

## 1932–2007: OUR 75<sup>TH</sup> ANNIVERSARY YEAR

BY HENRY F. SMITH, M.D.

This issue of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* marks the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the journal. Established in 1932 by Dorian Feigenbaum, Bertram Lewin, Frankwood Williams, and Gregory Zilboorg, its first editors, the *Quarterly* is the oldest independent psychoanalytic journal in continuous publication in the United States. Sigmund Freud contributed the lead article to the inaugural issue. Anna Freud was one of its contributing editors. A single copy cost 75¢, a subscription \$3.00. It was self-published then, as it is today.

### *Freud and the Quarterly*

As the editors note in their preface to the first issue—a copy of which appears on the opposite page, signed by Freud and others on the occasion of the *Quarterly*'s inaugural dinner—the journal was “established to fill the need for a strictly psychoanalytic organ in America.” Part of the mission was “a close collaboration with associates abroad.” In addition to Anna Freud, the cover, reproduced on the previous page, lists many other European contributing editors, including Max Eitingon, Otto Fenichel, Karen Horney, and Hanns Sachs of Berlin; Sándor Ferenczi and Géza Róheim of Budapest; Marie Bonaparte and René Laforgue of Paris; and Ruth Mack Brunswick, Helene Deutsch, Paul Federn, and Hermann Nunberg of Vienna. Notice that William Alanson White of Washington was also a contributing editor.

The spirit of ecumenism was not universally welcomed. Despite the fact that the “prime objective of the magazine” was “to stimulate American work and provide an outlet for it,” there were inevitable

tensions with the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* and its editor, Ernest Jones, who was alarmed both by the *Quarterly's* international aspirations and, paradoxically, by what he perceived as its American "separatist"—and uncooperative—tendencies (as indicated in his letter of July 30, 1937, to Bertram Lewin).

In fact both parties traded insults, for Jones's letter was a response to one from Lewin, written July 20, 1937, a draft of which reads:

The editors of this *Quarterly* will hardly be accused of American chauvinism; but it is a fact that the psychoanalysts of this country do not feel that the *International Journal* is anything but English, perhaps for no better reason than that it is published in London and edited actually by British subjects . . . . We know that Americans have preferred to have their papers appear in other journals, not through any animus to the [*International*] *Journal*, but because they really felt nearer to American psychiatric publications. All this may be deplorable, but it seems inevitable as long as there is an Atlantic Ocean, and as long as the *Journal* is English and the "hyphen American" after the "Anglo" impresses Americans as an afterthought. To summarize, there is a reason for an American psychoanalytic magazine, since Americans think that the [*International*] *Journal* is predominantly an organ of the British group, and is a journal manned by the British exclusively and in the publication of which Americans do not feel they have a hand.

More felicitously, the founding of the *Quarterly* had come about in part as the result of a misunderstanding on the part of Freud, who had learned several years earlier that a new journal might appear in America. As the editors explain in the first issue:

Two years ago, Professor Freud wrote a preface to a special psychoanalytic number of a medical monthly edited by one of us, under the impression that it was the inaugural issue of a new psychoanalytic publication. When he learned of the real situation, he was somewhat disappoint-

ed. This mistake, which we interpreted as the expression of a wish indicating the need for such an organ, activated latent thoughts in this direction and finally led to the organization of this periodical.

While surely not unique in its origins, it is noteworthy that something that began with such promise and has endured for so long was conceived on the basis of a misunderstanding and the fervent perception of a wish.

The first issue of the *Quarterly* was supposed to see the light of day in January 1932, but the editors, ever hopeful that Freud might contribute the lead article, delayed publication until April. No stranger himself to the self-doubts of ordinary authors, Freud had written to Dorian Feigenbaum on December 27, 1931, begging for time:

As far as I am concerned I have to confess that I have nothing at present. Should something occur to me in the near future, it belongs by contract to the *Int. Zeitschrift*, but could also simultaneously be printed in your new journal.<sup>1</sup>

By way of compensation, he noted regarding Anna Freud's agreement to be a contributing editor, "I would like to add that it was my influence which motivated my daughter to accept."

On February 17, 1932, Freud wrote again, "I beg you not to wait for me with the publication of the first issue, for at present I have nothing to offer you . . . . At the next occasion, if it is granted to me, I will not forget your new journal which is assured of my best wishes."

By April, Freud had sent the *Quarterly* "Libidinal Types," which then became the lead article of the inaugural issue and appeared that same year in an alternative translation in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*. The *Quarterly's* first issue, which, as Freud

<sup>1</sup> All quotations from the letters of Sigmund Freud are © 2007 The Estate of A. W. Freud et al., and appear here by special arrangement with Paterson Marsh Ltd., London.

wrote to Feigenbaum on May 31, 1932, “makes a very good (respectable) impression,” also included papers by Otto Fenichel, Bert Lewin, A. A. Brill, Géza Róheim, and Frankwood Williams. Freud became a frequent contributor during the first several years, supporting the journal despite his well-publicized misgivings about psychoanalysis in America.

### *Our 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Celebrations*

Now, seventy-five years later, we have begun our anniversary celebrations with the publication of a new book by another of the *Quarterly*'s most illustrious contributors, Charles Brenner, whose *Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning* has been sent without charge to all subscribers for 2007. This continues the *Quarterly*'s tradition of publishing important books and monographs, including Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, retitled *The Problem of Anxiety* (1936), Otto Fenichel's *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique* (1941), and *Selected Writings of Bertram D. Lewin* (1973), edited by Jacob Arlow.

Throughout the anniversary year, we will be marking each issue with a special section in which we republish key articles from the *Quarterly*'s first four decades. Each article will be accompanied by commentaries from leading contemporary analysts. It is, of course, an impossible task to select from seventy-five years of articles the few that best represent a journal's history. One reader's classic is another's forgotten afterthought. Nonetheless, the papers we have chosen are ones that we feel have played important roles in the development of psychoanalysis, either by the significance of the ideas proposed or by the controversies stirred. I am especially grateful to Lawrence Friedman for his help on this project.

For this issue, we have selected two articles from the January 1936 issue. To give a sense of the difficulty of our choices, the lead article in that same issue was a portion of Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, which was published serially in the *Quarterly* in the 1935-1936 volumes before being reassembled as the monograph mentioned above. With some temerity we chose not to re-

publish it again as one of our classic papers, though it surely is that. Instead, we selected two other articles that coincidentally appeared in the same issue.

The second article in the January 1936 issue—the one immediately following Freud’s—is Karen Horney’s “The Problem of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction,” discussed here by Shelley Orgel and Elizabeth Spillius. It warrants a bit of explanation. This was the first paper Horney gave to the New York Society, of which she was then a member, and it was highly controversial. While apparently not meant as a challenge to Freud’s view of the negative therapeutic reaction, but rather as complementary to it, Horney’s emphasis on the immediacy of the transference and on the importance of cultural factors—along with her apparent slighting of genetic, especially oedipal, ones—was viewed as heretical. Five years later, she was stripped of her training analyst status and shortly afterward resigned, soon to found her own institute with Clara Thompson and several others who had resigned with her in protest. They were joined in this new endeavor by Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan. Ironically, only two years later, the new institute would itself split when Horney argued that Fromm, as a nonmedical analyst, should not be allowed to teach clinical courses. This time it was Fromm’s turn to resign, and he, Thompson, and Sullivan left to form the William Alanson White Institute.

Horney’s paper would have remained a mere footnote in the history of psychoanalysis in this country were it not for the fact that in England her ideas, while not wholly credited to her, gained considerable influence. As we return to the paper now, it is impossible to ignore how prescient Horney was, forecasting contemporary approaches to: (1) the analysis of the transference in the here and now, (2) the defensive layering of the material and the importance of taking up the immediate surface, (3) the understanding of countertransference as created by the patient, and (4) the role of envy and aggression. Eight years after the New York presentation of her paper, David Rapaport wrote that her discussion of the defenses had anticipated Anna Freud’s *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, also published in 1936 (Quinn 1987, p. 293). As will be

evident to the reader, Horney's views also anticipated Melanie Klein's work on envy and aggression. Not only does the paper prove to be one that originated and integrated many ideas before they were split apart into separate fiefdoms, but in its contemporary feel, it anticipates a kind of synthesis that some of us are seeking today.

We are fortunate to have two such carefully observed discussions, one from each side of the Atlantic. Orgel and Spillius illustrate in their separate approaches to Horney's paper how her ideas were received and how they evolved over time in two different psychoanalytic contexts. Despite overlap in their views of her work, there are subtle differences in their perception of her paper even now. That difference is a concrete reminder of the power of psychoanalytic cultures to influence not only the dissemination of psychoanalytic ideas, but also their very meaning.

The third article in the January 1936 issue is Robert Waelder's well-known "The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-Determination," which is discussed here by Dale Boesky and Lawrence Friedman. Both commentators have a special interest in the history of the ideas Waelder formulated, and both bring fresh eyes to Waelder's classic paper, situating his work in the context of his own era, as well as subsequent ones, including its contemporary relevance. They point out in different ways how Waelder's views have frequently been misunderstood, and how important his role was both in the development of the structural model and in shaping a holistic view of the mind that continues to underlie many contemporary approaches.

Our anniversary year will conclude with the publication of a supplement to the 2007 volume, "Comparing Theories of Therapeutic Action," edited by Sander Abend, with contributions and commentaries by sixteen authors. This, too, will be sent without charge to all active subscribers.

There remains only to add that we are extremely fortunate to have five original papers for this issue that were submitted independently to the *Quarterly* and that complement the historical theme of the issue. Charles Brenner takes us on a masterful walk-

ing tour of Freud's early discoveries and their aftermath. Michael Schröter and Christfried Tögel, in their article on the early history of Freud's family, and Jerome Wakefield in his on Little Hans, analyze newly released historical data. Herman Westerink studies Freud's curious fascination with the Apostle Paul. And Eugene Mahon, in the true spirit of Freudian discovery, explores and compares the creation of a dream and that of a poem, using the analysis of a patient who is both a dreamer and a poet.

We hope you will enjoy this first issue of the *Quarterly's* 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of publication and all that follow.

*Acknowledgment:* I am grateful to Nellie L. Thompson for providing archival material on the early history of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* from the Abraham A. Brill Library of the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute.

#### REFERENCE

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## FREUD'S GREAT VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY

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*The author discusses some of Freud's most significant contributions: the psychoanalytic method, called free association by Freud; the discovery that symptoms have a meaning and that every symptom is a compromise formation; the interpretation of dreams; psychic determinism; the central role of infantile sexuality; and sublimation. Included is a brief review of the views of some noteworthy analysts, all of whom agree in ignoring the importance of infantile sexuality and/or in minimizing its importance.*

Anniversaries are times for looking back as well as forward. What better tribute could there be to Sigmund Freud, the great man whom we honor on this occasion, than to review the greatest of the great discoveries that he made during his professional career?

I shall begin by trying to imagine what it must have been like more than a hundred years ago for the man we honor this evening. There he is sitting in his office, thinking. He's a young neurologist who has just started his practice. Still, he is not without distinction in his field. It was at about this time that he published two monographs, one on cerebral diplegia and the other on aphasia, both well received. Here is what I imagine he must have been thinking.

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"I can't make a living on patients with cerebral diplegia or with aphasia. There aren't enough of them who are treatable. And there's nothing anyone can do for the ones with general paresis. They all die in a couple of years. No, the patients I get to treat are the hysterics and the neurasthenics. No one knows what causes it and everyone has a different way of treating it. Cold baths, hot baths, spas, high-fat diet, low-fat diet, electric stimulation. I've tried them all. The best is hypnosis, but even that's not really good. And it's all so unscientific. Is this what I'm going to be doing for the rest of my life? I wish I could have stayed in Brucke's lab. No use crying over that. What to do?"

We all know what he did. He heard from his friend and older colleague, Josef Breuer, about a patient whom Breuer had treated successfully some years before by hypnotizing her repeatedly and getting her to remember what was happening when her symptoms began. She had plenty of symptoms, but Breuer's experience in treating her convinced him that each was caused by an emotionally disturbing event and that each disappeared if he could get her to remember and to express the accompanying emotions that she had suppressed at the time.

Now Breuer was not just a run-of-the-mill doctor. He was a very superior one and one whose approach to medicine was thoroughly scientific. His name was attached to a particular pulmonic reflex that he had studied, the Hering-Breuer reflex, and he introduced the treatment of acute pulmonary edema by morphine, a mode of treatment that was still accepted as the best available when I was an intern. What Breuer said was bound to have weight with Freud. So he tried it on a series of patients, and the result was *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud 1895).

Freud was convinced by his own experience that getting a patient to remember and to express previously suppressed emotions was a valuable method of treating the patients who made up the majority of his practice. He was not satisfied to be dependent on hypnosis for overcoming his patients' amnesia, however. For one thing, a sizable percentage of patients were not hypnotizable. For another, he was unpleasantly surprised when one of his patients

threw her arms about his neck at the end of a session. To his credit, he attributed his patient's passionate declaration of love to the fact that he was her hypnotist and not to his irresistible charm, but he was confronted by a real problem. How could he overcome his patients' amnesia without hypnotizing them?

At this point, he remembered something. A few years before, when he was visiting France, he had witnessed an impressive demonstration designed to corroborate the thesis that suggestion is the basis of hypnosis. A subject had been hypnotized and wakened with the command that he remembered nothing of what had happened during the hypnotic session. Obediently, the subject had demonstrated the familiar syndrome of hypnotically induced amnesia. He awoke with no memory of what had happened during the hypnotic session. There was nothing new in that. It was a familiar experiment. But what followed was something both new and unexpected. What had happened then was that the hypnotist had insisted that the subject must remember what had happened during his trance, and, lo and behold, by a combination of persuasion, encouragement, and verbal bullying, the subject gradually remembered everything he had been told to forget.

"Well," thought Freud, "if a hypnotically induced amnesia can be overcome by forceful suggestion, maybe the spontaneous amnesia my patients have can be overcome in the same way." So he tried it, with enough success to encourage him to persist. At first, as he later wrote, he kept some of the features of hypnosis. He had his patients lie on his couch, had them shut their eyes, put his hand on their foreheads, and told them that when he removed his hand a thought would occur to them that would lead to the required memory. He would repeat the maneuver over and over until he got the desired result, all the time insisting that the patient could and must remember.

As you can see, this method of treatment is far from psychoanalysis. It was only its predecessor. How Freud got the brilliant idea of instructing his patients to say *whatever* came to mind, with no conscious effort to direct their thoughts, we do not know and

I do not think we ever shall. Here is how he described it in “An Autobiographical Study” (Freud 1925):

The means which I first adopted (after giving up hypnosis) for overcoming the patient's resistance, by insistence and encouragement, had been indispensable for the purpose of giving me a first general survey of what was to be expected. But in the long run it proved to be too much of a strain on both sides and, further, it seemed open to certain obvious criticisms. It therefore gave place to another method, *which was in one sense its opposite*. Instead of urging the patient to say something upon some particular subject (like what can they remember about what was happening when their symptom first appeared), I now asked them to abandon themselves to a process of *free association*—that is, to say whatever came into their head, while ceasing to give any conscious direction to their thoughts. [p. 40, italics in original]

And that's all he wrote about his discovery of the new method. In what follows the few sentences I have just quoted, he went on to describe the new method and to explain that no associations are ever really *free* in the literal sense of the word. They are always determined by a patient's underlying conflicts, so that by listening to a patient's “free” associations, an analyst can infer the conflicts themselves.

So I think one cannot answer the question, “How *did* Freud think of what he called free association?” As far as I know, it is a question that has never been raised. Every historical account with which I am familiar, including those I wrote myself, takes it for granted that the technique of free association just naturally developed when hypnosis was abandoned. But it was not just a “natural” development. It was a stroke of genius. Somehow or other, Freud had the brilliant idea of abandoning suggestion altogether and substituting for it the method of free association. Without that idea, psychoanalysis as we know it would never have existed.

Whatever the way was in which it came about, that is what happened, and with it psychoanalysis began. Freud had embarked on

his great voyage of discovery. As Joaquin Miller wrote of Columbus: "Behind him lay the gray Azores/Behind the Gates of Hercules;/Before him not the ghost of shores,/Before him only shoreless seas" (Gioia, Yost, and Hicks 2004, p. 16).

But the seas were not shoreless for very long. Great discoveries followed thick and fast. As it turned out, the greatest ones were all psychological. Freud's training had been in neurology, neuroanatomy, and neuropsychology, but he became a psychologist willy-nilly. It is hard to say which ones came first, but the one I will start with was the discovery that psychogenic symptoms have a meaning. They are not just meaningless mental phenomena that result from some hereditary or congenital defect or weakness. They make sense. Freud (1894) discovered very early in the course of developing and using the method of free association that every psychogenic symptom expresses a wish to do something and at the same time a defense against that very same wish. Every symptom is what he later called a compromise formation.

The knowledge that symptoms have meaning is so widely accepted and generally understood today that it is hard to realize what an enormous discovery it was. It really transformed the whole field of psychopathology. Instead of a patient's symptoms being bizarre and incomprehensible, as they had seemed to be, Freud discovered that they are not only comprehensible, but actually informative. What a difference that has made in the treatment of patients with psychogenic symptoms!

Another discovery at about the same time concerned dreams. Freud (1900) discovered that dreams, like symptoms, have a meaning—a meaning that can be discovered in the same way, that is, by the technique of association. And dreams, he discovered, have to do with wishes, just as symptoms do. Every dream, as everyone knows today, is a fantasy in which one or more of the dreamer's childhood wishes are fulfilled. How breathtaking! Freud discovered what dreams are really all about, after millennia in which, with rare exceptions, dreams were either supposed to have magic powers or were demeaned as mere froth. As we all know, it was this discovery that Freud himself deemed most precious. It was the

one that most appealed to his sense of pride. To have discovered the meaning of dreams quite rightly made him feel like the legendary Oedipus who had solved the riddle of the Sphinx.

The fact that Freud by his own account identified with Oedipus tells us something important about what making his great discoveries meant to Freud. According to the myth that is the basis of Sophocles' drama, Oedipus was a man who grew up to murder his father, marry his mother, and have children by her. For these terrible crimes, he incurred the displeasure of the gods and was brutally punished by being reduced in rank, exiled, and, symbolically, castrated. It would seem, if we can trust this evidence, that Freud unconsciously (perhaps consciously as well) equated having made such dazzling discoveries as he did with having triumphed over his father and won his mother. Did this have something to do with his fear of death in his late forties and with his inability to stop smoking, even when he was told that to continue would almost certainly lead to the development of cancer of the jaw?

Obviously, these are unanswerable questions, but one thing is clear. His voyage of discovery was one that required great courage. It is not only literal voyages into the unknown that involve dangers that strike terror into the heart of the voyager. Figurative voyages can try a man's soul as well. The Latin poet Horace wrote of sea voyagers that whoever first sailed the seas must have had a heart of oak. To embark on a voyage of scientific discovery like Freud's required no less daring, no less mastery of the fear of a fate like the one that befell Oedipus himself.

At the same time that he was making his discoveries about the meanings of neurotic symptoms and of dreams, Freud also made a startling discovery about a commonplace phenomenon, namely, the slips and errors of daily life. By using the technique of free association, he was able to demonstrate to his satisfaction that these phenomena of mental life are like psychoneurotic symptoms in that both symptoms and slips are, as he put it, the result of partly suppressed thoughts and feelings that interfere with mental functioning. Like symptoms and dreams, slips and errors have a hidden meaning.

Now slips and errors are everyday happenings, and usually they are trivial ones. Certainly, no one before Freud had ever paid very much attention to them. But Freud did. He wrote a whole book about them, which he called *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901). It appeared only a year after *The Interpretation of Dreams*, but it has had a much less dramatic history. In fact, while not wholly forgotten, its existence has been largely ignored. Everyone who studies to become an analyst reads *The Interpretation of Dreams*. I venture to say that many do not read *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, even though every analyst is, of course, familiar with the fact that slips and errors have a hidden meaning. But *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* deserves more attention than it usually gets, because in the last chapter of the book Freud put forward the idea of psychic determinism. "Nothing in the mind," he wrote, "is arbitrary or undetermined" (1901, p. 242). Everything mental or psychological is causally determined just as much as anything physical is. However one defines *causality*—and philosophers have struggled to define it for many centuries—it is as much a feature of the psychological world as it is of the physical one.

I think that last chapter was the reason he wrote the book. Slips and errors are not really important enough in themselves to have warranted a whole book. Freud had much more important things on his mind at the time. In fact, the examples he gave in the last chapter of the book to illustrate psychic determinism were not slips or errors at all. They were illustrations of the fact that if one thinks of a number—any number—one will discover, by the method of free association, that thoughts and feelings, not conscious at the moment, or perhaps ever, were responsible for one's choice of that number. Slips and errors may not be all that important, but psychic determinism is. It is, as Freud wrote (1901, p. 251), the justification of the psychoanalytic technique. Every one of a patient's associations is determined by that patient's pathogenic conflicts. Often enough, the conflicts are unconscious, but even though unknown to the patient, they point the way to an understanding of the patient's problems and symptoms. "Nothing in the mind is arbitrary or undetermined." Free associations are never free. They are

determined by what is going on in a patient's mind, even though the patient may have no awareness of what those determinants or causes are.

If you think back a minute, you will see how closely related the idea of psychic determinism is to the development of psychoanalytic technique. What Freud had witnessed during his stay in France at Bernheim's clinic in Nancy was a demonstration of the well-known phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion, which is an example of the principle of psychic determinism. A hypnotized subject, instructed to remember nothing of what went on during the hypnotic session after he wakes, follows that order without knowing it; when wakened, the subject indeed remembers nothing of the events of the session. The hypnotist's instruction, though unconscious, determines the result, an amnesia for the session. As I have already said, it was the fact that this artificially induced amnesia could be overcome by strong and persistent suggestion that started Freud on the road to the development of his method. But basic to it, as you can see, is the idea that conscious thinking—in this case, an amnesia—can be determined by what is unconscious—in this case, the hypnotist's instruction to forget.

As he acquired and developed skill and experience as an analyst, Freud made another remarkable discovery, one that, as he himself wrote, he had never anticipated. His patients' symptoms and the conflicts that gave rise to them had regularly to do with sexual wishes and fantasies. This was startling enough, but even more startling was the discovery that the sexual wishes in question and the conflicts to which they gave rise had their origins in early childhood (Freud 1905).

Despite occasional speculations to the contrary, every educated, decent European in Freud's day believed that sexuality begins at puberty. Freud was no exception. Like all the rest, he believed that before puberty, children are innocent of sexual desire and do not engage in sexual activity unless, of course, they are seduced by an adolescent or older person. So, when his patients told him of memories of sexual desire and activity in their childhoods, or when they dreamed dreams that indicated they had had such ex-

periences, he assumed that they had been quite innocent until they had been seduced by someone older. That is the traumatic theory of neurosogenesis, which has recently come under discussion again, as you all know. The child is the innocent victim, and the guilty one is an older seducer.

Well, it was not long before Freud became persuaded that this could not be the whole story. Certainly, some of his patients had been seduced and sexually abused in childhood, but equally certainly, that had not been true of all of them. What *was* true of all, he concluded, was that they had had sexual desires in early childhood, desires that they had to repress in the course of growing up. Infantile sexuality was one of Freud's great discoveries.

As we all know, it is a discovery that has been amply confirmed in the years since he made it—confirmed by child analysts and by observers of children in simple, everyday situations, observers whose eyes were opened by Freud to the facts that are so obvious. So obvious that one is tempted to say, "What's so great about that discovery? Everyone knew it already, if they'd only admit it."

But that is just what makes the discovery so great. No one wants to admit it, or, if they do admit it, no one wants to give it the importance that it actually has in mental development and mental life. I remember talking years ago, when I was young myself, with an intellectually curious young man who was the father of a four-year-old daughter and an infant son. He was very interested in what I told him Freud had discovered about sexual curiosity in young children, but he objected in that, as far as he could tell, his daughter had no interest in the fact that her baby brother had a penis. She expressed curiosity about lots of other things about the baby—what it ate, why it could not talk, when it would grow up—but not about the fact that it had a penis. When I questioned him further, he said that his daughter was often present when the baby was diapered and was clearly interested by the whole procedure, even though she expressed no interest in the baby's sexual anatomy. As he told me this, he realized that his wife always covered the baby's penis to hide it from his sister's gaze when he was being changed. His daughter, a bright little girl, had gotten the message



that the one thing about the baby that she should not be curious about was his penis. To exhibit an interest in the baby's sexual organs was clearly something that would displease her mother.

That is precisely why Freud's discovery was so great. It is not that the fact that children have a sexual life long before puberty requires for its detection some special, ingenious, or novel method of observation. It is not something you have to be a psychoanalyst using the method of free association to discern, even though that was the way that Freud himself got to it. The facts are there, plain as the nose on your face. What makes it so great is that Freud was able to see what was right in front of his nose. He did not have to ignore it or deny it, as so many others did and do. He was able, by whatever happy configuration of his own psychological makeup we will never know, to give childhood sexuality its place of proper importance in mental development and functioning.

The same has often not been true of those who followed him. It is interesting to see how many who came later could not and cannot face the facts that are so evident. A review of the history of psychoanalysis will, I hope, convince you as it does me of the correctness of this statement. What I propose is to go over the major schisms and revisions of theory of the past hundred years.

The first was Alfred Adler's, in 1910 (see Adler 1929). Adler broke with Freud, whose colleague and pupil he had been for several years, and founded a new movement that he called *individual psychology*. Chief among its tenets were the assertions that the inferiority complex and what Adler called the *masculine protest* were the reasons for psychogenic illness. Adler asserted that Freud's idea that what make for psychogenic illness are childhood sexual wishes and the conflicts associated with them is wrong. Instead, what is important are masculine protest and an inferiority complex, said Adler.

It may be of interest to note that one of the group surrounding Freud who left him and followed Adler was the man who was the father of Little Hans (see Freud 1909), Max Graf. Remember, this man had been Freud's assistant, so to speak, in the treatment of Little Hans. You may well ask how someone who had firsthand knowl-

edge of the importance of incestuous and parricidal wishes and of fears of castration could possibly have denied the importance of childhood sexuality a few years later. But, of course, the fact that he could and did is very much to the point of what I am trying to show.

Incidentally, Little Hans did very well in life. He had a successful professional career, one that was considerably more eminent than that of his father. The sister, little Hannerl in Freud's (1909) case report, did less well. Like the rest of her family, she fled Vienna to escape the Nazis, but she never really adjusted to exile and suicided in her late thirties.

Carl Jung defected a few years after Adler did. He, too, abandoned Freud's discovery of the importance of infantile sexuality (Jung 1915). What makes neurotic patients sick, according to Jung, is libidinal inertia. They do not sublimate enough. Also, said Jung, what seem like incestuous and parricidal wishes and conflicts are not really so. They are just metaphorical and not to be taken literally, as Freud had done. They are manifestations of a collective unconscious.

The next important defector was Otto Rank, who had been Freud's closest associate for some years. According to Rank (1924), it is the trauma of birth that is important, not childhood incestuous and murderous wishes. Rank settled in Philadelphia, where he was quite influential for a time. Among other things, he recommended that patients be kept in treatment for only a short time—several weeks or a month or two. *Rankian analysis*, it used to be called.

Wilhelm Reich is next on the list. Unlike those before him, he far from ignored or underestimated the importance of sexuality in mental life. He recommended lots of strong orgasms as a preventive of mental illness, in fact (Reich 1942). Where he turned away from Freud, as far as infantile sexuality was concerned, was in his belief that it was not worthwhile to *talk* with patients about their sexual wishes and conflicts. When it came to incestuous and parricidal wishes and the conflicts they give rise to, he simply paid no attention to them.

Now we come to Melanie Klein (1948). Conflicts over incestuous and parricidal wishes, guilt, and castration anxiety are as prominent in her theories of neurogenesis as they are in Freud's original discovery. What she did was to derogate the importance of such wishes and conflicts in the fourth to the sixth years of life. According to her and her associates, that is the second oedipal period and not nearly as important as the first one, which occupies the fourth to the sixth *month* of life. What is *really* important are not the wishes and fears of ages three to six years. What is *really* important are the phantasies (spelled with *ph* instead of *f* to distinguish them from the fantasies of later life) that are inborn and that flower during the first year of life. That is what one should pay attention to in analysis, not the ones that Freud discovered.

It has always amused me to wonder whether Gulliver's travels had had any influence in shaping Klein's theories. You remember that the Lilliputians were smaller than Gulliver by a factor of twelve: instead of being five or six feet tall, they were five or six *inches* tall. Similarly, Klein's theory of sexual conflict is expressed in months instead of years—again, a factor of twelve. Be that as it may, like the others whom I have listed, Klein and her associates recommended that analysts pay little attention to what Freud had discovered, namely, the sexual wishes characteristic of the fourth to sixth years of life.

Karen Horney, who left the New York Psychoanalytic Institute to establish an institute of her own, in a sense went in a direction opposite to that of Klein in her theory of neurogenesis. Instead of placing the crucial conflicts in the first year of life, she asserted that the critical time is in adolescence (Horney 1937). Again, no need to pay much attention to Freud's great discovery.

The self psychologists, following Heinz Kohut, place their emphasis with respect to pathogenesis on the psychologically significant events of the first two years of life, downgrading the importance of the sexual conflicts of childhood. Indeed, Kohut himself, in his last, posthumous paper, asserted that if a child has a cohesive self at the age of three or four years, it will have no conflict whatsoever about its sexual wishes at that time. As an example of

how self psychologists tend to ignore the importance of sexuality, I paraphrase a clinical interaction described in a recent article (Ornstein and Ornstein 2003). The analyst was a man, the patient, a woman.

The analyst wrote as follows: "So yesterday you were hungry for my approval," I observed, "but I turned away from you" (as her mother had done in an episode the patient recollected from her childhood).

"I was hungry for *contact* and approval," the patient replied, "and you turned away. It made me feel shut out."

Despite the fact that the patient had emphasized the word *contact*, as indicated by the fact that her analyst italicized the word in his report, the discussion that follows says nothing about sex, nor does it indicate that the analyst suggested that the patient say more about *contact*, an ambiguous word that might very well have alluded to a wish for physical contact, for all the analyst knew. This is a good example of what I mean.

Some colleagues, mostly in Latin America, go Klein one better and focus on presumed psychologically traumatic events in utero rather than in the first months of postpartum existence. Relationalists and others, whose ideas are plentifully expressed in current psychoanalytic literature, have similarly ignored Freud's great discovery or minimized its importance. Their attitude is what Abend has called the "yes, but" form of denial. They say, in effect, "Yes, the conflicts over sexual and aggressive wishes beginning in early childhood are important, but let's talk about other aspects of each patient's difficulties in life."

Betty Joseph, a highly regarded analytic practitioner and teacher, gave an example of the point I am trying to make at a recent seminar at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. She presented a vignette from a patient's analysis in order to illustrate her way of analyzing—her analytic technique. The vignette included a dream about which she remarked that it was almost too oedipal. It was indeed very suggestive on the face of it that the latent content of the dream contained sexual thoughts that the patient had about Joseph. But her passing remark about its "oedipal" nature was the

last we heard in her presentation and discussion about the patient's sexual thoughts, and her very way of mentioning it in the first place was clearly dismissive: "almost too oedipal"—a classic "yes, but" statement.

This last example seems to me particularly impressive, both because Joseph was there in the flesh to engage in discussion and because she is a master teacher. No one could have been more impressive in this regard. She knew exactly what she wanted to illustrate about her technique, and she was patient and clear in explaining how she works as an analyst. There was nothing fuzzy or defensive about what she had to say, and although I disagree with much of the content of what she teaches, I respect and admire her ability to present and explain it.

Still another group of colleagues downgrade the importance of Freud's discovery of infantile sexuality by laying principal emphasis on psychologically significant influences of various sorts that occurred before the age of three. Only preoedipal conflicts are of interest to them. Clearly, their approach overlaps with that of Klein and of the self psychologists, as does that of our colleagues whom I call neonatologists, even though their interesting and ingenious studies of children's behavior often have as their subjects children well beyond the neonatal period.

I believe that the lesson to be drawn from the history of psychoanalytic theories that I have tried to present is this. Adler, Jung, Rank, Klein, and all the rest each had a different theory of psychodynamics and pathogenesis. None agreed with any of the others. But their theories have one thing in common. They all ignore or minimize the importance of Freud's great discovery about infantile sexuality, namely, that children have sexual wishes that arise and are apparent long before puberty—roughly speaking, at ages three to six years; that those wishes give rise to intense mental conflicts; and that the wishes and conflicts connected with them are of central importance in the genesis of neurotic symptoms and in psychodynamics in general.

When one thinks about it, it should have been possible to predict that this would be so. If the incestuous and parricidal wishes

of childhood are as disturbing to everyone as Freud discovered they are, one can anticipate that some colleagues would create theories that ignore or minimize their importance, and one would expect such theories to have an appeal to many. Psychoanalysis, after all, is different from every other branch of science with respect to its content. Its content is psychological dynamite. This is particularly true of infantile sexuality. And that is why I think this discovery of Freud's deserves a very special place. Obvious though it is that children have a sexual life long before puberty, not many could have recognized the importance and extent of it as Freud did, as witnessed by the fact that there are many who still do not.

*The Interpretation of Dreams* went through eight editions between 1900 and 1929. There were copious additions to each of them, but in the very first edition, in a footnote, Freud expressed his opinion that Shakespeare's *Hamlet* sprang from the poet's incestuous and parricidal wishes and conflicts, wishes that had been repressed and that appeared in the play in a disguised and covert form. This, I think, is the first expression of another great discovery of Freud's, one that marked the beginning of applied psychoanalysis in general and of sublimation in particular. This line of thought was much expanded a few years later in *Grädiva* (Freud 1907), the first full-length work in the field of applied psychoanalysis. This discovery of Freud's was not directly dependent on the psychoanalytic method. Obviously, Shakespeare could not be analyzed. It was an argument by analogy. What Freud said, in effect, was that if a patient had a dream or a fantasy with a plot like Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, he would expect to find in the latent content, through the use of his free-associative method, wishes and conflicts having to do with incest and parricide.

The idea that the instinctual interests of childhood can change in the course of time to artistic and other socially desirable ones forms another link between the pathological and the normal, a link to be added to those furnished by the study of dreams and of slips and errors. As Fenichel (1945) expressed it many years later, sublimation can be thought of as a normal defense, one that gives rise to

one or another aspect of normal mental functioning, rather than to a symptom or a neurotic character trait.

So these are Freud's great discoveries. The psychoanalytic method, which he called the method of free association; the discovery that symptoms have a meaning and that every symptom is in fact a compromise formation; the interpretation of dreams; psychic determinism; infantile sexuality; and sublimation. A very impressive list, isn't it?

It's not often that one man, working in the field of science, has such a profound influence on his chosen branch of that field as Freud did on psychology. It is not too much to say that the introduction of the psychoanalytic method has contributed more to the field of psychology than all other methods of investigation put together. It is equally true to say that one man, Sigmund Freud, not only developed the method, but also, by using it, made most of the important discoveries its use made possible. He is the man whom we honor tonight, a man whose life was truly an extraordinary voyage of discovery.

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## THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION

BY KAREN HORNEY

There are many reasons for an impairment of a patient's condition during analysis; their common denominator is the arousal of anxiety, with which either the patient or the analyst is unable to deal adequately.

What Freud<sup>1</sup> has called the "negative therapeutic reaction" is not, indiscriminately, every deterioration of the patient's condition; but the fact that the patient may show an increase in symptoms, become discouraged, or wish to break off treatment immediately following an encouragement or a real elucidation of some problem, at a time, that is to say, when one might reasonably expect him to feel relief. In fact, the patient very often actually feels this relief distinctly, and then after a short while reacts as described. Freud considers this reaction indicative of a bad prognosis in the particular case, and, as it is a frequent occurrence, a serious barrier to therapeutic endeavors in general.

When Freud first published these observations many questions arose concerning the specific nature of such an impairment, among them, Are we so sure in our expectation of what should bring relief to the patient? I remember my own scepticism on the

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<sup>1</sup> Freud: *The Ego and the Id*; *The Economic Principle in Masochism*; *New Introductory Lectures*, 1932.

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subject. But the more experience I gained, the more I came to admire the keenness and the importance of Freud's observation.

Since there is nothing to add to Freud's description of the phenomenon, let me cite an example. A lawyer with widespread, subtle inhibitions in almost every life situation had not got on in life in proportion to his abilities. During the analysis the possibility arose of his getting a much better position. It took him quite a time even to perceive his opportunity. On this occasion for the first time we discussed his ambition, which he had repressed to an unusual degree. He could not even dream of ambitious aims, nor see possibilities in reality, nor take any step towards attaining such goals. However, when we indicated the possibility that he really was intensely ambitious, he recalled flashes of fantasy in which he was reforming the system of justice in the whole world. He came to see the discrepancy between his actual dull resignation and his hidden ambitions.

He must have felt relief for a brief time, but immediately he went into reverse gear, saying to himself, "You don't think you feel better after this!" Then he showed an increase in symptoms along the whole line. At the same time the disparaging attitude towards the analyst of which Freud speaks as belonging to the picture was manifest in his scarcely being able to listen to me and in his telling me: "You think you are smart. Any dummy could have told me that. These are all very trivial results."

In principle, this sequence of reactions is invariably present: first, a definite relief, then a shrinking back from the prospect of improvement, discouragement, doubts, hopelessness, wishes to break off, utterances like: "I had rather stay as I am—I am too old to change" (this from a twenty-four-year-old man). "If I should be cured of my neurosis I could break a leg and still have something to worry about." At the same time a definite disparaging, with intense hostility. One patient of mine had to think and express one thought throughout the hour—"you are no good." The patient whom Feigenbaum<sup>2</sup> describes thought of gangsters and charla-

<sup>2</sup> Feigenbaum, Dorian: *Clinical Fragments. (Laughter Betraying a Negative Therapeutic Reaction.)* This QUARTERLY III, 1934.

tans in transparent reference to the analyst. The impulse to berate the analyst more often comes out indirectly: doubts of the analyst; increasing complaints with a tendency to show the analyst that he is of no help—all indicating a hostility which may be so strong that if repressed it may show itself in suicidal ideas.

The only point one might add to Freud's description is that anxiety may arise during the phases of the negative reaction either openly or in disguised form. In the latter event the increase of anxiety may reveal itself in an increase of those symptoms which are the characteristic expression of anxiety in the particular person, such as the feeling of being rushed or having diarrhoea. The more hostility reactions are repressed, the more likely is anxiety to appear.

You will recall how Freud accounts for the phenomenon of the negative therapeutic reaction—in his opinion the attitude of spite and the impulse to show superiority towards the analyst represent only a surface reaction, or, as Feigenbaum calls it, a “by-product.” The real dynamics, he believes, lie in the particularly great tension of these patients, between the superego and the ego, resulting in a sense of guilt and need for punishment in order to avoid anxieties concerning the superego. The suffering in the neuroses, therefore, has too valuable a function to be given up.

The negative reaction, implying as it does essential frustration of therapeutic efforts, presents a sharp challenge. It is an intricate problem, of which we must learn much before it is solved. Its interesting theoretical implications, however, I shall not touch, but merely suggest a way in which the whole problem may eventually be solved—that is, steps from the technical side which will lead to this goal. To illustrate these technical suggestions I present the description and interpretation of the phenomena in cases of a certain character structure which, tentatively, I am inclined to call the masochistic. I wish to show how the negative therapeutic reaction follows out of this structure with such necessity that it can be predicted; and finally, how by understanding its underlying trends one can overcome it.

A description of this intricate structure would far surpass the frame of a paper. I shall, for the sake of presentation, take up only

those points which bear directly on the reaction, omitting many ramifications and interrelations, intricate and difficult to follow, and trace the main line only.

In the first place, we see these reactions stimulated by a good interpretation—by which, to repeat, I mean an interpretation that either states clearly a problem of the patient's current difficulties or offers a partial solution of it, or throws light on hitherto incomprehensible peculiarities of the patient. We see, moreover, that the negative reaction follows regardless of the special content of the problem or solution offered. That is, the reaction does not primarily express a resistance against some particular insight.

The question then is: What effect has such a good interpretation on the deeper emotional layers? In persons with the character structure in question, the effects of a good interpretation are of five kinds. They are not always all present, nor are they all always equally strong, but they may exist in combinations of varying intensity.

*The first reaction* is that these patients receive a good interpretation as a stimulus to compete, as if the analyst, by seeing something they had not seen, is proved more intelligent, clearer-sighted, or more articulate than the patient—as if the analyst had asserted his superiority over the patient. The patient is resentful and expresses his resentment in different ways. Very rarely he expresses it directly. For instance, a patient of this type began to ponder whether he would have been able to see the particular implication or to express it as clearly as I. Much more often the resentment is revealed in subsequent attempts of the patient to reestablish his superiority by belittling the analyst, as in the examples already cited. Connected with this impulse to disparage the analyst, there is much rage of which the patient may or may not be aware: but he is never aware that the rage was provoked by the skilfulness of the interpretation. The rage may be disguised, as above, or may determine a complete refusal to coöperate.

The vehemence of the disparaging impulses in these cases raises the question whether they are not more than a surface attitude, that is, dynamically speaking, an essential element in the

whole picture. To answer this question we must consider the rôle played by competitiveness, rivalry and ambition in the entire make-up.

In order to get an adequate estimate of the specific importance of this attitude for these individuals, we must remind ourselves of the enormous rôle played in our culture by competitiveness—a trait so general that we tend to consider it an ingrained trait of human nature. However, a knowledge of other cultures proves that such a view indicates only our insufficient detachment from the peculiar conditions under which we live in our civilization.<sup>3</sup> Our culture is pervaded by competition, not only in the business and political fields, but in social life, love life, marriage, and other fields as well. In fact, the entire picture as manifested in the character structure described is culturally conditioned, although, of course, through the channels of particularly unfortunate individual conditions in childhood. On the basis of this situation we must expect a certain amount of competitiveness in every analysis; and experience shows it to be a constant factor in the patient's relations with the analyst. Consequently we may limit our question to special features in our patients' competitiveness.

1. The competitiveness may exceed the average in quantity. Persons so affected constantly and automatically compare themselves with everyone they meet, even in situations which involve no actual competition. Their sole standard of values seems to be that of being ahead of or behind some other person. Their feeling towards life is that of a jockey in a race; they are dominated by the question, am I ahead? They have, in addition, fantastic expectations of their capacity for accomplishment. They fancy themselves the most popular person, the best physician, etc., in the world. They expect blind admiration.

<sup>3</sup> Alfred Adler has emphasized the role of competitiveness in neuroses, but puts it into an altogether different frame of reference. He does not relate it to cultural factors, and considers the striving for superiority an attempt to overcome an inferiority already existing; while I consider it to be the outcome of an intricate process of development in which—generally speaking—anxiety and hostility play the dominant rôles.

When they start to paint they expect to be masters like Rembrandt immediately; their first play they expect to be at least as good as one by Shakespeare; the first blood count in the laboratory must be perfect—with inevitable repercussions of despair and depression. In the moral sphere these extraordinary demands express themselves in having to be perfect, encountering here the same exasperations at everything short of perfection. These ambitions, however, exist only in fantasies, which may or may not be conscious. The degree of awareness differs widely in different persons. There is, however, never any clear realization of the powerful rôle these ambitions play in the patient's life or of the great part they play in accounting for his behavior and mental reactions.

2. The second special feature is the amount of hostility involved in these ambitions. Such a person's attitude may be characterized thus: "No one but I shall be a good musician, read a good paper; no one but I shall be attractive, praised, or get attention and care when sick." Combined with this is the impulse ruthlessly to brush aside all possible competitors. One patient who was writing a paper nearly destroyed the paper of a friend because he considered it good, although it dealt with an entirely different subject from his own. This reaction was followed by despair of ever accomplishing anything, which was another expression of his demand that he alone should be able to accomplish anything.

Rationalizing in one way or another such persons compulsively disparage every competitor; or repressing, they overcompensate by exaggerated admiration. They cannot endure the idea of the analyst's having other patients besides themselves, and often protect themselves by shutting the other patients entirely out of their minds.

This attitude of hostile rivalry generally (in my experience always) is entirely unconscious. These patients know only that they are inordinately sensitive to any kind of criticism. They may go so far as to react with anger to any advice or offer of help—so far as such an offer implies an insinuation of any possible imperfection or lack of self-sufficiency—even when they recognize that the offer is kindly meant.

They are aware, in addition, of certain subsequent reactions which are the outcome of the anxiety connected with their rivalry attitude, into which I shall go later. The origin of this compulsive rivalry may be traced back to childhood. It is sufficient to say here that this kind of striving for absolute supremacy serves as protection against an extraordinary anxiety: it insures safety through absolute power. Hence, if this position is endangered the patients react with anxiety, hostility, or depression. This attitude is usually evinced during analysis by the patient's regarding any progress as a triumph of the analyst—a possible feather in the analyst's cap. The fact that the patient himself will profit from such success seems irrelevant.

With these implications in mind we understand now the impact of the reaction to a good interpretation: the patients feel endangered in their own position and react with rage when the analyst dares have a better grasp of the situation than they themselves. They must express their hostility and their sense of defeat by belittling the analyst.

In the cases considered so far, the negative therapeutic reaction not only did not depend upon the content of the interpretation, but in addition the interpretation did not even have to be correct—only skilful or brilliant.

*The second type of reaction* to a good interpretation is somewhat more closely connected with the content, although only in a very general way. So far as a good interpretation usually implies the exposure of some weakness, or what the patient considers such, it means what one might call a narcissistic blow, or merely descriptively speaking, a blow to the patient's self-esteem. The demands of these patients to be perfect, flawless, beyond reproach, are so excessive that everything that falls short of absolute admiration strikes them as humiliation. They feel humiliated, therefore, if one uncovers nothing more than the fact that they are in a dilemma, that they have certain anxieties, and that there are irrational elements in their expectations. They react as if they automatically translated the analyst's reference to "anxiety" into "cowardice," "sensitivity" into "effeminacy," etc. In fact, they will tell the analyst that

they understand him that way, if their reactions are discussed and if they are able to grasp them.

It has always hurt the patient to be dimly aware of flaws in his personality. But he feels humiliated if the analyst brings these flaws to his attention. As long as he is not aware of his reaction he can only express a vague resentment, such as feeling scolded by the analyst, or feeling a diminution in his self-esteem since the start of the analysis. But no matter whether the feeling of humiliation is closer to or farther from conscious awareness, the patient will instinctively retaliate by trying to humiliate the analyst. He may do so frankly, or subtly try to make the analyst feel insignificant, preposterous, and ineffectual.

This impulse to humiliate the analyst merges with the disparaging tendency in the first reaction. Both reactions arise on the basis of strong competitiveness: while the first reaction is a direct expression of rivalry, the second springs from the grandiose ideas and the need for admiration which is a later product of the excessive ambitions. The self-esteem of these persons rests on the shaky ground of (unconscious) grandiose illusions about their own uniqueness and therefore collapses like a card house at a light touch.

I proceed now to describe *the third reaction*: in so far as a good interpretation means the unravelling of a knot or the elucidating a problem from which the patient has suffered, it brings definite relief. This relief may be felt for so short a time that it scarcely figures in awareness. But it may be quite outspoken and definite, although always of short duration only. The essential point in this third reaction is, however, not the relief in itself, but the immeasurably swift realization that such a solution means a move towards recovery and success; the anticipation that more solutions of this kind will eventually lead out of the neurosis.

It is this realization and anticipation that is followed by a feeling of discouragement, hopelessness, despair, and the wish to terminate the analysis. In order to understand the dynamic problem we must consider the further consequences of this particular kind of ambition, which as we have seen contains definite elements



of hostility towards others. Success is equal to crushing others, and maliciously triumphing over the crushed adversaries, an attitude necessarily leading to a fear of retaliation with two aspects: a fear of success and a fear of failure. The fear of success might be phrased: "If I attain success I shall incur the same sort of rage and envy that I feel towards the success of other persons"; and the fear of failure: "If I make any move towards ambitious aims and fail, then others will crush me as I would like to crush them." Any possible failure, therefore, comes to connote a danger to be avoided at all costs.

The device to ward off this danger might be formulated: "I had better stay inconspicuously in a corner, or remain sick and inhibited." To express this more generally, there is a recoiling from all aims that involve competition. This is accomplished by a constant, accurately working process of automatic self-checking, with inhibitions as a result. Thus, one patient gave up painting when she married, although it was her sole satisfactory activity, because she was a better painter than her husband and she feared his envy. This same patient observed that when she spoke to a stupid person she automatically acted even more stupid; and that when she played with a bad musician she played worse than her partner. Any success these persons achieve, such as progressing in their studies or winning a game, is felt as a peril.


Dreams show this tendency very clearly and often reveal the conflicts quite early in the analysis. These patients dream of being defeated by a competitor, of incurring failures, or being humiliated. They do not even dare to dream of plain wish fulfilments or ambitions; even in dreams (as in life) they feel safer when they imagine that they are humble or defeated. After these patients have thoroughly recognized their fear of success, their dreams change in character.

This attitude entails an automatic curb on any progress. The self-checking process is not limited, however, to activities involving ambitions, but is expressed principally in an undermining of self-confidence, the prerequisite for all accomplishment.

In this context their self-belittling operates to exclude them from competition. Women of this type will say, for instance, that

they feel so utterly unattractive that it would be absurd for them to dress nicely, or that they feel utterly incapable and incompetent. While the fact that they are actively engaged in self-belittling is unconscious, they are aware of the results, namely, intense feelings of inconsequence or even of worthlessness.

As a result of these inhibiting forces failures ensue, which even if not complete, cause a discrepancy between accomplishment and potentialities, not to mention an even greater discrepancy between grandiose ideas and feelings of inferiority. A realization of this discrepancy is essential for an understanding of the vicious circle in which these persons are moving. To omit again the originating childhood factors, the circle looks much like the following diagram:



Though the ambitions may not have been so fantastic and so hostile at the outset, these qualities grow and increase. This development in a vicious circle accounts for the intensity of the emotions with which we are now confronted.

Bearing in mind the ruthless energy with which persons of this structure must turn from any progress they make, we understand the third type of negative therapeutic reaction: progress means danger, so it must be averted. From this point of view *the negative therapeutic reaction is a special form of the fear of success*. The discouragement and hopelessness which accompany it are apparently genuine feelings, arising from a deep-lying realization of being caught in a dilemma from which there is no escape.

This third reaction almost coincides with the factor Freud pointed out as the main source of the reaction, with the difference in

emphasis that where Freud stresses feelings of guilt I have emphasized anxiety. The two feelings, however, are closely akin. In fact, in the cases I have in mind, sometimes one and sometimes the other is in the foreground. A second difference consists in my ascribing a special content to these feelings of guilt and anxiety, namely, hostility on the basis of rivalry.

Especially in those cases in which the guilt feelings are more in the foreground, there is a *fourth reaction* to a good interpretation: it is felt as an accusation. This reaction may be so strong as to dominate the picture for some time. More precisely, the interpretation is perceived as an unjust accusation, for the same reason given by Freud, namely, the sense of guilt is unconscious. The patient therefore feels constantly put on the defensive, so that the analysis resembles a trial. An interpretation, however kindly and considerately given, so far as it arouses a sense of guilt or merely proves the patients wrong in some respects, is reacted to as if it were a total condemnation, the intensity of which is proportional to the existing feelings of self-condemnation. The patients express this reaction by making a counterattack on the analyst: to prove him wrong by exaggerating his statements, by picking out some expression of the analyst's which was not altogether correct, by telling him directly or indirectly (for example by symptomatic doubts and anxieties) that he is keeping them from getting well or actually doing them harm.

To repeat: This reaction is in the foreground only in those cases in which the anxiety concerning the outside world is internalized to a particularly great extent.

The *fifth reaction* to a good interpretation concerns the patient's feeling of personal rejection on the part of the analyst, due to an excessive need for affection and equally great sensitivity to any kind of rebuff. Seen from this angle the patient takes any uncovering of his difficulties as an expression of dislike or disdain by the analyst and reacts with strong antagonism.

Wilhelm Reich<sup>4</sup> has pointed out this factor as constituting the whole picture of the negative therapeutic reaction. I consider it a

<sup>4</sup> Reich, Wilhelm: *Charakteranalyse*. 1933.

very important factor, indeed, but only one element among others, and one to be understood only on the basis of the whole character structure.

In the life history of these patients we find, generally speaking, that in childhood they endured an atmosphere lacking in all warmth and reliability but rife with frightening elements, such as fights between parents, injustice, cruelty, over-solicitousness, etc. The outcome was the engendering of hostility and anxiety. There are probably many ways of dealing with such a situation. The two most frequent in our culture seem to be the striving for power and the striving for affection, both representing a protection against anxiety—"If I have absolute power you cannot hurt me" and "If you love me you will not hurt me." These two strivings are, however, incompatible, for the ambitious striving contains a definite destructive element. This is in fact the main conflict in persons of the character structure under discussion.

Here I must make a reservation to a statement previously made, namely, that the attitude of hostile rivalry "necessarily" leads to fear of retaliation. Probably such a fear always will be present, although in varying degrees, but the simple fear of retaliation may function as a whip, driving the person on to gain more success and more power. What accounts for the recoiling from ambition, is an additional anxiety, namely, an ever-lurking fear of loss of affection. One might venture the guess that in those persons capable of factually pressing their "no one but I" ambition, the positive emotional relationships to others were earlier and more deeply disrupted. These people no longer believe in affection. The patients I have in mind, on the other hand, are continually wavering between rivalry and affection. In the analytical situation one has an opportunity of seeing the interplay of these two sets of motives. A move towards competition with the analyst is followed by increased anxiety and need for affection. The feeling of being rebuffed by the analyst is followed by a renewed rivalry.

We may observe the same wavering in the patient's life history: for instance, being offered a position that implies leadership, recoiling from it out of fear, and then rushing into some love affair;

or the other way around: being disappointed in a love relationship and suddenly developing a highflown ambitious attitude.

Why does the patient feel rebuffed so easily and react with such intense hostility to the rebuff?

These questions are easily answered if we have a full understanding of the implications of the patient's need for affection. We are accustomed to think and talk loosely of it as an "infantile" attitude, as a revival of the situation in which the child because of his helplessness needs help, affection, and attention from the mother. These infantile elements may be included in the excessive need for affection we see in neurotics, and may be expressed in dreams of longing for the mother, as well as otherwise. But there are elements in the neurotic need for affection—and these, dynamically, the essential ones—which make it a phenomenon entirely different from that existing in childhood.

Children certainly do need help and affection. But the healthy child, at least, is content with a reasonable amount of affection, or with the help it needs for the time being. The neurotic, on the other hand, needs affection for quite a different reason, to reassure him against a double anxiety—anxiety concerning awareness and expression of his own hostility, and anxiety concerning retaliation from without. Because of his own repressed hostility he scents hostility—deceit, abuse, malice, rejection—in every move of the other person, as may be observed in his reactions to the analyst. The fact that he has to pay fees, for example, is a definite proof to him that the analyst wants only to abuse him. Even kindness may have only the effect of strengthening his suspicions. The reassurance he requires is unconditional love; which means that the other person should have no gratification or advantage in the relationship, but offer him a complete sacrifice of all he loves or cherishes. The other should always be admiring and compliant, however the neurotic behaves. Needs of this kind will hardly ever be met, and the analytic situation certainly means their continued frustration.

