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THE FUTURE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Personal predilection has led me toward the educational dimensions of psychoanalysis: teaching, supervising, the administration of my own institute; in the International Psychoanalytical Association, working in what is now called the Conference of Training Analysts; and in the American Psychoanalytic Association, the Committee on Institutes and the Board on Professional Standards. The latter title condenses professional with educational standards, properly recognizing that standards of education are indissolubly linked with national standards for the professional practice of psychoanalysis. It therefore seems natural to me to think about the future of psychoanalysis as essentially dependent on how we educate those whom we judge, usually with some trepidation, to be potentially able to become analysts. And since I believe with increasing vehemence that only continuing immersion in clinical psychoanalytic work enables most of us to become and remain emotionally committed to the core of what is psychoanalytic, our traditional emphasis on training for clinical practice makes good sense, and is necessary for the future survival of the psychoanalytic idea and identity.

This core idea of psychoanalysis begins with the assumption that in every human being there is an unconscious mind, and that its existence, activities, and laws of operation can be inferred by observing their manifestations in distorted translation when the always present barriers to such observations are temporarily weakened or lifted. We are able to systematically ob-

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This is the seventh in a series of invited papers on this topic. For previous papers, see Vol. 57, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and Vol. 58, Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

serve and facilitate a relatively stable alteration of these manifestations in what we call the psychoanalytic situation. Here, in the form of clashes between unconscious drive and unconscious defense, they attach themselves to the figure of the analyst and are understood, interpreted, and linked to their origins in early development and primary relationships. The maintenance of a relatively intact psychoanalytic situation requires continuous care by the analyst, since both patient and analyst throw many obstacles in its path. It is our task as analysts as well as educators to stand in frequently uncomfortable opposition to natural human impulses to shut down the barriers, to deny, repress, dilute, avoid the basic psychoanalytic discoveries. In fact, every day psychoanalysts lose and refind in microcosm what psychoanalysis has lost and found in its tumultuous historical development from the very beginning. As analysands and later as analysts, we realize and we tend to "forget" in never-ending waves the ways in which the clash of drive and defense in us creates and influences, temporarily or enduringly, what we can know of ourselves and other people.

One insight of many great explorers of the human condition, including Freud, is that past is prologue, that the unexamined past dictates a future, that choice becomes relatively possible only when the past is examined and the compulsion to repeat it is thereby tamed. In writing about the future of psychoanalysis, therefore, I shall look back and retrace some aspects of the past history of psychoanalysis itself which we have been reluctant to examine and from which we have hesitated to draw some important conclusions. These avoidances imperil our future. A second direction of this essay comes from my belief that we must continue to try to understand the sources and the phenomenon of our resistance to *doing* analysis, and to teaching and analyzing others who will replace us as analysts in the future. Such efforts remain difficult but necessary goals if the core ideas of psychoanalysis are to live and flourish. Finally, because the position of psychoanalytic research is currently the subject of controversy, with political as well as scientific implications for

the future of psychoanalysis, the last section of this essay will develop some ideas about this issue.

Like the other analysts who have contributed to this series, I believe psychoanalysis will survive. There will always be a relatively small, politically and economically unimportant group within the large body of mental health professionals who will be fascinated to play in the constantly shifting sands of psychodynamics. Our profession will, however, always be threatened, because the basic idea of psychoanalysis *is* a threat. This idea, stemming from the very nature and origins of the forces engaged in intrapsychic conflict, will always place it in opposition to the self-perceived interests of what Freud (1925, p. 9) called "the compact majority." And, while survival of psychoanalysis as idea, treatment, and profession is not in doubt, the issues I am considering here concern the nature of the complex identity which defines us and how this will affect our lasting impact in the future. In addition to the quality of our clinical work and teaching, the relative harmony and vitality of our necessary scientific and professional organizations hold important keys to a growing influence that far exceeds our *numbers*—of analysts, candidates, even analytic patients.

There always have been pressures from within and outside of the psychoanalytic discipline to dilute the dreadful and wonderful power of the drives exposed in the psychoanalytic process by turning away from the central focus on the manifestations of intrapsychic conflict. They continue to tempt us with the false lure of societal popularity, greater numbers of candidates and patients, and the diminution of political conflict within our organizations. Even more powerful, however, is the unspoken illusion that more secure defenses and more gratifying compromise solutions to internal conflicts can be bought cheaply, that is, without the struggle for responsible awareness. It is not possible to be a practicing analyst without having to live in close quarters with sometimes painful or frightening internal conflicts, especially those fueled by the aroused aggressive drives and narcissistic claims in ourselves and our patients. But

it is always a temptation to dilute the pain by diluting the experience of both analyst and analysand in the analytic situation. How we practice our learned technique may greatly affect what we perceive and how we organize the massive amounts of psychological material our patients produce, and eventually how we apply our clinical experience to shape clinical theory. Enormous differences in analysts' and patients' experiences can result from modifying the number of sessions per week, or from significant violations of the principle of abstinence or alterations in the analyst's neutral position. Variations in the timing or even wording of interpretations of defense or transference may clear or obstruct the path toward obtaining data illuminating the nature and influences of unconscious fantasies (Arlow, 1969b). Recent surveys have shown that significant differences in the apparent availability of analytic patients for referral depend on whether an analyst conveys a sense of conviction or of ambivalence when recommending analysis in consultations, or when "preparing" a potential patient for analysis.

The pressure to turn away from the consequences of holding to a theory of unconscious intrapsychic conflict, toward an object relations theory stripped of a theory of drive and defense, has been active from the very beginning of psychoanalysis. The modification in 1897 of the seduction hypothesis gave birth to psychoanalysis as a developmental theory of intrapsychic conflict between unconscious drives and defensive forces. It also gave rise to the continuous chain of attacks on Freud and psychoanalysis by those who could not accept or tolerate what then became its goal—acquiring convincing knowledge of the nature of each patient's unconscious conflicts and their lifelong consequences. Psychoanalytic theory has always been a drive-defense-conflict theory in the context of a theory of object relations. The tendency to downgrade the importance of one in exchange for the relief of the other—to look for resolution and "cure" in *doing* and learning how to "relate" to others differently rather than *knowing* differently—has always been strong and

seems to have become even stronger in today's sociocultural climate.

We have been aided in our attempts to hold onto the responsible awareness of the "polyphony" of psychic life (Waelder, 1930) by periodically returning to the best of analytic literature. For every analyst, there are some works which have supplemented the foundation of Freud's writings and have had a lasting organizing impact on his or her work ego and superego. Among the writers whose guiding principles have helped me to regain my bearings, I think first of Anna Freud (1936), in particular her proposal of an equidistant stance for the analyst, her suggestions to allow the transference to deepen and intensify before interpreting it, and her developmental hierarchy of defense mechanisms, especially identification with the aggressor.

Another reorienting influence has been Waelder's (1930) principle of multiple functioning which demonstrates with brilliant simplicity the many-sidedness of the motivation and meaning that characterize each psychic act. This viewpoint "affords us a possible clue to the understanding of that sense of perpetual contradiction and feeling of dissatisfaction which, apart from neurosis, is common to all human beings" (p. 49). Other guides carrying much personal meaning for me include Paul Gray's emphasis on the necessity for analysts to focus on the analysis of the patient's ego and superego rather than the patient's life; several of Spruiell's clinically rich papers which bring the patient *and* the analyst in the analytic situation incomparably to life, notably his recent "Indivisibility of Freudian Object Relations and Drive Theories" (1988); and Brian Bird's classic discussion (1972) of the power of transference, of the universal tendency of analysts to resist analyzing the patient's transference and their own countertransference, and especially his reminder that analytic ideas, beginning with Freud's great discoveries, arise primarily out of transference experiences in the analytic (and self-analytic) situation.

Writings like these provide models, strengthen ideals, and

give support in struggling against choosing the relief of making ill-timed and wrongly aimed interpretations partly in order to prevent internal conflicts from emerging powerfully in relationships with patients. With Lawrence Friedman (1988), "I believe that the conflict between therapist and patient is indeed what keeps the hard fact of internal conflict before our eyes, despite the temptations of both theoretical intelligibility and professional comfort to draw a harmonious picture" (p. 205). It is one of the limitations of work done by researchers who study the analytic situation from outside or who are not themselves analysts that the storminess of the unleashed drives of the id in conflict with the ego and superego—in analyst and patient—must actually be experienced to apprehend the dazzlingly complex, interrelated occurrences from moment to moment in the analytic situation with the indelible understanding of insight.

A Historical Perspective: How We Become Our Own Worst Enemies

Spruiell notes (1989) that psychoanalysis, which began as Freud's individual enterprise, eventually made a decisive step, "the replacement of the power of the individual leader with the power of the community" (p. 7). Freud has told us some things of continuing relevance about such transfers of power. In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), *Totem and Taboo* (1913), and other historical "fictions," Freud explains that events of a "sexually aggressive nature" in the life of the human species leave "behind them permanent consequences" which are "for the most part fended off and forgotten, and which after a long latency came into effect and created phenomena similar to symptoms in their structure and purpose" (1939, p. 80). Certain phenomena of organized religions, group psychology, and the organizations of psychoanalysts are examples.

In *Moses and Monotheism*, the great imaginative work of his last years, Freud, the dying patriarch, identifying for the last time

with Moses, writes about and *for* those who will follow him and keep his ideas alive after his death. He writes, as a warning and prophecy, about the killing and cannibalistic incorporation of the primal father, about a latency period during which the ideas of the father, equated by Freud here with God and Moses, lie dormant and in repression but are gathering strength, and about the subsequent establishment of the father's injunctions and prohibitions (what the sons must do and what they must not do) in the superegos of individuals and groups. After an interval the original leader's ideas are revived, and he himself may be resurrected years later as a mythic figure of history possessing sacred qualities.

As Freud represents the equivalent of the primal father for so many analysts, his basic ideas, his essential "soul" and power, were grasped and more or less incorporated by succeeding generations in revived oedipal struggles in the personal analyses of those who would become analysts. It is clear that the basic story Freud created in his "fictions" about generational passage and conflict also describes the history of psychoanalysis as movement and organization. Among those who were followers or disciples, in the days when the integrity of Freud's "movement" demanded "filial piety," "defections" were regarded as equivalent to the murder of the father. These "defections" or "deviations" (how easily and menacingly the rhetoric of the radical ideologies of the twentieth century come to mind!) were viewed within the ranks of Freud's analytic family as dangerous to the movement, which could justify its concerns insofar as it imagined itself to be like the monotheistic tribe of Hebrews in Pharaoh's Egypt. The "deviants" were characterized either as sheep who had strayed, as poor souls who had been badly or insufficiently analyzed or were too "sick" to be redeemed by analysis. Alternatively, they were villains, liars, beyond the pale, who from the beginning had character flaws unreachable by analysis. Although many of these early and even later errant analysts were original thinkers who developed creative approaches and theoretical advances, there is probably a large

measure of truth in such pathographic designations. What remains a mystery whose power demands our respectful humility are the unpredictable individual outcomes of the complicated interrelationships between psychopathology, talent, motivation, the capacity to learn and change, and their variable vicissitudes over time and through life experiences.

Certainly, what was then and is now even more potentially dangerous to psychoanalysis than dissenters, no matter how "sick" or psychopathic, is the frightened use of quasi-religious or totalitarian-state metaphors to attack dissent for the expressed purpose of protecting our scientific and professional domains. Analysts now have more subtle ways of hiding their motives when they dismiss people because of their pathology, character, or membership in "deviant schools." But too many analysts still believe that defending the integrity of basic analytic principles, practice, and the good character of psychoanalysts justifies self-righteous isolation from contamination by challenging ideas. One consequence is the potential among us for fratricide, deriving in significant part from our projected and displaced guilt over the patricidal impulses we all own and must have experienced and, I believe, have often only partially resolved in our training analyses (Orgel, 1987).

Since many of us have replaced our own fathers with Freud as our family-romance father (Arlow, 1969a, 1970, 1972), our original oedipal murderousness inevitably fixes on our representations of Freud. We try, but often fail, to master these impulses through our transference experiences in our own personal analyses. And yet it is only by this route that we can possess Freud's Promethean power and be able to pass it on generously, freed of the necessity to commit self-destructive "murders" of the many displaced oedipal figures our profession makes available. These include our teachers, training analysts and supervisors, the Board on Professional Standards, the other organizations of psychoanalysts, rival institutes, and rivals in our own institutes. And we cannot exempt our patients from this list, especially candidate-analysands, those with whom we

most closely identify, who wish to kill us in order to take our psychoanalysis from us. Through seductive attacks on their spirits which contain the fires of inquiry, rebellion, skepticism and creativity, we, like Laius and Jocasta, may be tempted to prevent their ever reaching maturity.

Psychoanalysis is Freud's legacy to us, and it is the possession neither of its creators nor of its current caretakers. When analyzing patients, especially candidates who unconsciously wish not merely to become like their analysts but to replace them, we aim to allow the transitory flowering *and eventual analysis* of their transference idealizations, imitations, and identifications, as well as both preoedipal and oedipal aggressive transferences to us. In doing this, we free them to identify, not with the idealized (and unconsciously derogated) object, but with the functions of the analyst which include the unconflicted *pleasure* of being an analyst and doing analysis. Such work is one of the vital investments of training analysts in the future of psychoanalysis.

Every terminated training analysis (indeed every analysis) makes the analyst confront the necessary pain of surrendering himself or herself to the future, and of mourning the loss of those who are helped, through painstaking analysis of the multiple manifestations and vicissitudes of the transference, to leave their analysts to pursue *their* lives. From the side of the candidate-analysands, working through this necessary mourning helps them to tame inevitable ambivalence, and permits more reasonable relationships with the many figures in the institute, the society, and the rest of the profession.

It is my impression that most analysts today are relatively better able to distinguish between transference and "real" elements in patients' erotic fantasies (to identify and analyze erotic countertransferences) than they are to differentiate and interpret the origins and phenomena of transference idealizations and aggressions, especially of the unconscious admixtures of destructiveness embedded within consciously idealizing or erotic transferences. Many of us have particular difficulty with

analysands' observations and judgments about our functioning as analysts and as members of the analytic community. The temptation to enjoy the narcissistic rewards inherent in our positions as analysts and educators by continuing to think of ourselves as upholders and preservers of the "movement" merges with the wish to avoid the feelings of the parent who, with diminishing powers and shrinking time, is yielding up *his or her* future in the very action of analyzing the patients' transference wishes. Is there any analysis in which the analyst is not at least partly a Lear awaiting the fate of being killed by the children? And is this tragic conclusion not most poignantly felt in training analyses? But it is up to us to choose which Lear we are to be—the one who gives most to the child who most grandiloquently expresses love and allows us the illusion of retained parental power, or the Lear who can choose the silent child who represents the wisdom of narcissistic renunciation and the acceptance of the knowledge of the transitoriness of what one possesses, including one's life.

In general, I believe the narcissistic issues and aggressive countertransferences of analysts a generation ago were less well analyzed by *their* analysts than they are today. Of course, there were great individual differences, but it seems to me that many of the major figures of earlier analytic history were less abstinent in their relationships with patients. When I was a candidate, for example, the most powerful figure in my institute was rarely if ever challenged when he would say that *he* could do or say what we were taught was not *analytic* in treating patients because, he would add, "I know what I'm doing." People like him could be found everywhere in those days. Many of them were from Europe and had worked with Freud or one of the original small group of his students. In the United States a number of them founded new institutes, installed themselves in power for extended periods, and stamped these institutes in their images. They later installed their loyal assistants, often their own former analysands, as satellites. This pattern was true especially in small communities. As leaders and administrators,

they were often autocratic; as training analysts, they often used the power of the transference and their position in the institute to create disciples.

Many of the proscriptive rules our generation has set up, rules which appropriately restrict some of the instinctual gratifications and comfort of the analyst, were often violated by these analytic forebears of ours, including Freud, who was indeed a living model to these European fathers of our institutes. The stories about his crossing professional and personal boundaries are by now common knowledge—that he analyzed people he knew personally, including his daughter; that he took patients with him on vacation; that he began analyzing new patients even when he knew he was dying; that he gave patients food and money; and that he accepted contributions from wealthy patients for psychoanalytic organizational purposes. Every analyst must integrate this knowledge in the course of his or her development toward personal and professional maturity, and must try to accept that Freud had significant human limitations in order to appreciate his greatness of mind and spirit.

The inconsistencies, however, between what was practiced and what was preached in the days when many of us were analyzed and trained do continue to trouble us today. In order to deny these inconsistencies and hold fast to our idealized analytic transferences, as unanalyzed idealizations begin to crumble with the resurgence of symptoms and evidences of difficulties and lack of pleasure in work, we are tempted to turn the analysts of our parents' and grandparents' generations into mythic figures. I have suggested that such transformations reflect our continuing infantile need for "great men and women" in order to help us to curb our own drives, including patricidal and infanticidal ones (". . . they increased their own sense of guilt in order to stifle their doubts of God . . ." [Freud, 1939, p. 64]). These idealized images reflect our representation of their superegos with which we identify. We construct what we insist they *must* have believed, instead of giving credence to our perceptions of their real selves. For example, we rationalize and deny evidence

that many of them used their analysands, students, and younger colleagues as allies after their training analyses, as cadres of supporters in their own professional rivalries and quarrels. The results of such coercions have been harmful to psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts throughout our history.

Among the consequences, we have witnessed narcissistic derogations and aggressive transferences displaced onto those labeled "enemies" of psychoanalysis, sometimes including our analytic colleagues. For some, disappointments with their own analyses have led to doubts and even global attacks on the worth and validity of the therapeutic uses of psychoanalysis. Some critics have made exceptions of "new" techniques using modifications they themselves have proposed. Often enough, such new proposals have emphasized corrective object relationships (for the analyst at least as much as the patient) over interpretation and insight into the vicissitudes of unconscious conflict in the transference.

Related to this constellation is the not uncommon, often caricatured defensive arrogance and certainty of some analysts about what they know is true and proper, without their having to deign to say *how* they know. Such expertise may be offered not only in their professional activities, but also in all sorts of human enterprises, including parenthood, pedagogy, and political affairs. Sometimes such individuals, as supervisors or teachers of analysis or psychotherapy, claim to know what is technically correct at every juncture. There are no accidents, mistakes, or unknowns to such persons, who have turned off and turned away more psychiatric residents and other potential analysts than we can calculate.

To some other analysts, the years spent in the unrewarding labors of doing psychoanalysis are blamed for the complex depressions of later life. It then becomes the discipline and profession of psychoanalysis to which, perhaps years later, they attribute their disillusion, rather than other vicissitudes of life and work, including the flaws and failures of long-past personal analyses. Those in positions to influence and advise others may

represent themselves as voices of experience who gravely discourage younger colleagues and students from being analyzed, or from entering institutes to become analysts.

In addition to the problems of the *analysands'* unresolved aggression and narcissism in training analyses, many of those analyzed in the nineteen forties, 'fifties, and 'sixties have gradually realized that their training-analytic experience included unacknowledged and unintegrated aggression *by* training analysts against them. Among such manifestations of actual or potential aggression was the exercise of power training analysts believed was appropriate to use to make judgments and take actions that vitally affected the professional futures of their analysands. The phenomenon of "convoying" (Greenacre, 1966; Kairys, 1964) is surely an aggression against the analysand whose need to maintain filial devotion and passivity, even as an aging adult, has had so many destructive consequences in our institutes' histories and functioning. The actual influence the training analysts exerted on candidates' educational progress by directive measures in the analysis, and by detailed reports on the analysis to education and progression committees, meant that aggression toward and idealization of the powerful analyst in the transference was intensified, but also stifled in its expression and left unresolved. Awareness of such issues has developed out of post-analytic working through of previously unanalyzed aggressive transferences, sometimes in later re-analyses, and has resulted in greater sensitivity to the effects of violations of principles of neutrality and confidentiality in these earlier "model" analyses. But another consequence of these practices can be a rigidity and intolerance of differences in collegial and pedagogical relationships on the part of many in positions of educational leadership in the succeeding generation of analysts. I shall return to this point later.

Other evidences of unconscious aggression by analysts could be found a generation ago in the greater use of stark, "tactless" interpretations of drive derivatives to patients, without prior and concurrent attention to defensive constellations. The ana-

lyst "analyzed" and the patient "*was* analyzed." Insight was *given*, "pointed out," in styles of confrontation well suited to surgical and military metaphors. Analysts only gradually have learned to become interested in such features as the meanings of their own patterns of silence or talking, or in exploring the effects of their choices of words or tones of voice in articulating interpretations, as contributing to shaping the affective reality of the psychoanalytic situation, as a stimulus to transference fantasies, and as indicators of the "real" attitudes and feelings of the analyst.

More unacknowledged aggression was expressed in training analyses in the past than is generally true today, by virtue of the unquestioned authority of the analyst in those decades to set educational "rules" as well as analytic rules which were not to be questioned. I believe training analysts until quite recently had significantly greater difficulty in appreciating that criticisms of the training program or actions taken by students could be more than the "acting out" of displaced transferences. The development of site-visiting programs by analysts from other institutes, through the Committee on Institutes, has greatly helped to validate the views of candidates and make them participants in their own educations.

Some other aspects of the aggression of the self-designated parental analyst directed against candidate-analysands, individually and as members of groups, have also been damaging to the discipline of psychoanalysis (A. Freud, 1949). According to their basic character structures, some responded masochistically. As analysts, such individuals have inflicted similar kinds of aggression on patients and others in sadomasochistic relationships or in reaction formations or passive aggression waiting for opportunities to explode into vengeful activity.

In addition, this aggression by the powerful analyst-authority has tended to evoke the defense of identification with the aggressor. In some groups dominated by one or two powerful figures who exercised freedoms denied to others, the result was the creation in the next generation of a rigid, harsh group su-

perego, rooted in shared identification with aggressors experienced in common. Even today, some preach the necessity of what others would consider a stifling orthodoxy, labeling as dangerous the teaching or even holding of "heretical" positions, that is, ideas antithetical to those of the founding leader(s). Or the original monolithic authority for the group may have been a rebel figure himself or herself, having started a school as the proponent of a new theory, or a more "effective" method of shortening treatments, or proposing corrective emotional experiences under whatever name, or rationalizing more gratifying object relationships between analysand and analyst. If the analyst's unconscious aim was to create and maintain a permanent parent-child relationship, with the power to compel the ideas and behavior that would be permissible in the next generation, the mobilization and eventual analysis in the transference arena of important unconscious intrapsychic conflicts were necessarily limited or suppressed. In this sense, either the rigidly orthodox (usually self-styled conservatives) or the aggressively liberal demands for conformity constitute tyrannies betraying the essence of the psychoanalytic ethos—the ego's freedom to choose.

One indication of these patterns is seen in the mobilization of defensive self-protectiveness in some institutes, when an "important" member, or a usual clinical practice or shared theoretical emphasis is criticized by outsiders. The defense may take the form of morally condemning such critics as attackers of the true Freudian faith, or as attackers of intellectual freedom and local or individual autonomy, which is, for some, the label for their faith. As in identification with the aggressor in individuals, rigid moral positions in such institutes have been justified by their members' perceived need to distinguish themselves from their more "impulse-ridden" colleagues in neighboring, competing institutes. Or, in the reverse form, the "democratic" liberal institute sees itself as a bulwark against the rigid, backward colleagues who would stifle academic freedom and scientific progress. The other institutes may be described as not being

truly Freudian, a characterization based on the mythologized Freud, the unblemished leader of a sacred cause. Or it may just as well be called not truly Freudian for not following Freud as the bold explorer of the unknown depths of the mind, the individualist, innovator, and flexible modifier of old techniques as warranted.

The present period promises ferment and modification of some of these rigid attitudes, thanks to new opportunities to examine our past. As the psychoanalytic archives have become more available for study, we are increasingly able to correct our mythic images of Freud, and to work to chip away at some of the tradition-encrusted, transference-laden ideas about him and his work which many of the present generation absorbed in the years of our "growing up" as analysts.

Psychoanalytic Research and Professional Standards

Recently, I discussed the still valid justifications for our time-honored use of the clinical analytic situation as our primary research laboratory (Orgel, 1989). In that presentation I stressed that the value of the clinical analytic situation for scientific research depends on the competence of the analyst. I stated that this competence in turn is linked with the quality of the analyst's education, and that the outcome of the educational experience, in turn, depends, immediately *and* over time, on the experience of the training analysis or, in many instances, analyses. This linkage means to me that high educational standards are necessary for the growth of good research in our field.

Indeed, there should be no incompatibility between the aims of those wishing to foster more scientifically sound research in psychoanalysis and those whose major interests and professional activities are as clinical analysts and the educators of future analysts. These comments are made in the context of an increasingly heated current controversy in which scientific concerns about the insecurity of our knowledge are used polemi-

cally to challenge some of the principles which have guided the American Psychoanalytic Association in setting and maintaining national standards for education and practice. Some of those who have pressed urgently for more empirically based research by full-time researchers who are not practicing analysts, or who emphasize interdisciplinary research over that derived from the psychoanalytic situation, also question the continued justification for some of the basic positions and functions of the Board on Professional Standards, whose traditional focus and concern has been the quality of psychoanalytic education for the practice of clinical psychoanalysis.

The Board has served American psychoanalysis well in the last forty or more years, mainly through exercising two interlocking functions. It examines the ongoing activities of institutes accredited by it through collegial visits and other exchanges, and it reviews and certifies the level of competence of the clinical work of graduates of these institutes before they are eligible to become active (voting) members of the American Psychoanalytic Association. The requirement of certification for Active Membership has worked in two directions at once. Because certification has been the usual and expected next developmental step after graduation for most analysts, the Board has been able to give persuasive, clear messages to the institutes regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their educational programs, and it has given Active Membership a special value, the credential of a nationally tested and recognized standard of quality of analytic work.

Many who are challenging these traditional means of setting and monitoring educational standards point to the indisputable need for more analytic research and for greater involvement of more analysts in academic communities. These emphases lead them to oppose what they regard as the Board's undue centralization of authority in the hands of analytic practitioners who, they assert, are rigidly bound to their unchanging, cherished beliefs about national standards for education which have dominated the Association and limited its influence in the mental

health and contemporary science fields. They sometimes go on to argue that much more formal research on clinical processes and outcomes is needed to justify the position within the Association of a Board on Professional Standards with its present powers, and they add that the Board's requirements for Active Membership penalize and discourage the very people who would become the researchers we badly need. The present requirements, some argue, breed disaffection and professional insecurity in many graduates whose identities as analysts and participation as colleagues in the national organization would be strengthened if they could become active members of the American *without* being required to present their clinical work for review by a Committee on Certification. Among this group are psychoanalytically trained psychiatrists in psychiatric training centers who apply their analytic knowledge to their different modes of treatment, teaching, and research.

I fear that unfortunate polarizations are increasing within the American these days around these views. It surely must be possible to encourage and honor those among us whose contributions lie outside clinical practice, to recognize them and assist them in what *they* do, *without* dismantling a structure which has contributed to making training in the accredited institutes of the American imitated and even envied throughout the world. We do know a great deal and continue to learn much more about how to distinguish better from less good analytic work, and psychoanalysis from psychotherapy, even if such distinctions and criteria remain in need of further study and clarification. We should support valid efforts to do this, including modalities such as non-clinically based research where appropriate. However, I strongly disagree with positions which would at the same time overlook or devalue the accumulated work and experience over many decades of learning how to do and how to assess the quality of clinical psychoanalysis. Indeed, we tend to minimize how much the Committee on Certification, and before it, the Committee on Membership, themselves have contributed over many years to such knowledge. Their painstaking

clinical reviews and detailed communications to institutes have greatly enlarged and advanced our clinical perspectives and promoted useful, scientifically oriented discourse on our theoretical differences. In addition, I have tried to show in this paper that the roots and remedies for disaffection and discontents in those working in the underworlds of the human mind are so hidden and complicated that offering recognition of the kinds suggested would merely shift the manifest forms of some of our inevitable conflicts to other grounds, rather than resolve them. Along the way we would, I believe, lower the value of Active Membership for most of us and undermine the Board's ability to strengthen us as individuals in our continuing inner struggles with ourselves.

Any proposals which would undermine the national certification process carry meaningful implications for our future. Elimination of the requirement of certification for Active Membership would radically change the long-standing central commitment of the American Psychoanalytic Association to the demonstration of clinical analytic work of high quality before a *nationally* constituted group of peers. And since I believe that the future development of psychoanalysis as science as well as profession is built on a foundation of well-trained psychoanalysts doing competent psychoanalysis, I also believe that any change which would unbalance our structure for clinical standards would cost dearly. The outcome of the present studies and debates on these issues is of importance to every analyst.

Resistance to what is basic about psychoanalysis can manifest itself in many different ways. The fear of knowing what was unknown can serve equally as resistance to doing research, *or* to doing analysis. The more we are able to face our wishes to turn away from knowing, the more will controversies, in whatever happens to be the current form, become amenable to reason, discussion, and resolution. Under such circumstances our professional and educational organizations will be less enervated by counterproductive political struggles and will be strengthened in their scientific purposes. If we make this attempt, we will be

fulfilling our promises to our futures and will brighten the prospects of those who are entrusting *their* lives and futures to us.

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FREUD, FLIESS, AND THE PARENTHOOD OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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This paper focuses upon the roles of procreation, fatherhood, and identification with the fertile mother in Freud's creation of psychoanalysis. Fatherhood and motherhood, pregnancy and birth, children and siblings, figure prominently in Freud's self-analysis and in his relationship with his prototransference object, Wilhelm Fliess. Although Freud attributed his self-analytic interest and revived oedipal conflict to the death of his father, becoming a parent himself was also a significant determinant. Birth as well as death reactivated his childhood and stimulated his creative ferment.

Freud's development of psychoanalysis proceeded gradually, propelled sometimes by quantum leaps and strokes of sheer genius, at other times by an indomitable perseverance in the face of regression, confusion, and inhibition. The most fundamental discoveries about the development of the personality and the most complete scientific understanding of psychopathology and neurotic suffering were gleaned from a largely self-analytic process that still retains elements of the "uncanny." Freud's discoveries were made in a cultural, familial, and historical context that presented formidable obstacles and caused many setbacks.

The germs and sometimes the substance of vastly important

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psychoanalytic formulations may be found in his self-analytic work. Freud developed an enduring self-analytic ability which he regularly utilized thereafter in his creative endeavors, as well as in his psychoanalytic treatment of patients (Anzieu, 1959). He was himself his foremost patient, always integrating self-knowledge with knowledge gleaned from patients, from the psychopathology of everyday life, and from such products of civilization as art, literature, and archaeology. The self-analytic process clarified inner confusion and opposition, and engendered new, growth-promoting, insightful gratifications (Ticho, 1967). The task of understanding the origins of psychoanalysis is ongoing, and each generation of analytic historians has added its own perceptions and insights. Freud's writings remain the primary source, but they are subject, as we know from Freud's own comments, to both conscious and unconscious disguise. There was good reason for Freud to be prudent, both self-revealing and properly self-protective, and to compare self-analysis to a pelvic dissection.

In this paper I shall focus upon the role of procreation, fatherhood, and identification with the fertile mother in the parenthood of psychoanalysis. Fatherhood and motherhood, pregnancy and birth, children and siblings, figure prominently in Freud's self-analysis and in relation to his prototransference object, Wilhelm Fliess. While Freud emphasized his reaction to the death of his father in his undertaking systematic self-analysis and in his writing of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), I shall emphasize the complementary reactions to birth rather than to death and to becoming a parent rather than only to losing a parent. I refer here to Freud's biological fathering of his own children and the related psychological birth of his brainchild, psychoanalysis.

The purpose of this investigation is to widen our understanding of the historical roots of our discipline and, in the process, to enliven and enlarge our understanding of the creative process and of unconscious reactions to parenthood and to progressive development in parenting and self-analysis. Freud's

self-analysis and the early development of psychoanalysis will be scrutinized afresh from these perspectives.

My starting point will be Freud's special relationship with his colleague, confidant, collaborator, and competitor, Wilhelm Fliess. The beginning of Freud's relationship with Fliess and his immediate idealization of him presaged his break with and denigration of Breuer. Jones (1955, p. 3) noted six figures Freud idealized: Brücke, Meynert, Fleischl-Marxow, Charcot, Breuer, and Fliess. Fliess was idealized before and after the Irma dream, which occurred in 1895 and which preceded Freud's systematic self-analysis following the death of his father. The Emma Eckstein episode and the Irma dream analysis probably comprised a transitional turning point in the Freud/Fleiss relationship. What has not been thoroughly studied has been the effect of Freud's marriage and repeated fatherhood on his professional relationships and work. His increasing social and intellectual isolation, his estrangement from and disappointment in Breuer, and the intensity of his relationship to Fliess are all part of the background for the beginnings of his analytic investigations and his formal self-analysis.

Freud married Martha Bernays in September 1886 and soon thereafter met Fliess. Freud's six children were born in the eight years between October 16, 1887, and December 3, 1895, when Anna, his youngest child, was born. Freud was a new father when he wrote his first letter to Fliess on November 24, 1887. The letter coincides with his relationship with his new baby and his new relationship with Martha, now a mother. Admiring Fliess, and wanting to foster their friendship, Freud wrote: ". . . [I confess] that I entertain hopes of continuing the relationship with you and that you have left a deep impression on me which could easily lead me to tell you outright in what category of men I place you" (Masson, 1985, p. 15).[1] The last paragraph is also of interest: "My little one is flourishing; my wife is slowly getting better. I am occupied with writing three papers at the same

[1] All of my quotations from Freud's letters to Fliess are from the 1985 edition of the letters, translated and edited by J. M. Masson.

time, one of which is on the anatomy of the brain" (p. 16). In the following spring, on May 28, 1888, Freud wrote to Fliess, "When our little Mathilde laughs, we imagine that hearing her laugh is the most beautiful thing that could happen to us, and in other respects we are not ambitious and not very industrious. My practice, increased somewhat during the winter and spring, is now decreasing again, and barely keeps us alive" (pp. 21-22). This young Jewish male physician in Catholic Vienna had entered parenthood and was now burdened with new familial, social, and financial responsibilities. With great ambition, he was poised on the threshold of a pioneering adventure, analogous to that of an infant discovering a whole new world of self and objects.

The idealization of Fliess began at once and was related to this crucial period of Freud's development and to his need for an idealized figure. With each of Martha's pregnancies, Freud's dependent attachment to Fliess increased, as though he felt that he had been displaced and that Fliess was a replacement object. Sending a paper and a photograph of himself to Fliess on August 29, 1888, when Martha was pregnant with their second child, Freud wrote, "Last winter I was quite busy, and that gave me just enough to live on with my very large family" (p. 24). (He then had only one child.) He also wrote, " 'The Anatomy of the Brain' is still germinating, as it was at the time you gave me new ideas" (*ibid.*). Freud was fathering biological children and "brain children."

Freud had stumbled upon the importance of sexuality in psychopathology, a finding facilitated by his own intuitive gifts and by the hints of such teachers as Breuer and Charcot (Schur, 1972), and probably Fliess. As a new parent and as a scientist about to explore uncharted territory, he turned to Fliess to help in the search and, Freud hoped, to act as an authoritative guide and critic. From the outset, Fliess was to become "the healer," "the magician," his companion, alter ego, sounding board, and editor in his investigation into forbidden areas. He was also to be Freud's physician and surgeon. (Fliess was gifted, strange,

and daring, and the absence of his side of the correspondence leaves a regrettable historical void.) During the early period of their relationship, Freud had experiences with his own and other children. He worked in a clinic for children with neurological disorders and became an authority on neurological paralytic disorders of childhood as well as on the developmental implications of aphasia, and thus of speech. During this time, Martha was having one child after another. She never did become Freud's professional confidante and was probably de-idealized in the vicissitudes of marriage and motherhood. Fliess soon overshadowed Breuer, and in some areas, Martha.

There are explicit references in the Fliess letters to conception, pregnancy, parenthood—and unconsciously, to abortion and infanticide (Elms, 1980; Goldner, 1988). These conflicts would be later expressed in terms of fertility and sterility, life and death, creation and destruction. The two scientific collaborators continued to exchange their ideas by mail, their intense correspondence succeeding what had been Freud's even more concentrated, almost daily correspondence with his betrothed. Freud and Fliess would also arrange to meet in other cities for "congresses," a word which had many significant meanings. These "congresses" could last for several days, and they involved intense, concentrated exchanges. During the whole intimate period of their relationship, the two men exchanged detailed manuscripts and statements about their latest speculations and formulations, as well as personal and family information. On July 21, 1890, Freud wrote, "I very much look forward to seeing you again, to hearing what you are up to, and to rekindling my almost extinguished energy and scientific interests on yours, and I therefore accept and will write again to let you know when I shall come. You know my feelings and my respect for you; let us chat for a few days" (p. 26). This was soon followed by an impassioned letter, August 1, 1890: "When I talked with you and saw that you thought well of me, I even used to think something of myself, and the picture of absolutely convincing energy that you offered was not without its effect on

me" (p. 27). ". . . you are the only other, the *alter*" (May 1894, p. 73). These statements are reminiscent of Freud's earlier letters to his fiancée, Martha, who, as Freud wrote on June 19, 1882, "strengthened the faith in my own value and gave me new hope and energy to work when I needed it most" (E. L. Freud, 1960, p. 8).

