Anna Freud. Hartmann discussed the relationship between the individual and the social world in terms of an average expectable environment. Parin starts from the premise of a variable environment and goes on to describe the various ways in which the ego of the individual deals with the changing environment. He delineates such concepts as the "group ego," the

"clan conscience," and specific "modes of ego identification" (e.g., "identification with the role") to describe aspects of the adaptation process. The paper concludes with a discussion of narcissistic personality disorders as a function of adaptation to modern industrial society.

Male Adolescent Initiation Rituals: Whiting's Hypothesis Revisited. Leora N. Rosen. Pp. 131-155.

Rosen undertakes reappraisal of anthropologists Whiting, Kluckhohn, and Anthony's 1958 hypothesis that harsh rites at puberty were connected with close mother-infant bonds in primitive culture. Originally interested in validating psychoanalytic propositions through cross-cultural socialization data, Whiting, as well as the entire field of social or psychological anthropology, subsequently moved away from psychodynamic explanations of social phenomena. The author compares two societies with harsh male adolescent puberty initiation rituals, the Aranda of Australia and the Ndembu of Africa. She suggests that Whiting's earlier idea that the puberty rites deal with unresolved oedipal rivalry and his later notion that they are a way of breaking a strong identification with the mother are complementary. She utilizes Blos's idea that negative oedipal and preoedipal issues, such as separation from the mother, are revived in adolescence and can be dealt with through the puberty rites described. A discussion of how circumcision and subincision of the penis can have different symbolic functions in the same ritual sequence concludes the paper.

The Bimin-Kuskusmin: A Discussion of Fitz John Porter Poole's Ethnographic Observations of Gender Identity Formation in a New Guinea People. Edward F. Foulks. Pp. 157-169.

The author presents an account of anthropologist Fitz John Porter Poole's observations of the Bimin-Kuskusmin people of New Guinea. This group believes that there is a conflict between male and female forces in the mind and body of each individual. These views are compared with Freud's ideas about inherent bisexuality. The observations form the basis of discussion in a colloquium between psychoanalysts and anthropologists devoted to Poole's account.

Cultural History and the Film *Cabaret*: A Study in Psychoanalytic Criticism. Stephen F. Bauer. Pp. 171-197.

Freud's notion of the compulsion to repeat organizes for this author an interpretation of Christopher Isherwood's autobiographical novel, *Goodbye to Berlin*, and the subsequent works inspired by it, including the film *Cabaret*. Specifically, the author argues that certain intrapsychic themes important to society were revived in each of the four reworkings of Isherwood's novel. He discusses rebellious conflicts with fathers, rebellion against traditional values, and repudiation of the previous generation as the crucial themes. The setting in a wartime context had great appeal on both an individual and a group basis for those audiences in successive decades who watched these productions.

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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

To cite this article: (1989) Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 688-692, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927258

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927258

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 26, 1988. THE EVALUATION AND DIAGNOSIS OF SEXUAL ABUSE IN CHILDREN. Susan P. Sherkow, M.D.

Dr. Sherkow noted that in recent years the increasing evidence of sexual abuse of children has created a new field of medico-legal inquiry requiring a new expertise. In the field of psychoanalysis, the specific task is to address the issues of diagnosis and the effect of sexual abuse on intrapsychic dynamics. Dr. Sherkow's hypothesis is that it may be possible to determine early in psychoanalytic treatment whether sexual abuse has taken place. She has observed that the first sessions with little girls who have been sexually abused bear a striking similarity to each other. These sessions are markedly different from the first sessions with children who present with any other chief complaint, both in Dr. Sherkow's practice and when compared to cases presented in the literature. To illustrate her hypothesis, Dr. Sherkow discussed the early months of the analysis of a two-and-a-half-year-old girl whose father was suspected of having molested her.

The child, a lively, verbal, pretty little girl, was brought for evaluation and treatment because her mother had noticed unusual behavior that included genital manipulation, strange body movements, and words to the effect that her father had put "fishes" into her "heinie." She suffered from a sleep disturbance, had frequent temper tantrums, had regressed to the use of a bottle, and played sexualized, thrusting games with dolls that included putting a doll's arm into her vagina. During her first visit, she was interested exclusively in dolls. She undressed all of the dolls and examined their genital areas. She attempted to insert thermometers and "fishes" into the dolls' genitals and into their mouths and called this playing "monster," "doctor," and "daddy." In the next few sessions, this play continued. At times the child said that there were butterflies in her pants, and she looked intense and guilty. She protested strongly that boys had no penis. She displayed tremendous excitement in her play—for example, when attempting to penetrate the anal or vaginal areas of the dolls, or hitting a doll's penis with a hammer, or pouring water on a doll's genitals, saying its heinie was hurt and it needed a doctor. Within a few months of four-times-a-week analysis, the mother's suspicion that the child had been abused by her father had been borne out by the material. From such material, Dr. Sherkow has attempted to synthesize a set of guidelines for arriving at a diagnosis of sexual abuse. She suggested consideration of the following factors: 1) intense sexualized play appearing very early in the course of treatment; 2) a distinctive compulsive quality of this play; 3) preoccupation with one idiosyncratic kind of play to the exclusion of all others; 4) the extremely hostile nature of the aggression; 5) stereotyping of symbolic play; 6) an exaggeration of normal curiosity about sexual issues and genital differences; and 7) persistent preoccupation with reality versus fantasy, real versus not real.