These implications being clarified, we can now answer the above question: getting affection protects the patient against his own lurking hostility and fear; as soon as he feels frustrated or re-

jected in these protective needs his hostility springs up. On this basis it is to be understood that a good interpretation is bound to evoke hostility, implying as it does an acute frustration of the patient's excessive need for affection, so that he feels it to be a direct criticism and a direct rejection.

I shall now try to summarize the different points made here, disregarding detailed trends: It is inherent in the character structure concerned that intense hostility from various interrelated sources is easily provoked. It is provoked unavoidably in the analytical situation, particularly by good interpretations. This hostility turns against the analyst and in its entirety constitutes a definite impulse to annihilate the analyst's efforts.

On the other hand, growing out of the same conditions these patients have a definite dread of any move forward: progress, success, or recovery. One part of the patient definitely shrinks from recovery and prefers illness. Different as the two currents are, they coöperate, and this is what makes the negative therapeutic reaction so difficult to conquer.

The main difference in my concept of the negative therapeutic reaction from Freud's then would be: In those cases in which I can observe the negative reaction the hostility towards the analyst is no surface attitude, unessential by comparison with the patient's recoiling tendency. Both attitudes are, on the contrary, from the same sources, inseparably entangled, and of equal importance.

To deal adequately with the negative therapeutic reaction it is necessary in the first place to recognize it as such. This is not difficult in cases in which it comes out in rather dramatic form as described by Freud, or as I have presented it here. Yet even so, an inexperienced analyst may become uncertain and discouraged, without recognizing in a detached fashion that this is the very effect the patient designs to produce in him. The same forces in the same combinations may, however, operate in an insidious manner, skilfully masked in pseudo coöperation; on behind a recognition and admiration of the analyst, including calling attention to some superficial improvement made. There will, however, be a discrepancy between recognition plus gain in intellectual insight and

the lack of proportionate changes in the patient's personality. As soon as the analyst notices such a discrepancy he must confront the patient with this problem.

If one recognizes the negative therapeutic reaction in its various manifestations one must agree with Freud that it is a frequent occurrence, perhaps, as Freud points out, a feature of every severe neurosis—to which I should like to add only: in our culture.

The technical principles applied are pretty much the same as those presented in a recent paper.<sup>5</sup> They are, roughly speaking, the same principles we all follow, namely, observing and uncovering carefully the emotional reactions of the patient to the analyst, with emphasis on two points:

1. As long as the negative reaction persists I select out of the material offered by the patient those parts which I can relate to his reaction to the analyst, and interpret those only.<sup>6</sup>

2. As long as the negative therapeutic reaction governs the picture I refrain from making any construction of the past nor do I make direct use of one offered by the patient. The reason lies in the fact that *the attitudes we see in the adult patient are not direct repetitions or revivals of infantile attitudes, but have been changed in quality and quantity by the consequences which have developed out of the early experiences.* The “no one but I” ambition, for instance, is not a direct repetition of any infantile rivalry situation, nor is excessive craving for affection a simple repetition of the wish to be sheltered by the mother. Hence a direct interpretation in terms of the Oedipus complex is of no avail in as much as it skips the intermediate steps of development, and therefore cannot resolve the vicious circle in which the patient is moving. The negative therapeutic reaction is—if at all—soluble only if the analyst persists in analyzing the immediate reactions in their immediate causations.

It is needless to say—and I say it only because misunderstandings have arisen—that this procedure does not mean that I attribute less importance to childhood experiences than any other ana-

<sup>5</sup> Horney, Karen: Conceptions and Misconceptions of the Analytical Method. *J. of Nerv. and Ment. Disease*, 1935.

<sup>6</sup> Wilhelm Reich has presented similar principles of character analysis.

lyst. These are of fundamental importance since they determine the direction of the individual's development. In fact, memories pertinent to the present situation do arise if the upper layers are carefully worked through, and do their share in helping understand the entire development.

If one persists in this way the negative therapeutic reaction can be overcome: to put it with more reserve—this has been my experience in cases of the described structure. This, of course, does not mean that we can cure all severe neuroses, but it means that the negative reaction as such does not imply a bad prognosis. The criteria for the therapeutic chances of a neurosis seem to lie in a series of factors and it would be desirable to get a more precise picture of the nature, weight and combination of these factors.



## COMMENTARY ON "THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION," BY KAREN HORNEY

BY SHELLEY ORGEL, M.D.

Reading this 1936 paper today takes one back to a contentious, fertile period in psychoanalytic history. Karen Horney touches on or alludes to a number of subjects that continue to engage our interest and stimulate controversy: the mystery of therapeutic action; the impacts of a relationship between analyst and patient on the intrapsychic lives of both and on the psychoanalytic process; the mutual influences of biological factors, cultural traditions, and social attitudes on the psychology of individuals and groups; and impacts on the profession and its practitioners of wider world events and narrower psychoanalytic politics.

Beyond noting Horney's theoretical and technical additions to Freud's discussions of negative therapeutic reaction (Freud 1919, 1923, 1924), we are reminded afresh in reading the paper of the intergenerational tensions that smoldered in an era when many of the pioneer figures in psychoanalysis had been forced to emigrate from their homelands in the wake of the ever more terrible cataclysm in Europe. Transplanted as refugees in the new and strange American world, they must have found a compelling need to conserve the allegiances and beliefs they held in common, central among them, their bonds to Freud and *his* psychoanalysis. In this same period, Freud's patriarchal authority was necessarily weakening because of age and illness, and was being passed on to others—especially to his daughter, who firmly secured her place as his heir by publishing in this same year her landmark classic, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (A. Freud 1936).

Karen Horney arrived in the United States from Berlin in 1932, moved from Chicago to New York in 1934, and quickly became a popular faculty member of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. By 1936, she was already becoming embroiled in the controversies that would lead, a few years later, to her “voluntary” departure from the New York Society and to her establishing her own institute. The paper under discussion already shows her flinging a few gauntlets at psychoanalytic authorities, even as she expresses her wish to be accepted among them. Indeed, her ambivalent relationships with the conservative leaders of the New York Institute remind us, not just incidentally, of the transference-countertransference situations she proceeds to describe in analyses stymied in negative therapeutic reactions.

Horney begins with a standard definition of the phenomenon, indicating that patients may show

. . . an increase in symptoms, become discouraged, or wish to break off treatment immediately following an *encouragement* or a *real* elucidation of some problem, at a time . . . when one might *reasonably expect him* to feel relief . . . The patient very often actually *feels this relief distinctly* and then after a short while reacts as described. [p. 27, italics added]<sup>1</sup>

I have italicized words and phrases that show how much the *analyst's* perspective and “reasonable” expectations were unself-consciously emphasized at that time. This generation of analysts wrote as if they believed that their own attitudes and expectations had little or no bearing on the untoward effects on their patients that were produced by “good” interpretive interventions. In this regard, Horney was a forward-looking exception.

In the beginning of the paper, Horney implicitly refers to her earlier skepticism about Freud's original definitions. She asks, can we be sure about what should bring relief to the patient? She questioned Freud's idea that the patient's reaction is “negative,” in

<sup>1</sup> *Editor's Note:* In this article, page numbers from Horney 1936 refer to the numbering in the republication in this issue, not to the original *Quarterly* publication of 1936.

that it may simply represent a masochistic inability to use the good things that the analyst offers. But she immediately takes back her own doubts by making what seems like a gesture of tribute to "the keenness and importance of Freud's observations." Ambivalently positioning herself between discipleship and skepticism, she withdraws her challenge—for the moment.

Let us read the clinical vignette that follows as her next association. She writes about a male lawyer patient, one with grand but unconscious ambitions, who thwarts his analyst when she indicates "the possibility that he *really* was intensely ambitious" (p. 28, italics added). Inevitably, one wonders: who is the *really* ambitious one here—the interpreted-to, the interpreter, or both? In my reading of their reported exchange, the patient disappoints the analyst's therapeutic aims and expectations after an initial brief surrender to an interpretation that he experienced as aggressive, distancing, objectifying; what he seems to hear in the interpretation is: "I know better than you what you really think, what you really want. You're ambitious (aggressive), but you hide it."

The patient is briefly humiliated and self-critical, but these affects are immediately turned outward against the analyst. He diminishes the threat that the analyst's interpretation, if internalized, would impose. He: "You think you're smart, but any dummy could have told me this." It is as if he acknowledges the truth of the interpretation, but negates it by attacking the threatening power of the messenger; it is both taken in *and* cast out in a defensive action resembling negation (Freud 1925). He refuses to be a "dummy" who mouths the words the analyst has put into him. He says, in effect, "No! I will not swallow your interpretation and make it mine."

It seems to me that one can observe parallels between Horney's unacknowledged challenge to the primacy of Freud's ideas and her patient's response to her interpretation that he "really was intensely ambitious." His retort exemplifies the defense of *identification with the aggressor*, with the patient representing one side of Horney's ambivalence, speaking *for* her as well as *against* her, in mockery and protest to the all-knowing, therapeutically ambitious, "masculine" authority.

We might therefore conclude that she gives little weight to Freud's idea that such patients masochistically accept the attacks of a sadistic superego, as is seen in melancholia. Rather, her emphasis is on, first, an interpersonal struggle in defense of narcissism—narcissistic rage, as Kohut (1972) described it thirty-six years later. And, second, she gives a fine portrayal of an instance of identification with the aggressor, a mechanism of defense that was being named and described concurrently by Anna Freud. (Did Horney know of or anticipate Anna Freud's contemporaneous work?) That defense, Anna Freud noted, actually *precedes* and wards off the internalization of a critical superego; she emphasized that projection of the criticism leads the person more toward paranoid reactions than depressive ones, although the inability to engage an object on whom to externalize the aggression can bring on depression (see Orgel 1974). When the patient projects aggression outward, he or she is spared the experience of depressive affect. Horney refers to "a hostility which may be so strong that if repressed it may show itself in suicidal ideas" (p. 29)—a reference, in different theoretical terms, to the same dynamic configuration.

Two years earlier, Horney (1934) had explored these issues in a group of women patients who suffered from wounded self-esteem; they had all come in second in competitions with other women for men. They attempted to compensate for these failures by becoming unrealistically ambitious. Horney wrote: "They have a pathological need to drive any other woman from the field" (1934, p. 636). "If someone appears to do things better—their analyst, their husband, other women—they become depressed. Every improvement, every advance seemed to them not progress of their own, but exclusively the success of the analyst" (p. 609). These women were wrecked by their analysts' success, and their hostility, turned inward, produced depression. On the other hand, the lawyer patient of Horney's 1936 paper, a male, feeling able to attack his analyst's power of mind, is thereby protected, at least temporarily, from such depressive affect.

I am tempted to speculate that beneath the surface of Horney's characterizations of such patients, including the ambitious lawyer,

she is expressing *her* hurt and anger toward a father who has chosen another as his true offspring. If she cannot be the child who fulfills her own and her father's ambitions, she will be the one who refuses. She will, like her lawyer patient, respond negatively. And in her interpretation of her patient's unconscious ambition, she imitates the authoritative stance of Freud's early clinical manner, provoking an outbreak of "negative" responses. "On this occasion for the first time we discussed his ambition" (p. 28), she writes of this episode. In her timing of her confrontation, she essentially bypasses working with the reasons for his need to deny his ambition. She learns about these reasons in the aftermath of the interpretation, as he identifies with her as the aggressor, in what she describes as a prototypical example of a negative therapeutic reaction.

With present-day hindsight, we can infer from the patient's response his fear of his own aggression; his narcissistic vulnerability, especially to accusations of *not knowing*; and his anger at his analyst's objectifying, distancing judgments, which he feels are unfair and fail to recognize his intense need for her regard. This patient has a deep concern with principles of morality and fairness. We are told that he recalled flashes of fantasy in which he reformed the justice system of the whole world. And so the material that Horney gives us does not indicate a need to suffer that precludes analyzable transference; instead, we have little difficulty in picturing this patient fiercely responding to a narcissistic wound by attempting to wound the analyst, to force her to know the pain that she has made him feel.

In the body of her 1936 paper, Horney discusses five kinds of negative reaction to a "good interpretation," and in the end she gives advice to analysts on how to deal technically with these reactions. In doing so, she is far more encouraging than Freud about the analyzability of the phenomenon. A good interpretation, she writes, "either states clearly a problem of the patient's current difficulties or offers a partial solution of it, or throws light on hitherto incomprehensible peculiarities of the patient" (p. 30). It seems to me that such a description does not view the patient as someone who *actively* discovers what was previously unknown about

him- or herself, nor does Horney say anything about preparing the patient to be able to “receive” the illumination or solution offered by the analyst. Analyzing resistance to an awareness of the transference, or to the transferential (and countertransferential) meanings and impacts of what the analyst considers “good” interpretations, seems not to be a primary task. It has taken many years for analysts to recognize that interpretation in general objectifies the patient, that it expresses the analyst’s desire. From the patient’s perspective, a moral judgment inevitably accrues to it, and all these factors determine the patient’s responses, to a greater or lesser extent (see, e.g., Gabbard 2000).

Now to Horney’s list of these responses:

*The first reaction:* A good interpretation is a stimulus to compete, “as if the analyst had asserted his superiority over the patient” (p. 30). The patient is never aware that rage is provoked by the skillfulness of the interpretation rather than by its content. At this point, Horney refers to the “enormous” role that competitiveness plays in our culture. (This shift in focus from the interpersonal will have great significance in her future professional direction; oedipal competition and sibling rivalry are not even mentioned here.) Horney describes these patients as driven to be the best in everything, including morality. She writes, “This kind of striving for absolute supremacy serves as protection against an extraordinary anxiety: it insures safety through absolute power . . . . [These patients] react with rage when the analyst dares have a better grasp of the situation than they themselves” (p. 33). Fearing the losses that the hostility in their ambitions will bring, they may despair of accomplishing anything.

The people whom Horney describes are believable and are familiar to all analysts. I wonder, however, whether her generalizing assertion that such narcissistic characters are bred in our culture allows her to rationalize a kind of judgmental coldness toward them as individuals. To suggest this is not to deny that the cultural perspective that Horney championed expands our understanding of individual psychology, perhaps especially that of women. Her emphasis on the effects of cultural influences on later development, particularly on the dominant influence of what would be

characterized decades later as the *culture of narcissism*, separated her from most other major psychoanalytic scholars of the time. One thinks, for example, of the work of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, who were elucidating intertwined intrapsychic and object-relational developmental factors in infancy and early childhood. In addition, Horney's cultural orientation may have kept her from becoming aware of an ego-dystonic counteridentification with "the powerful role . . . ambitions play in the patient's life" (p. 32), and from having to confront the roots of such ambition in universal unconscious fantasies of childhood, including her own.

The *second reaction* Horney describes relates to her finding that a "good" interpretation exposes a weakness in patients who excessively demand that they be "perfect, flawless, beyond reproach" (p. 33). They tend to feel humiliated and to retaliate by trying to humiliate the analyst. In her view, it is not dread of the revealed unconscious or pathological guilt and the need to suffer that evokes a negative therapeutic reaction, but rather the need to ward off and retaliate for narcissistic blows inflicted by the analyst—a sort of clash of narcissisms. Gabbard (2000) writes similarly of a rebellion against the analyst's desire as it is expressed in the "good" interpretation.

Today we cannot help but note that Horney emphasizes the narcissistic vulnerability and aggression only of the *patient*. The relevance of every *analyst's* ongoing, shifting, inevitable feelings, attitudes, fantasies toward the patient—conscious and unconscious—was rarely acknowledged or written about in the 1930s. It was a commonplace observation in those days, and a belief held by many analysts—behind which their own narcissistic vulnerability could hide—that they, because they had been "thoroughly analyzed," had attained a degree of rational control that made them relatively immune to the distortions imposed by the dynamic unconscious. They could therefore claim to be objective knowers and interpreters of others' unconscious worlds.

In such psychoanalytic situations, we have learned, the kinds of reactions that Horney writes about are bound to occur, especially in narcissistically vulnerable patients. Also important, this brand of self-regard may render the analyst unable to anticipate and effec-

tively help the patient in resolving transference-countertransference impasses in which the patient proclaims, "My analyst's failure is my success!" But I believe it is crucial to be aware of our contributions to these outcomes—especially how and how much our patients and the results of our work with them serve our own narcissistic needs.

What may be modified, in time, is the original, sometimes almost delusional belief held by the kind of patients Horney describes here: *either* that their analysts embody and/or take sadistic pleasure in exhibiting their perfected images of themselves, *or* that they, the patients, do so. For them, they and their analysts cannot be good *and* bad; rather, the triumph of the all-good is the defeat of the all-bad. The so-called negative therapeutic reaction may thus be seen as a reflection of such splitting, and its analysis can be a step toward modifying it. The patient's attacks on the analyst are attempts to create sadomasochistic engagement and bonds that may make possible the achievement of ambivalence toward others and the tolerance of a self that lacks absolute power, without the need to experience "extraordinary anxiety."

In this paper, Horney writes about anxiety as a *state* that reflects the human condition in the world, rather than an affect that responds to and warns against any of the danger situations described by Freud. It is unclear whether her brand of anxiety refers to what Freud called *automatic anxiety*—the response of the overwhelmed, traumatized ego. But she does not seem to regard anxiety as the ego's signal of impending intrapsychic danger; her anxiety is more of a free-floating panic reaction, a state of helplessness in the absence of a protective presence in a terrifying world, where an individual either triumphs over others or is destroyed by them.

We cannot be certain how much Horney's intellectual and emotional responsiveness to the state of the world at the time determined this view. It must have been a powerful part of her own life and of the psychoanalytic community that she left in 1932, as well as of the ones she joined in Chicago and later in New York. By 1934, "the Berlin institute had ceased to exist and most of its members had fled their homeland in fear of their lives" (Quinn 1987,



p. 240). It seems incredible, and yet sadly too believable, how completely a realistic focus on the murderous aggressions of the Nazis in the 1930s is missing from psychoanalytic writings and from patients' recollections of what was discussed in analytic sessions during those last days of psychoanalysis in Europe. Horney wrote this paper in the year of the infamous Munich Olympics, documented in Leni Riefenstahl's classic propaganda documentary film, *Triumph of the Will* (1935). In her book *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (1939), which Fenichel (1940) scathingly reviewed in *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* as virtually not psychoanalytic, Horney summed up her core position: neurotic behavior, she wrote, "originates in 'basic anxiety'. . . a deep feeling of helplessness toward a world conceived as potentially hostile" (1939, p. 62).

For Horney, there is a universal primal anxiety, a basic fear of the world. What she calls *strivings* evolve in response to this anxiety, rather than the reverse. She implicitly rejects Freud's dual instinct theory and his conception of the negative therapeutic reaction as allied to the death instinct, to melancholia, and to other forms of internal destructive attacks on the self. For her, the individual's expressions of aggression and attempts to gain love, "the striving for power and the striving for affection" (1936, p. 38), represent defenses against anxiety.

The patients whom she is describing are deeply sensitive to what they take as the analyst's rebuff and dislike, reacting with antagonism when a "good" interpretation uncovers any difficulties. The patient's "feeling of personal rejection" (p. 37) is, in fact, the *fifth reaction* on Horney's list. She loosely connects such patients' vulnerability to early parental deprivations, inconsistency, cruelty, oversolicitousness, and so on. However, she emphasizes much more strongly that their character structures—that is, the ways in which they handle their anxiety—are largely culturally determined. The patient's position is: "If I have absolute power, you cannot hurt me," and "If you love me, you will not hurt me." Since the strivings for power and love are incompatible, she adds, the conflict between these two "most frequent" aims "in our culture . . . is in fact the main conflict in persons of the character structure under discussion" (p. 38).

For these patients, any progress is a triumph for the analyst, “a possible feather in the analyst’s cap” (p. 33), she notes. Such an analyst seems to be a male tyrant for Horney, while the patient is a feminized victim, the loser in life’s and society’s struggle for survival. Presented in 1935 or 1936 to the New York Psychoanalytic Society members, these ideas would have reminded many of what they had endured under the Nazis, whose propaganda justified their own drives for absolute power—as though it were *they* who needed protection against their chosen victims. A series of ominous parallel dichotomies reverberates as subtexts in these pages of Horney’s paper: analyst/patient, strong/weak, male/female, aggressor tyrant-victim/Nazi-Jew. Those the Nazis determined to destroy they labeled “weak, effeminate, cowardly”; these words express the universal language of oppressors. These words are precisely the same ones that Horney’s patients hear in their distorted perceptions of the analyst’s interpretations of their conflicts.

Freud’s famous footnote on the negative therapeutic reaction in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) is relevant here. Negative therapeutic reactions can be cured if the analyst assumes a posture—one that Freud emphatically rejects—in which the original idealization of the narcissistic object fused with the self can be restored. The ego-ideal aspect of the patient’s superego is regressively externalized onto, and incorporated by, the analyst, who thereby *becomes* the primal parent who promises the narcissistic bliss of fusion—provided that the patient reincorporates this unique representation of perfection and power.<sup>2</sup> We are well aware, as was Freud, that the cost to the patient of this Faustian bargain may be life in a state of permanent subjection. And, when this fantasy of fusion with “the best analyst in the world” falls apart, it is regularly followed by the explosion of a sadistic attack. The analyst’s cap has lost its feather and is trampled underfoot; the unconscious grandiose illusions fostered by this fantasy of fusion constitute an unstable resolution that can “collapse like a card house at a light touch” (p. 34).

<sup>2</sup> For Anna Freud (1936), such a relationship was required in the analyses of young children: “The analyst must succeed in putting himself in place of the child’s Ego-ideal for the duration of the analysis” (p. 45).

Thus, "cure" by primitive identification with the "perfect" transference analyst—the analyst as prophet and savior—is the reverse of identification with the aggressor. The latter, in Horney's version, results in an eruption of narcissistic rage at the analyst's assertion of otherness and at what is taken as the aggressive use of his or her power over the patient, as these are embodied in "good" interpretations.

In describing the *third reaction*, Horney notes that the relief achieved by a "good" interpretation brings "the immeasurably swift realization that such a solution means a move towards recovery" (p. 34). Her focus on ambition and competitiveness in the patients she discusses leads her to emphasize that becoming well will mean that the analyst, as the loser of the competition, will be envious and will consequently retaliate. Being inhibited and ensuring defeat protect such patients from the success they fear: "In this context, their self-belittling operates to exclude them from competition" (p. 35). In turn, they are envious of those more successful and less inhibited (the analyst in the transference?), and this hostile envy makes them more anxious. In Horney's examples, it is women who become inhibited, while her first vignette of the vengeful lawyer patient describes a male who attempted, with sarcastic jibes, to belittle his female analyst, to intimidate her into being less "good" and perhaps less of a phallic threat to his masculinity.

At this juncture, Horney minimizes her difference from Freud, whose emphasis is on the patient's sadistic superego, on unconscious guilt. She suggests that their views are compatible because it is hostility that produces both guilt and anxiety. However, Horney states that, in her view, the negative therapeutic reaction is a special form of a fear of success, that "it . . . constitutes a definite impulse to annihilate the analyst's efforts" (p. 40). It is a *relational* impasse ("the hostility towards the analyst is no surface attitude"). Here it seems to me that there is a significant difference between the two of them that may ultimately prove unbridgeable. For Freud, the reaction is essentially an *intrapsychic* impasse—Horney calls it a recoiling tendency—and involves shutting the analyst out. The defeat of the ego in the intrapsychic war between it and the super-

ego is ultimately a victory of the death instinct, which succeeds in overcoming the limited power of the analyst, representing eros. The patient refuses the analyst's invitation to be used, via the transference, to restore the libidinal relationship with the object world.

My impression is that Freud reluctantly accepts the situation, as he sees it, on personal and theoretical grounds. Intensifying "our attempts to exert an influence," exploiting the power of the erotic transference, would mean that the analyst was pressing the patient to respond to *the analyst*, to gratify his or her narcissistic need for affirmation and aggrandizement. It would amount to an attempt to seduce the patient into putting the analyst in the place of his or her ego ideal, replacing the patient's sadistic superego with the analyst's. Such wishes tempt the analyst to manipulate the transference in order to play the part of "prophet, savior and redeemer to the patient" (Freud 1923, p. 50).

In this famous footnote, Freud writes that such "role-playing is . . . diametrically opposed to the rules of analysis which aims to give the ego *freedom* to decide one way or the other" (1923, p. 50, italics in original). These rules are to be observed even at the cost of therapeutic failure, he implies. When he formulated the second dual instinct theory, Freud saw the patient's need for punishment as serving the death instinct. The latter, "cultured" in the sadistic superego and manifest as unconscious guilt in the ego, maintained an unresolvable conflict between them that absorbed the patient's energies and withdrew them from the outer world. The analyst's interpretation of this conflict reached a "deaf ear," as it were, "and called for a continued essential use of suggestion," a use that "suspended the analysis of those aspects of the transference associated with the superego" (Gray 1994, p. 108).

For Horney, in strong contrast, the reaction is a manifestation of protest, an indication of powerful ties to the analyst as object of a mainly narcissistic transference, a failed attempt to fight back, to say no, and to restore to the self the narcissism that had been surrendered to the analyst, thus turning passive into active in the relationship. She sees it as an indication that active efforts to analyze the aggressive transference are necessary in order to overcome the negative therapeutic reaction.

It is noteworthy that Horney never takes this third reaction, the fears of recovery, to the point of discussing the fear of termination and the wish to prolong the analytic relationship, the wish to stop time with its inevitable losses and renunciations. These factors often play a prominent role in my own clinical experience. What I have observed is that some patients cling to the status quo as a way of holding on to old objects and aims (including grievances and wishes for revenge), to early narcissistic self-representations, and to the analyst, who is believed to offer these regressive sources of gratification and regulation. Frequently, such patients attempt to achieve these goals by promoting and maintaining sadomasochistic stalemates. Requiring their analysts' presence in their outside worlds in order to maintain their representations in their internal worlds, these patients find separation intolerable, and mourning and internalization are "learned" painfully and slowly, if at all. Horney may be thinking of such patients when she writes that neurotics have *excessive* needs for affection. We may derive an important insight from her conclusion: that the response to any interpretation is bound to include opposition *in all patients*, since it represents and signals a frustration of the patient's transference wishes for the analyst's love.

Horney's *fourth reaction* to a "good" interpretation is characterized as a feeling not only of narcissistic wounding and a deprivation of wished-for love, but also one of unjust accusation. Horney writes that the intensity of the patient's experience of condemnation is proportional to existing feelings of (unconscious) self-condemnation, and the patient counterattacks with accusations directed at the analyst. In my experience, patients who react this way do so immediately, without experiencing an interval of relief that must then be negated. Therefore, such a response might be called an upsurge of aggressive or negative transference, perhaps in some instances a paranoid reaction, but it is not, strictly speaking, a negative therapeutic reaction, in the sense that the patient expected to benefit from an interpretation in fact becomes worse.

In struggles over narcissism, it can be tempting to diagnose negative therapeutic reactions, implying that patients are making

themselves suffer, when the *analyst's* anger at being rebuffed poses conflict and potential self-accusation. The analyst's self-criticism, in turn, may be externalized, creating sadomasochistic cycles of accusation and defense. The prolonged "tennis rally" of back-and-forth accusations between patient and analyst that can follow is exciting; it protects both egos from internalizing the attacks and prolongs the "match." An interminably tied score would be, I suppose, the perfect, if futile, outcome.

Horney concludes her essay by telling the reader about technical approaches that she has learned are necessary in order to work effectively with these patients. She focuses on "observing and uncovering carefully the emotional reactions of the patient to the analyst" (p. 41) in the here and now, apparently a controversial emphasis at the time. She suggests the analyst must be alert to a negative therapeutic response even when it is not dramatic and lasting, but momentary, or even when "masked in pseudo cooperation" (p. 40). She introduces the idea of monitoring countertransference reactions for evidence of projective identification, an orientation developed in succeeding decades as a central construct of Kleinian and modern object relations theorists. The analyst, she writes, "may become uncertain and discouraged, without recognizing in a detached fashion that this is the very effect the patient designs to produce in him" (p. 40). She continues by noting that, when a patient seems to have attained insight but has not given evidence of "personality change," the analyst should suspect the presence of a negative therapeutic response, and should immediately confront the discrepancy—a technical approach that has been subsequently supported by many others.

In a minor dig at Freud, Horney suggests that the negative therapeutic reaction is, as Freud noted, "a feature of every severe neurosis"—but she adds to this "in our culture" (p. 41). Explicitly, she is referring to conflicts over ambition and competition in our society as obstacles barring the wish to love others and to be loved by them. Implicitly, I believe, she is referring once again to cultural determinants of psychological phenomena; she is in the process of shifting her theoretical emphasis toward what will be her new di-

rection, away from the centrality, as in Freud's theory, of biological substrates co-determining conflicts between men and women, between masculinity and femininity, and conflict arising from the drive for power in opposition to the need to submit in order to gain love. She says nothing about the idea, central in Anna Freud's book (1936), of transference of defense.

Horney's technical advice follows logically from her understanding of the phenomenon: one should interpret the manifestations of the transference and focus on "the immediate reactions in their immediate causations" (p. 41). She sees present-day transference phenomena not simply as repetitions of infantile behavior or revivals of infantile wishes; instead, she implies that the analyst is also, and crucially, a "new object." She almost mocks what she may have perceived in some of her colleagues, not altogether wrongly, as a formulaic, mechanical tracing back of virtually all current conflict to the Oedipus complex, and she warns against succumbing to what Hartmann called a *genetic fallacy*.

Her jibes at those who offer clichéd oedipal explanations of current neurotic conflict may have been one of the reasons that her 1936 paper was received negatively at the New York Psychoanalytic Society. As if she realizes this, she makes a final statement to clear up "misunderstandings [that] have arisen" (p. 41). She says she *does* attribute primary importance to "childhood experiences," like any other analyst. But she emphasizes that the "upper layers" and intermediate steps of development must first be "carefully worked through" (p. 42), implying that others may neglect this work. Inflammatory as her words may have seemed at the time, one can discern in them elements of clinical theory and technique espoused by most current schools of post-Freudian thought. To varying degrees, these schools would also consider some instances of negative therapeutic reaction to be the result of mutual enactments between analyst and patient.

Horney may have experienced her attempts to take on the patriarchy of her day with some conflict, but also, one feels, with some relish. Regarded as a dangerously dissident voice by orthodox organizations, most dramatically the New York Psychoanalytic

Society, she has been demonized, a ghost haunting us. Her work, except for her early contributions to studies of the psychology of women (1922-1935), is rarely referred to in our mainstream journals, meetings, or seminars. Rereading this 1936 paper at a distance from the passions of its day may help the current generation to value the boldness and clear-sightedness of her clinical perceptions, and to reclaim her, flaws and all, among our ancestors.

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## ON THE INFLUENCE OF HORNEY'S "THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION"

BY ELIZABETH SPILLIUS, PH.D.

The 1936 issue of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* in which Horney's paper appeared was a noteworthy one. It contained not only her classic paper on the negative therapeutic reaction, but also parts of Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, as well as papers by Robert Waelder, Richard Sterba, and John Dollard—all three important psychoanalysts at that time and still remembered today. But Horney's is the best known of these in England.

Horney's paper is known in the United Kingdom because it states a somewhat different view of the negative therapeutic reaction from that of Freud, and also different from that of Riviere, whose paper, "A Contribution to the Analysis of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction," was published in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in the same year. Neither Horney nor Riviere refers to the paper of the other, and neither refers to a third paper, by Gerō, also published in 1936 in the *International Journal*; that paper mentions the negative therapeutic reaction in the context of a discussion of depression.

Horney cites Feigenbaum's "Clinical Fragments" (1934), part II of which is called "Laughter Betraying a Negative Therapeutic Reaction." But her main reference is to Freud's *The Ego and the Id*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps surprising that Horney does not refer to Abraham's "A Particular Form of Neurotic Resistance against the Psycho-Analytic Method" (1919), for, although it preceded Freud's use of the term *negative therapeutic reaction*, this paper gives a particularly vivid description of patients who scorn the analyst and tend to get worse in analysis.

(1923), which anticipates the work of both Horney and Riviere and the large number of later writers on the negative therapeutic reaction who followed. Freud writes:

There are certain people who behave in a quite peculiar fashion during the work of analysis. When one speaks hopefully to them or expresses satisfaction with the progress of the treatment, they show signs of discontent and their condition invariably worsens. One begins by regarding this as defiance and as an attempt to prove their superiority to the physician, but later one comes to take a deeper and juster view . . . . They exhibit what is known as a "negative therapeutic reaction". . . .

In the end we come to see that we are dealing with what may be called a "moral" factor, a sense of guilt, which is finding its satisfaction in the illness and refuses to give up the punishment of suffering. We shall be right in regarding this disheartening explanation as final. But as far as the patient is concerned this sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty; he does not feel guilty, he feels ill. [1923, pp. 49-50]

Horney's paper emphasizes mainly "the defiance and . . . attempt to prove their superiority to the physician" point of view about the negative therapeutic reaction, whereas Riviere takes up Freud's "deeper and juster view"—that the patient is suffering from an unconscious sense of guilt. In focusing on the hostile and competitive elements in her explanation of the negative therapeutic reaction, Horney anticipates much of the work of British Kleinian analysts on the negative therapeutic reaction, especially that of Klein (1957) and Rosenfeld (1975, 1987), although only Rosenfeld makes a point of citing Horney's paper.

Horney begins her paper with a terse but sweeping sentence: "There are many reasons for an impairment of a patient's condition during analysis; their common denominator is the arousal of anxiety, with which either the patient or the analyst is unable to deal adequately." She immediately goes on to describe the negative therapeutic reaction, making sure that it is not to be confused with

"every deterioration of the patient's condition" (p. 27).<sup>2</sup> It is specifically a condition in which the patient may show "an increase in symptoms, become discouraged, or wish to break off treatment immediately following an encouragement or a real elucidation of some problem, at a time, that is to say, when one might reasonably expect him to feel relief" (p. 27).

Horney says that she was at first skeptical about Freud's observations on the negative therapeutic reaction, but experience led her to admire their keenness and importance. She gives a brief example of the phenomenon and then goes on to remind the reader that Freud thought the superiority to the analyst was only a surface reaction, and that the real dynamics lay in tension between the superego and the ego, which resulted in a sense of guilt and need for punishment in order to avoid anxieties concerning the superego.

She then says that she will look at the negative therapeutic reaction from the point of view of technique, and will present a description and interpretation of the phenomena in patients of "masochistic" character. In view of the examples that follow, I think "patients of sadomasochistic character" would be a more accurate description, for attacks on the analyst are as notable a feature of Horney's descriptions as is the suffering of the patient.

She notes once again that the reactions she will describe are stimulated by a "good interpretation," by which she means one that clearly states a problem of the patient's current difficulties, offers a partial solution, or throws light on "hitherto incomprehensible peculiarities of the patient" (p. 30). In replying to her own question of "What effect has such a good interpretation on the deeper emotional layers?" (p. 30), she says that, in persons of the character mentioned, a good interpretation may lead to five sorts of response.

First, these patients receive a good interpretation as a stimulus to compete. Horney draws attention to the enormous role of competition "in our culture"—this being a phrase that few analysts of

<sup>2</sup> *Editor's Note:* In this article, page numbers from Horney 1936 refer to the numbering in the republication in this issue, not to the original *Quarterly* publication of 1936.

the time used, a sign that Horney was moving or had already moved some distance away from orthodox psychoanalytic formulations. According to one of her biographers, Bernard Paris, she had come to the United States in 1932 and had become well acquainted with Fromm (Paris 1994, p. 138); perhaps she had adopted some of the sociological views of Fromm and other social scientists. She was also close to certain analysts known as the neo-Freudians—Sullivan, Thompson, and Kardiner—who were as well becoming interested in the social sciences, and, for this and other reasons, were beginning to be considered not quite orthodox by mainstream analysts in the United States (Paris 1994, p. xviii).

Horney goes on to say that the patient's competitiveness may exceed the average level, and that a special feature is the amount of hostility in such an individual's ambitions. He is likely to disparage every competitor, or to overcompensate for his hostility by exaggerated admiration. But, she notes, all this hostile rivalry is entirely unconscious; its origin "may be traced back to childhood" (p. 33). In analysis, the patient is likely to regard any progress as a triumph for the analyst, and the fact that the patient himself will profit from such success seems irrelevant.

The second reaction to a good interpretation is that the patient is likely to consider it to be a humiliation, a blow to his self-esteem, and then the patient will in turn try to humiliate the analyst.

The third reaction concerns the patient's response to his own feelings of relief. Insofar as the interpretation elucidates a problem from which the patient has suffered, it is likely to bring relief—sometimes explicitly expressed by the patient, but at other times scarcely figuring in his awareness. In either case, the relief lasts for only a short time. It leads to a realization that the solution of problems in the analysis means a move toward recovery—and it is this realization that engenders discouragement, hopelessness, and despair. Success must be avoided, Horney states, because it means crushing others and a consequent fear of retaliation. But failure must also be avoided because the patient feels that, if he fails, others will crush him as he would like to crush them.

The solution, as Horney puts it, is for the patient to believe that "I had better stay inconspicuously in a corner, or remain sick and

inhibited" (p. 35). This is accomplished by meticulous "self-checking" to avoid both success *and* failure, and such self-checking is likely to lead to *actual* failure, which increases the patient's anxiety and creates a vicious cycle of anxiety, hostility, ambition, self-checking, inhibition, real failure, envy, and increased anxiety. It is interesting to note Horney's mention of *envy* in this cycle; Klein (1957), without citing Horney, was later to regard envy, and especially unconscious envy, as a particularly important aspect of the negative therapeutic reaction.

Horney notes at this point that Freud, too, pointed out that fear of success was the main source of the negative therapeutic reaction, though there is a difference of emphasis because Freud stresses unconscious feelings of guilt about the fear of success, whereas Horney stresses anxiety, and specifically anxiety deriving from hostility on the basis of rivalry. She adds, however, that the two feelings—*anxiety* and *unconscious guilt*—are closely akin.

In cases where guilt feelings are more in the foreground, there is a fourth reaction to a good interpretation, according to Horney: It is likely to be experienced by the patient as an accusation, and specifically an unjust one, for the sense of guilt is unconscious. This reaction of unconscious guilt, Horney says, is foremost only "in those cases in which the anxiety concerning the outside world is internalized to a particularly great extent" (p. 37). Here once again, she shows herself to be perhaps more aware of external influences than most analysts of her era, though whether she means general cultural influences or specific personal influences is not clear.

The fifth reaction to a good interpretation, Horney continues, is that the patient experiences it as a personal rejection by the analyst. This occurs because of the patient's excessive need for affection and hence sensitivity to the slightest rebuff.

Horney thinks that patients who are particularly likely to experience the negative therapeutic reaction had childhoods in which they endured an atmosphere that was lacking in warmth and reliability and was "rife with frightening elements" (p. 38), leading to the patient's becoming both hostile and anxious. She believes that the chief defenses of such patients are a striving for power and a

striving for affection, but these two are incompatible because ambitious striving for power contains a definitely destructive element that is likely to defeat the striving for affection. The patient's recoiling from ambition is accounted for by the ever-present fear of losing affection. The healthy child, Horney says, is content with a reasonable amount of affection, but the neurotic needs affection much more acutely and for a different reason—to assuage anxiety stemming from awareness of his own hostility and his expectations of retaliation. So, she concludes, a good interpretation is bound to evoke the patient's hostility because it frustrates this intense need for affection, so that the patient experiences the interpretation as a direct rejection.

Horney summarizes these points, saying that it is inherent in the masochistic character that intense hostility—and, specifically, hostility against the analyst—is easily provoked. On the other hand, masochistic patients dread progress and cure. She does not spell out at this point why this should be so, but her view as expressed earlier in the paper is that cure would provoke even more hostility and competitiveness toward the analyst, and hence more anxiety about retaliation.

The last part of Horney's paper is particularly interesting both in itself and also because it anticipates some of the current views, especially Kleinian ones, on psychoanalytic technique. She explains that she observes two rules when analyzing patients who show a negative therapeutic reaction: first, she chooses to work directly with only those parts of the patient's material that relate to the reaction to the analyst; and second, she refrains from making any constructions of the past. The reason for this second rule is that the attitudes of the adult patient are not, in Horney's view, directly based on the events of childhood; she thinks that past events are modified and mediated by the events that have occurred between past and present. The vicious cycle she describes in the earlier part of her paper cannot be resolved, she thinks, without attention to the intermediate steps of development.

Horney is critical of analysts, including Freud, who explain patients' feelings and behavior in the present time in terms of the

past, that is, in terms of childhood memories. In her slightly later book, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (1939), she writes: "When the real picture of childhood is befogged, artificial attempts to penetrate through the fog represent an endeavor to explain one unknown—the actual peculiarities—by something still less known—childhood" (p. 146).

In her 1936 paper, Horney states that she does not attribute less importance to childhood than does any other analyst, for childhood experiences determine the direction of the individual's development—by which I assume she means that childhood events lead to subsequent developments occurring between past and present, which also have a causal effect. She notes that childhood memories relevant to the current situation arise if the "upper layers" are carefully worked through.

Horney concludes this paper by saying that, if one persists in this way, the negative therapeutic reaction can be overcome; thus, unlike Freud, she does not think that such a reaction in itself implies a bad prognosis. Her overall view is therefore that the negative therapeutic reaction involves a hostile attack on the analysis and on the analyst, and she agrees with Freud's first view: that the negative therapeutic reaction occurs because of "defiance and . . . an attempt to prove . . . superiority to the physician." She sees this phenomenon as part of the masochistic character, and, for the most part, she does not agree with Freud's "truer and juster view" that it is based on unconscious guilt.

I find Horney's views on the role of childhood experiences in the negative therapeutic reaction a little inconsistent, for in an earlier part of her paper, she notes that the patient's hostile rivalry "may be traced back to childhood" (p. 33), and, a little later, she says that patients who demonstrate this reaction had childhoods lacking in warmth and reliability and rife with frightening elements, as previously noted. But toward the end of the paper, when describing her two rules summarized above, she says that she refrains from making any constructions of the past because adult beliefs and behavior are not explainable in terms of memories of the past alone.

This last part of Horney's paper raises questions about concepts of *time* and *causality* in psychoanalysis that have not been fully answered. I think it likely that Horney may have been developing her idea that it is not useful to explain the present in terms of the past for some time, although, as noted, she may have been influenced by Fromm and the neo-Freudians. Social scientists in the 1930s and 1940s were beginning to explain social structure not as the product of historical events, but rather as a system of inter-related parts influencing one another synchronically—that is, together, at the same time, and in the present (although Horney and the other neo-Freudians did not adopt this synchronic approach as enthusiastically as did British anthropologists of that period). Certainly, Horney was a cultural relativist, for she constantly qualified her explanatory generalizations by adding the words *in our culture*; unlike Freud and many others, she did not attempt to describe human behavior in general.

## A VIEWPOINT CONTEMPORARY WITH HORNEY'S

Riviere's classic paper of 1936 is rather different from Horney's. She believes that the negative therapeutic reaction is most likely to be found in narcissistic patients, and that the attacking elements are part of a manic defense against an underlying depression:

Observations have led me to conclude that where narcissistic resistances are very pronounced, resulting in the characteristic lack of insight and absence of therapeutic results under discussion, these resistances are in fact part of a highly organized system of defence against a more or less unconscious depressive condition in the patient and are operating as a mask and disguise to conceal the latter.  
[p. 307]

Riviere continues with an evocative, poignant description of the underlying depressive emotions that are defended against by the manic defenses of denial of psychical reality, contempt, depreciation, and control of objects. The patient uses projection and ra-



tionalization to deal with the apprehension of guilt and despair, according to Riviere. "The psychic truth behind his [the patient's] omnipotent denials," she writes, "is that the worst disasters have actually taken place; it is this truth that he will not allow the analysis to make real, will not allow to be 'realized' by him or us" (p. 312).

But Riviere does not think that patients who show the negative therapeutic reaction cannot be analyzed. By using Klein's idea of the depressive position and the object relations of the internal world, and recognizing that the patient feels undeserving of help from the analyst until he has helped restore and cure his internal objects, Riviere believes that the analyst may be able to reach the patient emotionally and help him to tolerate the intense pain involved in cure and in the depressive position. But she does not minimize the difficulties.

Riviere's paper has been very influential in Kleinian analysis, though, in my view, not primarily because it deals with the negative therapeutic reaction. It is regarded as an early and beautifully written statement about the *pathological organization*, that is, the constellation of anxieties, defenses, and object relations that locates the personality somewhere between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions in an attempt to escape from the problems of both. This idea has been adopted by many Kleinian analysts, most particularly Steiner (1993).

## LATER VIEWS ON THE NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION

Horney's 1936 paper and Riviere's almost simultaneous paper were followed by a large number of other papers on the topic, especially in the United States. A meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association focused on the topic of the negative therapeutic reaction in 1969, reported in detail in the *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* (Olinick 1970). Most later works on the topic cite Horney's paper and also, of course, Freud's work on the negative therapeutic reaction (1916, 1923, 1924, 1937).

Sandler, Dare, and Holder (1973) make a useful distinction between the *description* of the negative therapeutic reaction and the

*explanation* of it. They emphasize Freud's point that, after the patient recognizes some sort of improvement, his condition worsens. This has to be distinguished, they write, from episodes in which the patient disagrees with the analyst's interpretations or does not like them; according to Freud's definition, the primary criterion of the negative therapeutic reaction is that the patient's condition worsens (although neither Freud, nor Sandler, Dare, and Holder, claim that the negative therapeutic reaction is the only sort of occasion in which the patient's condition worsens).

There has been a tendency in many papers to broaden Freud's definition to include other sorts of negative behavior, a broadening that Sandler, Dare, and Holder deplore. Baranger (1974) also questions the appropriateness of extending the meaning of the term *negative therapeutic reaction* to cover other instances of difficult resistance, and Olinick (1964) writes that broadening Freud's definition "gratuitously nullifies the meticulous clinical observations of previous writers" (p. 542).

Although, in spite of this broadening trend, the description of the negative therapeutic reaction is more or less agreed upon, the explanations of it are much more variable. Many authors, unlike Horney, have adopted Freud's "truer and juster view" that unconscious guilt is the basic factor in the negative therapeutic reaction (Asch 1976; Gerö 1936; Lampl-De Groot 1967; Lewin 1961; Loewald 1972; Olinick 1964; Riviere 1936). Others, like Horney, think that masochism—or, in some cases, a combination of masochism and unconscious guilt—is the explanation (Brenner 1959; Eidelberg 1948; Olinick 1970; Renik 1991; Valenstein 1973). Many post-Horney authors also explain the negative therapeutic reaction as the result of the child's relationships in the early years of life (Anzieu 1986; Asch 1976; Chrzanowski 1978; Grotstein 1979; Kernberg 1975; Lampl-De Groot 1967; Limentani 1981; Loewald 1972; Olinick 1964, 1970; Valenstein 1973). Winnicott (1974) notes that a "fear of breakdown" often means that such a breakdown has already happened, a viewpoint anticipated by Riviere (1936).

Klein did not write a paper on the negative therapeutic reaction, although she discusses it in *Envy and Gratitude* (1957). Her

contribution to the understanding of the concept is her stress on envy, which she regards as having a constitutional basis. Her description of the way in which envy is aroused by good interpretations is very similar to Horney's description of the competitive patient's devaluation of the analyst's interpretations. But in Horney's picture of the competitive patient, envy is open and obvious, whereas Klein believes that envy is often unconscious, heavily defended against, and sometimes takes the form of an envious super-ego that begrudges the ego any goodness or success.

Klein also thinks that the depression likely to follow an envious attack will include severe persecutory anxiety, and she describes the particular defenses against envy in considerable detail. Envious impulses are likely to be split off from the rest of the self and denied, in her view, and the analyst needs to take great care in bringing these impulses to consciousness and in helping the patient integrate them with the rest of his personality. If this process is successful, then

. . . the split-off aspects gradually become more acceptable and the patient is increasingly able to repress destructive impulses towards loved objects instead of splitting the self. This implies that the projection on the analyst, which turns him into a dangerous and retaliating figure, also diminishes, and that the analyst in turn finds it easier to help the patient towards further integration. That is to say, the negative therapeutic reaction is losing in strength. [Klein 1957, p. 225]

Rosenfeld (1975, 1987) describes both Horney's and Riviere's papers in considerable detail, but his understanding of the negative therapeutic reaction is particularly influenced by his own work on narcissism. He thinks that narcissism involves a competitive struggle between the analyst, on the one hand, and a mad, narcissistic part of the patient, on the other, for the allegiance and loyalty of the dependent, infantile part of the patient. It is after a session in which there has been successful emotional contact be-

tween the analyst and the dependent part of the patient that a negative therapeutic reaction is most likely to occur. Rosenfeld writes:

I have observed that this negative therapeutic reaction is due to a powerful counterattack of the omnipotent narcissistic and often megalomaniac part of the patient which was felt to have been dislodged through the progress of the analysis and which reasserts its power by attacking and overpowering the infantile dependent part to re-establish the status quo and to regain control over the ego. [1975, p. 223]

He also notes that it is important to distinguish between attacks made by the narcissistic, omnipotent part of the self and attacks made by the superego, for interpretations referring to guilty feelings may cause severe confusion if the attack has come from the omnipotent, narcissistic part of the personality. He thinks that mania is not only a defense against depression, but that also, when linked with envy and triumph, mania becomes a cause of both depression and of the negative therapeutic reaction.

In my paper on the concept, I outline a clinical comparison of two patients' negative therapeutic reactions (Spillius 1980). The first, somewhat narcissistic patient made progress in analysis, followed by an openly envious attack of the type described by Freud, Horney, and Klein. His envious attack led to the sort of negative therapeutic reaction described by Freud, but he did not have the sort of unconscious guilt that Freud thought was characteristic of patients who show the negative therapeutic reaction. The second patient was very depressed and guilty, so that she fitted Freud's explanation of the negative therapeutic reaction, but her expression of it was much less clear-cut than that of my first patient. She nipped therapeutic understanding and improvements in the bud, so to speak, rather than making a clear advance and then an equally clear undoing of it.

One cannot generalize too much from such a limited comparison, of course, but this comparison has tended to make me think that Sandler, Baranger, and others are right in saying that even

when we apply a carefully limited definition of the negative therapeutic reaction, there is likely to be more than one explanation for it; the unconscious sense of guilt is not the only "truer and juster view."

Segal and Joseph have not written specifically about the negative therapeutic reaction, though Segal gives a striking example of it (1983, p. 271), and Joseph mentions the concept several times in *Psychic Equilibrium and Psychic Change* (1989); Joseph also says that she is always very much aware of it in her clinical work. Neither Segal nor Joseph cites Horney's paper, but the last part of Horney's paper, in which she describes her two rules for analyzing patients who show the negative therapeutic reaction, calls to mind Joseph's suggestions for analyzing *all* patients. When Horney writes, "I select out of the material offered by the patient those parts which I can relate to his reaction to the analyst," and "I refrain from making any construction of the past" (p. 41), I think that Joseph, in response, would say that her primary focus is on the analyst-patient relationship in the present, but that she would also make links to the past at times when it seems to be very much alive in the patient's feelings and thoughts—although she simultaneously recognizes that reconstruction can be used by both analyst and patient as a defense against the present.

Although Klein, Segal, and Joseph do not mention Horney's paper, it is likely that they knew about it. The connection between Klein and Horney was particularly close because they had known each other in Berlin, had the same analyst (although at different times), and Klein had analyzed two of Horney's children. Overall, I think that Horney's paper has become part of the general pool of psychoanalytic ideas, so that her colleagues have been influenced by it without being fully aware, perhaps, of the details of its effect.

## CONCLUSION

In her classic paper, Horney explains the negative therapeutic reaction mainly as an expression of narcissistic and envious attacks by a person of masochistic character. She thus disagrees with Freud's

explanation based on an unconscious sense of guilt, and she also disagrees with most of the many American authors who have written extensively on the subject, as well as with Riviere's contemporary paper on the same topic.

In her attribution of the negative therapeutic reaction to hostile, competitive attacks on the analyst, Horney anticipates the work of Klein and Rosenfeld on the role of envy and narcissism, in general, as well as their role in the negative therapeutic reaction, in particular. Furthermore, the last part of Horney's paper anticipates some of the modern Kleinian ideas about technique that are particularly associated with the work of Joseph.

The fact that there is considerable concordance between Horney's ideas and some of those of several Kleinian analysts raises interesting questions about how ideas are disseminated in psychoanalysis and how different schools of thought affect one another—often without the full awareness of those so influenced. Ideas and attitudes are often present “in the air,” rather than being specifically identified and recognized as having had general and long-term effects on the field.

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## THE PRINCIPLE OF MULTIPLE FUNCTION: OBSERVATIONS ON OVER-DETERMINATION

BY ROBERT WAELDER

The immediate occasion for the observations which follow is the new framing of the theory of anxiety which Freud has given in his book, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*.<sup>1</sup> Formerly it was assumed that anxiety originated in the id as a direct result of excessive, unrelieved tension and that during this process the ego was somehow overtaken as a defenseless victim. This Freud now modifies by stating that in a situation of danger, that is, in a threat of oncoming excessive, unrelieved tension, the ego may anticipate the latter in the form of anxiety, and that this anticipation then becomes the immediate signal which tends to induce the organism to adjust itself so as to avoid the danger—for example, flight, or any other appropriate protective measure—and thereby anxiety fulfils a biological function. This conception was naturally not intended to upset or displace the older theory, nor did Freud intend to say that anxiety could be caused first in this and then in that manner. The conception is, rather, that both manifestations—anxiety overpowering the

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<sup>1</sup> Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI.

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ego and anxiety as a signal through the ego serving a biological function—constitute two sides of one phenomenon. In other words, Freud describes the phenomenon both from the angle of the id and from that of the ego. This two-sided consideration gives rise to the presumption that the same method might be adopted and fundamentally applied to all psychic phenomena, and that a double or generally speaking multiple conception of each psychic action would not only be admissible but altogether necessary in the light of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis includes in the id everything by which man appears to be impelled to function, all the inner tendencies which influence him, each *vis a tergo*. The ego, on the other hand, represents the considered direction of man, all purposeful activity. When it is cold outside and I think of my gloves before I leave the house, I offer a typical everyday example of the working of the ego. Psychoanalysis, in so viewing the id and the ego, thus perceives man's being both impulsively driven and his being purposefully directed. This point of view has consciously and deliberately neglected the important problem, which of the two should be considered as primary and which as secondary; the fact has been ignored that it is important that psychoanalysis know both phenomena as well as the fact that being driven is the primary. The problems connected with this question are not within the scope of this paper and we shall limit ourselves from the outset to the statement that both phenomena are dealt with in psychoanalysis. The id is, so to speak, the continuation of that which the biologist knows as peripheral steering tendencies of living organisms, and the ego is the representative of the central steering in an organism. The scheme of processes in the id would then be, in short: instinct—instinctual expression; those of the ego, however, are: task—task-solving, or attempted solution respectively. The ego always faces problems and seeks to find their solution. Each of man's actions has in every case to pass through the ego and is thus an attempt to solve a problem. Even in the extreme case of an action carried out under the pressure of impulse which may seem at first to be driven purely by the instincts, the ego contributes its part; the imperatively appear-

ing demand for satisfaction is that problem proposed to the ego, the resulting action is the means to the solution of that problem.