Freud's ability to work had become "a function of the distance from our congresses" (Masson, p. 301). His needy idealization of Fliess reached its expressive acme on July 14, 1894, a year before the Irma dream: "Your praise is nectar and ambrosia for me" (p. 87). The idealized object restored narcissistic equilibrium. In his letter to Fliess of June 30, 1896, after noting that his old father, Jacob Freud, age eighty-one, was in a most "shaky state," he continued, "I feel a pall has been cast over me, and all I can say is that I'm looking forward to our congress as to the slaking of hunger and thirst. I bring nothing but two open ears and one temporal lobe lubricated for reception" (p. 193). (Freud's children were slaking their hunger and thirst with Martha.) The idealization and unconscious dependent attitude toward Fliess continued, but in diminishing degree, as their relationship evolved and eventually dissolved. Separating and fantasying fusion, Freud wrote, on March 19, 1898, "Your sleepiness now explains to me my own simultaneous state. . . . How nice it would be if this close harmony between us were a total one; I would always know how you are . . ." (p. 301). The idealization began to give way as Freud analyzed his transference-like relationship to Fliess, and in the process he became a "new species of himself" as the father of psychoanalysis. Freud also identified with his pregnant wife/mother and, with his fertile imagination, looked upon Fliess as a figure of inspiration. Fliess and, to a degree, the fetuses and babies were prototransference representatives of parent and sibling figures. Impregnation, Martha's pregnancies, and parenthood elicited a recapitulation and working through of Freud's present and past relationships to his adult and childhood families.

When Fliess withdrew from their association at the beginning

of this century, he apparently felt unappreciated and envious, and may have fully sensed Freud's growing independence. Interestingly, Freud (September 19, 1901) had referred to the loss of Fliess as the loss of his "only audience" (p. 450). Fliess was a "need-satisfying" object on many developmental levels, even a sustaining object, as was his cigar-smoking, which Fliess repeatedly interdicted. We do not know Fliess's contribution to the relationship. But we have enough knowledge of Fliess to recognize him as a charismatic, eccentric, and receptive friend to Freud, presumably ready to listen, to recommend, and to encourage. Freud was inundated with ideas which must also have seemed to him strange and anxiety-provoking. Fliess may have been used as an illusory guide, but also as an actual facilitating object who initially provided some necessary support and benevolent feedback. To be sure, Freud (September 29, 1893) had noted in passing, ". . . you altogether ruin my critical faculties" (p. 56), an early insight into Fliess as an impediment serving resistance.

Analysts have noted the physical distance between Freud in Vienna and Fliess in Berlin, so that Fliess, in a way, was the unseen, blank-screen analyst behind the couch. The psychological distance should also be noted, as well as the intimate closeness. What began as the conjoint investigation of two researchers into human sexuality was rapidly split into Fliess's physiological approach, akin to Breuer's hypnoid states, and Freud's psychological approach. Fliess was preoccupied with the nose, numerology, and biological clocks, while Freud was subjecting fantasy to analysis with growing awareness of his own resistances and of the opposition from both colleagues and patients. Fliess was two years younger than Freud (a revenant of his brother, Julius), with similarities in cultural, religious, and medical backgrounds. Recommended by Breuer, Fliess had also participated in a course given by Freud on hysterical paralysis, and they shared an interest in the therapeutic effects and applications of cocaine.

But neither Freud's passionate friendship, nor his open-

minded reception to daring innovative ideas, nor his use of Fliess as his personal physician can explain his idealized attachment to Fliess. The attachment was preceded by his marriage but coincided with both his actual fatherhood and the fathering of psychoanalysis. It was concurrent with the senescence and loss of his own father, the completion of his identification with fathers in his own fatherhood, and his identifications with other creative geniuses.

The death of Freud's father was a nodal point in his life, which he described as "the most important event, the most poignant loss, of a man's life" (1900, p. xxvi). Leaving aside the multiple meanings of this statement, or questions concerning the poignant mourning of other individuals and the loss of different, equally important love objects, the statement confirms the oedipal guilt and the revival of oedipal conflicts stimulated by his father's death. Parenthood as well as parent loss were sources of remobilized unconscious conflict and self-analytic scrutiny. Rivalry and jealousy, castration and separation anxiety were revived with altered object relationships, as his new family was created. Childhood is revisited—but also further removed —with having one's own children, with entry into fatherhood, and, in Freud's case, into middle age. Freud's first analytic discoveries actually anticipated his formal self-analysis. He had intuitively grasped the meaning of postpartum depression and parental ambivalence in 1893 and then, in an act of creative insight, replaced hypnotic reassurance with interpretation (Blum, 1979).

Freud's incipient interpretation of the conflicts of parenthood in the Irma dream preceded the birthday celebration of his wife who was pregnant with the ambivalently anticipated offspring (Anna Freud). Freud did not report associations to his wife's current pregnancy or to her recent pregnancies and, it appears, did not report the Irma dream to Fliess. The plaque that he later imagined (in a letter to Fliess of June 12, 1900, p. 417) would commemorate his discovery of the secret of dreams on July 24, 1895, was prefigured in the dream image of the

chemical formula. The secret of dreams was linked to a dream that had been kept secret, with disguised secrets. Martha's pregnancy reactivated primal-scene trauma and unconscious fantasies of castration, abortion, and infanticide.

A self-analytic process for Freud, with expanding self-knowledge, had germinated prior to the death of his father in October 1896. This informal, silent self-analysis had commenced under the impact of fatherhood and the ensuing revival of the oedipus complex and early parent/child conflict. Parenthood is a normal developmental experience that leads to adult transformations, particularly in those parents with personalities that are not closed to progressive change (Benedek, 1959). As in adolescence, what occurs in favorable circumstances results in new and more mature identifications and object relations. The new family promotes intrapsychic reorganization. Parenthood tests character and alters identity and prior adaptations. Superego transformations may permit new ideals and values (Blum, 1981; Erikson, 1968), and a search for ideal figures is prominent in new parents. Parenthood is a developmental challenge which inevitably revives one's own infantile life with all its problems of affection and aggression, nurturance and dependence. And, of course, parenthood presents new confrontations with adult standards and demands. The new parent identifies with the child *and* completes identifications with his/her own parents. Mature masculinity and femininity are facilitated through the experience of parenthood and the re-experience of childhood, while identifications with individuals from past and succeeding generations lead to a sense of continuity.

The reactivated oedipal competition and guilt can be favorably resolved by becoming a father like one's own father, by being for the first time on an equal footing in terms of actual fatherhood. Problems of sibling rivalry and jealousy, as well as anger toward the mother who has brought the new rivals into the world, also have to be confronted.

To counter the preoedipal, regressive, and infantile longings and to further differentiate himself from his own father (or

really from both parents), Freud sought an idealized father. Moreover, his disillusionment with old Jacob contributed to his family romance fantasies. The pride in fatherhood and creation, both narcissistic and object oriented, is also expressed in surpassing one's father, in being a better father. Idealized fatherhood complements the narcissistic wish for the perfect child who provides an idealized form of self (and object) replication and immortality.

Freud's relationship with Fliess had many motives and meanings and derived from multiple levels of development. Kohut (1976) noted that Fliess was the embodiment of idealized strength and power during a period which encompassed a creative revolution in human thought. Kohut regarded Freud's self-analysis as a creative illness which went beyond its therapeutic resolution to the understanding of mental life. I do not believe, however, that Fliess was primarily a self-object. Rather, the unconscious representation of Fliess changed over the course of their relationship. Fliess represented, in time and degree, the panoply of childhood objects. Freud's self-analysis became more systematic and progressive, following the completion of his own family and then the death of his father. He transcended the powerful, admired, and feared oedipal father in becoming a *paterfamilias*. Completing biological fatherhood, he then became the father of psychoanalysis. Analytic inquiry and insight had become the ego ideals of the first analyst. Freud may have become depleted and vulnerable during periods of intense creativity, but I infer a creative regression and resolution rather than a "creative illness"—a creative use of transference rather than a "transference of creativity." Oedipal guilt over defiance of authority, entering forbidden territory, maternal union and separation, bisexuality, and many other factors must also be considered.

On March 16, 1896, Freud wrote to Fliess, "On the whole I am satisfied with my progress, but I am contending with hostility and live in such isolation that one might imagine I had discovered the greatest truths. I hope our congress will be a real

relief and refreshment" (p. 179). The real relationship between the two men had its own impact, of course. Fliess courted, married, and became a father during a crucial period of their friendship. Ida Fliess, like Martha Freud, was pregnant during 1895 (*cf.*, the Irma dream), and both Robert Fliess and Anna Freud were born in December 1895. Fliess drew upon observations of his wife for his theories of numerology and periodicity and reported to Freud about his son's autoerotic activity and erections. Freud's attribution of genius to Fliess's presumed biological discoveries was not simply narcissistic twinship. It was a passive, deferential attitude avoiding oedipal rivalry and associated with open-minded, feminine receptiveness and pregnant creativity.

The evolution of Freud's creativity, his fathering of psychoanalysis, sequentially followed biological fatherhood, completing his family, and then probably coital abstinence as contraception. He derived additional creative stimulation from his relationship with Breuer, Fliess, and other colleagues, as well as from the cultural and historical forces to which he was exposed. But the wellsprings of creativity are to be found in the formative years of life, beginning with the infantile roots. Freud had six children between 1887 and 1895 which was reminiscent of the rapid succession of children born to his parents (Erikson, 1954). In the ten years between Freud's birth in May 1856 and that of his youngest sibling and brother, Alexander, in April 1866, his mother had seven pregnancies. Freud had probably been exposed to the primal scene while living with his parents in Freiberg, and he was certainly exposed to his mother's repeated pregnancies and to the birth of new siblings. Childbirth, at least in Freiberg, took place at home. He had greeted the birth of Julius, his first sibling, with infantile hostility and envy. His reconstructions of his preoedipal reactions to the birth and death of Julius constitute a dazzling self-analytic achievement (Blum, 1977). His reactions to the death of Julius, the disappearance of his nursemaid, and the move from the familiar surroundings of Freiberg were complicated by his mother's next

pregnancy with his sister, Anna, and then the birth of five sisters before the arrival of Alexander, who elicited fraternal love and fresh rivalry (Kanzer, 1969).

When Freud was forty-three and already had six children, he analyzed his screen memory of his mother's pregnancy and his siblings' births. He dated his memory prior to age three: he was crying for the mother he missed and had come to suspect that she was shut up in a wardrobe or cupboard. He demanded that his much older half-brother, Philipp, open the cupboard. Freud (1901, p. 51) emphasized his mother's slimness, a reassurance that she was no longer pregnant. At the time of his mother's confinement when his sister, Anna, was born, his nursemaid was discovered to be a thief. Her disappearance probably caused him to associate her loss as well as the loss of his mother to the sibling who had stolen his mother's affection. Freud was crying his heart out because his mother was nowhere to be found until she reappeared looking slim and beautiful. The preoedipal mother was transformed into the beautiful object of oedipal desire. Infantile questions concerning conception, pregnancy, and birth can be discerned in the screen memory. He displaced oedipal and sibling hostility onto his half-brother, Philipp, who was about the same age as his mother and whom he decided was responsible for his mother's pregnancy. He was "full of mistrust and anxiety that his mother's inside might conceal still more children" (1901, p. 51, n.). The fetus, as well as the oedipal father, was envious, envied, and possessive.

The profound anxiety stirred by his mother's pregnancies was further revealed in his only recorded childhood nightmare, the dream of the bird-beak figures. This dream, the only one explicitly from childhood reported in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, is connected with the primal scene. But it is also probably linked to his mother's last pregnancy and to the birth of Alexander Freud. Freud placed the nightmare—of bird-beak figures carrying his mother to bed—in his seventh or eighth year. His associations indicated that his mother's face in the dream had the appearance of her dying father. Freud's ma-

ternal grandfather had died on October 3, 1865, when Freud was actually nine years of age. Freud's reaction to maternal separation and loss and his ambivalence toward Philipp, who was held responsible for the pregnancy, appear in the screen memory and in the manifest dream. Awe and envy of female reproduction, identification with the fertile mother, the danger of engulfment in the womb-tomb of sleep, and death wishes appear to have been more deeply repressed than incestuous conflicts.

It is significant that Freud chose for his brother the name Alexander after Alexander the Great (see Jones, 1953, p. 18), the son of Philip, which was also a reference to the Philippson Bible (Grinstein, 1980). Important identifications with biblical and historic figures and an interest in antiquity were germinating in the conflicted child. Freud's childhood heroes were antecedents of the idealized Fliess, and were retained after deidealization of later figures. Philipp, who would himself disappear from Freud's childhood, was associated with teaching Freud the vulgar expression for copulation and with the power, prerogatives, and retaliatory threats of the oedipal father. Freud was the son of Jacob by his second wife, as was the Biblical Joseph. And his identification with Joseph (Shengold, 1971), Jew and Egyptian, the favored son who triumphed over the band of jealous siblings, can be related to the Egyptian birdbeak images in the dream and in the Philippson Bible illustrations. A number of parallels to the story of the biblical Jacob and Joseph have been noted in relation to Freud's childhood nightmare (McGrath, 1986).

Freud's nightmare may also convey the anxiety of his parents over the birth and death of Julius in a setting of home birth and high infant and maternal mortality. His fear of his own hostility and his fear of the loss of mother and sibling have been recognized and amplified in studies of the Irma dream and the dream of the pelvic dissection (Freud, 1900) and in other studies. The dream of Irma's injection with a dirty syringe conveys all the dangers of the primal scene and the ambivalent

wishes for both parenthood and abortion, creation and destruction. Similarly, the dream of the pelvic dissection, an important landmark in Freud's self-analysis, also concerns the traumatic anxiety and rage connected with his mother's pregnancy and the birth of his sibling (Harrison, 1979). The dream and its interpretation also represent the opposite—the pride and gratification associated with the fathering of his biological progeny and psychoanalysis. His self-analysis and parenthood were quite intertwined.

We have not, however, fully considered the meaning and impact of Freud's being the oldest child in a large family, with the rapid appearance of closely spaced siblings. Freud (1917) commented upon the ordinal position of the child in the family and the effect this has upon personality. The sheer size of the family must also be considered in its effects upon the parents and the children. Freud was the firstborn son, the undisputed favorite and darling of his mother. But he probably experienced developmental strain, and repeated traumata, as the number of children increased. Mothers in such families are overburdened, and maternal nurturance and attention tend to be overextended, leaving both mother and children depleted. Emotional and financial support are likely to be strained. The child who is repeatedly exposed to "birth traumata" may remain in an overstimulated state, burdened with anxiety, anger, and guilt. Yet, being entrusted with being a parent's companion or a surrogate parent for younger siblings and participating in their development and education can stimulate the older child's curiosity and ego development (and/or elicit disdain and resentment). A gifted child-parent can observe parenting, development, and parent/child conflict from a position between the generations. Children may reciprocally stimulate the development of the caregivers.

Freud did not reveal, and may have defended against, awareness of the full impact of his sensitivity to his mother's feelings and attitudes about her marriage, motherhood, and the increasing brood of children. His own children doubtless revived

the childhood and regressive tendencies which some parents fear and others relish. His creativity can be related to rivalry, and identification with and envy of the fertile mother; to the wish to undo parent and sibling loss; to repair of fantasied hostile damage to parents and siblings; and to mastery of trauma.

If Fliess was transference nectar for Freud which slaked his thirst, then Fliess was both a narcissistic and a nurturant preoedipal maternal imago (Gedo, 1968; Stolorow and Atwood, 1979). Fliess's presumed encouragement and support during periods of insecurity and the confused first steps of pioneering innovation indicate that Freud re-established an idealized mother/child reciprocity. The idealization simultaneously defended against repressed hostility and negative transference to Fliess; animosity and devaluation intensified after Fliess's surgical mistreatment of Emma Eckstein (see Masson, 1985, pp. 106, ff.). Freud's self-analytic regression was regression in the service of the ego, a creative regression comparable to maternal regression in the service of infant care. Freud's special endowment allowed him to obtain access to infantile conflicts and reactions. His childhood experience of parent/child relationships with his own siblings had a lasting influence upon his personality and his curiosity about the development of children. These questions and conflicts were reactivated during his own repeated experiences of parenthood and contact with his own and other children. If large families with closely spaced children have been shown to be associated with greater maternal and infant mortality and vulnerability, in Freud's case it was also fertile soil for his incipient genius and a spur to developmental achievement and sublimation.

A further exploration of the theme of parenthood in the creative discovery of the psychoanalytic process appears in Freud's case histories. He repeatedly uncovered important sibling relationships—for example, Dora and her brother, Little Hans's reaction to the birth of his sister, the Wolf Man's seduction by his older sister, etc. Freud reconstructed his preoedipal reactions to the birth of his brother, Julius, and also his infantile relation-

ship with his nephew, John. In his associations to the "non vixit dream," Freud (1900) referred to his nephew and stated, "All my friends have in a certain sense been re-incarnations of this first figure . . . they have been *revenants*. My nephew himself re-appeared in my boyhood, and at that time we acted the parts of Caesar and Brutus together. My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend and a hated enemy" (p. 483). His need for the friend and the enemy can be discerned in his relationship with Breuer, Fliess, Jung, and others. Further associations indicated Freud's ambivalent feelings toward Fliess who was born in 1858, the same year as his brother Julius, and who was a revenant of both Julius and John. It is possible to consider the shocking treatment of Emma Eckstein by Fliess, which Freud witnessed, as an unconscious revival of primal-scene shock and of the memory of the mistreatment of John's sister, Pauline, by John and himself (Freud, 1899).

Freud's writing about his nephew-companion and his mention of his niece make references to his five sisters conspicuous by their absence. A protective veil remained over the female members of his family, with only scant mention of his sisters and his mother, in comparison to his comments about his father. The mother's role, especially the omnipotent loved/hated, idealized, and dangerous preoedipal mother, was also minimized in his theorizing during the early period of his writing about the father complex. Parricide was an important feature of the oedipus complex, but there is no explicit reference to matricide in the *Standard Edition*. I shall leave aside here the question of his nursemaid as a surrogate mother, in order to emphasize the paradoxical position he held with his mother. The peasant woman who predicted that with his birth his mother had brought a great man into the world also gave voice to his mother's own ambition for her uniquely endowed son. While being privileged as her favorite, he nevertheless probably felt repeatedly betrayed and deprived, and suffered from uncon-

scious envy and rage, as her attention and affection had to be shared with one sibling after another.

Freud (1913) wrote about the band of brothers in *Totem and Taboo*, but was silent about sisters. Following soon after the death of his brother, Julius, the birth of five sisters in a row must have been a formidable experience. A sister was born during virtually each of his childhood years between three and seven. The circle of sisters may well have been a tempting and threatening, an exclusive and excluding sorority, a restricted zone, with gender and incest barriers. The protective screening of the females in the family may be related to the "dark continent" of female sexuality noted by Freud (1926, p. 212). The sorority of sisters and Freud's individual relationship with each sister may well have been screened behind the "band of brothers." His difficulty in being the eldest of a large group of closely spaced siblings and in being overburdened and perhaps pressured to mature is implied in a letter to his future bride, "I believe people see something alien in me and the real reason for this is that in my youth I was never young and now that I am entering the age of maturity [thirty] I cannot mature properly" (E. L. Freud, 1960, p. 202).

Freud may have had a capacity to observe childhood from a distance while experiencing it. This was perhaps amplified by his identification with the regulatory functions of his parents and by his having become his mother's confidant and counselor, his siblings' indirect supervisor. He analyzed his attachments to and struggles with Julius, John, and Pauline, but not those involving his sisters. We know only of his tearing the pages of a book with Anna when he was five, which had masturbatory implications. Regrettably, we are not informed of the siblings' love and hate, caring, sharing, and play, their interidentifications, their alliances and enmities, cooperation and competition, and their common developmental experience. We lack information about his siblings' activities (e.g., eating, bathing, dressing, playing) or about his mother's management of his sisters, or

their teaching and learning together, etc. (Neubauer, 1983). The sense of equality and fair play as well as community spirit are derived from sibling relationships (Freud, 1930). It should seem a safe inference that as Freud's six children were born into a rapidly enlarging family, the sibling experiences of his own childhood were reactivated. That Anna Freud would have been named for Wilhelm Fliess had she been born a boy seems pregnant with unconscious import—the fathers had cross-fertilized each other's ideas, and Fliess would be replaced by Freud's offspring. Anna Freud's conception and the Emma Eckstein episode were almost simultaneous, and both contributed to Freud's developmental thrust and burgeoning self-analysis.

Freud was his mother's undisputed favorite, and this not only instilled confidence but also stimulated oedipal and sibling conflict. The parents' oedipal conflicts impinge upon the child, and parents influence the unfolding of the oedipal conflicts and solutions of their child. Parenthood revives the oedipus complex of the parent, reflected again in the oedipal reactions of the grandparents to their childrens' parenthood (Rangell, 1970). The solution to the oedipal child's dilemmas, the resolution of oedipal conflict, depends upon identification. In Fliess, Freud initially identified with a benevolent, idealized parent who was utilized in fantasy and probably in reality to permit and promote his son's penetration of the secrets of human nature. He was freed to realize his creative potential and to explore the forbidden internal territory of the mind, a sublimated oedipal victory. As his self-analysis progressed, Freud became more objective, critical, and independent; the idealizing, ambitious son became the confident, creative father. This progression appears in his letters and in his dreams. When he attains analytic mastery, he is represented as the father of his own children in the manifest content of his reported dreams. Before and beyond the death of his father, Freud's actual and symbolic fatherhood, with the revival of his own childhood and associated unconscious conflicts, is a significant additional dimension of his self-analytic process, the prototype of the psychoanalytic process.

SUMMARY

Although Freud attributed his self-analysis and revived oedipal conflict to the death of his father, his becoming a parent was also a significant determinant. Freud was a child observer, as physician, as parent, and as eldest sibling. He fathered six children, which reactivated his own infantile unconscious conflicts and fantasies. And his idealization of Fliess began with his fatherhood, which interrupted his exclusive relationship with his wife, Martha, and, unconsciously, his mother. His growing family evoked his mother's pregnancies and the birth of his seven siblings. The experience of having five sisters in succession (after the death of his brother, Julius) was also of great importance. Freud's mother and sisters have been protectively veiled in his associations, which has theoretical implications. Freud creatively analyzed himself, encountering and explaining the childhood past in his present life, as he became the father of psychoanalysis.

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Analysis of a Woman's Homosexual Strivings by a Male Analyst

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ANALYSIS OF A WOMAN'S HOMOSEXUAL STRIVINGS BY A MALE ANALYST

BY OWEN RENIK, M.D.

Clinical material is presented describing how analysis of the homosexual aspects of a woman patient's transference to a male analyst unfolded. Comparison and contrast is made to previous case reports and discussions of the impact of the analyst's actual gender on analytic work.

In a recent article dealing with analysis of women patients' homosexual transferences, Roth (1988) makes the following observation about the appearance of negative oedipal urges in the analytic situation when the analyst is a man:

> . . . genital active desires (i.e., the wish to see and explore mother's body with masturbatory aims, to stimulate as one has been stimulated, or to give a child to the mother) will not easily be experienced toward the male analyst in a sustained, passionate manner . . . they will find expression outside the office. . . . It is this displacement drama which provides an opportunity for . . . interpreting the homosexual conflicts (pp. 32-33).

Roth finds that a female analysand is only able to experience a male analyst as if he were a genitally desired mother for an occasional split-second. Roth's clinical examples describe how, during the analysis of a female patient's negative oedipal transferences to women in her life, the male analyst is cast in the role of the father, sometimes tolerant of his daughter-rival, but more often disapproving, and in any case without the capacity to satisfy the desires uppermost for her in that phase.

It is not made explicit in Roth's article exactly in what way he understands an analyst's maleness to impede the emergence, undisplaced, of a female analysand's homosexual transference. It seems likely that Roth sees the problem to be that the analyst's actual gender is used by the analysand to rationalize avoidance of awareness of highly resisted transference fantasies as they are played out within the analytic relationship. At least that is suggested when Roth says that his patient's

> frustration with the analyst's being a man and unable to satisfy [her] homosexual longings produced irritation, anger, and depression. I lacked firsthand knowledge of a woman's special attributes and experiences. . . . In lesbian . . . fantasies I could play no role (p. 46).

Like Karme (1979) and Kulish (1984) in their descriptions of the impact of the analyst's gender on the unfolding of transference during analysis, Roth implicitly regards a discrepancy between external reality and internal fantasy as the constraining factor.

My own clinical observations are not entirely in accord with Roth's and lead me to a different emphasis. My female analysands often do present their homosexual transferences in relation to other women rather than to me. However, I find that analytic work not infrequently leads to intense, more-than-fleeting experience of those same wishes directly within our relationship. I would emphasize that in order to unveil a female analysand's awareness of homosexual urges toward me, it is usually crucial to identify and clarify the way she has been using my actual gender to disavow her fantasy experiences. While I would agree with Roth that a great deal of productive analytic work can be done through the analysis of a woman's homosexual transferences to persons other than the analyst, it is my impression that homosexual transference does receive a more compelling and thorough investigation when it comes to be experienced within the analytic relationship.

Insofar as the analyst's actually being male places limitations

on the emergence of aspects of a female analysand's homosexual transference directly within the analytic situation, I am inclined to look toward the gender-related specifics of countertransference for an explanation. In order to address a woman patient's conviction that he cannot be penetrated, impregnated, and excited by having these things done to him, a male analyst must disagree with that conviction in the first place! We know that every male analyst has resistances to acknowledging his femininity, and it is not very difficult for these to collude with a female analysand's resistance to experiencing him as if he were a woman. Beyond the special problems a male analyst can have imagining himself as a sexually aroused woman, there can be particular difficulties associated with tolerating the experience of excited passivity in relation to a phallic woman (as contrasted with assuming the passive role in a male patient's homosexual transference, for example). These are but a few of the obstacles that could be listed. My view of the impact of the analyst's gender is analogous to that of Goldberger and Evans (1985), who describe the shaping role of certain types of countertransference that typically occur when women analyze men.

CASE ILLUSTRATION

In the following highly schematic and abbreviated account, I would like to focus on the manner in which a female analysand's homosexual transference to me became manifest.

The patient was a woman in her late thirties who spent the first two years of analysis understanding and ameliorating the inhibitions that underlay her inability to proceed from graduate school to a career. She was the mother of two young children and gave a credible picture of a reasonably happy marriage that included a satisfying sex life, about which she said very little. She remembered her relationship with her mother, whom she thought of as moralistic and dictatorial, as always having been somewhat strained. She felt more fundamentally accepted by

her father, though his reserve made him less available than she would have liked. Three younger siblings were born during the first seven years of her life, yet she had no conscious memory of her mother's pregnancies, the arrival of any of her brothers and sisters, or her childhood reactions to these events.

From the beginning of the treatment, the patient expected me to demand that my narcissistic needs be met and to be critical of her whenever she failed to meet them. Analysis of this experience of our relationship exposed elements of transference related largely to the view of her mother already described. Sometimes I was the controlling, competitive, needy mother herself, sometimes the desired father from whom the patient had to keep her distance so as not to arouse her mother's wrath. As the work proceeded, the patient became more freely expressive and relaxed during her sessions and made significant progress in her work life.

Toward the end of the second year of her analysis, she began to become preoccupied with having more children, something her husband was reluctant to do. It was important to her for many reasons to have a large family like the one she grew up in, and she felt she could manage it alongside the career she had launched. When she began to feel some loss of interest in her husband, she related it predominantly to her resentment of him as an obstacle to her maternal ambitions. She depreciated her husband by contrasting him with an idealized image of me as a man. When this was analyzed, her first awareness of sexual attraction toward other women came to the fore. This appeared first in dreams, then in waking fantasies of being seduced by friends. Often the friend was one who had just had a baby, was pregnant, or was trying to conceive. She was rivalrous with her friends, and had wishes to be in the other woman's place as well as wishes to ruin her success. We reconstructed with conviction some of the origins of these fantasies in childhood solutions to her envy and resentment, as an eldest daughter, of her mother's mature sexuality and all it entailed. She retrieved a memory of

feeling excluded by her parents when she surprised them cuddling under the covers early one morning.

One day she reported a dream in which she was making love with a woman. The setting bore traces of the analytic office, also of the home she had grown up in. In some ways the other woman resembled the patient herself, in other ways the patient's mother. She and the other woman were lying face to face, their bodies pressed together. Sometimes the patient was on top, sometimes underneath. It was confusing, kept switching around. The dream was enormously exciting. The other woman had a penis and began to enter the patient, who felt on the point of orgasm. At this juncture she awoke, dying to masturbate but unwilling to do so out of embarrassment at being discovered by her husband.

The patient's associations dwelt on the many oscillations and sense of uncertainty that pervaded the dream. Her exquisite excitement seemed to be related in some way to this ambiguity, but she could not elaborate further. I directed her attention to her inability to consummate her sexual longings. It was not self-evident why she was concerned at the idea of her masturbation being known to her husband; nor for that matter why, if she felt that way, she did not attempt to have sex with him. Her thoughts centered around her intense shame at providing pleasure to herself and at taking pleasure from a homosexual fantasy. She felt she had a disgusting secret that made her want to hide from her husband.

My own speculations about this material went in a variety of directions. Certainly there were indications that the patient was engaged in a regressive flight from forbidden heterosexual gratifications: urges toward me as well as toward her husband were probably expressed in disguised form in the dream. However, this did not seem to me to be the most immediately significant feature. One could infer a reaction against sadistic and exhibitionistic impulses to place her husband, and me, in the position of the excluded child, helpless witness to the scene of

sexual excitement depicted in the dream and almost enacted via masturbation. Most of all, I was impressed by the vividness of the sexual excitement aroused in her by the dream, and the fact that this excitement was intimately tied to some kind of oscillation between self and other. It made me wonder how much her homosexual passion, which had the aspect of something long contained and now finally bursting forth in an irresistible crescendo, had to do with the experience of being entered by a woman with a penis, and how much it had to do with the experience of being a woman with a penis who could enter another woman, arousing in that other woman well-known feelings of pleasure.

These thoughts were still with me when the patient began her next hour by remarking, as she had from time to time before, on her reluctance to look me in the eye on her way to the couch. On this occasion I asked her what she thought might be seen and by whom. Her response was to relate her concern about what my reaction had been to our last hour. At first she described her fear that I might be disgusted, but later brought forward the idea that I might also have been "turned on." She knew that some men liked to watch women have sex. I said to her that in any case she thought it quite possible that her words of the last hour had entered my mind and stirred up feelings there, evidence of which she might see if she had looked at me as she entered my office.

Now she was aware of becoming suddenly very upset, confused, slightly dizzy. She seemed to be using this abrupt and puzzling change of mental state as a context for lapsing slightly in the report of her thoughts, and I pointed this out to her. She agreed that she was embarrassed. What was coming to mind, she didn't know why, was a fantasy she sometimes thought about, even during sex with her husband. She found it exciting, but had never told him or anyone else. The fantasy was of watching a man having anal intercourse with her husband, entering him from behind. She had thought about renting a homosexual porno tape so she could watch a man do that to an-

other man; but she never would, for fear of getting caught. Her husband would never want to watch something like that. If he knew about her fantasy, he would be furious at her, because it meant turning him into a fairy, like a woman. She wondered whether I felt that way about it and hated her.

I reminded her that in the previous session she had also begun by worrying that I would have a negative reaction to what she brought up, but later discovered the hope that I might also find it arousing. This reminded her of liking the idea of turning me on, and of what I had said about her words entering my mind. Her associations led her to the recognition that her excitement at the anal intercourse fantasy came from thinking what it would be like to penetrate her husband and cause him to like being entered the way she did. As before with the masturbation, her fear of being caught by him if she got a porno tape contained a wish that he would get into it too and be turned on. She sometimes got an excited feeling entering my office, walking through the door. It was like entering my space. She considered the idea that she might like to perform anal intercourse on me. The problem was that she didn't have a penis, so it was impossible. She couldn't really know how a man felt during intercourse.

Here I pointed out to her that she seemed to prefer to think about what was not possible rather than what was. She had, just before, experienced herself as entering and arousing me in a way. No, she insisted, it was all fantasy and metaphor. Words aren't penises. Watching someone else on a porno tape is not the same as doing it. In reality, she didn't have a penis, and so in reality she couldn't have intercourse the way a man does with a woman. She continued in this vein rather vociferously and at some length, until eventually she slowed down and reached a point at which she commented ruefully on the extremity of her feeling. Maybe she was suffering from a bad case of penis envy, she quipped.

I agreed that maybe she was, but added that in her forceful expression of penis envy, she had shouted down my suggestion

that she was avoiding thinking about what was possible. This comment made her quite uncomfortable. Hesitantly, she admitted that she had a thought before that she was aware of having put out of her mind because she dreaded telling it to me. It was about what she actually did do with her husband that was pretty kinky. Why was it so hard to talk about? In fits and starts, her dedication to the analytic task barely winning out over an urgent desire to flee, she described how in certain moods she loved to have her husband stick things up her—bottles, shoes, other things—usually up her vagina, but sometimes up her rectum too.

Having gotten this confession out, she had trouble specifying the nature of her mortification. I suggested that since telling me was what she dreaded, her dread might have something to do with the reaction she anticipated from me. She started to say how afraid she was that I would be appalled, but caught herself doing the same thing we had talked about several times before. The truth was, she knew I was an analyst, and must be very interested. I was probably excited. Analysts must get turned on a lot. That was probably one reason they went into the field. She would be turned on in my place. She thought of women analysts she knew. She heard me shift in my chair and had the thought I was masturbating. When I encouraged her to describe her image in detail, it became evident that she was not thinking of me as a man. She pictured me rubbing my groin, much as she might do, my pants bulging not with an erection but as if with a swollen pussy.

By now she was obviously enjoying herself. Our interchange had become for her an act of homosexual intercourse between us. First she was the exhibitionist, I the voyeur; then she became the phallic, penetrating woman, and I the receptively aroused one. We were mutually identified, switching and trading actual and imagined traits and sensations. Her experience during this hour continued in waking life what she had dreamed about two nights before.

Subsequently, we explored her enjoyment of having things

stuck up her. It had many determinants, including the idea of taking in a giant penis, larger than her husband's. This made her more phallically powerful than her husband or me. It made her feel like a little girl having intercourse with her great big father. She was being kinky, breaking the taboos. There was pleasure in giving herself over. But perhaps most important to this particular phase of the analytic work was her feeling that if she got excited from having inanimate objects stuck up her, it demonstrated that one didn't need to have a penis to penetrate and turn somebody on. What men did to her, she could do to them—or to another woman.

Throughout this patient's analysis, contributions to her active genital homosexual wishes continued to be elucidated. On one hand, they drew strength from the troubles of her earliest years, her infantile longings to prove to herself she could have an impact, sometimes a sadistic impact, on her ambivalently regarded mother. On the other hand, they represented a flight from femininity, insofar as her quest for phallic power implicitly denied her female potency, the fact that she could actively arouse, create, be influential and competent through her own mature heterosexuality.

The particular relation of the patient's active genital homosexual urges to her negative oedipus complex was most evident in connection with her wish to have a child. Earlier fantasies of being seduced by women who were involved with bearing children seemed to reverse, through the kind of facility for vicarious experience that characterized her dream, her wish to play an active, productive sexual role in relation to a mother.

At one point she became concerned about the welfare of her youngest sister, who was having financial troubles. The extreme degree of the patient's sense of responsibility in the matter, when we examined it closely, reflected a feeling on her part that she was essentially a parent to the sister. Specifically, she felt herself more fit to advise the sister than was their father, whose role it would ordinarily be. Work around a dream that connected this sentiment with resentment of her husband for not

wanting to have more children, and with a wish to somehow do it without a man led us to speculate that the patient had entertained a fantasy in childhood that she, not her father, had made this baby sister with her mother.

At another point, she believed I had gotten angry with her and was refusing to admit it for foolish reasons of psychoanalytic orthodoxy. As it happens, I was not aware of having been angry, but her assessment of the situation was by no means farfetched. What was of interest, however, was her conviction that she was right, and her insistence that I admit it and consider the implications of what she had told me about the reasons for my unreasonable unwillingness to acknowledge the truth. Her fantasy that I had gotten angry was, in the first place, an expression of her desire to know she could stimulate me into arousal. However, as we went into the meaning of the whole interaction, she clarified her longing to know that she could make an interpretation that would set in motion a process of growth in me, as I had so often done to her. Among the multiple determinants of this poignant ambition was the version of her active genital homosexuality that involved a wish to impregnate her mother.

DISCUSSION

This report is intended to describe the kind of clinical observations I take to be evidence that I am being experienced as the object of a female patient's homosexual longings, transference determinants of which can be brought to light. The first conscious homosexual thoughts presented by my patient did not involve me, which is in keeping with what Roth finds; however, as analytic work proceeded, there was an evolution that brought homosexual urges toward me into consciousness. From comparing notes with female colleagues,[1] I have the impression that

[1] I would like to express my gratitude to Eva Lester, Malkah Notman, Sydney Pulver, and the other members of the Workshop on Women's Sexual Response at the American Psychoanalytic Association Meetings for their helpful comments when this material was informally presented in that setting.

the events I have described parallel what happens regularly in the analysis of women patients by women analysts.

I had ample opportunity to address the material of this phase in an "upward" direction, i.e., as a regressive compromise of the patient's positive oedipal wishes, or "downward" as an expression of her longing for an idealized pregenital mother. Either of these aspects of the truth could have been pursued at the expense of a full elucidation of the patient's genital homosexuality. Roth points to this danger. Virtually all investigators agree that it is genital homosexual transferences that often are not apparent in the analysis of women by men, whereas pregenital mother transferences typically do develop. This observation does not seem to me best explained by the idea that an analyst's being a man is less discordant with the pregenital girl's images of her mother than with developmentally later ones. Rather, I think it likely that pregenital mother transferences do not tend to elicit as much anxiety in a male analyst as do transferences in which he is treated as a genitally responsive homosexual woman, and that this difference can have a subtle impact on technique.