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 16, 1987. THE SPECIFIC TASKS IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF WELL-STRUCTURED SEXUAL DEVIATION: A PROVISIONAL TREATMENT. Charles W. Socarides, M.D.

Dr. Socarides described a tentative approach to several explicit therapeutic tasks crucial to the psychoanalytic treatment of sexually deviant patients. This therapeutic technique can be used with patients with well-structured sexual deviations arising from a common core disturbance in the preoedipal phase of development: a failure to traverse separation-individuation phases, which can lead to preoedipal fixations and the persistence of the original primary feminine identification with the mother. This may result in a disturbance in gender-defined self-identity, deficiencies in ego functions, including pathological internalized object relations, and an object relations class of conflict, i.e., anxiety and guilt in association with insufficient self-object differentiation. Dr. Socarides stated that his clinical experience with sexually deviant adult patients has led him to conclude that oedipal-phase conflict in certain deviant patients is superimposed on a deeper, basic preoedipal nuclear conflict. His overall strategy is to discover the location of the fixation point—whether rapprochement, practicing, differentiation, or symbiosis—and to define ego deficits and the type of object relations dominating the patient's life. He added that in all patients his aim is the elucidation of the three great anxieties of the rapprochement subphase: fear of the loss of the object, fear of the loss of the object's love, and undue sensitivity to the approval or disapproval of the parents. The aim of the analysis is the resolution of preoedipal conflicts in order to promote a process of developmental unfolding. The removal of these conflicts makes it possible for the patient to progress along the road to heterosexual functioning, as the need for deviant gratification becomes less obligatory. Thus, according to Dr. Socarides, the treatment of all sexually deviant patients is the treatment of the preoedipal developmental arrest which, he feels, is the source of the sexual deviation.

Dr. Socarides then described the strategies and techniques he employs to fulfill four major tasks crucial for the successful psychoanalytic treatment of sexually deviant patients: (1) separating and disidentifying from the preoedipal mother; (2) decoding the manifest perversion; (3) providing insight into the function of erotic experiences in sexually deviant acts; and (4) "spoiling" the perverse gratification. He discussed each of these four tasks.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Warren Goodman agreed, in general, with Dr. Socarides's overall strategy for the treatment of those patients who present with deviant sexuality arising from compromised development of ego functions. He acknowledged that a significant number of patients who present with deviant sexual behavior do fit into this particular group, but he feels that the literature does not afford us a secure confirmation regarding the proportion of patients about whom these theoretical assumptions are valid. Our interventions with our patients are based on formulations relating to our assessment of their level of ego intactness. Interventions

based on analytic data derived from patients' associations that we classify as preoedipal will obviously not be efficacious for a patient whose actual psychodynamic conflicts are predominantly on the oedipal level. Further, we can be misled in basing a conclusion about the level of developmental arrest on the confusing products of regression in the face of conflict-generated anxiety. Dr. Goodman also noted the etiological role of biology which, especially in the homosexual, cannot be accurately quantified, but may well have a significant influence on a psychological or behavioral manifestation which we may classify as deviant sexuality, but which may, at the same time, allow for relatively mature development of other behavioral lines, including highly articulated capacities for object relatedness, sensitivity, and empathy. Such a clinical scenario would not be compatible with heavy theoretical emphasis on a preoedipal developmental failure and would not respond to the therapeutic strategy advocated.

Dr. Renato Almansi stated that, considering the great resistance to change in cases of sexually deviant patients, one may reasonably expect that such analyses must be particularly difficult, that parameters may often have to be used, and that in carrying out the four tasks suggested by Dr. Socarides, a very careful balance may have to be established between standard analytic technique and a considerable degree of activity on the part of the analyst. Dr. Almansi discussed the great complexities inherent in the formation of gender identity and sexual behavior. He commented on the involvement of cognitive factors, social learning, biological determinants, possible hormonal variations, particularly during intra-uterine life, and/or genetic factors. In spite of the possible presence in each case of several participating components, Dr. Almansi felt that Dr. Socarides was correct in placing the psychological causes at the center of the etiology of perversions.