If it is correct to designate the scheme of the processes in the ego as the attempted solution of problems, then we must further ask ourselves what those problems are to whose solution the ego is consecrated, in which characteristic types respectively can the manifold content of these actual appearing problems be classified. Some will clearly be those coming to the ego from without, or those which are placed before the ego by factors foreign to it, as, for instance, in the example of the impulsive action of the instinct. How many of such possible problems exist can be gathered by realizing how many agencies the ego faces. There is first the id, the world of the instincts which approaches the ego with its claims; then there is the outside world with its demands on the individual; there is, finally, in growing proportions from a certain time forward in the development of the individual, the superego with its commands and prohibitions. They all demand something and they all place the ego before the problem of finding ways and means to meet those demands, that is, the problem of finding attempted solutions. In addition, we would consider as a fourth problem that which imposes itself on the ego through the compulsion to repeat. Although it is customary in psychoanalysis to consider the compulsion to repeat as part of the id (its lowermost layer), it nevertheless seems to us propitious to distinguish between the claims of those impulses which require concrete gratification and the demands of the tendencies to repeat and continue former actions, even those which are unpleasant, or, more correctly, to distinguish between these two sides of the instinctive impulsion, without the intention in so doing to give a more far-reaching opinion concerning the status of the compulsion to repeat. If we are permitted to speak in this connection of the compulsion to repeat as of an agency of its own, the ego appears to be solicited by concrete problems from four directions: from the outside world, from the compulsion to repeat, from the id, and from the superego.

However, the rôle of the ego is not limited to this passivity alone. The situation is by no means so simple, the ego has more to

do than merely to take orders and care for their execution. Rather, it develops toward the outer world, as well as toward the other agencies in man himself, its own peculiar activity. This activity may be characterized as striving to hold its own, and beyond this to assimilate in organic growth the outer world as well as the other agencies within the individual. This activity of the ego is first noticed in the ego's contact with the outer world. But it seems that also in its contact with the instinctual life there exists from the very beginning this trend to coördinate itself with its central steering—a fact which seems to be proven in that the ego experiences each excessive *crescendo* of the instinctual forces as danger for itself and independently of any consequences menacing from the outside, a danger to be destroyed and its organization overwhelmed. Evidently, the ego has then also an active trend toward the instinctual life, a disposition to dominate or, more correctly, to incorporate it into its organization. The fact that there is a similar disposition of the ego towards the impulse to repeat, that the ego uses repetitions imposed on it by this deep-rooted disposition in order to overcome the menacing drives, has been emphasized by Freud from the very beginning when he introduced the concept of the compulsion to repeat.<sup>2</sup> In the real occurrence of the repetitions it is difficult to distinguish in how far the ego is subject to the compulsion from behind and in how far it uses it as a means to overcome the psychic experience; these two sides of the actual repetition can be separated only by abstraction. Furthermore, it would be fairly easy to illustrate by way of example that the ego also contains a similar tendency in its relationship to the superego.

The function of the ego is therefore not limited to finding attempted solutions for problems which are placed before it by the outer world, by the compulsion to repeat, by the id, by the superego, but in addition it assigns to *itself* definite problems, such as overcoming the other agencies or joining them to its organization by active assimilation. There are, then, eight problems whose solu-

<sup>2</sup> Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. Ges. Schr. VI, 202. (Trans. by C. J. M. Hubback, London, 1922); *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 110.

tion is attempted by the ego: four of these are assigned to the ego and the other four the ego assigns to itself. Or, even, better there are eight *groups* of problems, since what we have termed as problems contains in each instance a *group* of problems. (For example, the problem of instinctual gratification assigned by the id naturally contains as many problems as there are instincts seeking gratification.) Thus, the occurrences within the ego can be described as distinct attempted solutions; man's ego is characterized through a number of specific methods of solution.

It appears now as if our psychic life were directed by a general principle which we may name the principle of multiple function. According to this principle no attempted solution of a problem is possible which is not of such a type that it does not at the same time, in some way or other, represent an attempted solution of *other* problems. Consequently, each psychic act can and must be conceived in every case as a simultaneous attempted solution of all eight problems, although it may be more successful as an attempted solution of one particular problem than of another.

In a consideration of this principle, it first occurs to us that it is fundamentally impossible that any sort of an attempted solution could answer to a like degree and with equal success all eight problems, for these problems are of inconsistent character. Above all, the problems of the first group which are assigned to the ego are at variance with those of the second which the ego assigns to itself. For instance, instinct gratification is at variance with instinct control, and fulfilment of the commands of the superego is in opposition to the assimilating victory over the superego. As a rule, there will be still other contrasts between the problems, as for instance between those of the id and those of the outer world or of the superego. And, finally, other possible variances are to be found within a problem group, as for instance when opposing impulses demand gratification, opposing superego demands occur in definite conflict rising against the claims of the not less contradictory outer world, etc. The whole complex of the problems whose solution is constantly attempted by the ego, is consequently inconsistent in three directions and a complete simultaneous solution of these

eight problems is impossible. The character of each psychic act is thus proven to be a compromise, as psychoanalysis first discovered in the case of the neurotic symptom, which is a compromise between instinct and the defense against it. Perhaps this affords us a possible clue to the understanding of that sense of perpetual contradiction and feeling of dissatisfaction which, apart from neurosis, is common to all human beings.

It is thus fundamentally impossible for any psychic act to be to the same extent and with equal success an attempted solution for all and each of the several problems. If it is a necessary conclusion that under the principle of multiple function an attempted solution solves one problem with more success than the other, then we can understand the unique position of all psychic acts which approach such a far-reaching solution. This is in the first place true of the act of love if it is to combine completeness of physical gratification with a happy relationship. Fulfilment of the instinctual need, the deepest repetition impulse, a satisfaction of the demand of the superego, and the claims of reality are all contained therein as well as the redemption and the self-discovery of the ego in face of all those realities. It appears now that the unique importance of the act of love in the psychic household is to be understood as that psychic act which comes nearest to a complete solution of all the contradictory problems of the ego. Consequently, if each psychic act is in some way—no matter how imperfectly—an attempted solution of all other problems which are found in the ego, this is only possible because each psychic act is of multiple meaning. If perchance the work on a machine which in the first place is an attempted solution of the adjustment to the outer world, becomes even imperfectly an instinctual gratification, this is possible only because the work on the machine has in addition some other meaning. In other words: a multiple meaning corresponds to a multiple function.

These considerations bring us in close touch with one of the oldest and most familiar concepts of psychoanalysis—over-determination. It is over-determination which as one of the most fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis most clearly distinguishes it from other psychological schools. This concept was introduced in-

to psychoanalysis, as a result of empirical observation, first as something accidental which might or perhaps might not exist in a world more or less replete with diversity. Where it appeared, over-determination was explained by the fact that a psychic trend alone was not yet equivalent to psychic effectiveness and that only the conjunction of several trends would, so to speak, exceed the boundary value of psychic effectiveness. It is clear that this conception has been built up in analogy to those of the older neurology and that it shows a logical difficulty: there can be a complete determination—natural science knows the concept of the necessary and adequate causes—and as long as one remains within the sphere of natural science, it is difficult to understand in how far an occurrence should be determined more than adequately. In mathematics over-determination is even nonsensical: a triangle is adequately determined by three determining components; it is over-determined by four, i.e., in general, impossible. In psychoanalysis over-determination meets further a practical difficulty: in psychoanalytical application, psychoanalytical hermeneutics, the introduction of the concept of over-determination yields neither a guiding point nor a boundary for the expected reconstructions; over-determination opens onto infinity, as it were, and there is no principle of psychoanalytical hermeneutics that can set down any sort of postulate as to how far over-determination reaches and when it may be considered exhausted.

The principle of multiple function is perhaps in a position to meet all these difficulties. It is free from faults in logic for it no longer affirms that a psychic act is determined beyond its own complete determination, but only that it must have more than one sense, that even if initiated as an attempted solution for one definite problem, it must also, at the same time and in some way, be an attempted solution for other specific problems. The whole phenomenon of the multiple function and of the multiple meaning of each psychic act, then, is not—in analogy to the older neurology—to be understood through any sort of conception of a summation of stimuli and threshold values, but—parallel to the concepts of newer neurology and biology—is to be understood as the expres-

sion of the collective function of the total organism. Since the organism always reacts in its entirety and since all these problems are constantly living within it, each attempted solution of a problem must be conjointly determined, modified and arranged through the existence and the working of the other, until it can serve, even if imperfectly, as an attempted solution for all these problems and thus necessarily preserve its multiple meaning. There is nothing of the happen-chance in this procedure which may appear in one case and not in another; it naturally follows from the structure of the psychic organism. Finally, we have now a definite guide for psychoanalytic hermeneutics. The multiple meaning of a psychic act is clearly exhausted if it is interpreted as an attempted solution for all eight problems or, more correctly expressed, for the problems of all eight groups. The multiple meaning naturally has not ceased to be infinite, but there are certain directions marked out in this infinity. The valency which must be attributed to these various meanings is certainly not affected.

The principle of multiple function permits a series of applications of which only a few shall be outlined. In the first place, it explains pansexualism which has been made a basis for reproach to psychoanalysis, i.e., the propensity of psychoanalysis to look for a sexual meaning in all matters even when its realistic interpretation yielded a complete meaning. Inasmuch as each psychic act has a multiple function and therefore a multiple meaning and since one of these functions and meanings will refer to the problem of instinctual gratification (furthermore, the instinctual life of man is never entirely dormant), obviously everything that man does, all his purposeful action directed toward reality, must contain the elements of instinctual gratification. Thus, it is essential for psychoanalysis that it should in addition attribute a particular rôle to the drive for instinctual gratification and consider it, as a rule, the motor of what occurs. This second trait of psychoanalysis, as also the question of primary existence, will not be considered here; it follows from the principle of multiple function why it is admissible and proper to explain each phenomenon according to its sexual content.



The principle explains also the importance of sexuality for character development. Character is very largely determined through specific solution methods which are peculiar to each individual and which remain relatively constant during the course of time. However, in accordance with the principle of multiple function, these methods of solution must be so formed that they represent also a gratification for the dominant instincts of this person. If now the instinctual life is considered chronologically the prior and dynamically the more powerful in the whole structure, it follows that the dominant instincts influence the selection with regard to the choice of methods of solution possible for the given individual. In other words, the principle of multiple function proves the importance of instinctual life in the process of character formation. This subject will be further discussed when we consider the problem of psychoanalytical characterology.

The specific reactions to love and work in an individual manifest themselves as the expression of the principle of multiple function. They mean that a person is successful in loving or working (that is, in solving the respective problems) only when other specific impulses are thereby simultaneously gratified. From this one gains insight into such phenomena as anticathexis, reaction-formations, sublimation. Sublimations, for example, can definitely be termed such successful solutions of the problem of adaptation to the outer world or of mastering the outer world, as simultaneously and in accordance with another meaning which they carry, they represent successful gratifications of strong impulses. Through this principle it is further understandable that the orgasmic experience of the psychically abundant, diversified person can be much more intense and of quite another quality than the orgasmic experience of the less abundant and more superficial individual. For in the case of the more abundant individual who has in himself a more diversified set of problems, many more meanings converge at the time of the orgasm in the happy love relationship, and the act can represent a simultaneous solution in several trends. In the light of this principle, it would seem that psychoanalysis is a kind

of polyphonic theory of the psychic life in which each act is a chord, and in which there is consonance and dissonance.<sup>3</sup>

Above all, the principle seems to throw a certain light on three problems, on the problem of neurosis, that of character, and that of clinical manifestations. Neurosis in psychoanalysis was originally conceived as a compromise between two trends; thereby it was subject to at least two functions and meanings. Generalized, one may say that neurosis, as all other psychic phenomena, is a simultaneous attempted solution for every type of problem in the ego, and that it has accordingly the same abundance of meanings as corresponds to the contemporary psychoanalytical concept of the neurosis. A number of theories on neurosis have been formed with psychoanalysis alone or partially as basis. The first and simplest is that conceived by Adler, which sees in the neurosis merely the solution of one of the eight problems—the solution of the problem of how to master the outer world.<sup>4</sup> Since there are eight problems, eight such theories are obviously possible, each of which reflects only one side of the neurosis. Those theories which place the neurosis on two foundations go a step farther. They consider it the simultaneous solution of two problems—as for instance, instinctual gratification and punishment. A simple contemplation reveals that twenty-eight such theories are possible if one views these traits as having an equal right in the neurosis. A further amplification might be effected if one feature were subordinated to the other; for in-

<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, those phenomena are also embraced in this principle which must be ascribed to the "synthetic function of the ego." What impresses one as its characteristic synthetic function is that each act in the ego has a multiple function.

<sup>4</sup> It is understood, of course, that this is not the whole difference between psychoanalysis and individual psychology. For quite apart from the fact that psychoanalysis takes multiple motivation into consideration, it does not place equal value on each of the multiple meanings. In psychoanalysis the instinctual is sometimes considered as primary, while in individual psychology it is the being directed which is considered as primary and the instinctual life is seen as an expression of this being directed. This question, which can be called one of ontological primacy, will not be considered in this paper. It forms the central point of another work by the author which appeared in the *Verhandlungen der Internationalen Gesellschaft für angewandte Psychologie und Psychopathologie*, edited by C. Bonhoeffer and published by Karger in Berlin.

stance, punishment for the sake of instinctual gratification (incidentally, this last formula follows the theory of Alexander). A reverse subordination might also be visualized. If one were to unearth such possible theories—theories which view the neurosis as the simultaneous solution of three or more problems—and in addition to consider the possibility of subordinating one problem to the other, the number of such theories of the neurosis would reach many tens of thousands. The value of these conceptions—as for instance Alexander’s—would not be affected thereby. We may voice the expectation that these theories will not all be developed, for the principle of multiple function includes them all, leaving the study of the distribution of the valencies and of the various forces to which they are subjected to the investigation of specific clinical conditions or perhaps to the special theory of neuroses.

Then, too, certain statements can be made concerning the possibilities of a psychoanalytic characterology. The character of a person, as has already been mentioned, is determined through specific methods of solution in typical situations, which methods the person retains permanently (through the nature of his preferred attempted solutions). Thus expressed, it would seem at first glance that the character had no immediate connection with the instinctual life or the superego, for instinctual life and superego determine the *content* of problem groups, not the specific methods of solution which, *for* these problems, are selected by the ego. In the presence of any kind of instinctual disposition and for the purpose of its gratification, a great number of attempted solutions and accordingly a great many character types would be possible. On the other hand, however, this is opposed by the psychoanalytic experience that certain instinctual constitutions are accompanied by certain types of character, perhaps not with inevitable regularity but with a proven frequency. It is at this point that the principle of multiple function asserts itself. According to this principle the specific methods of solution for the various problems in the ego must always be so chosen that they, whatever may be their immediate objective, carry with them at the same time gratification of the instincts. However, in the face of the dynamic strength of human instinctual life this means

that the instincts play the part of choosing among the possible methods of solution in such a way that preferably those attempted solutions which also represent gratification of the dominant impulses will appear and maintain themselves.

This relation between a preferred attempted solution and the instinctual life may be illustrated by two simple examples. The first is the relation of oral impulse presentation and identification, made familiar to psychoanalysis primarily through Abraham's works. Identification is an attempted solution in a definite problem situation. It may be termed a character trait when a person in a certain situation of instinct, of superego demands, and of difficulties with the outer world, regularly finds the way out into identification as his specific method of solution in a diversified situation. Now we know that this propensity toward identification is developed particularly in the case of the oral character and we understand this factual association without further explanation. From the various methods of solution which are possible in the same diversified problem situations, the method represented by identification will be chosen preponderantly by persons in whom exist strong oral drives. This for the reason that in addition to everything else for which it is an attempted solution, identification realizes the gratification of those very oral impulse dispositions. Therefore in this case the oral impulse operates in a selective way—which is shown by the fact that among the possible methods of solution always those materialize which gratify the oral desires. A similar relation seems to exist between the disposition to passive homosexuality and the solution method of paranoid projection. In a situation of conflict each method of solution which perceives an experience as coming from the outside and itself passively surrendering to these outside forces, is an attempted solution for certain problems, is gratification of love and hate relationships, defense reaction, and others such. Moreover, the attempted solution (the projection) is itself a gratification of the passive homosexual impulse tendency. This perhaps renders understandable why this mechanism (that is, attempted solution) of the paranoid projection appears even exclusively or preferably in the case of passive homosexual impulse

disposition—which is to say that perhaps thereby the association of homosexuality and paranoia, for the time being purely empirical, becomes understandable.<sup>5</sup>

Let us turn back now to psychoanalytic characterology. We have seen that the right to set up character types according to the dominant impulses (for instance, to speak of anal, oral, or genital character) rests in the fact that according to the principle of multiple function the preferred methods of solution must be of such quality that as such (that is, as methods of solution according to the meaning of the act) they simultaneously represent gratification of dominant instincts, and that the person with a marked dominant impulse preferably inclines toward a certain method of solution. Here the word *inclines* must be emphasized, for on account of the enormous complexity of the problems constantly operating in the ego, the function involved cannot be one of exclusive validity. Also, in the case of an oral character, we naturally find other methods of solution than identification, the relationship between dominant impulses and preferred methods of solution being but one of a statistical frequency. However, for a future psychoanalytical characterology this carries with it the consequence that these methods cannot be linear but must be at least two-dimensional according to the dominant impulses and specific methods of solution, between which, of course, certain statistical relations will exist.

The examples mentioned, in which a method of solution (i.e., a certain element of form in the psychic life) is associated with dominant drives (i.e., contents) finally lead to the third phenomenon to which our principle opens up an approach: to the problem of form. This is just the problem which does not appear accessible from the psychoanalytical point of view which deals primarily with the psychology of ideational content. However, the principle of multiple function shows us that the forms of reactions appearing in the ego cannot be independent of the contents for they must be so constituted that according to their signification they appear at the same time also as attempted solutions of the content problems,

<sup>5</sup> These explanations apply to masculine paranoiacs and are not to be transferred to the apparently fundamental complicated associations in women.

as for instance instinctual gratifications. Thus, in one of the above examples, the settlement of certain conflicts of content through their projection—the specific paranoid mechanism—is doubtlessly something formal in the psychic life, and yet this form is not independent of the content (in the case of this example, of the instinctual life) because this form preferably appears in the case of an instinctual constellation which can also be satisfied through it or through its meaning. Hence it can be said that according to the principle of multiple function the content of the psychic life, above all of the instinctual life, has its importance for the choice of the forms of solution—briefly, for the form—and what possibilities there are in the treatment of formal problems in psychoanalysis is shown. One need not mention particularly that the problem of form in the psychic is in no way exhausted with the aforesaid.

The principle of multiple function may have its part, too, in social psychology. It implies the consideration of typically social phenomena in multiple function, that is, an historic movement with regard to its economic side (adjustment to the outer world or overcoming the outer world) with allowance for instinctual gratification, collective ideals, etc.

Finally, we may look for the operation of this principle even in dream life; the dream is the sphere wherein over-determination was originally discovered. Nevertheless, the general character of dreams remains the reduction of the psychic experience as well in relation to its content (receding of the superego and of the active problems of the ego) as in relation to the way of working (substitution of the manner of working of the unconscious for the manner of working of the conscious in attempted solutions) and finally in the chronological sense (receding of the actual in favor of the past). In consideration of all these reduction or regression developments which mean a change in the problems and a reversion in the specific methods of solution from the manner of working of the conscious to the manner of working of the unconscious, the dream phenomena can also be explained through the principle of multiple function. Every occurrence in the dream appears then likewise in

eightfold function or clearly in eight groups of meaning. The distinction of the dream is characterized only through the change or the shifting of the problems and through the relapse in the manner of working.

The question may now be asked, in what various ways is there a progressive development or change in the psychic life to which an individual is subject and which types of such change can be distinguished. Since each psychic act is at the same time an attempted solution of different problems, the psychic act necessarily changes itself when the problems change. Thus there is change or development on the basis of change or development of the instinctual life, of the outer world, or of the superego. Hence, through the biologically predetermined development of the instinctual life other problems will approach the ego in puberty than in the period before puberty, and accordingly change all happenings in the ego, all attempted solutions. The changing of the outer world places the individual at times before changed problems. We can also speak of a development of the superego. The superego itself originated as an attempted solution in a situation of conflict, then becoming constantly more and more independent, it had its own development. These possibilities are covered by the statement that psychic problems change their content; it could be amplified by saying that problems actively assigned by the ego itself have a progressive development as far as their content is concerned. Furthermore, we have the development of the *methods* of solution with two points to be distinguished; the development of the manner of working from the primitive-archaic to other forms, such as from the manner of working of the unconscious to the manner of working of the conscious, or from the magical thinking and experiencing of a certain childish stage to the thinking of the adult; then, the development of the methods of solution peculiar to the individual—which development constitutes that of the character and of the ego in the narrower sense. Finally, to be added as a further ground of development, we have the fact that each attempted solution issuing from the ego already carries within itself the tendency to its destruc-

tion, for scarcely is it fixed than it no longer constitutes a solution. Through each act the world is changed in all its elements; for instance, the outer world is changed generally, and something in the instincts is changed by what this act contains in the way of gratification or denial, and so on. To use a crude example: he who takes up a calling as an attempted solution of a situation of outer world claims, instinctual pressure, superego demands, and pressure of the compulsion to repeat, also as an attempt to master the compulsion to repeat, the drive of the instincts, the inner commands and the outer world claims, that person has through this exercise of calling created a new piece of reality; now a new outer world is there which sets up claims and which the ego tries to master, the new situation must change something in the desires emanating from the instincts, certain superego demands perhaps recede while others advance, etc. In short, through the attempted solution itself everything is changed, so that now new problems approach the ego and the attempted solution fundamentally is such no more. Thus in addition to the change of the various problem-assigning agencies, as for instance of instinctual life, and in addition to the development of the *methods* of solution, we may consider as a basis for the psychic development the property inherent in each attempted solution to cease being such with its fixation.

We see accordingly that an aspect of enormous many-sidedness of motivation and meaning of psychic occurrences results from psychoanalysis. Freud, in distinction from the other psychological schools, has from the very beginning founded the psychoanalytical way of thinking on the importance of the *vis a tergo* and the dependencies of the ego, and on the other hand has warned against the exaggeration of that point of view and also clearly rejected a demonological theory of psychic life.<sup>6</sup> The diversity of these associations may make it advisable to adopt a certain caution regarding premature simplification.

The conceptions of id, ego, and superego have not been used in this article in the sense of sharply distinguished parts of the person-

<sup>6</sup> Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 32.



ality. Rather does the application of our principle show that these elements are to be conceived as different factors evidenced in each psychic act of the adult human. The individual actions and fantasies have each their ego, their id, and their superego phase, as well as a phase conforming to the compulsion to repeat. According to this principle an eight-sided aspect can be demonstrated.

Finally, we may add some few remarks of an anthropological nature. It will seem to us as if these three elements of psychoanalysis—the phases of the psychic experience—correspond at the same time to stages in the organic life. The instinctual urge probably appears in all organic life. The ego, or something morphologically similar, appears where there is a central steering in the organism—which apparently corresponds to the severance of the individual from the botanical associations and the zoölogical individualization, but which may perhaps be attained only with the appearance of the central nervous system. The superego is the domain of the human being; it is that element through which man in his experience steps beyond himself and looks at himself as the object—be it in a way aggressively penalizing, tenderly cherishing, or dispassionately neutral—as, for instance, in the case of self-observation and the ability of abstracting one's self from one's own point of view.

Here belongs the ability to see a garden as a garden regardless of the place of observation, or the ability not only to experience the world in its momentary instinctual and interest phases but also to recognize that the individual is independent of his own ego and that this independence outlives his own ego. In this sense it is a function of the superego when man as the only living entity makes his will. The thesis that it is in his possession of the superego that man is distinguished from animal is proven by everything we know of animal psychology. Unfortunately, this subject cannot be further discussed within the scope of our present article. There is always the possibility of transcending the instinct and interest foundation in a given situation, of stepping beyond thinking, experiencing, acting—in short, of placing one's self in the realm of the superego. If this be true, it would seem that by Freud's choice of ele-

ments we have found the stages of everything organic: organic life itself, the central steering of the organism after the individuation of organic life, and finally man's reaching beyond himself. Perhaps the principle of multiple function in man's psychology is paralleled by a similar principle in animal life, though naturally with a lesser diversity on account of the poorer problem situation.

## “THE PRINCIPLE OF MULTIPLE FUNCTION”: REVISITING A CLASSIC SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER

BY DALE BOESKY, M.D.

Robert Waelder was widely regarded as a preeminent psychoanalytic theoretician, teacher, and author.<sup>1</sup> Born in 1900, the same year that Freud published *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Waelder died in 1967. While in his twenties, he was already prominently recognized in the circle of Viennese psychoanalysts for his incisive and searching intelligence and the intellectual vitality afforded him by his prior education in physical chemistry. His mastery of Freud’s theoretical evolution was leavened by his cultural and literary erudition, and when Freud’s radical theoretical proposals appeared in 1926 in *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*, there was no one as well prepared as Robert Waelder to explain to psychoanalysts everywhere how to integrate Freud’s prior views with his revolutionary new proposals about the relation of anxiety, defense, and symptoms. “The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-Determination” was written with this as its main purpose.<sup>2</sup>

With the erosion of time, it is often not appreciated today that reading Waelder’s classic paper without this essential contextual link to Freud’s historic monograph alters the meaning of the paper substantially. In fact, Waelder discussed Freud’s revolutionary proposals of 1926 three times. The first was his 1928 review of *Inhibi-*

<sup>1</sup> The German spelling of Wälder’s name was subsequently anglicized to *Waelder* in his American publications.

<sup>2</sup> The paper was originally published in German (Waelder 1930). The first English translation, by Marjorie Haerberlin Milde, was published in 1936 in *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. The paper was later retranslated by Muriel Gardiner and published as a book chapter (Waelder 1976).

tions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, and the second was “Das Prinzip der Mehrfachen Funktion: Bemerkungen zur Überdeterminierung,” published in 1930 (“The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Over-Determination” [Waelder 1936, 1976]). The third discussion appeared in “Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety: Forty Years Later” (1967). And because Waelder’s views changed importantly in this final paper, a fuller understanding of “The Principle of Multiple Function” requires reading his other discussions of the 1926 Freud monograph, in both 1928 and 1967.

The present discussion of Waelder’s classic paper was prompted by the wish of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*’s Editors to commemorate the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the continuing publication of the journal with a reconsideration of this famous article, first published in English by the *Quarterly* (Waelder 1936). I am grateful to the Editors for this opportunity to discuss the paper (though I assume individual responsibility for the views expressed here). The conclusion I have reached in revisiting this essay is that Waelder deserves more credit than he has generally received for formulating the implications of the tripartite structure of the mind that had been slowly evolving in larval form in Freud’s mind for many years before 1923, when his monograph *The Ego and the Id* appeared.

When I was a psychoanalytic candidate in the 1960s, there was a mythic belief in the schematic shift in Freud’s thinking between 1918 and 1926, culminating in his proposing the structural or tripartite theory and revising his views of anxiety, defenses, and the drives. Stein (1969) provided a penetrating discussion of the falseness of that view:

Sixty years ago, the theory of symptom formation reached a stage of elegance and inclusiveness which has so far been surpassed by no other clinical theory in our field. In an eight-page paper with the deceptive title, “Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality” (1908), Freud summarized what he had discovered up to that point, and managed to anticipate most of what was to be written of symptom formation during the succeeding sixty years . . . . [There follows an itemization of the nine formulas that Freud described in his remarkable 1908 paper.] *In these*

*nine formulas we may recognize not only the foreshadowing of ego psychology, but even more clearly the expression of a radically new and unique psychoanalytic approach.*

The symptom is seen not simply as the manifestation of a sexual drive, nor of the defenses against that drive, nor even of that conflict by itself, essential though each aspect may be. A psychological phenomenon is now to be regarded as having been determined by multiple factors and as representing multiple meanings. Waelder (1930) later elaborated this antireductive, antisimplistic point of view under the title "The Principle of Multiple Function." It has been of the greatest importance in psychoanalytic theory generally, especially so in our efforts to understand behavior and character. [pp. 675-676, italics added]

Freud was the inventor or father of the structural theory, but Stein is correctly crediting Waelder here as contributing far more than simply the translation or explication of Freud's views. I suggest that a careful reading of this essay by Waelder in the light of subsequent events supports Stein's view, because Waelder extended and deepened Freud's schematic proposals in very important ways, taking them to their logical conclusion in a manner that forever altered our theory of technique.

The chance to revisit this classic paper some seventy-five years after its initial publication confronted me with certain problems in translation. The initial, visible problem related to translating from German into English and had been unknown to me until now, because I had not been aware that the first English translation, which appeared in the *Quarterly* in 1936, was improved upon by a later translation (Waelder 1976). The less visible translation problem related to the profound changes that time has wrought over these seventy-five years. These include advances in psychoanalytic theory, changes in the *zeitgeist*, controversies about psychoanalytic epistemology, and changes in psychoanalytic theory and in my own experience as a psychoanalyst since I first read this paper.

The differences in the forcefulness and clarity of the two translations of the article are immediately apparent in comparing their opening statements. The Milde translation begins as follows.

The immediate occasion for the observations which follow is the new *framing* of the theory of anxiety which Freud has given in his book, *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* . . . . Formerly it was assumed that anxiety originated in the id as a direct result of excessive, unrelieved *tension* and that during this process the ego was somehow overtaken as a defenseless victim . . . . Psychoanalysis includes in the id everything by which man appears to be impelled to function, all the inner tendencies which influence him, each *vis a tergo*. The ego, on the other hand, represents the considered direction of man, all purposeful activity. [Waelder 1936, pp. 75-76, italics added]<sup>3</sup>

The Gardiner translation begins:

The immediate occasion of the following exposition is the new *concept* of the theory of anxiety which Freud has given us in his book *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* . . . . In his earlier concept, Freud assumed that anxiety *erupted* from the id as the immediate result of the tensions of excessive, unsatisfied *needs*, and that the ego was, as it were, a defenseless victim . . . . In the id, according to psychoanalysis, there is gathered together everything by which a person is driven, all inner tendencies which influence him, every *vis a tergo*. In the ego, on the other hand, reside all man's purposeful actions, his direction. [Waelder 1976, pp. 68-69, italics added]

This famous essay is packed with so many topics that I have perforce made arbitrary and personal choices about what to select for discussion. This has also been the occasion to reflect on what is most relevant in considering an esteemed colleague's writing that appeared originally about seventy-five years ago. First, it seems banal and patronizing to consider to what extent the ideas in the paper are "still" useful or "true." Who among us (Freud included) could write a paper that would not benefit from revision after the

<sup>3</sup> *Editor's Note:* In this article, page numbers from Waelder 1936 refer to the numbering in the republication in this issue, not to the original *Quarterly* publication of 1936.

passing of so many years? A more interesting focus of inquiry is what the questions and problems were that most interested the author at the time he was writing this paper. And to what extent were the solutions to these problems that seemed plausible at the time conditioned by the *zeitgeist*? How has time altered plausibility?

There is always the ambivalent danger of condescension or idealization toward an earlier generation when we attempt to translate ideas as old as those put forth in this paper. Moreover, highly important changes in his views occurred as Waelder himself grew older. The schematic, dogmatic style of the original essay (in either translation) was offset by his much later reconsideration of Freud's 1926 monograph entitled "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: Forty Years Later" (1967). The gradually widespread concretization of Freud's concepts of the tripartite theory concerned Waelder. By this time, the ego in the United States had metamorphosed into a concretized homunculus. He cautioned in his 1967 paper about the misleading tendencies of teleological explanations, and pointed out that the creation of the ego concept reflected the teleological fallacy of positing that the ego in its higher (levels of abstraction) operation was a problem-solving agent, and thus a teleological one. At this point, he had delineated his famous hierarchy of levels of abstraction, and he warned: "Teleological concepts may be quite illuminating on the clinical level, but the question is whether they are satisfactory as ultimate, irreducible constructs" (1967, p. 15).

Waelder (1962) made a highly important contribution to the clarification of the levels of abstraction in psychoanalytic discourse some thirty years after writing his 1930 paper:

In speaking of psychoanalysis or Freudian doctrine, one can distinguish between different parts which have different degrees of relevance. First, there are *the data of observation*. The psychoanalyst learns many facts about his patient which other people, as a rule, will not get to know. Among them are facts of conscious life which people are not eager to relate to others, not even to psychological interviewers, or about which they do not care to tell the

truth, or the whole truth, or of which they do not usually think but which will occur to them and which they will relate in the psychoanalytic interview because of its peculiar climate mixed of relaxation and discipline, of intimacy and personal aloofness. To this, one must add the things which are not conscious or preconscious but can send derivatives into consciousness under the conditions of the psychoanalytic situation. The psychoanalyst learns not only about all such data but also about the configurations in which they appear. All these form what may be called *the level of observation*. These data are then made the subject of interpretation regarding their interconnections and their relationships with other behavior or conscious content. This is *the level of clinical interpretation*. From groups of data and their interpretations, generalizations have been made, leading to statements regarding a particular type such as, e.g., a sex, an age group, a psychopathological symptom, a mental or emotional disease, a character type, the impact of a particular family constellation, or of any particular experience, and the like. This is *the level of clinical generalizations*. The clinical interpretations permit the formulation of certain theoretical concepts which are either implicit in the interpretations or to which the interpretations may lead, such as repression, defense, return of the repressed, regression, etc. This is *the level of clinical theory*. Beyond the clinical concepts there is, without sharp boundaries, a more abstract kind of concept such as cathexis, psychic energy, Eros, death instinct. Here we reach *the level of metapsychology*. Finally, Freud, like other thinkers, had his own philosophy, his way of looking at the world, and he was more articulate than many in expressing it. His philosophy was, in the main, the philosophy of positivism, and a faith in the possibility of human betterment through Reason—a faith which in his later life, in consequence of his psychoanalytic experience, became greatly qualified though not altogether abandoned. This may be called *the level of Freud's philosophy*. These levels are not of equal importance for psychoanalysis. The first two, the data of observation and the clinical interpretations, are entirely indispensable, not only for the practice of psycho-



analysis but for any degree of understanding of it. Clinical generalizations follow at close range. Clinical theory is necessary too, though perhaps not in the same degree. A person may understand a situation, symptom, or dream with little knowledge of clinical theory, and while this would certainly not be enough for a practicing analyst, one would yet have to recognize that such a person has a considerable measure of understanding of psychoanalysis. [Waelder 1962, pp. 618-619, italics added]

The "determinants" of simultaneously shaping influences of the id, ego, and superego are on different levels of abstraction than the meaning of any psychic act, of course. It is ironic that Waelder, who was destined to famously suggest these advantages of a stratified classification of levels of abstraction in psychoanalytic theory (see quotation above), was evidently unaware in 1930 that the "force" of the repetition compulsion was confusingly duplicated in his view of the "deepest layers of the id." It was not until 1966 that Schur suggested the presence of confusion among analysts about how to distinguish the id from the primitive or immature ego.

It is, of course, essential to reconstruct the historical context in which Freud introduced his new formulations about the nature of anxiety and symptoms, since that was the stimulus for Waelder to write this paper. Disagreements about what Freud "meant" or what he "should have meant" when he proposed these radical theoretical changes in 1926 continue to the present day. The later disagreement between some United Kingdom psychoanalysts and some United States psychoanalysts about whether the structural theory should *replace* the earlier topographic model has become quieter, but was never resolved, and many European analysts prefer to speak presently of the *first and second topographic models*, rather than of the structural model as replacing the earlier topographic one (Green 1977).

Almost forty years after Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* appeared, Arlow and Brenner (1964) found it necessary to further explicate the inadequate fit between the topographic model and certain clinical facts. They also mounted powerful arguments

to demonstrate the superiority of the structural over the topographic model.<sup>4</sup> Defenses are unconscious, so the placement of the cleavage line of conflict between the System *Cs.* and the System *Ucs.* in the topographic model was incorrect, according to Arlow and Brenner (1964).

The problem of guilt and self-directed aggression was poorly mapped in the earlier model, and so were repetition phenomena. In his earlier topographic theory, Freud stated that anxiety was produced by dammed-up libido that had been repressed; repression was the cause of anxiety. Of paramount importance in Freud's 1926 monograph was the modification (not abandonment) of this first economic theory of anxiety thought to form from repressed libido directly, as wine becomes vinegar.<sup>5</sup> But in his second theory of anxiety (1926), it is *anxiety that causes repression* rather than the reverse. In this discussion, Freud announced the cardinal danger situations of childhood: loss of the object, loss of the object's love, castration, and punishment by the superego. He now viewed anxiety as a signal of impending danger (as well as an economic consequence of dammed-up libido), although he never renounced his former view, which he retained in adherence to the existence of the *Aktual Neuroses*.

Much later, Waelder called attention to a widespread misunderstanding about the historical appearance of these ideas:

It is now widely believed that in Freud's lifetime psychoanalysis was for all practical purposes a drive psychology, a psychology of the id, and that balance was restored later, in the 1940s and 1950s, through the development of the new ego psychology. This to my mind is a myth; as myths do, it contains an element of truth under a thick crust of error. Its main disadvantage is that it blocks understanding of what actually happened, and so blocks the view to the underlying problems which, however unrecognized, are still with us. [1967, p. 12]

<sup>4</sup> Brenner (1994, 2006) has subsequently called for abandoning the structural hypothesis. For an opposing view, see Boesky (1994).

<sup>5</sup> I do not know the origin of this often-quoted analogy.

In 1926, Freud announced explicitly what he had been gradually recognizing for many years. The mere decoding of what the analyst could decipher in the associations of the patient and the act of telling the patient about the unconscious meaning of symptoms were neither mutative nor enduring in their effects. He had concluded by this time that it was better to investigate all sides of unconscious pathogenic conflict and to strengthen the ego by analyzing the *multiple determinants* of such conflicts.<sup>6</sup> Waelder's understanding of this is illustrated by the proleptic significance of his subtitle for this paper: "Observations on *Over-Determination*" (italics added).

Thus it was that, in the years from 1920 to 1926, Freud (1920, 1923) provided a new theoretical map of the abiding functional configurations that he called the *agencies* of the mind—the id, the ego, and the superego—and of their normal and pathological relationships with each other. It was this announcement of the *functional* "overdetermination" of neurotic symptoms that Waelder made his major topic in suggesting his principle of multiple function.

Notice here that *overdetermination* is used in a different connotation than previously. Until this point, the term *overdetermined* was used almost as a synonym for *multiple possible meanings*. An example of this usage, which I chose at random, is the following: "The tic was of course overdetermined. I do not here discuss its other meanings" (Bornstein 1945, p. 163). That loose connotation has, of course, persisted, and in fact eclipsed the connotation that Waelder now introduced.

McLaughlin (1978) called "The Principle of Multiple Function"

. . . perhaps Waelder's most seminal contribution to psychoanalytic theory and its basis for the adaptive viewpoint in metapsychology. In fifteen pages he so orchestrates the relationships between the basic *conflict*-resolving and synthetic functions of the ego versus the task-challenges set for it by id, repetition compulsion, superego, and outer world that his innovations seem to emerge inevitably out

<sup>6</sup> In the *New Introductory Lectures* (1933), Freud officially proclaimed the strengthening of the ego as the central mutative task of the treatment (p. 80).

of Freud's dual function concept of anxiety and his structural theory of personality. *Waelder applies his construct to modify and dispose of the alternative and older psychoanalytic concept of "overdetermination," whose inconsistency and lack of parsimony were already proving awkward.* [p. 431, italics added]

McLaughlin thus agrees with the earlier quoted comments by Stein (1969) regarding the manner in which Waelder's views elaborated and clarified Freud's evolving ideas about his own unsatisfactory, reductive earlier views on pathogenesis in the two decades prior to the publication of *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (Freud 1926). Waelder wanted us to understand that the other determinants of unconscious pathogenic conflict were the polyphonic interaction of the id, the ego, and the superego in their adaptation to the demands of reality and the need to repeat.<sup>7</sup> This represented a new theoretical home for the agencies of the mind. There were now two possible types of overdetermination, the first being the possibility for multiple meanings. This new connotative addition by Waelder constituted a functional mapping of the multiple, adaptive tasks in the polyphonic interaction of the agencies of the mind. Moreover, Waelder made it clear that this polyphony characterized every act of the mind, not just symptom formation.

This use of the term *determinants* figured prominently in Waelder's discussion, and this "enshrined an ambiguity"<sup>8</sup> in which he appears to have conflated two different definitions of *determinant*. In the context of dreams—to give an example of one definition—the meaning of any dream is always *overdetermined*, in the sense that valid views of the dream might express a variety of meanings, and,

<sup>7</sup> As far as I have been able to determine, it was Waelder (1976) who introduced this very apt analogy of polyphony. He said: "For in the case of the more abundant individual who has in himself a more diversified set of problems, many more meanings converge at the time of the orgasm in the happy love relationship, and the act can represent a simultaneous solution in several trends. In the light of this principle, it would seem that psychoanalysis is a kind of polyphonic theory of the psychic life in which each act is a chord, and in which there is consonance and dissonance" (p. 76).

<sup>8</sup> I have borrowed this metaphor from Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, p. 4).

as noted, *overdetermined* has been used to mean *having more than one meaning*. But in this paper, Waelder is speaking of the shaping influence of the agencies of the mind on any given mental act. And, because the id, ego, and superego simultaneously influence the mind at any point for all acts, then any particular act of the mind is *overdetermined*, because each of four tasks are integrated into every act: the influences of the id, ego, superego, and the repetition compulsion. The modern reader will, of course, recognize here the seeds of later controversies in our literature about the nature of the differences between meanings and causes, to which I will allude again in what follows (see Opatow 1996).

Waelder characterized overdetermination as one of the oldest, most familiar, and most fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis. He then made some prescient observations: “Multiple meaning corresponds to multiple function” (1976, p. 73), and a few lines later, he stated that:

Overdetermination encounters a practical difficulty in psychoanalysis: in the psychoanalytic method of interpretation the introduction of the concept of overdetermination offers neither a guideline nor a boundary for the required overinterpretations. Overdetermination is, as it were, open to infinity. No principle of psychoanalytic interpretation can give any guidelines as to how far overdetermination extends or when it should be considered exhausted. [pp. 73-74]

Waelder thus described the central problem in our methodology for validating interpretations—a problem that, to the present day, remains the Achilles heel of this methodology. His definition of this problem has never been surpassed.

Waelder clearly meant the term here to refer to more than one causal source and influence in the conflicted but integrated activities of the mind, rather than referring to the possibility of more than one meaning, perspective, or interpretation. Unlike the regulatory principles, the reality and pleasure principles, which govern the functioning of the mind under the sway of the drives or of reality, the principle of multiple function describes a theoretical map for

comprehensive understanding of the mind as a polyphonic instrument in its every act. The key word *principle* seems to reflect Waelder's ambition to place his proposals on the same high level of abstraction as that occupied by the reality principle and the pleasure principle. But, at the same time, he left the way open for us to decide in the future exactly where to place the "principles" in this emerging structural schema.

Waelder's ensuing discussion of overdetermination continues the conflation of function and meaning. If every psychic act has multiple functions, it must also have multiple meanings. And Waelder celebrates the fact that this theoretical provision for overdetermination distinguishes psychoanalysis from all other psychologies. He senses the possibility of the criticism that something resulting from either a necessary or sufficient cause cannot also be overdetermined. If by *determined*, we mean to connote causes that are both necessary and sufficient, there can be no supplemental determinants left over; a triangle is determined by its three components, and a fourth would be impossible to include.

So we come to the use of *determined* in two different senses: the first is *determined* in the sense of *caused by*; the second is *determined* in a loose sense as synonymous with meaning and in the equally loose assumption that meanings and causes are "almost" the same thing. The relationship between the concepts of meaning and cause are tricky and complex. In a panel discussion (see Opatow 1996, p. 639), Hanly raised these questions: Is meaning discovered or constructed in the psychoanalytic process? What is the relationship of compatibility between the understanding of a meaning and an explanation by a cause? Are these commensurable? Can subjectivity be rendered in objective terms?

Recent examples of a rather nihilistic pluralism in which no theoretical explanation can logically be considered to be better than any other is supported by the view that there is an infinite set of possible meanings for any clinical event. Waelder knew that. Yet there seems to be a category error here,<sup>9</sup> in which the fact that in-

<sup>9</sup> Philosophers speak of mixing two frames of reference as a *category error*—e.g., *purple patriotism*.

finite numbers of meanings can be assigned is erroneously compared with multiple purposes and functions in different parts of the mind. If a dream is viewed as a compromise formation, one analyst might make certain inferences about the manifest content of the dream, while another analyst might come up with a different interpretation. But that is in a very different frame of reference than is the suggestion that, in this dream, there is an active influence from a part of the mind other than the drives, the defenses, and the super-ego.

To help the reader better understand Waelder's view of multiple function, let me provide a brief reminder of his definition of the tasks of the agencies of the mind: "The scheme of processes in the id would then be: instinct-instinctual expression; and in the ego: task-task solution, or attempt at solution . . . . All human activity . . . has passed through the ego and is therefore an attempt to solve a task" (Waelder 1976, p. 69). Waelder asks, "What are the tasks the ego must confront . . . . First there is the id, the world of drives . . . . There is the outer world . . . and finally the superego" (p. 70).

Next, Waelder makes a proposal that has met the fate of non-acceptance by most analysts for many decades: he introduces the repetition compulsion on an equal footing with the world of reality, the id, and the superego as confronting the ego with essential tasks. He attempts to stave off criticism of his idea in this way:

It is usual, in psychoanalysis, to consider the repetition compulsion as the deepest layer of the id. However, it seems to me useful to distinguish between the demands of those drives that require concrete satisfaction and the demands of the tendency to repeat and continue earlier experiences, even unpleasurable earlier experiences. It is perhaps better to say, I shall distinguish between these two sides of instinctive force, without intending thereby to examine the position of the repetition compulsion. [1976, p. 70]

He asks us, then, to grant him the liberty of speaking of the repetition compulsion as of a separate force, and then suggests his famous proposal that "we see that the ego is confronted with concrete

tasks stemming from four different sides outside itself: the outer world, the repetition compulsion, the id, and the superego" (p. 70).

Waelder next contrasts the earlier (pre-1926) formulation of so-called automatic anxiety with Freud's new proposal that anxiety is a signal of the threat of a future build-up of accumulated tension. Thus, anxiety is a signal that allows the ego to take defensive steps to avoid such a danger. It is evident throughout Waelder's discussion that, for him, Freud's economic, theoretical commitment to the concept of libido and psychic energy and to the diverse vicissitudes of psychic energetic cathexes are a given—one that he does not think it necessary to question. Waelder cautions that this contrast of the older view of automatic anxiety with the later view of anxiety as a signal was not intended by Freud to indicate that the latter formulation should replace the former; rather, each theory represented one side of the actual phenomenon, described at one time from the side of the id and at another time from the side of the ego.<sup>10</sup>

Waelder was intrigued that this possibility of there being more than one perspective on the manner in which the mind functions might have deeper and more extensive applicability:

This twofold method of observation gives rise to the conjecture that this method might be applicable to all psychic phenomena, and that a twofold or perhaps, generally speaking, a manifold approach to each psychic act would be not only admissible but even required by psychoanalysis. [1976, p. 69]

It is with this idea that Waelder's paper comes to life for me. This prescient idea foreshadows what only later came to be called the *structural hypothesis*. One could conjecture about the modest tone Waelder takes in his terse suggestion about the requirement

<sup>10</sup> One might infer from this that, in disagreements between the two sides of the Atlantic about whether the structural model should replace the topographic model, Waelder would probably have held that the same principle applied: that is, that each theory describes events from different perspectives, rather than that one should replace the other. Arlow and Brenner (1964) viewed the topographic model as included within the structural, but there are complexities to such a view that are beyond the scope of this discussion.



that, from this point on, psychoanalysis would require a manifold approach to each psychic act. Certainly, this constitutes an important step beyond what Freud made explicit in 1926. One can only speculate about Waelder's modest tone in referring to his own addition to Freud's proposals, which may have been due to the fact that, at this time, Waelder was only thirty, and Freud, at seventy-four, had long ago *become Freud*.

The idea of the polyphony of mental functioning is the core concept of the principle of multiple function. If that idea was often implied in Freud's earlier and later views, to my knowledge, it was never stated as clearly or urgently by Freud as it was by Waelder in his 1930 paper (1936, 1976). Indeed, the full implications of Waelder's view of the polyphonic essence of the functioning of the mind in conflict are still being worked out in our diverse theories. And this view serves as a caution against reductive, one-sided formulations for those espousing some of our newer theories. The assumed role of psychic energy in all these formulations seems like the famous theoretical scaffolding described by Freud<sup>11</sup> as easily dismantled, but the essential concept of the polyphonic voices of the mind in conflict has remained intact.

Shortly after discussing these ideas, Waelder states the definition of the principle of multiple function:

The function of the ego is, accordingly, not limited to attempts to solve tasks imposed from without, namely, by the repetition compulsion, the id, the superego, and the outer world. On the contrary, the ego itself confronts these four regions with its own concrete tasks: to subdue them, or rather, actively to assimilate them into its own organization. So there are eight tasks which the ego must attempt to solve; four of them imposed upon the ego, and the other four imposed by the ego itself. Or rather there are eight

<sup>11</sup> According to Freud: "We are justified, in my view, in giving free rein to our speculations so long as we retain the coolness of our judgement and do not mistake the scaffolding for the building. And since at our first approach to something unknown all that we need is the assistance of provisional ideas, I shall give preference in the first instance to hypotheses of the crudest and most concrete description" (1900, p. 536).

groups of tasks, since each task I have mentioned contains a whole group of problems . . . . *So it would seem that there is a general principle which directs our psychic life, which we might call the principle of multiple function.* According to this principle, every attempt to solve a task is necessarily, at the same time, an attempt to solve other tasks, even if incompletely. Every psychic act can and must be understood as an attempt to solve simultaneously all eight tasks, although the ego may at certain times succeed better in its attempted solution of one particular task than of another. In considering this principle we are at once struck by the fact that it is completely impossible for the attempted solution to be equally successful at one stroke in regard to all eight tasks, since these are inconsistent with each other. [1976, pp. 71-72, italics added]

And, just a few lines later, he claims a much deeper significance for the principle of multiple function:

From this follows the compromise character of every psychic act; psychoanalysis found this first in relation to the neurotic symptom, which is conceived of as a compromise between drive and defense against drive; but it would seem that the compromise character in this more general sense must hold true for every psychic act. This principle may even provide a possible gateway to the understanding of the eternal contradictions and dissatisfaction which, quite apart from neurosis, form the common lot of mankind. [p. 72]

Thus, in Waelder's view, the functions of the ego are not limited to passive attempts to solve the tasks imposed by these four groups of force; the ego itself confronts each of them to assimilate them into its own organization.

It has been claimed subsequently that the principle of multiple function as described by Waelder was merely a description of the ego as a problem solver, and that Waelder scanted the role of conflict with his new view of multiple functions.<sup>12</sup> The above-cited par-

<sup>12</sup> What appears to be a more cogent criticism of the principle of multiple function is its commitment to the repetition compulsion, which to us today ap-

agraph is open to a different interpretation, in that compromise would be unnecessary if there were no conflict. In fact, the cited passage strongly resembles the definition of compromise formation that emerged in later decades.

Arlow repeatedly cited the principle of multiple function as a synonym for compromise formation over the span of many years. The following quotations illustrate this:

In *Inhibition, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (1926) Freud went to great lengths to define the nature of symptoms. The term symptom, he said, should be reserved for the result of the failure of defense against the derivative of an instinctual drive. The drive, in the symptom, had forced its way to satisfaction in spite of the determination and the efforts of the ego to prevent this. The resulting symptom, however, is a distorted and substitutive gratification. It has combined into its structure the ego's efforts to integrate the opposing claims of the id and reality as well. It follows in its composition, as Waelder pointed out later, the principle of multiple function. [Arlow 1963, p. 14]

In the context of intrapsychic conflict, the ego integrates drives, defense, memory, fantasy, and superego in keeping with the principle of multiple function. [Arlow 1969, p. 38]

For purposes of presentation, till now, it has been necessary to isolate the specific functions that unconscious daydreams may serve. It must be remembered, however, that in common with all other mental products, the effects of unconscious fantasy are governed by the principle of multiple function . . . . Id, ego, and superego derivatives may all become manifest in a conscious experience that is determined by unconscious fantasy even though the conscious disturbance is only of minor significance. [Arlow 1969, p. 19]

Under the dynamic conditions that govern the psychoanalytic situation, affects appear as a part of the continuum of

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pears as something of a "scaffolding" that is extraneous to modern views of repetition phenomena.

psychic experience. They are compromise phenomena shaped by contributions from each of the major components of the psychic structure, in conformity with the principle of multiple function (Waelder 1936). [Arlow 1977, p. 159]

There have been several attempts to split the superego as a structure, sharply separating the elements into ego ideal and superego proper respectively, the former emphasizing the “dos” and “ought to,” the latter representing the “do nots” and “must nots” (Nunberg 1926); (Piers and Singer 1953); (Lampl-de Groot 1962). On the basis of such a delineation of function, specific affects like shame and guilt could be assigned roles as regulatory agents of superego functioning, evoking specific dangers associated with prototypical, developmental encounters. While such efforts would be welcome as an attempt to simplify and clarify clinical observation, the data refuse to fall in line. The all-pervasive principle of multiple function (Waelder 1930) works against such efforts. Besides, the idealizing “ought to” is the other side of the coin “must not.” For example, someone who pursues a narcissistically grandiose ideal of perfection may experience failure in terms of an inner voice commanding, “You must not be less than perfect.” [Arlow 1982, p. 236]

Waelder offers a justification for his views that suggests a disquieting parallel to a tendency seen in our recent literature to use neuroscience to justify some of our theoretical assumptions. He states:

The entire phenomenon of the multiple function and the multiple meaning of every psychic act is then no longer analogous to older neurological conceptions pertaining to the summation of stimuli and threshold values; rather, it is, in accord with more recent assumptions of neurology and biology, to be understood as an expression of the total function of the organism. Since the organism always reacts in its entirety, and all these tasks are constantly alive within it, every attempt to solve a task must be codetermined, changed, set right, through the presence and effectiveness

of the others, so that it will serve, even if incompletely, as an attempt to solve all these tasks, and thereby essentially maintain its multiple meaning . . . . Finally it gives us certain guidelines for the psychoanalytic principles of interpretation. The multiple meaning of a psychic act is obviously exhausted when it has been interpreted as an attempt to solve all eight tasks, or more correctly, the tasks of all eight groups.<sup>13</sup> [1976, p. 74]

Waelder recognizes that multiple possible meanings are unceasingly infinite. The inexhaustible supply of rival meanings for any clinical event has always been a core problem in our methodology of evaluating clinical evidence. Only certain directions are traced out into this infinity. But Waelder was not prepared to discuss this problem further until he returned to it in an elegant discussion of the problem of psychic determinism and prediction (Waelder 1963). What is striking in this appeal to neuroscience is that he provided no clinical data even to illustrate, let alone to support, his theoretical views.<sup>14</sup>

By reminding ourselves that, even today, a consensually accepted integration of the topographic and structural models is still unachieved, we might better appreciate what may have been Waelder's perspective on the importance of issuing a clarification of Freud's views on the tripartite structures of the mind in 1930. This complex problem of arriving at a satisfactory integration of older and newer theories has highly important and timely relevance in our present era of pluralism. One can hope that some of the old lessons learned about the problems of reconciling the structural and topographic models will be instructive in our contemporary disagreements about integrating older knowledge with newer theories.