It is probably worth focusing for a moment on the fact that prior to her first conscious awareness of strong, sustained homosexual feelings toward women in her life, the patient had been preoccupied with criticisms of her husband that were easily attributed to realistic considerations, and that these turned out to be rationalizations of a derogation of him in relation to an idealized image of the analyst. Here is a common opportunity for countertransference interference. On the basis of his own positive oedipus complex, a male analyst at this phase of the work can easily construe himself exclusively as the patient's preferred heterosexual object. And, of course, the analyst's own competitive strivings, especially if the patient is particularly appealing, can lead him to be less than vigorous in unearthing and analyzing the gratifying covert invidious comparison. Yet, only if implicit idealization of the analyst in relation to other men is identified, will analysis of it reveal the patient's

turn toward homosexuality. Ultimately, the idealized analyst is very much a mother the patient fears she will lose if she maintains a successful closeness with a man outside the analytic situation.

Reviewing the evolution by which my patient's expressions of homosexuality came to take me as an object, an important step was the exposure of her focus on the fact that she did not have a penis. This part of reality had been used by her to deny another part of reality—namely, that she could penetrate and arouse other people and take pleasure from doing it. Denial of her actual capacity to penetrate and arouse had precluded awareness of her urges toward active phallic genitality. When this new direction became accessible, her associations took her to homosexual transference fantasies, referable in part to her negative oedipus complex. Some of the work on this use of a concrete external circumstance in the service of resistance to self-awareness was done through analysis of the patient's sex life with her husband. She first had to discover her not unrealistic wish to physically enter and excite him. However, it was by examining her immediate experience of speaking about her sex life in analysis that she discovered similar wishes toward me, of which the homosexual component could be teased out. Because of her resentment of her husband's refusal to have more children, the vengeful sadomasochistic side of her phallic sexuality was accented with him. It was when phallic homosexual wishes toward me came to the surface that their loving, generative components, and the yearnings they defended against, could also be appreciated.

In conclusion, I would like to state the obvious, which is that an analyst's gender is only one of myriad "realities" about him or her that inevitably participate in the analytic situation. The analyst's style of dress, personal manner during sessions, way of arranging the office, the information about the analyst in the public domain, and any extra-analytic contacts with the analysand are a few of the other circumstances whose impact on the analytic process has been discussed in our literature. In every

instance, the question arises whether a constraint, or at least a burden, is placed upon analytic work. It seems likely that the effect of any external variable, including the analyst's gender, is best assessed on a case-by-case basis, with as much consideration given to the psychology of the analyst's functioning as to the patient's.

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Psychoanalytic Reflections on a Particular Form of Language Distortion

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PSYCHOANALYTIC REFLECTIONS ON A PARTICULAR FORM OF LANGUAGE DISTORTION

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A female obsessive patient communicated with her sister via a distortion of the Hebrew language, in which she masculinized the feminine gender second person pronoun and certain nouns. This treatment of words is analyzed in terms ranging from the concrete to the metaphoric uses of language. Lacan's emphasis on the meaning of the word is explored and is seen as an amplification rather than a replacement of the object relations approach to language and metaphor.

The importance Freud assigned to language as a vehicle for the unconscious has gained additional impetus from the view that language represents the very structure of the unconscious. This new approach is primarily associated with the writings of Jacques Lacan (1964, 1966). Lacan's work is being subjected to increasing critical examination, and the constructive, innovative contributions of his various complex, confusing, and embedded metalinguistic and philosophical expositions are being weighed against the more cloudy, quasi-mystical, clinically unsubstatiatable aspects (Ragland-Sullivan, 1985; Turkle, 1982). A central contribution lies in Lacan's dynamic-structural interpretation of language, although I believe it to be basically object relational,

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and an application of his approach to clinical material will be considered here.

The psychoanalytic community has readily accommodated Lacan's concept of the mirror phase, and his emphasis on the phenomenology of the word with its manifold but never obvious relationship to its true object. Lacan was prone to state that in the word we are given the symbolic presence of the absent thing signified (1966, p. 65). However, I take this as stating in an existential way what has been known by psycholinguists for some time: language is a system of symbols based chiefly on forgetting, in that the original meaning or object of a word must first be forgotten or repressed in order for the new and acceptable meaning to be established (Thass-Thienemann, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 79). And it was obvious to Freud as well that apparently playful games and expressions—such as the *fort-da!* game discussed in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920, pp. 14-16)—were structured efforts to accommodate mother's absence and return. Yet we remain indebted to Lacan for recasting important tenets perhaps diluted by neo-Freudian and ego psychological revisionism.

It has become clear, at the same time, that Lacan's revolutionary canons to a certain degree distort basic psychoanalytic theory (Edelson, 1975; Ricoeur, 1970; Vergote, 1983). While the mirror stage, for example, is useful and empirically verifiable, it is much more hypothetical to conclude that the ego produced by this stage is *essentially* an alienation and a misrepresentation. In Lacan's radical, almost nihilistic insistence that metaphor—the word—can never lead to a true object, the enterprise of psychoanalytic therapy as well as everyday communication becomes a cynical Moebius puzzle, wherein terms like consciousness, self, and object relationship lose all relevance. Even if we retain Lacan's valuable emphasis on the *kind* of unconscious structure the word reveals, his linguistic preoccupation is lopsided. Lacan seems to have discarded the cornerstone distinction between the way the unconscious creates structure

and the structures that are involved in the creation of the unconscious. He offers no clinical evidence to justify his collapsing of the two into the former. Lacking, for another example, is an awareness of the interrelationship between linguistic signifier and affective investment (see Ragland-Sullivan, 1985).

More important, it seems that when Lacan gets around to making what one might call clinically relevant statements—the kind that would appear in an actual interpretation to a patient—he seems essentially to be portraying the word as a part-object, as an entity bearing linguistic properties but also deeply connected to symbolic representations of body and self experience and the qualitative manner in which these are internalized. For example, Lacan's (1954-1955) own alternative analysis of Freud's Irma dream reads very much like an existential, object relations interpretation, turning the focus toward the self and the many "identifications" implicit in Freud's imagery. At no point does Lacan's analysis appear to be uniquely linked to his complex theorizations.

In fact, during the twenty or so years it has taken for Lacan's work to become more generally known among English-speaking readers, an explosion of new thinking in contemporary object relations theory had produced a far less abstruse, less radical complementary approach to the meaning of language, synthesizing the relationship between self, drive, the object, or "the Other," and the *word* that signifies this relationship. Regardless of one's approach, however, any idiosyncratic use of language in an otherwise linguistically competent patient merits attention and inference regarding the underlying unconscious structure expressed through such distortion.

CLINICAL ILLUSTRATION

The following summary from the psychoanalytic treatment of an obsessional twenty-six-year-old female illustrates an unusual relationship between the word, its unconscious structure, and

unique dynamic and object relational meaning. This relationship was brought to light by an idiosyncratic deviance in the patient's use of her native Hebrew language.

C elected thrice-weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy following a series of unsatisfying courtships and increasing dissatisfaction with her job as an educator in a girls' school. She had never been in therapy before, but announced from the outset serious doubts about psychologists and psychoanalysis, favoring instead a well-known counselor whose specific advice-oriented, short-term sessions seemed more efficient and more commonsensical. She wondered about the adequacy of my Hebrew, but after "evaluating" my fluency decided that it would do, especially since perhaps I would be less prone to offer too many fanciful psychological interpretations. Psychologists's words were "contrived out of the air," like the rabbinic *pilpul* (casuistry) she so disdained. She added that she openly challenged lecturers when she found them in error. Oral aggressive and phallic tendencies were immediately evident in this early confrontation, but it more significantly presaged her eventual destructive assault against language itself and the categories of thinking (Bion, 1970).

In many ways, the patient's obsessive concerns revealed a deep core of shame-riddenness, as shall be seen below, in terms of both their dynamic content and the permeable quality of the self-other boundary (see Lewis, 1971; Morrison, 1983; Spero, 1984). Yet her overall object relations functioning was on a high level. No inadequately disguised primary process material surfaced in connection with these aspects of self structure, either during psychological testing or during the first three years of treatment. In view of the above and also in view of her emotions with which one could readily empathize, her dedicated (if conflictual) friendships, higher level defense mechanisms, and insight, I considered her personality structure essentially neurotically constricted, with narcissistic tendencies.

The patient was the oldest of five desired children born to academic parents of middle-class Israeli socioeconomic status.

Her mother was described as an expert in Hebrew, a dedicated, "hyperorganized" teacher who put on airs and affected stilted intonations when she spoke. C remembered her mother as a basically supportive but emotionally awkward parent, about whom it was repeatedly told that she could not manage to get C, as an infant, to eat. Infant C began to lose weight and needed to be intubated temporarily. Her father she viewed as somewhat distant, slightly henpecked, and preoccupied with his horticultural and other interests. When he took the children on outings, he rapidly turned the events into nature lectures. Yet C was also aware that her father had compiled a very detailed and emotionally touching log of her first two years of development, which she, in fact, possessed. She reported that her father was said to have succeeded with feeding her where others could not, and created all sorts of diminutive nicknames for her, which her mother viewed as foolish.

Although C had very attractive facial features, she remained quite thin (never anorectic), partly due to various vague stomach problems and her general disinterest in food. Her idealized fantasy of a perfect husband depicted a man of the spirit, of few words, who would be satisfied with some kind of basic meal, and her religious heroes were individuals who were reputed to have lived simple, even monastic lives. She expressed interest in sexuality, akin to a child's curiosity, but was very uninformed factually. In another area of drive investment, she always wore well-matched outfits in pastel or earth tones, yet here, too, claimed disinterest in clothes or color. The large body of religious legends, lore, and law expressing positive attitudes toward worldly pleasure C either ignored or reinterpreted in forced ways (see Spero, 1982). There was thus a marked libidinal restriction in central areas of object interest, and words spent discussing these topics were viewed as wasted. These inhibitions were associated primarily with her mother.

In yet another area, C's mother had been only mildly religious as a youngster, and became more religious in a rigid, for-

malistic way during C's teens, while her father, despite vast religious knowledge, practiced religion as convenient. The role shift hinted at above gained expression in religious life as well: mother took very little pleasure in religious ritual (C recalled arriving at school ashamed because her mother had made only minimal efforts to costume her for pre-festival school activities), while father regarded lovingly the rituals of interest to him, such as blessing the children on Sabbath eve. His religious practices she experienced as embarrassing, which revealed an oedipal quality as opposed to the more primitive shame feelings she experienced with her mother. Although C was religiously raised and educated, she had, for the last five years, engaged in pitched battles with God over various theological issues which paralleled the central themes of her psychosexual and psychosocial conflicts. Most obvious was her obstinate rebellion against projected masculine aspects of religious dogma and her frustrated attempts to assert herself in a phallic way within the religious institution (Meissner, 1984; Spero, 1987, 1990). When this failed, she dangled between intense, oedipally based hatred against God, fear of divine punishment, and self-hatred for continuing to practice certain key rituals compulsively.

As therapy progressed, C described good relations with her brothers and fair relations with her sister, whose more womanly figure and innocent, carefree ways she envied. In fact, C was intensely envious of anyone who could speak, eat, pray, move, or relate socially in a spontaneous manner, for she was uncomfortable with her body, its inner and external movements, the way it occupied space, the flow of her hand, the motion of her mouth when eating, the pitch of her voice, the amount of words she needed in order to express herself eloquently. She related with great embarrassment that she adopted her particular way of walking by copying a movie actress. This allowed her to walk as she felt a woman should walk, reducing somewhat the anxiety of having constantly to "decide" how to walk or posture, yet this was maddeningly artificial.

Therapy slowly enabled C to relinquish her suspiciousness and her guardedness about early memories and the feelings bound up with them. Most important were the developments leading toward releasing her virtual stranglehold on the use and interpretation of words. Until the middle of the third year of treatment, derogation of psychology permeated many hours. C allowed virtually no interpretation of her material which went beyond the literal. Often, tentative reflections by the therapist about the most obviously connected and apparently interpretable associations were rejected out of hand. For example, C depicted events utilizing recognizably sensual signifiers, yet subsequently would have only vague recall of these elements, or be absolutely stymied as to what to do with them. Metaphoric allusions almost immediately ossified into empty casts, giving the impression that they shared nothing but alphabetical similarity to their reflected image in the mind of the therapist.

The therapist's countertransference experience was of having his words shot out of the sky in mid-flight. Perhaps one could describe a sense of emasculation.[1] By carefully interpreting the evident projective mechanism, the therapist enabled C to recognize how she controlled emotional and interpersonal experiences by denuding language of its consensual meaning, becoming the sole arbiter of what words could mean or how they

[1] A few remarks about one particular aspect of the countertransference. This analysis was conducted, of course, in Hebrew. While my Hebrew is fluent, there is no hiding my American accent, or occasional Americanisms (e.g., slightly literalistic translations into Hebrew of parables or phrases). On one hand, such errors objectively attract attention and merit correction, but they could as easily be ignored. But, perhaps not *so* easily for the patient seeking an opportunity to devalue or to triumph. The intensely derisive, pathological manner in which C related to such errors initially required some inner preparation on my part. I thought, prior to one early session, "This lady sets my teeth on edge!" In fact, she typically delivered her perorations through clenched teeth. My immediate association was to the didactic prescription for the Wicked Son in the Passover *Haggadah*, "You, too, in retort, set his teeth on edge" (". . . *ve-ātāh, hakeh et shi'nāv*"; literally, "strike his teeth"). Beyond the personal, objective, and neurotic meanings of this and other associations, there was here an early perception of the projective-introjective interaction between C and her mother.

should be used. Second, she learned that her attempts to invalidate the basic linguistic framework of the therapy recreated the identical efforts of her mother to control C's emotional impact on herself and what her mother perceived as C's sensual impact on her father. There was thus beginning evidence in this work that the word played a special role in sexual identity development.

During one particular month, a configuration of topics began to emerge. Aided by the gradual renewing of interest in sensual aspects of experience, C related memories of animosity toward her father's coarse habit of using her blanket to rest upon after returning drenched in sweat from his Sabbath walk. She had an obsessive-phobic association to the talmudic legend that the scholar, ben Sira, was conceived when his mother became impregnated by semen floating in the water of the ritual bath. She immediately rejected the legend as nonsense. There followed what might be considered an episode of acting out in reaction to the anxiety aroused by the previous material. C had earlier left teaching to pursue nursing, and at this juncture in therapy left nursing and elected graduate studies in a linguistic field. Although she had occasionally intellectualized about this field, her sudden decision seemed designed to bolster her defenses against random expression and self-revelation. In rationalizing the precipitous decision, C declared that she was a natural for this field, adding the association that she was fairly certain of having not committed a *single* grammatical error in either conjugation or punctuation (formal Hebrew is based upon a complex dot-vowel system) since third grade!

In the subsequent hour, C spoke of mild discomfort in the university setting, her lack of spontaneity, and, again, jealousy of her sister's ability to enjoy campus-style attire. She was convinced that a fellow student was developing a romantic interest in her. She soon began to talk about the way her brothers and sister would horseplay, wondering aloud whether the boys derived some kind of sexual stimulation from these activities. She

quickly added that it was all quite "brotherly," yet admitted that perhaps she was projecting her own dim sense of some sexual attraction, possibly to her brothers or even to her sister. In the next session, she mentioned that she, "as is common in our culture," occasionally shared her bed with her sister. She added that she specifically looked for homosexual feelings but found none.

C then revealed, with marked interest, that when she was approximately eleven years old, she initiated a special language with her then one-year-old sister based on a unique distortion of the Hebrew language. The first aspect consisted of dropping the suffix letter *heh* at the end of most feminine gender Hebrew nouns, rendering them masculine, and accordingly changing into masculine form all related verbs or adjectives used with the noun: e.g., *temunah* (f.) (picture) = *temun; temunah yafah* (f.) (pretty picture) = *temun yafeh*. This distortion was applied even to words which, when modified, became difficult to pronounce: e.g., *simlah* (dress) = *siml; ḥulẓah* (shirt) = *ḥulẓ*. In the second aspect of distortion, instead of addressing her sister with the feminine form of "you" (*āt*), she added the letter *heh*, correctly yielding the masculine form of "you" (*ātāh*), and spoke to her sister with masculine gender pronouns and verbs. In effect, she spoke to her sister as if referring to a male: e.g., instead of the feminine form for "you went," *āt hālākht*, C would say *ātāh hālākhtāh*.

C could recall no reason for this special language, adding only that while it seemed completely natural between the sisters, others hearing it found it quite strange. C noted that her sister, ten years her junior, was initiated into this dialect essentially from the time she began to speak. C also recalled that "she was *so* cute and such a *small* little *pishpesh* [a beetle, or, in vulgar Hebrew, a little penis] that she just seemed to invite a short form of Hebrew. In addition, you know my penchant for efficiency!" C initially attempted to emphasize the fact that most nouns became shorter through the elimination of the *heh*. Only

later was she able to recognize that the key was the masculinization of terms, which in the case of the second person pronoun resulted, in fact, in a *longer* word.

The patient's subsequent associations and therapeutic work confirmed the line of analysis to be presented below. The following illustrates the kind of confirmatory material she produced. In one session about three weeks after the above developments, C brought in two children's books that she described as among her favorites. She spoke warmly about these childhood companions; she had related, with marked delight, to the cuddly, round-featured little children in the colorful pictures. She then added with enthusiasm that she "loved the *nikud*," referring to the system of dots and accents which appear under Hebrew letters, serving as vowels. While the reading ability of the average eight-year-old no longer depends upon *nikud*—which becomes implicit as a function of word and consonant recognition—and printed matter intended for this age group and beyond no longer features *nikud*, C expressed a special longing for these dots. She remarked that for a long time she had needed the theme of older children's literature to be especially captivating in order to compensate for forgoing "the pleasure of the little cute dots!"

As the hour continued, C remarked that *nikud* was essential, since many simple Hebrew words were ambiguous without vowels (although this well-known problem is precisely what advanced, word-in-context recognition corrects). She gave as an example the Hebrew word made of the two letters, *shin* and *mem*, which, without vowels, might be read as Shem (the name of the firstborn son of Noah), *shām* (there), or *shaim* (name). "How can you tell them apart otherwise?" she naïvely wondered. At this point, I alluded to our previous work with the extra letter *heh* in the word *ātah* and its apparent sexual significance, and I related this to the current context in which "little appendages" were necessary in order to distinguish one word from the other.

Without acknowledging my comments at first, C proceeded to talk about an incident that had taken place when she was about four years old and the family had gone to the beach. She described the young children, all dressed in simple bathing trunks, running about with matted wet hair of relatively similar length. She asked her father how it was possible to tell the difference between the boys and the girls. He responded to the effect that girls had rounded ear lobes. With this association, the theme of the succeeding sessions turned toward oedipal relationships, followed closely by the fantasied representation of the paternal penis in the form of the letter *heh*, its removal from the phallic mother (*temunah* = *temun*), and its transposition to the wished-for masculine phallic self-representation and the fragmented phallic part-object in the form of the scattered dots and dashes of *nikud*.

DISCUSSION

The English speaker is unfamiliar with gender-restricted first and second person pronouns, nouns, and verbs, and many languages which indeed feature feminine and masculine nouns and associated verbs do not extend this to the first and second person pronouns. Yet this is fundamental to Hebrew, mastered by most native children by age seven or eight, after which point errors are almost unheard of, certainly in spoken Hebrew. C's idiosyncratic language, while in certain ways similar to the "secret language" of young siblings and twins, is especially interesting because of the relatively late age at which it appeared in an individual who so carefully respected the formalities of language, and because of its sustained use over the course of some fifteen years.

The sole reference to a similar phenomenon occurs in one of the Wolf Man's dreams (Freud, 1918). Working slowly with emergent primal scene material and his displaced erotic feelings for the maid, Grusha, the Wolf Man described a dream in which

a man tears off the wings of a wasp, which he mispronounced in German as "*Espe*" instead of "*Wespe*."[2] Freud concluded, "The *Espe* was of course a mutilated *Wespe*. The dream said clearly that he was avenging himself on Grusha for her threat of castration" (p. 94). In psychoanalytic terms, the *Espe* shorn of its "*W*" is a *symbol* of castration in the sense that the abstract connection between the signifier and the signified is repressed (Piaget, 1945, p. 165), the meaning of the symbol hidden from the subject. For Lacan, the lived psychological experience expressed through the distorted structure of the word *is* castration. In Lacan's emphasis (1956, p. 269), "The word can also suffer symbolic wounds!" As stated above, Lacan prefers to emphasize repeatedly that what is presented by the word is precisely what is absent (Lacan, 1966, p. 65), and in the Wolf Man's case the dilemma is not only the missing phallus-W, but also the parallel *experience of lack* in his basic sexual identity.

While there is much that Lacanian exegesis does not inform us about clinical material, such as will be discussed below in more traditional terms, its approach to the word illuminates C's amputation of the letter *heh* from feminine nouns and its anastomosis to the masculinized pronoun *ātāh* ("you").[3] For C, the word is clearly not a concrete *equivalent* for mother or self, as might be expected of a more primitive personality (Segal,

[2] Freud related the dream as follows (1918, p. 94): " 'I had a dream,' he said, 'of a man tearing off the wings of an *Espe*.' '*Espe*?' I asked; 'what do you mean by that?' 'You know; that insect with yellow stripes on its body, that stings.' I could now put him right: 'So what you mean is a *Wespe* [wasp].' 'Is it called a *Wespe*? I really thought it was called an *Espe*.' (Like so many other people, he used his difficulties with a foreign language as a screen for symptomatic acts.) 'But *Espe*, why, that's myself: S.P.' (which were his initials)." In *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud (1901, p. 48) made reference to the screen memory of a twenty-four-year-old man, which might be seen as related to our discussion. The patient recalled his aunt's trying to teach him the letters of the alphabet, and his difficulties with the difference between *m* and *n*. The aunt explained that "the *m* has a whole piece more than the *n*." Only later was this linked to the deeper theme of sexual curiosity. (*Cf.*, Melanie Klein's illustrations cited in subsequent paragraphs.)

[3] In its root, *am-putō*, *-āre*, "amputate" carries *putō* = "penis," and *putātus* = "chopped off." Thass-Thienemann (1968, Vol. 2, pp. 98-117) provides an excellent review of the etymological root of the term "castration."

1957). C's distortion is unlike the language of the psychotic, for whom the word, its referent, and relevant metaphoric meanings are completely dedifferentiated (Searles, 1962; Shahly, 1987), retaining only a primitive and primary "thing-identity." Yet it is also unlike the pure transposition of metonymic or metaphoric meaning such as in higher level symbolization, since C *acts* in distorting the word (Ekstein, 1961). Rather, C's personal use of the word lies somewhere in between, an amalgam of dynamic conflict, preoedipal dispositions, and an idiosyncratic level of linguistic-object representation in an individual who has achieved advanced levels of self-other differentiation. In this function, it is similar to the way Melanie Klein's young patients attributed phallic significance to the letter "i," urethral pleasure to the curve of the "u," and experienced musical notes, dots, and score lines as the maternal genitalia (1923, pp. 64-67; 1925, p. 111).

The deletion of the *heh* was indeed understood during subsequent analysis as a castration, and its joining to the feminine *āt* represented the desire to acquire phallic capabilities.[4] The *heh* as what Lacan terms a "phallic signifier" means the symbolic or representational agent of separation, of detachment from mother, of the self deemed repugnant, and not the male sex organ per se. The equivalence to "sex" comes only when gender identity is confused in language with the oedipal drama, when language has to bear the burden of resolving oedipal identifica-

[4] Although the feminine Hebrew form *āt* (thou) occasionally appears in the Bible simply as a shortened form of the masculine form *ātāh* (Deut. 5:24; Ezek. 18:14), without implying that the object is female, the usage of the feminine form in one particular passage drew the attention of rabbinic commentaries. In Numbers 11:15, Moses wearily exclaims to God, "And if Thou [*āt*] deal thus with me, kill me, I pray Thee, out of hand." Noting that "Thou" is written in the feminine form, Rashi (eleventh century) interpreted, "Moses' strength was weakened like a woman [*ka'ne-keivah*]." Yet, as the anthologist-exegete Barukh Halevi Epstein (d. 1942) noted, the word *āt* in the passage cited refers to God and not Moses. Epstein daringly paraphrased Rashi, "Moses' strength weakened as following sexual relations with a woman" (*Torah Temimah*, Num. 11, no. 9). Again, the deletion of the masculine signifier *heh* seems to capture the projection of the castrative-depletive quality of object relationship.

tions. But if we are to agree with Lacan that the architectonics of C's language reflect the structure of the unconscious, this can make sense only if we include the dynamic factors which hold such structure together, giving it its tensional, motivational character.

First, a disposition was set by C's mother's own sparse, controlling use of language and generally parsimonious approach to rich dialogue and the interpersonal relations which accompany it. This was coupled with the mother's early lack of synchrony with infant C during the oral and anal stages and during the fundamental prestages of verbal development. C's continued exercise of near-conscious control over phonetic precision and linguistic economy suggested impairment of the stimulus barrier function of words, as an aid to preserving ego autonomy (Edelheit, 1969), and the object relational function of words, as a replacement for the gradual withdrawal of mothering functions, or Lacan's "presence of absence" (see Edgcumbe, 1981). All other ego functions, however, were highly integrated, and her overall symbolizing skills quite advanced.

Second, oedipal relations were also conflictual, in that the father early on provided maternal functions, only subsequently to become more distant (but possibly seductive). Pleasant, rich, abstract, multinuanced language was associated with father, whose fructifying words had to be dampered when, during C's middle childhood, they appeared to incite mother's jealousy. From her mother she experienced projected castrative rivalry due to her close relation with her father. Castration anxiety was expressed through the *removal* of the *heh* from all other nouns, manifestly in the interest of masculinizing them, and also through the fantasied fragmentation of the penis in the form of the relieving dispersion of the *nikud* dots. Third, the birth of a sister during C's early adolescence stirred anew latent homosexual aspects of her neurotic oedipal identifications. There followed a displacement of homoerotic feelings toward mother (dealt with until then via identification with the aggressor) onto the sister, rendered "brother" by masculinizing the pronoun

used for communication with her. This simultaneously allowed the experience of possessing a penis (the extra *heh*) when similarly addressed by her sister in the masculine form. All of these factors are "knotted" together in the *heh*, which for Lacan means that there is always a castration-separation dilemma to be overcome in the patient's language.

LANGUAGE DISTORTION AS FETISH

I was disinclined to view C's language as a transitional phenomenon, since it was more closely linked to denial of castration anxiety and of envious and homosexual feelings toward her younger sister (Barkin, 1978, p. 528). More important, *thinking* and *speaking* to each other in the masculine form reified latent but shared homoerotic fantasies (Issacs, 1948), enabling C simultaneously to project and identify with masculine tendencies, pathologically stabilizing her conflicting negative and positive oedipal identifications. Thus, while there exists a repressed, dynamically determined symbolic link between the signifier (*ātāh*) and what it signifies, the active involvement of the language in the sisters' lives perpetuated an incompletely internalized quality of object relationship. Through the use of the artificial *ātāh*, C's relationship with her sister retained a part-object, *almost* fetishistic quality, masking "congealed anger" and sadomasochistic strivings (Greenacre, 1969).

I have suggested that C's use of language ought probably to be distinguished from fetishism proper. Clearly, in her case there is no evidence of the creation through language of a delusion of castration or of possessing a phallus, although the word reflects a relatively discrete pocket of *illusion* through which conflict and reparation can be unconsciously experienced. Recently, Weich (1989) presented the case of a patient for whom obsessive and obscene telephone conversations served to ward off castration anxiety: words were used "as though they were the objects for which they symbolically stand" (p. 250; see also,

Keiser, 1962). According to Weich's analysis, the patient's obscene words and the victims' erotic reactions became phallic equivalents, taken through the mouth and ears, creating the illusion of a female phallus. Would the same analysis apply to my patient?

First, note that despite Weich's (1978) earlier, clearly segregated outline of the development of language—through transitional, fetish, and constancy stages—his 1989 analysis appears to conflate these qualities, depicting the patient's obscenities as at once symbolic, object-equivalent, and fetishistic. In fact, Weich is essentially grappling with the "betwixt 'n' between" level of development reflected by his patient's compulsion. Weich therefore emphasizes symbol-*like*, object-*like*, and fetish-*istic* qualities. He then compares this hybrid phenomenon to Werner and Kaplan's (1963) notion of the protosymbol, a presymbolic creation which *means* rather than *represents* its object.

This relabeling is conceptually misleading, I think, because a valid determination of the fetish or fetish-like nature of speech depends upon the context of the overall level of self-other development and not on the speech product itself. It will be useful to compare (with the information available) my patient and Weich's. Weich's patient is relatively more disturbed than C; more impulsive, less capable of maintaining autonomous functioning, singularly dependent upon his compulsion in order to negotiate heterosexual relations. C's distorted speech focuses upon a specific object, close to the oedipal hearth, whereas Weich's patient relates to his objects less specifically, using them more as drive-discharge objects than as reflexive ones (Parkin, 1987). Weich's patient uses forms of speech he finds in his culture's language to directly discharge and act out sadomasochistic fantasies, whereas C, in a manner that is truly symbolic, transforms linguistic structures to comply with, and modify, an unconscious reality. Thus, I surmise that Weich's patient's speech, understood against the overall context of the perversion, was much more akin to the fetish proper: a part-object phenomenon reflecting a relatively inferior level of internaliza-

tion in general as well as in the specific domain of the internalization of language. In C's case, structural conflicts are symbolized entirely within the domain of language, requiring very little additional, undisguised forms of discharge (see Beratis, Miller, and Galenson, 1982-1983; Call, 1980).

LACAN'S CONTRIBUTION

For Lacan, the person *is* the word; he or she is comprised of signifiers. It is not the human who creates language, or phallic symbols, but rather the pre-existing structure and logic of language and the experience of psychic separation (Lacan's Law of the Name-of-the-Father) which create a certain kind of unconscious, which, in turn, creates conscious experiences and derivative expressions of the Other's impact upon the individual. It is the image, sound, effect—the "letters"—of the Other that are introjected and begin to form the representations of our objects. Lacan is thus a linguistic positivist, yet he does not completely ignore the various paralinguistic (e.g., affective) contributions of the object (see Ragland-Sullivan, 1986). Also, there is the problem of Lacan's own recognition that, developmentally, the symbolic order—or the ability to name things—follows the imaginary order, which suggests a prior nonlinguistic stage. Yet Lacan maintains that the Other's language is what brings forth the imagining functions of the self.

If one mistakenly were to follow Lacan literally, one might conclude that the word *is* a substitute for an impossible union with the Other, or *is* the absence of the phallus. But this would render all words fetish objects. Rather, truly symbolic words retain a transformational relation to separation, union, and relation with the phallus, a relation which fetish words never achieve. Proof for this comes from Lacan's own hypothesis that psychosis represents a holding on to the word or signifier *itself* to deal with reality, minus the symbolic order of the word.

Does Lacan's thought help us to understand something new

about C's pathology and her psychotherapy? It is axiomatic for Lacan that "the Unconscious is the discourse of the Other" (1966, pp. 85-86). In view of the above, one can offer an agreeable Lacanian formulation that the modified or transposed gender of the word, of the pronoun "you," reflects the castrative unconscious structure of the mind of the "Other," i.e., the mother, and the forbidden, oedipally seductive unconscious structure of the mind of the father, as these were partially internalized by C over the years and projected onto others. Yet we also know that salubrious changes must have taken place in therapy prior to the patient's being able to "remember" the existence of this language (Olinick, 1976, 1978; Voth, 1970). There had to be a certain regression away from defensive tendencies, some advance in the oedipal content of her associations, some internal movement from relative concreteness toward being able to appreciate the metaphoric value of her uniquely distorted language.

Lacan's way of thinking allows an amplification of another aspect of the treatment and the patient's language. One can suggest that C's revealing the existence of the secret language at that particular point in therapy indicates an unconscious perception on her part that an Other, the therapist, is psychologically able to "hear" her, to detect the resonation of new signifiers that cross between the *heh* and key events in the patient's life (Schneiderman, 1980, p. 15), to accept empathically the new totality of personality the patient is about to unfold. C must have begun to feel that the unconscious structure of the mind of the therapist would accept metaphor, would tolerate word distortions, would not rush to steal the augmentary *heh* from her pronouncements.

Psychoanalytic and object relations theories gain from Lacan a precise locus for the substitutive, restitutive, and representational dynamics so central for an understanding of human behavior, and it is the word. Lacan will engender renewed consideration of the embodiment of psychic structure and object relational patterns in the patient's linguistic patterns, and the

influence of linguistic patterns on psychic structure. In this capacity, the word is a transitional object in its own right, not just between internality and externality and self and other, but also between prelinguistic-imaginary and linguistic-symbolic versions of these aspects of reality.

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EROS AND SEXUALITY IN ANTIQUITY

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY ON HOMOSEXUALITY IN ANCIENT GREECE[1]

BY EMMETT WILSON, JR., M.D.

An intense interest in the role of sexuality in antiquity has occupied scholars from many disciplines over the past decade. In this review on Eros in antiquity, I shall examine some recent discussions of the role of homosexuality in ancient Greek culture. A selection of five studies will provide an opportunity to explore the major themes, problems, and controversies involved in this aspect of Greek civilization.

For much of classical scholarship during the past hundred years, the proclivity of the ancient Greeks for certain forms of homosexuality has been, depending sometimes upon the classicist's own sexual preference, a source of embarrassment or inspiration, of attraction or repugnance. Classical scholarship, in the broad sense of an understanding of Greek culture, has suffered accordingly. The great German classicist, Wilamovitz, wrote of the "degenerate" character of the pederasty practiced in that culture. Jowett's translations had made Plato sound like a priggish homoerotic English schoolmaster struggling with attempts at sublimation. Some translators went to the other extreme and, in delicately distorted renditions of Greek poetry, read homosexuality into or reconstructed it from the most fragmentary of fragments. Discreet "studies" in Greek ethics, such as that of Symonds (1901), were nothing more than tracts proclaiming boy love as the *cause* of the brilliance of Greek civilization. A certain prudery and a priggishness were often rampant in classical scholars' evaluations of ancient Greek homo-

[1] Kenneth Dover (1978): *Greek Homosexuality*; Harald Patzer (1982): *Die griechische Knabenliebe*; Bernard Sergent (1984): *Homosexuality in Greek Mythology*; Bernard Sergent (1986): *L'homosexualité initiatique dans l'Europe ancienne*; Michel Foucault (1984a). *The Uses of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2.*

sexuality. Dover (1978) presents an interesting set of quotations from the "greats" of classical scholarship, and concludes: "I know of no topic in classical studies on which a scholar's normal ability to perceive differences and draw inferences is so easily impaired" (p. vii).

The German scholar, Ernst Bethe (1907), initiated a new approach to the study of Greek homosexuality when, some eighty years ago, he published his article, "Die dorische Knabenliebe, ihre Ethic, ihre Idee" ("The Dorian Love of Boys, Its Ethic, Its Idea"). With this publication, Bethe violated classical philology's taboo against scholarly examination of the topic. He took an important step forward in his attempt to understand the meaning of Greek homosexuality in terms of the culture in which it occurred. Instead of ignoring, denying, minimizing, or praising Greek pederastic behavior, Bethe maintained considerable objective distance. He was critical of the general repression, whether official or covert, of discussions of the sexual aspect of the Greek pederastic practice. Bethe discussed evidence in a quotation (preserved for us in Strabo) from Ephoros, a writer of the fourth century B.C., about an archaic custom of ritualized homosexual abduction practiced in Dorian Crete. Although Bethe followed the standard view in attributing the origin of the pederastic practices to the Dorian Greeks, with its subsequent adoption by the other Greeks, he disputed the prevailing view that ascribed the homosexual behavior to the privations of barrack-room life. He argued instead that in the homosexual practice can be discerned an initiation rite, a social and religious practice marking the entry of the initiated youth into manhood and adult status in the community. Bethe thus brought a positive interpretation, that of *ritual*, to the discussion of the pederastic practices of ancient Greece.

Bethe's interpretation of the homosexual practices was influenced by the developing science of ethnography. He suggested that the meaning of the practices in Greece was similar to that of the ritualized pederasty of certain Papuan, Australian, and Micronesian tribes that the ethnographers of his day had begun to study. For Bethe, the homosexual act was implicitly anal intercourse,[2] which was to be understood in the context of the initiatory

[2] Bethe's claim that anal intercourse was involved seems to have been an extrapolation from ethnographic studies on contemporary neolithic societies, for it is not in

purpose. Bethe argued that it had a meaning for the Greeks similar to what the ethnographers found among contemporary neolithic societies: anal intercourse infused the initiate with magical qualities attributed to semen, namely, bravery, excellence, and all the virtuous quantities necessary for entry into manhood, all that is summed up by the Greeks in their word *arete*.

Whether or not Bethe's interpretation is correct, it was an important innovation, a new approach to the question. Yet it was not well received at the time. Bethe immediately met with objections, counterarguments, even scorn and repudiation by classical scholars, the great Wilamovitz included. Bethe's article was misunderstood and consigned to oblivion. The "noble" and "obscene" sides of Greek pederasty had to be kept separate, his critics argued. The sexual aspect of Greek homosexuality was an aberration, the behavior of a few degenerate individuals, and *arete* should never be associated with it. The preferred negative explanation of Greek homosexuality based on privation, that is, on external and situational needs, was maintained. It was regarded as a carry-over from military camp life during the early wanderings, a "comradeship of warriors" that developed initially because of the unavailability of women on these migratory, plundering forays, and was later maintained through Dorian military training. This explanation was as old as Plato's *Laws*, in which the practice was ascribed to the communal messes and physical training which were conducive to intercourse "against nature."[3] The Dorians were seen as the originators of a practice that "somehow" became generalized among the other groups of Greeks, the Ionians and Aeolians.