SETH EICHLER

MEETING OF THE OREGON PSYCHOANALYTIC FOUNDATION AND STUDY GROUP

March 7, 1989. THE MANAGERIAL MYSTIQUE. Abraham Zaleznik, D.C.S.

Dr. Zaleznik focused on ethics in discussing the application of psychoanalysis to business and government. In his presentation, he drew largely from Chapter 7 of his book on leadership and responded to the questions and comments from the audience. The first as well as the final challenging questions were about the feasibility of a successful indoctrination in moral values. There is good reason for insistence on this question, to which Dr. Zaleznik and others have given much thought. There is a more or less closed system of teaching and research in business schools as well as in other training institutions. This "mental cooptation" serves as an inherent program for survival, yet it poses a potential obstacle in the search for truth and integrity. Professionalism and audit committees, though intending to prevent or control unethical and illegal procedures, have obviously failed, as shown by the abundance of violations that are continually being exposed. The ones thus far exposed represent only a fraction of the ongoing successful violations. Unethical

practices in business and government are so extensive (and intensive) that they are accepted by many as a cultural norm of aggressive leadership.

The abundance of superego breaches among leaders could not continue without their followers' identifying with the corrupt leaders. The leader needs the enviable gift of charisma to attract a following, but the full success of achieving support can be attributed to the unconscious appeal of the defective superego of the leader. At a 1982 meeting here, Dr. Leo Rangell discussed the reciprocal corruption of the leader and those led. The latent defects of the superego become manifest and active through mutual influence, and corruption comes to be condoned. Without the reciprocity of psychopathology, both inner and outer censorship maintains some measure of control. Dr. Zaleznik called attention to the readiness of the followers to sacrifice themselves, as for a cause, in this intimate relationship. The leader survives the exposure of the offense on the strength of "plausible deniability" and claims ignorance of the machinations of his many underlings. In a magnanimous gesture he maintains composure and states that he fully assumes responsibility for their actions, but that he was not informed of what was going on! With this, he absolves himself of guilt and, with some manipulation of his own memory, deceives himself as well as the public. A final cleansing statement then points to the breach of ethics (or law) as having been for a noble cause in any case. The cause may be for the country, for the Aryan race, for the morale of the corps, for the union, for The Faith, for God.

John Shad, altruistic businessman in search of a solution through education, was quoted by Dr. Zaleznik as offering several explanations for moral breaches: the excessiveness of the temptations; the challenge of getting away with the outrage; peer pressure and rivalry to win a game with a dollar sign; a breakdown of morality as the sequel to wars, with their disruption of families, etc. Dr. Zaleznik suggested another motive: in an example, he referred to a contemporary drama in which latent hostility and destructiveness are given license, in that particular instance in the name of the welfare of a family. A "good" cause can justify almost any action, especially if the action can be done surreptitiously.

Dr. Zaleznik's printed words seem more optimistic than his spoken ones, expressing the hope that eventually the tenets of professionalism will provide stability and objectivity and that with this help, we can overcome our many biases of race, gender, religion, etc. Success is more likely a transient thing, however, a behavioristic façade. Resolution of our human limitations is far more difficult, even with the help of analysis. The incentive to violate ethical and legal restraints both by the educated and by the uneducated grows with the temptations of authority, prestige, and opportunity. Mr. Shad gave $30,000,000.00 to Harvard for the purpose of establishing a training program in ethics, and he holds the naïve conviction that crime does not pay. Unfortunately, crimes does pay only too well. Indeed, crime is an important business in itself, a major source of income not only for individuals but also for states in the union. Although his final chapter heading in his book hints at a cure by way of leadership, Dr. Zaleznik leaves no doubt that coping with the burden of ethics will call for endless effort.

SIEGFRIED BERTHELSDORF

The Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOSOMATIC SOCIETY will be held March 22-24, 1990, at the Copley Plaza Hotel, Boston. For further information, contact American Psychosomatic Society, 6728 McLean Village Drive, McLean, VA 22101; telephone: 703-556-9222.

The SIGMUND FREUD CENTER of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem will hold its 6th Annual Conference on Children-in-War in Jerusalem, June 24-28, 1990. For further information, contact: Dr. Roberta Apfel, Program Director, Dr. Bennett Simon, Sigmund Freud Professor, or Ms. Sonya Franco, Conference Coordinator, Sigmund Freud Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Telephone: 02-883-380; FAX: 001-972-2-826-249.

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ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Name Index

To cite this article: (1989) Name Index, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 693-698, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927259

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927259

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The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Subject Index

To cite this article: (1989) Subject Index, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 58:4, 699-710, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1989.11927260

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1989.11927260

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KEY: (A) Abstract from other journal
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