<sup>13</sup> In this passage, Waelder once again uses meaning and function interchangeably, as though inferring a function and inferring a meaning could be viewed as comparable categories. This is another example of the category error noted earlier.

<sup>14</sup> Waelder resembles Hartmann in providing no clinical evidence to illustrate his views.

At the very outset of "The Principle of Multiple Function," Waelder contrasts Freud's earlier and later views of anxiety. In the earlier view, anxiety erupted from the id due to excessive accumulation of ungratified needs. The ego in that early view was a defenseless victim. In later years, it has been common to contrast the pre-1926 theory of anxiety and repression in simple contrast to Freud's later views. Before 1926, repression of libido was believed to cause it to be dammed up, which, for quantitative reasons, could lead to automatic anxiety. It was then said, after 1926, that exactly the reverse occurs: that anxiety causes repression (in the generic sense of *repression* as a global term to encompass all the defenses).<sup>15</sup>

Let us return now to the question of the sole versus multiple sources of automatic anxiety that Waelder barely considered in his 1930 paper (1936, 1976). At that early point, he merely contrasted the automatic and signal theories of anxiety and did not return to the question of automatic anxiety due to sources *other* than repression of libido. Those other sources were thought by Freud (who never recanted these views) to occur in the actual (*aktual* in German means *contemporary*) neuroses. By definition, the *actual neuroses* were thought by Freud to be due to contemporary (*aktual*) pathological accumulations of libido, and were not influenced by ideas, conflict, or motivation.

This marks one of a triad of paradoxical, "nonpsychological" phenomena in Freud's canon. Typical dreams, symbols, and actual neuroses were "beyond" interpretation. Because these phenomena were either biological or innate, one could forego a search for meaning in them. Associations for typical dreams were not forthcoming, in any event, and one could simply translate them just as one would a symbol, and, in the same manner, the actual neuroses were due exclusively to the toxic accumulation of pent-up libido that followed unhealthy sexual practices. Masturbation, *coitus interruptus*, and prolonged abstinence could produce neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis, or hypochondria. Very few analysts today, if

<sup>15</sup> At this point, Freud had just proposed using the term *defense* in the generic sense and returning to the use of *repression* as the description of one specific defense.

any, accept this concept, but Waelder, like Freud, maintained the plausibility of the existence of actual neuroses until the end of his life.<sup>16</sup>

When Waelder returns to a discussion of the actual neuroses in his 1967 paper, he acknowledges that most analysts have rejected the notion. But he nevertheless advocates keeping an open (*sic*) mind about this concept:

But whether or not *Aktualneurose* exists, it seems to me that there are phenomenological characteristics of neurotic anxiety—a kind of frustraneous excitement—which remind us of some sexual manifestations, so that the possibility of relationship between anxiety and sexuality should not be so easily dismissed. [Waelder 1967, p. 24]

In “The Principle of Multiple Function,” we note that Waelder’s views about the mind centered on his definition of the ego, whose task it was to deal with the problems of demands from the id, the superego, and the outside world of reality, and also with the innate human demand to repeat. He reasoned that, even though psychoanalysis viewed the repetition compulsion as a part of the deepest layers of the id, it was nevertheless useful to distinguish between the demands of the drives that require satisfaction, on one hand, and the demands of the tendency to repeat and continue earlier experiences, on the other. One is reminded of George Santayana’s aphorism, “Repetition is the only form of permanence that Nature can achieve.”<sup>17</sup> So Waelder decided to grant to the repetition compulsion not only an actual existence, but to favor it also with full “agency” status (although he called it merely a “force”) in its postulated relationship with the ego.

Waelder was keenly aware in his 1967 discussion of the pitfalls of teleological reasoning. He argued in that context that the ego concept was burdened with its teleological origins because it was defined in terms of its functional purposes.

<sup>16</sup> For now-rare discussions favoring retention of the diagnosis of *actual neurosis*, see Blau (1952) and Fenichel (1945).

<sup>17</sup> See the following two Web sites: [www.fengshui88.co.nz/fly.html](http://www.fengshui88.co.nz/fly.html) and <http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/FLAOH/cbnhtml/quotes.html>.

Waelder was silent on the relation between the death instinct and the repetition compulsion postulated by Freud in his original introduction of the repetition compulsion (1920). This is the second time in the 1930 (1936, 1976) and 1967 papers that we see evidence of Waelder's continuing belief, throughout the course of his career, in the viability of a concept that many analysts have rejected. First the concept of the actual neuroses met this fate, and later the repetition compulsion.

Over the years, an extensive critical literature about the topic of the repetition compulsion has accumulated. Challenges to its acceptance have been widely accepted as persuasive by most analysts in this country. It is a concept that ultimately succumbed to more than one objection. Perhaps the principal initial criticism was its claimed link to the death instinct,<sup>18</sup> but the problem of accounting for the mastery of trauma, and an increased appreciation for the psychological complexity of repetitive phenomena, were probably important related factors in its gradual fading from prominence. It is a classic example of a teleological concept in that it was claimed to exist so that it could be postulated to serve a function: that of causing repetition in human mental life.

Kubie (1939) noted that repeating could be more economically explained on the basis of three factors: the cyclical nature of the drives; the continuing efforts to gratify drives whose gratification had been blocked before; or the belated effort to master trauma. Fenichel (1945) essentially agreed, and Schur (1966) published an extensive critique of the repetition compulsion. The point here is that these withering attacks on the concept of the repetition compulsion preceded Waelder's 1967 reassessment of his original views of Freud's 1926 monograph as they had been expressed in 1930 (1936, 1976). And, like Freud in some instances, Waelder did not acknowledge these criticisms or reconcile his earlier and later views.

Loewald (1971) again provided a comprehensive critique of the vagueness and incompleteness of prior notions of repetition, and

<sup>18</sup> Flügel (1953) voiced the consensus of many analysts in the middle of the last century when he described the death instinct as an embarrassment.



Inderbitzin and Levy (1998) called for the abandonment of the concept of the repetition compulsion. These selected references to a large literature provide merely a sampling, because the point at issue is the general rejection by most analysts of this idea of a compulsion to repeat as a motivating, separate entity in the mind.

It is worth pondering why Waelder maintained his belief in the repetition compulsion to the end of his life. At the very least, we can say that he never retracted or modified his views about it in print. This was clearly not because of intellectual or scientific gaps in his thinking or information. The evidence for that is that he mounted highly sophisticated discussions about the pitfalls of teleological arguments in his 1967 reconsideration of Freud's 1926 monograph. There he argued forcefully that merely postulating the existence of a phenomenon that serves a purpose does not explain its formal causes. He also warned that explanations in terms of purpose have little predictive value; such explanations would have predictive value if all organisms were always able to realize their purposes, but in that case, knowledge of *purpose* would mean knowledge of *behavior*, and we know that this is not always the case.

So, having written one of the finest critiques of teleological reasoning in our literature, Waelder still adhered to an egregiously teleological concept—for, if ever there was a teleological concept, the repetition compulsion would serve as an egregious model. One can only indulge in idle speculation about this paradox in Waelder's thinking; we will never have an explanation of it.

It has been a complex and rewarding experience to reread and discuss this classic paper with which Waelder far extended Freud's views on the interaction of the agencies of the mind. And with this paper alone, he earned a place in our pantheon. We can be very grateful that his work continues to profoundly illuminate our thinking.

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## RESPECTING THE UNITY OF MIND: WAEOLDER'S 1936 MULTIPLE FUNCTION PAPER

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The whole phenomenon of the multiple function and of the multiple meaning of each psychic act, then, is not—in analogy to the older neurology—to be understood through any sort of conception of a summation of stimuli and threshold values, but—parallel to the concepts of newer neurology and biology—is to be understood as the expression of the collective function of the total organism . . . . The organism always reacts in its entirety. [Waelder 1936, pp. 81-82]<sup>1</sup>

Freud's theory of the mind gave psychoanalysts a way of looking at patients as both single persons and warring collectives all at once. Among the conflicting "elements" inside people were, first, consciousness and unconsciousness, and later, id, ego, and superego. But since these were reflections of a single person, they had no sharp boundaries (and what is a boundary if it isn't sharp?). Fantasies floated over the whole topography. Ego and id were only vaguely distinguished (as Freud emphasized in 1937, and as was discussed by Gill [1963] and Schur [1966]; see also Friedman 1973). And the superego seems a really separate thing only when mistaken for the conscience of common parlance.

Practicing analysts, searching for a handy conflict to separate one item from another, naturally preferred the internally negotia-

<sup>1</sup> *Editor's Note:* In this article, page numbers from Waelder 1936 refer to the numbering in the republication in this issue, not to the original *Quarterly* publication of 1936.

ting mind to the blended glob. But they could not rest with that, because therapeutic leverage comes from attributing purpose to a whole person, no excuses allowed for a subversive agent in the basement ("my superego made me do it"). So both clinic and coherence required theorists to fill in the unfinished business of Freudian theory and do justice to the whole mind.

The call is not eagerly answered. A divided mind was easier for theorists to visualize and diagram than a mind that is both unitary and divided. To say outright what the false borders actually mean for a whole mind, one must slide forward and backward in abstraction, erasing and overwriting again and again on the theoretical blackboard. It taxes the theorist's subtlety. No wonder that post-Freudian elaboration of the holistic aspects of psychoanalysis mostly awaited analysts of a somewhat philosophical bent, who elaborated what (for the most part) became known as ego psychology (though the name makes us wonder how a merely hypothetical part can have a psychology). Ego psychology is not universally admired, and moreover it takes different directions that are at odds with each other. These battles suggest that there is more at stake than conceptual cleverness in choosing terms for ego psychology.

Readers of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* have been privileged to see milestones in this internal debate, by Waelder (1936), Hendrick (1942, 1943a, 1943b), Hartmann (1951), and Brenner (2002). We should see these in relation to the work of Glover (1955), Loewald (1960), Gill (1963), Schur (1966), George Klein (1976), Robert White (1963), Holt (1962), Arlow and Brenner (1964), and Schafer (1976). They all faced the problem of the many-in-the-one, but both their theoretical interests and their practical concerns vary in interesting ways.

## PARTS AS ASPECTS

Reprinted in this issue is Robert Waelder's famous "The Principle of Multiple Function" (1936). Waelder is conspicuous among his colleagues for his interest in epistemology and the place of psy-

choanalysis in society and culture. He is a philosopher among practitioners. His principle of multiple function is known to every analyst nowadays, and routinely cited as an accepted directive for practice.

Although the paper presents a realistically clinical and startlingly modern version of structural theory (in 1936!), the writer is clearly most interested in how it bears on the defining problem of hermeneutics: is there a principled way to parse human meaning in its various expressions? As to Freudian parsings, Waelder answers cautiously; he believes that psychoanalysis takes sexuality as fundamental, but he will not argue that position in this paper. The most he will say—and is pleased that he can deduce at least this from a nonpartisan hermeneutic principle—is that, since sexuality is an organismic demand, it must find some sort of expression in all of the organism's behaviors (and human meanings). In later work, Waelder (1962, 1970) will study the place of psychoanalytic meanings among all the others, and also describe the various levels of meaning within the psychoanalytic purview. But in the essay reprinted here, he wants mainly to show that, when it comes to the output of the whole mind, even just the bare three structures of psychoanalytic theory, taken together with the repetition compulsion, support a myriad of meanings, collectible in eight categories.

Keenly aware that presenting such a whole mind to a practicing analyst would seem to confront him again with the same raw and blurred phenomenon that psychoanalytic theory was supposed to carve into pieces for interpretation, Waelder does his best to specify at least separate *sorts* of directions the human animal inclines in, and he hopes that will help the clinician in his work. By ringing the changes on his structural categories, he deduces problems of negotiating and exploiting four demands: demands from instinctual tensions, self-reflecting attitudes (super-ego), the external world, and the organism's tendency to persevere.

Waelder visualizes the ego's problem with each of these as twofold: it must partly serve each demand, and it must turn it to advantage. Thus, the ego must find a way to satisfy instinctual de-

mands while bending them to its own purposes; it must meet super-ego standards, but also use that discipline to forward its own aims; it must be realistic, but in a way that forwards its preferred directions; and it must accept psychic inertia while drawing structural strength from that blind force. Waelder thus lists eight classes of problems, of which four are imposed on the ego and four derive from its own nature. (Waelder says the last four are tasks that the ego "assigns to itself," p. 78.) All of these problems are solved to some degree in every human act, and that simultaneous solution is what is meant by *the ego*.

Obviously, these types of problems are very abstract, and the clinician may find this way of looking at process less useful than parsing meanings into individual drives, self-judgments, and defenses. But that is exactly Waelder's point: if they listened to Waelder, analysts would be debarred from finding "the" meaning of a patient's message, and could no longer justify tracing symptoms or character types in a linear fashion to efficient causes such as fixations (though Waelder says that a "preponderance" of one or another goal can be assessed). As it happened, it was easier for the average clinician to simply assimilate Waelder's principle to the ordinary overdetermination they had always known, and it is likely that many persisted in looking on each psychic happening as the result of a characteristic drive, a characteristic satisfaction of the superego, and a characteristic way of fitting onto reality.

In other words, analysts could think of "multiple function" as simply a reiteration, rather than a reinterpretation, of overdetermination, and a license to simply multiply meandering speculations along familiar "drive and defense" lines. "Multiple function" seems to have slipped into the treasury of pious jargon without attention to its subversiveness. But, in effect, Waelder had begun to dig up the old ambiguity about drive and meaning that was buried in the structural theory. Others would later worry that problem to a frazzle, with fateful consequences for theory and practice.

The theoretical part of the puzzle was how to fit parts into a whole mind. Hanging on the answer was the critical treatment problem of how to nonarbitrarily characterize a person's particu-

lar purposes. It was a problem that would gradually overwhelm psychoanalytic theorists.

## WAELDER'S LINE OF ARGUMENT

The translation of Waelder's paper appeared in *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* at the same time that the journal was serially publishing a new translation of Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (1926 [1936]). Waelder's paper is separated from the second installment of Freud's paper by only one article (Horney's on the negative therapeutic reaction<sup>2</sup>), and Waelder starts his exposition by claiming that Freud's new work is not just a new theory of anxiety. It is a clarification of how structural terms should be understood in general. Waelder moves so quickly and casually from Freud's new, psychodynamic theory of anxiety to his own ideas about human meaning that a reader might unfairly suspect him of using Freud's innovation simply as cover to protect his own innovation. What makes it hard at first to see the connection between Freud's essay and Waelder's is that Waelder is selecting one arm of Freud's paradox. He is elaborating the semantic part of a hybrid theory that flickers between psychic physiology and human meaning, while pretty much ignoring the other arm of the paradox (which emphasizes a mental reflex, as signal anxiety is often understood).

Waelder may have thought that the anthropomorphic ego in Freud's rhetoric was so obviously a metaphor that nobody would take it literally, and so he could simply begin with its purely logical significance. In any event, he did not concern himself with Freud's literal image. On that literal level, Freud was saying that, if an on-rushing impulse would precipitate too much fearsome danger, a part of the mind (the ego) foresees the danger, and allows a bit of the predicted fear to be felt, so that the impulse will trigger its own repulsion from awareness. A reader naive to Freud's research program wonders why, if the ego is strong enough to limit the sampling, it cannot avoid the experience altogether. Why is any actual

<sup>2</sup> *Editor's Note:* Horney's article is also republished in this issue, pp. 27-42.



fear necessary to accomplish this repression? Why doesn't the mere cognitive appraisal accomplish the same thing (as Herbart [1891] might have said)? The answer, of course, is that Freud was trying to trace the *forceful interconnections* of the parts of the mind, and in order to connect *force* to the *person* whose mind it is, he had to superimpose a system of reason and purpose upon a prior theory, according to which a physiologically derived impulse physiologically determines an outcome by means of a physiological pleasure-pain principle.

In other words, Freud needed a theory that would go on respecting underlying biological automaticity but would eliminate a non-ideational stimulus as an actual player on the mental stage, and replace it with such things as foresight, meaningful threat, and purposeful reaction. Freud wrote his monograph so that, as a *psychological* event, anxiety should no longer be regarded merely as an expression of a vague too-muchness of stimulation. But in order to link a semi-biological event with a semi-ideational principle, he needed a bridge, and he found it in a reasonable repressed fear "signal" that reasonably interacts with the most basic organismic reasonableness—the pleasure principle. In this schema, both the disturbing impulse and its reason for unconsciousness are alike suffused with ideation.

According to Freud's new theory of anxiety, there is a brief, imaginative (i.e., dramatic) *anticipation* of consequences, and there is a *handling* of the awareness (by repression) that is not only an automatic *reaction* to the pleasure principle but is also, at the same time, an *action* by a "rational" appraiser—an *appropriate* action in the (logical) light of the foreseen causal consequences. In effect, analysts were being told never to say about patients "there was no motive in that psychic event; that's just the way it happens." Analysts could now see *reason* in the patient's resistance to treatment and avoidance of "health," and they gained new leverage to help patients *sympathize* with their own deviousness and pain. This shift in emphasis also brought a welcome bonus: it was now possible for an analyst to picture himself as a tolerant liberator rather than an impatient coach or disciplinarian.

So the clinical implications of Freud's new theory were profound, but that does not seem to be what excited Waelder. What impressed him (or gave him license to speak hermeneutically) was that, if you contrast this theory with the previous theory, where one part of the mind (id) threatens to overwhelm the other part (ego), in this essay the parts do not seem to be parts after all (just as Freud had always maintained).

Instead of a weak ego *using* the pleasure principle to *manipulate* a powerful, blind impulse, one can say that "the ego" represents the potential future of the impulse-in-action. Instead of the ego *preferring* a tiny anxiety signal to the giant fear that would accompany a real danger, we might say that the ego *is* the potential, integrated, articulated meaning of an impulse over time, extending to its dangerous consequences. In other words, once we stop thinking in terms of animated parts, and think instead of the abstract features named by those parts, the mission of the anxiety "mechanism" looks quite different. It amounts to this, that in a well-functioning mind, there *is* no unarticulated and unrelated movement into danger that would threaten survival. The theory of signal anxiety is a way of saying that the impulse is *not* unarticulated, after all, but is already "half-articulated" (in other words, it is subliminally visualized in a causal context), and therefore safely repressed. We put that in picturesque language when we say that the repressed impulse has been fleshed out with realistic implications "by" the ego.

But since, now, *Freud's new theory has managed to drench every component of the danger reaction with tincture of ego, the question arises of what could possibly be "left over" that is not ego.* Waelder's answer is this: If the ego is, so to speak, what the impulse means in real-world terms (i.e., as an actual intention), the only thing that would not be ego is the opposite *aspect* of the mind. That is the aspect Waelder found in the theory of signal anxiety, where the id is recalled as something organically sourced, but (in some sense) not yet fully defined. The blind push of organic tension (which Waelder calls peripheral tendencies, and presumably includes stimulation from erotogenic zones) cannot be thought of as a pur-

poseful agent to be subdued by another agent (the ego). Waelder thought Freud made that clear in *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (1926 [1936]), and he saw that monograph as a lesson in how to understand psychoanalytic terms.

According to Waelder, Freud revealed psychoanalytic theory to be a diagram of the double nature of mind—a product of both biological force and personal intention. (This roughly corresponds to Ricoeur's [1970] characterization of Freud's formula as the union of force and meaning.) The id is not a person's wish shoving up against a frightened ego. A wish is something that is *already* purposeful, and purpose is already *ego*. One should not think of the new theory of anxiety as a sketch of a Rube Goldberg sequence (A does something to B, which rings the bell on C, etc.). Id and ego are simply different *aspects* of the same psychic event, two sides of the same coin. When you talk about the ego, you are looking at psychic life as purposeful; when you talk about the id, you are looking at psychic life as forced. The drives represent the biological-demand aspect of mind; the ego represents the aspect of form and purpose. They cannot be separated; it is one event. Id and ego are two aspects of a single mind.

The very same formula of signal anxiety that would lead others to anthropomorphize the ego led Waelder to give an *aspectual* reading to the Freudian structures. (That, of course, was inherent in structural theory from the beginning, but is complicated with ambiguities about unconscious fantasy, hallucinatory gratification, etc.) It amounts to this: here are groups or categories of challenge, and they exist within a single, whole mind.

Waelder goes on to observe that the identity of the whole person does not mean that either he or his aspects/parts are unchanging. Besides the organic changes that occur as the years go by, the mind makes many and varied adjustments to external and internal stimuli. Throughout all the changes, the greatest constancy is the body, and therefore the instinctual constitution is the prototype of all solutions, manifested in character type. But both body and environment also change over time, and personal history, with its record of success and failure, has an impact on absolutely every

aspect of mind, not excepting the impulses themselves or the ego's preferred ways of meeting challenges. In this latter category of ego change, Waelder takes account of fundamental alterations in the whole mix of mind brought about by maturation, intellectual growth, and the capacity for objectivity. (The philosophical Waelder seems to have allowed more importance to philosophy in mental functioning than the analytic tradition usually grants it, but Freud himself was of two minds about what can be expected from rationality.) Moreover, a person can balance his interests more or less satisfactorily, though theory leaves that to common sense to explain, since it is always hard to say in holistic terms what satisfactoriness and unsatisfactoriness might mean.

If this schematism seems a little ragged around the edges, it is because Waelder is no more able than anyone else to iron out the lumpy part/whole map of the mind. It is hard for any theory to describe the id, and Waelder has chosen a good tactic in defining *id* as the pure aspect of mental *drivenness*. But then it is hard to say what we mean by a drive without a purpose. (We will return to that difficulty below.) As for the ego, there are similar difficulties in thinking of it as merely an aspect. Much is clarified with the brilliant (and historically sound) explanation that *ego* stands for the purposeful aspect of mind, but, like the gap between *drivenness* and *a* drive, it is hard to see how an *aspect* can be a problem *solver*.

All sorts of tangles are produced by these clear and sensible readings. For instance: Waelder describes eight groups of problems facing the ego, two of which are presented by the superego. But look what happens when we compare problems presented by the id and problems presented by the superego: To begin with, Waelder has accepted the proposition that the superego is a subpart of the ego; it is not raw impulse, not one of the "peripheral" demands. The superego actually performs the "best" of the ego's activities. But if the superego is *part* of the ego, then the ego's task with regard to the superego cannot be the same as its job with the id, namely, to define what is undefined. For example, the superego has, in its very genesis, already solved some problems that were presented by the id—it has already *made* some purpose out

of some impulse, so the type of problem *it* presents to the rest of the ego must be altogether different from just giving purpose to raw tendency. But what else is there for the ego to do if giving purpose to raw tendency is how the ego is *defined*?

Furthermore, the solving of a problem between ego and super-ego would seem to require another (master) ego, standing above both of them, to put the ego's house in order. These awkwardnesses are created by Waelder's abstract, aspectual definition of structures, and they make us long for the old ego *thing*—the sort of entity that Hartmann could put on the dissecting table, carve out intrasystemic conflicts from, and probe for separate nuclei of reality testing, synthesizing, organizing functions, etc. Waelder's proposed mental parts are not so tangible. The best we can do is squint our eyes and imagine an ego that is a pure abstraction (but yet somehow possessed of assorted organs), and an id that is half way between a blind, organic disequilibrium and a specific lust for a vague objective.

A nasty critic would paraphrase Waelder as saying that one can look at the mind from two perspectives: From one of them (an ego perspective), the mind is purposefully directed . . . except that the superego part of it still needs further directedness, while from the other perspective (the id perspective), it is, by contrast—well—only just a *little bit* purposefully directed . . . but *mostly* restless and uncomfortable, and in need of a lot of further directedness. Of course, it isn't fair to poke fun like that because unity in a plurality is inherently paradoxical. The critic has a field day as long as he does not have to take up the challenge and offer what is bound to be a worse theory of his own. It is the sort of easy mockery that enemies of analysis always enjoy, who then mostly leave the field and employ themselves elsewhere.

But we shall see that this is not a parlor game; theorists have not been just amusing themselves, and there are serious clinical issues at stake. The fact is that the Freudian categories, backed up by common sense, have been quite serviceable for understanding people's behavior, and that is *because* of their mixed, inconsistent nature. The theoretical problem, as Ricoeur (1970) pointed out,

is a result of the mandate to mix terms of force and meaning. The corresponding practical problem is to find some way to segment behavior so that we may track it in a disciplined fashion. In the case of Freudian theory, the overall, schematic problem is to distinguish a basic complement of fundamental, separate impulses, without already attributing to them the separate, articulated “purposes” that are elaborated by real-world details.

But now let us turn to the profit that Waelder wrings from his efforts. Having discussed the mental apparatus and offered clinicians a chart of problem types to substitute for the more familiar structural conflicts, he moves on to his main interest. Multiple function means multiple meaning. There lies the reasonableness of the “unscientific” concept of overdetermination, according to Waelder. Just as we would not call it unscientific to find myriad meanings in a novel, Waelder asks us to think of overdetermination as referring to meaning rather than causes. There are many problems solved by each human action. A proper psychoanalysis, Waelder tells us, is an appreciation of “the polyphony of life” (unlike partial analytic theories, like Adler’s or Alexander’s, that recognize only one theme at a time; cf. Rangell [2004]).

And Waelder does not shy away from the disillusioning consequences of this meaning of overdetermination. Psychoanalytic interpretation is hermeneutics, and it is not a causal science. And, yes, the implication must be granted that it cannot guide interpretations very specifically. The best an interpreter can do is to be aware of the various types of interest whose permutations will be found in mental action, keeping in mind the persistence of old coping styles and heeding the priorities of interest that Freudian psychoanalysis has suggested.

To sum up, Waelder understands Freud’s new model as an account of a whole mind, whose purposes and actions serve a variety of interests. Its interests are diagrammed as separate structures in the theory, but all interests are simultaneously served in some proportion by every act of the whole mind. Since the ego aspect is the aspect of unity among diverse interests, we might say that *ego* is a word for the mind as a blend (or as organization or

mediation or mastery). His own way of putting this is that the ego is the problem-solving tendency of mind. Since the ego is an aspect of mental *activity*, we cannot say that the ego waits for a command from the id, any more than we can say the id waits for permission from the ego. Initiative is as characteristic of the ego as of the id.

What about those meanings that Freud thought primary? Waelder is committed to the primacy of sex as setting the parameters and the basic challenges of life, but he holds that the way those challenges are met is as important as the parameters they work within, and so he grants partial validity to the many one-sided psychoanalytic theories, such as Adler's and Alexander's, as long as they do not exclude other meanings. To be sure, he reserves central significance for the instinctual meanings ingredient in every act, but tagging paramount drives that have to be coped with does not lessen our wonder at the way people cope with them or diminish our respect for creativity.

Finally, an ending statement but clearly not a mere afterthought is Waelder's inference that a principle of multiple meaning will apply to everything human, and thus to society in general. Relinquishing as he does the Freudian totalizing explanations of everything, Waelder has a right to dislodge other, reductionist, single-meaning theories of human life that held the twentieth century in thrall, including economic determinism. Society has multiple functions and multiple meanings. If everything isn't sex, neither is it the means of economic production.

## STRUGGLES OVER MOTIVATION

Waelder adds one unexpected problem to the ego's familiar tasks of mediating between id, superego, and the external world, and the reader might not realize how crucial and controversial this small detail is. Waelder lists the repetition compulsion as a separate agency and therefore a specific challenge to the ego. And, more fatefully, he adds that the ego acquires from the id a repetition compulsion of its own. The reader should follow these few lines closely. Waelder first distinguishes between the sort of repe-

tion compulsion that insists on drive satisfaction and a different sort of repetition that endlessly repeats for the sake of repeating. The ego, he writes, must find a place both for drive “aims” and for mere, organic stubbornness.

Why is that distinction important to Waelder? Although he is not very explicit on this score, one can see a special need for the second kind of repetition—the kind that is not an insistence on drive satisfaction. The heedless sort of repetition is useful to the ego itself in establishing its own style. All living things tend to conserve themselves, and so does the human psyche, and so, also, would its “parts” (if, indeed, we are to consider them as parts), *and so would the ego if it is one of those parts*. The ego is a problem solver, and problems tend to be solved in characteristic ways over time, which is the excuse for treating the ego as a *part* as well as an *aspect*. So the ego’s self-identity requires it to borrow a non-drive sort of stubbornness from the id. That makes sense; problem solving does not operate in a vacuum.

Without spelling it out here, Waelder seemed to realize that phrases like *problem solving* or *mastery* have no meaning whatever unless there is an ongoing and specified organism that needs to be conserved. A current problem is only a problem *for* a someone or a something that has an ongoing identity. Otherwise, there is no *particular* problem—each tendency would just play itself out, and the devil take the hindmost. So Waelder asserts that the ego assigns itself its own problems. It must take account of its own habits as it puts together solutions, and exhibits a repetition compulsion of its own. (In some ways, that was the burden of Hartmann’s [1939] general thesis of adaptation, and his particular notion of the superordinate organizing function that anticipates and takes into account the organism’s own unavoidable reactions.)

But what about the second kind of repetition compulsion—the kind that can be satisfied by discharge? Does the ego also borrow that from the id? Waelder is a little vague on that score, but we see that not just the persistent repetition compulsion, but also the “satiatable” or consummatory type of repetition compulsion, ends up in the ego. And *that* loan from the id (if that is where it



comes from) is even more portentous than the acquisition of heedless repetition. When the ego borrows the satisfiable kind of repetition compulsion, it takes on very idlike properties. A trait of persistence-until-satisfied gives the ego the same defining character as the drive aspect (the id). *Does the ego represent another drive?*

The term *repetition compulsion* seems to have become a two-faced placeholder for the heterogeneity of force and purpose: in one sense, it is mere organic inertia, but, in another, it is the “purpose” of a structure. Waelder’s listing of a separate repetition compulsion for the ego elevates the phenomenon of work, the striving for effectance and mastery, to a commanding height, and this marks out what will later become a strategic objective in the battle over the structural theory.

As we stare at this inclusion of the repetition compulsion in the ego’s problems, we see reemerging the many-in-one tension at the heart of psychoanalytic theory. Analysts like to imagine the repetition compulsion as a chthonic and not-too-healthy brake on realistic adjustment, one of the ways the id makes life miserable for the flexible and adaptive ego (and the frustrated analyst). But Waelder realized that, if the new ego amounts to the purposefulness of mental life, it not only has to struggle with the stubbornness of id drives, it must “borrow” their compulsion for itself so that it will have a particular *way* of giving form to those impulses. The id has its constant or repeated pressures, but what is repeated in every act is both the impulse *and* the (ego’s) way of expressing it. Once again, repetition as stubbornness and repetition as definite purpose are two visions of the same thing; it is just an aspectual difference. What is a repetition of an impulse from a biological perspective is a decisional act from the standpoint of meaning. The repetition compulsion of the impulse and the repetition compulsion of its formed-ness are the same thing. As Waelder puts it in his 1936 paper:

In the real occurrence of the repetitions it is difficult to distinguish in [sic] how far the ego is subject to the compulsion from behind and in [sic] how far it uses it as a

means to overcome the psychic experience; these two sides of the actual repetition can be separated only by abstraction. [p. 78]

To sum up, if we consider all the impulses, exigencies, and superego demands expressed in any given meaningful act, the ego represents (1) the characteristic purposeful form of many subordinate purposes, but also (2) the characteristic (repetitive) way of integrating all those subarticulations into a grand, articulated, personal action that also expresses the whole person's striving for mastery. And all of that is ego.<sup>3</sup>

This is obviously an unsettling exegesis of structural theory, and it deserves to be scrutinized again. When theory awards the ego a repetition compulsion of its own ("borrowed" from the id though it may be), it allows the ego not just a function, but substantial agency, which means that the ego has a purpose and a typical satisfaction, independent of the merged purposes that it represents. Waelder declares outright that mental life is *moved* not only by a *vis a tergo* but also by aspiration for an imagined future, which is not much different from postulating two drives. In a later review of *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (Freud 1926 [1936]) in the *Quarterly*, Waelder (1967) writes that conceptualizing an id and conceptualizing an ego constitute two different theoretical strategies. The ego is part of a "teleological" account of human motivation; the id is part of an organic, "causal" account. (Waelder believed that Freud, having tried hard to avoid teleology, gradually grew more comfortable with it, and *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* is a demonstration of that comfort.)

So the ego has its own aims, its own joys and sorrows. Are we, with this conclusion, moving away from Freudian psychoanalysis? It is one thing for the ego to be allowed "functions," and quite another thing for it to be granted a recognized, proprietary, identity-conferring, stubborn aspiration of its own. An ego that looks for opportunities to satisfy itself is no longer simply the locus of a

<sup>3</sup> This ego corresponds to Hartmann's (1939) superordinate, organizing function "of" the ego. See Friedman 1989.

function. Or, if it is a function, it is nothing less than the function of the human mind. Waelder is bold enough to declare that the ego is not simply a responsive blender automatically activated by input; it is an interested party in its own right, an adventurer looking for work and achievement.

But now, if the ego has a grand, separate ambition, and if that ambition (according to Waelder's definition of the ego) is the purpose-aspect of what would otherwise be a blind impetus, how shall we envision the underlying, grand impetus that the ego's large goals give a more specific purpose *to*? What is the raw material for such a thing as ego? It has to be something as large as organic imbalance in general. The conclusion is that the ego tries to correct organic imbalance; that is no big news. But (and here is the unusual emphasis) the ego also reaches into the future to flex its goal-achieving muscle:

The ego has more to do than merely to take orders and care for their execution. Rather, it develops toward the outer world, as well as toward the other agencies in man himself, its own peculiar activity. This activity may be characterized as striving to hold its own, and beyond this to assimilate in organic growth the outer world as well as the other agencies within the individual. [Waelder 1936, pp. 77-78]

The essay ends with Waelder's celebration of man's occasional "possibility of transcending the instinct and interest foundation in a given situation . . . [and] reaching beyond himself." Waelder's ego is not only a name for the integration and articulation of urges; it is the aspect of man that *will*—by God!—*make meaning* out of whatever comes along, and force that meaning to serve each man's purposes, and even beyond that (via the superego), serve the purpose of future generations. In the final pages of this essay, Waelder seems to be saying that man (in his aspect of ego) lives to be creative, to understand, and to triumph over individual mortality. That was Freud's therapeutic goal, and sometimes also his faith, but it is not exactly the old, world-weary "hermeneutic of suspicion" we are used to in Freudian analysis. Nor is it a very good in-

strument for winking out a patient's disowned, infantile, "grubby" ideas and wishes.

Historically, this line of thought has led to frank departures from psychoanalytic theory, such as existential analysis, the human potential movement, and Jungian analysis. Waelder is not unaware of that possibility, nor is he unconcerned by it. Exactly how concerned is hard to say. It is not surprising that, after allowing partial legitimacy to Adler's view of the ego, he catches himself and adds a cautionary footnote, but the equivocal wording is a little odd. Once again excusing himself from the task of arguing for "the ontological primacy" of instinctual meanings, he points out that "in psychoanalysis the instinctual is sometimes considered as primary, while in individual psychology it is the being directed which is considered as primary and the instinctual life is seen as an expression of this being directed" (p. 84).

This is far from a resounding repudiation of Adler. Waelder is, after all, in a difficult position. He could easily be construed as (or accused of) having argued that these are equally valid ways of looking at the mind. Gardiner's translation (Waelder 1930) actually has Waelder saying, "In its division between a person's ego and id, psychoanalysis recognizes *the two aspects* of his being driven and his being directed" (italics added). The two translations of Waelder's article—the *Quarterly's* version, by Milde, and the translation by Gardiner (Waelder 1930)—vary here and there in their tone of advocacy and diffidence toward the primacy of the Freudian, instinctual emphasis. Where exactly does Waelder stand?

It is obviously a delicate matter. The ego concept leads naturally to holism, and I think it was partly to stop the holism of ego theory from leading in the direction of Adler, Jung, and the existential and "humanistic" thinkers that Freudian theory took such exquisite, "scholastic" pains with its metapsychological formulations. Mighty issues are thrashed out in what looks like obsessional haggling over Freud's terms. The arguments have the logic-chopping quality that brought metapsychology into disrepute. Is mastery an instinct, a motive, an aspect, etc.? To some, this can look like the theological disputes that have led to sectarian killings.

Closer examination shows that there was actually something at stake in the old theological debates besides words and authority, and so it is in psychoanalysis.

## OTHER ADVENTURES IN HOLISM

Waelder's holistic thesis does not seem to have had much impact on his colleagues. It was evidently not in Hartmann's memory when, in 1939, he, too, seemed to be defining the ego as the problem-solving feature of the mind. Was he unwittingly duplicating Waelder's work? Yes and no. There are conspicuous differences between their formulations: Although Waelder viewed mind as embodied, he was an unabashed hermeneuticist, interested primarily in meaning. In contrast, Hartmann (1927) argued that psychoanalysis is mainly a "positive" science, concerned with efficient causality, i.e., regularities in mental movement.

Indeed, Hartmann wanted to keep the science of psychoanalysis as far from hermeneutics as possible, and labored to spell out the variety and detail of its biological grounding, though he recognized that neither theory nor practice could completely forswear hermeneutics. So while Waelder leaned toward a whole mind composed of aspects, Hartmann strove to preserve the parts of mind as interacting entities. And where Waelder granted the ego a mastery motive of its own, Hartmann used every term he could to avoid talking of new motives, preferring to picture transformations of energy into more or less staid forms of integration, with fusion and defusion, etc. Like Waelder, Hartmann was aware of the new studies of infant cognitive development. But instead of an independent ego motive, he preferred to take account of those issues by talking of *change of function*, *conflict-free sphere*, *secondary autonomy*, etc.

Despite those considerable differences, the fact remains that Hartmann, no less than Waelder, was one of the great whole-mind completers of Freudian theory, and while they make little reference to each other in this context, their overlap is a predictable result of their common project. Hartmann's *synthesizing ego* corre-

sponds to Waelder's *problem-solving ego*. Hartmann's *superordinate organizing function* approximates to Waelder's *independently motivated ego*. *Autonomous and neutralized areas of the ego* is Hartmann-speak for nonlibidinal motivation, just as *the ego's borrowed repetition compulsion* is Waelder-lingo for the same thing. In general, Hartmann's term *function* softens the holistic challenge to the Freudian system, while Waelder's *purposeful agency* intensifies it.

If this embedded message in Waelder's famous paper had caught the attention of the profession, it might have rocked the analytic boat. Waelder was adding a very vague, general, personally creative motive to the separate and distinct, passionate, and defensive motives that lay at the heart of Freudian theory, and, worse still, despite his denial, he seemed to award the crown of supremacy to this new, very general, ego motive of creative mastery. That, however, is not how his paper was received, probably because he had pitched his exposition at a relatively uncontroversial level of generalized "meaning," and was not personally interested in debating clinical motivation. He reassured his readers that the drives were the "motor" of behavior, even though his model had "borrowed" that motor's output and made it "drive" something other than "the" drives.

Waelder's aversion to the radical implications of his approach can later be seen in his response to Hendrick (1942, 1943a, 1943b), who elaborated very similar implications without reference to Waelder's earlier essay. So, far from claiming priority, Waelder seems to have disowned this whole direction of thought. Hendrick had proposed an instinct of mastery or effectance that might develop out of Piagetian sensorimotor reflexes. Like Waelder, Hendrick thought his mastery motive might springboard off of the familiar Freudian repetition compulsion; it might even arise out of the classical Freudian experiences of wrestling with trauma and loss. Such *anlagen*, he argued, would then be exploited by a child's lust for accomplishment, and the result would be a special, epigenetically programmed nonlibidinal pleasure, arising from a regular, joyful effort of the ego on its own behalf.

Reading Hendrick, we are reminded of Waelder's ego that borrows repetition compulsion from the id in order to go out and conquer the world. But if that reminds us of Waelder's article, it apparently did not remind Waelder of it (according to Hendrick's report [1943b, p. 562]). Or perhaps Waelder did recognize the similarity and regretted it. He had been careful to describe problem solving as an independent project of the ego, but Hendrick was brave enough or reckless enough to call it an instinct of mastery.

Hendrick's new instinct was, to put it mildly, not a welcome guest at the metapsychology table. It doubtless reminded everyone of what was regarded as Adler's effort to turn depth psychology into superficial common sense. In our reprinted classic, Waelder had admitted Adler's partial truth. But, in 1943 (Hendrick 1943b), Waelder was staying closer to safe terms, and allowed the ego only its special "tendencies" and special pleasures. What is more (if Hendrick's account is accurate), when faced with the explicit proposal of an instinct of mastery, Waelder did a complete volte-face from the whole thesis of the "Multiple Function" paper, and put forth a view of the ego as "an organization of effectors which serve to discharge instincts" (Hendrick 1943b, p. 562). That's how far he had come from the two-perspectives model, and from the independent ego aspirations of his 1930 paper!

It is the greatest of ironies that Hendrick, citing Freud, could reproach Waelder for the unsophisticated misunderstanding of ego and id "as discrete and opposed, not to say combative, structures" (1943b, p. 562). Waelder, of all people! At least in his professional persona, Waelder had evolved into one of those plodders who need to be reminded that "the ego must be regarded as fundamentally dynamic" (Hendrick 1943b, p. 562). Reading Waelder's (1967) later reflection on *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* (Freud 1926 [1936]), one gets the impression that he may, indeed, have forgotten his earlier line of thought. In that later review, Waelder wonders *how* the ego is able to foresee consequences of a threatening impulse. That would be a cogent question for someone thinking about an ancillary ego *function*, attached to its other

duties, but it would have had little meaning for the Waelder who wrote about ego as the very essence of imagination and purpose.

Why did Waelder repudiate (or forget) the major point he had made earlier? He did so for the same reason, no doubt, that Hartmann (1948) voted against naming a new instinct to account for the *funktionslust* that he, along with everyone else, saw in children's play. Behind the terminological objection, I think, is the fear that calling it an instinct would allow a general, nonlibidinal explanation of behavior—which, being an innocent and evident motive, would short-circuit the hunt for the earthy, embarrassing, secret, passionate, conflictual, individual, interpersonal dramas of psychoanalysis. The Freudian notion of drives had the enormous power of connecting visceral impulsion with interpersonal aims, and it did it in a time-tested way that clinicians have found usable in chasing down patients' intimate, disguised, biographically molded pursuits and dodges. An overall instinct of mastery would churn all those particulars into a universal mush of uplift. It would be better, the profession thought, if the pursuit of mastery and the pleasure in effectance were viewed as instances of aggression, or of traumatic repetition compulsion, or even sadism, or perhaps explained away as just a synonym for instinctual pressure in general. And for any actual clinical example, of course, analysts did not lack for libidinal explanations to compete with explanations in terms of an instinct of mastery.

It was not a new problem. In addition to the early "ego instincts," Freud had shown that what looked like children's nonlibidinal, almost abstract play could be understood as a libidinal fantasy. Analysts had plenty of practice in explaining what seems to be practice-for-practice's-sake as a way of trying to digest trauma. It is true that Freud admitted a repetition compulsion that went beyond the pleasure principle, but so far beyond it (as death instinct) that most analysts did not take it too seriously. And yet, by the time of Waelder's paper, and increasingly afterward, analysts were reading about, and paying more attention to, the persistent and prominent practicing urges in growing children, and their driven efforts to learn and to master skills (which of course was



evident in every family). And all of this could easily be thought of as a preprogrammed drive—in other words, something like an instinct.

Reading Waelder's paper today, one sees him as a pioneer of that viewpoint, but we have noted that when Hendrick advanced similar ideas, Waelder was not identified with that stance, and, still later, when Robert White (1963) suggested something even closer to Waelder's early view than Hendrick's idea, White's extensive monograph made no significant reference whatever to Waelder. White sensibly reasoned that every structure, by definition, performs some sort of task, and if that task—whatever it is—is performed well, it will add to one's sense of competence. Isn't it expectable, asked White, that such proofs of competence will contribute to a general feeling of security, and wouldn't that reassuring feeling have an appeal of its own?

White argued that the appetite for a sense of competence so conspicuous in children can also be seen in adults' attitude toward work. White was at pains not to be provocative. He had no wish to undermine libido theory. He positioned himself between Hartmann and Hendrick, agreeing with Hartmann that the energy of mastery is supplied by Freudian structures, but with Hendrick that it did not require a process of instinct neutralization. White was defining something *like* a separate mastery drive that, however, did not need to be *seen* as a separate drive (just as one could say, for example, that the inevitable preference for a well-functioning mind still needs to call on a separate source of energy). Explicitly taking a stand between Hartmann and Hendrick, White did not notice Waelder in the vicinity, even though Waelder had once stood approximately where White did, both pointing to the sense of overall purposefulness and pride in achievement evident in general mental functioning. That position evidently never became part of Waelder's image.

White left psychoanalytic theory largely untouched, and one supposes that this was because the analytic establishment feared that even such overall resultants of standard drives were still non-

erotic escape hatches that could spare from exposure the earthy, interpersonal meanings designated by drive theory. The irony is that the existence of motives for work and effectance are tacitly presupposed by most theories of therapeutic action, and underlie the expectations of most practicing analysts throughout the profession's history.

## FROM STRUCTURES TO GRADIENTS

As a many-in-one theory, Waelder's aspectual exegesis of structural theory, if it had been followed consistently, could have dimmed the analyst's spotlight on specific, intensely personal and interpersonal dramas, based on id impulses and validated by the biology of specific drives. A problem-solving motive that reigned in its own name would be an alternative, new paramount drive that was extremely general, extremely existential, not particularly interpersonal, and indistinguishable from the whole person. The new drive would not be readily subdivisible into many specific wishes. As Brenner (2002) indicates, it would not be analyzable in terms of conflict (though Waelder allows that, within it, impulses could be well or badly fused). Moreover, the new ego drive (if we can call it that) was so abstract that it could characterize anything and everything. In such a resultant vector, the rest of the drives end up indistinguishable from each other. (For tendencies to be different, they must tend in differently defined directions—that's what *tendency* means—but on this account, all definition of articulated directions is *ego*.)

These unfortunate implications are the price paid for the otherwise welcome simplicity of Waelder's holism. Contemplating these clinical drawbacks, we can better appreciate Hartmann's baroque complexity, developed, as it was, for the specific purpose of sparing the new holistic analysis from the loss of libidinal specificity (while also acknowledging holistic data from infant observation). Thus, Hartmann's ego, so far from being, like Waelder's, a mere name for definition and purpose, actually provides particu-

lar, varying blends of form, purpose, anticipation, and integration, mixed with impulse in very specific ways.

Unlike Waelder, Hartmann was concerned with detail. He fussed unceasingly about the relationship between the particularities of the ego, its physiological features, its maturation, its anthropomorphisms, its varying negotiations with drive and conflict, etc. But he also paid a price. In contrast to Waelder, Hartmann cluttered up his ego with so many ad hoc, miscellaneous functions, that he made himself an easy mark, first for careful critics like George Klein (1976), and then for a whole generation of casual theory mockers. But though Hartmann is cited with distaste as often as Waelder is with approval, Hartmann inaugurated a more realistic and practical exegesis of Freudian theory: In place of Waelder's aspectual analysis (two sides of one coin), we have *gradients* and *spectra*—degrees of unformedness and articulation, separation and integration, passion and objectivity, intuition and articulation, discipline and indiscipline. This provides a rich variety of targets for the analyst's thought and action. And as a bonus, Hartmann could explain, as Waelder could not, what it might mean in theoretical terms for one mental state to be more satisfactory than another, and how the ego could be more or less on top of things. (One could force such answers into Waelder's schema, but only by making it into a more Hartmann-type theory.)

Hartmann's gradients allow intensely personal, biological force to be mixed with interpersonal, dramatic meaning in various ways. Plurality is preserved, and the ego, unarmed with any new instincts, is prevented from rising above its station. (Critics of Hartmann's ego psychology often fail to appreciate that fact.) This compromise depends on a notion of "functions" of which it can be said that they serve, but do not lead. (Leading is the business of drives.) But, of course, we cannot expect this theoretical tactic to work. In any paradoxical whole/part theory, no problem is actually solvable. The problems that afflict Waelder's schema find their way into Hartmann's notion of the superordinate organizing function "of the ego" (which is really nothing but the whole mind; see

Friedman [1989]). Hartmann's was a precarious solution, and he had trouble with it. But Hartmann's gradations were the wave of the future.

The Freudian establishment struggled to save the many-in-one structural theory of the mind, and they battled over terms like *function*, *tendency*, *instinct*, *compulsion*, *mastery*, *aggression*, *funktionslust*, etc. Theorists realized that, if ego and id, primary process and secondary process, pleasure principle and reality principle were to produce individual and personal parts of a mind, rather than general pairs of abstract aspects, it would be necessary to distribute those abstractions in a variable and relative way over a gradient of more and less—rather than featuring them as pure polar contrasts, sitting side-by-side, or one on top of the other. If instead of being pictured as separate centers, “structures” could be thought of as levels in a continuum, each relative to the other, one could define a variety of individual wishes by the various stages they represent of integration with the rest of the mind and with reality.

Accordingly, Gill (1963) described a continuum in which whatever is more advanced is secondary process relative to what is less advanced, which, in turn, is primary process in comparison to what is still more integrated. Arlow and Brenner (1964) placed primary and secondary process along a continuum of tools useful for varying needs of ordinary thinking. Schur (1966) used ego and id as terms of comparison among items on a continuum. These theories portrayed the parts of the mind as types and levels of meaningfulness within every segment of a continuum.

Some of the more process-oriented theorists, such as Loewald (1960), emphasized the development of meaning along a continuum of real time, in the short and long term. Instead of Waelder's momentary snapshot of *an* aspect of force and *an* aspect of meaning in each momentary act, these theorists imagined a journey of global yearnings progressing into increasingly articulated forms. In a sense, these theorists were looking again for a topography, but a topography with a thicker and more complicated transition zone from unconscious to conscious—a psychoanalysis of the actual (rather than the schematic) creation of meaning.

## FROM GRADIENTS TO PHENOMENOLOGY

Dispersed that way in a flow of process, the original Freudian structures looked more and more nominal, less and less useful, no longer nouns, but adjectives. The parts of the mind seemed more and more mythical until, finally, the whole-mind project reached its apotheosis in Schafer (1976) and Brenner (2002), where parts cease to exist. Instead of parts, we have a phenomenology, structured as narrative, fantasy, or compromise formations. (Object relations theory arrived early on that scene.)

Brenner's (1982) reappraisal and criticism of Waelder is illuminating. What he especially objects to is the abstract level of Waelder's discussion. It is the cool, computerlike image of problem solving that he finds unreal, out of keeping with the live conflict that is embedded in compromise formations, and is, indeed, more than a stylistic feature of Waelder's essay, as witness his suggestion that sublimation represents a perfect solution to the ego's problem.

In response, Waelder could argue that he is close to Brenner, because Brenner's theory of compromise formation necessarily implies a general talent for problem solving, even if it is not theorized. Indeed, Waelder might say that, if everything in the mind is a compromise formation, as Brenner believes, the general solving of conflict/problems must be the prime feature of the human mind, just as Waelder had said. He might plead that it goes without saying that the *problem* in *problem solving* designates a conflict. He might ask to be numbered again among Brenner's heroes on grounds that a cool, computer image is, after all, not a bad way to deflate the supposedly heroic "ego" that Brenner wishes to debunk—the popular, dramatized, muscular homunculus, ready to run interference for the analyst in a therapeutic alliance. If Brenner's ego-less picture is the best theory, well, surely the *next* best theory would be one that admitted only an extremely abstract ego—a cool and calculating principle.

Is Brenner, then, exaggerating the difference between his theory of compromise formation and Waelder's theory of problem solving? Not at all: I think he is quite justified in disowning Wael-

der. Waelder had steadfastly maintained the Freudian double vision of mind as a single whole that is also a collection of parts, and so, like Freud, he necessarily equivocated between describing the parts as aspects and describing them as parts. Although he did not want to press the point, and seems later to have repudiated it, he had placed a new actor on the analyst's screen. It was a very general actor representing the person as a whole, not a part of a mind in an agonistic struggle with other parts. Waelder's insistent, aspiring, conquering ego characterizes mind as a transcendent essence, rather than the burdened particularity of an individual creature fighting within himself.

Brenner (2002), in contrast, finally takes his place at the end of the whole-mind journey, with need for neither parts nor transcendent harmony, because he portrays mind as the uneasy, detailed, conscious and unconscious phenomenology of our poignant particular and personal drama. Brenner is right: the verbs make a difference. Waelder's "problem solving," though in reality a whole-mind function, is also an action of a subordinate agency. In sharp contrast, Brenner's compromise formations are not invisible, quasi-things that handle energies; they are constellations of visualizable dramas, enduring fantasies, and their permutations. Brenner has ended the profession's customary equivocation by finally discarding the notion of ego. He does not tell us about a *process* of compromising; he portrays varying *outcomes* and personally lived universes. The generalities that this theory supports are simply the empirical generalizations and similarities one detects in the analysis of many such universes.

## CONCLUSIONS

Freudian theory of the mind was a delicate balancing act. Parts had to be brought together into a whole, responsible mind, where, in effect, they are no longer seen as parts. As long as parts are distinguished, the biological forces can be traced. When unified meaning is emphasized, the *person's* intention gets emphasized and the factor of biological force falls into shadow. If one talks about parts

only as floating terms that designate something only relative to something else—for example, describing something as the greater refinement of a something with less refinement—the analyst is left scratching for particulars to deal with. And when, at the culmination of this theoretical history, parts are at last no longer thought of as in *any* way real, the mind—whole, and therefore equivalent to the person—is described by its story (or stories), read in various ways, according to the experience of the analyst and his view of human nature.

In a thoroughly whole-mind theory without parts, what serves to segment the scene is a canonical phenomenology. The phenomenology of a given school provides the working shapes that are needed for dealing with patients, while the holism, depending on whether it is soul-centered or body-centered, will offer either spiritual elevation or Freudian skepticism. With a whole-mind phenomenology of one sort (e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1963), a therapist can build morale and encourage creativity. With another sort of phenomenology (e.g., Brenner 2002), one can conduct a psychoanalytic treatment. What neither type of phenomenology provides is a theory of mental functioning or a theory of therapeutic action. Since theory of mental functioning has been found daunting, and theory of therapeutic action almost hopeless, many today regard this modest outcome as the best and most honest we can achieve.