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the Ephoros passage. There is, however, some support from the inscriptions at Thera, where homosexual "scoring" with boys was recorded in rather jubilant inscriptions in what seems to have been the religious precincts of the sanctuary of Apollo. In those inscriptions the verb *oiphein*, to mount, is used for the act, a word that is pretty generally taken by philologists to mean anal penetration in this context. Further on, I shall comment on other theories concerning the type of sexual intercourse that may have been involved.

[3] Plato, *Laws* 636ab, quoted by Dover (1978, p. 186). It should be noted in passing that the phrase "against nature" (*para physin* in Greek) is a very ambiguous one and is sometimes used with apparent inconsistency by the same writer. The phrase is thus itself the subject of considerable discussion and controversy in studies of sexuality in antiquity. It is difficult at times to know just what the Greeks thought was "against nature."

Thus the standard view continued to prevail. Some scholars did come to recognize the central role of pederasty for the Greeks in the education of the young, but, with the notable exception of Jaeger's (1934) *Paideia*, it was generally regarded as an embarrassing aberration. In his study of education in antiquity, Marrou (1948) wrote of the "unnatural sexual intimacy" (p. 27), "misdirected sexual instinct" (p. 35), and "degeneration into something carnal" (p. 33) caused by the "weakness of the flesh" (p. 27). Even the general acceptance of the pederastic behavior was questioned, and some scholars (e.g., Flacelière, 1960) even claimed that homosexuality was forbidden by law in most Greek cities. Attempts to understand Greek homosexuality in terms of Greek culture virtually ceased, and scholarly embarrassment and confusion about it pretty much continued until the past decade. It was implicitly assumed that the behavior was homosexual, and that homosexuality was a concept that was applicable across cultural and temporal lines.

Kenneth Dover, one of the foremost classical scholars of our day, published his *Greek Homosexuality* in 1978, opening the way to a thoroughgoing re-examination of the topic and a revision of our understanding of it. To my knowledge, his book has not yet been reviewed in the psychoanalytic literature, and Dover is just beginning to receive the attention of psychoanalysts. Robert Liebert (1986), in a paper in which he discusses the contemporary psychoanalytic implications of the integration of unconscious homosexuality and bisexuality in normal life, was perhaps the first psychoanalytic author to accord recognition to the importance of Dover's work in clarifying the role of institutionalized homosexuality among the Greeks.

Questions have been raised concerning what occurred in Greek homosexual activity: what was involved in the homosexual relationship; how the homosexual love relationship was carried on; what were its limits and its approved modes of pursuit, surrender, and intercourse; what were its enjoined taboos; and what was its function within the social structure. Dover's study is indispensable in attempting to answer many of these questions. It is a storehouse of information that has not as yet been fully sorted out. Utilizing an approach similar to that in his study, *Greek Popular Morality*

(1974), Dover tries to discern the outlines of what was acceptable behavior and what were the limits on certain types of conduct. This strategy is, of course, fraught with difficulties in understanding any historical period, especially because of the divergence between what is said and what is actually done, a hypocrisy current in any society. Dover, for the most part, intentionally ignores some of the more famous people, texts, and places in favor of dealing with "such topics as graffiti, legal terminology and the details of bodily stimulus and response" (1978, p. viii).

In the case of Greek homosexual behavior, there are some extant texts that can provide information about the limits of societal acceptance. Dover takes up in detail what is perhaps one of the most important of these texts, the speech of the orator, Aeschines, against a certain Timarchos. In order to eliminate this rival as a political opponent, Aeschines charged that Timarchos had homosexually prostituted himself in his youth and thus, by Athenian law, should be disenfranchised from political office. In his speech, Aeschines discussed his own homosexual activities, in anticipation that they would be distorted or that derogatory accusations would be made concerning his own interest in boys. The speech, happily for Dover's purposes and ours, involved a good many explicit statements and estimations as well as implicit assumptions and presumptions about Greek homosexual behavior. Dover argues that it can reasonably be used as a handbook of such behavior, permitting us to form an idea of the taboos, limits, and accepted forms of homosexuality among the Greeks.

Dover's position is that what was said before the assembly in a law court about homosexual activity can provide information about what was acceptable and what was not in Greek homosexual behavior. The value of this speech is obviously that the speaker, unlike Plato or the poets, was addressing an audience of jurors whom he sought to convince and with whom he could take no risk of expressing sentiments that might be "suspect or repugnant to the average juror" (p. 14). This reading of the speech, Dover believes, provides us with an excellent chance of studying the "sentiments and generalizations" (p. 13) of the average Athenian. Dover examines the speech in detail and provides many clarifications and amplifications by means of a thorough collocation of the evidence

from other sources, ranging over any and all materials that have survived from Greece.

Dover's extensive and detailed examination of this evidence goes a long way toward establishing and clarifying Greek homosexual behavior in the *erastes/eromenos*[4] relationship. He thus provides a very interesting and illuminating discussion of what Foucault calls the "morphology" of the sexual behavior, that is, the accepted forms of sexual expression.

It is not clear, Dover claims, that among the Greeks there was an "adult" homosexuality or a "gay" community in the contemporary sense. The institutionalized pederasty of the Greeks was vastly different from any such "ordinary" homosexuality. An elaborate, ritualized courtship developed around boys, with a social opprobrium similar, as Dover repeatedly points out, to that experienced by a female in Victorian England should the youth transgress against what was proper for him by this code. Nor was the boy supposed to enjoy the situation. He was rather to be a paradigm of modesty and decorum, and was to yield only after a long pursuit that gave evidence of the worth and sincerity of his *erastes*. He is usually depicted during the sexual act as staring off into space, uninvolved. Although it was appropriate for him to demonstrate some fondness for his *erastes*, the affection is depicted in vase paintings and described in literature as discreet and decorous. The *erastes* showed what was termed *epithymia* (desire) for the boy, while a different word, *philia*, sometimes translated as friendship or love, was used for the feelings of the *eromenos* toward the *erastes*. The boy's role was not to enjoy but to be enjoyed, again similar to Victorian mythology involving females.

One of the major contributions of Dover's study is his conclusion that intercourse with the boy was intercrural, not anal. Abundant evidence for this mode of sexual contact is available in the surviving vase paintings, amply illustrated in Dover's photographs. Dover's recognition that the type of intercourse was intercrural is important; it is an indication of the sort of finding that a methodology applied without bias can lead to. One can wonder why it was

[4] *Erastes* is used to refer to the male taking the active, pursuing role in these courtships; *eromenos*, and sometimes *pais* (boy), or *paidika*, are used to refer to the boy whose role was to be the passive recipient of the wooing.

overlooked for centuries. Erotic praise of the boy's thighs, as evidenced in the homoerotic poetry of the Greeks,[5] has been taken as a euphemistic way of talking about the buttocks. According to Dover, anal intercourse was associated with submission, conquest, and domination. There is a good deal of scatological contempt shown for passive adult homosexual behavior, for example, in the comedies of Aristophanes.

There is also "an absence of scenes of human homosexual fellation" in the behavior which the visual arts ascribe to the *erastes/eromenos* pair (p. 99). On the other hand, there is no hesitation at what seems to be a "general penetrability" with respect to women, who are shown as the objects of vaginal and anal intercourse and as performing fellatio in some vase paintings. (Satyrs are depicted as doing and enjoying just about anything with anybody or anything, of course.)

In the pederastic relationships, elaborate precautions were designed to prevent the mistreatment of the youth and to avoid placing him in a subordinate role. As soon as his beard appeared, the boy was to cease to be an object for love, and would subsequently become himself a (temporary) pursuer of boys. Much scorn was voiced for men who continued to pursue a youth beyond the stage when the boy's beard first appeared.

Dover has shown us the details of Greek homosexuality with a greater thoroughness, scholarly accuracy, and completeness than has been demonstrated before. He has given us more information than ever before collected on the nature of the rituals—on the manifest content, as it were—of Greek homosexuality. He seems to accept, though with some reservations, the "very popular and widely accepted generalization" that Greek homosexuality originated "in the military organization of the Dorian states" (p. 185). Dover concludes that we must assume that the practice spread to other Greek states and continued to be current because "homosexuality satisfied a need not otherwise adequately satisfied in Greek society" (p. 201). The need in question was "a need for personal relationships of an intensity not commonly found within marriage or in the relations between parents and children or in those be-

[5] For example, in fragments of Aeschylus' *Myrmidons*, Nos. 228, 229, cited by Dover, p. 196.

tween the individual and the community as a whole. . . . *Erastes* and *eromenos* clearly found in each other something which they did not find elsewhere" (p. 202). The pederasty thus developed into the "compound of an educational with a genital relationship" (*ibid.*). It may not have been much different from the idealizations presented by Plato in his *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, dialogues that deal with what Dover terms the "philosophical exploitation" (p. 153) of homosexuality, in which there was a move from physical homosexual love to its sublimation via a philosophical theory about love in general and the impetus it gives to the pursuit of philosophy, understood in its fullest etymological sense as "the love of wisdom."

Dover refers only in a rather cursory fashion to the practice of ritualized homosexual rape in Crete described by Ephoros. However, the behavior described for the Cretans seems to be markedly different from that catalogued by Dover for Athens. One might begin to wonder whether there are not two different phenomena involved, the Doric pederastic initiation rite as discussed by Bethe, and the Athenian homosexual pursuit of boys in the palaestrae or gymnasia which Dover has so carefully detailed. What was the historic relationship between the two types of pederastic practice?

As to the Doric custom, Ephoros made it explicit that the *eromenos* was chosen for his strength, courage, and moral character, rather than his good looks. The *erastes* notified the boy's family, then spirited the boy away, meeting only token resistance from the boy's family and friends. The two lived together outside the city and outside society for a period of two months. The stay on the outskirts of civilization ended with a test of hunting skills. After this romp in the bush with its homosexual conclusion, the pair returned to the city where they exchanged expensive presents as prescribed by ritual, marking the boy's access to the status of warrior and citizen and his readiness eventually to become husband and father. This so-called Doric pederasty seems to have been much more institutionalized, with greater prescribed obligations for the individual participant. It was highly structured by ritual and took place in a delimited and specific context. It was directed toward the development of the youth as an adult warrior, with an emphasis on bravery and fighting ability (*arete*).

The Athenian version of Greek pederasty, with its "personal, erotic, and aesthetically colored" aspects (Vanggaard, 1958), has

led some scholars to regard it as a degenerate form of the Doric initiation ritual. Werner Jaeger (1934), in contrast, thought it the highest development of the practice, for which the Doric version had been only the forerunner. Marrou (1948) thought there was a historical development, with the ritualized behavior remaining fixed at the warrior level among the Dorians because of their conservative tendencies, while there developed a sort of pedagogical homosexuality in Athens. Dover, for his part, thinks any derivation unprovable and elects to deal only with the evidence for fifth and fourth century Athens, using that evidence to describe the "normal form." He sees the other versions as locally limited variations.

Harald Patzer, in *Die griechische Knabenliebe* (1982), finds sufficient structural similarities to warrant the equation of the apparently differing Dorian and Athenian practices. He offers a new perspective, with the claim of a common Indo-European origin for initiatory pederasty. Further, he argues that this initiatory pederasty is so different from contemporary experience that the concept of homosexuality can be applied to the Greek phenomena only through what he calls an ethnocentric bias.

Upon careful consideration of the evidence throughout archaic and classical Greece, Patzer concludes that the attribution of a purely Doric origin to the custom is not warranted. There were striking differences even within the Doric community, while there is evidence that some form of the practice was found just as early among Ionic as well as Aeolic Greeks. The evidence suggests that the practice was all interlinked and shared throughout the Greek world. Further, it seems to have been basically similar among all the Greeks, showing itself in conservative and frozen versions in some localities, yet demonstrating further development in others.

There were, according to Patzer, genetically older and newer forms of the pederastic practice, and all were social institutions of initiation. The differences are to be accounted for by the difference in the social organization of the particular group involved. The Athenian version molded the boy into a citizen and not a warrior. It was an institution legally open only to Athenian citizens, not to foreigners or slaves. In fact, however, it was the province of the nobility and assured the continuation of those characteristics valued by the aristocracy. The criteria by which the boy was chosen, and the role for which he was trained, changed with the

historical shift from a warrior state to a city-state in which all citizens partook of the civic life. The concept of *arete* changed from bravery in battle to the combination of virtuous characteristics considered essential for the good citizen, such as *sophrosyne* (temperance or self control), *sophia* (wisdom), etc., as well as bravery. There was a shift in Athens from the Doric ideal of *agathos* (good, meaning brave) to *kalokagathos* (beautiful and good) as the ideal toward which the youth, as a future member of the society, should strive.

The aim in Athens was thus the formation of a member of the nobility. With the development of democracy and the erosion of the prerogatives of the nobility, the aim became the formation of a citizen of the city. Physical beauty was emphasized, but it was merely a focus on the outward appearance of virtue as the first manifestation of the rest of the virtues. The ideal goes beyond the narrow concept of physical beauty and involves a basic ideal of nobility that was held generally among the Greeks, an *Ur*-Greek ideal, according to Patzer. In a more general sense, the aim of the custom was the same in the older and the newer forms, for both aimed at leading the youth into the status of manhood in his community.

The various elements of the ritualized practice, which seem to differ between the older and newer versions, are actually symbolic or functional equivalents. Patzer spells out the structural correspondence between the two forms of the ritualized pederasty. He sees a parallel and an equally powerful ritualization precisely in those very practices that Dover described. The Athenian version was admittedly less public, less codified, and more individual—the boy's family was not officially involved as it was in the Cretan version, for example. But there were basic similarities. Instead of finding sanctuary outside the town, the boy and his would-be lover met only in specified precincts, the gymnasium or in symposia (drinking banquets), but they were still secluded away from the rest of society, away from women, and away from the boy's family. Behavior in these situations was rigidly prescribed with respect to what constituted decorum. In the process that Dover termed "pursuit and flight," Patzer sees a correspondence to the ritual abduction. The boy kept aloof and had to be pursued, while the *erastes* did the pursuing in a process that was supposed to indicate the worthiness of both *erastes* and *eromenos* over a period of time. Al-

though the stipulated gifts differed, the symbolism was, Patzer claims, the same. In Athens these consisted of a cock, hare, horse, and dog, in contrast to the cup, armor, and ox in the Doric custom. To some extent the Athenian choice of gifts may have been influenced by their associations with noble hunting pastimes. However, Patzer argues that both sets of gifts could be seen as symbols of fertility, potency, and acceptance into the male community as a man. The gifts suggest the transfer of phallic power to the younger man upon his entry into manhood.

The contrast between the types of intercourse would seem to be a major difference between the two practices. Patzer claims that there was even a shared symbolism in anal and intercrural intercourse. The thighs were regarded by the Greeks as a source of gestational power, as shown, for instance, in the myth of the birth of Dionysus from the thigh of Zeus. This symbolism, Patzer notes, is found also in some contemporary primitive societies in which the thighs are regarded as the source of fertility. Thus intercrural intercourse was also a symbolic representation of the transfer of numinous fertility power. The boy was passive in the intercrural act, which took place standing up, just as anal intercourse does in the contemporary Pacific societies in which initiatory homosexuality has been studied. By this structural analysis, Patzer attempts to show the congruity of the two Greek versions of initiation. For Patzer, both are aspects of the ritualized and institutionalized demarcation of the transition into manhood and phallic power.

Patzer's more difficult and more interesting thesis is the question of ethnocentricity. The problem is whether the modern concept of homosexuality can be applied to the ritualized practice of the Greeks. He argues that the initiation phenomenon is not homosexual but can be more accurately described as initiatory pederasty; as such, it is devoid, he claims, of homosexual connotation or meaning. Hence Patzer's preference for the term "pederasty" (*Knabenliebe*). In spite of the invaluable work that Dover carried out in providing a detailed account of the Athenian or classical type of boy love, Patzer finds Dover's viewpoint itself ethnocentric, in that even the title of his study uses the word, homosexuality. He claims that an ethnocentric bias influenced Dover's conclusion that Greek civilization was homosexual, as opposed to our own heterosexually oriented society.

Patzer argues that, to the Greeks, the pederasty did not arise out of a psychological inclination toward same-sexed objects, but represented an aspect of development toward heterosexually oriented manhood. There existed simultaneously two distinct cultural traits among the Greeks. On the one hand, they despised and ridiculed passive adult homosexual behavior, sharing the general Indo-European contempt for the womanish man. On the other hand, they not only tolerated but honored institutionalized pederasty. To the Greeks, Patzer claims, there was a greater gulf between the initiatory pederasty and homosexuality than between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Both homosexuality and heterosexuality were based on sexual desire, while the pederastic practice aimed at the assimilation of the young man into adult society and was not based on desire or psychological inclination for a homosexual object.

The French social historian, Bernard Sergent, has produced two important studies on the institutionalized homosexuality of the Greeks, following in the tradition of the French school of structural anthropology. This school has made major contributions to our understanding of classical antiquity. Interesting and important developments in classical studies have come out of the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis Gernet, George Duméznil, Maurice Detienne, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Jean-Paul Vernant,[6] among others. In one way or another, these writers have begun to apply the methods and insights of anthropology and structuralism to Greek civilization.

Sergent is quite critical of the claims for a Doric origin for the male-behavior-under-conditions-of-deprivation hypothesis. He is equally critical of Dover's second hypothesis, i.e., that the institutionalization of homosexuality had to do with certain deficiencies in the relationship between men and women in Greek society—a thesis which, to Sergent (1984, p. 52), "is basically only a greater generalization of the first hypothesis concerning the isolation of men from women in military situations." Sergent questions George Devereux's (1967) psychoanalytic view, which ascribes the homo-

[6] In the references accompanying this discussion are citations to some of the works of these authors. See also, Knox (1983).

sexuality as well as the creativity of Greek culture to its retention of the polymorphous aspects typical of adolescence. Sergent (1984, p. 54) is at odds with those who see the phenomenon as a historical accident, an "archaic local phenomenon" that requires some exceptional and conjectural explanation. He feels that it has much more ancient, pre-Greek origins in the Indo-European past.

Sergent's first volume outlines these general theses and then focuses on the homosexual element that is deeply entrenched in Greek myths. Dover (1978) had referred only briefly to what he called the "homosexualization" (p. 198) of mythology, but he tended to regard these topics as tangential to his main theme of the development of what he termed the "homosexual eros" (p. 200) in classical Greece. Sergent carefully reviews the structural details in the Cretan practice reported by Ephoros and finds correlates among other Indo-European peoples and in the myths he examines, particularly in the prescribed gifts. Far from dismissing the homosexual themes in myths as modifications of inherited myth or as mythologized etiologies providing the explanation of an innovation, as Dover had, Sergent sees the myths as reaching deep into the Indo-European past. He sees a shared cultural heritage in these myths that are concerned with the theme of the initiation of youth. Sergent examines the myths of Laius and Chrysippus, Zeus and Ganymede, Poseidon and Pelops, Apollo and Hyakinthos, Achilles and Patroclus, and traces the initiation theme throughout this mythology. His emphasis is on the role of the homosexual practice in the maturation process of the Greek adolescent, and he argues that the myths embody this same theme.

In his second, as yet untranslated volume, *L'homosexualité initiatique dans l'Europe ancienne* (1986), Sergent utilizes his earlier mythological studies in a sort of "feedback process" (p. 10) to consider the evidence concerning homosexual behavior in Greece. He examines the major sources of evidence and the controversial issues about that behavior, such as the homosexual inscriptions at Thera, the seeming absence of homosexual themes in Homer, the evidence from the poets and prose writers in various cities throughout Greece, and, finally, the literature and plastic art of Athens. In contrast to Dover's rather static account of Greek homosexuality, Sergent makes an attempt to trace its development, dissemination,

modification, and, ultimately, its role and function in Greek society and in the development of the individual.

His major innovation is to place the topic on a broader psychological level. Sergent argues that pederastic homosexuality was not an aberration or a perversion of the educational process for the Greeks. It involved, rather, a different mode from ours of structuring relationships between individuals, a mode in no way specific to the Greeks, but prevalent throughout pre-Christian Europe. In a brief but important chapter in his first volume, entitled "The Meaning of Initiatory Homosexuality," Sergent argues that the homosexual practice is to be seen as an identificatory ritual for young males through which the roles of male and female in that society come to be defined. He finds in the isolation of the homosexual pair from society and in the homosexual practice itself a common origin and explanation that must be sought in the initiatory symbolism. The meaning of initiation is a rebirth of the youth as a man, in the biological, the civic, and perhaps even the psychological sense of the term. Before the initiation, the youth was regarded, and possibly regarded himself, as asexual, or presexual, and certainly premasculine, possibly even feminine. Sergent states this succinctly: "The purpose of initiation is to establish an unbreachable gap between the feminine and the masculine" (1984, p. 52).

Sergent draws frequently upon evidence from contemporary ethnographic studies as confirmatory of his theses. Initiatory practices in other, non-Greek cultures sometimes involve penile mutilation intended to produce more powerful erections, and often involve a change of name. These features signify a symbolic death and a rebirth as an adult male, a change of status from "not-man" to "man." The non-initiated is thought of in terms of defect and lack, his status virtually equated to that of the female.

This interpretation by Sergent places initiatory homosexuality within the context of the difference between the sexes, and the ritual becomes part of a process by which the sexes are defined—by which the youth psychologically becomes a man, represses the feminine aspects of his psyche, and is received into society as a man. Seen in this fashion, the "military" homosexuality of deprivation, as well as the passive feminized behavior of adult homo-

sexuals, is the antithesis of Greek initiatory homosexuality and in opposition to it.

On the controversial issue of whether the mode of homosexual intercourse was intercrural or anal or both, Sergent is eminently practicable. The issue cannot be settled by studying iconographic evidence, and it must remain controversial. Sergent acknowledges that there is no representation of anal intercourse between *erastes* and *eromenos* in the vase paintings. But he points out that there are limitations to the vase documentation: things may have been done without being represented in the iconography. From the treatment of anal intercourse in Attic comedy, with its pejorative projection of anal preoccupations onto foreign peoples, its representation in vase paintings might have been considered shameful for the *eromenos*. It may very well have been that "the taking of real liberties" in homosexual intercourse was not depicted because it was considered inappropriate, obscene, or degrading to the youth. Thus Sergent sides neither with Dover, who argues that anal intercourse would have been bad form, nor with Bethe, who argued that, for the Dorians, it was *de rigueur* and had magical meanings. Sergent does, however, question Bethe's claim that the Greeks believed in the magical transmission of manly qualities via semen. For Sergent, this claim represents a misuse of the data from Micronesia, where there was ample evidence for the fantasy as a part of general beliefs about nature. There is, according to Sergent, no such evidence of a similar belief for the Greeks.

With Sergent's work, we again become acutely aware of the peculiarly intense anxieties about homosexual practices that, as Dover clearly showed, are manifest in the materials from Athens. According to Sergent, there occurred a reaction to the non-aristocratic laicization of homosexual practice, and worries arose about its generalization and its potential for degradation. One of Sergent's major findings is that in fourth century Athens, there was apparently an increased emphasis on its pedagogic aspects, suggesting a return to the sources of the pederastic behavior which previously has been but rarely mentioned. This, Sergent feels, suggests considerable anxiety about the practice and what it had or could become.

In the iconographic record Sergent also calls attention to a rad-

ical change in the treatment of homosexual topics that occurred simultaneously with the well-known shift from black figure to red figure vases somewhere around 500 B.C. In the earlier iconography there was a close link between hunting and pederasty. The crudity and the directness of the sexual acts were striking in these earlier, black figure vases. There were certain themes that endured with the change in technique and style, but the nudity, the explicitness of the gestures, and the nature of the gifts depicted all changed over time. The violence and the obviousness of the accompanying erotic scenes became attenuated and disappeared with the shift to red figure, at the same time that the theme of the chase loses its pertinence. The initiatory and probationary hunt all but disappeared, as did symbols of violence and force. The figures became clothed and were represented in conversation. The young man merely starts to disrobe and pulls aside his tunic to show his thigh in the later iconography, in contrast to the crude copulation found in the earlier paintings. Finally, the scene was located most often in the palaestra or gymnasium; that is, there was a change to an urban rather than a country setting, as in the Cretan version and earlier representations. The symbolism that previously identified the youth with a hunted animal changed to courtship, and gifts became the principal element. The strident and obvious sexuality of the sixth century gave way to a discreet, decorous, introverted sexuality in which suggestions of desire replaced the actual physical act.

Sergent argues that these literary and iconographic changes are linked with important sociopolitical upheavals. Sixth century Athens was still an archaic city dominated by aristocratic values, a city in which the education of well-born youths emphasized physical exercise and the hunt. With the further development of the city and an urban lifestyle, and with the installation of democratic institutions, the importance of the aristocracy was reduced, and the difference between city and country was attenuated. There was the inevitable adoption by all the citizenry of the aristocratic ideals, including those concerning sexuality. There was a generalization of homosexual practices throughout many levels of society. This produced a defensive reaction of "good" Athenian society that invoked a vindication of decorum, the development of laws concerning the practice, and an idealization of the pedagogical aspects of homo-

sexuality. At times there was even an authentic rejection of pederasty by some later writers, such as Xenophon in the fourth century. As often happens, the literary texts took into account only much later what had been evident for several decades in the vase paintings. In fact, the erotic figures were practically finished from 470 B.C. onward, and tended to be replaced by intimate heterosexual conjugal scenes (Sergent, 1986, p. 102). Sergent's careful study of this progression in the Athenian evidence indicates that there was a growing anxiety about the phenomenon and what it might become.

It is this anxiety that concerns Michel Foucault. The problem with the historical and anthropological approaches which we have considered thus far is that they tend to leave out the erotic element, the love relationship that seems to have been central for the Greeks in the pederasty. The institutionalized homosexuality involved an intensely erotic relationship. Perhaps the Greeks did not view the pederasty as homosexual—Patzer has some interesting, even amusing and rather Teutonic "civic duty" speculations on what went on psychologically in the heads of the copulating *erastes/eromenos* pair, something on the order of "Close your eyes and think of the glories of Greece!"—but the homosexual activity for the *erastes* was certainly not regarded as an onerous duty. There was an intense investment in and attraction to the boy, an eroticization that was at times extreme and disorganizing. And the behavior apparently recurred repetitively, the *erastes* moving on again and again to still other youths each in need of his initiation. As David Halperin (1986) remarks in his review of Patzer, "A pederasty without an eroticized homosexuality just isn't in either the historical or the anthropological record" (p. 44).

We saw with Dover that there were elaborate precautions suggesting that the Greeks were aware of the possibility of a degradation of the practice into an activity that was actually compromising and degenerate if either the *erastes* or the *eromenos* transgressed the limits of permissible, institutionalized behavior. Dover also commented on the cries for restraint, the moralizing about homosexual love, and the ambivalence about the expression of homosexuality in Greek society in spite of the Greeks' supposed tolerance for it. We have seen with Sergent the reaction to the laicization of the initiatory practices, the regulation of homosexual practices by law,

the curious shift toward decorum and understatement in vase painting, the move toward discretion, and the eventual disappearance of visual depiction by 470 B.C. In spite of their proclivity, or perhaps because of it, the Greeks seemed anxious about homosexuality and were obsessed with its proprieties.

In Michel Foucault's *The Uses of Pleasure*, the second volume in his *History of Sexuality*,[7] he focuses on the reaction against the pleasure and eroticization of homosexual activity. He examines in depth the anxiety concerning the potential for the homoerotic behavior to lead to loss of control and degradation. His work moves our discussion to a more philosophical level by exploring the notions of "right conduct" and "self-control," which he claims developed out of this anxiety.

The Greeks, according to Foucault (1984a), had a relatively free society in which there was "no institution—whether pastoral or medical—that claimed the right to determine what was permitted or forbidden, normal or abnormal" (p. 36). Yet, in spite of that, the Greeks seemed obsessed with the problem of right conduct, especially in matters of sexuality. Foucault's title, *The Uses of Pleasure*, indicates his interest in how the Greeks "used" sexual pleasure, their concern with the "dynamics" of sexual pleasure rather than its "morphology." Its morphology, as to gender or manner in which it was obtained, was irrelevant to the Greeks, he argues. He thus shifts the discussion from sexuality to pleasure, claiming that the uses of pleasure were "morally valorized." The moral notions he considers are *enkrateia*, mastery of the self, and *sophrosyne*, a complex notion translated sometimes as "moderation," sometimes as "temperance." Foucault discusses the distinction, so important for the Greeks, between being active or passive in sexual activity, and the designation of objects of pleasure for the sexually active man as "women, boys, and slaves." This preoccupation of the Greeks with "right conduct" leads to a discussion of what he calls the "stylization" of conduct in four areas to which he gives somewhat exotic names: *dietetics*, concerned with the body; *economics*, concerned with marriage and the household; *erotics*, concerned

[7] In this work, Foucault changed direction from *Volume I: Introduction* (1976) and focused almost entirely on the nature of love and sexuality in antiquity. This second volume deals primarily with Greek homosexuality, while the third volume (1984b) deals with the repudiation of sexuality and sensuality with the rise of Christianity.

with the subject of boys; and *philosophy*, concerned with the nature of love.

For Foucault, a central difference in Greek thinking about sexual activity is that the injunctions and restraints upon it were not due to some sort of fundamentalist notion that the sexual act was bad in itself, or that it bore the mark of a "primordial fall from grace." Sexual activity was perceived as natural, as tending to the restoration of the highest state of being that man had achieved. Sexual pleasure was characterized as being "inferior," however, because it was common to animals and man, not specifically human, was mixed with privation and suffering, and was dependent upon the body and its necessities. In addition, it was extremely acute. It was the natural acuteness of sexual pleasure, together with the attraction this pleasure could exert on desire, that caused sexual activity to go "beyond the limits." By nature, sexual pleasure was an inferior, subordinate, and conditioned pleasure. But because of this acuteness, it could lead to the overthrow of order, moderation, decorum—it could, in other words, get out of control. It had what Foucault terms a "hyperbolic" potential (1984, p. 30).

Anxiety about homoerotic activity influenced a whole philosophical scheme, the "philosophical exploitation" of homosexual love that Dover discussed. The concern with homosexual behavior led to a *problematization* (to use Foucault's French term) of ethical thinking about such conduct, and eventually to the development of a philosophy of love more or less based on these problems of homosexual erotics, or on what we might call their sublimation. Foucault analyzes this development in a sort of genealogy of morals based upon controlling pleasure, homoerotic pleasure in particular. He locates the anxiety about homoerotic behavior in the very possibility of degradation of *sophrosyne* and loss of moderation and control. He emphasizes the real possibility that the homoerotic activity, described so enthusiastically by Plato and the poets, could come loose, and obviously did with some frequency, from its purely initiatory function as a ritualized courtship, a prelude to and part of an educational relationship. The idealized outcome—the assumption of a masculine role by the *eromenos*—had now to be assured by these safeguards of morals. The possibility, the frequency, perhaps even the ordinariness of an eroticization of the relationship, had made its function less clear, and the risk of a con-

sequent feminization of the object of pleasure—and with it a degrading of the boy—was real. The boy's honor could be lost. Foucault emphasizes the focus of anxiety on the object of pleasure and his need to "become in turn the master in the pleasure . . . and in the power that was exercised over oneself" (1984a, p. 225). The boy had to shift from being an object of pleasure to a subject who was in control of his own pleasures.

From this anxiety and concern developed what Foucault calls philosophical erotics, the so-called Socratic-Platonic reflections on love. Plato developed a theory in which love, though homosexual in its origin, led the lover ever upward on a "ladder of love" (*Symposium* 210a-212b) to a striving toward the Good and the Beautiful. The philosophical moves toward sublimation, and a suppression of homosexual impulses, led to what Foucault terms "basic transformations and displacements" (1984a, p. 235) on the question of love. This moved the inquiry to the nature of love itself—from the question about "the boy's honor" and when and to whom he should yield, to the philosophical love of truth and wisdom to which the love relationship should lead both *erastes* and *eromenos*.

With this shift and displacement, the stage was set for much more severe moral systems and for the generalized repudiation of the flesh that was to characterize Christianity. It is one of the ironies of history, Foucault claims, that in granting legitimacy to homosexual activity, the Greeks were led, in their anxieties and attempts to "stylize" such pleasures, to an austerity, an emphasis on purity and truth, and a valuation of abstention—all to be subsumed later into ethical systems which would largely repudiate any freedom in the ethical sphere and reject any pleasures. Thus, Foucault attempts to show, the stage was already set in Greek culture for the abnegation, abstinence, and disdain of the body that developed with the triumph of Christian ethics.

The main questions our authors have tried to answer about Greek pederastic behavior concern: (1) its origins: geographical, historical, anthropological, political, and social; (2) its "morphology and syntax," that is, what constituted the practice and the rules of prescribed behavior; (3) its import in terms of its function and meaning for the individual and for the society; and (4) the anxiety

that arose and the reaction to it that anticipated the development of an ascetic Christian abnegation of sexuality.

There may be some major shortcomings in these discussions within their appropriate classical or anthropological contexts, but I shall focus on the psychoanalytic point of view. None of the authors is an analyst or particularly psychoanalytic in orientation, so we cannot expect to find psychoanalytic reflections on the ritualized homosexual behavior in ancient Greece. The psychoanalytic reader will probably be most concerned with the meaning and role of the homosexual behavior for the individual and society, and the nature of the reaction against it.

In terms of "morphology," that is, what went on in the relationships and the prescribed rules of homosexual conduct, Dover has given us much information on the nature of the rituals, the manifest content, as it were, of Greek homosexuality. Long on research, much of it brilliant, Dover is short on conclusions. Even his fellow classicists have criticized him for not developing or discussing the implications of his study sufficiently. He seems hesitant in speculating about the origins and significance of Greek homosexuality, and, as we saw, seemed to accept the prevailing deprivation theory in one of its forms.[8]

There are some major aspects to the phenomenon that are suggested but not developed in his discussion, which the psychoanalytic reader might have liked to see addressed more fully. Dover brings up, without developing it, the muted but clearly evident intense aggression that the rituals seemingly seek to channel. He notes, in the chapter entitled "Pursuit and Flight," that "hunting is not an uncommon metaphor of homosexual pursuit. . . . This

[8] Dover (1988) acknowledges that he was "chary of offering explanations," because of his wish to address the "need for adequate description and classification of the phenomena." In this later article he considers the Bethe-Patzer-Sergent thesis concerning the ritualized initiation aspects of Greek homosexuality, and the claim for an Indo-European inheritance as its origin. He admits the great attractiveness of this theory, while at the same time he is extremely critical of the anthropological and mythological data utilized. He prefers, however, to view the development of homosexual practices in Greece more or less as a historical accident, resulting from "a very slight shift in one social variable [that] can trigger major and lasting changes, and once social approval has been given to an activity which is physically, emotionally and aesthetically gratifying *to the adult males* of a society it is not easily suppressed" (1988, p. 132, original italics).

usage and the very frequent use of words for pursuit, flight and capture sustain the notion that the *eromenos* is the quarry or victim of the *erastes*" (1978, p. 87). The rarity of homosexual assault in the visual arts (in contrast to the many depictions of men and youths mauling and beating women) again suggests some anxiety about aggression toward the *eromenos*. The elaborate ritualization, the prescribed gifts, the decorous behavior required of both *erastes* and *eromenos* seem to cover a set of highly charged feelings, with denial of a wish for aggressive domination and mastery. Despite the elaborate arrangements to protect the youth from any semblance of being dominated, he was placed, with prostitutes and slaves, into a category of inferior love objects. The elaborate precautions seem to be a form of undoing or denial of the intense aggression and striving for domination involved in the relationship. The persistent association of the ritualized homosexuality with hunting themes and the insistent linkage of the erotic pursuit to sacrifice, death, and rebirth suggest hidden aggressive aspects and destructive rage in the initiatory homoerotic behavior. Werner Burkert, in *Homo Necans* (1972), an important study of Greek ritual and myth, explores the links between religious sacrifice, cannibalism, human sacrifice, and hunting, with findings that possibly bear on our discussion of initiation rituals. There is much in Dover's study to suggest aggression or antagonism between the generations in these rituals and possibly an unconscious contempt of one generation for the other.

Sergent, though more psychological in orientation and more aware of the darker side of the hunting metaphor and of the aggressive aspects of the rape, anal penetration, and symbolic death he discusses, does not draw any conclusions about this aggression. The material, however, is quite suggestive. Just as incest was a prerogative of the gods in the Greek myths (Rudhardt, 1982), so was homosexual rape. In the myths examined by Sergent, aggression is openly portrayed. The link between this aggression and the negative oedipal conflict in, for example, the Laius-Chrysippus-Oedipus myths with their subtle interplay and reciprocity between homosexuality and oedipal conflict, has been given consideration in the psychoanalytic literature.[9]

[9] This has been examined, for example, by Ross (1982, 1984). One tradition associated the "shame or honor" of the introduction of pederasty into Greece to Oedipus' father, Laius, who, in his earlier years, raped the youth, Chrysippus, with

Although Dover touches briefly on it, none of the authors who are the subject of this review seems to link the homosexual practices to the misogyny of Greek society. The interrelationship between Greek homosexuality and the status of women in Greek society, however, is an important issue, of concern to classicist and psychoanalyst alike.

On the positive side, the implications of Sergent's work may actually carry quite far. Sergent's is an important innovation that moves us to a psychological plane with immense possibilities and ramifications. One narrow way for an analyst to view the phenomena is to take initiatory homosexuality as an "acting out" of the negative aspects of the oedipus complex with the young boy in a passive-receptive attitude toward a father surrogate, the *erastes*. Anal penetration in this ritualized experience would seem to represent anal incorporation of the paternal phallus, leading to an identification so necessary to adult male functioning. Urtubey (1984), in a review of Sergent's first book, cites his work rather triumphantly as confirmatory of the developmental hypotheses of psychoanalysis, indicating a parallel between the prehistory of the race and the psychological development of the individual.[10] We could thus talk of ritualized expression of the negative oedipus complex institutionalized as a way station en route to manhood.

The determinants of homosexual behavior are complex, however, as Liebert (1986) stressed, and caution is in order about applying concepts we find ready at hand. Although we might have difficulty in understanding Patzer's concept of ethnocentricity and in rejecting, as he does, the term "homosexual" for these ritual phenomena, there is a danger that our own understanding of them could be limited and culturally biased. I am thus not sure that we should regard Sergent's work as automatically confirming psychoanalytic propositions about the negative oedipus complex. One could take a different perspective from that of Urtubey. It may well be that the progression of psychosexual stages we observe at present is an artifact of the society in which they were "discovered."

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whom he had become enamored while in exile at the court of Pelops. According to one version, Chrysippus committed suicide for shame over his abduction by Laius. Ross has developed this version into a major negative counterpart to the positive side of the oedipus complex.

[10] I find this approach in Rangell's (1988) discussion of anthropological studies of ritual in New Guinea.

The variance between modern developmental patterns and those of the Greeks may derive from the way in which the differences between the sexes are regarded and the timing of their recognition and acceptance. It might be that certain aspects of separation-individuation and the achievement of personal and sexual identity that occur earlier with us were postponed in ancient Greece until late adolescence. It might be that among the Greeks, acceptance of the differences between the sexes and between the generations in certain respects occurred at a later stage than that which we view as "normal." The differences in the two developmental timetables may reflect cultural differences. Comparative ethnographic studies from Micronesia have suggested to anthropologists that there are many ways of "classifying and thinking about the sexes . . . rooted both in a wider set of cosmological premises and a characteristic pattern of social privilege and obligation that divides the sex and age categories" (Whitehead, 1981, p. 82). We still do not know enough about the cultural determinants of gender identity and gender role identity.

There are many methodological issues in an area of study such as this. The validity of comparative studies is certainly a central question. The comparisons deriving from the work of ethnographers on contemporary "primitive" societies and from that of classical anthropologists studying past societies present an interesting set of problems. Of what value is our understanding of homosexuality in our own society in explaining the phenomena of ancient Greece? What is the relevance of contemporary ethnographic studies to our efforts to understand ancient Greek homosexuality? Could they not generate unwarranted speculative extrapolations? The claim of a common Indo-European heritage of initiatory homosexuality involves an attempt to go well beyond historic Greece to the far distant past; it involves a complex sort of comparative ethnography of the past. Similarly, the attempt to apply psychoanalytic theory to past societies or contemporary "primitive" societies raises interesting questions. It may carry with it, as I have suggested, the burden of ethnocentrism that Patzer discusses. The deeper questions may concern our belief in the universality of psychoanalytic concepts and possibly our inability, through what has been called "habitudinization," to utilize other cultures, other times, and other ways of schematizing experience to widen the psychoanalytic viewpoint.

What is in need of study may be not so much the meaning of homosexual behavior in ancient Greece as the unconscious meaning of initiation rites and ritual demarcation of passage. It seems to me that more psychoanalytic attention ought to be directed to initiation and initiatory ritual. Although the topic is a rich and rewarding one, the major discussions have developed out of fields that are not predominantly analytic in orientation.[11]

Finally, all the authors considered in this review seem to want to stress the differences between the manifestations of ritualized pederasty among the ancient Greeks and homosexuality as we find it in our own culture. In their view, whether or not there was a "gay" community among the ancient Greeks, ritualized homosexuality would not have been part of it. But does calling the practice "initiatory" make it any less homosexual? Certainly not on an unconscious level, one would think. If the practice was a socially condoned, guilt-free form of homosexuality when played according to the rules, why were the Greeks so "uptight" about those rules, and ultimately about the practices themselves? There is more to be explored regarding Foucault's questions about this anxiety. Perhaps Patzer is right to see a basic tension in ancient Greece between sharing Indo-European contempt for the male homosexual's failure to achieve manhood while at the same time condoning a homosexual episode as a way station toward achieving adult masculinity. Perhaps the cultural acceptance and institutionalization of a homosexual practice that was not consciously supposed to involve homosexual desires provided a regressive modality for the expression of homosexual tendencies that were and are universal, but problematic. This is suggested by the Greeks' growing anxiety and their eventual repudiation of the ritualized practice.

[11] There have been some psychoanalytic explorations of the theme of initiation in present-day society (Arlow, 1951; Flugel, 1939; McDonald, 1972; Reik, 1915-1916), but much more detailed study is needed of the intricate factors involved in initiation and graduation rituals, especially in the light of the growing anthropological literature on the topic. Initiation is, predictably, a theme which frequently makes its appearance in films about adolescence. The homosexual and negative oedipal aspects were depicted with unusual bluntness in the movie, *Youngblood*, in which a rookie hockey player has his pubic hair shaved off by the older team members as a part of his acceptance and initiation into the team. Dressing up in "drag" is an accepted part of the graduation time theatrical productions of the Triangle Club at Princeton and the Hasty Pudding at Harvard (Marsden, 1968). Some of these phenomena are studied in a recent book by Raphael (1988).

These attempts to answer some questions concerning ancient Greek ritualized homosexuality are valuable, even though they leave much unresolved. Further studies are needed on the misogyny of the Greeks, the place of women in Greek society, and the complex issues concerning the development of asceticism and the abnegation of sexuality that characterized the waning of antiquity and the rise of Christianity.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Addendum to the Review of Dr. Shirley Panken's Book, VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE "LUST OF CREATION": A PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLORATION. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. 336 pp.

It has been brought to my attention that in my review of Shirley Panken's *Virginia Woolf and the "Lust of Creation"* (see Vol. 58, 1989, pp. 131-134), I may have conveyed an erroneous impression in at least two significant areas. I would like to amend my initial comments at this time in order that Dr. Panken's valuable biography of Virginia Woolf—and her own clinical acumen—not be misjudged.

The first matter concerns my criticism of Dr. Panken's discussion of Woolf's depressions. From my review, it is possible that a reader might conclude that Dr. Panken is poorly informed about the nature of affective illnesses, their diagnosis, and their biological aspects. I do not mean to imply such a criticism of her. After a re-reading of Dr. Panken's book, I am confirmed in the judgment that such a criticism is not justified.

The second matter concerns what I described as her "bashing" of Leonard Woolf. Again, after re-reading her book, I find that my description erred in being an overstatement and that, in fact, Dr. Panken's treatment of Leonard Woolf was more cogent and less one-sided than I initially indicated.

I regret that my review may have led some readers to think ill of Dr. Panken's work, and, needless to say, I regret any distress it may have caused the author.

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FREUD: APPRAISALS AND REAPPRAISALS; CONTRIBUTIONS TO FREUD STUDIES. VOLUMES 2, 3. Edited by Paul E. Stepansky. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1988. 200 pp., 201 pp.

The spate of books and articles in the last decade testifies to a deepening general interest in Freud, the man. Paul E. Stepansky, the editor of this series, has accurately described the widening of the "domain" of disciplines focusing attention on Freud studies and the origins of psychoanalysis. While broadened, responsible

scholarship will inevitably enrich our understanding of Freud's character, there remains some question as to corresponding improved appreciation of the subtleties in Freud's scientific work. Contributing to this shift in emphasis and to the unpredictability of its consequences is the relative diminution of participation by psychoanalytic clinicians, about which less notice appears to be taken.

In a lively discussion on science writing, George Johnson weighed two alternatives: "A writer can focus on the science, as though it were received wisdom, like a Coke bottle that fell from the sky, or on the scientists, laying bare the emotions and drives that are part of the haphazard process of discovery."[1] He contended that both are desirable in illuminating the science itself and ultimately create a necessary balance. The case can be made with special cogency in relation to psychoanalysis. Since it is quintessentially a clinical science whose methodology requires the combined introspective/empathic capacities of both participants, hardly any accurate account can be given of its "facts of observation" without giving oscillating attention to each one.

In this sense, then, the "historical instrument" may be considered analogous to the "analyzing instrument," necessitating a measure of alertness to the character and motives of the historian, not merely to the data of historical observation (George Moraitis and John Gedo have expressed similar views). These two "instruments" may differ more in degree than in kind. The challenge, and the dilemma, of historical research may be viewed as much the same as the ones psychoanalysts encounter in their daily clinical work: simultaneously taking into account both elements of their instrument.

But there are also differences in the way these disciplines function, both as to the sources of the data collected and in the ways in which their interpretations are made. Optimally, there is a self-correcting process in the course of psychoanalysis because analyst and analysand must function both as observer and interpreter (the analysand usually having the last word). No such process of quasi-automatic validation exists in historical research, rendering its conclusions subject to different, albeit equally rigorous, tests of veridicality.

[1] *The New York Times Book Review*, April 9, 1989, p. 1.

Gedo's comments on this subject (in Volume 1) are characteristically germane, and give another twist to the problem. He suggests "that the relationship between psychological conclusions and historical insights is fully reciprocal: We are just as likely to misdiagnose Freud's character if we fail to understand the history of his ideas as we are prone to distort history through psychological reductionism" (p. 244).

This continuing series, *Freud: Appraisals and Reappraisals*, appears sensitive to these issues, and most of its selections are exactingly objective and circumspect. The notable exception in the volumes under review here is Swales's essay. But, overall, the series provides a forum for responsible, scholarly inquiry and discussion. It is evident that Stepansky sets high standards in selecting all his contributors. Whatever else may be said in criticism, all their essays are consistently knowledgeable, make strong and cogent arguments, and ably present novel insights in readable form. And because they are provocative, they promise to continue to stir up healthy controversy. Judging by the consistency in the quality of the content and writing style, it is likely that Stepansky exercises careful editorial control. Several contributions demand careful study; casual browsing will not squeeze out their juice. But such effort is sure to pay unexpected dividends for those addicted to Freudiana as well as for those in allied disciplines who are interested in pursuing the intriguing search for the wellsprings of Freud's creative genius.

These two volumes remain true to the publishing style established in the first one, released in 1986.[2] Each contains an editor's introduction, two major essays, and a brief contribution. Here again, Stepansky deserves special credit for pithy prefatory remarks designed to explain the overarching design and focus that each volume intends to create. While he has tactfully chosen not to steal the scene from his essayists, he sets a tone of excellence for original, discriminating, and candid exposition, each piece a truly brief summary contribution in its own right.

Volume 2 is entitled *Pathways to Freud's Identity*. The commonality Stepansky finds in the contributions of Peter Homans,

[2] Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1988, 57:95-100.

Richard E. Geha, and Patricia Herzog lies in a "historical continuation" of Freud's self-analysis, "less to the interpretive conclusions . . . than to the analytically pregnant quandaries that launch their respective inquiries" (p. xvii). All three challenge conventional wisdom and, in so doing, they are engrossing.

The conceptual basis of Homans's work is adopted from the self psychology school of Kohut (though Winnicott's influence is evident as well). Freud's relationship with Jung is given fundamental importance as a "second creative illness" (the first arose with Fliess) and as the model for a lifetime cycle of an idealization/de-idealization process. Homans connects "de-idealization and its historical correlate, disenchantment . . . [as] . . . a master theme in Freud's life and thought" (p. 71). Thus, he sets himself an ambitious goal in linking a clinical psychoanalytic theory of mourning to a theory of culture, in which the ability to mourn presages more highly differentiated psychological structure in the individual and analogous advancement in cultural values. Here, Homans broadens the scope of Freud's concept of sublimation (both as a maturational and as a psychoanalytic outcome) to explain cultural change, using such work as *Civilization and Its Discontents* to support his thesis. In a similar vein, Homans regards as inseparable such theoretical works as *On Narcissism* and cultural texts like *The Moses of Michelangelo*, the theoretical as isomorphic with the literary.

Relying heavily on Kohut's concepts of de-idealization, Homans insists on the primacy of preoedipal factors in explaining Freud's dominating psychology. He finds it difficult to account for such patterns in Freud "as the persistence of maternal motifs in his intimate dealings with men" (p. 5) without recourse to earlier developmental lines. The usual view of Freud's oedipal relationship to his mother is revised, placing higher priority on a far more primitive and ambivalent quality. His "death-anxiety" arose in this dyad, according to Homans, as did Freud's subsequent pattern of idealization/ de-idealization. While the author makes an interesting case, his utilization of self psychological theory and terminology is overly generalized, at times implausible, and formulaic. Here again, the absence of clinical perspective may be a major detracting element.

Geha's provocative essay addresses issues made familiar in recent times by Roy Schafer and Donald Spence, anchored by earlier

views of Nietzsche and Vaihinger. Since psychoanalysts deal primarily with unconscious psychic reality, they discover the "truth" about their patients by means of construction and interpretation, a "hermeneutical circle" (p. 104). Historical truths derived in the course of the analytic process encompass narrative coherence rather than external correspondence, resulting in a creative fiction. Geha proposes "that we comprehend the constructional activities of psychoanalysis according to an artistic model. The term fictionalism stresses the rupture with realism that this particular artistic model necessitates" (pp. 129-130). In the following condensed statement, Geha strongly avows what he believes Freud just as strenuously discounts in the Wolf Man: "The imagination constructs the world that the imagination interprets" (p. 111). Hence the title of this essay, "Freud as Fictionalist: The Imaginary World of Psychoanalysis."

Geha makes a textual analysis of the Wolf Man to illustrate his reasoning: the presentation "issues from Freud's imaginative constructions, his text is a novelistic fiction" (p. 144). Then Geha generalizes his view to include all of psychoanalysis, which he believes "is wholly involved with fictions and fictional texts" (p. 144). In this controversial conclusion, Geha lines up again with Schafer and Spence in supporting the linked ideas of narrative versus historical truth and psychoanalysis seen as hermeneutic science. As to the issue of Freud's identity, Geha finds it ironic that Freud so strongly disowned the very artistry he exemplified.

This volume ends with Herzog's brief contribution, "The Myth of Freud as Anti-Philosopher," a persuasive refutation of a widely held belief. Underscoring Brentano's decisive influence on Freud during his university years, Herzog carefully distinguishes between different methods of philosophy: the scientific versus the speculative metaphysical. In his relentless zeal to preserve the unconscious squarely within a scientific tradition, Freud had to distance himself from those philosophers for whom the unconscious was "something mystical, something intangible, and undemonstrable" (p. 169). In so doing, claims Herzog, Freud's undeserved reputation as an anti-philosopher took firm root.

Stepansky's introduction to Volume 3 is entitled, "Text, Context, and Freud." Its two major essays share common ground in a joint

effort to align contextual historical insights with illuminating textual material. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Back Again: Freud, Jung, and Sabina Spielrein," John Kerr reaches some intriguing, albeit debatable conclusions in his search for a more comprehensive and tenable origin of Freud's "death instinct." Kerr first frames his discussion by clarifying the puzzling nature of the unpopular concept introduced in 1920 with an original review and interpretation of Freud's paper. He then studies the significance of Jung's "Transformations and Symbols of the Libido" and Spielrein's "Destruction as a Cause of Coming into Being," by interweaving the tangled cross influences of Jung and Spielrein on each other and on Freud. Kerr's assertion, "that Freud built his theory of the death instinct essentially by revamping the models of Spielrein may be alarming to some" (p. 56), is then reinforced by his suspicion that Freud had "an ingenious polemical motive" (p. 61).

As in Homans's paper in Volume 2, Kerr finds the lingering ghost of his earlier relationship with Jung hovering over Freud for years to come, remaining critically instrumental in the evolution of his ideas. Decisive modifications of his libido theory (expanding the phenomenon of the repetition compulsion from its clinical position to a more fundamental role possessing instinctual characteristics), not the proposal for a death instinct, are what Kerr believes are central in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, adumbrating newer ideas in his theory of psychoanalytic technique.

Peter J. Swales's essay, like the one in Volume 1, is characteristically daunting in its scholarly detail, and reads like the work of an ambitious doctoral student employed as an investigative reporter. While he claims his intention is "to present an historical reconstruction of Freud's encounter with 'Katharina'—also, a comprehensive account of her family's origins, history, circumstances, fate, and subsequent contact with Freud" (p. 86), his agenda is much more crowded. Besides attempting to show the "essential flimsiness of Freud's interpretation" (p. 128) of the case and how "conspicuously oblivious to a traumatic yet nonsexual interpretation" (p. 119) he was, Swales asserts that Freud "cooked his story" (p. 115) and "fudged his data" (p. 124). Near the end of his essay, Swales concludes that "afflicted ever since with the problem of de-

termining just where the fantasy stops and the theory begins, [psychoanalysis] has rendered itself liable to the charge of being a mere fantasy of a psychology" (p. 132). As in his earlier work, the dual target of Swales's conscientious attack is Freud's character and psychoanalysis as respectable science.

Stepansky finds value in Swales's sensitive efforts as a historian "to reappraise Freud's understanding of Katharina, and thereupon to enlarge our understanding of the cognitive and social bases of the young Freud's theory choices and clinical strategies" (p. xvii). But Swales makes his case with an unconcealed a priori conviction that Freud, both as clinician and as scientist, from start to finish, was a charlatan, a greedy practitioner, and a social climber. In conspicuous contrast to other contributors in this series, who strive to plumb the unknown vagaries composing Freud's turbulent creative efforts, Swales seems either oblivious or unsympathetic to those complexities. Gedo's pointed demurrer (in Volume 1) deserves attention for a contrasting point of view.

But because his flaunting disrespect for Freud is tacitly introduced by Swales, it becomes an issue too obtrusive to be ignored. Accustomed as they are to listening for style and form as much as to content, psychoanalysts reading this essay will surely question the objectivity of Swales's hunches, inferences, and deductions. It is unlikely that anyone soon will check the facts that Swales has unearthed in a decade of research. And, taken at face value, there are indeed many issues worth raising about Freud's understanding of Katharina. But the tone in which Swales chooses to present these fascinating new data creates unfortunate distractions and undermines the conclusions of an otherwise penetrating historical inquiry.

Robert Holt "retraces Freud's intellectual footsteps" in his brief contribution entitled, "Freud's Adolescent Reading: Some Possible Effects on His Work." He reviews three texts read by Freud and his close friends, essentially "best sellers" of the day: Buchner's *Force and Matter*, Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*, and Strauss's *The Old Faith and the New*. Buchner and Feuerbach eschewed a religious-supernatural world view in favor of a relentless search for truth via scientific methodology, while supporting a rational basis for morality. Holt makes the interesting observation that both these authors often sound remarkably like Freud. Strauss, "the

19th century's most notorious theologian," according to Holt, is entirely harmonious with the other two, asserting that a moral basis for life does exist, but within the matrix of Darwinian evolutionary theory.

Holt convincingly shows how these works held such strong appeal for intellectually enthusiastic and rebellious teenagers like Freud. In closing references to the nature of creative thinking, Holt recalls "the maxim of Democritus that nothing proceeds out of nothing" and ends with a sentence worth quoting: "To discover antecedents of a great thinker's formulations in books he read is more a work of homage than of detraction, or at least it should be" (p. 189).

This series strives to earn "multiple appeal" among several disciplines, and it is likely to achieve its goal if it has not already done so. As long as the current high standards of quality are maintained and a clear distinction is preserved between the science of psychoanalysis and the life of its creator, a regular and loyal following is assured among those of us still fascinated by studies of Freud.

SAMUEL HOCH (SAN FRANCISCO)

FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME. By Peter Gay. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1988. 810 pp.

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, saw no limits to his own curiosity but did not wish to be scrutinized by others. He was "alarmed" that the writer, Arnold Zweig, wished to become his biographer and wrote him, in 1936: "No, I am far too fond of you to allow such a thing to happen. Anyone turning biographer commits himself to lies, to concealments, to hypocrisy, to flattery, and even to hiding his own lack of understanding, for biographical truth is not to be had. . . ."[1] Consistent with the concern that he would not "escape whipping were he used after his desert," Freud twice systematically destroyed his written correspondence, diaries, and manuscripts—in his late twenties (with fame not even a glimmer) and again, two decades later. We will never know, unfortunately,

[1] Freud, E. L., Editor (1960): *Letters of Sigmund Freud*. New York: Basic Books, p. 430.

to what extent Freud's obstructionism has compromised biographers' views; it does not appear to have had much effect on biographers' efforts. Close to a dozen full-scale biographies of Freud have appeared over the past half-century, the best known of which are by psychoanalysts. Beginning with Fritz Wittel's 1924 *Sigmund Freud: His Personality, His Teaching, and His School*, and beyond the classic three-volume *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* by Ernest Jones, the life of Sigmund Freud continues to elicit renewed attempts at fuller understanding.

Peter Gay is eminently qualified to be Freud's latest biographer. An analyst as well as a Guggenheim scholar and Rockefeller Foundation fellow, he is currently Sterling Professor of History at Yale. He has not embarked on this massive effort *de novo*. After immersing himself in the eighteenth century and producing a two-volume work, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, Gay turned to the nineteenth century and has already completed the first two volumes of *The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud*.[2] A year before the current work Gay published *A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis*.[3]

Unlike earlier authors who relied primarily on personal experience (especially Wittels and Jones), Gay includes five pages of grateful acknowledgments for access to interviews, private correspondence, and previously unpublished documents from the Freud Collection of the Library of Congress and the Freud Museum in London.

We are reminded that, in contrast to Freud's patients, who were predominantly upper middle class professionals or even aristocratic, Freud's father was a wool merchant and the family quite poor. Had Freud's superior academic performance—he was consistently first in his class—not freed him from tuition payments, his education might have ended earlier. The family moved from Freiberg (a city Freud loved for its woods) to Vienna, a cosmopolitan city with which Freud never admitted comfort but in which he remained as long as he could. Gay notes that the development of psychoanalysis did not depend on the uniqueness of Vienna. On the contrary, the society of Vienna—the opera, salons, cafes—was

[2] Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1988, 57:241-46.

[3] Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1989, 58:494-98.

dispensable, if not irrelevant. A first-rate medical school and an affluent, educated public were necessities.

Like Oedipus, Freud's greatness had apparently been forecast by a local prophetess, and he was treated as special. His initial inclination toward law changed to medicine for reasons which are not completely clear. What comes through is a strong sense of ambition and a need for direction from an early age. Freud confessed no early love of medicine, but rather a greed for knowledge. Gay, the psychoanalyst, reminds us of Freud's early voyeurism (as later revealed in his self-analysis), suggesting earlier roots to the selection of his life's work. In fact, by noting Freud's misdating an observation of the primal scene, Gay emphasizes the import of Freud's constitutional curiosity.

While Gay attends to the major influences in Freud's development of psychoanalytic theory, he is not always consistent in explicating the significance of Freud's experiences. For instance, Gay appropriately notes Freud's observations of Charcot, but he never clearly delineates their importance to the development of psychoanalytic theory and technique. Freud observed that if someone with post-hypnotic amnesia is given the opportunity to talk freely, the amnesia might be undone gradually. This was to suggest the existence of the unconscious and would lead to the technique of free association. Just as Carl Koller had applied Freud's observations about the anaesthetic effects of cocaine a decade before, so Freud intuitively extended Charcot's observation of the mechanism of traumatic neurosis to hysteria in general and thence to phobias and obsessions.

Gay has achieved considerably more distance than Jones did and is therefore able to be more comfortably critical of Freud, in both the professional and the personal realms. His excellent discussion of Freud's *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* is a balanced appraisal, in which he notes that "for all the brilliance of its deductions, [it] is a severely flawed performance" (p. 270). The German mistranslation of *nibbio* as vulture—instead of kite—led Freud to erroneous speculations about nursing, and to homosexuality. The foundation for the speculation disappears when the term is correctly translated. While this gaffe was pointed out as early as 1923, Freud never corrected it; nor did any biographer mention it during Freud's lifetime.

Two major events in the early 1920's may attest to Freud's capacity to view himself in an exceptional way; or they may point simply to his use of denial. Freud had suspected that the mouth lesion he developed was probably cancerous, but was willing to participate in the reassuring charades advanced by his dentist, his personal physician (Felix Deutsch), and his colleagues. Even after his condition deteriorated and he required surgery and radiation, the fantasy of a cure was maintained. Freud's continued cigar smoking caused constant irritation and likely contributed to his need for thirty more surgical procedures. Interestingly, Freud dismissed Deutsch as his personal physician when he learned of the latter's duplicity.

The second incident involved Freud's youngest daughter, Anna, to whom he had become increasingly close. From 1918 to 1921 he served as her analyst in what, by Freud's own standards, was a conspicuous departure from the usual clinical and ethical guidelines. Gay's defense of Freud's behavior, however, is not convincing. Whether or not it was justifiable on purely technical grounds, Freud appears to have underestimated his own countertransference in the matter. He was well aware of the major issue with which his daughter had to deal—her "father complex"—and had been concerned about her ability to find a suitable mate. While Freud considered the analysis successful, the fact remains that Anna became increasingly tied to her father, personally and professionally; and these ties persisted throughout the remainder of their lives. Gay informs us that in his later years Freud referred to Anna as Antigone, the loyal daughter who, in *Oedipus at Colonus*, leads her blind father by the hand. While Anna became a pioneering child analyst in her own right, she also served as her father's secretary, confidante, representative, colleague, and nurse. Whatever benefits may have accrued to the psychoanalytic movement from her devotion, Freud's behavior—as in the cancer episode—raises questions about his ability to utilize good judgment in personal matters consistently. And yet Freud was not oblivious to his daughter's predicament. He wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé in 1927 that "Anna is splendid and intellectually independent but [has] no sexual life. . . . What will she do without her father?" (p. 541).

Initially, Freud was ostensibly impartial when the debate be-

tween Anna Freud and Melanie Klein developed, claiming a lack of expertise in the area of early child development. But later he sided strongly with his daughter. Gay informs us that in personal correspondence Freud accused Jones of "arranging a campaign against his daughter's way of analyzing children, defended her criticisms of Melanie Klein's clinical strategies, and resented the charge that she had been insufficiently analyzed. This last hit Freud in a sensitive spot; he argued that such insinuations were undesirable and dangerous. 'Who, after all, has been sufficiently analyzed? I can assure you . . . Anna has been analyzed longer and more thoroughly than, for example, you yourself' " (p. 469). The irony of this *ad hominem* attack on Jones is apparent when one recalls (Gay either ignores this or assumes that readers will make their own connections) that although Freud regarded his daughter as having been too attached to him, he had, in fact, previously rejected Jones as a potential suitor for Anna. Freud appears to have been telling Jones: "Anna's analysis was successful! She didn't marry you!" Ironically, the success of the analysis remains in question—she remained with her father.

The section on Freud's view of female development ("Dark Continents," pp. 501-521) is one of the more enjoyable, as Gay successfully attends to the roles of the various women in Freud's life. Freud's mother was a "formidable personage . . . handsome and obtrusive . . bound to be desirable to her son" (p. 504). Gay suggests that "there is no evidence that Freud's systematic self-scrutiny touched on this weightiest of attachments, or that he ever explored and tried to exorcise, his mother's power over him" (p. 505). "He seems to have dealt with the conflicts that his complicated feelings toward his mother generated by refusing to deal with them" (p. 506). Is it a surprise, then, that Freud would elaborate his view, "anatomy is destiny," along the lines of deficient superego development for women? "Their super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins . . ."[4] as that of the male. Gay does point out the irony in the fact that it was Anna Freud who read this 1925 paper at the Bad Homburg psychoanalytic congress!

[4] Freud, S. (1925): Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. *S.E.*, 19:257.

Gay comments (p. 485) that *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* "is aesthetically less satisfying than most of Freud's other writings [because] it strings together ideas instead of demonstrating their necessary connection. Some of its lasting contributions to psychoanalytic thinking . . . are scattered across the text and tucked away in one of the appendices." To some extent, this may be said of Gay's effort as well.

The question of a possible affair between Freud and his sister-in-law, Minna Bernays, has, of late, piqued considerable interest. Readers may be disappointed in the limited attention given to this in the text. Minna "was his valued companion in conversations, on walks, on trips" (p. 502). A footnote suggests that the "rumor, launched by Carl G. Jung, that Freud had an affair with Minna Bernays lacks convincing evidence" (p. 76, n.). Additional consideration in the appended bibliographical essay ends with Gay's conclusion that "given the incompleteness of the evidence . . . one cannot be dogmatic" (p. 753). The matter, however, is not yet closed. In an essay for *The New York Times Book Review* (January 29, 1989) Gay reported on his more recent findings after reviewing the newly available "Freud-Minna correspondence." If Gay's account of the letters is accurate, the data is only marginally suggestive and remains inconclusive. But, as with any good mystery, one may still wonder about the contents of the presumably sixty-five missing letters covering the period from 1893 to 1910, when such an affair would likely have occurred—if at all.

Gay excels at capsule distillations of Freud's major works and places them in an appropriate historical context. Informed by Gay's vast knowledge of both the psychoanalytic and sociocultural literature and issues of Freud's internal struggles. Gay's précis of *The Future of an Illusion* does considerable justice to Freud's "attack" on religion, but readers are left to puzzle by themselves whether this work was simply an impersonal scientific essay criticizing mysticism or whether Freud's attack was the product of a much more personal ax he had to grind.

Similarly, Gay attributes Freud's ferocious and indiscriminate anti-Americanism to his "inner need rather than . . . his experience." Gay asserts that Freud adopted the conventional European stereotype of Americans but also acknowledges that Freud had a need for an enemy as much as for a friend. "The America that

Freud constructed stood as a gigantic collective manifestation of the enemy he said he could not do without" (p. 570). Gay's explanation of Freud's vituperativeness, an odd mixture of psychology and sociology, is satisfactory on neither count.

In all, *Freud: A Life for Our Time* is a splendid addition to our literature on Freud. That it undoubtedly is not the last word on so monumental and complex an individual is neither a complaint nor a criticism but rather a statement of the obvious.

KENNETH I. GOTTLIEB (SAN FRANCISCO)

A PHYLOGENETIC FANTASY. OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSFERENCE NEUROSES. By Sigmund Freud. Edited and with an essay by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis. Translated by Axel Hoffer and Peter T. Hoffer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. 113 pp.

By mid-1915 Freud had more or less completed the twelve chapters of what he hoped would be his *magnum opus* on psychoanalytic theory, the successor to Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The book on metapsychology was written in gloomy times when there were few patients and only one available close collaborator, Sandor Ferenczi. Despite the hard times, or because of them, the work took on a life of its own. First conceived as a completion and summation, and written under the duress of what Freud called his "bad moods" (he even said the first metapsychological papers functioned as sedation), the subsequent papers led to new ideas. Stimulation replaced sedation. Freud soared into audacious fantasies about our origins as social (and neurotic) beings.

During the next two years, he read the literature by and about Lamarck, and planned a paper with Ferenczi on the subject of inherited racial memories. But then, gradually or suddenly, he abandoned both the joint venture and his own book. Five of the chapters were published as individual papers: "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," "Repression," "The Unconscious," "Mourning and Melancholia," and "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams." They rank among our classics. But presumably Freud destroyed the manuscripts of the other seven.

It is natural that psychoanalysts have puzzled about what was in

the seven "lost" essays—and about Freud's motives for "losing" them. We knew several of their subjects: consciousness (thus, representations and "presentations" of reality), conversion hysteria, obsessional neurosis, anxiety, and a synthesis of the transference neuroses (Strachey speculated that the two other papers were about sublimation and projection). Judging from what is known about Freud's other interests during this period, these essays almost certainly would have included discussions of the following: narcissism; the general concept of transference, including not only the phenomena observed clinically but the "structural" relationship of transference neuroses to narcissistic neuroses; and brain-mind, biological-psychological phenomena implied by the interrelated influences of constitution and experience (the principle of complementarity). And we might have guessed, because it was known that Freud strongly held to Lamarck's belief in the heritability of experiences, and because of the existence of *Totem and Taboo*, that he would have speculated about the origins of humanity—the phylogeny and ontogeny of humans as psychological and social beings.

What a loss! And for those of us interested in Freud's inner motivations, what frustration! But not everyone would agree; there are analysts disinclined to read about a largely discredited biological theory of the past, and there are analysts who believe we pay far too much attention to the past in general and specifically to Freud's personal history. Better to attend to the present and future, they say. I disagree, but, it is necessary to ask, *was* the decision to destroy the unpublished papers an intellectual loss? And, except to satisfy idle curiosities and biographers, do we have a need to know what we can about Freud's motivations? Freud demonstrated in action that he believed psychoanalysis would be better off without the destroyed writings. And presumably, as a man who had exposed the inner workings of his mind to strangers to an unprecedented degree, he also thought that decisions about what to publish or not were his own business. Wasn't he justified?

In partial answer to the first question, we need only remember the astonishing burst of creativity which succeeded (perhaps caused) giving up the book. Instead of ending his life's work at about the age of sixty, Freud during the next twenty years trans-

formed psychoanalysis—clinically, theoretically, and professionally. It is entirely possible that the missing chapters, had they been made public, would have interfered with these private and public transformations. But now we are in a different place. Surely we have sufficient distance from the scientific and intra-disciplinary political issues of the 1920's to be trusted to know what was lost.

Of course Freud had a right to personal privacy, but he has been dead for more than fifty years. Mortal rights, even as dispersed among descendants, gradually disappear, especially in regard to great women and men. In any new intellectual discipline, the early group needs to follow a heroically conceived leader to give way to more impersonalized contributions and governance. Furthermore, as psychoanalysts know about themselves and about their analysands, authentic insights into the mind of another are infinitely more interesting than idealized images—no matter the gifts of the idolator or his or her subject. It would be best for all of us to know everything that can be known about Freud: we are now in position to appreciate his genius more as a human than as a mythological figure.

Even more important is a full understanding of Freud's *work* as a whole. There is a particularly unfortunate tendency among some psychoanalysts to scotomatize those aspects of Freud's thought that are currently out of fashion or found no support in the years after he enunciated them. If acknowledged at all, they are dismissed as vagaries or eccentricities. Worse, enemies of psychoanalysis use them to justify notions that psychoanalysis is essentially silly or evil. Freud remained loyal to some of his least generally acceptable beliefs, no matter what evidence or opinions countered them. We may find difficulties in viewing, for example, nosological categories as exactly as he classified them. Freud certainly understood the difficulties for others of some of his concepts, although we do not know to what extent he saw for himself that they were problematic. It is useful, however, to remember that he learned most when confronted with "difficulties." He was intrepid. Obstacles were due full respect and analysis, just as are the analyses of intrapsychic resistances. Adversity can be, and probably always is, the impetus to creation.

In 1983 a piece of the puzzle about the lost chapters turned up

unexpectedly. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, working on the extensive correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi (much of which was still kept privately at that time) came across a remarkable letter from Freud, dated July 28, 1915. It contained, in manuscript form, the draft of the twelfth and final chapter of the book. It was given the provisional title, "Overview of the Transference Neuroses."

However, that title does not quite fit the text. It is an overview of the "transference neuroses" *and* the "narcissistic neuroses," an organized synthesis of the nosology of that time. Besides that, it is a presentation of what Freud called a "phylogenetic fantasy," an astonishing set of guesses about the origin of each diagnostic entity in a specific prehistorical period. It is not quite clear who was responsible for making this phrase of Freud's the primary title of the book in the English translation; some will argue that it is too partial—that at the very least it could have included the "narcissistic neuroses." But contents are important, titles not very.

Whatever else might be said about it, the phylogenetic fantasy, or "fiction," is startling. Freud was probably as sophisticated as any person of his time (or ours) about the necessities, values, and defects of the uses of fantasy (thus, in part, the uses of fiction) in artistic, historical, and especially scientific matters. While he often downplayed his own playful bent, claiming to work arduously and drearily, piling one little empirical observation on another in order to develop theories, he was more candid when he called himself a conquistador. The 1914 work, "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," contains the remark that he had laboriously "learned to restrain speculative tendencies."[1] In fact, in the book under review, we learn of a letter to Ferenczi, written on April 8, 1915, in which he described the mechanism of creativity as "the succession of daringly playful fantasy and relentlessly realistic criticism" (p. 83). Grubrich-Simitis believes that it was the criticism that stalled the fantasy in the instance of the twelfth chapter. Unlike the others, it could not be compared to clinical data.

The first section of this well-developed draft of "A Phylogenetic Fantasy" is written in a condensed, almost shorthand form. It covers familiar territory already partly spelled out in "The Uncon-

[1] Freud, S. (1914): On the history of the psycho-analytic movement. *S.E.*, 14:22.

scious" and "On Repression." But it also organizes the observations and theories in a proposed nosological series: first, the three transference neuroses (anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, obsessional neurosis) associated with the narcissistic neuroses (dementia praecox, paranoia, melancholia-depression). They are related and compared according to six variables: repression (in its earlier general sense, not its later specific sense), anticathexis, substitutive- and symptom-formation, sexual function, regression (fixation), and disposition.

The first five of these had been well-considered in the published papers. The last, disposition, had only received glancing mention. But any close reader of Freud will find the word all over the place in various writings, for example, in the footnotes added in 1915 to "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality," or in the "Introductory Lectures" as the "principle of complementarity"—the mutual, complementary influences of endowment and experience. Freud also mentioned in numerous places his belief that memories of *group* experiences of our ancestors are included in each of us, as part of biological endowment. Thus, biology for Freud included conventional Darwinian theories and the ideas of Lamarck.