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## MAX GRAF'S "REMINISCENCES OF PROFESSOR SIGMUND FREUD" REVISITED: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE FREUD ARCHIVES

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*Recently derestricted Freud Archive interviews with Max and Herbert Graf and Herbert's wife shed new light on Max Graf's article, "Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud," published in The Psychoanalytic Quarterly in 1942. To explain discrepancies between the interviews and the earlier article, the author postulates that, in the article, Max Graf purposely distorted or omitted certain details in order not to reveal Herbert's identity as "Little Hans" (Freud 1909). The interviews place incidents reported in the article in a new and more complex light, and also underscore the intensely personal nature of the intellectual development of the psychoanalytic movement.*

### INTRODUCTION

In 1942, *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* published a remembrance of Freud by Max Graf, a Viennese musicologist and writer who was an early member of Freud's circle interested in applying psychoanalytic theory to musicological topics, and who for some years was a personal friend of Freud's. Titled "Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud," the admiring article, translated into English by Gregory Zilboorg, accompanied publication of a 1904 draft by Freud on "Psychopathological Personages on the Stage" that Freud had given to Graf. The lively "Reminiscences" took its welcome

place among the small number of firsthand descriptions of Freud and his inner circle.

Max Graf's "Reminiscences" appeared to be a straightforward if worshipful remembrance by a somewhat peripheral member of Freud's early circle. However, this simple manifest appearance, I will argue, hid a more complex latent reality. In particular, Graf's son, Herbert Graf, was the five-year-old "Little Hans" whose treatment for a horse phobia—with his father, Max, acting as analyst with Freud's guidance—was detailed by Freud in his case history of an "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" (1909). Thus, when Max<sup>1</sup> says in "Reminiscences" that "Freud's point of departure in the investigation of the psyche was Oedipus," and that Freud "analyzed love for the mother and hate for the father and considered them the primary drives in the sexual development of humanity" (1942, p. 466), he knew personally whereof he spoke. The Little Hans case report is centered on interpretations concerning Hans's excessive love of his mother and hatred for his father, and the case remains the *locus classicus* for study of the oedipal complex. The case is repeatedly cited by Freud as the best evidence he produced for the oedipal theory, and it has been studied by each generation of psychoanalysts since.

There is, however, not a word in "Reminiscences" about the case of Little Hans, even though it provided the context for some of Max Graf's most important interactions with Freud. This is because it was not yet public knowledge at the time of publication that Herbert Graf was Little Hans. Max made every effort to respect and preserve this confidence, an effort that confronted him with some perplexing challenges in writing the article.

To make matters even more difficult, the Little Hans case record reveals that Hans's mother had been a patient of Freud's. However, the fact that Max's wife at the time, Olga Hoenig, had been in treatment with Freud was a closely guarded confidence that, as we shall see, was not directly shared with Herbert even decades later.

<sup>1</sup> With apologies for the overfamiliarity, I sometimes refer to Max Graf simply as *Max* in the following discussion, in order to avoid confusion with his famous son and other Graf's.

The confidentiality of the mother's treatment, and of her broader involvement in psychoanalysis as a consequence of that treatment, was respected by Max in "Reminiscences" even though it, too, had direct relevance to some important aspects of his interactions with Freud.

Constrained in the writing of "Reminiscences" by the need to prevent any clue from emerging as to his son Herbert's treatment, Max faced a conflict: some of his most fascinating and historically important interactions with Freud occurred in relation to this case and he wanted to report them; yet he could not state the truth about their context. His compromise solution, I argue, was, in a few instances, to purposely distort and disguise the context or the date of an incident in order to preserve his son's privacy, in the way one might distort some information about a patient's occupation or hometown to disguise his or her identity in a published case history.

The resulting distortions generally have not, until now, been recognizable. Although the identity of Herbert Graf as Little Hans has been known for some time, no means has been available to independently assess the accuracy of Max's statements in "Reminiscences." However, such a means has recently become available: a lengthy interview with Max Graf conducted by Kurt Eissler in 1952 has been derestricted by the Freud Archives and become available for scholarly use. Moreover, briefer interviews with Herbert Graf (1959) and Herbert's wife (1960) have also become available.<sup>2</sup> These interviews provide not only a valuable trove of information on the background of the Little Hans case in their own right, but also the means for cross-checking some of Max's assertions in "Reminiscences" and placing some of his remembrances in their proper context for the first time. In other instances, the interviews simply provide new information that enriches our understanding

<sup>2</sup> The transcript of the interviews is primarily in German. I thank Frederick Bauman and Chadwick Smith, who gave invaluable assistance with translating, as well as Harold Blum, Director of the Archives, for providing access to the interview records. Because passages from the interviews quoted in this article reflect unofficial and otherwise unpublished English translations, page numbers of the interview transcripts are not specified.

of the Graf–Freud relationship and other topics covered in “Reminiscences.” In particular, the interviews present a more complex picture of Max’s relationship to Freud than is found in the 1942 article, and reveal aspects of Max’s personality that may have influenced how he chose to present some of his remembrances.

As an interesting aside, the interviews reveal that, as an adult, Herbert Graf continued to accept the oedipal-theoretic approach to his own life story presented in his case history. In his Archives interview (1959), he notes that Plutarch says that a king’s son was not allowed to enter the king’s bedroom with a sword because such fear existed between father and son; yet in his own case, “For the first time in the history of the world, a little boy told his father: ‘I’ll have to kill you!’ And the father didn’t become upset.” Indeed, not only Max and Herbert, but Herbert’s wife, too, were “Freudian to our core,” according to her 1960 interview.

In this article, I consider various passages in the Archives interview that shed light on the “Reminiscences” of 1942 in one way or another—some by revealing distortions, some merely by adding a dimension of information. This presentation is organized in roughly chronological order, according to when the relevant incident occurred in the course of Max’s relationship to Freud.

I begin with the issue, unresolved in “Reminiscences,” of who introduced Max to Freud in 1900, and associated issues about the nature of Olga Hoenig’s analysis. I then consider a comment of Max’s in “Reminiscences” about Freud’s charitable treatment of poor patients without requiring a fee, and describe a surprising revelation in the interview about what lay behind this comment. Next, I consider an anecdote regarding the early Psychological Wednesday Circle meetings that is revealing of Max Graf’s personality in a way that is useful in what follows. I then explore incidents that occurred from the time of Little Hans’s analysis in 1908, through Max’s withdrawal from the Circle in 1911, to Herbert’s and Max’s individual visits to Freud in 1922 following Herbert’s discovery that he is Hans. In several of these instances, as we shall see, the interview allows us to correct significant distortions put forth in “Reminiscences.”

## WHO INTRODUCED MAX GRAF TO FREUD?

I first consider the bearing of the newly derestricted Archives interview on the question of who introduced Max Graf to Freud, and on the timing and nature of his wife's analysis with Freud. In "Reminiscences," Max indicated that he originally met Freud in 1900:

I met Freud in the same year in which he published the Interpretation of Dreams (1900)—in other words, in the most important and decisive year of his life . . . . Freud was then forty-four years old. The very black hair on his head and beard had had begun to show traces of gray. [1942, p. 467]

The vivid details, as well as other references to the time when Max knew Freud, suggest that this is correct.

But how did Max get to know Freud? Max explains his acquaintance with Freud in "Reminiscences" as follows:

Freud at the time had been treating a lady whom I knew. This lady would tell me after her sessions with Freud of the remarkable treatment by means of questions and answers . . . . These new ideas . . . aroused my interest in the new investigator. I wanted to know him personally. I was invited to visit him in his office. [p. 467]

Although the young lady's identity remains unstated, we know from a remark in the Little Hans case history (Freud 1909) that Max's wife had been a patient of Freud's:

His [Little Hans's] beautiful mother fell ill with a neurosis as a result of a conflict during her girlhood. I was able to be of assistance to her at the time, and this had in fact been the beginning of my connection with Hans's parents. [pp. 141-142]

Note that Freud's locution that this was the beginning of his connection with "Hans's parents" does not necessarily imply either that he became acquainted simultaneously with *both* parents or that

they were yet parents, or even married. In stating that he had been of assistance “at the time” of the illness, Freud places the analysis of the mother in the past. This suggests that the treatment occurred prior to the Little Hans case record, for Freud is writing soon after the case was completed, and the phobia had lasted only four months. Moreover, Freud notes that, following Hans’s recovery, the mother wrote to him more than once to express her gratitude (p. 99), suggesting that she was not then seeing him regularly in analysis. Freud’s comment that Hans’s mother’s analysis “had in fact been the beginning of my connection with Hans’s parents” seemingly suggests, though does not strictly imply, that Freud met Hans’s father through his wife’s analysis.

Once it became common knowledge that Max Graf was the father of the real “Little Hans,” commentators reasonably enough put two and two together and concluded that the woman whom Max knew, who was a patient of Freud’s before Max’s marriage and who introduced him to Freud, was in fact Olga Hoenig, later to become Max’s wife and Hans’s mother. The reason for Max’s not identifying her in “Reminiscences” was presumably confidentiality; because it was not yet known that Max’s son Herbert was Little Hans, the fact that his wife had been in analysis could not be made inferable from the public record, both to protect her confidentiality and to avoid giving away the boy’s identity.

One might have expected that in Max’s 1952 interview with Eissler, he would clarify this point by directly stating that the woman who introduced him to Freud was indeed his wife. However, oddly enough, when Max discusses in the interview how he met Freud, he again fails to give her identity, merely reiterating what he had said in “Reminiscences”:

When I was a student in Vienna, I had a relationship with a young woman with whom I used to go for a walk every evening and who told me one day that she was in therapy with Professor Freud, and every day she would tell me about the treatment itself . . . . One day, I expressed the wish to meet Professor Freud himself and was invited by him.

This seems odd because there was no plausible confidentiality motive for hiding her identity from Eissler, who knew that Olga Hoenig was the mother of "Little Hans," and thus also knew from the case history that she had been in analysis. Max's initial silence about the young woman's identity might be considered a stylistic matter and perhaps a lingering habit of confidentiality as the interview got under way.

However, a nuance later in the interview reveals the truth. When Max comes to describe his wife, he not only states that she was in treatment with Freud, but indirectly reveals that she is the very young lady referred to previously:

Before I made the decision to marry this woman, I went to Professor Freud, whose patient she still was at the time, and asked him whether I can marry her, whether her state is such that one can marry her.

The statement that his wife was "still" in treatment makes no sense if Max has not already referred to an earlier stage of her treatment in the interview; and the only plausible such reference is to the treatment of the young lady who introduced Max to Freud.

Five years after the interview, Max was ready to publicly acknowledge his wife's analysis. In an autobiography of his life in the arts (M. Graf 1957), at the outset of the chapter on his relationship with Freud, Max again explains when and how he came to meet Freud:

I met Freud shortly after 1900, as his *Interpretation of Dreams* first descended into the dark depths of the unconscious . . . . It was by chance that I met Freud. A young lady of my acquaintance had become his patient and often recounted to me the remarkable medical treatment that, through conversation, recovered the long-forgotten and displaced storms of the soul from the unconscious. [p. 162]

Although here Max once again leaves the woman unnamed, on the next page, he gives away her identity, this time more explicitly: "This first acquaintance was soon followed by a familiar coming-and-going in my house when I married the girl treated by Freud



and he often climbed the four flights of stairs to my apartment" (M. Graf 1957, p. 163).

Interestingly, in the 1952 interview, Eissler never directly asks the identity of the young woman who introduced Max to Freud, nor does he explore the topic of the wife's analysis, perhaps in both cases in implicit recognition of the confidentiality issues involved and of Max's deep respect for such confidences. For example, Max is willing to discuss his son Herbert's treatment (Freud 1909) as a matter of psychoanalytic history and a contribution to science, but terminates the interview with Eissler when asked about psychological issues subsequent to his son's phobia, insisting that such matters are Herbert's business. The transcript records this interaction as follows:

M. G.: I have a lot to say about my son, but not about this topic, as it is only of my concern . . . . They are also his concerns. So I can't just go on without permission . . . . If it would be necessary for a scientific purpose, I would tell it; but I don't see that . . . . I am willing to tell you, but I do not want this to become public, so we must first talk this over privately.

K. E.: Should I write to your son . . . ?

M. G.: No, I will talk this over with him myself.

In notable contrast, Eissler directly raises the issue of the mother's treatment by Freud in his interview with Herbert Graf seven years later, in 1959. Oddly, even though Herbert had read the case history of Little Hans—of himself—and thus, one would assume, must have noticed the remark stating that his mother had been in analysis with Freud, Herbert asserts in his interview that his mother never discussed this matter with him and that he still knows nothing about it:

K. E.: Your mother did not give you details of her treatment?

H. G.: None at all!

K. E.: Why she went to treatment?

H. G.: None at all! I wasn't aware that my mother underwent any treatment. I never knew! I still do not know anything!

It is unclear from this interchange whether Herbert is actually forgetting here that his mother was in analysis (or that he never knew, despite having read the case history; perhaps he overlooked this information), or whether Herbert is instead saying that he did not know about it at the time of his treatment with Freud and has learned no details since. Either way, his lack of knowledge reveals his mother's remarkable and continuing circumspection about her treatment, about which we still know little. Note that, despite his lack of knowledge, Herbert does judge that the treatment must have done her no good: when Eissler asks, "You think it [the analysis by Freud] has helped her?", Herbert answers emphatically, "No! It didn't help my mother at all."

However, Max Graf's Archive interview does allow us to infer something about Olga Hoenig's analysis. Because Max mentions that she had two older brothers who suicided by shooting themselves, we can conclude that it is highly likely that she is the "19-year-old girl with almost pure obsessional ideas" who entered analysis with Freud in summer, 1897, according to a letter from Freud to Fliess (Masson 1985, p. 254).<sup>3</sup> There Freud noted that "the Almighty was kind enough to let the father die before the child was 11 months old, but two brothers, one of them three years older than the patient, shot themselves" (p. 254). Additional evidence that Freud was referring to Olga lies in his mentioning in another letter that Breuer had sent him a patient during the same summer that Olga began treatment (p. 249); this matches Max's comment in the interview that Olga was initially under Breuer's care. (Actually, in the interview, the name is truncated due to an interruption: "Breu—"; but "Breuer" seems the overwhelmingly likely intention.)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> I thank Harold Blum for bringing this letter and the likely identity of the patient to my attention.

<sup>4</sup> Recent speculations (Bergeret 1987) that Olga is "Katharina" of *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud 1895) would seem to be disconfirmed by this information because the analysis with Katharina predates the 1897 referral. I thank Nicholas Midgley (2006) for bringing Bergeret's thesis to my attention.

The information in the letter is consistent with Max Graf's observation in his interview that he was twenty-seven when he married and his wife was about four years younger. Max says he met Freud in 1900, so he could not have consulted Freud about the prospect of marrying Olga before then; Olga was apparently still in analysis at this time. We may assume they married within the next year; the marriage could not have occurred much later, because Max reports that a year after the marriage he again consulted with Freud and resolved to forgo divorce and have children, and Herbert was born in April 1903. Thus, at the time of the marriage, the patient referred by Breuer, who had been nineteen in mid-1897, would indeed have been about twenty-three, four years younger than Max. This rough calculation based on Max's various assertions from memory is in conflict, however, with Blum's (2006) statement that the couple married in late 1898, so, despite rough agreement, further rectification of these remembered dates and ages and refinement of the precise timeline of events are needed.

One can well imagine the nature of Freud's interpretations of Olga's problems at this early stage of his theoretical development, when he believed in the seduction theory. His letter to Fliess offers his theory of the case:

According to my speculations, obsessional ideas go back to a later psychic age and therefore do not necessarily point to the father, who tends to be the more careful with the child the older the child is, but rather point to the slightly older siblings for whom the child is yet to become a little woman. [Masson 1985, p. 254]

Thus, when Freud goes on to explain that the father in this case had died early, "but" two brothers, one three years older than Olga, shot themselves, he is offering an implicit explanation of who committed sexual acts with Olga. It is difficult to imagine how Olga must have felt if, after having first seen her neurosis blamed by Freud on her dead brothers' acts, she then watched Freud's theories change to the point that he gave up the seduction theory altogether, proving her earlier "resistances" correct after all! One must assume that her ultimate turning against Freud and embracing of

Adler's more commonsense approach is not unrelated to the nature of the interpretations Freud had likely offered her.

## HOW DID MAX GRAF FIND OUT THAT FREUD TREATED CHARITY CASES?

In "Reminiscences," Max Graf notes that: "Freud took the warmest part in all family events in my house; this despite the fact that I was still a young man and Freud was already aging" (1942, p. 474). After then mentioning an incident in which Freud brought Herbert a rocking horse (discussed later in this article), Max goes on to say that Freud "knew how to live with people; he was a person with social feelings," and he illustrates this characterization as follows: "It was his fundamental rule always to treat at least one patient without compensation. It was his way of doing welfare work" (p. 474). This revelation about Freud's charity cases is left at a wholly abstract, intellectual level, suggesting that it is secondhand knowledge gleaned from conversations with Freud.

The Archives interview suggests the possibility of a surprising personal background to this statement that may explain why, as he wrote "Reminiscences," Max associated from the topic of his family's personal relationship with Freud to the issue of charity cases, and that has the potential to reshape how one sees the relationships among Max, Olga, and Freud. I speculate that Max's knowledge of Freud's charitable practices was not obtained initially from Freud himself, but in a much more personal way, from his intimate acquaintance with a recipient of Freud's welfare, namely, his future wife, Olga Hoenig.

Max's discussion in the 1952 interview of Freud's "welfare" cases is as follows:

Well, I'll tell you something personal [*Personliches*] because it will illustrate the character and personality of Freud. So, Professor Freud, there was a session every day, and then there came a time when the family of this lady [*dieser Dame*] felt resistance against the things that the girl

had apparently told them, and the mother declared that she would no longer pay for the treatment. As a consequence, this young lady went to Freud and said, "Professor Freud, unfortunately I can no longer continue the treatment—no?—I ask, I no longer have the money for it," and told him the story. And Freud said to her: "No, and you cannot make up your mind to continue treatment as a poor girl?" She accepted that—he treated her without any fee. He told me later, occasionally, that he treated one patient for free every week. That is the kind of charity he can practice and that he practices habitually.

There are several things to note about this passage. First, the use of the demonstrative "this" in *dieser Dame* comes out of the blue, in the first mention of the patient in this passage. This indicates that the referent is already at hand and that there very likely was a reference to this woman earlier in the interview. It is true that, in German as in English, it is possible colloquially or as slang to use the demonstrative *this* without prior availability of the referent in the conversation, as in introducing a new topic with "I saw this woman the other day," meaning that one saw a certain, unspecified woman. However, such a level of informality is quite uncharacteristic of Max Graf's speaking style and seems a less plausible gloss of his use of *dieser Dame* in the welfare-case discussion; instead, he seems to be picking up the thread of an earlier discussion about a young lady. Since the only such person referred to in the interview thus far was the one described as having introduced Max to Freud, the phrasing suggests that it was Olga who at some point was treated for free, as a welfare case, by Freud.

Max says that the story is "personal." The intention here is ambiguous, exactly as it would be in English. The speaker could mean merely that he is going to say something personal as opposed to public, in which confidentiality must be respected. Or, he could mean that he is telling a story about Freud's personal, versus intellectual, nature in responding to a girl's need. Or, Max could mean that he is going to tell a personal story, that is, a story that has confidential and personal dimensions *for Max himself*, and a story about which he has personal, not secondhand, knowledge. If the

latter, the story is most plausibly about the experiences of his wife, who had reported her analytic experiences to Max.

The content and style of Max's description suggests that it is "personal" in the latter sense. Max presents this account not as a fact gleaned from Freud in conversation (as in the mention of charity cases in "Reminiscences"), but rather from the perspective of one directly and intimately familiar with the young lady under discussion. Max describes her interaction with her family, and quotes what she said to Freud and what Freud said back to her in vivid detail. He even hints at the internal conflict experienced by the woman in accepting Freud's offer that she should be "treated as a poor girl." It is hard to imagine Freud repeating this sort of conversation at this level of detail to Max. But Olga would tell Max—her husband—this potentially embarrassing story. And, given the personal nature of the story and the gratitude Freud's actions no doubt engendered in Max and Olga, it is more understandable why a physician treating an occasional patient who was unable to pay—a practice not at all so unusual—should garner such effusive praise from Max.

The story fits Olga's situation in two additional ways. First, Max says the family of the lady objected to what she was reporting of the analysis's insights. Olga had started analysis when Freud believed that actual seductions explained conditions such as hers, and thus the interpretations that she may have communicated to her mother would likely have involved claims about incest committed by her suicided brothers—part of the implied case formulation mentioned by Freud in a letter to Fliess in 1897. Such interpretations surely would have horrified Olga's mother and seemed manifestly false, understandably justifying the ending of family financial support of her daughter's treatment with Freud, which would have been going on at that point for at least three years (given that this was after Max met Olga in 1900). Second, the family's decision in the matter and authority over expenses is expressed in the person of the mother, not the father, an oddity for that time and place. We know that Olga lost her father when she was an infant. Thus, the mention of the mother as the exclusive representative of the family's financial decision with respect to Olga's analysis fits.

In the 1952 interview, after describing this personal anecdote, Max reports Freud's practice of generally treating one charity case. He indicates that this general knowledge of Freud's charitable practices came from Freud separately, emerging "later" than the events described in the anecdote, in occasional conversations: "He told me later, occasionally, that he treated one patient for free every week." Surely, if Freud had told Max the anecdote about the woman, that would have been the time for Freud to mention his general practice of treating welfare patients to explain his offer to the girl. Instead, the text suggests that Max was independently privy to the individual incident first, and then that Freud—in later conversations, perhaps, when this personal incident came up for discussion—placed the incident in perspective by telling Max of his general practice of suspending the fee in certain cases.

If Olga was indeed treated for free after her family refused to pay Freud's fees, this presumably introduced an element of need for reciprocity into the relationship between Olga and Freud. Perhaps the meticulous journal of Herbert's early years that the Grafs kept in response to Freud's request for more information about child sexual development might have been partly motivated by the desire to repay Freud.

As to Freud's motives other than charitable ones, it might be wondered whether he had difficulty giving up daily sessions with this woman for reasons other than professional ones (it is probably relevant that, in the 1909 case report, Freud described Little Hans's mother as "beautiful"). One also wonders if Olga's later embitterment toward Freud (see below) could have been fueled partly by lurking feelings of humiliation at having been a charity case dependent on Freud's generosity, or perhaps guilt over turning against a man who had been kind to her.

At any rate, evidence supports a reasonable probability that Olga Hoenig was the woman described by Max as Freud's charity patient, and that Max's story was in the first instance obtained from his wife-to-be during her reports to him about her analysis. The report in "Reminiscences" was therefore a pale shadow of the quite personal story that Max could tell about Freud's generosity. In 1942, when Max published "Reminiscences," Olga's treatment had

to remain confidential; Max could report only that Freud's kindness extended to the treatment of patients with insufficient funds to pay, and not that this courtesy was extended to his own wife. But, in the interview, the personal, suppressed latent content emerges of Olga's status as a charity case beholden to Freud.

### WHY DID THE ANALYSIS OF FREUD FAIL, AND WHAT DOES MAX GRAF'S ACCOUNT REVEAL ABOUT MAX HIMSELF?

I next consider an amusing anecdote that Max Graf tells in the Eissler interview about the early Psychological Wednesday Circle, started in 1902, of which Max was a founding member and which was the forerunner of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (started in 1908). Max's account of this incident is of interest because what it reveals about Max himself will illuminate the subsequent discussion.

An attempt by the group to analyze Freud, described by Max in his 1952 interview, turned out to be more interesting for the reasons that it failed than for anything that emerged in the aborted analysis. Max details the "one single point" on which it failed as follows:

Now, it is interesting that, once, we suggested to Professor Freud that the entire circle analyze him. Thus, in short, using all the rules of psychoanalysis which we had learned, we got Freud to talk and if resistance occurred we helped to get past it. We failed on only one single point, and that was very interesting. Freud had told us something of his mother, and in connection with that about a black fur muff [*Pelzsmuff*] which lay on the table. And when he said that, we all smiled because we knew the answer, and we told Professor Freud what it was. He absolutely did not want to accept something that was from the A-B-Cs of Freudian technique, and what without doubt completely evidently—Isn't it so? [*nicht wahr?*!—was an erotic symbol, and we were unable to continue the treatment. Freud had declared himself ready to do it. And then we began with,



“Please tell what happens to go through your head without self-examination; if it seems nonsensical to you or not,” and Professor Freud began. And then we came to the point [about the fur muff], and then it just absolutely didn’t go any further. Perhaps psychoanalytic examination is not possible within a group? Isn’t it so?

Had the group, given a historic opportunity to analyze Freud, “muffed” the analysis? Granting that amusement or expressions of self-satisfaction at the patient’s expense (“we all smiled”) are not the best way of helping the patient overcome resistance, it is plain that, in the context of the time, the group had not erred. Max was correct that, within the framework in which Freud routinely approached the interpretation of others’ associations at that time, including those offered at the Circle meetings and in the Little Hans case, the group’s interpretation was entirely fair—and even, as Max points out, obvious. The conclusion must be that Freud, in his dismissal of the group’s interpretation, was being unreasonably defensive about possible sexual elements in his relationship with his mother; the failure was his. Max’s anecdote thus reveals that Freud’s reputation for engaging in relentless self-examination must be qualified; he could be defensive when he was not in control of the interpretations.

Nor was such resistance on Freud’s part unknown at other times. For example, Rudnytsky (2002), who also reports this anecdote about the group analysis of Freud, observes its similarity to an episode reported by Jung that occurred on Freud’s sea voyage to America in 1909 with Jung and Ferenczi. When the three attempted to analyze each other’s dreams, “Freud called a halt to the experiment with the comment, ‘But I cannot risk losing my authority!’” (p. 45).

The final sentences of this anecdote are revealing in terms of Max’s personality and his relationship to Freud. After reporting Freud’s unwillingness to proceed with the agreed analysis, Max says to Eissler: “Perhaps psychoanalytic examination is not possible within a group? Isn’t it so?” Of course, Max is absolutely right to observe that analysis is ordinarily more difficult and perhaps virtually impossible in a group setting. And, of course, it may well

be that Freud was quite right in his judgment, and that his memory of the fur muff did not in fact represent a sexual element in his relationship with his mother; he also might have been expressing his growing realization that breaking through defenses was not such good technique, after all.

But this was no ordinary psychoanalytic setting and no ordinary analysand! As Nunberg and Federn (1967) observe, Freud and the Circle regularly engaged in this intense kind of group discussion that included revelations of personal analyses with interpretations similar to the one proffered to Freud, with little respect for defenses. Open-minded responses to such interpretations were implicitly demanded from others by Freud. Nor is it clear on what grounds Freud could have been so sure that his conscious rejection of the interpretation represented the truth of the matter; he would not have considered such subjective certainty to be determinative in others. The excessive resoluteness and defensiveness of his response, bringing the analysis to a grinding halt, is evident. Yet, rather than expressing frustration or disappointment that Freud did not display more flexibility in modeling the appropriate response to the sort of sexual interpretation that he regularly administered to others, Max leaped to a readily available rationalization for why Freud might have behaved as he did due to the circumstances.

This is an important clue to Max's personality and a point to keep in mind in considering his remembrances. He notes in his interview that "it is my nature to find the good in everything." He certainly finds the good in Freud: when Eissler asks Herbert's wife in her 1960 interview, "Did your father-in-law [Max] ever tell you about Freud?", she answers, "Yes, only good things, pleasant things, lovely memories." We shall see that this uniformly pleasant view is not entirely consistent with the reality of interactions between the two men.

Quite aside from his relationship to Freud, Max's sometimes admirable tendency to see the positive could occasionally yield rationalization in order to avoid confrontation of negatives such as hostility or disappointment. For example, Max appears to optimistically misjudge his relationship with his son Herbert. Where-

as Herbert, in his 1959 interview, reports very little in the way of a relationship to his father ("there was no real contact with my father until now, until he came to America . . . I was eight years, for instance, in Germany for an engagement and he was in Vienna . . . until Mr. Hitler—we saw each other only in the summer or so"),<sup>5</sup> Max asserts that the relationship is a good one ("I mean, the relationship to my son is very good, it is a mutual relationship of respect and openness"). Moreover, Max sees only the good in Herbert's analysis and the writing up of the case history ("And [Herbert] told me that he was very thankful when he read it, it made a great impression on him, and he is very grateful to me that I took the matter in hand back then")—whereas Herbert himself expresses ambivalent feelings, especially about the case's publication, including shock that his identity had been revealed in a journal, and he asserts that he "would not have agreed" to have the case published.

Again, Max, explaining in his interview that his divorce did not harm his children due to his own Stoic delay, notes, "I lasted eighteen and a half years in this marriage until the children were so big that I could easily leave the marriage without disturbing their development." In contrast, Herbert refers to the divorce as "the destruction of our family," and says of his stays in Vienna years later that "this was personal misery because of the divorce of my parents."

Max's predilections may have led him to be defensive in analysis. Herbert says: "When [Max] and his [second] wife had a more difficult period, he went into analysis, but did not like it." This fits

<sup>5</sup> Herbert's feelings about the lack of relationship with his father resonate with Max's feelings about his own father, as the transcript of Max's interview indicates:

K. E.: Did you have a good relationship with your father?

M. G.: No, I was afraid of my father . . . I would not normally call this a good relationship, in the deeper sense; well there was nothing at all . . . He was still of the old school of bringing up children here; you got beaten if you did something. I was afraid of my father.

with the fact that, when it came to threatening topics such as death and funerals, Max tended to suppress and avoid negative feelings. In his interview, Herbert recounts this aspect of his father's personality as expressed in his reactions to the death of his second wife and the funeral of his daughter (the "Hanna" of Little Hans's case history; see Freud 1909):

H. G.: Father had this wonderful ability . . . practically like Goethe's . . . to push things away . . . I remember when his second wife died, when he was still rather young, in his best age, and I came to him. I was horrified at the idea of going to him at that moment and seeing him alone. He was sitting there with a smiling face. He said, she died so beautifully, so wonderfully! And this was a good trait. He had enormous strength to turn things to the positive, or to forget them . . . put them aside.

My sister, in this country, unfortunately committed suicide. Father was here when this happened, and I don't know how he could really manage that situation. It was amazing! But he would not go to the cemetery, even so.

K. E.: And to the funeral?

H. G.: No!

We will see in the discussion below that Max's positive outlook and avoidance of the negative could shape his perceptions to a degree that may have obscured some important aspects of his relationship with Freud.

### WHEN (AND WHY) DID FREUD CARRY LITTLE HANS'S ROCKING HORSE UP THE STAIRS?

In "Reminiscences," prior to its becoming common knowledge that Max Graf's son was "Little Hans," Max reported the following striking story, framed as an illustration of the closeness of Freud to the Graf family.

Freud took the warmest part in all family events in my house; this despite the fact that I was still a young man and Freud was already aging and his marvelous black hair was beginning to gray. On the occasion of my son's third birthday, Freud brought him a rocking horse which he himself carried up four flights of steps leading to my house. [1942, p. 473]

Once it became known that Herbert Graf was the Little Hans who was treated for a horse phobia at about the age of five, this story of Freud's gift of a rocking horse to the boy almost two years earlier lost its innocence. It became of interest why Freud, seemingly presciently, had given the rocking horse to the child before his horse phobia developed—and even whether it conceivably could be related to the etiology of the phobia. Despite Max's attempt to explain this gesture as an example of Freud's taking “the warmest part in all family events,” Freud's act of giving the horse and of himself climbing the stairs with the horse seemed out of proportion to his relationship with the Graf family, and specifically with Herbert, prior to the development of the phobia and Herbert's analysis.

Consequently, the gift seemed to require further explanation, quite aside from the seemingly inexplicable coincidence that it represented. Most of all, the question arose as to why the presence of this horse in the Graf household during the time of the boy's phobia was not mentioned in Little Hans's case history. Confidentiality would have required not mentioning that Freud had given the horse to the patient as a gift, but the feelings of a boy with a horse phobia toward a rocking horse that he had had for some two years would seem quite relevant to the case.

Out of such anomalies, scholarly theories are born. Billig (1999), citing the 1942 article's mention that Freud gave a rocking horse to Hans on his third birthday, asks what, according to his own theories, Freud “was omitting by failing to mention the rocking-horse” (p. 123) and by failing to consider Hans's attitude toward the toy horse in the case history. He observes that Freud viewed horses as symbols of intercourse, and saw the climbing of stairs, with its rhythmical breathlessness culminating in reaching the top,

as also a representation of intercourse. He thus suggests that, in exerting himself rhythmically in climbing the stairs with a toy horse, Freud was, according to his own theory, symbolically expressing his sexual interest in Max's "beautiful" wife: "If he could see himself, Freud would have a ready interpretation" (p. 123). Billig concludes that Freud ignores manifest evidence of adult desires in the case to focus exclusively on the child:

What Freud does not say is as revealing as what he does . . . . We, the readers of the case history, are to remember Hans, running from horses with big widdlers, or riding on the back of his nurse. We are not invited to imagine Freud climbing the stairs to the Graf household with a rocking-horse in his arms, the father of psychoanalysis introducing the symbol of sexual intercourse into the house of the child . . . . The omissions of the adult desires are, in the broadest sense, repressions. [1999, p. 123]

All of this speculation is built upon Max Graf's remark about the rocking horse gift in "Reminiscences."

Rudnytsky (2002) suggests that the "Reminiscences" report of the delivery of the rocking horse on Hans's third birthday is "vital to our understanding of Little Hans," and laments that it has "received only cursory attention from scholars" (p. 43). He goes on to argue that the delivery of the gift not only reveals that, prior to the boy's analysis, "Freud's emotional investment in Hans goes far beyond what might be gleaned from the case history," but also inevitably triggers a deeper suspicion: "Given that Hans's phobia is one of horses, one cannot help wondering whether Freud's gift played a role in its etiology, though this is nowhere hinted in the text" (p. 43).

In the 1952 interview, Max confirms the rocking horse gift story that he had mentioned in "Reminiscences," but corrects one detail, and thereby changes everything:

I want to complete this picture of Freud with something which was characteristic of Freud: After the boy had been cured, and had his birthday, Freud came to my apartment.

He climbed four stories with a rocking horse under his arm, which he was bringing the boy as a gift.

Thus, the rocking horse was in fact delivered *after* the cure of the phobia, in 1908, when Herbert was five, not (as reported in “Reminiscences”) when he was three. It therefore could not have had anything to do with the etiology of the phobia or the process of its treatment. Billig (1999) and Rudnytsky (2002) were misled by Graf’s earlier distortion; Freud did not “omit” the toy horse from the case record of Little Hans, because the horse was not given until after the case had been completed and the phobia had subsided. Billig’s and Rudnytsky’s reliance on M. Graf’s (1942) false information to help build their overall arguments is an example of how such unannounced distortion in a scholarly article can do real harm to scholarship and waste scholarly effort.

Even among those who are aware of the interview’s redating of the rocking horse gift, there appears to be a peculiar resistance to accepting the implications of the changed date. For example, seemingly attempting to have it both ways, Rudnytsky (2002) includes the earlier-quoted comments on the importance of the delivery of the rocking horse on Little Hans’s third birthday centrally in his discussion of the Hans case, and only later explains that, based on Max’s interview with Eissler (to which Rudnytsky had access before it was widely available), the premise underlying those comments is likely false. Noting that “there may be some doubt as to the reliability of Hans’s father’s dating of the rocking-horse episode” (p. 43), Rudnytsky mentions after a series of long digressions that, in the interview, Max gives Herbert’s age as five at the time of the gift, and that this later age seems overall more plausible. Finally, several pages after his claim that the gift could have been etiological-ly relevant to Little Hans’s phobia, he conditionally acknowledges that “if Freud’s gift of the rocking horse occurs after Hans’s analysis, it cannot have influenced the formation of his symptom” (p. 46).

Despite all this, Rudnytsky bewilderingly later refers to “the bombshell concerning the gift of the rocking horse” (p. 51), and he continues to insist that, even if the rocking-horse episode took

place after the treatment ended, "the episode remains indispensable to understanding Freud's relationship to Hans" and "still proves that his involvement with Hans goes far beyond anything that he was prepared to acknowledge in the published record . . . . Whatever the timing of Freud's gift, it indicates that he was being disingenuous concerning his personal involvement in the case" (p. 46). However, the published record is about the relationship *prior* to the end of treatment, and does acknowledge that Freud knew Hans; the gift could certainly make sense at the termination of treatment, independently of any unacknowledged intensity of relationship during the treatment, and surely is no "bombshell."

Similarly, Blum (2004), in announcing the derestricted interviews of the Grafs, chooses to remain neutral on the date of the rocking horse gift when he states simply that "Max Graf (1942) wrote of Freud's gift for his son's third birthday, but in the 1952 interview he referred to the gift on Little Hans's fifth birthday" (p. 11). Blum notes: "Remarkably, considering their son's horse phobia, Freud climbed four flights of stairs to bring 'Little Hans' a gift of a rocking horse" (p. 11). The gift certainly seemed remarkable in "Reminiscences" (M. Graf 1942) because it was described as having been made *before* the onset of the phobia. It is less remarkable in light of the change of date that Blum reports, for the gift was actually made in response to the *resolution* of the horse phobia. More recently, Blum (2006) similarly referred neutrally to Max's "inconsistent memory" regarding the date of the delivery of the rocking horse, and suggested the possible "prescience" of the act, which would be the case only on the supposition that the "Reminiscences" date could be correct.

These puzzling comments seem to make sense only if commentators remain uncertain of the correct dating of the gift and are unable to resist the enormous allure of the remarkable *possible* story of its delivery prior to the appearance of the phobia. So we must ask: What assurance do we have that Max was indeed correct and not misremembering when he stated in the interview that the rocking horse was delivered after the analysis was over? Is it possible that he had been correct in "Reminiscences" and incorrect in the later interview, as Rudnytsky and Blum seem to allow?



The evidence in fact makes it overwhelmingly likely that the interview's dating is correct. First, an error on this point seems highly unlikely in light of the described emotional significance of the act as a recognition of Herbert/Hans's cure. Second, rather than being a result of random memory failure, the disguised truth in "Reminiscences" had a clear motive of confidentiality. Third, in one fell swoop, this correction resolves all the puzzles raised by Billig (1999) that are generated by the earlier date. The motive for the gift now becomes understandable: there is no mystifying pre-science on Freud's part, and the post-treatment context of his relationship to the Grafs makes the gift appropriate to the circumstances. Lastly, the details of Max's 1952 description of the surrounding events are consistent with the interview's dating of the gift; he says that Freud brought the gift "after the boy had been cured, and had his birthday." In separating the two events but placing them into about the same time period, Max is correctly remembering; Herbert was born on April 10, and the case ended at the beginning of May, so if Freud delivered the gift directly after the end of the case, it would have arrived within a few weeks of his birthday, soon enough to be a belated birthday remembrance. We may conclude, then, that Max changed the date in "Reminiscences" to disguise Herbert's identity as Little Hans; presumably, he thought this would make it less likely that the reader might guess it based on the coincidence of Herbert's fifth-birthday present of a rocking horse and Little Hans's cure of a horse phobia at about the time of his fifth birthday.

Later in Max's interview, he asserts that Freud was a proper, good person, and Eissler asks, "Any examples that he was a good person?", at which point Max cites Freud's delivering the rocking horse story as the best such example, concluding: "Only a really good person could have done that." However, even if we set aside Billig's (1999) speculation about a possible sexual motivation, Freud's altruistic motive need not be taken as the only one. In light of the new information that the rocking horse was delivered after, not before, the treatment, one might ponder: what else might also have motivated Freud to climb those stairs?

The most obvious answer, not inconsistent with altruism, is that the gift was in part a clinical intervention, designed to help Herbert consolidate his mastery of his fears by exposing him to the formerly feared object routinely and in a benign setting. Herbert's use of a rocking horse would be expected to solidify the conquest of the horse phobia that had beset him; fear could turn back again into love.

Of course, even such a clinical act can have both altruistic and self-gratifying motives. Freud had an enormous stake in the long-term outcome of this case. He understood that it would be controversial; indeed, both Max Graf and Freud himself reported an immediate public reaction as soon as the case was published—one of outrage that so young a child should be psychoanalyzed and exposed to sexual discussions. When, years later, Herbert visited Freud, the single point uppermost in Freud's mind was that Herbert's subsequent health obviated the fears that the analysis would leave him emotionally crippled, or that Herbert was a hereditarily tainted neurotic. The interview with Max reveals that these concerns about Herbert's future were already in Freud's mind at the time of the analysis; Max reports that Freud had told him, "You will see, some day this boy will serve in the cavalry." (Max notes in the interview that "Hans did not serve in the war so did not have to make that decision.") Moreover, Freud argues at length in the case report that Little Hans was basically a normally developing child who was helped by the analysis, and he himself raises the question of "whether experience will prove me right" (1909, p. 144).

It seems reasonable to infer, then, that if anything other than personal kindness, clinical prudence, and a celebration of shared triumph motivated Freud's exertions, it was probably the hope that, if Herbert played with a rocking horse, this would help to ensure that the cure remained intact over time, providing a convincing support for Freud's theories rather than an embarrassment. This continuation of therapy by other means was thus no doubt partly motivated by Freud's burning desire to have his theories proven correct and to secure his scientific immortality. (None of this, of course, removes his kindness or clinical prudence from the act.)

## PSYCHOANALYTIC POLITICS AND MARITAL CONFLICT: WHY DID MAX GRAF LEAVE THE CIRCLE?

In “Reminiscences,” Max Graf cites the growing medicalization of the Wednesday Circle and Freud’s dispute with Adler, and, above all, Freud’s forceful insistence on a “with-me-or-against-me” orthodoxy, as the causes of Max’s decision to leave the Circle, which occurred a couple of years after his son’s treatment and at about the same time as Adler’s defection from the Circle in 1911:

[Freud’s] . . . most gifted pupil turned away to follow a path of his own—Alfred Adler, who in a series of excellent discussions of his own views quietly and firmly defended the following point of view: Freud has created a new technique, a product of real genius; this technique was a new tool for investigative work, which every physician should use for independent research . . .

Freud would not listen. He insisted that there was but one theory, he insisted that if one followed Adler and dropped the sexual basis of psychic life, one was no more a Freudian. In short, Freud—as the head of a church—banished Adler; he expelled him from the official church.

I did not feel able to decide to take part in the strife between Freud and Adler’s group. [1942, pp. 471-472]

Thus, Max Graf portrays himself as a passive observer who did not want to be forced to take part in the conflict between Adler and Freud. And, even here, despite Max’s description of Freud’s demandingness, Max rationalizes that, for Freud, it was necessary to keep doctrine pure at this early stage of development:

[Freud] . . . was serious and strict in the demands he made of his pupils; he permitted no deviations from his orthodox teaching. Subjectively, Freud was of course right, for that which he worked out with so much energy and sequence, and which was as yet to be defended against the opposition of the world, could not be rendered inept by hesitations, weakening, and tasteless ornamentations.

Good-hearted and considerate though he was in private life, Freud was hard and relentless in the presentation of his ideas. [p. 470]

There is an oddity here: Max's sympathies clearly lie with Freud, yet he cannot succumb to Freud's demands to act on those sympathies:

Freud's best pupil cannot be compared to [Freud's] creative imagination and real genius. Adler possessed clarity, poise and a fine psychological feeling; he went along his path in slow steps, ever testing. He remained on the surface of the earth. Unlike Freud, he never rose into the air in a flight of imagination, nor did he ever dig deep shafts into the bowels of the earth. But I was unable and unwilling to submit to Freud's "do" or "don't"—with which he once confronted me—and nothing was left for me but to withdraw from his circle. [p. 474]

Max's 1952 interview generally confirms the 1942 article's account of how Max came to quit Freud's circle in the midst of the Adler-Freud conflict that led to Adler's defection in 1911. However, it offers a wholly different perspective on Max's role. Rather than acting as a passive observer, Max emerges as having taken an active and even relentless role in debating Adler's theory and its merits with Freud—not only at the Circle meetings, but also, and especially, in Freud's frequent visits to his home. It appears that it was Max's insistence that Freud could incorporate some of Adler's ideas, rather than an arbitrary impulse, that triggered Freud's demand that Max make a choice. In the interview with Eissler, Max tells the story like this:

Every time Adler started discussing inferiority, he got resistance from Professor Freud, who always got the last word . . . I tried [to find common ground] in my conversations with Professor Freud, and above all in conversations in my house, because I was a friend of Professor Freud's. I had always invited him to us; Professor Freud often came to an evening meal at our house, although

he'd already had a hard work day and was tired and would much rather have been at home. And we frequently talked about the opposition between his and Adler's points of view.

After three years, Adler and Stekel dominated, and I thought that what this circle had to offer me had been exhausted. I had the feeling that this conflict, a purely scientific conflict, did not advance me in my music criticism. It is my nature to find the good in everything, and in different opinions to find the kernel of truth, so I made the effort to also find some merit as well in the opinions of Dr. Adler, with whom I was very friendly. But I was unable to reach a decision because I did not have the knowledge . . .

Adler gave a lecture in which he tried to present both sides, including Freud's objections, and tried to reconcile, but it did not lead to a compromise or reconciliation . . .

When I made the effort in a conversation with Professor Freud to find a bridge between his theories and the theories of Professor Adler, he very vigorously corrected me, and said to me, "Either you accept or not." That gave me the feeling that my time was past, right? . . .

I did not really want to take part in these "guilt"/penance discussions that reminded me of the council discussions of early Christianity. So I no longer went to sessions of the psychoanalytic association.

Why was Max working so hard to find a bridge between Adler and Freud? His inclination to see good in various theories and to find their kernels of common truth could perhaps explain it, but there is a more intriguing possibility: the theoretical bridge Max was looking for would also serve as a bridge between himself and his wife. It turns out that, for Max, this dispute may not have been "a purely scientific conflict." Max says that he was "very friendly" with Adler, and that he pursued the Adler-Freud controversy "above all in conversations in my house, because I was a friend of Professor Freud's," and that in his house "we frequently talked about the opposition between his and Adler's points of view." He portrays his ultimate failure to embrace Adler as a matter of his being "unable to reach a decision because I did not have the knowledge."

What Max fails to say in *both* "Reminiscences" *and* the interview is that the Adler–Freud opposition was not just discussed in his marital home; it was an opposition *within* his marriage and led to a marital schism that may have played a role in his divorce. For Max's wife, Olga, became an embittered anti-Freudian and went over to Adler's side; she felt that Freud's personal advice had harmed her and the marriage.

The presence of this marital tension about psychoanalytic theory emerges in the Eissler interview with Herbert Graf of 1959:

H. G.: My mother had later a very great personal friendship with Alfred Adler. She didn't like Professor Freud because of what she felt was bad advice to my father. But she was a great personal friend of Alfred Adler . . . . And she is full of psychoanalysis and studying *now* . . . . She is quite experienced, I mean, and reads about it. But she did not *ever* speak to me about it, in particular . . . . My mother still has complaints, saying that Freud was not good in her life, and advising father to have children, and so forth, etc. It more or less ultimately broke up the marriage.

K. E.: She thinks she should not have had children?

H. G.: She should, maybe one, maybe still me, but not then the sister who has in the meantime died. But that it was too much of a burden on her mind, and so this went on and so forth, and it was not good for their private living. I have no way of judging it. I would think all these things develop rather normally and it was a different cause why this marriage broke up.

And Herbert's wife (here denoted by *F. G.* for *Frau Graf*) says the following in her 1960 interview:

F. G.: My mother[-in-law] had broken with Freud, and then she went to Adler. And whenever you see her, she still talks about Freud and Adler.

K. E.: But against Freud?

F. G.: Against Freud!

K. E.: Yes. And what had turned her against Freud? Do you know that?

F. G.: No, I don't know that. I didn't want to know it.

K. E.: Why?

F. G.: Because we are Freudians to our core. And Herbert's mother's nerves are not so good and never were. She exaggerates and somehow we never really wanted to go into it with her.

Herbert offers a startling explanation of why his mother turned against Freud: she believed that Freud's bad advice had harmed and ultimately destroyed her marriage. Herbert, resisting the simplistic notion that Freud had broken up his parents' marriage, nonetheless concedes that Freud's advice and his mother's consequent rejection of Freud did considerable harm.

The interviews generally reveal a picture of intense marital tension and spousal conflict over many issues, including sex and work, starting from the beginning of the marriage. No doubt Herbert is correct that his mother's blaming the marital troubles on Freud is to some extent a displacement, but Freud *had* advised Max to marry his first wife in a seemingly unconsidered way, and Freud *did* respond to Max's question as to whether he should get a divorce after a disastrous first year of marriage by seemingly endorsing instead the idea that the couple should have children. The depth of the marriage's troubles and Freud's role in them emerge vividly in Max's interview.

Max reports that he was twenty-seven years old when he married his wife, who was four years younger. His wife had had a difficult childhood, with several suicides in her family; perhaps these events were the reason for her consulting with Freud. In any event, she continued to suffer from various emotional problems that placed a stress on the marriage. Max had serious concerns even prior to the marriage, which turned out to be amply justified; he consulted Freud twice, once before marrying Olga, when he got Freud's ap-

proval, and once after a year, when he decided to stick out the marriage and to have children with her. Here is his description in the 1952 interview of the evolution of the marriage and Freud's involvement:

My first wife is a very interesting, very intelligent, and very beautiful woman. She is without a doubt a hysterical woman, something I was not able as a young man to judge. Even in those moments when she was hysterical, she was attractive and interesting. Before I made the decision to marry this woman, I went to Professor Freud, [who] . . . said to me, "Marry her, and you'll have your fun." Well, I didn't really have fun, but it was possible that I was too young. It was possible that if I had been older, that I really would have laughed. On the one hand, I was at the beginning of a career, I wanted to advance, I had the ambitions of a talented person, I had already published two books. On the other side was a woman who, for example, did not want to socialize, or was uncertain in social situations, was restless, and didn't feel well and therefore avoided going into social situations.

So you have a beautiful young woman, with whom one is shut up into an apartment. That was one of the reasons. Another reason was that the woman suddenly became jealous of my writings and that she tore them up. In short, after a year, I went to Professor Freud. And I said to him, "Herr Professor, this marriage isn't working." He was very surprised, and I made another effort. I thought, maybe children will change the circumstances. But that didn't happen, and nevertheless I lasted eighteen and a half years in this marriage, until the children were so big that I could easily leave the marriage without disturbing their development. Only later did I have doubts if it wouldn't have been better if I'd left sooner. I don't know what would have been the right thing.

Max's comment that, when he was a young man, his wife's pathology was "something I was not able to judge," suggests the weight he must have placed on Freud's expert view of a woman whom Freud was actually treating, and constitutes a perhaps unconscious,



indirect accusation: Freud was surely in a position to judge this matter correctly, yet did not do so! Nonetheless, Max does not explicitly emphasize Freud's responsibility for an error of judgment; instead, in character, Max offers his own youth as a possible reason that, contrary to Freud's prediction, he "didn't really have fun." His suggestion that, had he been older, he might have handled it better and just laughed off his misfortune, rings quite hollow, given the magnitude of the marriage's described problems.

Whatever Max's wife's flaws, this passage offers support for her claims against Freud. Max says he consulted Freud about the problems in the marriage, that Freud was surprised and apparently did not support ending the marriage, and that, following that consultation, Max resolved to try having children to fix the situation. The passage at least suggests Freud's acquiescence to this plan; moreover, the degree to which the wife herself was consulted is not stated. That the father took Freud's advice on important and sensitive matters of family life, seemingly without consulting his wife, is also suggested in both "Reminiscences" (1942) and in the 1952 interview by the account of Max's consultation with Freud on whether Herbert should be raised Jewish. Here is the interview version, more succinct and pointed than the earlier article's:

When my son was born, I had to decide whether to let him grow up as a Jew, or I wondered if to make life easy for him, I should have him baptized. I went to Freud and asked his advice; he said raise him as a Jew, because the boy will gain a lot from having to do twice as much as anyone else.

It is hard to see why Max himself was not angrier at Freud. Freud's ill-considered advice not only helped get him into a disastrous marriage; it also later forestalled a divorce for eighteen years—a divorce that would possibly have occurred after one year, without children, but for Freud's advice. However, for present purposes, the critical point is that Max's wife had both theoretical and personal objections to Freud and a growing friendship with Adler. Although the timeline of this shift cannot be precisely established, it seems possible that, already by the time of Herbert's phobia and

surely by the time the Freud–Adler disagreement was at its height, the couple's personal issues had become intertwined with an added marital dispute over the Freud–Adler conflict. In all likelihood, in choosing what to do about the Freud–Adler split, Max was also choosing what to do about the split between himself and his wife over this split. To reject Adler overtly and totally, and to stick with Freud, would have been to throw gasoline on the fires of his marital strife, already sufficiently intense to lead Max to consider divorce.

Moreover, Max's active debates with Freud in which he tried to find a bridge between Freud and Adler, as well as the fact that this dispute was frequently discussed during Freud's visits to the Graf household, are clarified in light of the couple's disagreement and Olga's active involvement in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic politics—an interest she fervently maintained throughout her life, according to her son's and daughter-in-law's interviews. Indeed, the link to Adler was apparently sufficiently firm to last a lifetime; in a 1953 letter from Olga to Kurt Eissler, in which she refused a request for an interview, Olga referred to Adler's opinion about such an interview, suggesting that she was still in contact with him when she was in her mid-seventies (Ross 2006). Max's inability to acquiesce to Freud's demand to take a stand, despite Max's clear preference for Freud's views, also becomes more comprehensible in the light of what such a stand would have meant at home.

However, the revelation of this personal consideration in Max's reaction to the Freud–Adler dispute does not at all suggest that Max would not, in any case, be inclined toward a compromise between Adler's and Freud's ideas. Max tended by nature to be a compromiser who saw multiple sides to intellectual issues rather than irrevocable conflict. An interesting illustration of this tendency emerges in the Archives interview. In both "Reminiscences" and the interview, Max mentions Wagner-Jauregg (the Nobel Prizewinner for the discovery that malarial fever could cause remission of general paresis), whom Max knew personally, as an important early arch-opponent of Freud's who maintained a strictly physiological approach to mental disorder. (In "Reminiscences," Max notes, how-

ever, that Wagner-Jauregg later became more flexible when, as an eminent Professor, he did not stand in the way of Freud's belated appointment to a professorship at the University of Vienna.) In "Reminiscences," Max reports Freud's response to an attempt by an unnamed but clearly courageous interlocutor to make the case that Wagner-Jauregg's physicalist approach to treatment was not incompatible with a psychological one:

Freud did not want to hear of any physical treatment of a psychological illness. When the opinion was once expressed that the intimate relationship between body and soul would permit one theoretically to believe that mental diseases could be cured with medicaments, that is to say, by means of the bodily approach, Freud remarked that theoretically it was possible, but not practically—that there was no way of approaching the psyche via the body—that one should approach the psyche only psychologically. [M. Graf 1942, p. 467]

Clearly, Freud believed that, theoretically (and, perhaps, practically at some point in the future), physical treatment of psychological afflictions was possible, but he was adamant that the kinds of intricate psychological etiologies he uncovered could, at that time, be approached only psychologically. Who in Freud's circle would dare to present an argument challenging this basic assumption of Freud's and defending Wagner-Jauregg? It turns out that the unnamed interlocutor was Max Graf himself. In the Archives interview, a version of the very same question is reported, with the same answer from Freud, but Max identifies himself as the questioner:

And once I said, "Look, Herr Professor, if you lay a bunch of coins next to each other in a particular order, if, let's say, one head and two tails, three heads, and so forth, and if you then turn the coins around so then the distribution would remain the same, it's the same law of distribution on one side as opposed to the other. That means it must be possible to treat a neurosis from the psychological side and there must be a possibility of also treating it from the

physical side." Freud granted that. He said to me, however, that we have no other way than the psychological way.