These latter ideas, of course, have received no scientific support —especially since the years of the tacky neo-Lamarckianism of Stalin's Lysenko. But, in agreement with the commentary on Freud's thought in this book, I believe that the biological theories of the future will differ from *our* "accepted wisdom" in as revolutionary ways as Freud's thought differed from previous biological, psychological, and medical "certainties."

This book demonstrates that not only did Freud stubbornly hold to Lamarckian beliefs, he extended them in reference to postulated origins of what he called the transference neuroses and the narcissistic neuroses.

The resulting sweeping synthesis, he thought, helped explain choice of neurosis and the awesomely intense forces involved. It holds that the series of neuroses "seems to repeat phylogenetically an historical origin." What are now neuroses (and what nowadays we would call psychoses) were once phases in this schema in human conditions during the last ice age and its aftermath.

The first phase came, Freud speculated, in the face of the

danger of group extinction during the waxing and waning of the ice age. It resulted in the development of a firm patriarchal system and successive patterns which were then normal, but which now constitute the psychoneuroses or *transference* neuroses. First, it became the norm to react in intrapsychic ways like those seen in contemporary anxiety hysteria; later, the norm came to be to react with repression like that seen in conversion hysteria; lastly to react with obsessional organizations.

The second phase, in the aftermath of the ice age, had to do with the development of the social stage of civilization. It was related originally to the castration of the sons (and the exile of those who escaped actual castration) by an increasingly tyrannical father. The resulting "norms" became, in one day, *narcissistic* neuroses. Thus, Freud connected the development of dementia praecox to such actual or symbolic castrations. Later, the surviving sons returned and murdered the tyrant. The memories of that prehistoric tragedy are nowadays expressed, Freud thought, as psychopathology in paranoia. The extreme narcissistic neurosis, "melancholia-mania," is a revenant of the guilt, denials, and subsequent chaos after the murder of the Leader.

Because of our habits of thinking, it seems odd to us that Freud located the narcissistic neuroses developmentally *after* the transference neurotic organizations had been elaborated. But it is not strange when it is remembered that he originally thought that narcissistic libido was transformed into object libido during *adolescence* —long after the primary mechanisms in the transference neuroses had been elaborated during the oedipal period. Freud even remarked that there seemed to be an inverse relationship between the two series, in which the later the disorder developed, the earlier were the developmental points to which regression occurred.

We do not have to *believe* in this fantasy to find it a valuable "difficulty."

Now, translated into English, we have a beautiful little book. It contains, in fact, four gifts: (1) facsimiles of the actual Freudian handwritten text, lovingly printed verbatim in facing pages; (2) an explanatory rendering of the text in German by Grubrich-Simitis, translated into English; (3) an extensive essay by her, titled "Metapsychology and Metabiology," which not only helps distinguish

what is probable from what is improbable in our thoughts about the Freud who made the work, but also is one of the best approaches to Freud's metapsychology in the literature; and (4) the Foreword by the brothers Hoffer who translated the work into English; in addressing the complications of such a translation they add a great deal to its worth. The translation itself goes so smoothly that one forgets it is a translation. I am told by colleagues who are qualified to judge that it conforms to the highest levels of scholarship.

The book belongs to Grubrich-Simitis as much as it does to Freud. Her scholarly contribution was necessary to make Freud's handwritten manuscript, much of it written in abbreviations, intelligible. She adds an understandable context which touches on much more than what is included in Freud's "phylogenetic fantasy" itself. So that she could do this, most of the massive correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi was made available to her, although, at least at that time, she still did not have permission to quote all of it.

Nevertheless, she is able to demonstrate that the collaborative relationship between the two men was far more extensive than most psychoanalysts had known. In some ways it may have resembled previous collaborations Freud had had during other creative periods. Very likely, it was complicated, perhaps essentially destroyed, by another attempt by Ferenczi to be analyzed by Freud during part of it. It is easy for us to see how difficult and perhaps impossible it is to frame off one kind of relationship, that of the analytic situation, from another, that of friendship or family relationship. But it took painful experiences to learn many things which we now take for granted.

Going beyond the biographical interests and the additional access to Freud's creative functions, Grubrich-Simitis's essay is a beautiful exposition of a psychoanalytic way of thinking, not only about clinical matters but about theories, not only about psychoanalysis but about all productive intellectual work that soars beyond mere classification and abstraction. She makes it clear how much Freud depended upon free communication intrapsychically; in illustrating this, she produces an eloquent argument to preserve the forms and functions of metapsychology, without freezing it

into dogma or concretizations of metaphors. Freud was not only a psychological revolutionary, he was an epistemological revolutionary as well.

Finally, this small book is a contribution to the current arguments about psychoanalysis as a scientific enterprise, entwined with biological issues as much as it is entwined with the more general humanities, but maintaining an individuality of its own. Sulloway's insistence on seeing Freud as a biologist[2] and the arguments against his viewpoints, along with the interests of individual scholars like Lucille Ritvo,[3] are alive. In my opinion, they will result neither in the "biologizing" of psychoanalysis nor in dismissal of its resemblances to some of the other humanities, particularly history; they will lead us to retain the changing and metaphorical forms of the "witch," metapsychology, rooted as it is in the life of the body and the brain as much as it is rooted in internal psychological experience. And it will do this without mixing the replaceable superstructure with the foundations; i.e., with disciplined observations.

The book is satisfying and stimulating. It will be useful to scholars, to historians of science, to epistemologists, to those of us interested in creativity in general—particularly in Freud's. It will be a major voice in the dialogues about the heuristic value of retaining a metapsychology. Most of all, it will show by example the virtues of minds that are open and flexible—yet skeptical. We all know that the more free we are to fantasy and the more we subject fantasy to rational criticism, the more useful will be our work. Not merely a beautifully presented piece of curiosa, this little book is a challenge for any reader who is not trapped in literal-mindedness.

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[2] Sulloway, F. J. (1979): *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend*. New York: Basic Books.

[3] Ritvo, L. V. (1965): Darwin as the source of Freud's neo-Lamarckianism. *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.* 13:499-517.

Ritvo, L. V. (1972): Carl Claus as Freud's professor of the new Darwinian biology. *Int. J. Psychoanal.* 53:277-283.

HALO IN THE SKY. OBSERVATIONS ON ANALITY AND DEFENSE. By Leonard Shengold, M.D. New York/London: The Guilford Press, 1988. 184 pp.

Anxiety and anal defenses make the anal world a dark, forbidding universe entered through a tight ring (projected and idealized by a perverse patient as a "halo . . . in the sky"). Shengold's compelling essays, cast within structural theory, open the door to this nether land, illuminating it anew. Much of the ground is familiar, but Shengold shows it to have a power and structure that is not sufficiently appreciated. Anal phase defense development, according to the author, is the scaffolding upon which subsequent defense development adheres—resulting in cohesion, strength, and mastery in health; perversion, loss of identity, and murderous rage in disease. Readers familiar with the author's work over the last twenty-five years can be assured that rich new veins are mined and processed within this slender volume.

Shengold introduces his book, which contains seven chapters and a concluding coda, by outlining his conceptual framework and its relationship both to established psychoanalytic thought and to his own unique contribution to the study of anality and defense. "I am trying in this book to contribute something toward the basic psychoanalytic concept of defense, which I see as an aspect of the even more basic concept of body ego" (p. 3). Shengold affirms his conviction that the core of the ego is a body ego infused and given structure by the drives. Only after the body ego is established can a psychic ego develop. Shengold reiterates the view that the earliest defense is the psychologically based stimulus barrier. Other defensive precursors emerge from the body ego as well, for example, "negation (I spit out, which leads to *projection*) and affirmation (I swallow it, which leads to *introjection*)" (p. 16). But it is during anal phase development—when drives and ego greatly mature and differentiate—that Shengold begins his ontogeny of defense. For him, "the psychological birth of the human being [is metaphorically conceived] as an anal birth" (p. 32).

As the anal phase achieves dominance, and as early sensorimotor intelligence becomes more complex, discrete defensive operations become possible. Defensive displacements and reversals are the consequence of libidinal shifts from the mouth to the anus. "Just as

the anal sphincter separates and disconnects the fecal column, so there can be imposed a defensive discontinuity in chains of thought both between ideas and between ideas, feelings and action" (p. 20). The ability to induce discontinuity allows for isolation and splitting. Additional anal phase defenses are anal introjection, anal projection, and the opposed, reversible, defensive pair of idealization and devaluation. Working in concert, these defenses culminate in denial, where "feelings as well as facts can be disposed of in an effective, massive way; everything meaningful, everything associated with feeling, conviction, and value—can be reduced to shit" (p. 20).

Before oedipal repression is possible, anal narcissistic defense, as Shengold calls it, "acts as a kind of emotional and sensory closable door that serves to control the largely murderous and cannibalistic primal affects derived from the destructive and perverse sexual drives of early life. . . . Anal narcissistic defense represents an amalgam of anal impulses (resorted to defensively in later life by way of repression), anal symptoms, and above all anal defense mechanisms. . . . The sphincter-like defensive power of reducing intensities enables the individual to modulate unpleasure and pain, to avoid *over*stimulation and to diminish and evade conflict ridden feelings associated with object ties" (p. 24).

Shengold elaborates these ideas in the second chapter, "Defensive Anality, Sphincter Defense and Anal Narcissism." "Defensive anality [is] a mobilization of anal erogeneity, defense mechanisms, and symptoms . . . by danger situations at all levels (including the developmentally advanced castration threat which flourishes during the oedipal development that follows the period of anality)" (p. 31). Sphincter defense is an alternate term for anal defense but carries a different implication. Anal narcissism is the libidinal cathexis of the excretory apparatus and of its products. Shengold, citing Abraham and A. Freud, notes the substantial cathectic shifts which take place during toilet training. To secure the love and approval of the mother, children must surrender some libido invested in their body and its products as they simultaneously transfer this libido to their mother. Object libido is augmented at the expense of narcissistic libido. "The internalization of the parents who take part in the toilet training struggles changes the

quality of both the self and the object representations. There is no separable line for narcissism here" (p. 35). These internalizations contribute not only to ego development but to the precursors of the superego and ego ideal and the values they encompass: idealizations and devaluation. Because anal phase development is so aggressively charged, hatred and devaluation can be extremely heightened.

The developmental challenge during this critical phase is to achieve the balance between sphincter control over primal affects while maintaining touch with the wellsprings of humanity—feelings. Failure to achieve a reasonable balance may result in an obsessional neurosis as well as in a variety of characterologic disturbances. "Character traits result that encompass an infinite variety of contradictory variables (contradictions and reversals are the stuff of anality, which is made up of coexistent defensive and expressive components): The entirely predictable (life as caricature) alongside occasional unpredictability; dullness interspersed with violence; being emotionally dead yet also subject to outbursts of affect" (p. 32). Vertical splits within the ego sustain these polar character traits.

In "Healthy Anality and Anal Creativity," Chapter 3, Shengold affirms that the capacity to be creative has its origins in toddlers' magical belief that they have created their body products—their feces (and urine). This conviction becomes embedded in conscious and unconscious fantasies which equate shitting and shit with working and its products—including creative endeavors. Where Shengold has an extraordinary gift is in his ability to illustrate his ideas from brief clinical vignettes and through brief excursions into biography and literature (in this instance, Gustave Flaubert), raising psychoanalytic exegesis to a new standard.

In several clinical and literary examples, some very funny, Shengold illustrates "Defensive and Healthy Anality" in Chapter 4. At the core of healthy anality is the emerging sense of mastery over the body and the pleasure in its products. Mastery of oral and anal phase primal affects assures a predictable, coherent sense of self when subsequent anxiety-induced regressions revive oral and anal narcissistic states. "We live intermittently in narcissistic erogenic worlds alive with projected intense sensations whose center is a

part of one's own body: an oral world, an anal world, a genital world" (p. 77). Successful mastery also contributes to the toddler's developing capacity for lucid thinking—thinking not rent asunder by splits and confusing denials. Healthy anality permits robust entry into the oedipal period, where passions can ignite without destroying.

Defensive anality can reduce anxiety, but at a price. The world shrinks as libido is withdrawn from objects and is invested in the body. "Anal narcissism involves a regressive reduction of ego to body ego, dominated by the 'sadistic-anal organization'; the whole psychic apparatus (impulses, defenses, symptoms and character) once again acquires an anal cast. Relationships become self-centered and hollow; people are reduced to things; values to 'stuff' " (p. 76).

In this chapter Shengold further explores the already familiar rat imagery, but adds the goose to his menagerie. The rat, with its nearly universal association to biting and tearing, dirt and destruction, is a common clinical and literary symbol for anal-sadistic fantasies. Though less frightening, the goose—as in being goosed—has for some patients the meaning of passive anal surrender, leading to the dangers of overstimulation and feeling overwhelmed.

Shengold enriches his existing work on "soul murder" in the chapter, "A Literary/Historical Example of Anal-Narcissistic Defensiveness: The Soul Murder of Kaspar Hauser." Soul murder (the crime for which there is no forgiveness) "refers to killing the joy in life and interfering with the sense of identity of another human being" (p. 79). "Soul murder is achieved by a combination of torture, deprivation, and brainwashing. One person who has absolute power over another enforces submission and an identification with the oppressor, who is justified or even idealized by the victim. The most likely victim of soul murder is a child . . ." (p. 86). The rage, pain, deprivation and/or overstimulation endured by the child augments the primal effect of rage that accompanies oral-sadistic and anal-sadistic development. Anal defenses are employed to protect images of both the child's and the parent's ability to sustain life, if only to permit it. The sphincter closes, pain is regulated, and the world shrinks to a mass of shit.

Improbable as it is, the story of Kaspar Hauser in no way ex-

ceeds the improbability of comparable current nightmarish and tragic narratives—like those of Lisa Steinberg and Hedda Nussbaum. On May 26, 1828, an adolescent boy stumbled into the town of Nuremberg. Barely able to walk, incapable of speech except for a few words, he recited his name and carried a letter from the man who presumably raised him. The letter claimed the lad had been left with the man when he was six months old and had been raised by the man for the last sixteen years. The letter further requested that the lad be taken to Nuremberg to become a cavalry officer as his father had been. Adopted and tutored by kindly town officials, Kaspar soon learned to speak and later to write. His recalled history was as cruel as it was grotesque. There was no beginning before Nuremberg, where "he came into the world" (p. 84). For as long as he could remember, he lived in a dark hole, alternatively called a cage. Dressed only in a shirt and pants, he could never stretch to his full length, evidenced by the deformity of his knees when he was first discovered. He was cared for by a man whose face he never saw. The man brought him his food and water and attended to his bodily hygiene. Evidently, his drinking water was laced with small amounts of opium to keep him in a drugged stupor. "The 'hole' had been his womb, his universe; a timeless anal-narcissistic world . . ." (p. 84).

Kind and gentle, Kaspar could never become angry, even when taunted and teased by the curious hordes who came to see him. Anal defensiveness had achieved its aim of taming primal rage—but at what a price! In spite of his sixteen years of (virtual) slumber and its massive developmental interference, Kaspar flourished for a couple of years becoming almost intoxicated with the beauty of the world and the kindness of his first Nuremberg caretaker. This paradise was shattered after a year and a half when a first attempt was made on Kaspar's life. Found dazed and bloodied and hiding in the basement, Kaspar could tell little about the assault. His head healed, but the psychological injury had been grave. Defense restrictions and regressions blunted Kaspar's belated cognitive and emotional development. Toward the end of his life, Kaspar became an irritable, joyless young man locked in obsessional constrictiveness. "When he was murdered [in 1833], his soul was already half-dead" (p. 111).

This essay is extraordinarily compelling in several ways. The re-

telling of Kaspar's tale is itself spell-binding. More important, it gives Shengold the chance to weave his theory of anal development (anality, anal narcissism, and anal defense) into the fabric of the narrative as well as into the developmental theories of A. Freud and M. Mahler. The finished product is rich, variously hued, and textured. Shengold details the many traumatically disrupted developmental lines occasioned by Kaspar's entombment. Separation-individuation theory is imaginatively employed to explain Kaspar's resumption of development after being found. Shengold adduces from several different sources that Kaspar was probably raised for the first three of four years of his life by a wet nurse before his imprisonment. Defensive regression, isolation, and the drug-induced hypnoid state enforced developmental delays and arrests which could be partially undone. Kaspar's release from his cage permitted ambulation, recapitulating the practicing subphase of development. As the toddler first walks and then runs away from the mother to be chased and reclaimed by her, psychic structure is laid down which leads ultimately to self and object constancy. And so it was with Kaspar, who was briefly able to emerge from his timeless, objectless, narcissistic world. Shengold acknowledges that Kaspar's story is not a clinical record but an analytic review of biographic data. Nevertheless, Shengold's commentary suggests the utility of developmental theory in assessing adult psychopathology. His views may give pause to critics who believe developmental theory to be interesting but of unproven (and unprovable) relevance in the appraisal of oedipal and postoedipal psychopathology.

In "The Place of Anality in Defense Theory," the author extends his views of a coherent hierarchy of defense. Shengold posits a "hypothetical *proto*experience" of primary idealization emerging from real experiences of drive satisfaction, which "involve a narcissistic, grandiose enhancement of emotional force, granting an urgent, wonderful, vibrant meaningfulness to whatever is invested in it" (p. 124). Unpleasure carries devaluation (a first vicissitude of primary idealization) with equal intensity, "but [is] now directed to the deprivation of meaning, a degrading in the direction of nothingness" (p. 125). These primal defenses, together with their sensory registrations, are the prototypes of regressively revived oceanic states—mergers with the primal mother. Primary idealization and devaluation adjunctively carry introjective and projective defense mech-

anisms and are related to primary repression. These primary defenses are later elaborated into secondary defenses, when self and object can be differentiated. Idealizations and devaluations "are greatly augmented during the anal development phase, when psychic reversals become organized and entrenched at the time of a wave of aggressive drive" (p. 127).

These defenses shed light on the study of perversions, as well as on the understanding of perverse elements of "normal" sexuality. Shengold extends our knowledge of perversions as he asks, for example, why the buttocks and anus evoke such excitement in some homosexual practices (and in some heterosexual ones as well). He identifies two phenomena which are closely linked with both idealization and devaluation: fascination and scotomatization. Fascination "blends self and object representations. It takes the form of a potential heightening of perception and sensation accompanied by a narrowing of consciousness—a kind of autohypnosis" (p. 13). As sexual excitement increases, the fascinated individual fantasies partial mergers with part objects experienced as enormous self enhancements: "All this world reposed on me" (p. 138) [Proust].

Shengold re-examines his concept of sphincter defense in the last chapter, "Defenses Against Murderous Impulses." Anal themes from the analyses of male homosexuals disclose that fantasies and acts of penile-anal penetration include ideas of being overwhelmed and destroyed, and conversely of overwhelming and destroying. Typically the fantasies and actions represent aspects of the primal scene, in which the child conceives of parental sex as a brutal, murderous encounter. Images of these primal scene parents are often sphinx-like, murderous, castrating, phallic women and/or murderous, castrating men endowed with breasts. At the same time, anal sex denies these frightening possibilities: no murder, no castration, no death. It is pure theater with (near) suspension of disbelief. Sphincter defense (including the urethral sphincter) assures control over the overwhelming threats of anxiety, murderous rage, cannibalistic destruction, and loss of identity. "These are the unconscious dangers associated with anal rape [and for Shengold, all rape is unconsciously anal rape] with violation and destruction of the anal sphincter and its controlling powers" (p. 154). Finally, "sphincter defensiveness is a major component of what must be a complicated defense development of the pre-oe-

dipal period and . . . it becomes part of what is transformed into the repression barrier" (p. 154).

In a brief reprise, "Coda: Final Words on Defense Integration, and Soul Murder," Shengold eloquently summarizes his views on the evolution of defense during anal development. Anal defense assures "the taming of affects in relation both to the mental representation of [the child's] own self (featuring his own body and its parts) and to the mental representation of his parents and the rest of the external world" (p. 162). Mastery of anal defense permits the blending of the good and the bad, of hatred and love, as it also permits the affective knowledge of these extremes of human emotion. Children require a "good enough" environment for their development to occur. Thus "a range of compromise is permitted that grants us a range of humanity so that we can live, in varying degrees, with the good-and-bad, the pleasureable-and-painful, the anus-and-the-halo in the sky" (p. 163).

Not since Abraham has a psychoanalyst explored and mapped anal phase development as Shengold does in this book. He significantly extends our view of this territory. The unique triumph, however, is in Shengold's ability to integrate and synthesize issues which are often written about as if they were antithetical: instinct and ego psychology; the somatic and psychic contributions to defense; the developmental lines of object relations and narcissism; and the continuity (discontinuities notwithstanding) of pregenital and oedipal development. Written in a spare and elegant style, this book is rich in theory and illustration which is readily confirmed, I believe, in daily analytic work. It must surely be added to the top of every psychoanalyst's reading list.

MORRIS L. PELTZ (SAN FRANCISCO)

THE WOLF MAN'S MAGIC WORD: A CRYPTONYMY. By Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok. Translated by Nicholas Rand; foreword by Jacques Derrida. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 132 pp.

The authors of this short but intense book write as a team, reflecting many years of collaboration on psychoanalytic projects. The style of their work is unique and will undoutedly be unfamiliar

to most English-speaking psychoanalysts. Furthermore, they come to psychoanalysis from a background more related to philosophy, literature, and linguistics than is that of most American psychoanalysts. For them, the usual guidelines for collection and validation of data, so much the keystone of clinical psychoanalysis in the United States, seem unnecessary. Such insistence on limiting material to that derived from the analytic process as the basis for psychoanalytic reports and theorizing would be constraining and would interfere with what they view as creative in their thinking.

It is no surprise to find that this book has been published as Volume 37 in the University of Minnesota Press series, *Theory and History of Literature*. Its content, while derived from an intensive and personal study of one of Freud's case studies, *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*, is decidedly more indebted to that trend in literary criticism known as deconstruction than it is to clinical or theoretical psychoanalysis. This is not a new book. It was first published in France in 1976. While it received considerable attention in the world of literary criticism, it was not published in English until 1986. The distinctly French tone of the work rests with that aspect of French psychoanalysis which sees a return to the original Freud text as the main method of expanding psychoanalytic understanding—by penetrating beyond the point that Freud, in the estimation of the new psychoanalyst-reader, was able to go at the time he produced a particular manuscript.

The personal tone of this work invites the reader to join the authors in their immersion in the case of the Wolf Man. They explain their method of reading the text of *The History of an Infantile Neurosis*. They begin by stating, "Five years [is] the average length of an analysis. We have spent them in the company of the Wolf Man" (p. lxx). The material of Muriel Gardiner's *The Wolf-Man by the Wolf-Man*[1] also became available to them in the course of their work. But the central intent appears to have been a reanalysis of the patient himself through their reading of the case report (or more precisely, through the deconstructionist intent of their reading of the text).

[1] Gardiner, M., Editor (1971): *The Wolf-Man by the Wolf-Man*. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1972. 41:268-269.

Abraham and Torok write of their investigations much as if they were detectives on the trail of clues that would allow them to "crack the case" more accurately and in greater depth than Freud was able to do as the original detective. A rereading of Freud's case does reveal the extent to which Freud was tracking down, in an investigative mode, what the earliest events of the Wolf Man's second year of life included. For Freud, the infantile neurosis, which had to have preceded the adult version, hinged upon the reconstructed primal scene in which, at age eighteen months, the Wolf Man witnessed his parents in coitus *a tergo*. The effect of this visual exposure on the vicissitudes of his infantile sexuality were meticulously reconstructed by Freud as he traced the Wolf Man's subsequent development. A seduction by his older sister figured into Freud's understanding of his patient's unsuccessful attempt to seduce his nurse and his subsequent passive turning to his father. In Freud's view, it was only his intense castration anxiety and the masculine protest of his narcissism that protected the Wolf Man from a lifelong negative oedipal, homosexual orientation.

Torok and Abraham review a great deal of this already familiar case history, quickly elucidating a very different solution to the mystery of the Wolf Man. Through an extraordinary demonstration of knowledge of linguistics and faith in the origins of words as reliably linked in the unconscious, they come to a construction of the "core" of the case. This involves a radically altered interpretation of the Wolf Man's anxiety dream at age four about the wolves in the tree. If Freud's interpretation of this dream depended heavily on the intrapsychic aspects of excitation and castration anxiety, the current authors see the dream in terms of reconstruction of a different set of interpersonal interactions. The child who was to become the Wolf Man, they feel, was dreaming in relationship to the need to conceal what he had witnessed in his earlier childhood, and this was not, in their view, the primal scene. Rather, they assert that the decrypted dream indicates that the child was witness to his father's seduction of his older sister. In particular, they reconstruct the Wolf Man's witnessing his father's having the sister rub his penis, an act which she later duplicated with the patient. The authors reconstruct from a mixture of words in Russian, English, and German an interpretation of this pivotal dream as representing a

struggle between the English governess and the mother. The governess insists that the boy saw what happened; the mother insists that he was only dreaming and should not be listened to because of his unreliability as a witness.

The authors see in this construction the basis for a lifetime of falsity on the part of the Wolf Man. No one must know about what happened, not even himself. Furthermore, as a result of this, no one must know him as a person. The material of the concealed secret, the forbidden knowledge, is "sent to a crypt, encrypted." Torok and Abraham view this process as different from repression and outside the scope of Freud's metapsychology. The crypt, for them, resides in the ego and hence beyond the scope of analytic effectiveness. This perspective on the Wolf Man draws upon the imaginations of these new authors as well as the psychoanalytic theories which they are inventing and promoting. This is the main impetus for their emphasis on crypt formation, rather than some of the important material on the Wolf Man's later life that can be drawn from both Gardiner's book and from interviews conducted by the journalist, Karin Obholzer[2] when the Wolf Man was in his eighties. This later material indicates that the Wolf Man was more unalterably disturbed than Freud's appraisal led him to believe. His subsequent life after analysis with Freud revealed an individual with both intermittent psychotic-like episodes and unrelenting, paranoid grandiosity. Ruth Mack Brunswick's description of his state during his treatment with her confirms the paranoid, grandiose nature of his transference to Freud.

When Freud wrote the case of the Wolf Man in 1914, his emphasis was directed at demonstrating the importance of infantile sexuality as the deepest, most important, causal factor in neurotic illness. His masterful attempt to defend his theory against the more superficial explanations of Adler and Jung succeeded within the limitations of the historical period. Ironically, Torok and Abraham's textual analysis attempts to illustrate Freud's perceptual limitations in terms of his inability to extend his metapsychology beyond where he was in 1914. They maintain that it is only with

[2] Obholzer, K. (1982): *The Wolf-Man. Conversations with Freud's Patient—Sixty Years Later*. New York: Continuum. Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1985, 54:123-125.

Mourning and Melancholia that the Wolf Man could be understood in terms of incorporation. They insist that the Wolf Man was really two people existing at the core of the same person, these consisting of his elder sister's image as well as his own. Their reinterpretation of the wolf dream is based upon their own favored notions; this, unfortunately, must be the case, because they choose to limit themselves to reinterpreting the text of Freud's manuscript while insisting that a mixture of linguistic clues leads to a radical new solution to interpreting both the dream and the case. The problem, however, is that the authors' altered view of what troubled the Wolf Man in his adult neurosis and throughout his life derives from intellectual agility. Rather than revisiting the Wolf Man's case armed with new theoretical understanding derived from the past seventy-five years of psychoanalytic work, they invade the text with a dazzling display of fantasy and linguistic facility in at least three languages.

The wolf nightmare becomes the center of exposition for the authors. They state: "It would be inconceivable to reconstitute, even partially, the work of deciphering (decrypting) accomplished over the years. But it does seem vital to explain in a few words how the expression 'I dreamed' (with which the patient's recounting of the dream began) becomes, once decrypted, the amazing sentence, 'The witness is the son' " (p. 33). The reader is asked to follow the authors in translating the dream into its hidden meaning; this is, of course, a process familiar to psychoanalysts. Abraham and Torok, however, depart from the usual methods of interpreting dreams. For them, the unconscious is such that in looking for the meaning of words, and even parts of words, in a variety of languages, the dream can be deciphered. This whole process is far from convincing, even if one expends considerable effort toward accepting the authors' methods. Furthermore, beyond the methods that they use to analyze dream material, the content that they insist results from their approach seems to result from something outside their methodology. They join the early Freud in viewing early, actual experience as causal in the formation of the infantile neurosis, but they come up with a different idea of what constituted the trauma in concluding that the Wolf Man had to suppress his observations of his father seducing his elder sister. The efforts required to

maintain this falsehood explains for them many of the aspects of the Wolf Man's lengthy history as an analytic patient and personage.

As long as the authors stay confined to their mode of dream analysis, it is easy to respond to their linguistic approach by stressing how difficult it is to follow them, no less judge the accuracy or validity of their approach. It is simply too strange and unfamiliar to appraise; furthermore, it hardly seems connected to psychoanalysis as it is known to most psychoanalysts. The concern with words and symbols rather than affects, transferences, and countertransferences is foreign and somewhat alienating.

Nicholas Rand, the translator of this book, provides an introduction in which he helps orient the reader to the deconstructionist school of literary criticism, of which he is an ardent member. His dedication to Paul de Man as his mentor predates the exposure of Professor de Man's pro-Nazi sentiment during World War II; the timing of his writing of this introduction deprives us of any knowledge of his reaction to this disclosure. Probably, it has no relevance to how psychoanalysts should respond to the work by Abraham and Torok.

Revisiting Freud's cases is an essential part of any psychoanalyst's education. Advances during the past fifty years have changed how we would understand the material with which Freud grappled. We have moved away from an unrelenting search for material from the "deep" unconscious. Freud, for instance, was quite aware of how narcissistic the Wolf Man was, but he was less interested in the developmental factors that increase narcissistic vulnerability than we are today. The importance of frustration and neglect in the preoedipal period and beyond would certainly be given more stress by present-day psychoanalysts.

The deconstructionists remove themselves from material outside the text in a way that encourages fanciful interpretations more pertinent to poetry and literature than to neurotic illness. As shown here, the deconstructionist reading gives permission for the analyst of the text to assign meanings in a highly personal, even idiosyncratic fashion, without having to justify this with anything but an outline of how the reader came to her or his conclusions. In this work, it is possible to see how the clinical, scientific nature of

modern psychoanalysis can be lost or bypassed, while, at the same time, the author-analyst radically challenges psychoanalysis.

Abraham and Torok abandon the usual constraints placed upon theorizing, whether this be in regard to a single case or the elaboration of psychoanalytic theory. They give themselves the license usually extended in the fields of philosophy, poetry, and literature. As a result, their work is extremely clever without being grounded in clinical experience. Their thinking is complex and soars into a creativity which sounds impressive, but is ultimately disappointing because it is disconnected from psychoanalysis as a clinical endeavor. In a separate afterword written by Maria Torok after her collaborator's death, she reveals her dissatisfaction with psychoanalytic concepts which have endured without, in her estimation, any proof of their usefulness or effectiveness. She states: "The daily practice of psychoanalysis for the last quarter of a century has left me with some disturbing thoughts about the therapeutic usefulness of various notions bequeathed by the heritage of Freudian psychoanalysis such as castration anxiety, penis envy, frustration construed as a rule, primal scenes, and death as a final verdict" (p. 85).

While these concepts have evolved over the past fifty years, Torok's conceptual and theoretical preferences have little to do with the expansion of psychoanalytic theory in the United States. She states: ". . . my research has provided a number of clinical and theoretical correctives to the theories of Freud and Ferenczi such as preservative repression, the theory of the phantom, and the problem of intrapsychic inclusion" (p. 85). These concepts may be definable by the author in some manner that relates them to psychoanalytic theory, but their utilization in this study of the Wolf Man fails to demonstrate this relationship. Instead, the reader is left with a sense of the authors' personalities being the determinant of a new mode of reading of this classical text.

This book inspired me to reread *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*. The originality of that case, as well as Freud's economical use of the data, stand in marked contrast to the product of this return to Freud's text as the basis for a further elaboration of theory. Over recent years, much has been made of those contributors who approach Freud's writing as a text to be interpreted

rather than the foundation of an observational science to which other observations must be added as a mode of expanding and/or modifying the theory. While the present effort may satisfy those who approach psychoanalysis as they do literature—as an endeavor which permits any interpretation that the readers' intelligence and textual analysis dictate—it will certainly disappoint those who believe that we are dealing with a science of how the mind dysfunctions and what interventions result in recovery. Hidden within or beneath this dense work, however, aspects of the authors' efforts to understand disordered narcissism can be seen. This makes it more regrettable that their retreat from a clinical approach reduces the accessibility of their contributions in this area.

HENRY J. FRIEDMAN (CAMBRIDGE, MA)

THE SUPPRESSED MADNESS OF SANE MEN. FORTY-FOUR YEARS OF EXPLORING PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Marion Milner. London/New York: Tavistock Publications, Inc., 1987. 309 pp.

Because I seek an image, not a book.

William Butler Yeats

Those who, over the years, have followed Marion Milner's journeys (see, apropos, Chapters 16 and 17 of the book under review) and delight in her sensitive, deeply personal, questing spirit, as manifested in such works as *On Not Being Able to Paint, The Hands of the Living God*, and *Eternity's Sunrise*,[1] will rejoice in her latest volume. They will discover there a gathering of essays written over a forty-year period on a variety of topics but giving priority to her reflections on psychoanalysis and culture. This collection will also be of value to newcomers to Milner's work, because it offers an overview of her contributions in clinical, theoretical, but above all, applied psychoanalysis. While five of the chapters have been previously published by *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, others have

[1] Milner, M. (1950): *On Not Being Able To Paint*. New York: Int. Univ. Press, 1957; (1969): *The Hands of the Living God*. London: Virago, 1988; (1987): *Eternity's Sunrise*. London: Virago.

made more obscure appearances, and some are in print for the first time. Thus, it is a pleasure to welcome this convenient assemblage of papers by a distinguished British analyst whose highly original approach has evolved gradually out of her own blend of a background in the field of education with pioneering insights gleaned from mentors and colleagues such as Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott.

Interestingly, the title of her new volume brings to mind the names of two other psychoanalytic texts published within recent years: *Plea for a Measure of Abnormality* by Joyce McDougall (1980) and *On Private Madness* by André Green (1986). Like them, *The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men* is a phrase implying that a substrate of *insanity* haunts the psyches of normal human beings—a notion that, while hardly new to psychoanalytic discourse or even original to it, is one that seems prevalent in our time for reasons that perhaps bear as much on widespread cultural factors as on shifts endemic to the domain of psychoanalysis. Coincidentally, Milner's book, like its above-mentioned similarly titled predecessors, consists of essays linked principally by authorship. They purport to explore their postulated *madnesses* with admixtures of fascination and compassion. Although it would be tempting to expatiate on this convergence of titular thematics and format among three outstanding and otherwise widely divergent psychoanalytic texts, it must suffice to flag the convergence and leave further speculation, if any, to others.

What follows is limited to general commentary on Milner's work and remarks that bear on the two chapters which, in the opinion of this reviewer, serve as its centerpiece. These pieces occupy the spatial center of her book, Chapters 11 and 12 out of 21, and they are titled "The Sense in Nonsense (Freud and Blake's *Job*)" and "Psychoanalysis and Art."

Whenever chapters range over many years, choices as to where precisely to stop and reflect are notoriously idiosyncratic because the books that contain them are not planned with a continuous thread in mind (Milner herself protests the image of a thread as too restrictive for her purposes, p. 1). Yet, a decision to designate one or two pieces as paradigmatic is warranted here, in part because of the considerable repetition from essay to essay—repeti-

tion that extends not only to theory and case material but to actual illustrations within the text (*cf.*, Figures 42 and 55; 43 and 53; 44 and 58; 31 and 46; 26 and 37; 22 and 35). With regard to repeated figures, it is noteworthy that the initial and final images (Figs. 1 and 62) are identical. Whether by accident or artifice, this particular visual recapitulation serves subtly to frame word with image and to underscore Milner's impatience with teleology by lending a formal circularity, a *da capo* movement to her work.

Repetition, of course, has to do with format as well as, on a more recondite level, content. We must expect it in books that reproduce minimally altered texts of papers written over time by one hand. In this case, by way of gentle criticism, it should be said that more careful cross-referencing, editing, and judicious deletion might have reduced the redundancy. At any rate, the essays I wish to highlight exhibit Milner at her interpretive best and telescope themes reworked in other chapters. Likewise, it needs be said, they repeat one another.

Working with ideas heavily inflected by Kleinian and Winnicottian accents, Milner's presentation of her views reflects her conviction that to loosen one's grip on structure imposed from without is to discover a different kind of structure that emanates from unconscious processes deep within. Thus, she seeks to avoid limitations imposed by what she calls at one point "exclusively logical mental activity which separates itself from what it looks at and also from its unconscious roots" (p. 182). In this effort to escape reifying abstractions and to resist premature closure (which, however, in her early Kleinian clinical work, she does not eschew; see Chapter 3, "A Suicidal Symptom in a Child of 3"), she adopts a meandering, free-associative prose style. Such inward-gazing, however, tends to disregard the presence of others and thus is not the most salubrious mode for expository writing. It runs the risk of becoming tedious or irritating. As a result, Milner's genuine originality and insight do not always prove sufficient to carry along her would-be reader. Many admirers, on the other hand, have enjoyed her easy-going, tentative approach and found it refreshing. Apropos, it is odd but perhaps not entirely bewildering that the *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Feminism, Law, Medicine and Teaching* recently published a review of her collected works

under the title, "Female Reason: Marion Milner's Discourse on Method Reviewed."[2] Their reviewer, noting that Virago, "England's leading feminist publisher," has reissued Milner's books, identifies her mode of thought as quintessentially feminine and relates it to the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan.