It is not clear why Max omitted specifying his own identity from "Reminiscences"; this seems to have nothing to do with the Little Hans case. Perhaps it was merely modesty, or, perhaps, in emphasizing his close association with the greatness of Freud, Max tended to minimize the conflict between the two men. In any event, the anecdote reveals Max's willingness to enter into conflict with Freud in order to defend his constitutional openness to intellectual compromise, quite aside from any special features of the Adler issue.

### HOW DID HERBERT GRAF DISCOVER HE WAS LITTLE HANS AND COME TO MEET WITH FREUD?

The Little Hans case report was amended by Freud in 1922 to reflect a visit that the grown-up "Hans" made to Freud:

A few months ago—in the spring of 1922—a young man introduced himself to me and informed me that he was the "little Hans" whose infantile neurosis had been the subject of the paper which I published in 1909. I was very glad to see him again, for about two years after the end of his analysis I had lost sight of him and had heard nothing of him for more than ten years. The publication of this first analysis of a child had caused a great stir and even greater indignation, and a most evil future had been foretold for the poor little boy, because he had been "robbed of his innocence" at such a tender age and had been made the victim of a psychoanalysis. But none of these apprehensions had come true. Little Hans was now a strapping youth of nineteen. He declared that he was perfectly well, and suffered from no troubles or inhibitions. [Freud 1909, p. 148]

Although neither the visit nor its genesis could be reported in "Reminiscences," both are reported in the interviews. Max and Herbert Graf each describe how Herbert came to pay a visit to Freud after Herbert had discovered his identity as Hans, but there is a dif-

ference of memory, or at least of emphasis, between their two accounts. Herbert says that he suspected his identity as Little Hans (about which he had no firsthand memories) when he noticed some familiar names as he perused the case history while packing his father's books after his parents' separation. As he indicates in his 1959 interview, he approached his father to verify his suspicions:

I asked him whether it was true. And he said, yes, it is all true. And then we discussed it. I said I would like to meet Professor Freud now. And he said, of course, you should. And I called Professor Freud and made an appointment. I came to him and I went to his studio, and he looked at me, of course, not recognizing me. And I said: I am the Little Hans. And it was very touching. He came to me and embraced me, and said, sit down! And then we had a long discussion in which he asked me what I am doing, what I am planning to do, and so forth, at the end of which he said that he felt that the treatment must have done some good because I spoke or acted—at least in his presence—quite normally.

And I went home. And later I heard that some sort of a postscript had been added that I came to him after so many years and that seeing me in the flesh was the best proof of the correctness of his theory, and so forth. And I remarked that the fact that I ended up in the opera might be proof that all is not so normal, after all!

Max Graf's description of this event, in his own interview, places more emphasis on the role he himself played as instigator of the visit:

In 1918, when Hans entered his artistic career, I suggested that Hans should visit Professor Freud so he could see that everything was in order. Professor Freud was very interested to see what the success of the treatment was and what had become of the boy.

The year of the meeting between Herbert Graf and Freud is incorrectly stated by Max to have been 1918, a date inconsistent with

the postscript to the case in which Freud says Hans visited him in 1922. Moreover, in 1918, Herbert would have been fifteen years old, a bit young to be embarking on an artistic career. On the other hand, in 1922, Hans would have been about nineteen, the age Freud ascribes to him, so we can take Freud's dating as correct. The time of the meeting is confirmed by the following additional account given by Herbert in his 1959 interview:

The strange thing is this: I was not aware of anything [regarding the case history] which ever happened to me until my parents were divorced when I was about sixteen or seventeen, when I had to take care of the moving of the library of my father from my mother's home to what later was his home. I was interested in psychology and so forth at that time, but it was the first time that into my hands fell this particular analysis which concerned me. And I saw it, I read it, and, of course, *my* name is not the *real* name, but the names of my aunt and other persons in it are correct names; for instance, I have an aunt, the sister of my mother, who is called Maritschi, which is a very unusual name, and this name was in it in the correct way. And in reading this I realized that the whole thing *had* to do with me.

And I went to my father who, of course, knew a lot about these things which I didn't, and I asked: what *is* this? It obviously concerns *me*?! My father said: Yes, this is so, and he told me the entire story of this analysis, which went through *his* hands actually, which *he* did. As I understand it, I had not seen Freud except in the beginning once and the end *once*, when I was five years old. So I asked him whether it was true. And he said, yes, it is all true. And then we discussed it. I said I would like to meet Professor Freud now.

Herbert notes that his parents divorced when he was sixteen or seventeen, which means between mid-1919 and mid-1921. Apparently, his mother initially remained in their old apartment. When Herbert says that he was moving the books to "what later was his [father's] home," he must mean that the move occurred some time later, after the divorce, when his father was settled and perhaps re-

married (which both spouses did rapidly after the divorce). Indeed, Freud states in his addendum to the case report that, at the time of the visit, Little Hans's parents had both already remarried. Thus, the packing of his father's books that led to Herbert's discovery likely occurred when his father was moving into a new place with his second wife on the occasion of being remarried: that is, in 1921 or 1922, when Herbert was seventeen or eighteen years old, consistent with a subsequent visit to Freud when Herbert was nineteen.

### WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN MAX GRAF'S ONE LATER MEETING WITH FREUD?

Max Graf's interview offers a striking description of the sequelae of Herbert's visit to Freud that surely would have been an important part of Max's personal reminiscences of Freud, had he not had to hide the fact that his son was Little Hans. For Max himself visited Freud following Herbert's visit, having not had contact with Freud for a decade. In "Reminiscences," we get merely a pale echo of what really happened via an extensively disguised description; there Max indicates only that, after leaving the Circle, he did not meet with Freud again, except for once more at the time of Freud's seventieth birthday. On that occasion, Max says, Freud was distrustful and angry:

But I was unable and unwilling to submit to Freud's "do" or "don't"—with which he once confronted me—and nothing was left for me but to withdraw from his circle. I did, of course, express my admiration for Freud later in an article on the occasion of his seventieth birthday . . . while the destroyers of German culture in Berlin burned many great books and among them also the writings of Freud . . . . At that time, I had a chance to speak once more with Freud, and I found him distrustful, bitter, and angry. His teaching had spread all over the world . . . . The spiritual and scientific world belonged to Freud. [1942, pp. 474-475]

In that article, Max reports no other contacts with Freud subsequent to his leaving the Circle. Zilboorg points out in his note accompanying the publication of "Reminiscences" that there was an apparent lapse of memory in this description, because the Hitlerian book burnings occurred at Freud's eightieth birthday, not his seventieth (see M. Graf 1942, p. 465). This is surprising, for the book burnings had taken place only about six years prior to the publication of "Reminiscences," and presumably would have been a salient memory for Max if linked with meeting Freud.

Another oddity is that the description of Freud as distrustful, bitter, and angry is given no specifics in terms of what Freud said that revealed this, and no context in terms of the reasons for Freud's feelings (although Max characterizes Freud as having had a distrustful look even when they first met). Instead, immediately after noting Freud's negative emotions during the meeting, Max launches into a description of how complete was Freud's success ("His teaching had spread all over the world . . . . The spiritual and scientific world belonged to Freud"). This simply amplifies the mystery of what it is that Freud was so negative about at Max's last meeting with him, a mystery left unaddressed in "Reminiscences."

However, these puzzles are resolved by Max's comments in his 1952 interview. First, the one later meeting with Freud did not in fact occur at the time of the *Festschrift* article on Freud's seventieth birthday (at least, that was not the only or most salient meeting). The use of that date appears to have been a way of disguising the facts, and this deviation from the truth might also have led to the confusion noted by Zilboorg. Instead, in the interview, Max describes his one further meeting with Freud as occurring after Herbert paid his follow-up visit, outlined in Freud's 1922 postscript to the case report. In 1922, Freud would have been about sixty-six, not seventy. The context of the visit as a follow-up to Herbert's visit could not, of course, be described in "Reminiscences" because it would have given away the identity of Little Hans. In the interview, Max reports no other contacts with Freud after leaving the Circle; he does not mention any seventieth or eightieth birthday meeting. So one may assume that the suppressed meeting in 1922 is likely the same one later referred to misleadingly in "Reminiscences."



Second, whatever else Freud felt at the meeting, it is clear from Max's interview that Freud's negative attitudes emerged primarily *in regard to Max Graf himself*:

At that time, I had not seen Freud for a few years, and that was when psychoanalysis really became an international school. After Freud had received the boy in such a friendly fashion, I contacted Freud, because I wanted to speak with him myself about the boy. When I went to him, he received me in a very unreceptive and closed manner. I couldn't get him into a friendly conversation, and I asked him, "Tell me sincerely, what is the matter that you have this tone, and your behavior toward me has changed." He said: "Yes, you have left the psychoanalytic association, and you did not pay your membership fees, and you did not take part any more." That was true; whether I still owed the membership fee, I did not know, but that was possible. But I saw that this conversation would no longer be on the old friendly basis. I said goodbye, and I have only seen Freud since from time to time on the street. I always greeted him in a polite manner, because my opinion of him had not changed. But he always looked at me with a sideways, mistrustful glance. He returned my greeting, of course, but in a way you greet a stranger.

This description provides what might be seen as a rather unflattering insight into Freud's character. It is clear that Max's visit was at least in part an attempt at reconciliation, aimed at rekindling the friendship with Freud. This followed Max's sending his son to Freud to confirm the healthy outcome of the long-ago treatment, a matter of no small importance to Freud. Moreover, a great deal of time had passed since the claimed transgression in payment of dues. Not only does Max say, "At that time, I had not seen Freud for a few years," but Freud places a number on this interval when he states in the postscript regarding Little Hans (and, therefore, presumably regarding his father) that "about two years after the end of his analysis I had lost sight of him and had heard nothing of him for more than ten years" (1909, p. 148).

It must also be kept in mind how much Freud owed to Max Graf. Due to the need for confidentiality, and given the anticipated outrage in the medical community over the psychoanalysis of a child, Max, who aspired to be a writer, got no public credit for his eloquently written diary of his son's sexual development and account of the psychoanalytic treatment of his son's phobia that formed the core of the case history (Freud 1909). All the authorship credit went to Freud—although, when it was initially published, Freud did clearly acknowledge that the case report had been communicated by, rather than authored by, Freud himself, and Freud was generous in his praise of the anonymous father's role.

Moreover, Max was not himself trained as a doctor or analyst, and his interests were mainly in the applications of psychoanalysis to music criticism, so his leaving the Circle at a time when it was becoming increasingly medical, theoretically polarized, and distant from his own interests is quite understandable. One might have thought, therefore, that a softened attitude on Freud's part, or even some degree of gratitude toward Max, would have been the appropriate order of the day at this last meeting. Instead, Freud rejected Max on the basis that Max had left the psychoanalytic society and *had not paid his dues ten years before*. Max's reaction to this bizarre rebuff is remarkably (and characteristically) charitable.

This last meeting does not reflect well on Freud. Having warmly embraced the healthy son as a choice piece of evidence for his theories, Freud was unresponsive to the father who had not only delivered the son's case history years before (a case history repeatedly cited by Freud as his best evidence for the oedipal theory), but who also remained sympathetic enough to Freud fourteen years later to deliver the healthy son himself to Freud. One might speculate that Freud's distancing response must have been partly an expression of his unwillingness to confront and acknowledge his lingering guilt over the advice he had offered to Max so long ago. After all, the visits of Herbert and Max Graf must have served as reminders that the marriage between Max and Olga, recently and finally dissolved, had been a mistake from the beginning. And it must not be forgotten that, when Max left the Circle, he was in

effect refusing Freud's demand that Max choose Freud himself over Adler.

Whatever its sources, Freud's response could not help but cause pain to Max. In addition to Freud's well-documented rejection of associates cited by Max in "Reminiscences" (he "would break with his most intimate and reliable friends" [1942, p. 472] over matters of theory), the unforgiving nature of Freud's response to Max's attempted overture may well explain what Max was thinking when he wrote in "Reminiscences" that "we may think of [Freud] as a Moses, full of wrath and unmoved by prayers" (p. 471).

## CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The case of Little Hans has a unique place in psychoanalytic history and thought. It is the first case of child analysis, the first description of clinical supervision (by Freud of Max Graf), the prototype for analysis of phobias, and, most important, the clearest presentation by Freud of the analysis of oedipal dynamics and the most direct attempt to provide evidence for the oedipal theory of sexual development. For these reasons, it has been studied by generations of psychoanalysts and been the subject of endless reinterpretations. Consequently, Max Graf, as Little Hans's father and analyst (though not formally trained as one), will retain an important place in psychoanalytic history.

But he will also be remembered for his friendship with Freud and his involvement in the early Wednesday Circle, and it is in this capacity that he wrote "Reminiscences" (1942). What has been unknown is the degree to which these two roles—father of the patient called Little Hans, and reminiscer about his relationship with Freud—came into conflict when he wrote "Reminiscences," due to the confidentiality of the true identity of Little Hans. This conflict led Max to distort some of the historical facts so as to provide some information while not revealing what had to remain hidden, yielding a split in some instances between the manifest and latent content of the information.

An examination of Max and Herbert Graf's (1952; 1959) later interviews with Kurt Eissler shows that much was lost as a result of these omissions. Contrary to the impression given in "Reminiscences," we find a revelation of Max's quite active involvement in the intellectual disputes over Adler's theory and Wagner-Jauregg's physicalist approach, and of his challenges to Freud, which better explain Freud's pressure on him to be unequivocally supportive. A full description of Herbert Graf's discovery of his identity as Little Hans and Herbert's subsequent visit to Freud emerge as well. Max's revealed tendency to idealize or at least look on the positive side of things may have implications not only for his relationship with Freud, but also possibly for his handling of his son's analysis. Freud's amusing defensiveness in being analyzed—and his disastrously poor judgment about momentous, intimate matters regarding marriage and childbearing in the case of a patient and a friend, matched by equally poor judgment in his willingness to offer explicit advice—also newly emerge. Freud's well-known ability to reject close associates is underscored by the seeming gratuitousness of his rejection of Max Graf. And Freud's kindness, but also perhaps his ambition, emerges in a new light with the revised date of his gift of a rocking horse to Herbert.

Perhaps the greatest lesson to be gained from Max Graf's 1952 interview is an awareness of the intensely personal nature of the early psychoanalytic movement, even as issues were being framed as intellectual. The continuity between the theoretical and the personal in psychoanalytic politics emerges clearly in the Grafts' marital relationship, seen as an intimate correlate of the Freud-Adler dispute, and the possible role of those conflicts in Max's leaving the Circle. These factors, as well as the surprising depth of the Grafts' marital problems, are all potentially relevant to understanding the Little Hans case record, and they become clear for the first time with the derestriction of the Freud Archive interviews.

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## THE LEIPZIG EPISODE IN FREUD'S LIFE (1859): A NEW NARRATIVE ON THE BASIS OF RECENTLY DISCOVERED DOCUMENTS

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*This paper sheds new light on the facts and chronology of Sigmund Freud's two-month stay in Leipzig. Using material from the Leipzig city archives, the authors explore the attempts of Freud's father in 1859 to obtain a permanent residence permit in Leipzig for himself and his family. At that time, there was a ban on the immigration of foreign Jews into Saxony, lifted only for merchants whose residence was deemed beneficial to local commerce. Evidently, Jacob Freud did not meet this requirement and therefore had to move on to Vienna. The significance of these events for Freud's mental development is discussed.*

In 1859, the Freud family (parents Jacob and Amalia, the infant Anna, and the three-year-old Sigismund, who would later call himself Sigmund) left their home in Freiberg/Príbor, Moravia, and set off to Vienna via Leipzig. These bare facts are well known, but many details remain unclear: what was the precise date of the family's departure from Freiberg; what was the exact duration of their stay in Leipzig; what did Jacob Freud plan to do in Leipzig; and what prevented him from settling there? Based on recently discovered documents in the Leipzig city archives, the present paper aims at

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Michael Schröter wrote this article; Christfried Tögel carried out the archival research. The German original (Tögel and Schröter 2004) was slightly altered for the English version, which was translated by Daniela Haller.

answering these questions. We are thus bringing previous research (Bernfeld and Bernfeld 1944; Goodnick 1998; Jones 1953; Krüll 1986; Laible and Hlousek 2003; Sajner 1968) a considerable step forward.<sup>1</sup>

Our emphasis is on the facts and chronology of the Leipzig episode. We will start out by exploring the circumstances surrounding the family's departure from Freiberg. Subsequently, we will shed light on Jacob Freud's attempts to obtain a permanent residence permit in Leipzig. Third, we will investigate the details concerning the family's journey from Freiberg to Leipzig and from there to Vienna. Finally, we will add some comments on the potential psychic implications of this chain of events for the young Freud. We hope that our findings not only tell a dramatic story, but also provide further understanding of Freud's earliest years and their familial and sociocultural context.

## THE DEPARTURE OF JACOB FREUD

Freud's father had come to Moravia from the more eastern Galicia in the 1840s (at that time, both regions were part of the Austrian empire) and had established himself as a wool and textile merchant in the town of Freiberg/Príbor, which was not easy for a Jew. In 1855, he married his second (or third?) wife, Amalia, who came from Vienna. One year later, their first child was born: Sigismund.

Jacob Freud stayed in Freiberg for fifteen years. Why he decided after this time to move on is not known, and, unfortunately, we can add nothing new on this subject. According to Jones (1953, p. 12), Freud's father was strongly affected by the general decline of textile manufacturing and by the resulting resurgence of anti-Semitism. Freud's own comments (1899) point in a similar direction: "At that time, the branch of industry in which my father was concerned met with a catastrophe. He lost all his means and we were forced to leave and move to a large town [Vienna]" (p. 312). Others contradict

<sup>1</sup> In a similar quest for details, Laible and Hlousek (2003) also gained access to the Leipzig documents under discussion. While they do not cite any references, we agree with their assertion that this material fills in a "blank in Freud's biographical land map" (p. 238).

this narrative (Krüll 1986, pp. 143-144; cf. Sajner 1968, p. 176), maintaining that, on the contrary, the textile industry in Moravia at the time was expanding. They refer to the example of Jacob Freud's Jewish colleague Ignaz Fluss, a tradesman who became a textile factory owner—evidence that also renders anti-Semitism a less plausible reason for the Freuds' move.<sup>2</sup> Since it is difficult to get exact dates and regionally specific information about economic developments and anti-Jewish activities in the 1850s in Moravia, we can only note the problem but not resolve it.

Existing sources contain a further, not much heeded explanation of why Jacob Freud left Freiberg. His daughter Anna (Freud-Bernays [2004]) writes in her memoirs with a clearly idealizing overtone:

Father's integrity became manifest when the sons from his first marriage floundered with their ostrich farm in Transvaal. At that time, Father sold his flourishing factory in Freiberg to pay the debts of his sons in Transvaal so that none of their debtors would lose a penny. My parents then moved to Vienna where Father worked as a wool merchant. [p. 98]

On another occasion, Anna Freud-Bernays tells the same story as follows: The two older Freud sons never lived in Freiberg (this is clearly not true; cf. Sajner 1968, pp. 170ff.), but had already emigrated to England in 1854. Philipp, the younger son, had worked in a textile firm in Manchester that belonged to his brother, however:

Later, Philipp moved to South Africa (the area around Johannesburg), where he ran an ostrich farm. A bird epidemic<sup>3</sup> led to a financial breakdown from which he was

<sup>2</sup> Krüll (1986) assumes that Freud's father may have moved from Freiberg to Leipzig so that the two adult sons from his first marriage would not be conscripted to military service (pp. 144-145). This hypothesis was adopted by Goodnick (1998, pp. 196-197). It does not, however, explain why the whole family would have had to emigrate.

<sup>3</sup> The bird epidemic is more plausible as a causative factor than the one recorded by Roazen (1993), which was that the demise of the ostrich farm occurred as ostrich feathers were no longer in fashion. In fact, the fashion did not fade until the First World War, and then in part because of the advent of the automobile.



rescued by Father's selling his textile factory in Freiberg to a former employee, Herr Fluss, who later became the biggest industrialist in Fr. What happened to Philipp after that is not known. ([Comments by Oliver Freud:] This version sounds implausible because in 1859 Philipp would have been a very young man. Should all the other facts be correct, the events concerning the ostrich farm would have taken place at a much later date.)<sup>4</sup>

Although a number of Jewish merchants were involved in trading with ostrich feathers in South Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century, this story contains too many inconsistencies. The "flourishing factory" of Jacob Freud is not supported by any other evidence, and raising ostriches did not begin before the 1860s.<sup>5</sup> The recollections of Anna Freud-Bernays do not, therefore, clarify the reasons why Freud's father left Freiberg.

Jacob Freud must have decided to leave at the beginning of 1859, at the latest, because on February 1, the Freiberg Clothmakers' Guild issued the following "certificate" to him:

The local Clothmakers' Guild hereby for the sake of truth certifies that for 15 years Herr Jacob Freud has continuously been in our midst as an expert commissioner and honorable tradesman whose involvement reaped great benefits for us, and in general that he was dwelling in our midst as such a peaceful, moral and honest man of kindness that we regret his departure from here. We award him with this certificate for legitimisation when needed. [Sigmund Freud-Haus 1975, p. 12]

This paper also shows that the collapse of Jacob Freud's business—even if there may have been something compromising about it

<sup>4</sup> This account (translated from the original by D. Haller) is reproduced from O. Freud 1944b, p. 2. Roazen (1993, p. 37) has the story, too; he may have heard it from Edward Bernays, Anna's son.

<sup>5</sup> We wish to thank Fritz Huchzermeyer, Veterinary Institute of the Onderstepoort University of Pretoria, for pertinent information. See also *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon* (1890) and: [www.jewishgen.org/SAfrica/communities/1/index.htm](http://www.jewishgen.org/SAfrica/communities/1/index.htm).

(see below)—was not accompanied by any impropriety.<sup>6</sup> A good three weeks later, a similar action took place in Klogsdorf/Klokocov, where the Freud family had the right of domicile, although they lived in neighboring Freiberg.<sup>7</sup> On February 26, the mayor of this village certified that:

Herr Jacob Freud, born in Tismenitz on Dec. 18, 1815, as well as his wife Amalie Freud, nee Nathansohn and his two children of this marriage, Sigismund Freud born in Freyberg on May 6, 1857 [sic] and Anna Freud born in Freyberg on Dec. 31, 1858, and any other children issuing from this marriage in the future are registered in this community and have a right of domicile here and will be readmitted at any time should they not have acquired subjects' rights elsewhere. In addition, the undersigned Mayor confirms that Herr Jacob Freud and his wife are of good repute in every respect and that nothing untoward in their conduct has ever been reported. [Sajner 1968, p. 176]

Finally, on March 23, the municipal council of Freiberg issued a *Sittenzeugnis* (certificate of good conduct) confirming that, in his fifteen years of residence, Jacob Freud "has been above reproach both in moral respects and also in respect of his civic duties" (Krüll 1986, p. 144). All these documents evidently intended to pave the family's way out of Freiberg.<sup>8</sup> This also holds true for the certificate of marriage, dated February 15, 1859, which Jacob Freud received from the Jewish *Cultus-Gemeinde* in Vienna (Krüll 1986, p. 144).

As far as the exact date of the family's departure is concerned, our only information up to now has been the otherwise uncorrob-

<sup>6</sup> This is in contrast to the case of Freud's father-in-law, Berman Bernays, who was convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy in Hamburg in 1868, and who therefore moved to Vienna after his release from prison (Hirschmüller 2005, pp. 336-337).

<sup>7</sup> It was not until 1908 that Sigmund Freud gave up the Klogsdorf right of domicile in favor of that of Vienna (Laible and Hlousek 2003, p. 237).

<sup>8</sup> They also show that there can be no question of a hasty or abrupt departure, let alone of "fleeing," as maintained by Goodnick (1998, p. 196).

orated statement by Jones (1953) that father Freud, with the two sons from his first marriage, Emanuel and Philipp, had set off to Leipzig in June 1859, and that the family followed in October.<sup>9</sup> This chronology needs to be corrected. While we have hardly any reliable information on the time and mode of emigration of Emanuel (plus family) or Philipp, there is indeed archival evidence that the Freud family did not immediately travel to Leipzig together, but that the father was the first to go and make preparations for their move.<sup>10</sup> However, the whole process took place earlier and was over by mid-October of 1859.

### JACOB FREUD'S EFFORTS TO GET A PERMIT OF RESIDENCE IN LEIPZIG

In 1859, the Easter fair in Leipzig took place from May 9 to May 28. We do not know if Jacob Freud had visited this fair previously. It is clear, however, that he did so this time, or at least used the period of the fair to visit Leipzig. On May 9, the first day of the event, he arrived in the trade capital of Saxony and took up residence in the hotel Stadt Rom, in the immediate vicinity of the railway station.<sup>11</sup> Since foreign Jews could not easily stay in Leipzig except during the time of the fair, it seems highly unlikely that he would have arrived earlier.

There are a number of documents<sup>12</sup> that shed light on the ensuing activities of Jacob Freud and that are employed here for the

<sup>9</sup> This information is found only in the English edition of Jones's biography of Freud—in particular, in a table of dates at the beginning of the first volume, which was not carried over into either the American or the German edition.

<sup>10</sup> In a letter of September 9, 1875, to his friend Silberstein, Freud (1990) reports that Emanuel and Philipp “used to live with us in Freiberg, where my elder brother's three oldest children were born. The unfavourable turn their business took there caused them to move to England, which they have not left since 1859” (p. 126). Since Emanuel's third child was born in February 1859, they seem to have emigrated at about the same time as their father.

<sup>11</sup> This is according to the *Leipziger Tageblatt* of Monday, May 9, 1859. Other bearers of the name *Freud*—for example, Jacob's sons from his first marriage—do not surface in the available fair documents of the time.

<sup>12</sup> All of them can be found in the Leipzig city archives in a file titled “*Acta: Die Israeliten betr., die um Aufenthalt hier außer den Messen gebeten haben*” [Files: Re-

first time in a scholarly manner.<sup>13</sup> All of them concern Jacob Freud's efforts to achieve "a permanent residence permit" in Leipzig for himself and his family. He submitted an application to this end, directed to the police, as early as May 1859.<sup>14</sup> In it, he explained that "during and outside the fairs," he had "considerable buying of goods to do in Russia and Poland which required permanent presence there," and emphasized that "the purchasing commission that I am carrying out on behalf of major foreign traders will not be without advantages for local trade and will ensure me a secure income" (Tögel and Schröter 2004, pp. 26-27).

In order to understand the wording of this application as well as its eventual fate, a brief look at the immigration prospects for Jews in Saxony in the middle of the nineteenth century will be helpful (we must keep in mind that Jacob Freud was an Austrian citizen and therefore a foreigner in Saxony). Generally, at that time, "most German states did not permit any Jewish immigrants" (Tourey 1977, p. 27), and, in principle, this was also the case in the Kingdom of Saxony. However, Leipzig was to some extent an exception to this rule, as was Hamburg, because of the importance of trade in these two cities.

For centuries, the Leipzig fair, which took place several times a year, had been "a magnet for Jews from the east" (Tourey 1977, p. 30); in the years before 1840, when records were kept (later discontinued), the "fair Jews" accounted for an average of one-quarter of the visitors to the Easter Fair. In absolute numbers, this amounted to about 3800 (Diamant 1993, p. 52). Their significance for Saxony's foreign trade, especially with eastern and southeastern Europe, was acknowledged; earlier restrictions on their business

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garding the Israelites who requested residence outside the duration of the fairs].” They are reproduced in Tögel and Schröter 2004, pp. 26-30; translations are by Daniela Haller.

<sup>13</sup> In the account given by Laible and Hlousek (2003), the sequence of events is not quite accurate; in particular, we do not see any indication that Jacob Freud's first application remained unanswered (p. 239).

<sup>14</sup> The application itself seems to be lost. What have survived are only the files of the city council, not those of the subordinate police authorities.

opportunities had been lifted in 1818. A small minority even managed to acquire permits of residence in Leipzig beyond the duration of the fairs. In a report of the Leipzig commercial council (*Kammermeister und Handelsdeputierte*), drafted in 1832, regarding the stay of "several foreign Israelite buyers from Russia and Poland," this was expressly welcomed; it was pointed out that:

In wise consideration of these circumstances [i.e., the commercial significance of Jewish merchants from the east], the state government has issued the directive that an extended stay here after completion of the fair may be granted to those Jewish merchants who in the estimation of the commercial council would be useful for the conduct of trade in Leipzig. [Diamant 1993, p. 50]

Thus, a permanent residence of foreign Jewish tradesmen in the city could be permitted as an exception, but only in important cases where the deputies of commercial Leipzig regarded their stay as useful.<sup>15</sup>

This state of affairs seems to have been confirmed by a Saxon law of 1838 (cf. Diamant 1973, p. 30). It limited the residence of Jews to the cities of Dresden and Leipzig; they were not allowed to settle in other areas. This regulation affected those individuals who were already living in Saxony. In addition, it stipulated that "foreign Jews" could take up residence in Dresden and Leipzig with the permission of the ministry of the interior, "which will, however, only grant it if previously the municipal officials and representatives of the city have given their approval" (Hartstock 1998, p. 45). The legal equality of Jewish citizens with Christians, which had been achieved in Saxony in 1849-1850, does not seem to have affected this situation (cf. Diamant 1973, p. 32; Levy 1900, pp. 99-100). The net of restrictions was loose enough to allow a growth in the membership of Leipzig's Jewish community from 713 to 1,027 between

<sup>15</sup> Similar exceptions had been made in Moravia before 1848, if Jews wanted to settle outside the fifty-two communities where this was permitted; they referred to Austrian citizens. Jacob Freud had made use of them himself when he joined his grandfather's business in Freiberg (see Krüll 1986, pp. 91-93).

1858 and 1864 (Diamant 1993, p. 362). But it was only in 1867, after the unification of North Germany, that a law was issued granting freedom of movement for Jews within and between the member states to which Saxony belonged (Toury 1977, p. 341).

The regulations and developments quoted here show that the Saxon authorities intended, on the one hand, to guard against an immigration caused by poverty (as is still a concern among wealthier nations today). On the other hand, those regulations are characteristic of a certain phase of German-Jewish coexistence when traditional animosities toward Jews manifested themselves not so much in anti-Semitic public campaigns, as they did in Germany from the 1870s on, but rather in discriminating legislation, which was basically abolished after the foundation of the German Reich in 1871 as the result of an increasing, overall political liberalization (cf. Brenner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Meyer 1996; Rürup 1987; Toury 1977).

Clearly, Jacob Freud was familiar with the legal restrictions that stood in the way of settling down with his family in Leipzig.<sup>16</sup> This is evident from his application for a permit of residence in which he argues that his business “would not be without advantages for local trade” (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 27). With these words, he precisely referred to the above-mentioned regulation for exceptional cases (which also seems to have included the condition of ensured income). As far as the legal situation can be reconstructed, his plan may be described as difficult but not absolutely hopeless.

Back to our narrative: After Jacob Freud had submitted his application, the police authorities requested the city council of Leipzig on June 10, 1859, “to furnish as soon as possible information whether the continued stay of Freud was of particular advantage for local trade” (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 26). In other words, inquiries were being made as to whether there was sufficient reason in this case to deviate from the general prohibition on residence for foreign Jews. On June 15, the council referred the in-

<sup>16</sup> We stress this point, in contrast to Laible and Hlousek (2003).

quiry to the Leipzig trade deputation (*Handelsdeputation*). Six weeks later, on July 29, the deputation responded that they were not able “to learn anything specific about the business of the applicant Freud.” This indicated that “the magnitude of the business he is involved in cannot be significant,” and, consequently, his application was not supported (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 26). Obviously, the procedure and the line of argument corresponded to the regulation described above, and in particular to the governmental directive mentioned in the report of 1832.

In Jacob Freud’s case, the representatives of commercial Leipzig were not convinced that permanent presence would be “useful for the conduct of trade in Leipzig”—in short, Freud’s father was only a minor businessman. Accordingly, the city council responded to the police authorities one day later:

We have not been able to endorse the application of Jacob Freud from Klagsdorf in Moravia to be granted permanent residence in this city for himself, his wife and two children because Freud’s permanent residence would not be of such particular advantage for local trade. [Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 27]

This notification was given to the police on August 2, 1859, and Jacob Freud’s application was subsequently rejected. It is not clear when he was informed of the rejection, but it seems to have been some time before the 19<sup>th</sup> of the same month (see below).

Jacob Freud did not give up. He repeated his application, citing the additional circumstance that he had since May “started a new business branch,” and had been entrusted “by Messrs. Samson and D. Fleischl<sup>17</sup> to undertake commissions regarding the purchase and sale of Russian and Moldavian-Walachian wool as a trade assistant (*Commis*),” for which purpose he would have to do a lot of trav-

<sup>17</sup> In the Leipzig archives, we could find no reference to this firm. Laible and Hlousek (2003) mention the brothers “D(avid)” and A. Fleischl, and report that: “Father and son Fleischl came from a well-situated family who had emigrated from Bohemia” (p. 239).

eling (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 27).<sup>18</sup> For this employment (which was possibly feigned), he produced a "certificate" from his bosses. Samson and Fleischl, he maintained, were satisfied with his "numerous business connections in those places where this wool was to be procured," as well as with his personal acquaintances and his expertise. He added that, in their service, he could anticipate a good income, especially given their agreement that he was allowed to pursue "his other business" (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 27) when he was not dealing with the commissions. Then A. Fleischl, a representative of the firm, was questioned by the police. He apparently described the connection to Jacob Freud somewhat differently, whereupon the police also rejected the renewed application.<sup>19</sup>

This rejection was "revealed" to the applicant on August 19, 1859, together with the order that his family, which had in the meantime come to Leipzig, was to leave the city by August 23, i.e., within four days. In a further protest, Jacob Freud submitted an appeal against the rejection on the 20<sup>th</sup>, now with the help of a lawyer, and addressed it directly to the city council. It bears his own signature and is the longest and most informative of the available documents. A. Fleischl had told the police that the future "trade assistant" would not receive a fixed salary and that he would not be entrusted with bookkeeping, information that had led to doubts about whether he really was to take over the function he claimed. In his new letter, Jacob Freud sought to dispel these doubts. Finally, he expressed the hope that, in view of his "altered circumstances," the council would be able to approve a permit of residence, after all, and pass the recommendation on to the police (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 28).

On August 22, the police communicated its files on Jacob Freud to the council. On August 24, the council again asked the trade

<sup>18</sup> In 1844, Jacob Freud had already cited business connections to Moldavia and Walachia in a petition to the Moravian-Silesian state government (Krüll 1986, p. 94).

<sup>19</sup> Of this act of the drama that took place on the police level, no direct records seem to have survived; it can, however, be deduced from the subsequent petition (see Tögel and Schröter 2004, pp. 27-29).



deputation, which responded on the 30<sup>th</sup> that in its renewed inquiries it “could unfortunately not learn of anything that favored the applicant, quite the opposite; his past makes it seem advisable to protect our place from such a businessman” (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 29). There was, the trade deputation concluded, still no reason to support the application. Thus, whereas the initial application had simply been refused because Jacob Freud’s business affairs were not significant enough to warrant permanent residence in Leipzig, a dark allusion was now added that the applicant may not have been an honorable businessman in every respect.

Jacob Freud’s past made it seem advisable that “our place” be protected from “such a businessman”; among all the material presented here, this is a particularly startling sentence. But we cannot say with any certainty what lies beneath it. Perhaps it only refers to a generally held suspicion of wandering Jewish merchants (Rürup 1987, pp. 31–32)? Or should we conclude that Freud’s father had been compromised by the collapse of his Freiberg business after all? And once our thoughts have been set in motion, more comes to mind: In 1866, Jacob’s brother Josef, who had been living in Vienna since 1861 (Gicklhorn 1976, p. 31), was sentenced to ten years in prison as an accessory in forging 50-rouble notes, an episode mentioned by Freud in his *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). The forgery business had been going on for a number of years when the trial began; its headquarters were in Manchester (Gicklhorn 1976, p. 31)—where Emanuel and Philipp Freud were living. According to an official memorandum, letters from them with “very suspicious contents” had been discovered during police investigations of their uncle Josef (Gicklhorn 1976, p. 40). It is virtually impossible to assess this alleged evidence and to ascertain if Josef Freud really was one of the main figures in the forgery; Freud (1900) quoted his father’s statement that “Uncle Josef was not a bad man, but only a simpleton” (p. 138). Nevertheless, this also casts a slightly dubious light on Jacob Freud. In any case, something disreputable seems to have become known in Leipzig in 1859.

In view of the comment of the trade deputation, the city council dismissed Jacob Freud’s last appeal as well. The letter to his lawyer containing this information was dated August 31, 1859.

Thus, the attempt of the family to settle in Leipzig had definitively failed.<sup>20</sup>

It is noteworthy that, in spite of this failure, it seemed out of the question for Jacob Freud to return to Freiberg. Instead of Leipzig, he and his family now moved to Vienna, where his parents-in-law lived (and where he apparently remained the insignificant merchant whom he had appeared to the Leipzig trade deputation: so far no traces of his business have been found in any Viennese documents). Why he did not choose to go to Vienna right from the start, although it was such an obvious option, is not known.

In principle, this kind of change had become possible after the Austrian constitution of 1849 granted Jews the freedom to move within the empire. Since then, the number of Jewish inhabitants in Vienna exploded; between 1857 and 1869 alone, it rose from around 6,200 (1.3% of the total population) to over 40,000 (6.6%) (Brenner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Meyer 1996, p. 307). On the other hand, the number of Jews in Bohemia and Moravia "fell dramatically," which is partially ascribed to their emigration to the Austrian capital (Pauley 1993, p. 56). A tiny strand in these large migrations was the resettlement of the Freud family from Freiberg to Vienna.

## THE JOURNEY OF THE WHOLE FREUD FAMILY TO LEIPZIG AND VIENNA

So far, we have concentrated on Freud's father. The question still remains as to when and how Jacob Freud took his family to Leipzig, and when exactly the whole group traveled on to Vienna after it had proved impossible to obtain a permit of residence in Leipzig. Here again, we are able to present some new and reliable information, at least regarding the chronology. This is of special relevance because it directly concerns the experience of little Sigismund.

<sup>20</sup> Laible and Hlousek (2003, pp. 239-241) repeatedly call what happened in Leipzig a "deportation," thus linking it to the fate of German Jews under the Nazi terror. This term definitely overstretches the evidence, which refers to the refusal of a permit of residence and the consequent order to leave the city.

Freud himself writes that he was three years old at the time of his departure to Leipzig (e.g., 1931, p. 259; 1960, p. 64); that determines the *terminus a quo* as May 6, 1859. His famous childhood memory of playing in a meadow full of blooming dandelions (Freud 1899, p. 311) also confirms that he was in Freiberg at the end of April or beginning of May. On the other hand, Jacob Freud wrote in his petition of August 22 (included in the Leipzig files) that on the 19<sup>th</sup>, “my family” was told to leave the city immediately (Tögel and Schröter 2004, pp. 28-29). At that time, therefore, the family was clearly already in Leipzig. When between May and August, exactly, did mother and children arrive there?

We can glean some information from Amalia Freud’s still existing “travel passport” (Tögel and Schröter 2004, p. 30; cf. Sigmund Freud-Haus 1975, p. 13). It was issued on August 11, 1859, in Brünn/Brno, for a “continuing stay in Leipzig,” which indicates that the family was counting on settling in the Saxon metropolis. On the back of the passport (which up to now has gone unnoticed in the literature), the two children, Sigismund and Anna, were registered as accompanying travelers, together with the 29-year-old “maid servant,” Anna Hrazek. She was Catholic, unmarried, and probably served as the children’s nanny as well, most likely the successor of that “ugly, elderly but clever woman” who had been little Sigismund’s “teacher in sexual matters,” and who was arrested at the beginning of 1859 because of theft (Freud 1985, pp. 268-271; see also Freud 1901, pp. 49-51). The children and the maid would thus have accompanied the mother on her journey, which must have taken place after August 11.

Amalia Freud’s passport somewhat discounts a recollection that Freud’s sister presented in her memoirs (Freud-Bernays 2004):

I cannot of course remember the first weeks of my life, but I know from what my mother told me that when I was six weeks old, I came to Leipzig with my father and my oldest brother. There in the hotel I had scarlet fever that went unrecognized, and subsequently dropsy. [p. 9]

First of all, this passage sets too low the age at which little Anna traveled—she was born on New Year’s Eve in 1858—and also inac-

curately implies that her father had traveled alone with her and Sigismund. In fact, both children were registered in their mother's passport and would therefore have accompanied her. Since nothing in the Leipzig files indicates that Jacob Freud was in the city between May and the middle of August, it seems most plausible that he traveled to Saxony together with his family in August. Clearly, he was in Freiberg at the end of June because, at that time, Freud's second oldest sister Rosa was conceived. She was born on March 21, 1860.

All this suggests the following course of events: At the beginning of May 1859, Jacob Freud went to Leipzig alone, submitted an application for a permit of residence there, and, while the application was being processed, he returned to Freiberg to wind up his household.<sup>21</sup> In the middle of August, he took the horse coach to Ostrau/Ostrava, with his wife and children, and from there the train to Leipzig via Breslau/Wrocław—a journey that Freud (1899) mentions in connection with the dandelion episode (p. 310). At the Breslau railway station, young Sigismund was frightened by the gaslight that reminded him of "spirits burning in hell" (Freud 1985, p. 285). This means that, when the little group arrived in the Silesian capital (or, less probably, when they left), it would have been nighttime. They probably spent the night, or even some days, at the house of Abraham Freud, a younger brother of Jacob who was a wool merchant in Breslau. Although the visa of the Austrian Consulate in Leipzig on the back of Amalia Freud's passport is dated September 10, there can be no doubt that the travelers arrived in Leipzig before August 19.

On this 19<sup>th</sup> day of August, 1859, Jacob Freud's family was ordered to leave Leipzig within four days. However, as we can see from a further entry in the mother's passport, the police registration of their departure did not take place until October 15, 1859. Their departure may have been delayed by the infant Anna's illness, which she mentions in her memoirs. The destination noted on

<sup>21</sup> This might have occurred after the wool market in Leipzig took place on June 14-15 (*Leipziger Zeitung*, May 19, 1858).

the passport was “to Freiberg in Moravia.” This need not be taken literally; the family may have simply presented the place where they had a right of domicile. In fact, they did not leave Saxony via Silesia and the Oder valley, which had been their route to Leipzig and would have been the most convenient way to get to Moravian Freiberg, but instead crossed the Saxon-Bohemian border at Bodenbach (Tetschen/Decin) in the Elb valley, on October 16. Their route through this border town indicates that they took the train that went from Dresden to Vienna via Prague. At that time, there was a morning and an evening train; in either case, their journey would have involved traveling at night.<sup>22</sup>

Somewhere on the way between Leipzig and Vienna, whether in an inn or on the train, the primal scene of psychoanalysis most likely occurred, of which Freud told Fliess in 1897: the three-year-old spent the night with his mother, where there “must have been an opportunity of seeing her *nudam*,” so that his “libido toward *matrem*” was awakened (Freud 1985, p. 268).<sup>23</sup> It is well known that this was one of the self-analytic insights that convinced Freud of the reality of the Oedipus complex. If, in addition, the journey took place without the father—which, from what is known, cannot be excluded—this fact would have contributed to the intimacy between mother and son.

We can therefore say that Freud certainly did not spend a whole year or almost a whole year in Leipzig, as Bernfeld and Bernfeld (1944) were the first to assume (p. 195), an assumption repeated by Jones (1953, p. 13) and surviving in later literature (e.g., Goodnick 1998, pp. 190, 199).<sup>24</sup> And we can also dispel the vague doubts

<sup>22</sup> These details are deduced from contemporary train schedules. We would like to thank Alfred Gottwald (head of the Department of Railways at the German Museum of Technology in Berlin) for his kind assistance in researching train timetables.

<sup>23</sup> In this passage, Freud says he was “between two and two and a half years” of age, which is evidently a careless mistake and, if amended to “three and three and a half,” would make the statement true.

<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, this went against the family tradition. Oliver Freud (1944a) expressed his doubts toward Bernfeld that the period would have been so long, and he later (1944b) added that, according to the recollection of his aunt Anna Bernays, their stay in Leipzig would have lasted “perhaps ten days” (p. 3).

about whether there ever was a Leipzig episode at all (as put forward by Clark 1980, p. 14). Little Sigismund actually *was* in Leipzig, and he was there most likely for a period of about two months. However, when he arrived, there was already not much hope that his family would stay permanently.

And when did these wanderers reach Vienna? Freud (1970, 1989) occasionally said that he was four at the time. This cannot be literally true; at the very latest, the family settled in Vienna in March 1860, when his sister Rosa was born. This date is generally set as the *terminus ante quem* (e.g., Clark 1980, p. 14). The date of their departure from Saxony, which we can now pinpoint as the middle of October, suggests a much earlier date. After all, where would the family have stayed in the interim, having closed down their household in Freiberg? And Vienna, where Amalia's parents lived, would have been an option all along.

We do not need to speculate, however, because there is a nice piece of evidence showing that Freud was already living in Vienna at the beginning of November 1859. In a letter that he wrote to his fiancée, Martha Bernays, on January 14, 1884,<sup>25</sup> he recalled, twenty-five years later, that as a child he had seen the procession during the celebrations for the Schiller jubilee in 1859 (cf. Wagner and Rinnhofer 1985). The procession took place on November 8 and went from Praterstern to the Stephan Square and from there to Schottenfelder Glacis; the flat that Freud's family occupied at the time was only a few hundred yards away from the route. If this memory is correct, it seems to prove that at least the mother and children went directly from Leipzig to Vienna.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

So much for our story. One might ask what it has yielded. We were able to establish a number of chronological details and to describe the failed attempt of a minor Jewish tradesman from Austria

<sup>25</sup> The originals of these letters are held in the Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Sigmund Freud Collection. They are presently being prepared for publication by Gerhard Fichtner, Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, and Albrecht Hirschmüller.

to settle in Saxony, despite the state's policy of severely restricting Jewish immigration. However, what does all this have to do with the history of psychoanalysis? We would like to offer some points for consideration.

One main argument comes from psychoanalysis itself. Freud attributed a particular and decisive significance to early childhood and tried to utilize this insight in his biographical studies—for example, of Leonardo da Vinci and Goethe. His own biographers inevitably applied the same approach to his life (see Bernfeld and Bernfeld 1944; Jones 1953, pp. 1-14). Along these lines, the odd family constellation of young Sigismund, among other factors, has been stressed: his half-brothers were his mother's age and his nephews and nieces were his age, which surely stimulated his interest in research.

Of particular note is the fact that, barely one and a half years after the birth of her first son, Amalia Freud had a second son who died at the age of six months, followed soon afterward by the birth of a daughter. Freud (1917) vividly described what it means for a man to be "his mother's undisputed darling" (p. 156); later biographers would ask how little Sigismund coped with the continuous mental absence of a mother who had to deal with several pregnancies and the loss of a baby. Hardin (1987, 1988) supposed that, in this situation, the nanny who figures in Freud's earliest childhood memories must have been of enormous significance for the little boy. It was all the more traumatic that he lost this substitute mother at the same time that his sister Anna was born.

In short, Freud's early childhood was characterized by the experience of losses to such a degree that present-day authors speak of his "traumatic infancy" (Breger 2000, pp. 7-21). One of these traumas was the move of the three-year-old from Freiberg via Leipzig to Vienna, and it has occupied his biographers accordingly (see in particular Krüll 1986; Rizzuto 1998<sup>26</sup>). Of the few childhood

<sup>26</sup> Strangely, however, Rizzuto (1998) does not mention the Leipzig interlude at all (pp. 43-46).

memories recorded by Freud, two explicitly refer to this event (1985, pp. 268, 285), and it provided the backdrop for a third one (1899). At that time, young Freud lost a whole network of familiar people, including his most important playmates. Looking back, he himself emphasized how he missed the woods of those years for his whole life (1899, pp. 312-313); he experienced the resettlement of the family as a personal "catastrophe" (1899, p. 314).

Rizzuto (1998, pp. 243-244) claimed that Freud's disappointment in his father, who proved unable to support his wife and children, was instrumental to his later rejection of God. Others attributed his loving addiction to archaeology to the loss of his life in Freiberg (Bernfeld 1951), or surmised that he developed a hatred toward his father for robbing him of his childhood paradise (Ginsburg and Ginsburg 1992; Goodnick 1998, p. 192). Moreover, the young boy was torn from his familiar surroundings at a time when he had just experienced the birth of a sister and the disappearance of his nanny or substitute mother.

The two episodes from his journey to Leipzig and then to Vienna that he retained in memory were to prove influential: of the gas flames in Breslau, because the adult Freud connected them to his railway phobia (Freud 1985, p. 285; Jones 1953, p. 13), and of the naked mother, because he remembered her when he first envisaged the Oedipus complex (cf. Hardin 1987, pp. 641-642). Moving from Freiberg via Leipzig to Vienna was without doubt a crucial experience for the child Sigismund Freud; this alone would make any investigation and account of it worthwhile.

Three points in particular illustrate how the present paper may contribute to understanding Freud. First, it is of relevance whether the Freud family stayed in Leipzig for a year or for two months—i.e., if the stay had been intended for a longer duration or was known to be an interim solution all along. Depending on this, the episode was either another experience of loss for the young Freud or just a moment in an admittedly stressful transition from Freiberg to Vienna. It also makes a difference if the journey to Leipzig meant renewed separation of the little boy from his mother (as his



sister Anna recollected), if Sigismund was alone with his mother for a while before they set off (as has sometimes been claimed), or if the family experienced most of their odyssey together. Finally, and perhaps most important, the documents we have presented suggest that Jacob Freud might not have been very realistic in planning the move to Leipzig, and, at any rate, that he had his family join him there prematurely. This experience, which brings to mind Freud's characterization of his father as someone who was "always hopefully expecting something to turn up" (Jones 1953, p. 2), can hardly have been without influence on the view that Jacob's family had of him.

Nonetheless, the facts that we have established were part of an *external* reality, and we cannot with any confidence say what the *internal* significance was for Freud of the separation from Freiberg and the interim stay in Leipzig. One reflection makes this particularly clear. Our material contains a dominant aspect to which one would like to ascribe psychic relevance: the constant threat of expulsion that hung over the family from the moment when the mother and children arrived in Leipzig, and, related to it, the futility of Jacob Freud's endeavors to create a new home for his family there. However, we simply do not know if and to what degree this affected the little boy. For children, the subjective importance of an event is not proportionate to its objective importance, as Anna Freud, for example, pointed out repeatedly (e.g., A. Freud 1958). Here our work runs into a common frustration of biographical research: the documented facts and their psychic significance are separated by an unbridgeable abyss.

There is, however, at least one undisputable merit in our reconstruction: it provides another piece of reliable, factual evidence for our thinking about Freud's early childhood, and may, as far as it goes, protect future research from untenable speculation.

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## THE GREAT MAN FROM TARSUS: FREUD ON THE APOSTLE PAUL

BY HERMAN WESTERINK, PH.D.

*The author describes developments in Freud's writings concerning his views on the apostle Paul. This development shows that Freud more and more clearly regarded Paul as a key figure in understanding the complex relationship between Judaism and Christianity—and also as a man who essentially has no comfortable place in either of these religions. For Freud, Paul was a unique figure, an analyst of the human character and of his own culture and religion—a Jew who tried to free himself and his people from the burden of the sense of guilt.*

### INTRODUCTION

In the writings of Sigmund Freud, there is a clear tendency to refer to intellectuals such as Sophocles, Shakespeare, Goethe, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer, authorities from the past whose writings show a rare analytic gift to understand human nature and culture. For Freud as founder of psychoanalysis, a new therapy and science, there was an important strategic reason to refer to “pre-psychoanalytic thinkers” (Tausk 1914, p. 127) who had been able to put psychoanalytic insights into words long before psychoanalysis existed.

In many cases, Freud's references to an authority are not just strategies, but also—or mainly—an expression of a personal admiration or even identification. This is apparent throughout his writings. One of the most notable examples is Moses. Various scholars have elaborated on Freud's personal fascination for this founder

of Jewish religion (Grubrich-Simitis 1997, 2004; Rice 1990; Robert 1977; Yerushalmi 1991). For Freud, Moses seems to be the key to understanding Jewish character in general and his own Jewish identity in particular.

In the shadow of this fascination for Moses, Freud develops an interest in another founder of religion, the apostle Paul, the great man from Tarsus. But although Freud's view on Moses has provoked many studies on the subject, his view on Paul has hardly been elaborated upon. In this paper, I will present a brief reconstruction of the developments in Freud's view on the apostle Paul. The leading question will be: in what way did Paul become, and in what way was he, a "great man"?

## FREUD'S FIRST INTUITIONS ON THE APOSTLE PAUL

Freud's first significant references to Paul are made in the period around 1910, when he starts to study religion extensively and at the same time develops a remarkable fascination for Michelangelo's *Moses* statue in Rome, on which he wrote a paper that was published anonymously in *Imago* (Freud 1914a). In his first text in which religion receives serious attention, "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907), Freud also quotes Paul for the first time (p. 127). In this essay, Freud shows that there are analogies between obsessional acts of neurotic patients and the way in which religious practices are carried out. According to Freud, the common characteristics of obsessional acts and religious ceremonies can be explained by the psychic source from which both the acts and the ceremonies emanate: the suppression of drives and an accompanying sense of guilt. In the final pages of the text, Freud argues that it is essential in religions for people to sacrifice the release of their drives to a god. This is the reason why, in many religions, gods have human features and are inclined to perform human deeds and misdeeds; they are permitted, or even supposed, to do what to men is forbidden. This shift of permissible acts from men to gods essentially means that men can satisfy their drives fantasmatically.

To enforce his argument, Freud quotes from the biblical Letter to the Romans, a letter attributed to Paul: "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord" (Romans 12:19b). This quotation is actually a double quotation: Paul is here quoting from Deuteronomy (32:35) in Jewish tradition, and this quotation is also, according to Freud, attributed to Moses (Mampuys, unpublished). It reveals an early intuition of Freud's about Paul: he was someone who—consciously or unconsciously—had a (psycho)analytic awareness that the properties of God are essentially the expression of a human egoistic drive to take revenge, or even to murder.

The next step in Freud's thinking is expressed in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-1913, pp. 153-155). In this, his first comprehensive study of religion and culture, Freud tries to find the origin of religion, of moral and cultural institutions, through an analysis of commandments and prohibitions in primitive religions. He shows that underlying these commandments and prohibitions is a historically suppressed event: the murder of the primal father by the primal horde of sons. As in "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907), the apostle Paul is not mentioned by name. Nevertheless, Freud's thoughts toward Paul's letters are apparent in his short analysis of the Christian doctrines of original sin, redemption, and atonement. Here, in the final chapters of the book, Freud expatiates on the murder of the primal father as the prehistoric origin of culture and religion. He argues that religions conserve the remembrance of this murder and its most eminent and immediate effect, the sense of guilt. Both the totem meal in primitive religions and the Christian communion represent ritual expressions of murder and of atonement with a father god.

Considering Christianity in particular, Freud states that, in the doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Christ for the sins of mankind, "men were acknowledging in the most undisguised manner the guilty primeval deed" (1912-1913, p. 152). Tragically, with this undisguising confession, Christianity did not liberate itself of primeval guilt, but, in comparison with Jewish religion, this must be considered a step forward: the atonement in Christianity is the "fullest" one possible (p. 152), as expressed in Christian doctrine.

But what and whose doctrine is Freud talking about? The apostle Paul is not mentioned in connection with this doctrine and the undisguising of guilt, but it seems likely that Freud is referring to him when he writes about Christian principles. A closer look at Freud's references to secondary literature points in this direction.

Freud refers to the analysis of original sin carried out by Salomon Reinach in the second volume of his *Cultes, Mythes et Religions* (1906). Reinach analyzes various religious phenomena and themes from myths, such as the deaths and births of gods and mythical persons in Greek and Egyptian cultures, and the origins of the Mithras cult (all mentioned by Freud in his chapter containing the passage about Christian doctrine [1912-1913, pp 152-153]). Reinach (1906) argues that original sin is of Orphic (Hellenistic) origin (pp. 75ff.) noting that it was adopted into early Christianity (p. 83). In this second volume of *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Reinach does not elaborate on Christian doctrine beyond this. But in the third volume of this same comprehensive study (1908), he elaborates on the basic idea of original sin and makes it clear that it was the apostle Paul who introduced this element into Christianity. This is particularly evident in his Letters to the Romans and the Corinthians (Reinach 1908, pp. 357-359).

The ideas Freud expresses in *Totem and Taboo* about the Christian concepts of original sin, redemption, and atonement were likely adopted not only from Reinach's second volume, but also from his third volume, where Paul is viewed as the key figure bridging Orphism (Hellenism) and Christianity. Recently, it has been shown that Freud read both volumes with great care: they were in his possession and show many underlinings and other markings (Davies and Fichtner 2006). Freud's analysis of Christian doctrine also shows a clear resemblance to Reinach's analysis in his third volume; there, Reinach makes clear that the doctrine of original sin and redemption (in relation to death) and atonement (in relation to communion) are components of Paulinian thought.

Freud does not mention Paul here, and we should be cautious in drawing conclusions, but the reference to Reinach's second volume of *Cultes, Mythes et Religions* (1906), and the fact that Freud's



passage about Christian doctrine seems to refer to Reinach's third volume, make it highly probable that, for Freud, Paul had some part in undisguising "the primeval guilty deed" and thus aiming for the liberation from sin. Yet, in *Totem and Taboo* (1912-1913), Freud has not decided exactly what role Paul played; after all, he also says that Christ was the one who sacrificed his life, and in doing so redeemed mankind from original sin (p. 153). So who introduced what in Judaism? The question remains a puzzle, but it is clear that the doctrine of sin and atonement is a key to understanding the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, and that the apostle Paul is therefore a key figure.

### PAUL'S UNIQUE POSITION IN THE HISTORY OF EPHEBUS

A convincing argument for the hypothesis that the apostle Paul intrigued Freud during the period when he was working on *Totem and Taboo* is a very short publication, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" (Freud 1911). This paper reveals Freud's attempt to deepen his insight into the apostle Paul. At first sight, it is about the continuity of worship of the mother goddess in the ancient city of Ephesus; that is, that worship of the goddess Diana was replaced by worship of the mother-goddess, Mary, after Christianity arrived. Freud briefly sketches this historical development. But a closer look at the text reveals that this paper is essentially about the apostle Paul.

Freud's knowledge of the history of Ephesus and his analysis of the worship of the city's goddess are based on Sartiaux's *Villes mortes d'Asie Mineure* (1911). Sartiaux describes the worship of Artemis (Diana) and the transformation of her cult into the worship of Mary. Quoting from the biblical "Acts of the Gentiles" (Acts 19:28, from which Freud had taken the title of his 1911 paper), Sartiaux develops a view of Paul that is close to Freud's. But there is an important distinction. Sartiaux clearly points out that Paul was "a good Jew," as well as a man of Hellenistic culture (1911, p. 99). Despite the latter identity, Paul was unable to reform the Diana cult.

In the end, his competitor and successor, John, succeeded where Paul could not: he transformed that cult into the worship of Mary (p. 103). Freud, on the contrary, clearly rejects the idea that Paul had any part in imposing the worship of Mary.

According to Freud (1911), Paul was “too strict a Jew” (p. 343)—a man who was forced to found a new Christian community because he was “persecuted and accused by the Jews” (p. 342). But also, he was too strict for the Ephesians: he condemned the worship of Diana, and thus a conflict arose with the people who not only loved their goddess, but also their earnings that devolved from her worship and its pilgrimage. Nevertheless, Paul succeeds in establishing a community that is faithful to him, although not for a long time; a man named John, accompanied by Mary, instead gains the greater influence in the community. Mary becomes the new mother-goddess, part of what may be seen as a regression to the ancient worship of polytheistic times.

Thus, in Freud’s 1911 paper, the apostle Paul is seen as a rather isolated figure, caught between two traditions: he is a Jew, but is forced to found a new and distinct religion in Ephesus of which he himself is the first member. But “the church founded by Paul did not long remain faithful to him” (Freud 1911, p. 343); soon after Paul took these actions, the church in Ephesus came under the influence of John and made a decisive turn in another direction. In this respect, it seems significant that Freud does not describe Paul as a proselyte or a Christian, but indeed as a Jew. This detail indicates that Freud did not (want to) associate Paul with the regression to polytheism—in comparison to strict monotheistic Judaism—that Christianity eventually came to represent, according to Freud.

When we consider *Totem and Taboo* (1912-1913) and “Great is Diana of the Ephesians” (1911) as representing complementary Freudian views on the apostle Paul and on developments in early Christian doctrine, we can conclude that, for Freud, Paul played a part in the undisguising of guilt in Jewish religion, and thus tried to liberate his people from a burden; at the same time, he cannot

be held responsible for Christianity's regression, the return to the polytheism represented by the shift to the worship of Mary.<sup>1</sup>

## TWO ADMIRERS OF PAUL: FREUD AND PFISTER

The next of Freud's writings in which the apostle Paul is mentioned is *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). In this study, Freud analyzes libidinal structures within groups and in the relationship between a group and its leader, focusing on identification and idealization. Here for the first time, Freud mentions a certain admiration for Paul. In one sentence, he calls both Plato and the apostle Paul "great thinkers" (p. 91). In the passage where Freud makes this statement, admiration or idealization of great men is not the subject; the passage is about the concept of libido. Freud defines libido in a very broad sense, arguing that it should not be confined or reduced to sexual desires, but that it should be translated as *love*. Thus, psychoanalysis has discovered nothing new or previously undiscovered: this libido, or love, is what Plato called *Eros*, and it is nothing other than the love praised in Paul's first Letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 13). Paul is—again—admired for his analytic (and intellectual) qualities.

In Freud's major writings, this is the first explicit mention of admiration for the apostle Paul, although his admiration had been expressed before; for example, in 1920, Freud had written a letter to Oskar Pfister, a Swiss minister who was his friend, praising Pfister's (1920) article in *Imago* on Paul. In this article, Pfister clearly pointed out that Paul was first of all a Jew, with a Jewish character. Pfister defined this character as a religious attitude marked by the fear of God; it included a need to uphold the law, with an awareness of guilt and a longing to overcome an inferiority complex through the accomplishment of deeds.

<sup>1</sup> Considering the fact that these two Freudian texts were written during the period of conflict with Jung, Freud's view on Paul takes on an extra dimension: Freud recognizes himself as the founder of a new "religion" and as the man who undisguised guilt. By contrast, he identifies Jung with John the renegade, who in the end is the actual founder of a new religion (Ellenberger 1970, p. 816).

Paul had been able to overcome this constrictive attitude via an impressive personal and religious sublimation. This sublimation had been possible because Paul, educated in the schools of Tarsus, had a great knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy. This knowledge had been decisive for him because, according to Pfister, belief in resurrection and the commandment to love one's fellow man were elements of a Hellenistic worldview. That Paul had been able to overcome the Jewish character is evidenced by his introduction of Hellenistic elements into Jewish religion; this was what made him a religious genius. In Pfister's (1920) view, non-Jewish philosophy had been decisive in shaping early developments in Christianity: the importance of liberation from guilt and a strict, law-abiding attitude as evidenced in the new commandment of charity.

In his letter to Pfister of 1920, Freud writes: "I have always had a special sympathy for St. Paul as a genuinely Jewish character. Is he not the only one who stands completely in the light of history?" (1963, p. 76).<sup>2</sup> This rhetorical question poses a puzzle that can be resolved by looking at the closing remarks of Pfister's paper. His conclusion was that Paul was able to become the founder of Christian charity, with the central doctrine of loving one's neighbor as religious and ethical truth, through his astonishing sublimation (Pfister 1920, p. 290). In comparison with Jewish religion and mystery cults, this innovation in Christian doctrine represented a huge and lasting step forward. Thus, according to Pfister, Paul, seen "in this new light" (p. 290), is a remarkable historical figure, worthy of admiration.

We should read Freud's rhetorical question in his letter to Pfister as a critique on his friend's viewpoint. Freud might say that, yes, Paul is a remarkable figure, but not because he was the founder of a religion that ethically stood above previous religions—not because Christianity constituted an evolutionary step (as Jung had argued years before). In fact, Freud was convinced that the Christian commandment to love one's neighbor (or enemy) should *not*

<sup>2</sup> In the original letter, Freud did not write *Sankt Paulus* or *Apostel Paulus*, but just *Paulus*. The English translation added a Christian appellation that Freud usually omitted when reflecting on Paul's Jewish character.

be considered progress over the high ethical standards set by Judaism. On the contrary, a few years later, Freud (1930) uttered a sharp critique on this Christian commandment, arguing that it represented an inflation of love, and even a threat to civilization (p. 143).<sup>3</sup>

So it was because of his Jewish (moral) character that Paul should be admired, not because he founded a supposedly superior religion, according to Freud. Illuminative ideas on love ascribed to Paul made him a great thinker—and probably even marked a further development in Jewish thought. But to cast Paul as the author of an impossible commandment would certainly not make him admirable. Despite Paul's ideas on love, Christianity after him took a different turn, imposing exactly this impossible commandment.

In this respect, it is also interesting that, although Pfister strongly focuses on Paul's conversion to Christianity, Freud never mentions this topic in his writings. In Freud's view, Paul never really converted to anything; on the contrary, Paul always maintained his Jewish character and could therefore never be called a true Christian. Later, in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud mentions that the name *Paul* was after all nothing but a Roman equivalent for the Hebrew name *Saul* (p. 135); in other words, this change of name had nothing to do with a conversion.

## THE APOSTLE PAUL'S HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Different elements from these previous passages converge in the viewpoint expressed by Freud on Paul (now discussed without the specification of *the apostle*) in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). This text occupied him during the last five years of his life. The history

<sup>3</sup> This view on the Christian commandment might well have earlier roots: in one of Freud's letters to Martha Bernays from 1883, he describes a personal experience with anti-Semitism in an encounter on a train with men who used this very Christian commandment as an argument in their anti-Semitic credo (Freud 1968, p. 59).

of the realization of *Moses and Monotheism* is a complex one (Grubrich-Simitis 1997, pp. 90-106; Mampuy, unpublished), as is clearly reflected in the text itself, which consists of three essays. The first two essays were published in 1937 in *Imago*. The third and longest essay, preceded by two different introductions (one written in Vienna, the other in London), consists of two parts. The first part of this essay (written in London from June 1938 onward) could be seen as a reformulation of the second part (first composed in 1934). The final sections of both parts contain a reflection on the historical significance of Paul (Freud 1939, pp. 86-89, pp. 135-137). These passages were written at about the same time (from June 1938 onward)—that is, the second passage on Paul was not part of the 1934 text, but was later attached as a “repetition” (Freud 1939, p. 130). Thus, both passages on Paul were composed as part of Freud’s final reflections of the full text.

Let me first give a general outline of the whole text before presenting my exegesis of the passages on Paul. *Moses and Monotheism* is essentially a reflection on Jewish identity, Jewish character, and anti-Semitism. Freud’s starting point is the idea that Moses—in the earliest parts of the third essay, written in 1934, he is mentioned with the adjective *great man* (Freud 1939, pp. 107-111)—is not a *representative* of the Jewish religion, but is the *founder* of this religion. In the first essay, first published in 1937, Freud tries to sustain this thesis. In his view, Moses was an Egyptian prince, someone close to the pharaoh Akhnaten, possibly part of the royal household. This pharaoh was known in historical literature as one who introduced a form of monotheism during his reign. His death, though, marked the beginning of a period of counterreformations by the priests of Ammon that eventually resulted in a regression to the polytheistic religion of an earlier time. For followers of Akhnaten, such as the Egyptian Moses, there was only one way out: to found a new society with the help of a new people. Thus, Moses appointed himself as the leader of a group of Semitic tribes living in slavery, and together they left Egypt.

Freud does not deny that this thesis and reconstruction of historical events is highly speculative. The main problem with this

view is the fact that, according to the historical literature of his time, the founding of Jewish religion did not take place in Egypt, but in a region south of Israel called Meriba-Qades, where Semitic tribes were supposed to have adopted the worship of a Midian volcano god named Jahweh as their own. According to this theory, the founder of Jewish religion was not an Egyptian prince, but a Midianite priest by the name of Moses.

Freud puts himself the task of synthesizing this contemporary theory with his own. In the end, the synthesis is a compromise. With reference to exegetic studies, Freud introduces the idea that the Egyptian Moses was murdered by the Semitic tribes somewhere in the desert, the motive being the people's unreadiness for Moses's monotheism. These people moved on and joined with other Semitic tribes under the leadership of a Midianite priest. Jahweh became the only god worshipped, but he had to be addressed as *Adonai*, a name that bore resemblance to Akhnaten's god, Aton. Certain customs and characteristics of the Egyptian group were adopted, such as circumcision and a high level of moral and intellectual civilization.

From this moment on, history was reinterpreted: it was Jahweh who liberated his people from slavery in Egypt, and the anonymous Midianite priest was now named Moses. Thus, Freud drew an astonishing conclusion: the Egyptian Moses never knew the god Jahweh, and the Midianite "Moses," founder of Jewish religion, had never been in Egypt and never knew the Egyptian Moses. The compromise reached in Meriba-Qades, where the two groups joined, was intended to cover up the murder of the Egyptian Moses.

Historical events interpreted in this way and their long-term effects were, in Freud's view, decisive for the development of the Jewish identity and religion: the murder of Moses immediately resulted in a strong sense of guilt. Through this sense of guilt, it became possible for a strict monotheism to develop among the Jewish tribes. And it was also through this sense of guilt that the savage volcano god Jahweh could gradually develop into a loving, almighty God who maintained the character of the god worshipped by the Egyptian Moses. The influence of a deep sense of

guilt is determinative for Jewish religious developments. But how can this sense of guilt be proved, for it is unconscious (and is as powerful as it is exactly *because* it is unconscious)? How can we bring this unconscious sense of guilt to the surface? Who will unveil it?

In Freud's view, it was the apostle Paul who became aware of the deep impact of the sense of guilt on Jewish religion and identity, and who was capable of tracing back this sense of guilt to its historical origin. Formulated more broadly, the repressed core of Jewish religion becomes visible when we examine Christianity's earliest developments. In *Totem and Taboo* (Freud 1912-1913), this idea was already apparent.

The true meaning of the figure of Moses was unraveled by the apostle Paul. "The reason we are so unhappy is that we have killed God the father" (Freud 1939, p. 135). This is a "quotation" that cannot be found in Paul's letters; Freud puts the words in his mouth. The message is clear: that insight into Jewish religion, and therefore possible liberation from the burden of the sense of guilt, emerges from Jewish religion itself. For Paul is, "after all, a Jewish man, Saul of Tarsus (who, as a Roman citizen, called himself Paul)" (Freud 1939, p. 135). Paul was able to understand this phenomenon, but unable to articulate it. According to Freud, we should not blame Paul for having had no other means by which to express his insight into Jewish religion than to formulate the illusory message of a new religion: that guilt could be expunged through the sacrifice that Christ had made for mankind.

Unfortunately, this message could not really liberate people from their burden of guilt: "The unnameable crime was replaced by the hypothesis of what must be described as a shadowy 'original sin'" (Freud 1939, p. 135). Original sin and redemption thus became the foundations upon which Paul's ideas were built. But, as Freud had already described in "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" (1911), most Jews rejected this new message. They could not face the unnameable crime and confess to an ancient murder. This meant that Jewish religion, having historically emerged from two groups of Semitic tribes, now again fell apart into two groups.



Only a small number of the Jews followed Paul's teachings and became Christians. Thus, according to Freud, the Jews themselves created a situation in which Christian anti-Semitism could strike hard. For the Jews were not redeemed, but, on the contrary, were inclined to take "a tragic load of guilt on themselves" (Freud 1939, p. 136).

So who is Paul, and what is his historical meaning? He is a Jew, his character loaded with the burden of guilt because of a repressed murder in ancient times. Paul suffers from this sense of guilt, but through his self-analysis and analysis of the surrounding cultural and religious environment, he is able to identify the source of this sense of guilt, the *sine qua non* for his message of redemption and reconciliation. The means to express his message was at hand: "a man whom a small number of adherents in Judaea regarded as the Son of God" (Freud 1939, p. 89). This man, Jesus Christ, had been a religious and political rebel. Whether he was truly "the great teacher portrayed by the Gospels" (Freud 1939, p. 89) is impossible to say. It is hardly important because it is not his life that is decisive, but the circumstances of his death. Besides this, we know hardly anything about him. More important, Paul did not know him either (Yerushalmi 1991, p. 38). According to Freud (1939), this is a crucial factor because it gave Paul the opportunity to give a meaning and an identity to Christ that had not been assigned to him before: as the killed and resurrected second Moses (p. 89).

In Paul's interpretation of Christ, the key concepts are original sin, sacrificial death, redemption, and reconciliation. (Here Freud essentially repeats the central elements of Christian doctrine, as described in *Totem and Taboo* [1912-1913].) These concepts, according to Freud, were part of the doctrine of Jewish religion in Paul's time, based on earlier Hellenistic influences and those of mystery cults. The consequences of this viewpoint of Freud's—in contrast to the view of Pfister (1920)—are important: Paul's genius did not lie in the fact that he introduced Hellenistic concepts into Jewish religion as later pillars of the Christian faith. Freud refuses—consciously or unconsciously—to make Paul re-

sponsible for any subsequent regressive step back to a polytheistic religion. With this refusal, Freud places full emphasis on Paul's analytic capacity: Paul searched for the origins of the sense of guilt, and in doing so was able to ultimately bring the repressed to consciousness. In the words of Freud: "The dark traces of the past lurked in his mind, ready to break through into its more conscious regions" (1939, p. 87).<sup>4</sup> In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Paul fully achieves the status that Freud had earlier intimated: that of a great thinker, the man who became conscious of an ancient tragedy and tried to liberate his people from the burden of a sense of guilt (Bernstein 1998, pp. 78-79).

Being a Jew, Paul has to be regarded first as someone who supported continuation of the Jewish religion. His belief that the death of the rebel from Judaea had brought redemption represented his attempt to reconcile the Jews with their Father God. But, in preaching reconciliation, Paul eventually became a destroyer of Jewish religion (Freud 1939, p. 88). Perhaps a wish for revenge against the Jews for their resistance to his ideas was part of his motive to found a new religion, says Freud. But, more fundamentally, Paul became the destroyer of Judaism because he rejected the necessity of circumcision and proclaimed the creed of a universal religion without the constrictions that had characterized Judaism.

Amid Paul's strivings for reconciliation with the Father God, however, Christianity soon developed into a "Son" religion (Freud 1939, p. 88). Was this Paul's intentional doing? Was Paul's faith in Christ meant to become the core of a new Son religion? Freud does not give straight answers to these questions, but it seems clear that he may have seen the transition to a Son religion as another aspect of Christianity's regression to a more primitive form of religion. In *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud refers to *Totem and Taboo* (1912-1913) when he argues that the Christian communion became a repetition of the primitive totem meal, and that Christianity adopted "numerous symbolic rituals from surrounding peoples" who were "of a lower level" (1939, p. 88).

<sup>4</sup> The use of the expression *dark trace* is a reference to the Oedipus story—specifically, to a quotation from *Oedipus Rex* (see Westerink 2005, p. 398).

But here again, the founder of the new religion, the apostle Paul, seems to have played no direct role in what might be considered Christianity's regression to the doctrines of earlier religions. Freud argues that this regression was only the natural effect of the universalization of Judaism and the incorporation of a mass of people who lacked the religious and moral standards of the Jews. For, in Paul's time, a sense of guilt as "a dull malaise" had already spread throughout the Mediterranean world (Freud 1939, pp. 86, 135). This is the reason for the triumph of Paul's mission: "No doubt he owed his success in the first instance to the fact that, through the idea of the redeemer, he exorcized humanity's sense of guilt" (p. 88).

Tragically, history repeated itself, and Christianity could not uphold a high standard of monotheism. Freud calls Christianity a second triumph of the priests of Ammon. Again, he describes the unique position of Paul—this time comparable to the unique position of Akhnaten—between religions. As a supporter of the Jewish faith, Paul finds himself nevertheless founding a new religion, and yet this new religion soon betrays him. Paul's liberating and reconciling ideas within strict, Jewish monotheistic boundaries could not prevent Christianity from regressing back into polytheistic tendencies and "superstitious, magical, and mystical elements" of a more primitive level (Freud 1939, p. 88).

## FREUD'S IDENTIFICATION WITH PAUL

We do not know when exactly Freud developed his "special sympathy" for the apostle Paul, but already, in his earliest writings on religion, Paul is present. Over the years, Freud recognized the importance of Paul's character, his message, and his acts. In the last written passages of *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), this sympathy develops into a remarkable identification.

In Freud's view, Paul is a Jew, a man with a strict moral character, a true monotheist, guilty to the bone and trying to free himself from that burden. He manages to do so, but in an ambivalent manner (Assmann 1999, pp. 11-12), as both supporter and de-

stroyer of his faith. As founder of a new religion, he reminds us of Moses, in that Moses as a non-Jew founded Judaism, and Paul as a Jew (non-Christian) founded Christianity. Just as Moses had to leave Egypt, Paul had to leave the Jewish faith. And, like the message of Moses (who was killed by his fellow men—by those who could not or would not follow his strict monotheistic views and longed to return to Egypt), Paul's message was smothered by the next generation of Christians, who could not or would not hold to the high standard of Jewish monotheism, instead regressing to polytheism, adopting rituals and beliefs from surrounding peoples. The example par excellence was seen, of course, in the history of the city of Ephesus, where John gained control and built a basilica in honor of the new mother-goddess, "alongside"—use of this word is significant—"of the church of the apostle" (Freud 1911, p. 343).

To conclude on this point, then, we can note that Paul tried to reform Judaism and, in doing so, became the founder of a new religion. But he kept his Jewish character and the high moral, intellectual, and religious standards that go along with it. He was never part of the illusionary Christian religion in which polytheistic tendencies, the impossible commandment to love one's neighbor, and anti-Semitism join hand in hand.

So Moses and Paul as founders of a religion have certain traits in common. On this point, Freud could identify with both men: he himself was a founder of a new "religion," that is, psychoanalysis, and he also had reason to feel betrayed by the next generation, considering not only the debates and breaks with Jung and Rank, but also the debates with the London School (Jones, Klein, Isaacs, and others). By the time he wrote *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), Freud was well aware of the fact that a young generation of psychoanalysts was critical of some of his key ideas.

However, we should not label Paul simply as a second Moses, a great man to the extent that Moses was. After all, we must first ask ourselves which Moses we are referring to. Freud's personal fascination with Michelangelo's *Moses* and for the man himself certainly points in the direction of his identification with the great

man. In the original, 1934 text of *Moses and Monotheism*, Moses is positively described as a man who, because of his psychical and intellectual distinctions, was capable of becoming the founder of Jewish monotheism (Freud 1939, p. 108). But in the parts of this text written later, the figure of Moses is deconstructed. He is two men, an Egyptian prince and a Midianite priest, both founders of Judaism, but not Jews. His character is then described in a rather negative way: he was a violent and dominating political leader who evoked the aggression of the Semitic tribes whom he had freed from slavery, and who could thus be compared to the primal father who was killed by the sons. By force, he imposed monotheism, circumcision, and other religious laws upon his chosen people. And thus he was also the founder of the problematic Jewish character, with its burden of a sense of guilt and a repression of drives.<sup>5</sup>

This is where the apostle Paul comes in. He was not a man of great political power, but someone who tried to free himself and his people from the burden of guilt and to reconcile with the Father God—not by imposing religious laws, but by analyzing himself and his culture and using the ideas that were at hand to exorcize the sense of guilt. Freud could identify with this character not because Paul founded Christianity, with all its shortcomings, but because Paul was a crucial historical figure with the qualities of a prepsychoanalytic thinker—in short, a great man. Freud's identification with Paul is of a different nature than his identification with Moses, however; Moses was the father figure (Freud 1939, p. 110), the fascinating authority with a powerful personality. Paul can hardly be interpreted as a father figure, but more as a soul mate or intellectual brother, having the same Jewish character as Freud,

<sup>5</sup> In the present paper, Freud's motives for his changing attitude toward Moses are not the central issue, and the matter is too complex to deal with in a limited way. Grubrich-Simitis (1997) has convincingly shown a connection between Freud's ongoing self-analysis and his changing attitude toward Moses as expressed in *Moses and Monotheism*. She is probably right in observing that Freud eventually had to establish some distance between himself and the overwhelming power of the figure he had come to identify with (pp. 77-78).

and possessing the (self-)analytic gifts of a brilliant psychoanalytic thinker.

Freud's most personal and complex work, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), is in effect an analysis of Jewish character—also of his own character—and of anti-Semitism, which was a part of Freud's society and affected his daily life. In this analysis, he recognizes himself in Paul, the man from Tarsus, seeing him as one of the really great men who are able to get to the bottom of their own character and of religion, and thus can liberate themselves and others from a sense of guilt (Mampuy, unpublished). In the end, Freud put these analytic gifts on a pedestal; he recognized in Paul's character and message one of his own most important (and lasting) ideas: that we can understand our character and the culture/religion we are part of, and we can make the repressed conscious and thus liberate ourselves from constricting forces (in character and in culture/religion) by "remembering, repeating, and working through" (Freud 1914b).

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## A POEM AND A DREAM

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*Recently, a journalist in analysis had a dream that stimulated the writing of a poem, the two psychic products occurring no more than a few hours apart. Since the analysand had copious free associations to both products, believing both to be culled from the same unconscious raw material, an interesting study of an act of aesthetic creation almost in statu nascendi became possible. A concept called poem work is entertained in this paper and is compared and contrasted with the classical psychoanalytic concept of dream work, allowing some unanswerable questions to be posed and discussed in regard to the formal constitutive elements of poetry.*

### INTRODUCTION

The aesthetic comparison between a dream and a poem is my topic. I plan to focus much more on the latter, even though I believe the mutual influence of one on the other in this instance is very impressive. Recently, a writer-analysand reported a dream and a subsequent poem that he wrote "on the heels of the dream," the one very influenced by the other, in his opinion. Before I present the particular dream and poem in question, I want to make a few comments about the way an analyst reflects on dreams and poems in general.

A psychoanalyst does not turn to dreams primarily to extract from them their aesthetic properties. He studies the manifest appearance of dreams, and with the dreamer's collaboration, arrives at latent meaning through the portals that free-associative keys have



opened. This does not mean that an analyst or any other dream watcher is unaware of or lacks interest in the aesthetic enchantment that many dreams create with their most artistic manifest images. An analyst is not unaware that dream experience may have been the first inkling of an artistic, uncanny, internal, and surreal life that nourished our ancestors before *art*, as we have come to know it, had any human provenance or cultural meaning whatsoever.

Was *dream* the first unconscious artistic statement that bent reality out of all recognition (even though past and current realities were the dream's raw material and days' residue, day after atavistic day), since the dawn of perception? In other words, before *Homo sapiens* had museums or pen and parchment, and art as a concept must have been far from the hunter's mind, were his dreams not strange internal images that may have begun to pave psychological roads toward philosophy, religion, poetry, and art—even before these concepts had any of their modern meanings? Was it dreams that made an artist of primal man, his dreams a kind of internal Lascaux that prefigured the numinous animals that would eventually find their aesthetic permanence in ancient stone?

Ancient stone and modern parchment are separated by little aesthetic time, it would seem: in fact, James Joyce was so fascinated by the aesthetic properties of the dream that, after *Ulysses* (1922) had exhausted all narrative possibilities and frontiers (at least for him!), he planned to write his ultimate masterpiece (*Finnegans Wake* [1939]) using the dream as model (Ellman 1982). And William Butler Yeats claimed that his poem "The Cap and Bells" (1899) was nothing more than a dream that he wrote down exactly as it had appeared to him upon awakening. No doubt Yeats and Joyce introduced their own artistry into their final aesthetic products, regardless of these disclaimers, with dream imagery informing their own efforts rather than replacing them. My point here is that aesthetic issues are not the cardinal concern of an analyst as a dream is being interpreted.

The manifest appearance of a poem, by contrast with the manifest appearance of a dream, is not thought of as a facade that conceals the real meaning of the poem. The poem contains

depths that can only be arrived at after several readings (with Empson [1966] even claiming that some of a poem's aesthetic ambiguities can perhaps never be fathomed completely), and the actual sequence of words on the page represents the manifest artistry of the poet; no other words are ever available to the reader to lighten the burden of interpretation. What you see is what you get. Robert Frost's comment that "poetry is what is lost in translation" (Untermeyer 1964, p. 18) hits this aesthetic nail on the head, and is often quoted in and out of context for that very reason.

If a poet were to supply all of his free-associative ruminations to one of his poems, this would be an extraordinary complementary document, to be sure, but it would not change the word order on the page, and it would not necessarily explain why a very particular word order creates an aesthetic sensation that no other sequence of words could accomplish. When Shakespeare (1606), in a throwaway line in *Antony and Cleopatra*, had a minor character, Lepidus, say, "Let all the number of the stars give light/To thy fair way!" (III.2.80-81), who can say why "all the number of the stars" has an aesthetic impact, while "countless stars" or "innumerable stars" would leave the reader cold?

What appears to be a simple aesthetic question such as this is actually terribly complex, and therefore applied analysis is confronted by an almost impossible task. Shengold (2004) emphasized the *alas* in Freud's (1928) oft-quoted, militaristic sounding statement, "Before the problem of the creative artist, analysis must, alas, lay down its arms" (p. 177), thereby bringing attention to the aesthetic longing of the analyst and his inevitable defeat, perhaps, in the mysterious playing fields or battlegrounds of art and art criticism. And Grubrich-Simitis (1996) commented on applied analysis in a challenging way:

It must be conceded . . . that psychoanalysis of whatever school has difficulty in accounting for the formal constitutive aspects of both artistic and scientific creativity. The charges once brought by Flaubert against Sainte Beuve and Taine as critics can equally well be leveled at not a few psychoanalytic studies of Art: "that they don't take suf-

ficient account of Art, of the work itself, of its construction, of its style, in short of everything that constitutes beauty." [p. 78]

I am not sure that psychoanalysis can account for these formal constitutive properties of beauty that Flaubert and Grubrich-Simitis bring to our attention. I am also not sure, however, that psychoanalysis can or should "lay down its arms," given how intriguing the topic is, and I must confess that an *alas* of my own was recently stimulated by a serendipitous analytic event.

As mentioned earlier, a writer in analysis related a dream and a poem almost in one breath, the one clearly stimulated by the other, with only a few short hours of temporal space between them. I will present the analysand's dream and the poem, a brief description of the analysis of the dreamer, a thorough report of his associations to poem and dream, and then attempt to discuss what, if any, aesthetic conclusions can be drawn from all this.

## THE DREAM

The analysand related the following:

In my dream, I awaken to find my house full of guests. I am surprised, but ask if anyone would like air conditioning. I look out the window and am alarmed to see so many people. There are stalls and tents, a circus atmosphere. I scream at my wife to explain the crowds of intruders. She answers, but I cannot hear her: "Don Mattingly died in Florida." I scream again that I cannot hear her. And again she says: "Don Mattingly died in Florida."

## THE POEM

"Forked Animal"

Hiding out in the open  
I shield my heart from the rain,  
The wind my only clothing,  
Is my name Abel or Cain?

Time will never tell me.  
Memory leaves me cold.  
Night and Day stand witness  
As young blood turns to old.

Hiding out in the open  
I shield my heart from the pain,  
Bloodless stars above me,  
My loss, the Pleiades' gain.

### A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYSIS

The dreamer—let us call him Dimitri—is a journalist who has written essays, short stories, and poetry all his life, as well as, of course, his news articles from around the world, which have “kept bread on the table,” as he would say with characteristic modesty. He would be reluctant to call himself a poet, even though the poem just cited, I believe, qualifies as a fine piece of verse. It may not be canonical, but it is arresting and well crafted. It is brief, but deep and rather haunting in its simplicity.

Dimitri is seventy-six years old, married, with grown children and grandchildren. He was born in Latvia but has lived in New York since 1950. He has an older brother who still lives “in the old country,” but the siblings never communicate. What began as sibling rivalry turned into a malicious adult hatred, which probably had a psychotic component as the older brother’s envy of the younger’s success and talent became delusional. This broke Dimitri’s heart when he was young. Age has seasoned the wound, but a scar remains, which has found a reflection in this poem, I believe.

Dimitri’s father was addicted to gambling and alcohol, losing most of his possessions (a farm, a small business) as his reckless life began to spin out of control. He was charming and childlike, and Dimitri’s anger at him was as profound as it was repressed, never tapped until analysis was well under way. It seemed like betrayal to be angry at such a tragic man, as Dimitri’s deep masochistic character traits suggest, and these traits are also reflected in the poem.

Dimitri's mother was the abiding stable relationship throughout his childhood. Her humor, her ebullience in the face of great personal hardship became his ideal, and he believed that some of his poetry was influenced by her, even though she had no intellectual aspirations whatsoever, and never wrote a line of poetry in her life as far as Dimitri knew. But he remembered the rain in Latvia and her poetic depiction of it as coming from "an opening in the sky." To awaken him in the morning, she would scream with robust humor, "Wake up, Dimitri, wake up! You'll be dead long enough!" He loved the totality of her—even including the death wishes aimed at him! In analyzing dream and poem, he would become even more aware of how deeply she had insinuated herself—with his unwitting complicity, of course—into the very fabric of his poetry and his life.

I want to keep this biographical sketch to a minimum and concentrate entirely on what applied psychoanalysis can or cannot contribute to an understanding of the aesthetic strategies that Dimitri's poem uses to capture the attention of its audience. The rest of this paper will address the poem and the dream and whether an understanding of the one can assist us in our deliberation on the other.

The poem and the dream, placed side by side, may not seem to be unconscious bedfellows, or to bear much resemblance to each other at all, for that matter. The dream occurred not long after the analysand had been awakened briefly by dawn at his window. The dawn seemed Shakespearean to the dreamer, "in russet mantle clad," walking "o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill" (Shakespeare 1600-1601, I.1.166-167), and he awakened his wife to share the beauty with her. On returning to bed after this brief interval, he chuckled to his wife: "When you've seen one of these, you've seen them all!" Not to be outdone by this defensive, dawn-bashing cynic, his wife slyly counterpunched: "Dawn—she's too young for you anyway, Dimitri. You're wise not to be too beguiled by her." On relating this to me, Dimitri remembered being proud of his wife's quick-witted repartee, and then falling back to sleep and dreaming the above-described dream.

When Dimitri awakened from the dream, a line of poetry came to him suddenly—"like an inspiration," it seemed—as if unbidden by any act of will but simply emerging from the unconscious. The line was "hiding out in the open" and seemed initially to be a reference to Dimitri's father, whom he thought of as lonely, tragic, and Lear-like. The dream had spawned this particular line, Dimitri felt, but how the gestation got started was a mystery. Within an hour, eleven more lines that seemed like associations to the dream imagery had appeared. Dimitri gave the poem the title "Forked Animal" because the atmosphere seemed so Lear-like to him. Dimitri had gone from a Shakespearean dawn to a Shakespearean blasted heath in an instant, it seemed, and the uncanny transformation would only become clear after a considerable amount of analytic process and deliberation.

Several weeks of analytic work made it possible to define the latent dream thoughts that Dimitri believed not only informed the manifest content of the dream, but also the "manifest content" of the poem as well. Dimitri believed that the "primal scene" of the dawn at his window (as he called it, only half humorously) was the day's residue that got the unconscious engines started. As described earlier, the dawn seemed so unusually beautiful that he had awakened his wife to share the beauty with her. They both gazed at it, transfixed by first light and its aesthetic artistry. "When you've seen one of these, you've seen them all," Dimitri commented—a defensive statement, a piece of humorous self-mockery whose full meaning became clear to him only after considerable free-associative rumination.

Initially, Dimitri's wife had teased him about his automatic, almost reflexive defensiveness, and it was in a humorous, if ironic, mood that he fell asleep again and dreamed the dream we have been addressing. As Dimitri began to "play" with the meaning of the dream and the subsequent poetic creation, his defensiveness was better understood as he doggedly insisted on pursuing the latent thoughts that sparked and shaped both products. In the interest of parsimony and clarity of argument, the latent dream thoughts can be presented here "whole cloth" rather than as a series of free associations that stitched the fabric together over time.

Dimitri's initial humor about a primal scene led eventually to a more serious consideration of infantile sexuality and imagination. The beauty of an "innocent," youthful dawn peered at by Dimitri and his wife did seem like a reversal of childhood's arrangement, when infantile sexuality loses its innocence as curiosity takes the parental bedroom and its activities as location and subject matter for intense inquiry. His mother's directive to "wake up, Dimitri, you'll be dead long enough" and her description of rain as being produced "when the sky opens" seemed indicative of an ambivalent intimacy with her that Dimitri, as the transference neurosis unfolded, had come to think of as "primal." The relative lack of a substantial relationship with his father gave an intense oedipal cast to his early years; when peering through the window of childhood imagination at his parents' sexual life, he seemed to see a powerful woman and a diminished man, the woman capable of opening the sky or closing the eyes of the dead, while the man seemed to be a nonplayer in this poetic, dramatic but Gothic depiction of the world.

With this preamble as guide, we can enter into the world of Dimitri's dream thoughts, which I summarize as follows:

I see the flesh of the ever-youthful dawn (my mother) at my window. Night (my father) has been vanquished by the sexual power of first light. I am giddy with excitement as I imagine the seduction of the eternal mother and the total exclusion of her husband (my father).

The starkness of these thoughts was changed utterly by the dream work, since the unconscious sense of guilt they aroused threatened to alert the censor and condemn all further dream construction outright. The defensive process that started so quickly, even while Dimitri was briefly awake prior to the dream construction (evidenced by the dismissal of dawn's uniqueness with the comment that "when you've seen one of these, you've seen them all") carried over into the dream and changed the latent thoughts drastically from a scene of seduction to a scene of deprivation and destruction, whereby Dimitri's house was overrun by strangers, and his wife was announcing the death of Don Mattingly in Florida.

Dimitri was thrilled when he noticed the pun embedded in his wife's statement in the dream: wasn't *Don Mattingly* a clever translation of *Dawn Matinly* (the word *dawn* as noun and adverb, side by side) into the real-life Yankee slugger Don Mattingly, who was being pronounced dead! The dream work is impressive and masterful as it translates every iota of sexuality and seduction into paranoia (a quiet house is transformed into a circus), while simultaneously expressing a reaction formation (the unwelcome guests are being offered air conditioning!) and displaced death wishes (dawn and sexuality have been transformed into death and castration).

Since the aesthetics of *poem work* are even more centrally my topic here than the aesthetics of dream work, the poem's manipulation of the dream thoughts will be focused on in what follows.

## DISCUSSION

If we place the latent dream thoughts and the poem side by side, the transformation wrought by the poem work does seem as radical as the dream work's distortions. Dream work, however, with no audience in mind other than the dream censor it wishes to deceive with cunning disguises, can alter the latent dream thoughts drastically and with a total disregard for any communicative accountability. Poem work, as we have seen, can be drastic also, but some communicative continuity with a current audience and some sense of competitive communicative continuity with all previous audiences and poets (what Harold Bloom [1973] has called the *anxiety of influence*) must be maintained consciously, preconsciously, or unconsciously.

In this case, I have argued that the poet has almost completely disguised the impulses and latent thoughts that got dream and poem started. Is it possible that the poem is even more disguised than the dream? Since the poem "goes public" in the sense that it is written with an audience in mind, is disguise even more necessary? Does poem work have to work even harder than dream work to conceal its latent meanings? But, if the poet's open-minded mis-



sion is to reveal the hidden secrets of life to his presumably less open-minded, relatively repressed public, why would poem work have to conceal at all? Wouldn't full disclosure of all the mind's contents be the goal?

These questions, on reflection, make it clear that art is not at all about full disclosure. Like transference (or all aspects of psychoanalytic process, perhaps), it reveals and disguises all at once. Transference, as Freud taught us, tries to pin something on the analyst that there is an initial unwillingness to recognize in the self. This is the only mirror the self can use to recognize itself, eventually: it is as if self-deception is the only means available to arrive at eventual self-knowledge, if one is willing to go through the laborious transferential hall of mirrors that psychoanalytic process represents.

Is art not a similar hall of mirrors, perhaps, in which the artist attempts to reveal the hidden recesses of meaning while keeping a lot of his private self to himself? "In every work of art, chaos must shimmer through the regular veil of order," as Novalis put it, capturing the dichotomous conflict of the artist in one elegant sentence (O'Brien 1995, p. 312).

The irony of revelation and disguise that poetry represents is captured in the first five words of Dimitri's poem, which announce boldly that exposure is the great tragic topic that the poem will take up—and yet we have come to realize that a whole other topic is being concealed. At first, Dimitri had the uncanny conviction that the first line of his poem encapsulated his father's tragic existence and strange psychological nature with a brevity that was staggering. How could a man's life and complexity be so summed up in five words! As the free-associative wheels continued to turn, however, Dimitri came to see that the line "hiding out in the open" and an earlier one, "I shield my heart from the rain," were also striking defensive allusions to his mother and her comments about sky and rain and openings. In this context, "I shield my heart from the rain" had a pun in it (hiding out in the open, so to speak) that Dimitri seemed not to notice until the analyst hinted at it.

As mentioned earlier, Dimitri uncovered the pun *Don Mattingly/Dawn Matinly* early in his free associations to the dream,

marveling at the unconscious artistry behind such transformations. In fact, his stumbling on this hidden pun in his associations became the key that unlocked the entire defensive strategy of the dream. But the poem also had a pun in it, which Dimitri had missed at first. The word *rain* concealed *reign* and *rein* and the French *reine* (queen), suggesting that if rain held an obvious allusion to his mother, the oedipal *reins* that could guide Dimitri's horse toward the conquest (*reign*) of his queen (*reine*) were too conflicted to handle!

In time, Dimitri would reflect on the ease with which the dream pun revealed its secret to him, whereas the poem's pun on rain seemed repressed and unavailable. If Dimitri was identified with his father's lonely existential isolation, he seemed equally identified with his mother, even if he wished to shield his heart from her. In the first two lines of the poem, has he not done precisely what the dream work has done: he has changed seductive, sexual thoughts into hiding and shielding, with instinct masquerading as defense quicker than one can say "forked animal"! If *forked animal* is a reference to Lear, it is the bifurcated, conflictual nature of a dreaming, poetic animal that is being emphasized.

"The wind my only clothing" is a line of great existential anguish that ushers in the haunting question, "Is my name Abel or Cain?" In other words, the first stanza depicts a Lear-like man—stark, naked (the wind his only clothing), and unsure if he is killer or victim. Isn't this the primal lover at the window, ogling the sexual dawn, but totally disguised as the furtive, castrated hero in hiding?

The ever youthful, sexual dawn/mother at the window seems to have been banished completely. She may be hiding out in the open, but she is difficult to see, since she seems to have had a gender change and has become a Lear-like, naked, forked animal, clothed only by the wind, shielding her heart from the rain. To be sure, the gender of the poem's narrator is disclosed only by line four's question, "Is my name Abel or Cain?"—but this revelation throws the reader off the "scent of the woman" that got the poem started! The introduction of the Abel/Cain theme further dis-

guises the sexuality of the latent dream/poem thoughts, even though it obviously accentuates the oedipal “total exclusion” of the father/brother theme as “night (my father) has been vanquished by the sexual power of first light.” The Abel/Cain question introduces the idea of oedipal guilt (displaced onto the biblical sibling issue, to be sure), and the confusion at the heart of the question is left unresolved, just as the question itself is never answered.

A similar introduction of a sibling theme was used by Coleridge in a much longer poem, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” in which the guilty mariner is eventually saved in the “Pilot’s Boy” episode. It has been argued (Mahon 1987) that this is a reference to a genetic event in Coleridge’s childhood, an intense sibling conflict with his brother Frank, which “sneaked” into the great poem’s finale with an unconscious urgency that seemed unstoppable, regardless of any aesthetic, last-minute awkwardness it may have dragged along with it in its unconscious wake!

Returning to Dimitri’s much shorter poem, we are aiming to focus exclusively on the poem work, and the nature and function of its disguises. The second stanza suggests that time, memory, and experience witness the guilt and suffering of the forked animal, but do nothing about it. This is more Beckett than Freud, perhaps; but, again, it emphasizes the harshness of reality—its rind rather than the juicy, sexual, appetizing, fruity pulp of its interior. The latent thoughts of sexual triumph have been replaced by starkness, pain, suffering, loneliness, and guilt. This is Oedipus at Colonus, not the cocky young Oedipus who is about to approach the fated crossroads at Thebes. The third stanza suggests that the only winners in this dark depiction of the human condition (or in the Oedipus complex) are the Pleiades—nature herself, in other words, who lures mortal man to the window of desire day after day with a new and ancient dawning of unconscious yearning, which seems to offer eternal satisfaction, but in the final analysis disappoints the foolish, oedipal, forked animal.

In this kind of cosmic Darwinism, human loss equals gain for the Pleiades, the seven daughters of Atlas and Pleione. They were pursued by Orion but rescued by Zeus, who turned them into

doves and then placed them in the sky. Only six are visible as stars; one is perpetually in hiding. Six were loved by gods, and only Merope had to be content with the love of a mere mortal, Sisyphus—hence she shines less brightly in the sky than do her sisters. It was this more human, Sisyphean version of the mythological creature that Dimitri had unconsciously identified with, bending mythology to his own purposes, to be sure, and clearing a space for such revisionism in his poem. Thus, the poet seems to be surrendering his entropic molecules to the bloodless stars, dutifully paying his debt (and his death) to the exacting exigencies of nature. But, secretly, he identifies with the rebellious star that “hides out in the open”—waiting for dawn to appear, no doubt, as the orbit of sexual desire “dawns matinly,” as long as flesh has the lure of instinct to guide it.

The poem work, by turning latent thoughts of seduction and sexual fulfillment into a *cri de coeur* of existential man at his most vulnerable, a guilty wretch with seemingly little interest in the *joie* of sexual ambitious life, seduces the reader in subtle, aesthetic ways, and it is the nature of this strange seduction that will be addressed next. If the three stanzas of the poem are disguised verbal representatives of the dream thoughts, the disguise is practically complete. Dawn is never mentioned, and sexuality and a primal scene are not easy to intuit. However, as Dimitri’s insights gradually coalesced, he became aware that the poem presses its nose at the window of the reader’s house, so to speak, like a seductive dawn that insists on awakening the dreamer and the reader to its luminous charms. A spell is cast on the reader: he is being seduced to identify with the tragic, existential plight of a naked hero, a poor forked animal trapped in the finite axes of the human condition under a thoughtless sky. The raw materials of dream thoughts that were sexually explicit have been changed dramatically into existential wails that sound like the cries of a wounded animal, but are quite seductive, nevertheless.

In fact, one could argue that the formal constitutive elements of this aesthetic sleight of hand are an elaborate disguise of explicit desire and a replacement of it with masochistic tragic im-

agery that seduces in its own way. The reader may not be conscious of the elaborate and disguised seduction, but, since the reader is a poor forked animal also, he will appreciate on some level how desire and defensive denials and transformations operate. He will, after all, have had experience with his own dreams and the complexity of their disguises.

How can a poet capture and seduce the reader, even though he may have changed his latent thoughts so drastically? Chukovsky (1925), in his advice to those attempting to write poetry for young children, suggests that he knows the answer to that question. In his thirteen commandments for writers of children's poetry, he suggests that, since young children are active creatures with shorter attention spans than those of adults, poems that seek to engage them must flit from image to image and must be full of rapid action to match this great fluidity of images in motion. Consequently, children love verbs, which are active, and they hate adjectives, which slow down the action. They love the dance of the trochee. They love rhyme, and ideally the rhyming part of a poem carries the bulk of its meaning.

Chukovsky wrote about children from ages two to five. Things will change, obviously, as they grow older. And if Chukovsky knows how to capture the attention of children, how one captures and seduces the adult reader is another matter. Charles Lamb (1994) believed that he could distinguish Shakespeare's pen from Fletcher's in their collaborations, but recognition of Shakespeare's stylistic genius is not quite the same as defining its formal constitutive elements, a task that may forever elude the literary analyst (and applied analyst, as well—alas). What we can say about Dimitri's poem is that it is seductive and that the reader identifies with the plight of the forked animal, recognizing a kinship with that component of the universal Oedipus complex that mourns with Oedipus at Colonus more readily, perhaps, than it embraces the hubris and sexually ambitious accomplishments of the pre-Colonus hero. With the phrase "hiding out in the open," Dimitri suggests (very indirectly and covertly, to be sure) that even a blind Oedipus can see the rich inner sexual life of the mind and body, as long as he refuses to

ignore the body's charms and dreams and ambitions, no matter how inexorably and pitilessly "young blood turns to old."

Dimitri, who became defensive even as he was chanting the praises of the dawn to his wife (as evidenced by his comment that "when you've seen one of these, you've seen them all"), nevertheless managed to seduce the reader secondarily, even if the primary target of his sexuality and attention had to be ignored. The poem work turned a defensive maneuver into an aesthetic one: by using rhyme, metaphor, mythology, and primary processes of displacement, condensation, and symbolism, in less than a hundred words, the poem seduces not directly but very *indirectly*, as the reader identifies with Lear-like, universal affects that pull at human heart strings, from Homer's time to Beckett's time, consciously and unconsciously. The simplicity of the singsong lines (suggesting a nursery rhyme or ballad) provides a jolting contrast to the Lear-like imagery that predominates. If this is the ballad of a forked animal, there is no hint of the balladeer romancing the dawn from his veranda! Dawn Matinly/Don Mattingly has certainly been wiped out of the poem almost entirely, as seductive dawn and powerful slugger are replaced by the furtive, guilty, and confused Abel/Cain character.

Those great primary processes of disguise that the dreamer can exploit with seemingly total disregard for coherence must be curbed and modified by the poet, at least in the manifest facade of his communication. The latent bulk of unconscious communication in poetry probably has as much access to the full range of primary processes as dreams do. The interweaving of the two likely defines the formal constitutive skills of the poet as he disguises unconscious raw material in manifest facade, but also allows chinks to appear in the aesthetic armor, so that human vision can peer through and reveal to itself the seductive nakedness of raw unconscious yearning.

If defense and instinct form an alloy that a compromise called the human condition has exploited ever since it could be called *human*, neurosis—a creative compromise formation that is pretty universal itself—has a counterpart in art, which also transforms in-

instinct into aesthetic representations or misrepresentations of itself. Neurosis recognizes itself in art, art recognizes itself in neurosis, and it is this doppelgänger effect that pulls the reader into the aesthetic illusion with almost the same intensity as instinct itself. Poem work, like dream work, seduces the awakener/reader with one manifestation of itself that leads to deeper communion with less obvious latent manifestations of itself, if he dares to follow.

What poem work hides and reveals is at the heart of a great mystery called *aesthetics*. The primary processes Freud discovered compress and conceal and distort, and the resultant intensity of that compression packs a wallop. Mannoni (1971) has suggested that Freud's joke book (1905) may have been his first attempt to crack the code of the aesthetic mystery. I would like to suggest that a joke is a little coil of compressed meanings: it jolts the listener and releases pent-up (repressed) energies (the incentive bonus or bonus of pleasure, as Freud called it), which results in the immediate affective response of laughter. All art may possess equally condensed coils of compressed meaning that spring out at the reader like aesthetic jack-in-the-boxes, not always inducing laughter, to be sure, but certainly releasing profound affects of empathy and understanding. The artist and his audience, the poet and his reader, approach this jack-in-the-box (or Russian box) of compressed meanings within meanings with precarious expectancy, like a face reading itself in a mirror at the first startling moment of perception and recognition. Baudelaire (1857) captured this startling duality when he addressed the reader with provocative irony: "Hypocrite lecteur,—mon semblable,—mon frère!" (p. 6).

If dream work's compression of meaning into compact, primary-processed obfuscation is completely unconscious, poem work's artistry must represent a collaboration of conscious and unconscious components that make poetry accessible and intelligible, on one level, and mysterious and baffling on another. Any line of Dimitri's poem seems simple and straightforward on first reading, and yet there is an aftertaste that is disquieting and haunting.

Take "memory leaves me cold," for example. The expression "it leaves me cold" might be used as a comment about an artistic

product that does not arouse the expectable emotional reaction; something abstract (like art) is being judged by the impact it has on the body: the *psychological* is being put to the *physiological* test, so to speak, to see whether it is the real thing, an artistic product that can grab you by the flesh and move you. "It leaves me cold" is a more powerful way of saying "it had no emotional impact on me." Words referring to the body and the elemental carry more clout than abstract or intellectual referents. An artistic product made by a fellow human being can be judged by whether it affects the body "on a gut level." The body temperature of a work of art can be assessed by its effect on the body of the audience, with "it leaves me cold" constituting a near-damning evaluation. "Memory leaves me cold" consequently expresses an idea that jolts, since memory, after all, is not an external artistic product that is being judged.

Memory is the *self* or a major component of it. Memory is man's great compensation for all that experience is powerless to hold on to. Man has the illusion of mastering the past by keeping a record of it. If repetition compulsion is a caricature in action of this most prized ego function, memory's internal function itself is one of nature's finest achievements. But it has limitations. It is finite and mortal, no matter how photographic or reliable it may seem. Dimitri's line reminds the reader of the fragility of the human mind and its products—that it is mortal porcelain they are made of, not immortal steel. Time (night and day) and memory witness the entropy of human flesh; they are powerless to do anything about it. Dimitri's frustration with the limitations of human memory is an indictment—not only of analysis that puts such stock in memory retrieval, but also of the whole cultural and memorial enterprise of the human condition itself.