In the opinion of this reviewer, however, Milner's wandering style often impedes the communicative thrust of her own written text—a charge that cannot be gainsaid by invoking her claims that external structure works defensively or that its apparent lack is fundamental to her project. To answer thus would merely beg the question, since it might be precisely the fault of her theory that the prose in which it is rendered fails to carry more effectively. She asks, in effect, what happens when we try to do without structure and answers that we initially grow anxious but then gradually perceive the emergence of new configurations. This compelling claim, however, is not always instantiated by what emerges in the pages of her own book. Apropos, her theory of creativity, which gives priority to notions of loss, emptiness, submergence, diffusion, and receptivity is expectably one that would tend to underestimate the very craft and careful pruning that are indeed missing here. As Yeats contrarily put it, " 'A line will take us hours maybe;/ Yet if it does not seem a moment's thought,/ Our stitching and unstitching has been naught."[3]

Pertinently, *The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men* both conceals and reveals Milner vis-à-vis her readers. Despite the prevalence of first person pronouns and omnipresent qualifiers, a curious distance remains. An analogous reaction has often occurred in this reviewer with regard to the writings of Donald Winnicott, for he too, albeit paradoxically concerned with what he termed the *true self*, penned prose that can often strike readers as woolly. Charmed and sympathetic commentators, unable to pin him down, occasion-

[2] Sayers, J. (1989): Female reason: Marion Milner's discourse on method reviewed. *Amer. Philos. Newsletter on Computer in Philosophy/Feminism and Philosophy/Philosophy and Law/Philosophy and Medicine, Teaching and Philosophy*, Issue No. 88.2, March.

[3] Yeats, W. B. (1960): *The Collected Poems*. New York: Macmillan, p. 78.

ally dub him "cryptic," "evocative," or even "*poetic*."[4] Yet, *true poets*, on the contrary, are often both lucid and concrete.

Wrestling continually with his own problems of *true self*, Yeats, for example, left an unforgettable poem, "Ego Dominus Tuus," which explores revelation and representation of self through the imagery of a dialogue between two characters, *Hic* ("This one") and *Ille* ("That one"), who oppose intense unremitting introspection with action, with seeking out opposites in the world. His studied images—a "lamp/Burning alone beside an open book"—belie the assumption that what is loose, incoherent, and disorderly reveals more than what is clearly and carefully wrought. Milner herself provides a counter example to such a view by framing her own book, as mentioned above, with identical figures: her famous drawing of two adjacent jugs with their common boundary—a memorable and quotable image precisely because of the clarity with which its ambiguity is laid bare.

In sum, Milner advocates somewhat mystically (see Chapter 18), through both form and content, a slackening of the reins of secondary process, yet without addressing the ironies that attend upon such a project and without considering what role it plays in a complex phenomenology of creativity.

Milner's central thesis is that "change of heart, growth of spirit does not come . . . from purposeful activity, by having an ideal or plan and then working directly to achieve it" (p. 186); it is rather that "change of heart is initiated by those moments when we manage just to look at the pain, feel it, embrace it" and then allow what she calls "the redeeming force" to come into play (pp. 186, 187). It is best illustrated by her reading of Blake's *Job* in the aforementioned chapters. Allying the receptivity she advocates with New Testament theology and with the redeeming figure of Christ, she quotes: " 'Take no thought for the morrow,' " " 'Consider the lilies of the field, they toil not neither do they spin' " (p. 214).

Her views find lucid expression in an interpretation which takes

[4] Greenberg, J. A. & Mitchell, S. A. (1983): *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.

Grolnick, S. A., Barkin, L. & Muensterberger, W., Editors (1978): *Between Reality and Fantasy: Transitional Objects and Phenomena*. New York: Aronson.

Job, virtually, as an objective correlative for them. She reads the title character in this masterpiece of "Blake's composite art"[5] as figuring, initially, an artist who cannot create because he is out of touch with his inner world. Noting that Blake[6] depicts Job's self-righteous countenance as identical to that of the Lord's (Plate 2), she interprets him as having wrought an image which is largely a projection and then having proceeded to worship it. Denying his unconscious rage and destructiveness, pain, inadequacy, and innate femininity, Job has mistakenly equated good conscious intention with uprightness. Meanwhile, his wife, daughters, and the figure of Satan all represent the split-off aspects of himself. Thus, when (in Plate VI), Satan afflicts him with boils, Job is pictured repudiating his wife, who kneels in sorrow at his feet. Unable to experience any lacks in himself, even after his sons have been killed and his flocks burned, he continues to give alms to others (Plate V)—thus showing that he clings to an omnipotent self-righteous imago and cannot permit himself to feel bereft, needy, and dependent on others. Only after his suffering has intensified and he has accepted both evil and femininity as authentic parts of himself (see the marvelous Plate 15 that depicts the monsters Behemoth and Leviathan), can he receive alms from others (Plate 19), accept redemption, and in the end (Plate 21) join with his family to play the muscial instruments that were hanging unused on a tree in Plate 1.

Thus, Milner's theory, hurriedly encapsulated here, gives priority to deep inner changes as the crux of artistic experience. Stressing spontaneity and the value of absentmindedness ("The Framed Gap," Chapter 8), her work eloquently advises us to prize our own "suppressed madness" as a source of potential growth and renewal. In closing, however, it seems worthwhile to comment that while the final plate of Blake's masterpiece depicts Job and his family jubilantly playing musical instruments; it requires skill, concentration, and hours of narrowly focused, highly motivated practice—aspects of art for which a psychoanalytic theory needs likewise to account.

ELLEN HANDLER SPITZ (NEW YORK)

[5] Mitchell, W. J. T. (1978): *Blake's Composite Art.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
[6] Blake, W. (1826): *The Book of Job.* New York: Paddington Press, 1976.

TREATING THE ELDERLY WITH PSYCHOTHERAPY. THE SCOPE FOR CHANGE IN LATER LIFE. Edited by Joel Sadavoy, M.D. and Leszcz Molyn, M.D. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., 1987. 366 pp.

This is one of the most practical books ever written on the psychoanalytic psychotherapy of the elderly. Because increasing numbers of elderly are seeking treatment, many readers are likely to need the wisdom contained within it in the near future. It provides help, for example, in deciding whether or not individual, family, or group therapy is indicated. We need to broaden our perspective from the individual to the family system without losing our intrapsychic focus.

This is not a simple book. It demands frequent stops for self-confrontation and reflection on such matters as our own aging, the age-biased selection of patients, and the therapeutic accessibility of various categories of aging patients.

In his foreword, Irvin Yalom observes that among the age-specific, dynamic themes discussed, the one most emphasized by the contributors is loss. One of my first papers, twenty-five years ago, "Loss and Restitution," was controversial in that some felt I had not fully appreciated the adaptive, constructive side of growing old. Yalom quotes Heidegger on death as "the possibility for impossibility." He notes that recent generations of elders are the first in history from whom younger people may have little to learn. It seems probable that the relationship between the realities of aging and feelings of optimism or pessimism are important countertransference issues for many young, enthusiastic therapists confronted by elderly patients who are facing limited possibilities in life. At no other time does functional impairment play such a prominent part.

George Pollock's more optimistic focus on the mourning-liberation process in the first chapter stands in fitting counterpoint. He acknowledges how catastrophic living long can be, but reminds us that vast numbers of the "old old" today are less frail, less often institutionalized, and more independent than previously believed. He inquires into the factors that allow them to thrive. He addresses the appropriateness of intensive psychotherapy for carefully selected older patients, for whom forgotten or neglected parts of the

self can be rediscovered. Different kinds of depression require different modes of therapy. For the elderly, medication and psychotherapy may be indicated simultaneously to help reinvest "energies in new pursuits and creative activities." Pollock emphasizes the role of incomplete mourning in interfering with successful adaptation.

With meticulous attention to detail, Jerome Grunes attends to the therapist's task in response to an office visit by an aged patient and her or his family. He discusses differences encountered when treating older men and older women, age factors, and the unique experiental biases of different therapists. The more dissimilar the observer is to the observed, the more removed he or she is likely to feel and the more difficult it will be to develop the empathy necessary for the work to prosper.

Martin Berezin reminds us that shared grieving between physician and family can intensify the wish for rapid relief from pain. This can lead to an overuse of medication, thus bypassing the benefits of psychotherapy.

Adrian Verwoerdt's conception of late-life paranoia and its treatment utilizes the Kleinian paradigm of a reserve of gratitude for a life given as the antidote for envy, jealousy, and vindictiveness. The more enmeshed the patient is in the paranoid position, the more impaired will be the therapeutic alliance. Specific recommendations are offered for the management of hypochondriacal defenses that are employed to forestall paranoid decompensation.

Henry Krystal focuses upon the late life sequelae of massive traumatization and its relation to the capacity for affect tolerance and for grieving effectively enough "to risk living and loving again." He honors the incredible human potential for self-restoration in the face of irreparable damage. While the core of his work involved concentration camp survivors, his material resonates richly with the clinical pictures of elders I have encountered who have been overwhelmed by repetitive, converging traumata from which they had to recover, although little time was left to them in which to do so. The common ground of all "survivors" is destruction of the "security derived from the basic belief in the general benevolence and causality of the world" (p. 97). Individual factors define the pattern of the regression that follows. Because painful affects in infancy *may* lead to helplessness, mortal dread, and proneness to dedifferentiation and resomatization, he shares my

reservations about "the prevalent overuse of the word trauma." Predisposed by such a "regressive nidus," some of the elderly respond to the narcissistic insults of aging with primitive fears of abandonment, suffocation, etc. Illusions of omnipotence and of privileged ongoingness may be shattered. The heritage of residual anhedonia with "libidinalization of anxiety," especially in the alexithymic, expresses the experiencing of life as an inescapable, continuously painful reality.

Lawrence Breslau addresses the countertransference issues in "the exaggerated helplessness syndrome." Anguished cries of pain may lead "a vulnerable therapist" to join in with seeking external solutions, although only intrapsychic adjustment to the inevitable can be effective. Some therapists try to undo experiences of painful rejection from their own parents by serving as an idealized other for elderly patients.

Sadavoy correlates five vulnerabilities and eight age-related stresses to demonstrate how aging, character-disordered people can find themselves assaulted by the very things they have most feared in their lives. He describes three features of the expression of character pathology: disturbed interpersonal relationships with exacerbation of narcissistic symptoms, somatic preoccupations, and depressive withdrawal. Inability to adapt to loss via effective grieving produces a feeling of panicky emptiness and rage at being "willfully abandoned." Eventually, the necessity of relying upon physical caretakers creates an age-specific threat. An unconscious need to be held can produce fear. Bodily care from strangers may be experienced as forced, humiliating intimacy to which the only response can be negativism. Refusal to rely on strangers who appear and disappear, are from another culture, or speak a different language leads to rage and isolation.

In "Beyond Crisis Management," Ralph Kahana addresses the dynamic principles underlying the range of geriatric psychotherapies. A crisis may be as simple as "a break in tradition, a decision, a turning point for better or worse . . . when the balance of inner needs, regulative controls, and adaptive methods are destabilized" (p. 234). These may be as ordinary as physical illness, bereavement, or interpersonal tension, or as obscure as failure to achieve a private personal goal.

Noting the lack of controlled studies on the effectiveness of

various treatments for older people, Lawrence Lazarus, et al., report on a time-limited model of fifteen sessions. The goal is to gain access to "aspects of the self previously submerged in the service of active parenting or vicariously lived out through a spouse" (p. 285). With the passage of years, they found, men can become freer to express "feminine" potentials, and women more able to assert traditionally "masculine" ones. Outcome scales indicated that women showed earlier and more lasting improvement and were more active in attempting to resolve focal issues. Men tended to remain enmeshed in the troublesome interpersonal relationships which had precipitated their entry into treatment, to use the therapist as a calming, nurturant object, and to have more difficulty terminating. They were not as successful in recovering diminished aspects of the self. The therapeutic relationship seemed to be "the only legitimate arena for the expression of passive strivings." In the elderly, improvement can occur without the benefit of insight, so long as the sense of mastery and self-esteem are enhanced.

In Etta G. McEwan's chapter, "The Whole Grandfather," "the gift of life" is approached as "an everlasting link with the past and the future . . . a universal transgenerational commitment" (p. 245). She advocates "family therapy to help elders gain a sense of their achievements . . . [and] . . . to help grandchildren recognize the fullness of their grandparent's lives . . . and . . . understand that sickness or dementia do not define grandparenthood" (p. 296).

In the last chapter, Molyn presents a Kohutian orientation on aging. Enhanced vulnerability to narcissistic insult makes losses more grievous, as chances for restoration and substitution diminish. The self is conceived of "as relatively stable and cohesive or vulnerable to fragmentation or empty depression, depending on how much integrity is regulated internally or how much the sense of self is regulated externally . . . and how many external regulatory objects are available. The needs for affirming, mirroring, and soothing functions of the self-object are as great as, if not greater than, at any other time. Group therapy is an effective treatment because it directs itself to interpersonal concerns, shared problem solving, and increased use of the present to bolster self image" (p. 330). I was delighted that the pioneering work of Maurice Linden in the early 1950's was not ignored.

This book achieves a goal to which many of us have aspired for a

long time. It places the art of psychotherapy with the elderly on a par with psychotherapy with patients at any age.

STANLEY H. CATH (ARLINGTON, MA)

KNOWLEDGE AS DESIRE. AN ESSAY ON FREUD AND PIAGET. By Hans G. Furth. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 179 pp.

In this theoretically ambitious but, at times, abstruse book, Furth sets himself the task of integrating Freud and Piaget. He seeks to "overcome the baneful split between knowledge and emotion . . . by presenting the inextricable interaction of logic (knowledge) and sexuality (desire) from the very first developmental beginnings in human symbol formation" (p. x). Who could ask for anything more? But Furth gives us more. The last three chapters of this volume involve a "larger biological scale" (p. 14) and have the following titles: "Symbols: The Key to Humanization," "Symbols, Biology, and Logical Necessity," and "Logic and Desire." These last three chapters are reminiscent, in spirit, of Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. I will not deal with these three chapters in this review; while coherent in a very broad sense with Furth's purposes, they nevertheless involve content of such a different order (especially evolution theory) that they constitute another topic, one not immediately germane to the psychoanalytic literature.

I do not believe Furth is successful in his effort to integrate Freud and Piaget. His effort comes down to something very familiar: Freud is to supply the desire, and Piaget the knowledge structure motivated by such desire. Such an effort, I think, is doomed to fail. Either Freudian theory eventually will be enlarged so as to enable it to comprehend Piaget within its own essential orientation, or vice versa; or else a new non-Freudian, non-Piagetian theory, with its own theoretical terms, will emerge to accomplish such integration. There is no other way for (or meaning to) integration.

Once Furth creates this initial setup, it is inevitable that both Freud and Piaget suffer from a forced simplification. For example, Furth points out that children at one and a half to two years can symbolize in a new (emergent) way and that one manifestation of this is pretend play. According to Furth, the child initially invests

all symbols with libidinal energy: ". . . unless children first assimilated reality to their desires, they would never go to the trouble of constructing a symbolic world" (p. 40). This is a remarkable statement. One could argue that this was Freud's view, but it certainly is not post-Freud Freudianism, especially considering the contributions of Hartmann. Another example: Furth argues that Piaget's concepts of assimilation and accommodation cannot altogether explain the content of early symbolism—the content, for example of pretend play. With this, one can agree. But then Furth goes further, stating that "*all* objective knowledge is . . . linked to . . . unconscious fantasies and desires" (p. 99, italics added); and consequently, Piaget's theory "is shown to be radically social and emotional, contrary to what is commonly assumed" (pp. ix, x). But this was not Piaget's own view. Piaget conceived that a child's motivation to construct certain critical structures of knowledge (e.g., conservation) is an intrinsic element in the intellectual process itself.

Furth conceives the very significant transition from early playful-wishful symbols to (latency) realistic, socially consensual symbolism in the following way: especially during the oedipal period, a process of "primal repression" (p. 97) occurs such that these early playful symbols ("I am mommy/daddy," etc.) are excluded from consciousness. Furth also connects such basic repression with what he terms a "second (libidinal) binding" (p. 89) that gives rise to (latency) realistic symbolism. Thus, an initial libidinal binding Furth connects with the emergence of symbols altogether, and a secondary libidinal binding he connects with the construction of (latency) realistic symbolism.

But it is not at all clear what such energy constructs provide other than a redescription of the emergence of (relatively) mature symbolic thought, with another terminology. This is not necessarily an argument against economic theory in psychoanalysis. It is simply to indicate that Furth now is exposed to the criticism already evident in our literature as regards the usefulness of psychic energy theory. But nowhere does Furth demonstrate any necessity for the use of such energy constructs. And nowhere does he ever consider the relevance of aggression for the development of realistic symbolism, even if just to indicate why aggression is not relevant.

But still more serious, and clinically relevant, such an emphasis upon "repression" and "binding" does not accord with our clinical conception or observation of healthy latency. In the first place, we expect that in healthy latency there will continue to occur some masturbatory experience (but now not with oedipal figures). There is also the well-known phenomenon of latency "dirty jokes." In the second place, this heavy use of the ideas of "repression" and "binding" downplays the actual vast sublimatory potentials of clinically healthy latency.

About one thing Furth is correct and crystal clear. Freud, with respect to (let us say) the emotional object or self, and Piaget, with respect to (let us say) the intellectual object or self, were both *constructionist* theorists. Both Piaget and Freud emphasized a working and reworking of experience, with object or self organization as an outcome of a complex, rather lengthy developmental process. Put another way, both Freud and Piaget very much wanted to avoid any undue and unbalanced emphasis given either to some idea of an endogenous-source factor (instinctual attachment) or to any sort of environmental-source factor in the determination of development. This constructionist orientation shared by Freud and Piaget is an important source of the appeal for an integration of these two theorists; it is clear that any successful integration also would have to be constructionist in nature. The current fashion in developmental research, with its emphasis upon the idea of a species specific (provided) infant-caretaker system is not really the kind of a constructionist orientation shared by Freud and Piaget.

IRVING STEINGART (NEW YORK)

THE JEALOUS POTTER. By Claude Lévi-Strauss. Translated by Benedicte Chorier. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. 250 pp.

In the 1950's, two traditions prevailed in anthropology. These were the so-called cultural and social schools. Influenced by Freud, American thought was dominated by cultural anthropologists like Benedict, Kluckhohn, and Mead, with psychoanalysts, notably Róheim and Erikson, making occasional sallies into the terrain of ethnography. To paraphrase Benedict, these studies all

emphasized "patterns of childrearing" and their dynamic underpinnings and consequences. They concentrated on the parents' communication, through established practices, of the given culture's attitudes toward the phenomena of the nature surrounding the growing and impressionable child as well as toward the instinctual drives with which each individual was endowed.

Myths were also scrutinized from this dynamically minded perspective—as expressions of impulse and fantasy. The stories told by primitive peoples to explain their origins often shed light on the unconscious mythologies of more civilized men and women. They were further seen as parables and homilies depicting how one was to act in a dangerous world. The cultural anthropologists thus followed the path first trod by Freud in his application of psychoanalytic principles to the story of *Oedipus Rex* in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The logic of the Oedipus narrative, perhaps as much as any clinical revelation, may have moved Freud to supplant his seduction theory with a subsequent emphasis on *psychic reality*. In fact, this is suggested in Freud's 1897 letter to Fliess about the play. Without an *Oedipus Rex*, a structuralist might wonder, would there have been an "oedipus complex"? Psychoanalysis needed, she or he might say, to find and create its own myth.

Influenced by Durkheim and Malinowski, the (largely) British School took exception to the imposition of an individualistic Western vantage on what they called "simple societies." Social forces, not individuals, interested them, so they dubbed their discipline "social anthropology."

Myths were analyzed from this perspective, presenting as they did elaborate if fanciful rationales for the various laws of exogamy and endogamy governing socioeconomic transactions and sexual relations, and thereby maintaining social equilibrium. In this view, people and their motivations were of less interest than the forces which potentially disrupt social cohesiveness and the formal devices developed to keep them in check.

To these schools, dynamic and functional, Lévi-Strauss then added a third point of departure in his first major work, *Structural Anthropology*. This volume and Lévi-Strauss's later works—*The Savage Mind* and *The Raw and the Cooked*, for example—were welcomed with the same admixture of excitement, awe, and confusion

accorded to other French structuralists, including Lacan. *The Jealous Potter* is perhaps the latest in this series, and these mixed responses persist, as it tantalizes the reader even as it, at times, obscures its already dense subject matter.

With its different objectives and unfamiliar language, Lévi-Strauss's argument is hard to follow. Like many French thinkers, he teases the Anglo-Saxon reader with ideas that never quite find a consummation. He never quite makes his point, so he never quite has to prove it. For example, he does not fully define "signification," which he seems to see as central to the mythmaker's ambitions.

For Lévi-Strauss, myths are not incidental and secondary phenomena. They are not merely derivatives of instinctual conflicts or of the balance of forces within a given society. They cannot be explained by "decoding" their latent content. Nor can myths be understood by mapping out the social purposes they serve. According to this theorist, the stories comprise the basic subject matter of anthropology itself—the study of the logic of the human being. They reveal the symbolic, or better, the metaphorical, order imposed by "the savage mind" on the human's relation to internal and external nature. Like psychoanalysis's heroic version of Oedipus, they have their own life and their own organizing power. As Lévi-Strauss put it in *The Raw and the Cooked*:

> The truth of the myth does not lie in any special content. It consists in logical relations which are devoid of content or, more precisely, whose invariant properties exhaust their operative value, since comparable relations can be established among the elements of a large number of different contents.[1]

Elaborating on this notion in *The Jealous Potter*, Lévi-Strauss continues: "There is no more truth in one code than in any other. The essence of the myth (. . . its message) is founded on the property inherent in all codes: that of being mutually convertible" (p. 187). To put this point of view in still other of his difficult terms, myths are irreducible metaphors, synthesizing and transcending the symbols they employ to make a whole. It is a fallacy, therefore, to look for literal, concrete, or original meanings determining the evi-

[1] Lévi-Strauss, C. (1964): *The Raw and the Cooked. Introduction to a Science of Mythology, Vol. 1*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 240.

dent "figurative elements" in the story—to search out a "transfer of meaning" (p. 193) from "latent" to "manifest" contents—to "decode" the myth. Far more important to understanding culture or the dawning of consciousness is the anthropologists' painstaking description of the intrinsic *structure* of a given tale, its story line and imagery, for instance, elements that often reveal striking parallels across disparate cultures. The reason for the similarities in content and form lies not in the universal nature of what it is they represent but rather in the forcefulness of the metaphors themselves.

Lévi-Strauss examines similar myths—whose "sexual or psychoorganic symbolism" seems seductively obvious—from widely distant areas. As he looks at stories from the Indian tribes of southern California and of the Andes (including the Jivaro, Chaco, Machiguenga and Tacana groups)—all with their differing ecologies, social organizations, and resulting psychological predilections—he finds similar "beliefs and representations."

Pottery, he shows, looms across the hemisphere as a magical art, with the potter seen to mediate between celestial and mundane forces. Out of the earth the potter creates pots and tubes, which figure as renderings of alimentary and reproductive anatomy. Because of these powers, others are envious; and the stories of potters are characterized by adultery, betrayal, jealousy, and revenge. It is not the libidinal referents for these recurrent images (infantile sexual elements and primal scene fantasies), according to Lévi-Strauss, but rather their inherent representative power that explains their universality, their "signification." The references to sexual matters or bodily anatomy are not what is crucial, he asserts. Rather, the potter's creative genius, like that of the mythmaker, lies in the ability to fashion something out of nature's materials. The stories are metaphors for the making of metaphors.

The analogies of structures and content between these myths are, he concludes, a result not of any dynamics or function but of their internal logic. Explicating this, he demonstrates just "how distant structural analysis is from psychoanalysis."

The author's excursion into particular tales takes him well beyond the ken of most readers—whether they are analysts or, for that matter, anthropologists. Moreover, his data and the interpretive process he applies to them are very difficult for those looking

on from the outside to translate into more familiar form. Few readers will be interested in pursuing him along the paths he takes from one America to the other.

What is of more pressing interest is Lévi-Strauss's concluding foray into psychoanalytic dream interpretation. While he differentiates his own emphasis from Jung's attempt "to replace sexual symbolism with a symbolism of a linguistic or philosophical nature" (p. 197), Lévi-Strauss does take exception to Freud's efforts to adumbrate the latent meaning—a meaning most often of a "sexual nature"—of the manifest dream or, by extension, the manifest myth, although, he says, Freud equivocates on this point. In so doing, Lévi-Strauss avers, psychoanalysis merely creates its own myth (that everything is libidinal in origin), complete with its own laws of transformation and an intrinsic (mytho-) logic.

In this enterprise, in his quest for the passion behind symbols and a finite number of "signifieds" underlying the infinite variety of "signifiers," according to Lévi-Strauss, Freud revealed his roots in the Enlightenment and the rationalistic romanticism of Rousseau and Voltaire. In a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*, Lévi-Strauss concludes: "Psychoanalytic theory cannot be credited with uncovering the latent meaning of myths. Myths were its precursors in this" (p. 186).

Lévi-Strauss anachronistically equates psychoanalysis with id analysis, seemingly unaware of the ego psychology which has gained sway in our field. He appears at times naïve as he wages war with a straw man. Psychoanalysts, too, are concerned with enduring patterns of defense, integrative/synthetic processes, and the internal logic of dreams and myths. The concept of structure lies at the heart of ego psychology.

And yet, what about the passions and terrors of which Voltaire, Rousseau, and the early Freud spoke? The structure of dreams and myths is not all that is of interest. Can the structuralist's perspective ever supplant the dynamic point of view without forsaking what is human? Do motives, reasons, even first causes, have to be discarded as topics of concern in favor of form and logic alone? Can psychic life really seem that way either to the psychoanalyst or to the ethnographer in the field?

In summary, *The Jealous Potter* should prove of limited interest to

the psychoanalytic practitioner and theorist. The body of Lévi-Strauss's work, however, resonating with other challenges to and misconceptions of psychoanalysis, needs to be addressed by those analysts who would remain involved in the intellectual trends of our time. We cannot afford to ignore the structuralist movement, whose effect in one form or another has reverberated through the entire academic community. Psychoanalysis cannot succumb to isolationism if it is to survive the times.

JOHN MUNDER ROSS (NEW YORK)

GUILT AND DESIRE. RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES AND THEIR PATHOLOGICAL DERIVATIVES. By Antoine Vergote. Translated by M. H. Wood. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1988. 254 pp.

This monograph presents a masterful statement of the dialectical tensions existing between religious and psychoanalytic understanding. Vergote comes to his task well equipped. He has been a professor at the Catholic University of Louvain for a good many years, teaching philosophy, psychology, and religion. More to the point, his understanding of psychoanalysis is profound and the grounding of his religious and theological thinking is firm and sound. In the course of the years of his teaching and psychological experience, Vergote has established himself as one of the foremost interpreters of religious experience in psychoanalytic terms. Some American readers may remember his *The Religious Man* of a few years ago.

Vergote has written a psychoanalytic book—one that is best read with psychoanalytic eyes. The psychoanalytic matrix from which he addresses us is French, basically from the Parisian school. It is the intellectual world of Lacan, Dolto, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss, Merleau-Ponty, Lhermitte, and Hesnard, to name a few. The American, and even the English, psychoanalytic literature is cited not at all. But behind the flow of the argument, and often enough in the center of attention, is the spirit and the word of Freud. Vergote is not preoccupied with the hermeneutic obsession—his focus is on the human phenomenon, particularly with reference to its religious investments and their pathological distortions.

The basic structure of the text falls along familiar psychoanalytic lines—the division between the hysterical and the obsessional. The section dealing with obsessional expressions of religious pathology focuses on neurotic aspects of culpability, sinfulness, the guilt-ridden forms of conscience, and finally the ritualized forms of superstition and magical action that often flourish in religious contexts. The latter half of the book is given over to differentiating hysterically based pathological religious inspiration from the more authentic and nonpathological religious experience. The focus here falls on the interaction of desire, which is instinctual at root but not limited to that, and a profund and meaningful yearning for religious fulfillment. This carries the argument into a highly serviceable and thoughtful reconsideration of mystical phenomena and ecstatic states. A final chapter is devoted to an attempt to understand the demonic, the role of belief in the devil for religious existence, and the interplay between psychopathology and belief in demonological experiences, such as possession.

Throughout the argument, Vergote manages to strike a balanced position that seems to me to avoid the constant and easy temptation to fall into either psychoanalytic or theologizing error. He is careful to avoid a kind of psychoanalytic reductionism that can, and often does, do violence to religious meaning. By the same token, he declines the frequent opportunities to wander into the refuges of theological interpretation that too often leave the psychoanalytic seeker of truth excluded from the garden of sacrosanct gnosis. The balance of such tensions is perhaps best expressed in his own words. At the beginning of his discourse, he states the theme which is elaborated throughout the rest of the book:

> The mutually interacting networks of demands—those from outside the individual and those inscribed within the psychic system—constitute the two dimensions where the disciplines of psychoanalysis and religious studies can be brought together in a common field of inquiry. . . . I have chosen here to concentrate on the internal tensions and unavoidable conflicts with which religion must grapple. These conflicts are inscribed in the very heart of religion, and it is these that propel and determine its progress. Moreover, the believer's standpoint is marked by a twofold excess: an excess of the unconscious significations that, in spite of man's intentions, assert themselves on him, and the excess of hidden significations he apprehends in manifestations of the divine. A truly authentic faith will assume these tensions, but no matter how legitimate the

> explicit intentions of belief may be, these conflicts, which touch the very roots of man's being, are fraught with snares and delusions, and the religious path remains a confused and risky one. Like any other human enterprise, faith can also fall into the helplessness and pathological binds that distort the best acts and intentions of religious men (pp. viii-ix).

A case in point is his treatment of demonic possession. The psychological interpretation of possession accounts for its meaning and explains the effectiveness of rites of exorcism. But by emphasizing the symbolic efficacy, this interpretation demythologizes the phenomenon and effaces its symbolic dimension. Vergote writes:

> The religious references functioning in possession and exorcism are not simply the metaphorical manifestations of a mental illness; the symptoms of the illness also intimately incorporate the metaphors of a spiritual combat. The psychological interpretation of possession often empties possession of the religious and existential dimensions of its suffering. As justified as this psychological discourse may be, a simplistically causal application of it carries the danger of regarding possession as only a surface manifestation of a psychic cause without ethical or religious experience behind it (p. 211).

Such a relatively nuanced analysis should at least challenge, if it does not clarify, psychoanalytic thinking about religious symbolism.

Vergote's work is a masterful statement of a wise, thoughtful, informed, and balanced perspective on the complex issues generated within the sphere of religious experience—embracing the broad range of authentic and meaningful as well as deviant and pathological expressions of the religious impulse that are so unalterably endemic to the human condition. He has advanced the dialogue between psychoanalysis and religion in a profoundly meaningful way, and in so doing, has opened new paths for deeper and more relevant psychoanalytic understanding. I would recommend this book to any psychoanalyst who is seriously interested in understanding religious experience—it is one of those rare books that Francis Bacon might place with those to be digested rather than tasted. I would recommend that it not only be read, but studied, absorbed, and integrated—with the promise of great nutritional value.

W. W. MEISSNER (CAMBRIDGE, MA)

INTEGRATION AND SELF-HEALING: AFFECT—TRAUMA—ALEXITHYMIA. By Henry Krystal, M.D., with a contribution by John H. Krystal, M.D. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1988. 383 pp.

If reading a book is like traveling down a road, with the author as your guide to a destination that he knows and you are to discover, then the journey through this book is analogous to a road with varying surfaces and many detours. Our vehicle is the author's prose. Krystal's prose at times resembles a fine machine, smooth and well-functioning, but at other times we are traveling in an Edsel. Detours on a trip of discovery are not always to be discouraged. However, many of them in this text distract and detract from Krystal's stated purposes and destinations. If the reader can overlook the potholes, unimproved pavement, and poorly banked turns, she or he will be enriched by the intermittently smooth asphalt and beautiful vistas.

Krystal contends that in order to understand and treat difficult patients, psychoanalysts must go beyond issues of phallic identification to identification with the preoedipal mothering parent and issues of self-regulation. He sees the recognition of alexithymia as the key element for facilitating integration and self-healing:

> Alexithymic patients' impaired ability to utilize emotions as signals to themselves is based on the "form" that their emotional responses take. The reactions are basically somatic, consisting of the "expressive" or physiological aspect of affects with minimal verbalization. In addition, their emotions are often undifferentiated; they are vague and unspecific . . . (p. 243).

Alexithymia is observable, to varying degrees and intensity, in many psychosomatic patients, addictive patients, and patients in severe post-traumatic states. For Krystal, the understanding of alexithymia grows out of the study of the development of affects and psychic trauma.

The book is divided into three sections. The consistency of organization within these sections is variable. Part 1, "Emotions," is by far the most cohesive section. Particularly readable are Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 7. In part 2, "Trauma," only Chapter 9 can be highly recommended. Part 3, "Alexithymia and Post-Traumatic States," is disturbingly unclear and poorly organized. Chapter 14 in this sec-

tion, contributed by John H. Krystal on the topic of psychometric assessment of alexithymia, is self-contained and complete.

In Part 1, Krystal uses the terms "emotions" and "affects" interchangeably. He extends and details Elizabeth Zetzel's developmental lines of affects and affect tolerance. He conceptualizes two developmental lines for affects: (1) differentiation from primitive experiences of pleasure and unpleasure and (2) development toward verbalization or desomatization. He describes the function of affects as evolving from that of communication (interpersonal) toward that of signal (intrapersonal). Affect development is disrupted if the child has experiences of being emotionally overwhelmed either by the intensity or the frequency of affective responses. The experience of being overwhelmed constitutes infantile trauma and effects the child's ability to develop affect tolerance. Only after adolescence is the development of affect and of affect tolerance completed.

> The adolescent renunciation of childhood privileges and view of one's self makes possible the advancement of conscious self-integration, self-possession, and "self-awareness of one's affects as signals to one's self." This development is neither easy nor satisfactorily accomplished by most people (p. 67).

The core of Part 2 is Chapter 9, "Trauma and Affect," in which Krystal clearly brings together the relationship of affect development and the effects of experiencing trauma. After reviewing Freud's and Sidney Furst's contributions, Krystal differentiates infantile response to psychic trauma from the adult traumatic pattern. He states,

> The infantile form of trauma continues as long as the affects are undifferentiated, unverbalized and mostly somatic. The adult forms of psychic trauma come into the foreground with the development of ego function and the ability to mobilize such defenses as denial, depersonalization and derealization (p. 167).

Scattered through the text of this section are clinical examples illustrating the association of severe psychic trauma with post-traumatic anhedonia and alexithymia.

In Part 3, Krystal presents his clearest definitions of alexithymia. Interspersed throughout this section is a review of the literature on alexithymia, particularly the work of Joyce McDougall. In the last chapter, "Therapeutic Considerations in Alexithymia," Krystal describes technical modifications necessary in psychoanalytic psycho-

therapy: "I would try to understand what they were re-experiencing and give them interpretations about the defensive nature of their regression. . . . Describing to the patient the nature of their emotions was helpful to them and was even appreciated by them" (p. 314). He advocates direct interventions with patients around issues of self-regulation and self-caring. His observations about the transference in these patients resembles descriptions others give of transference paradigms observed with narcissistic and borderline patients.

The psychodynamics and theories that Krystal describes are familiar. I find puzzling his need to distinguish alexithymia as a new, separate diagnostic category. He discusses patients as alexithymic versus neurotic and attempts to distinguish alexithymic patients from borderline and narcissistic patients. Krystal describes a defensive pattern that is central to borderline and narcissistic pathology. To a lesser extent, it is observable in neuroses. The developmental basis for alexithymia is theoretically sound, leading to recognition of a defensive pattern. As Krystal states, alexithymia is important to recognize in evaluation or early treatment, and has prognostic implications. This does not mean that it has to be added to our already confusing list of syndromes, however. I am in agreement with McDougall, who, in discussing an earlier paper by Krystal, states "Alexithymia is thus an uncommonly strong defense against primitive terrors. It is evident also that the more fragile the subject, the stronger the defensive walls need to be"[1]

Krystal, who is unquestionably knowledgeable about his subject, makes a heroic attempt at an interdisciplinary, comprehensive approach to it but it is unsuccessful. Repeatedly, he interrupts himself to introduce data from tangentially related fields. His definitions are not clear and concise, particularly when he is using self psychology terms. His need to reject economic and structural theory has left him with cumbersome descriptive metaphors and language. And, lastly, the reader is continually distracted by an extraordinary number of typographical and copy editing errors.

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[1] McDougall, J. (1982): Alexithymia, psychosomatosis, and psychosis. *Int. J. Psychoanal. Psychother.*, 9:386.

L'INCONSCIENT DU POLITIQUE. (The Unconscious of Politics.) By Pierre Kaufmann. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1988. 251 pp.

The introduction to this book contains a quotation from *Civilization and Its Discontents* that expresses one of the main themes of the book: "If civilization is a necessary course of development from the family to humanity as a whole, then . . . there is inextricably bound with it an increase of the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate" (*Standard Edition*, Vol. 21, p. 133). The author (p. 15) then turns to *Totem and Taboo* and equates the murder of the father with the acquisition of language. Kaufmann continues with the *New Introductory Lectures*, and claims that Freud said that psychoanalysis "is the study of drives." He proceeds: "He [Freud] specifies that the conditions under which the drives are expressed is a problem for socioeconomic analysis, benefitting in particular from the contributions of Marxism" (p. 18).

Chapter 1 begins with Freud's analogy of the crystal (*S.E.*, Vol. 22, pp. 58-59) and goes on to study the breakdown of political systems, using the Russian Revolution as an example. The author emphasizes the shift in the soldiers' allegiance from the monarchy to the crowd and underlines the role of guilt and its displacements. Chapter 2 begins with the statement that Freud's first thoughts on the origin of the State arose in 1915, "out of the breakdown of the supposedly guaranteed norms of a European community of nations" (p. 15). Kaufmann goes on to note that Freud said that the State forbids violence to the individual only to monopolize it (*S.E.*, Vol. 14, p. 279). He adds that "the community is interposed between the individual and the State" (p. 40), and that "the monopolization of violence by the State is derived from the fascination with the ancestral father" (p. 41). He believes that it is necessary to reconstitute the mechanisms by which violence is made knowable (p. 46).

Chapter 3 states, "Collective guilt appears to be the condition for the transformation of the aggressive drive into the activities of civilization" (p. 53). The guilt of the group, the main theme of *Totem and Taboo*, results from putting to death the ancestral omnipotence. The author's task is "to link omnipotence, repressed violence and guilt" (p. 58). In Chapter 3, there is a quotation from

Moses and Monotheism: "The 'omnipotence of thoughts' was, we suppose, an expression of the pride of mankind in the development of speech . . ." (*S.E.*, Vol. 23, p. 113), which is used to support the view that the entry of humanity into language has as its counterpart the emergence of guilt (p. 60). This guilt can be decreased only through an illusion (p. 65).

Chapter 4 deals with the illusion the State uses to mask its monopolization of violence. The author also mentions the goal of artistic illusion, "the return of the object of fantasy," and of religious illusion, "the resurrection of the destroyed omnipotent figure" (p. 85). Political illusion undertakes the return of the dead omnipotent father, whether the role of the political leader be that of the Executioner, the Victim, or the Educator. The thesis of Chapter 5 is that, with the murder of the father completed, the individual can no longer love, but the dead father retains the capacity to fascinate. Because of the inability to love, the aggressive drive is released and a spiral of aggression and guilt is initiated. The State's monopoly of violence is a continuation of the fascination with the leader of the horde.

In Chapter 6, the author suggests that there is a similarity between Freud's shift of emphasis from the drives to the need for an object and Marx's analysis of the shift from the workers' enjoyment of the fruits of their labor to their receiving a salary.

Chapter 7 categorizes political ideologies as conservative (the executioner), revolutionary (the victim), and advocating reform (the educator). Political leaders are either artists (hysterics), organizers (obsessionals), or visionaries (paranoids). For instance, Napoleon was a conservative and a visionary, Trotsky an artist and a revolutionary, Stalin an organizer and a revolutionary, etc. Whatever the ideology or the personality, the purpose of the illusion is to remove the guilt associated with the acquisition of language. Lifting the "intolerable tension" of guilt is expected from the very power whose monopoly of violence perpetuates the conflict (p. 181).

The last chapter deals with the influence of social organization on art. The common theme of *Oedipus Rex* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is a plague, which in the first is the penalty for parricide and incest and in the second, for rivalry between the sexes (Tatiana and Oberon) for the "changeling boy" (a phallic symbol). The first transgresses the law establishing the City-State while the second

transgresses the principle of conjugal life. In *King Lear*, the King's crime is to reject Cordelia because she intends to love her husband. At the end of the book the author quotes Freud: "It was my hope that dream-interpretation would help to make possible the psychological analysis of neuroses; since then a deeper understanding of neuroses has reacted in turn upon our view of dreams" (*S.E.*, Vol. 4, p. xxvii). The author claims this passage was in the introduction to the 1912 edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. He also believes that psychoanalysis changed from interpretation to construction, which introduced the historical dimension also found in Hippolyta's lines in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.

I have a number of comments. The lines quoted above come from the introduction to the 1911 edition. There was no 1912 edition. Freud did not say, as far as I am aware, that psychoanalysis was the study of drives. He did say: "The theory of instincts is so to say our mythology" (*S.E.*, Vol. 22, p. 95). Although *Constructions in Analysis* appeared in 1937, it is questionable whether analysis moved from interpretation to construction. My main criticism is of the author's view on the closeness between Freud's and Marx's thinking. Here are two examples of Freud's views: "But it cannot be assumed that economic motives are the only ones that determine the behaviour of human beings in society" (*S.E.*, Vol. 22, p. 178), and, "Theoretical Marxism, as realized in Russian Bolshevism . . . . has created a prohibition of thought which is just as ruthless as was that of religion in the past" (*S.E.*, Vol. 22, pp. 179-180). I did, however, find that the book provides a plausible hypothesis for the repeated disillusionments with political ideologies and political leaders we find throughout recorded history. Removing the Lacanian emphasis on language from this book would still leave the rest intact.

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ABSTRACTS

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XLVIII, 1984.

Abstracted by Emmett Wilson, Jr.

Elements of a Theory of the Transmission of Psychoanalysis. Claude Girard. Pp. 19-238.

This is a thorough, detailed study of the various theories concerning how psychoanalysis is passed on to future generations of analysts. The French term for this process is *transmission.* Girard discusses the history, crises, and contemporary problems concerning transmission, with a thorough review of the literature and summary statements of the problems both in France and in contemporary American psychoanalysis. He concludes with an extensive bibliography on the subject, arranged by topic and covering the major psychoanalytic publications. For Girard, what is transmitted are certain aspects of the analyst's particular relationship with the body of theoretical and technical knowledge as well as with his or her teachers. The main emphasis for Girard, as for Freud, is on the contrast between a knowledge of psychoanalysis gained through lecture courses or reading, and the specific process of analytic training by which the future analyst becomes an analyst. Girard examines Freud's discussions concerning the topic. Freud did not specifically develop a concept of the transmission of psychoanalysis, although he did use the notion of transmission in discussing the passing on of taboos or of cultural and linguistic heritages. Freud discussed transmission in certain texts which were provoked by three critical situations: the break with Jung, the prospects for the development of psychoanalysis after World War I, and the legal ramifications of the Reik affair. These prompted Freud to set down his ideas on the development and institutionalization of psychoanalysis in "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" (1914); "Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy" (1919), "On the Teaching of Psycho-Analysis in Universities" (1919), and "The Question of Lay Analysis" (1926). Early thoughts on and problems of transmission can also be found in *The Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society.* As the movement developed, some fundamental rules of analysis were formulated: free association, the necessity of a personal analysis for the analyst (Ferenczi), and the need for institutional rather than individual training (Eitingon). Finally, it was felt that membership in a psychoanalytic society was necessary.

Girard's own view of Freud's theory of transmission is an interesting one. He sees *Moses and Monotheism* as a testamentary document, expressing Freud's fantasies about his doctrine and the survival of his work as well as its transmission. This text not only envisaged Freud's death and its effect on the evolution of psychoanalysis, it dealt as well with the destiny of the negative transference when it becomes sheltered in a cult of institutes and the text. Although psychoanalysis was not intended to be a religion, it was to become one for some, and Freud in this work showed us the repressed conflicts which lead to this situation. He was concerned with the theme of the murder of the father and his surrogates, and the role of the "great men" who have a need for authority and admiration. To the extent that the development of

psychoanalysis supposes a cultural diffusion, a personal transmission, a "conversion," and an institutional organization, the schema of the development of monotheistic religion in *Moses and Monotheism* serves as a guide.

Analysis Defined and Indefinable. About the Second Fundamental Rule. Jean-Luc Donnet. Pp. 239-289.

The second fundamental rule of analysis was enunciated by Ferenczi in his article, "The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique" (1928). The rule was that "anyone who wishes to undertake analysis must first be analyzed himself." Donnet compares this rule to the first fundamental rule of free association. This second rule seems to be an institutional prescription rather than a rule of analysis itself. How can it be on a par with the rule of free association? Donnet discerns a fundamental antinomy here. Freud's early emphasis was on analysts' understanding their own conflicts and their need for mastery of countertransference feelings. He was at first much more sanguine about the possibility of didactic analyses, but in his later writings, for example in "An Autobiographical Study" (1925), some bitterness and disillusion began to show. In "The Question of Lay Analysis" Freud was really dealing with the metapsychology of conviction, which does not seem to come from simply learning the theory in the abstract, but through a personal analysis. Yet it is this requirement of a personal analysis that confronts us with a basic antinomy in the position of analysts. They must on the one hand define their position in the treatment in relation to their patients' suffering, and on the other hand, they must accept their commitments to institutions which are concerned with the transmission of psychoanalysis and the maintenance of an analytic ideal. In this antinomy is to be seen one of the elements making the role of the analyst impossible. The risk is that the didactic analysis becomes less an analytic experience than a situation in which analytic doctrine is promulgated through the force of the transference. This makes it an experience of initiation or confirmation, rather than one of conviction. Still, the requirement of a personal analysis assures the chance that a genuine analysis of the analyst will take place in spite of its being also a prescribed procedure. It thus becomes not a verification of the theory, but a verification of its incompleteness and its openness in the face of the analytic experience and the unconscious.

Some Guidelines in Evaluating the Concept of Identification. Jean Begoin. Pp. 483-490.

Identification is a concept that raises many questions in psychoanalysis, both for technique and theory. In particular, questions arise about the level at which the mechanisms of identification operate in the course of the analytic process. Another important issue is whether identification or the object relation comes first. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* Freud made statements that seem paradoxical to us today, first that identification is "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person," and then that this "kind of tie is . . . possible before any sexual object-choice has been made." To understand this, we must understand to what point the theory had been developed in 1921 when this was written, and its relationship to the structural theory introduced in *The Ego and the Id* in 1923. In the latter work we find Freud's more advanced thinking on the question of identifica-

tion. There, identification is explicitly and definitively linked to renunciation of the incestuous sexual object, with resulting transformation of the ego through introjection of this object. This links identification and object relations, rather than making them opposites. The model for introjection in this work is the same as that in *Mourning and Melancholia*. But there are sharp differences. Melancholia comes about from a failure of the mourning process — there is introjection, but of a sort that destroys the ego, which is unable to assimilate the introject. Freud thus came to speak of two principal modes of identification: a narcissistic one, which implies a confusion of identity between subject and object, and a secondary one, which is based upon a successful mourning process. The renunciation of narcissistic identification in favor of introjective identification is one of the principal economic problems encountered in the course of psychological development. There are two principal obstacles to this renunciation of narcissistic identification and the completion of a successful mourning process. One is the intensity of separation anxiety, which may be so great that mourning is prevented. Klein's work on projective identification provided an appropriate theoretical structure to deal with narcissistic identification. Winnicott in his concept of "holding" emphasized the quality of the mother-child relationship, as did Bion in his conceptualization of the first relationship in terms of the container and the contained.

To Identify, To Be Identified, To Identify Oneself. Alain de Mijolla. Pp. 491-508.

The complexity of the notion of identification is attested to by the various grammatical voices—active, passive, and reflexive—of the verb "to identify," both in French and in German. Various psychoanalytic theorists have emphasized one or another of these voices of the verb. It is a mistake, however, to claim that these various voices can be isolated. We have made many theoretical advances concerning identification, but they have led some analysts to speak of the various psychic structures as if the structures were capable of identifications. Some analytic accounts of treatment deal rather facilely with the notion of identification. Analysts cannot limit themselves to these three voices (or interpretations) of identification, but must include such difficult concepts as primary identification, presymbolic identification, and Lacan's notion of mirror identification. There is much that remains fluid and unfinished concerning the concept of identification. The discovery of an identification with such and such a person in analysis comes in phases. First, there is recognition of the imitative behavior, and only later, after considerable analytic work, does the identification come to be treated as an "identification screen," a dynamic formulation from which unconscious fantasies of identification can be sorted out. Mijolla emphasizes that when one speaks of identifications in psychoanalysis, it is with this implicit reference to the possibility of interpreting them, along with the revival of past identifications.

Identity and Identification in James Joyce's Short Story, "A Little Cloud." Frosso Carapanos. Pp. 581-599.

Carapanos analyzes this story, written by Joyce in 1906 for the *Dubliners* collection published in 1914. She reviews Joyce's peculiarly paranoid stance toward his pub-

lishers about delays and difficulties, and his avowed pleasure in this particular story. It deals with the identity crisis evoked in the constricted and timid hero, Little Chandler, whose life is upset by the return to Dublin of his friend, Gallaher. Gallaher's travels, fast life, and contempt for Chandler's domesticity have their effect, and Chandler undergoes a severe identity crisis, as is shown in the text, in his thoughts, reminiscences, and observations. An appropriation of Gallaher's identity comes about, as Chandler becomes envious of his friend's life and his bachelor freedom. At home a domestic scene develops, as Chandler ineptly attempts to care for his infant son. The cries of the infant disturb him, and he is unable to calm the child. Chandler screams at his son, terrifying him and then becomes frightened himself that the child is going to die. Chandler's wife, who had been cold, angry, and indifferent to Chandler, is able to calm the child. Chandler's remorse and his fear that the child might die are suggestive, Carapanos thinks, of Chandler's own slow death in the life situation from which he cannot flee. That Joyce identified himself with Chandler has already been noted by some critics, but previous discussions have not explored the extent or nature of this identification. Carapanos discusses the circumstances of Joyce's life at the time when "A Little Cloud" was written. His life with Nora Barnacle was a melancholy and impoverished exile in Trieste, and his son, Giorgio, was only one year old, a source of pride for his father but also a source of practical difficulties for Joyce's creativity. In the unconscious background elements to the story, Carapanos sees a reflection of Joyce's relationship with his own parents; Chandler's cold and indifferent wife may represent Joyce's mother, while homosexual yearnings for the father are portrayed in Chandler's relationship to Gallaher.

On So-Called Unconscious Homosexuality. Joyce McDougall. Pp. 675-685.

The author discusses the vicissitudes of normal bisexuality and the fate of the homosexual component of bisexuality as adulthood is reached. She draws on her experience with patients in analysis and on her self-analysis. The homosexual component finds expression in normal adult life in enrichment of the narcissistic self-image; it is involved in the ability to identify with the desire and pleasure of the sexual partner in the sexual act, in which, if only briefly, we transcend the narcissistic limits that our monosexuality has imposed upon us. Our relationship with our children is a rich mine and resource of homosexual expression. The author recognizes the vicariously phallic relationship she has with her son. And the intensity of mother-daughter conflicts she has had to deal with would suggest that here too are to be found normal expressions of homosexual feelings and impulses. The pleasure found in intellectual and artistic work is impregnated with homosexual and narcissistic elements, even though the homosexual dimension is rarely conscious. In this process of creation we are both male and female at the same time, and difficulties and blocks in creativity may come from conflicts around this bisexual parturition. Finally, the homosexual investments that link us to friends and colleagues of the same sex are important. McDougall's thesis is that the unconscious homosexuality that finds normal expression in these areas springs from the same sources as that in the unconscious of the active homosexual. What is striking, however, in the analysis of homosexual patients is the violence unveiled in the course of the analysis, directed first against the image of the homosexual's own body, which is attacked in

imagination and experienced in a persecutory mode as monstrous, stinking, ill, or dead. Homosexual attachment presents itself unconsciously as a cannibalistic love, in which the other is sought not so much as an individual in himself or herself, but as essential nourishment for the subject. The aim is the recuperation of the self at the expense of the other, the repair of a sexual self that is viewed as damaged, which must be repaired through a narcissistic mirror image of the self. The homosexual who enters analysis is surprised to discover, underneath the idealization of his or her own sex and the idealization of the partner, hatred for one's own sex and an envious and destructive attitude toward the opposite sex. The problems of an unresolved or unintegrated homosexuality will show up in treatment in the patients' distortions of their narcissistic self-image, in problems with their children, colleagues, friends, in their intellectual work, and in their sexual relations and love relations. In order to be sensitive to this homosexual element in the analytic work, the analyst must come to terms with her or his own homosexuality, avoiding either complicity with the analysand or countertransferential deafness.

Unconscious Homosexuality and the Dynamics of the Double. Cesar and Sara Botella. Pp. 687-708.

The authors concentrate on a type of collusion that may develop between patient and analyst in the course of an analysis, a complicity which is more or less unconsciously homosexual and can prevent the emergence of a certain mode of relating in the transference. They cite Freud's unconscious homosexual transference to Fliess. The libidinal gaze of Fliess was necessary for Freud and permitted him to launch without fear the autoerotic efforts involved in all original thought. In Freud's development we can see his use of exterior, homosexual doubles, who offered protection against the vertigo of original thinking. The development of his thought shows an oscillation between the need for reassurance by cathexis of these doubles and the need to disengage himself in order to be free to create. We can see Freud pass from reliance on an exterior double to an autonomous interior double, with the resulting originality in his thought. He repeated the situation with Jung in 1911, and it was to be invoked again in his study of the Moses of Michelangelo. Only in the Acropolis paper did it get analyzed, with the transference-at-a-distance to Romain Rolland. He transformed Moses, the founding father, into an interior double. When finished with the Moses paper, he did some of his most original and creative work in his late papers. Through an illustrative case history the authors indicate how these homosexual elements can come up in the transference-countertransference material and can lead to the experience of doubling. This experience and the resulting collusion is perceived by the analyst as uncanny and as deranging and disorganizing. It is a narcissistic love, the bearer of the ego ideal, more or less covered by the homosexual oedipal object love of the infantile neurosis. Earlier metapsychological considerations of the analytic process have been enlarged by the study of the narcissistic economy of the relation between analyst and analysand. We could learn still more by a study of the dynamics of the double, but what we most often see is a homosexual transference which covers the doubling. This phenomenon is especially important in dealing with borderline patients in analysis.

Homosexuality—Unconscious or Preconscious Guilt? Nicos Nicolaidis. Pp. 731-743.

How could there be a system *Ucs.* which is merely a photocopier that retains repressed representations exactly as they were? Can one hold that representations, returning from the repressed, appear as they were before the repression, without transformation by the dynamics of the unconscious and by the economic-symbolic function of the psychic apparatus? Freud's notion that in the unconscious the only regulation that is possible is that of the pleasure-unpleasure principle is the cornerstone of any psychoanalysis that claims to be dynamic. Yet it is from this proposition that the difficulties start, as when Freud speaks of unconscious guilt, etc. If something in the unconscious is regulated only by pleasure-unpleasure, how can it retain the characteristics that it had when conscious or preconscious? There is a difference for Nicolaidis between simple unconscious representations and repressed unconscious representations. What characteristics do "unconscious homosexual feelings" retain when repressed and under the direction of primary process, which only recognizes pleasure-unpleasure? Do they retain a specifically homosexual character? For Nicolaidis, every repressed representation loses all its qualities except those of pleasure and unpleasure, every other cathexis being withdrawn and given over to the representation used for counter-cathexis, as the preconscious protects itself from the force of the unconscious representation. The result is that the unconscious representation loses its character of guilt but retains one of unpleasure. This suggestion counters the embarrassment of supposing a double registration in consciousness and in the unconscious, a problem that Freud raised at certain points in his theorizing but left unanswered.

Psychiatria Fennica. XVIII, 1987.

Abstracted by Lee Grossman.

The Mourning Work of Small Children after the Loss of a Parent through Divorce. Leena Linna. Pp. 41-51.

Reactions of three siblings, ages seven and a half, six, and three, to the departure of their father were studied through notes kept by the mother over a three-year-period. Feelings of rejection, guilt, fear of abandonment, and anger were spontaneously reported by the children. Conspicuously absent, at least to the mother's observation, were any signs of longing for or missing the absent father, until she herself conceded over a year later, that she missed her husband. There followed a period of pronounced sadness for the children, with curiosity about death, and frank acknowledgment of feelings about what was missing. The angry and guilty reactions abated concomitantly. The sense of family re-established itself, after previously having been compromised by the children's identifications with the absent father.

Psychiatria Fennica. XIX, 1988.

Abstracted by Lee Grossman.

The Theory of Crick and Mitchison Concerning the Function of Dream Sleep. A Psychoanalytic Comment. Johannes Lehtonen. Pp. 41-49.

Lehtonen notes some compatibilities between psychoanalytic concepts and the neurological/information-processing model of dreaming proposed by Crick and

Mitchison. They proposed that dreaming is an attempt to unload from the mind disturbing and valueless residues of experience and development, an active "unlearning" of "parasitic modes" of thought, which otherwise may compel maladaptive behavior. Lehtonen sees this process as analogous to the concept of tension relief through wish fulfillment in dreaming, and compares "parasitic modes" to drives. Crick and Mitchison's concepts of "completion" and "classification" are compared to the psychoanalytic concepts of displacement, condensation, overdetermination, and symbol formation. Nonetheless, many of Crick and Mitchison's conclusions are compatible with psychoanalytic thinking, including their insistence on looking at the manifest dream only and their suggestion that remembering dreams may be a bad idea. Lehtonen concludes with the observation that the physiology and psychology of dreaming are not competing models; they must be described in different terms. He suggests that Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity applies to the relationship between the physical and psychological function of dreams.

American Imago. XLIV, 1987.

Abstracted by Anita G. Schmukler.

Psychoanalysis and Art: The Carnality of Interpretation. Donald Moss. Pp. 171-183.

The author suggests that psychoanalysis "aspires to a taxonomy . . . impervious to surprise." Thus, precise naming of objects is a specific aim. Science pursues a "perfected method," which the author views as "a kind of auto-erotic independence." Art, however, "seeks an object whose . . . authoritative *presence* will turn all problems of method superfluous." The objects for Freud were his patients. At that point, both object and method were central. With the introduction of the factor of craft, mastery becomes an aim. A study of the relation between art object and psychoanalytic theory would, in the author's view, expand our understanding of object love.

On Obsessionality and Sublimation. Donald Moss. Pp. 185-194.

From a Lacanian perspective, Moss examines traits of individuals in whom either obsessionality or sublimation are primary. An obsessional focuses upon doubt, problems of method, reconstruction, and fantasies of early states of love and purity. The difficulty in selecting alternatives may result in excesses. The sublimator is viewed as one who investigates, discards, engenders disorder, and only *dreams* of love, but does not love. Representative thought patterns, which are "neither fiction nor reportage" of both a sublimator and an obsessional are presented. One promise of psychoanalysis is viewed as "access to the present tense."

The Angry Marx. Martin Birnbach. Pp. 195-211.

Birnbach explores the contempt and the antagonism which underlie humor (wit) in the writing of Karl Marx. He contends that Marx's debt to Hegel and his defense of this legacy are partly responsible for the polemical nature of Marx's writing. In terms of oedipal conflict, Birnbach hypothesizes that Marx, whose early work was, in fact, appreciated by the critics, unleashed unbridled hostility toward his contemporaries, the objects of his fratricidal wishes.

Othello: Jealousy as Mimetic Contagion. Rob Wilson. Pp. 213-233.

The social/sexual jealousy which Iago stirs in his male rivals is examined in relation to mimetic desire, a model proposed by René Girard. Iago serves as a motivating force for "*five* triangles of male rivalry within the play." Othello perceives Cassio as a rival for Desdemona, Roderigo views Othello similarly, Brabantio is struck with a sense of betrayal by Desdemona, Iago proposes the fiction that Othello is linked with Emilia, and Iago broods over Cassio's promotion of Othello. With preoedipal unbounded reckless rage directed at his rivals, Iago "imagines from the outset that he can destroy both the *love object* (Desdemona) . . . and the *power object* (General Othello)." The externalization of this wish engenders multiple sets of triadic relations, in various states of rupture and destruction. Threatened with loss of power and position, Iago wishes not simply to triumph over rivals but to destroy them, and, by contagion, their closest relations. Wilson directly explores Iago's "overdetermined envy" in a variety of contexts. Imitative elements are inextricably woven into the text. Othello becomes a scapegoated victim, and Desdemona repeats that pattern. Wilson takes the position that the mimetic nature of romantic desire heightens its destructive potential. Iago gains strength from an irregularly textured ego by engaging men to enact his brutal wishes. The enemy becomes the woman, whose infidelity is perceived, by projection, as universal.

Art and the Phenomenology of Imagination: Ursula R. Mahlendorf's "The Wellsprings of Literary Criticism." Laurence Edwin Abt. Pp. 235-239.

The creative writer's internal conflicts find resonance in the receptive reader's past experiences. Mahlendorf's chapter on Franz Kafka illustrates the use of fictional characters as representative of the struggles of the writer. In this sense, Abt refers to art as "the genetic code of history." Inherent in this genetic code is the capacity for healing—for both the creative artist and the participating audience.

Theories of Reading: Carvers and Modellers. Ian MacKenzie. Pp. 241-256.

In both the practice and criticism of sculpture, there is a distinction between carving and modeling. This is examined in relation to the work of Melanie Klein and the art critic Adrian Stokes. The author takes the position that "the carver esteems his material and his finished work for its otherness; the modeller molds his material into a form determined by his ego." An effort is made to extend Stokes's concept to include two types of readers and critics.

The Artistic Personality in Psychoanalytic Theory. Jon Frederickson. Pp. 257-273.

Frederickson examines those factors that have resulted in reductionism in psychoanalytic writing about the analyses of artists. The acceptance by psychoanalytic writers of stereotypes of artists (e.g., as prophets or madmen) has contributed to this misunderstanding. Freud's conception of the artist is distinguished from those of his followers, many of whom fail to grasp Freud's notions. Freud identified an internal kinship between the artist and the neurotic, but followers of Freud have frequently equated the two. Both the artist and the neurotic, in Freud's view, withdrew from an unsatisfactory reality, but Freud was explicit in stating that creative artists

could find their way back to reality through the vehicle of their artistic productions. For Freud, the artist "was a heroic figure who mastered his conflicts in a creative, non-neurotic fashion." Thus, art exists between the real world which frustrates wishes and the wish-fulfilling world of our fantasies. While the myth of the artist as a madman is prevalent in current literature, it was not one of Freud's notions. The view of the artist as a neurotic led to a notion of art as "sublimated neurosis." Ego psychology and its focus upon regression in the service of the ego permitted a view that creative work is an expression of ego strength. Recently, there has been a shift in psychoanalytic literature from focus on the artist to focus on creativity. The author suggests that some important questions must be addressed. These include the meaning of the "special meaning of the artist," the "bourgeois critique," the differentiation between "romantic stereotypes and actual historical and current artists," and the tendency to apply preconceived notions rather than specific analytic evidence.

The Sources of Creativity. Nevile Symington. Pp. 275-287.

The creative moment is examined, the contact of feelings and imagination which permits the scientist and artist to dissolve the resistance that impedes free, original, expressive production. We are protected from constant bombardment of external stimuli by defenses inherent in both our sensory and our feeling apparatus. Mental constructs, such as an image of the world as a "flat, solid, and stable place," serve a defensive, protective function. Thus, we create images to deny or distance ourselves from reality. In Koestler's study of creative insight, a *sine qua non* is the fusion of "matrices" into a single integrated art. Symington suggests that one reason Freud encouraged analysts to permit their thoughts to wander (evenly hovering attention) was to promote integration of matrices. In addition to flashes of insight, the creative moment involves displacing a previously held belief, which may have taken the affective form of true worship, for a belief which corresponds to a reality of the universe in an essential form. The great difficulty with which this dissolution of previously held beliefs occurs is demonstrated by three examples from Koestler: Copernicus was aware that the heavenly bodies actually move in an elliptical fashion, but he promptly dropped this notion and referred to the planetary motion as occurring in "perfect circles"; Kepler described universal gravity, but abandoned this idea; and Galileo provided us with the telescope but insisted that comets were "optical illusions." Freud underscored this phenomenon by describing people who could communicate knowledge which they themselves did not yet possess. The author emphasizes the profound influence of our attachment to inner objects (conscious and unconscious ideas). The ability to pursue bursts of insight is based partly upon self-belief. In terms of early development of this ability, Bion has stated that it is essential for the mother to contain the anxieties of the infant, to digest them, and to return them to their source. This enables the infant to possess the courage to bear his own thoughts.

Archaic Self and Object Imagery in Modern Figurative Sculpture. Emilie Kutash. Pp. 289-313.

Psychoanalytic theory of development, in the establishment of a sense of self, is used as a framework in examining particular aspects of modern figurative sculp-

ture. The sculpture provides access to preverbal images of self and object. Three qualities of modern figurative sculpture which enable it to be particularly accessible to psychoanalytic study include: the "dual or fused identity" of material and ideational images; "the constant play with the permutations of inside/outside"; and the use of "verticality as a dominant organizing principle of body image and self-object representation." Schilder's notion of an inner self which is perpetually engaged in both construction and destruction is viewed in juxtaposition with artistic efforts to create an image of man which transcends physical realities. Henry Moore's fascination with internal spaces is viewed in relation to notions of inside/outside, containment, boundaries, and object relations. Kestenberg's notion that "the beginning of a self-representation which is both spatial and ideational is the perception of the body-self as a one-piece unity, upright in space" is explored in relation to work of Gonzales, David Smith, and Brancusi. Verticality is an essential aspect of self-representation, growth, and ascendancy.

The War and Peace of the Vietnam Memorials. Adrienne Gans. Pp. 315-329.

The two Vietnam War memorials in Washington, D.C. are explored from both psychological and esthetic perspectives. Each memorial deals with a different way of facing grief. The Lin memorial addresses "those who attempt to process loss through active and interactive reflection" and the Hart memorial is thought to be more consonant with those in whom idealization is the chief way of dealing with loss.

Samson Agonistes: Love, Authority and Guilt. Judith A. Moses. Pp. 331-345.

Milton's *Samson Agonistes* can be viewed as a study of Samson's conflicts over both love and authority. These are examined in relation to his capacity for guilt and his establishment of a sense of self. Paternal authority occurs for Samson in three forms: the God of Abraham, Dagon, and Manoa. The author identifies Samson's conflict, in which at least *one* father must be displeased. If Samson "marries a Philistine woman [or] attends the feast honoring Dagon, he *has* to displease a father." This assertion of Samson's own authority is a displacement of the parental figure and may be linked unconsciously with parricide. Samson's courage to bear a sense of guilt and to establish autonomy promotes growth and strength, while leading inevitably to his tragic death.

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

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NOTES

The editors of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* wish to thank the colleagues who contributed to our Abstracts Section during the past year. Their work involves two functions: choosing which of a vast number of articles would be of interest to our readers, and then condensing what they have chosen into brief but comprehensive, clear abstracts. We know that our Abstracts Section is read and valued by many of our subscribers. That they are so valued is due to the efforts of the persons listed here. Again, we thank them for their excellent work.

LOUISE DIERKER
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG
SHEILA HAFTER GRAY
LEE GROSSMAN
JOHN J. HARTMAN
MARIANNE MAKMAN
FREDERICK MEISEL
ANITA G. SCHMUKLER
EMMETT WILSON, JR.

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

February 9, 1988. FREUD'S FASCINATION WITH ARCHAEOLOGY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE PHILIPPSON BIBLE. William G. Niederland, M.D.

Dr. Niederland noted that students of Freud's life, career, and scientific as well as personal pursuits are fully aware of his intense and lifelong interest in archaeology. Freud discussed this interest in his 1931 letter to Stefan Zweig (in which he said that he had "actually read more archaeology than psychology") and in other writings. It is evidenced also by his famous collection of antiquities: over two thousand items which he acquired over the years, some of them at considerable expense. Dr. Niederland's presentation sought to explore the psychogenesis of this marked interest and lifelong preoccupation of Freud's which Max Schur, in his book, *Freud: Living and Dying,* described as an "addiction second only in intensity to his nicotine addiction."

Dr. Niederland traced Freud's devotion to archaeology to a series of significant childhood experiences at the time when he had learned to read and had received the so-called Philippson Bible as an important birthday gift from his father. This Bible—then called *Die Israelitische Bibel*—was published in Leipzig in 1858. It was a weighty book (literally speaking), edited and translated by Dr. Ludwig Philippson, a distinguished German rabbi, author, and scholar. The original Hebrew and translated German texts appeared side by side on each page. The book contained more than five hundred impressive illustrations which depicted antiquities of prehistoric and early historic periods, in particular, Egyptian, Greek, and other deities of strange appearance, most of them birdlike. It also depicted ancient funerary barges, enigmatic figurines, both male and female, and birds and plants of uncertain na-

ture, etc. It is likely that such illustrations produced in the six- or seven-year-old reader, Freud, reactions and emotional responses far transcending any interest in the printed Hebrew-German text. Freud himself referred to this much later when, in his short autobiography, he spoke of "my deep engrossment in the Bible" and "its enduring effect upon the direction of my interest."

DISCUSSION: Dr. Mortimor Ostrow stated that Dr. Niederland had clearly established his thesis. The Philippson Bible, however, may have served an even more important function in Freud's life, according to Dr. Ostrow: it had mediated his relation with his father. Jacob Freud's inscription in the Bible, written on the occasion of his son's thirty-fifth birthday, indicates that Sigmund had actively abandoned the traditional Jewish concerns taught by his father. Jacob compared the rejected Bible to the tablets that Moses shattered. It can be argued that Sigmund Freud's subsequent concern with Moses and with Jewish history was motivated by a deferred obedience to his father's plea, expressed in that inscription, that he return to his childhood interest in the Bible.

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

January 9, 1989. SOME ASPECTS OF PSYCHIC CHANGE. Betty Joseph.

Psychic change is an ambiguous term sometimes used to mean "any kind of change in the mental state or functioning of our patients"; at other times it connotes a "more long-term durable and desirable kind of change." Both uses of the term and their relationship to each other were discussed by Miss Joseph. She began by asserting that psychic change is not just a long-term objective in analysis but also an ongoing process which takes place between, as well as within, individual sessions. She warned against viewing these "moment to moment" changes as evidence of progress or retreat, emphasizing instead that the analyst's task is to understand them as the patient's unique "method of dealing with anxieties and relationships." Being concerned with whether the shifts are positive or negative interferes with our ability to listen fully. It may bring unconscious pressure on our patients to comply with our felt wishes, or it may result in the patient's feeling misunderstood. At the same time, of course, every analyst has, at the back of her or his mind, ideas and theories about long-term treatment objectives—Miss Joseph's second meaning of the term, psychic change. Patients come to analysis with the conscious desire for change, without which analysis would certainly fail. Yet patients simultaneously and unconsciously "dread" changes in their "established mental and emotional equilibrium." This equilibrium, or balance, is maintained by tightly interlocking elements, and shifts in one area must cause disturbances in another. Patients do sense this, and so unconsciously feel the whole process of analysis as threatening. Moment to moment shifts in the psychic balance are the stuff of the analytic process, re-experienced and explored within the transference, and one hopes that they will lead to long-term positive psychic change.

Regarding long-term psychic change, Miss Joseph cited Freud's maxim, "Where id was, there ego shall be," with the implication that one of the goals of analysis was greater integration between ego and impulses, love and hate, superego and ego. She invoked Melanie Klein's concept of two positions or configurations of impulses, defenses, anxieties, and relationships to objects, namely, the paranoid/schizoid and the depressive positions. Miss Joseph outlined these positions in the schematic way as they relate to child development, and she described how, through analysis, the individual can progress from the paranoid/schizoid position to the depressive position. The shifts involved in moving from the former to the latter—shifts toward greater integration and taking more responsibility for one's impulses and their effects on objects—are, in fact, psychic changes. As this process proceeds, we can see changes in the patient's object relationships, with the analyst and with others. If not, then real changes in the ego are not occurring.

Miss Joseph went on to provide clinical examples to illustrate changes that took place during a single session, and changes that took place between two sessions. She concluded by suggesting that "long-term psychic change is based on, and is a continuation of, the constant minute shifts and movements that we see from moment to moment in the transference, and, like all manifestations of conflict, it can never be ended."

DISCUSSION: Dr. Stephen K. Firestein was struck by how Miss Joseph's discussion of psychic change, particularly its moment to moment features, captured the essence of the so-called "analytic process." He mentioned his participation in a study group working with tape-recorded analyses, in which one goal was to determine if criteria could be formulated for deciding on the presence or absence of an analytic process. The patient's communication, the analyst's response, and the patient's reaction to the analyst's response at times lead to the deepening of insight, but at other times the analyst and the analytic situation are used by the patient for the gratification of quite different impulses. According to Dr. Firestein, this perspective is in accord with Miss Joseph's emphasis on viewing the total situation. Dr. Firestein noted how Miss Joseph's paper on psychic change "draws us promptly into the core of the psychoanalytic process."

Dr. L. Noah Shaw stated that Miss Joseph's paper on psychic change evoked several questions. What is it that is changing? How does it change? And from a therapeutic perspective, how might that change be facilitated? After citing a brief vignette from a child analytic session in which a young boy recovered from a phobia of bees following one interpretation, Dr. Shaw proposed a number of ways to characterize what had happened. How one would settle this—to understand how the psychic change took place—depends in part on one's theoretical orientation. Miss Joseph's orientation, following Melanie Klein, utilized terminology that can be misleading. She had suggested that Klein's ideas, particularly the centrality of projective identification, are fundamental to our understanding of psychic change. Dr. Shaw commented that we must be both "accepting in order to be receptive to a new and helpful way of approaching a problem," and "cautious to make sure that what we hear is . . . supported by clinical data and not just an assertion of belief." Dr. Shaw then focused on several specific aspects of Miss Joseph's case material, including her lack of comment on countertransference feelings (despite this being a

hallmark in other of Miss Joseph's papers). He felt that the excellent analytic work she did was classic defense analysis, which was "not particularly indicative of work done by a Kleinian analyst." Dr. Shaw praised the vivid language used by Miss Joseph to bring her patients alive in the paper. He concluded on a somewhat lighter note by offering a version of "Casey at the Bat" as if it were written by Edgar Allen Poe, to convey an experiential example of projective identification.

KERRY J. SULKOWICZ

The Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held May 9-13, 1990 at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, N.Y.

The 67th Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION will be held April 25-29, 1990, at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, Fla.