"Like a piece of ice on a hot stove," as Frost (1939) said, "the poem must ride on its own melting" (p. 778). Poetry and memory can record the entropic melting, but they are powerless to do anything about it. The irony is that Dimitri's poem, which might have been a serenade to the dawn rather than a song of entropy, ends up melting into its own form of beauty anyway!



## CONCLUSION

One final clinical comment about the uniqueness of a poem in the psychoanalytic process: I would like to suggest that a poem in the context of clinical process may be different from a dream, with the latter never being off-limits to free-associative access, whereas a poem, once fixed in aesthetic time and space, may resist or defy further analysis, given the analysand's reticence to tamper with a sublimation that seems final.

This raises interesting countertransference issues: after the poem "Forked Animal" seemed to have become unalterable as an aesthetic entity, the analyst had a further association to the name *Mattingly* that had earlier eluded him. Wasn't there another hidden pun here on *mating* and *matting*, the one sexual and the other a cover-up? Wasn't Dimitri's oedipal wish to *mate* with the ageless dawn quite the opposite of his wish to cover it up with *matting*, and wasn't this yet another version of his defensive "when you've seen one of these, you've seen them all"?

Analytic tact suggested that the analyst should leave well enough alone and allow the sublimation to "defend" itself without further interpretive interference. *Mating* and *matin* and *matting* were not devoid of many alternative free-associative points of entry and had been pretty well explored already, and nothing seemed lost by leaving a few aesthetic, if defensive, stones unturned.

Dimitri (who gave permission for the publication of this aesthetic essay) was a modest man who would have dismissed any attempt to read more into 100 words or so than seemed warranted. With a similar modesty, I have offered a comparison between poem work and dream work that may shed a little light on the mystery of beauty without attempting to at all codify the precise ingredients that make art what it undoubtedly is: a creative compromise of man, a forked aesthetic animal in all his frailty and glory, hiding out in the open without a shred of immortal certainty to his name.

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## PAUL GRAY'S INNOVATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

BY LAWRENCE N. LEVENSON, M.D.

Are we due for a revival of ego psychology? With analysts exploring a variety of novel treatment paradigms in recent years, most notably the two-person relational turn, ego psychology seems to have fallen out of fashion, at least in some quarters of the psychoanalytic world. Should there be a revival of interest in ego psychology, it will surely include, and even perhaps be inspired by, the writings of Paul Gray, most of which have been collected for reading and study in the 2005 second edition of his book, *The Ego and Analysis of Defense*.<sup>1</sup>

To a contemporary audience, Gray's writings may seem almost quaint for the rigor and precision with which he explicated his views on the theory and practice of psychoanalytic technique. Few analysts have taken such care to relate technique to theory; fewer still have spelled out their methodological approach in such meticulous detail. Gray took as his starting point the structural and instinctual drive theory as the best-tested and most widely accepted psychoanalytic model of the mind, and he embraced traditional technical concepts such as analytic neutrality, the analyst's objectivity, the patient's relatively autonomous observing ego, and the rational alliance between analyst and patient. His theoretical and clinical framework was the "analysis of problems arising when instinctual derivatives encounter conflicts that force the ego to turn to unconscious rather than conscious solutions" (p. 90).

<sup>1</sup> Gray, P. (2005). *The Ego and Analysis of Defense (Second Edition)*. New York: Aronson (originally published in 1994).

All of this might place him, in the eyes of some contemporary readers, as belonging to an outdated, austere, authoritarian, “one-person” school of psychoanalysis. In fact, while adopting the theoretical framework of the structural model, Gray argued for major revisions in analytic technique and challenged many of the field’s most cherished technical shibboleths. Given his wide-ranging critique of traditional technique, it is hardly a surprise that his work has generated enormous discussion and controversy since it first appeared on the scene more than thirty years ago.

Throughout his scholarly career, Gray frequently referred to a lag in analytic technique. This lag was the focus of his best-known essay, the landmark “‘Developmental Lag’ in the Evolution of Technique for Psychoanalysis of Neurotic Conflict” (1982)—which, when initially published, aroused immediate interest in Gray’s ideas throughout the analytic world. Gray argued in this paper that the leap in theory that occurred when Freud replaced the topographical theory with the structural model had mandated a corresponding leap in technique, from interpreting unconscious drive material to analyzing the ego’s unconscious defensive activities against the drives. While analysts, inspired by Anna Freud’s (1936) classic monograph on the defenses, glibly spoke of the importance of defense analysis and routinely referred to the technical precept of “analyze defense before drive,” Gray pointed out that no methodology had been worked out for making defense analysis a priority of analytic work. What he cogently demonstrated in his developmental lag paper was that, despite all the talk about analyzing defenses, standard technique, rather than systematically analyzing defenses, continued to rely on the analyst’s transference-based authority to influence or bypass defenses as a way of gaining access to unconscious id material. Despite analysts having embraced the structural theory for its superior explanatory power, analytic technique remained tied to the topographic model with its goal of bypassing the patient’s defenses in order to make the unconscious id conscious.

The overarching thrust of Gray’s work was to reformulate analytic technique as a method to effect a far-reaching analysis of defenses. Ego psychology, an offshoot of the structural model, located

neurotic psychopathology not in the repressed drives, but in the alterations of the ego wrought by the ego's unconscious defensive responses to conflicted drives, and made analysis of those defensive activities the essential task of psychoanalytic treatment. One of Gray's consistent aims in his writings was to remedy those aspects of standard methodology that reinforced, rather than analyzed, the patient's defenses. Gray has evoked such intense interest and controversy because he proposed a fundamental reorientation in the analyst's approach, in the interest of analyzing defenses as completely as possible.

Just how far-reaching Gray's intention to refashion technique has been is evident in one of his first published papers, "Psychoanalytic Technique and the Ego's Capacity for Viewing Intrapsychic Activity" (1973), with which *The Ego and Analysis of Defense* begins, in which Gray called for a fundamental change in the nature of the analyst's listening. Analysts have long been encouraged to listen with evenly hovering, "third-ear" attention in order to pick up the patient's unconscious id material. Listening for defenses, Gray argued, calls for a different kind of listening: a focused, purposefully directed listening to pick up the ego's subtle activities. Instead of regarding the analyst's listening as an art, in which the analyst exercised ill-defined intuitive, creative listening capacities, Gray preferred to think of the analyst's listening as a *craft*—the craft of listening with close (not free-floating) attention for conflict and defense.

Here, in proposing a fundamentally different way of listening, Gray was challenging one of the sacred tenets of analytic technique. Even more significantly, in this first paper, Gray proposed, in what would become his signature contribution to analytic technique, a narrowing of the analyst's listening perspective to psychic events taking place during the analytic hour—specifically, to drive derivatives entering the manifest, conscious flow of the patient's material and encountering conflict, with the result that the ego takes defensive measures to remove the drive material from consciousness. This inside focus enables the analyst to observe the patient's drives and defenses in action within the immediate analytic process, allowing for

a vivid demonstration to the patient of his or her conflicted mind at work. Since the relevant data—a drive derivative entering consciousness, a sense of danger generated by conflict over the drive derivative, and then an automatic defense measure employed to remove it from consciousness—occurs at the conscious surface, the analyst can point to the data and thereby engage the patient's observing, rational ego, rather than bypassing the patient's ego by relying on transference-based powers of suggestion to persuade the patient about the unconscious contents of his or her mind.

Moreover, listening inside the clinical hour serves to place the focus of the analysis where it belongs, on the patient's mental functioning, and not on the patient's life functioning. Gray trenchantly noted that when the orientation of the analysis moves outside the analytic situation and into the patient's life (as easily happens when traditional technique is employed), attention inevitably shifts to the patient's functioning in his or her life—resulting in the patient's defenses, especially those related to the superego, being stimulated to manage decisions and behavior, instead of the patient's gaining undefended access to the farthest reaches of his or her mind. An orientation to outside life functioning also represents a displacement in time away from the necessity for the patient to contend with conflict anxiety in the moment.

Many of the technical issues that mattered deeply to Gray, and that he would continue to develop in publications over the next thirty years, were introduced in this first paper: listening for defenses in action, focusing on the mind and not the life, analyzing superego activity, attending to conflicts over aggression, and engaging rather than preempting the patient's mature ego functions. Gray regarded neurotic pathology as situated in those "habitual, unconscious, and outmoded" (p. 65) patterns of ego defenses, but he also saw the ego, with its relatively mature, autonomous functions, as optimally becoming a vital ally in the analytic process. The lag in technique that Gray cited had to do with the analyst's use of the authority transferred onto him or her by the patient as a source of power for influencing the patient to give up resistances, in order to bring unconscious drive material into consciousness. But rather

than relying on force to bring about change in the patient, Gray recommended that the analyst seek to foster the patient's relatively autonomous, mature observing ego and form a rational alliance with this healthy part of the ego in analyzing its unconscious defense activities.

In "On Helping Analysands Observe Intrapsychic Activity" (1986), Gray discussed specific techniques for helping analysands to exercise their observing skills for analyzing their resistances. Building on Sterba's (1934) classic contribution on the dissociation of the ego in the analytic process, Gray held that a rational, self-contemplative part of the patient's ego could be engaged to join with the analyst in a learning process about the unconscious ways in which the patient's ego dealt with unconscious conflict. A major advantage of analyzing conflict at the immediate conscious surface of the patient's mind was that the analyst had data to demonstrate to the analysand's rational ego about the patient's mind's way of contending with conflict. In this way, the analysand's higher-order, rational capacities could become an active participant in the analytic process.

In pre-Gray traditional technique, by contrast, the analyst interprets what is not yet conscious to the analysand; this keeps in place the analyst's transference-based authority, and weakens, rather than promotes, the participation of the analysand's relatively autonomous, rational observing capacities.

The belief that an analysand (at least, one from the "narrower" end of the spectrum, to use Gray's terminology) possesses a relatively autonomous, mature, rational part of his or her ego constituted a core postulate upon which Gray's entire theory of technique depended. Starting with that assumption, he then argued for a methodology in which the patient was helped to exercise those autonomous ego functions to observe and learn through rational attention about his or her mind's turn to regressive defensive activity, in response to an irrational sense of danger stemming from conflicts that had originated in childhood. To engage these mature, intellectual aspects of the patient's ego, Gray recommended that the analyst make interventions intellectually clear and attempt to find the appropriate tone and words for stimulating the patient's curios-

ity. He felt that, optimally, analysis is a learning process, and he never backed away from this position (despite criticism that analysis conducted on such terms would become bloodless and intellectualized), emphasizing that engaging the patient's intelligence is not to be confused with fostering intellectualization.

Gray's view that the patient possesses relatively autonomous ego functions that allow for analysis to occur through rational and objective learning processes established an avenue for change involving ego, rather than superego, activity. Gray regularly referred to the ease with which superego activity could commandeer the ego's self-observing capacities for critical, inhibiting purposes. To minimize superego encroachment into the observing ego, he advised that the analyst avoid words and interventions that attracted the analysand's superego into substituting a judgmental attitude for the ego's objective stance. For the same reason, Gray preferred that analysts speak of a *fundamental task of free association*, instead of the superego-stimulating injunction of the "fundamental rule."

The superego figured prominently in Gray's thinking about analysis. In the first of his two great papers on superego analysis, "On the Technique of Analysis of the Superego—An Introduction" (1987), he pointed out that analysands promptly and routinely re-externalize images of judgmental authority onto the analyst, images originally formed in childhood to support the child's efforts to inhibit painful impulses, and subsequently internalized as the foundation of the superego. These images are regressively called up and projected onto the analyst because they motivate caution and restraint, thereby serving to oppose revelation of threatening conflictual drive elements to the analyst. The analyst's neutrality provides freedom for the patient to reveal everything—a frightening state of affairs since it encourages risky self-disclosure, and hence the need to distort defensively the analyst's neutrality by projecting superego images onto the analyst.

Superego transferences are instances of Anna Freud's (1936) so-called second kind of transference, the transference of defense in which objects are cathected to provide "law-and-order" support against pressures from the instincts. Gray was explicit about giving



priority of attention to such transferences of defense over transferences of id. He held that transferences of superego defense were ubiquitous background fantasies in which the analyst was cast as a judgmental authority. Such superego defense transferences constituted the ego-defensive maneuver of greatest consequence, since they served as the basis for the ego's institution of other defensive activity against spontaneous disclosure to the analyst inside the analysis. In other words, once the analyst is cast as a judging authority, the analytic environment becomes safely unsafe for self-revelation.

A significant shortcoming in traditional technique, according to Gray, was that the analysand's deployment of superego defense transferences was not only overlooked, but also was actually exploited as the basis for the analyst's power over the patient. Gray saw superego transferences as posing a special problem for analysis precisely because they offered an avenue for therapeutic action, but an avenue that, in Gray's view, fell short of reaching the more mature therapeutic action possible by enlisting the patient's rational, objective ego capacities. Beginning with Freud, it had become an ingrained aspect of methodology for the analyst to use authoritative force derived from the transference of superego authority to overcome, rather than to analyze, the resistances that stood in the way of gaining access to repressed id elements. While ego psychologists spoke of analyzing defenses as the essence of the analytic process, they had never really developed a methodology for doing so, instead relying on their transference-based authority to bypass or influence defenses. Here, in analysts' reliance on authority derived from transference of the superego, were remnants of hypnotic-suggestive influence operating at the very center of psychoanalytic technique, even though the theoretical advances of the structural model and ego psychology had laid the theoretical groundwork for a technique centering on the ego, not the superego.

Gray understood that the analyst's use of transference-derived authority to bypass defenses can effectively bring previously repressed drive elements into consciousness, and thus represents a mode of psychoanalytic therapeutic action. Indeed, he stated fre-

quently that this approach—which dated back to Strachey’s classic discussion of therapeutic action as involving the internalization of the analyst as a more benign, accepting superego introject to replace the harsh superego with which the patient began the analysis—represented a satisfactory mode of therapeutic action for many, if not most, analysands. But he felt it fell short for those analysands with a capacity for full ego participation in the analytic process. For those analysands, it was preferable to gain insight, both cognitively and experientially, into the capacity of the mature ego in order for the analysand to manage his or her instinctual life without relying on the internalization of the analyst’s authority—an internalization that left superego forces, even if more benign, still active, limiting the possibility of the patient to gain more autonomous growth.

Gray recognized that, even in analysands with high ego strength, some degree of superego-based, suggestive influence was inevitable, but he cautioned against a reliance on suggestion or a fostering of it, since he felt that such analysands stood to gain the most if they could learn about their minds through the use of their rational, objective ego capacities in the service of grasping intrapsychic reality. Thus, Gray advised that the analyst take care not to exploit superego transferences, tempting though this may be, since analyzing them provides a relatively easy means of influencing the patient. Instead, the analyst should maintain neutrality as much as possible, in order to be in a position to analyze superego transference *projections*.

In his second paper on superego analysis, “On Transferred Permissive or Approving Superego Functions: The Analysis of the Ego’s Superego Activities, Part II” (1991), Gray called attention to the fact that, along with its more familiar inhibiting and critical activities, superego functioning also includes affectionate, permissive, protective features. Given its publication date, the paper seems in part to have been a response to the wave of enthusiasm in the 1980s for wider-scope methodologies, particularly Kohut’s self psychology. Gray saw essential psychoanalysis—the thorough analysis of resistance—as compromised not only by the “developmental lag” he had written about a decade earlier, but also by the spilling over of wider-

scope methodologies into psychoanalytic methodology in general. Gray understood this spilling over as the analyst's yielding to the patient's transference fantasy of the analyst as a maternalistic, approving, permissive object, because this fantasy converges with the analyst's natural inclination to be regarded in a loving, supportive, noncritical way. The analyst's neutrality is once again distorted, now with a positive valence that makes the distortion all the more elusive, but for the same safety-seeking purposes that motivate projection of critical, defensive superego imagery onto the analyst.

When the analyst aligns him- or herself with these benevolent transference distortions in order to gain leverage to convince the analysand to accept previously warded-off instinctual derivatives, there is a bypassing of the sense of threat and attendant defenses—in essence, a bypassing of the *conflict* over the drives. Consequently, the instinctual derivatives are accepted into consciousness because of the “approval” of superego authority, represented by the analyst, and not because the patient has acquired—through the analysis—a mature, rational understanding that the sense of threat against the drives that motivated unconscious defensive activity was anachronistic and no longer realistic. Change is founded on the reinternalization of images of authority, albeit more benign as a result of the analysis, rather than on the patient's gaining greater ego autonomy from unconsciously motivated superego activities.

For Gray, the aim of analysis was “a maximum of new, conscious ego solutions to conflict and a minimum of solutions involving new internalizations” (p. 124). Toward that end, he felt that the analyst must conduct him- or herself as a morally neutral person who wishes to make an idea intellectually clear, and not as one who wants to be “understanding.” Perhaps anticipating the charge that he was encouraging analysts to adopt an austere, remote attitude, Gray emphasized that there was considerable room for the analyst to be concerned and tactful while still maintaining a commitment to neutral and rational analytic work.

Just how differently the world of clinical analysis begins to look when one embraces defense analysis as the analytic priority is most strikingly evident in “Memory as Resistance, and the Telling of a

Dream" (1992). In this paper, Gray turned inside out some of our most cherished notions about the role of memory and dreams in therapeutic action. Instead of the recovery of memories as a goal of the analysis, Gray discussed how the analysand's turning to a memory in his or her associations can be approached as a defensive displacement of time and place away from the immediate analytic situation, citing the reporting of a dream as a common example of such a displacement. He elaborated further his position that it is most advantageous to help patients gain access to the ego's unconscious activity at the moment in the hour when it opposes instinctual derivatives that have begun to emerge into consciousness. We know that a familiar defense for the analysand is to escape the immediate stage where the living issues are being played out, using memory defensively by experiencing it in its conventional sense as referring to another time and place.

Gray recommended that the analyst help expand the analysand's experience of remembering to include awareness that the act of remembering is a present-tense event, an immediate, active phenomenon, and not only a recalling of something in the past. The resourceful ego uses any mental activity in the service of defense, and in the hothouse environment of the analytic situation, turning to memory is an especially attractive solution in that it moves the context of conscious experience away from the immediate present. Gray proposed that analysts keep their attention attuned to the analysand's turning to memory—going to a past context—in order to gain protective distance from the immediate live impulses.

Similarly, when a patient reports a dream in the hour, he or she has moved away from the living moment and into the detached, special frame of the dream, shifting from present to past context. Gray felt that if analysts note what the patient says or experiences immediately before narrating the dream, a more alive, dynamic perspective becomes available, in which the analyst can work with the telling of the dream as, among other things, a defensive effort to abandon the present context for the more secure context of the dream as "bracketed out" material—that is, as privileged, id-near material, and as referring to an event in the past.

Gray did not view the analysand's turning to a memory solely as a defensive shift away from the immediate intrapsychic scene. The analysand's recovery of memories was a positive development in the analysis when it signaled a lowering of the need for defense based on the analysand's acquisition of a greater capacity for consciously experiencing drive derivatives (for example, a greater tolerance of aggressive wishes, leading to the recall of memories of hating or attacking a parent in childhood). But these recovered memories were the result of analytic work, not a part of the therapeutic action. The genetic material that in Gray's view *did* have relevance for therapeutic action was the history of the defense measures utilized: how and why the analysand had come to feel that particular defenses against particular drive derivatives were necessary for a sense of safety. Gray put it this way:

The shift of genetic interest might be expressed in the following way: from "How and why, as a child, did you wish to destroy someone?" to "What was it, as a child, that made you need to stop knowing that you could hate some individuals enough to want to destroy them, and how did you manage to stop knowing?" [p. 125]

To many contemporary analysts' sensibilities, Gray's thinking may appear dismayingly out of step with the times when it comes to the place of countertransference in analytic technique. Gray highlighted the importance of the rational, observing, "data-gathering" functions of the ego—not only for the analysand, but for the analyst as well. In order for the analyst to facilitate the activity of those mature ego functions in the analysand, the analyst needs to refer to data from what the analyst observes and can point out to the analysand, rather than from what the analyst feels. According to Gray, attending to one's own unconscious, listening with the third ear, and seeking resonating sources of knowledge between analysand and analyst are all precepts that tilt listening too much to the side of identifying id derivatives, and away from the kind of focused listening necessary for identifying both the operative defenses and the drives they are defending against.

Gray clearly saw an important place for the analyst's attention to his or her own conflicts, but, again, with priority given to the consequences of defensive actions taken against conflictual drives. Just as he gave priority to the transference of defense over transference of id, he favored attention to countertransference of resistance over countertransference of the drives. The important countertransference, in other words, was the *countertransresistance*. Indeed, Gray attributed much of the lag in psychoanalytic technique to analysts' countertransresistance to transference affects, and pressed hard for analysts to become aware of their resistances to the analysand's drive-based affects as they surface in the analysis.

The drive to which Gray gave his most sustained attention was the aggressive drive. While his interest in aggression was there from the beginning, it is clear that analyzing conflicts over aggression steadily emerged as one of the very central tenets of his theory of technique. It was the subject of his last published paper, included in the book under the title "On the Receiving End: Facilitating the Analysis of Conflicted Drive Derivatives of Aggression" (2000). This emphasis on aggression put Gray very much on the receiving end of critics who felt that he overplayed aggression and consequently missed other important dynamic issues in his patients. It also placed him with strange bedfellows in that some saw a similarity between his approach and Kleinian theory. But, despite the criticism that his emphasis on aggression narrowed his listening perspective, Gray never retreated from the position that analytic treatment could and should do more to enable patients to become conscious of aggression as a primary drive, and to gain both cognitive and experiential awareness of their capacity to manage, rather than to defend against, their aggressive propensities, which would in turn lead to their finding effective sublimatory outlets for aggression in their lives. The fact that traditional methodology had not gone farther in the analysis of aggression Gray ascribed to analysts' understandable unease about being the targets of analysands' freed-up aggression.

Superego analysis figured so prominently in his thinking because Gray viewed superego activity as the ego's primary means of

defense against aggressive drive derivatives. Pervasively in his writings, he attempted to call attention to aspects of standard technique that he felt relied on and reinforced defenses against aggression, defenses that he believed could be effectively analyzed, enabling the analysand to gain fuller access to his or her aggression. For example, he held that analysts were prone to interpret aggression prematurely in genetic terms as a way of mitigating its intensity by displacing it to another time and to someone other than the analyst. Analysts, then, are not keen to be on the receiving end of the analysand's negative transference, and analysands, conflicted over the destructive potential of their aggression, are even less keen about becoming conscious of their aggressive inclinations. Thus, there are strong motivations in both parties to seek means of help that do not involve greater exposure of the analysand's aggression.

It was no surprise to Gray that interpersonal techniques held such appeal to analysts and analysands alike because, as he saw it, these methods invariably involved a drift away from contending with instinctual activity, especially aggression. To those who claimed that he was single-mindedly focused on conflicts over aggression to the exclusion of other sources of conflict, Gray's rejoinder was that attention to aggressive conflicts paved the way toward greater access to the sexual passions, since an increased capacity to manage aggression enabled patients to be less fearful of the prospect of frustration-aggression over their sexual, romantic passions not being reciprocated.

The reader can hardly fail to notice, however, that drives took a back seat to the ego in Gray's conception of the analysis of psychic conflict. He was not being glib when he proposed amending Freud's great dictum about the goals of psychoanalysis to "where unconscious ego was, conscious ego, as well, shall be" (p. 101). It was not that the drives were not important; of course they were, since they were what motivated the ego's unconscious defensive activity in the first place. But Gray held that the problem was situated not in the drives, but in the ego's irrational sense of danger from the drives, resulting in the deployment of unconscious defenses—defenses that were outmoded and unnecessary since the patient's mature ego

was, in fact, capable of consciously managing instinctual impulses. The drives had a natural “upward thrust” toward conscious expression, and therefore would come to the surface as long as the ego’s inhibitory mechanisms were progressively analyzed.

The analyst did not have to exercise authority in order to make interpretations of unconscious content; instead, the analyst could work at the surface, confident that, with progressive analysis of the defenses, the drives would be less and less held back from entering the patient’s consciousness. Emphatically, working at the surface, where conflictual impulses emerged until they were opposed by a threatened ego, did *not* mean working superficially or avoiding the most intense, most deeply repressed drives and affects. To the contrary, Gray held that conflicts over the drives are most vivid when they have entered the arena of the analysand’s immediate, “now” conscious experience. And insight for Gray meant having possession of something “now.” As the drives made their way into consciousness, the analysand gained both cognitive and experiential awareness of his or her ego’s capacity for assimilation of the drives. The affirmative tone of Gray’s work noted by many readers stemmed from his belief that many analysands had ego capacities that had been underappreciated, both for the ability to collaborate with the analyst in observing their minds, and for managing the drive impulses that entered consciousness as the defenses were systematically analyzed.

The second edition of *The Ego and Analysis of Defense*, published about three years after Gray’s death, essentially represents his collected works and includes four papers written after the publication of the book’s first edition. Most of his seminal papers make up the chapters of the first part of the book, addressing technique, while generally shorter, less formal, more reader-friendly pieces make up the second part, on teaching and supervisory guidelines. The papers on teaching and supervision reveal Gray’s marvelous success at communicating his thinking to students of analysis with the same kind of clarity and intelligence that he felt was essential to the analyst’s communications to analysands.



While all of the major papers were published previously in journals, this compendium of Gray's writings affords the reader an indispensable opportunity to appreciate the full sweep of his theory of technique. Gray was a true innovator who made thought-provoking contributions to the literature on technique, but, as seems to be the fate of many of our most original thinkers, his work tends to be put into a reductive, formulaic box. In his case, the facile summary is that he contributed the concept of close process attention, emphasizing defensive shifts during the clinical hour. Readers of the book who primarily associate him with this methodology may well be surprised to discover that it was but one aspect of his far-reaching reformulation of ego psychoanalytic technique.

Those who read and study *The Ego and Analysis of Defense* carefully may find ironic many of the most frequent criticisms of Gray's work. Here is an analyst who had grand ambitions for psychoanalysis—namely, that it could be a treatment that advanced the analysand's psychological freedom to the fullest extent possible through a far-reaching analysis of resistances, keeping suggestive influence to a minimum—yet who has been accused of creating a methodology that is narrow and rigid. Here is an analyst who placed the highest importance on the analyst's analyzing, not using, his authority, yet who is viewed by some as an authoritarian, "one-person" practitioner. And here is an analyst who believed that, as Samuel Ritvo states in his excellent foreword to this volume, "when resistances are analyzed . . . intense affects can be more fully experienced and tolerated" (p. xvii)—yet whose technique has frequently been called intellectualized, obsessive, and superficial.

Whatever the future may hold for ego psychology among the psychologies of psychoanalysis, Paul Gray's work seems likely to last for as long as there is psychoanalysis. The questions that analysts ask, the clinical phenomena that they take up, the theories they develop and embrace, and the lexicon they employ to describe phenomena and theories will continue to change over time. But it is difficult to imagine a theory and a therapeutics of psychoanalysis that do not give a central place to the concept of defense or wrestle with the thorny problem of suggestive influence; and, con-

sequently, it is difficult to imagine a psychoanalysis that will fail to find a preeminent place for Gray's pioneering work. And while his terminology and conceptual framework may seem to some contemporary readers to belong to another time in the history of psychoanalysis, readers may also be struck by the fact that many of his major convictions dovetail with issues of much interest to analysts at the present time. For example, his emphasis on aggression overlaps with that of the contemporary Kleinians, his attention to here-and-now analytic process and the role of the analyst's authority has some resonance with the thinking of relational theorists, and his emphasis on promoting the analysand's observing ego functions clearly anticipated current interest in the analysand's mentalizing capacities.

Gray's critics (for, like any innovative thinker—especially one who called for major revisions of established practice—Gray has his critics) have raised challenging questions about this or that aspect of his work. But even his sharpest critics, those who broadly reject the way he thought about the psychoanalytic process, would agree that his writings represent a major contribution to the psychoanalytic literature on technique (Phillips 2006). Although Paul Gray died in 2002, his majestic book, *The Ego and Analysis of Defense*, is for all time.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

RECOLLECTING FREUD. By Isidor Sadger. Edited and introduced by Alan Dundes; translated by Johanna Micaela Jacobsen and Alan Dundes. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 138 pp.<sup>1</sup>

Isidor Sadger (1867-1942) first became acquainted with Freud when he attended the latter's lectures in the winter of 1895-1896. On this account, he proudly claimed to be Freud's oldest pupil. In 1906, he became a member of the legendary Psychological Wednesday Society (the Wednesday Circle), precursor of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Although Sadger's presentations before the Vienna Society were often criticized by Freud for their lack of subtlety and nuance, he made a modest name for himself on the basis of his pioneering work toward a psychoanalytic understanding of homosexuality and for his contributions to the conceptualization of narcissism, which were publicly acknowledged by Freud. Moreover, he authored a series of pathographies, and may have played some historical role as a teacher of young radicals among the postwar analytic generation in Vienna. It was at the sexological seminar in 1919—organized by Otto Fenichel, with the help of Wilhelm Reich and others—that Sadger gave lectures about sexual perversions, which he later elaborated into his main work,<sup>2</sup> a handbook of sexual perversions, which was meant to be a psychoanalytic counterpart to Krafft-Ebing's notorious *Psychopathia sexualis*.

It has been known for years that in the late 1920s, Sadger wrote about his recollections of Freud, and that they had even been printed in 1930.<sup>3</sup> Strangely, however, it proved impossible to locate

<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this review was originally published in *Luzifer-Amor, Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse*, 2005, 18(36):158-166.

<sup>2</sup> Sadger, I. (1921). *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen (Psychopathia sexualis) auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage*. Leipzig, Germany/Wien, Austria: Deuticke.

<sup>3</sup> Sadger, I. (1930). *Sigmund Freud. Persönliche Erinnerungen*. Wien, Austria/Leipzig & Berlin, Germany: Ernst Wenig Verlag.

a copy of this book in any European or American library. Thus, for scholars of the history of psychoanalysis, the 2005 publication of Sadger's *Recollecting Freud*, edited and co-translated by Alan Dundes, is something of a sensation.

Alan Dundes (1934-2005) was a professor of anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. A noted folklorist and prolific author whose work was deeply informed by psychoanalytic theory, he wrote: "As a psychoanalytic folklorist, my professional goals are to make sense of nonsense, find a rationale for the irrational, and seek to make the unconscious conscious" (*The New York Times*, April 2, 2005). While doing research for *The Shabbat Elevator and Other Sabbath Subterfuges*, his 2001 psychoanalytic study of orthodox Jewish character, Dundes became aware of Sadger's memoir of Freud and began searching for it (see p. xlii of *Recollecting Freud*). His search culminated in the discovery of a copy in the library of Keio University in Japan, which he proceeded to edit and co-translate. Following Dundes's lead, there has also been a republication of the German original.<sup>4</sup> In this review, we attempt to reconstruct the dramatic history of this book, discuss its strengths and weaknesses, and assess the scholarship and translation of the 2005 English edition.

In his introduction, Dundes attempts to account for the fact that Sadger's memoir could not be found for so many years. Following Paul Roazen, he emphasizes the machinations of Ernest Jones. He cites Roazen's statement, in reference to Sadger's memoir, that Jones "did his best to suppress anything from being published about Freud which could be construed in an unflattering light,"<sup>5</sup> as well as a similar account found in a biography of Jones.<sup>6</sup> Dundes correctly notes, however, that it is puzzling that Jones was

<sup>4</sup> Sadger, I. (2006). *Sigmund Freud. Persönliche Erinnerungen*, ed. Herausgegeben von Andrea Huppke & Michael Schröter. Tübingen, Germany: edition diskord. (This republication also includes letters exchanged among Jones, Anna Freud, Eitingon, and Federn, as well as Sadger's letter of resignation from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and a bibliography of his publications.)

<sup>5</sup> Roazen, P. (1975). *Freud and His Followers*. New York: Knopf, p. 351.

<sup>6</sup> Brome, V. (1983). *Ernest Jones: Freud's Alter Ego*. New York/London: Norton.

upset in late 1932 and early 1933 over a book that had been published three years earlier, in 1930, and is unable to explain this or why Freud never read it. The puzzle could have been solved if Dundes had read in their entirety the letters cited in Roazen and Brome, because they, along with letters by Anna Freud, Max Eitingon, and Paul Federn, and Sadger's 1933 letter of resignation from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, shed important light on the circumstances surrounding the publication and fate of Sadger's memoir.<sup>7</sup>

Ernst Jones became aware of the memoir's existence because he was sent copies of it by Hogarth Press; it appears that Hogarth had been sent the manuscript by an agent inquiring about its publication in Britain. Jones first writes about Sadger's book toward the end of a circular letter dated December 19, 1932, directed to the members of the International Psychoanalytical Association executive, in which his evaluation of the book and of Sadger is harsh:

We have known that for many years Sadger has been making stenographic notes in Professor's presence, with the obvious intention of writing his memories.<sup>8</sup> A book to this effect has been printed, and bound, since 1929 [sic], by the Ernst Wengraf Verlag, and a so-called translation<sup>9</sup> by Emma Hecht has been printed by Farrar and Rinehart of New York . . . .

The book is disappointing inasmuch as one hoped for some interesting and unrecorded anecdotes from earlier

<sup>7</sup> These letters are held in the Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society. Polly Rosedale was very helpful in providing copies of these letters, and they are quoted here with the permission of Ken Robinson, Honorary Archivist of the Society.

<sup>8</sup> In fact, Sadger published shorthand notes of two of Freud's lectures on fetishism in his magnum opus of 1921 (see footnote 2). See also: May, U. (2003). The early relationship between Sigmund Freud and Isidor Sadger: a dream (1897) and a letter (1902), *Psychoanal. & History*, 5:119-145.

<sup>9</sup> Although both Roazen and Brome cite this letter, neither mentions the striking fact that Sadger had made the effort to have his memoir translated into English. This translation was subsequently lost, however, necessitating a new translation by Alan Dundes and Johanna Micaela Jacobsen for its 2005 publication as *Recollecting Freud*.

days, but it is worthless in this respect too. On the other side it reveals Sadger's worst characteristics, his envy, pettiness and general disgruntledness. He makes wild statements about matters he knows nothing of . . . and gives an entirely distorted impression of Professor himself. The accounts of the Vienna meetings sound like a nightmare, with Professor behaving alternately as a hysterical woman or, as he is often called, an "arger Sadist." Instructions have been given that the book be not published until after the Professor's death "lest it rouse his ire." I imagine this chiefly applies to a chapter in which the astonishing thesis is maintained that Professor has always been disloyal to his Jewish origins, that he loved only Christians and vented all his hate on his Jewish colleagues. [Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society, CFA/F03/63]

Jones closes by noting that it will be up to Anna Freud's discretion to relate as much of this to her father as she deems appropriate. In response, Anna writes on December 31, 1932, that the book's existence was news to her and her father, and that "It is unpleasant news, but after all such things will occur" (Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society, CFA/F01/21). In his reply, Jones notes that, since writing to her, he has received a letter from Eitingon, who informed him that he knew all about Sadger's book and would be writing to him (i.e., Jones) shortly.

In a letter of February 4, 1933, Eitingon relates the following narrative to Jones:

Concerning Sadger and his book, Anna has already told her father about it (something I would not have done in her place), and with her consent she will also tell the council of the Vienna Society who will then decide how to deal with Sadger. I learned of the fact of the book's existence about a year ago because for a short time I had a man in analysis, a former patient of Sadger's, who had the book printed for him. On this occasion he gave me a copy of the book.<sup>10</sup> I found the fact of this book being kept a secret as

<sup>10</sup> This copy of Sadger's memoir from Eitingon's collection of books is now part of the Hebrew National Library in Jerusalem. We were first made aware of its

well as lengthy passages of it quite horrible, but I was bound by discretion until I heard from you about the book. I visited Sadger in Vienna, and in no uncertain terms told him my opinion and that the book's existence is now known and that there will be conflict between himself and his colleagues in Vienna. Now the Viennese may deal with him as they see fit. It is very regrettable that the Professor was not spared these stupid nuisances. I could not quite judge how he reacted to it, but it appeared to me as if he had not even really listened, but had shrugged off the fact as if it were an annoying fly. For myself I have to admit that it is quite astonishing what we have to expect from analysts, that is, from human beings. [Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society, CEC/F01/63B]

The next communication of interest is a circular letter written by Anna Freud, dated March 29, 1933. She begins by noting that it is difficult to write about anything else but the political situation, but on Eitingon's last visit to Vienna, she and Freud had "discussed the Sadger affair, and both my father and myself definitely thought the Vienna Society ought to be informed about it (meaning of course just the council)."<sup>11</sup> Initially, Eitingon was opposed to this action, but in the end agreed to it. Anna then asked Jones for permission to make use of his *Rundbriefe* of December 19, 1932.

On April 1, 1933, Jones writes that he is

. . . under no promise to keep the Sadger information private, so can give permission for any use to be made of it. At the same time I do not understand what is to be gained by any action with the Vienna Ausschuss. How would it improve matters to take action against Sadger and make him—if that is possible—more bitter still? The only good would, of course, be if he could be persuaded to stop publication of something dear to his heart. That would

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existence by Johannes Reichmayr (Vienna); Eran Rolnik (Tel Aviv) then confirmed it. This copy, along with the one located by Dundes in Japan, may be the only two surviving of the 1930 publication of Sadger's memoir.

<sup>11</sup> This letter is in the British Psychoanalytical Society Archives (CFC/F05/066).



not be easy, but possibly someone has sufficient influence with him. [University of Essex (Colchester), Special Collections of the Albert Sloman Library, Archives of Sigmund Freud Copyrights]<sup>12</sup>

This rather measured analysis of the situation by Jones gives way to exasperation in his October 10 letter to Paul Federn, where he made his infamous comment: "The only practical solution I can think of is to get Sadger put into a concentration camp until he consents to issue orders to the publishers to destroy the MS" (Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society, CFD/F03/03).<sup>13</sup> Obviously, matters came to a head: in November of 1933, Sadger resigned from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In his letter to Robert Jokl, Secretary of the Society, Sadger is both bitter and defiant about his situation.

Vienna, November 10, 1933

Dear Dr. Jokl!

To your letter, dated November 4, 1933, arrived November 8, 1933, I have to reply:

As my publisher wrote to me, and was able to prove, some months ago he not only exercised the utmost care in any negotiations regarding my recollections of Freud, but as we agreed, he required absolute silence of all the other participants too. So Dr. Jones can only have learned about my book, whether directly or indirectly, by a grave breach of trust. In any case, I have gathered from his behavior as well as that of other officials what may be expected from prominent psychoanalysts.

And your registered letter is another confirmation of this. At first you maintain, "that no one is willing or able to censor what I have written out of scholarly conviction or a biographer's conscientiousness." But two lines later you already doubt whether "my communications do cor-

<sup>12</sup> A transcript of this letter was kindly made available to the reviewers by Gerhard Wittenberger and Christfried Tögel.

<sup>13</sup> The fact that Sadger died in the Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1942 retrospectively imbues this comment with a rather ugly taint.

respond to the scholarly or biographic truth." This example alone would have deterred me, even if I had ever thought of it, from submitting my manuscript to the Society or its chosen representatives. Whatever I have said in my book, I am able and ready to answer for. And unless you tear single words out of context, you may even find that my book contains the highest appreciation of the Master. Anyway, the verdict about the potential merits or faults of my book will be up to quite another public than the one you propose. Thus, I absolutely decline the veiled arbitration procedure which you propose and [with] which Dr. Wittels had already tried to lure me. I am *not* willing to show my MS to anyone.

But your letter has made still another decision ripen in me. Since May 1932 I have refrained from attending the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and from any participation in its work. As I stated repeatedly to several members of the Society, I am fed up with the cliqueness which is dominant there. It was only out of regard for Prof. Freud that I did not explicitly resign from membership last year. After your letter, however, I consider any further restraint to be unnecessary. Thus I formally declare my resignation from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and I ask you, as the first Secretary, to communicate this to the Council as well as to the Plenary Meeting.

Collegially and respectfully yours,  
Dr. I. Sadger

[Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society,  
CSB/F01/02]

Taken together, these letters suggest an explanation for why researchers were unable to find a copy of Sadger's book on Freud. Although Roazen and Brome blamed Jones for the book's disappearance, the letters indicate that Jones did not act alone, and in fact only learned of the book's existence well after Eitingon had. Because Dundes did not read these letters, he assumed that the book had been published and *distributed*, and speculates in his introduction to *Recollecting Freud* that "pro-Freudians might have

taken Jones's request seriously and purchased as many copies of the original book as possible in order to destroy them" (p. xlv). This is inaccurate since, in fact, it was Sadger himself who held back the release of his memoir, printed in 1930, until after Freud's death, "lest it rouse his ire" (as Jones expressed it in his letter of December 19, 1932).

In actual fact, *Sadger's narrative presupposes that Freud had already died*. To cite just the one passage where this is most evident, Sadger writes in the past tense: "Als Freud von dieser Erde schied, hinterliess er [When Freud departed from this earth, he left behind]." But in *Recollecting Freud*, Dundes and Jacobsen have failed to grasp the significance of Sadger's use of the past tense and rendered the sentence in the present tense in English, writing "when Freud departs" (pp. 68-69). From a few passages that mention "recent" events, e.g., the appearance of a Swiss book by Loosli about the "bad" Jews,<sup>14</sup> we surmise that Sadger's manuscript was actually finished around 1927-1928. The first sections may even hark back to 1924-1925.

On the basis of the available evidence, both external and internal, we hypothesize that Sadger wrote his memoir because he calculated that, after Freud's death, there would be a great demand among both German and Anglo-American readers for firsthand accounts of the founder of psychoanalysis. So he wrote his recollections and had them translated into English, thereby emulating his nephew Fritz Wittels, who had published a Freud biography in both German and English.<sup>15</sup> But Freud did not die as early as Sadger (and also as Freud himself) expected, and when the political situation deteriorated in the late 1930s, Sadger's plan to release his book after Freud's death was swept aside by events beyond his control.

Finally, one of Jones's letters also provides a clue as to how one copy of Sadger's book ended up in Japan while another survived

<sup>14</sup> Loosli, C. A. (1927). *Die Schlimmen Juden*. Bern, Switzerland: Pestalozzi-Fellenberg-Haus.

<sup>15</sup> Wittels, F. (1924). *Sigmund Freud: His Personality, His Teaching, and His School*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.

in Jerusalem. Writing to Federn on November 29, 1933, Jones reports that he has seen a good deal of a Japanese scholar, Kiyoyasu Marui, during the latter's stay in London (Archives of the British Psychoanalytical Society, CFO/F03/03). Marui, a professor at the Tohoku University in Sendai, visited Vienna from September to November 1933, and was supervised by Federn during his stay.<sup>16</sup> This was the period when the Sadger affair came to a head. A student of Marui's, Heisaku Kosawa, also visited Vienna, from January 1932 till the summer of 1933, in order to receive psychoanalytic training.<sup>17</sup> One of them may have taken a copy of Sadger's book to Japan, but since there is no known connection between either Marui or Kosawa and Sadger, it is not possible to state this with certainty.

But what of the memoir itself? Did Sadger's many years of observing Freud result in a portrait, as Dundes maintains, that enhances our understanding of Freud? Sadger upheld that his book contained "nothing other than what I personally experienced, and the impressions that Freud's character and his writings made on me" (p. 5 of *Recollecting Freud*). Questions then present themselves: What is new in his account, and can it be trusted? Concerning the first of these, there are indeed some new pieces of information, such as Sadger's description of a celebration of the tenth anniversary of the publication of *Studies on Hysteria*,<sup>18</sup> when the members of the Wednesday Society presented Freud with a cake inscribed *Studien ueber Hysterie, 2. Auflage* (p. 87)—thus providing a symbolic second edition for a work that had to wait another four years before it was reprinted.

In contrast to Jones, who reports that Freud spoke for five hours about the Ratman at the Salzburg Congress in 1908, Sadger recalls

<sup>16</sup> The exact dates of Marui's visit were recorded in his travel diary, where he notes that he arrived in Vienna on September 18, 1933; met Federn on the 28<sup>th</sup>; and finished his supervision with him on October 25. Two days later, he departed for Italy, returning to Vienna on November 4. He left for Munich on November 10, and by the 12<sup>th</sup> was in London (according to a personal communication from Geoffrey H. Blowers).

<sup>17</sup> See Blowers, G. H. & Yang, S. H. (1997). Freud's *Deshi*: The Coming of Psychoanalysis to Japan. *J. History Behav. Sci.*, 33:115-126; see p. 120.

<sup>18</sup> Freud, S. & Breuer, J. (1895). *Studies on Hysteria*. *S. E.*, 2.

that the talk lasted only an hour and three quarters (p. 74). We also learn more about Max Kahane (a rather shadowy figure)—an early follower of Freud's and friend of Sadger's. In a well-known episode in 1908, Freud had the Vienna Society "dissolved in order that it could then be reconstituted anew" (p. 43), and, according to Sadger, the motive for this was to ease Kahane out of the Society.

A particularly interesting section of the memoir is the account in the first chapter of Freud's university lectures of 1895-1896, where Sadger describes himself as having been one of only three students in attendance. And the chapter in which he harshly criticizes Freud for having adopted a positive attitude toward lay analysis demonstrates what is not generally known today, namely, that lay analysis became a topical issue only after the First World War. Earlier, it had been taken for granted that the practice of psychoanalysis was to be restricted to doctors. Sadger traces Freud's alleged change of attitude to his "hatred against doctors, especially the Viennese," whom from bitter experience he had come to regard as "malevolent opponents," while laymen, according to Sadger, "owing to their deficient knowledge would be afraid to contradict him" (p. 106).

The primary aim of the memoir, however, is to present a portrait of Freud as Sadger experienced him. Most compelling in this respect is Sadger's description of Freud as a speaker whose "deepest insights were stated almost conversationally" (p. 14). While Sadger clearly regards Freud as a genius, even calling him an "angel" in his final chapter, "From the Last Years of Freud's Life," his account is permeated by a profound, even visceral, ambivalence toward him. The result is a confusing portrayal of Freud's character. At times, Sadger describes him in grandiose, idealized language, and yet in the next sentence can portray his behavior in deeply unflattering terms. We may assume that it is these latter passages, alluded to by Jones in his letter of December 19, 1932, that were so appalling and infuriating to Freud's closest colleagues.

For example, there are several characterizations of Freud in Sadger's chapter, "Contributions to the Study of Freud's Character," that would account for their angry response to the memoir. In one, referring to Freud's breaks with colleagues (e.g., Breuer,

Fliess, Adler), Sadger writes: "As is the case with severely ill mental patients, he did not allow his ego to establish any permanent or long-lasting relationships, unless such a relationship was with people who lived far away and who willingly acquiesced to everything" (p. 34).

On several occasions, Sadger openly describes Freud as a sadist in his relationships with others. Characteristically, one such passage begins with Sadger's praising Freud before rendering a harsh judgment:

And as for negative virtues, he had no traces of moral hypocrisy, he never played judge which in matters of sexuality and decency is not always an easy thing. Perhaps one will admire his objectivity even more when one finds out that Freud was at heart an awful sadist who had to force himself to be scientifically dispassionate . . . . He had the ability to destroy someone with one sentence, friend as well as foe. [p. 31]

In another passage, Sadger portrays Freud as callous in his treatment of those around him: "He had an appetite for new people, always needing other individuals who, when he was finished with them, he would, of course, get rid of with the same ease with which he had acquired them" (pp. 33-34).

Sadger also describes Freud as frequently bestowing his ideas on select followers, but this intellectual generosity is depicted as costly for its recipients:

Freud repeatedly presented significant thoughts to selected students. In contrast to that, he was not pleased if one of them insisted that he wanted to discover something on his own. Then he would become grumpy, yes, even angry . . . . Even those who worked only with Freud's ideas . . . were looked askance at if they so much as once changed or added one little brick to the edifice. [pp. 39-40]

In "Freud as Leader and Organizer," Sadger renders a damning assessment of Freud when he uses the metaphor of a toxic poi-

son to explain, in his view, Freud's insatiable need for praise from his followers:

[Freud's] strong narcissism . . . required loudly articulated admiration and a perpetual need for favorite students. Now frankincense, as is well known, is the most deadly poison . . . . It was not enough for him for praise to be given; it rather had to be constant and loudly stated. [pp. 55-56]

It is difficult to reconcile Sadger's extravagant idealization of Freud's genius with his harsh, unflattering portrayal of him as a man and leader. Is the rhetorical style of his memoir unique to it or can it be found in his other writings as well? One of us has noted that exaggeration is one of the outstanding features of Sadger's writing style.<sup>19</sup>

A leitmotif in the memoir is Sadger's complaint that Freud ungratefully dropped his old adherents in favor of new and more exciting followers, often from abroad. It is in this context that he makes his most cutting criticism of Freud for trying to "christianize" psychoanalysis: "As amiable, charming, and appreciative as the Professor was towards the most insignificant Christian, he could be surly towards his able Jewish colleagues" (p. 97). Sadger goes on to assert that Freud "would have liked best to have been a German and was only condemned to go back to despised Judaism very much against his will" (p. 99). These comments reverberate with the frustration and disappointment of Freud's Jewish Viennese colleagues over his preference for newcomers from abroad, led by the Christian Jung, whom Freud preferred over themselves.

Dundes poses the question of how much credence should legitimately be placed in Sadger's recollections of Freud, but then sidesteps his own query by arguing that, because of Sadger's long participation in the psychoanalytic movement, his take on Freud is ultimately valuable. But Dundes also notes that Sadger's contribu-

<sup>19</sup> See May, U. (2003). The early relationship between Sigmund Freud and Isidor Sadger: a dream (1897) and a letter (1902). *Psychoanal. & History*, 5:119-145.

tions, their content and style, were criticized by Freud and others, and suggests that Sadger's memoir was an act of revenge for this treatment. If this is the case, then the reliability of Sadger's recollections, his interpretations of the events he reports, and his portrayal of Freud must be treated with skepticism and caution. In this light, it is regrettable that, in his introduction, Dundes provides such a fragmented treatment of Sadger's background and psychoanalytic writings. He does not draw on relevant research in a meaningful way to describe Sadger's relationship with Freud and his own psychoanalytic publications.<sup>20</sup>

Judged as a scholarly achievement, the English edition of Sadger's memoir is somewhat disappointing. A cursory introduction and a flawed translation contribute to our sense that there has been an opportunity lost to further reconstruct the history of psychoanalysis. As noted earlier, Dundes did not adequately research the history of the memoir; thus, he was unable to account for its disappearance and thought it "odd" that Freud never read it since it was "published" in 1930 (p. xix). His narrative of Sadger's life and work consists of a simple, albeit extensive, collection of loosely connected references and excerpts. His superficial knowledge of the history of psychoanalysis is reflected in his statement that "Sadger was one of the few early psychoanalysts who was not himself analyzed" (p. xxv), indicating his lack of awareness that Sadger belonged to an analytic generation for whom a personal analysis was not at all common.

Furthermore, to claim that Sadger wrote "what well may be the first book-length evaluative review of Freud's life and work" (p. xxxiv) does an injustice to Fritz Wittels, the author of the first such attempt (see footnote 15). And while Dundes repeatedly asserts that Sadger's "unusual contribution to our knowledge of Freud" (p. xxxi) rests on his long participation in the psychoanalytic move-

<sup>20</sup> Dundes does, however, cite some of this research, such as May's 2003 article (see preceding footnote) and another contribution by the same author: May [-Tolzman], U. (1991). Zu den Anfaengen des Narzissmus: Ellis-Naecke-Sadger-Freud. *Luzifer-Amor. Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Psychoanalyse*, 4(8)50:88.



ment, he fails to clarify the elements that constitute this contribution.

The book's editorial apparatus is quite wanting. A few facts have been added to the text in brackets, but this has not been done in a consistent or helpful way. Some of the information is wrong. For example, the "Party members" who gathered around Alfred Adler were by no means all "Communists" (p. 57). Furthermore, the translation presents too many errors to let them pass unrecorded. The change from the past tense to the present in a crucial sentence on p. 55 has already been noted, and there are other errors. While the German word *Abfall* can mean *garbage*, an *Abfallbewegung* is not a "garbage movement" (p. 130), but a *dissident movement*; *Menschen mosaischen Glaubens* are *people of Mosaic (i.e., Jewish) creed* and not people "possessing a mosaic of beliefs" (p. 92); rendering *seelische Energie* by "spiritual" instead of *psychic energy* (p. 72) betrays ignorance of psychoanalytic technical language. Anyone who wants to know what Sadger actually wrote (not to mention the special characteristics of his prose) will have to consult the German republication (see footnote 4).

In summary, Professor Dundes is to be strongly commended for locating Sadger's memoir and arranging for its publication. But his achievement is marred by the thinness of his research and his failure to distinguish what is valuable in Sadger's recollections for scholars of Freud and the history of psychoanalysis—Sadger's claims about which must be treated with caution. Sadger's interpretation of Freud's character is so contradictory that some readers may suspect that it reveals more about Sadger than it does about Freud. Nonetheless, Sadger's memoir is valuable above all for its description of how Freud interacted with his followers. For example, there is plenty of evidence to support Sadger's statement that Freud monitored the work of his pupils and gave them ideas of his own to be elaborated upon by them (pp. 37-39)—although Sadger omits the fact that he himself profited from this practice.

The ultimate place of Sadger's recollections among the memoirs that document the early history of psychoanalysis remains to be seen. What can be said with confidence, however, is that its recov-

ery presents an opportunity for investigation into the history of psychoanalysis.

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(BERLIN, GERMANY), AND ULRIKE MAY (BERLIN, GERMANY)**

<sup>21</sup> *Editor's Note:* In conjunction with the foregoing book review, readers may wish to refer to the article coauthored by Michael Schröter and Christfried Tögel in this issue of the *Quarterly*, "The Leipzig Episode in Freud's Life (1859): A New Narrative on the Basis of Recently Discovered Documents" (pp. 193-215).

PRACTICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR THERAPISTS AND PATIENTS. By Owen Renik. New York: Other Press, 2006. 179 pp.

The arrival of this evocatively titled book should excite the interest of all psychoanalysts who view psychoanalysis as an alive and evolving clinical discipline that requires continuous reappraisal of both technique and theory. Owen Renik, who has been Editor of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, as well as Chair of the Program Committee of the American Psychoanalytic Association, clearly has both stature and standing in the psychoanalytic world.

Furthermore, as the author of many frequently read papers that are part of the curriculum of most psychoanalytic institutes, Renik is indeed a psychoanalytic household name. The title of this relatively brief, beautifully written text in itself conveys what the reader can expect to encounter in this direct and personal account of how psychoanalysis can, in his opinion, save itself from continuing on its current pathway toward becoming increasingly obscure and ultimately obsolete. The book begins with this challenging sentence: "By now, the term *practical psychoanalysis* has become an oxymoron" (p. 1). Refusing to mince words, the author continues in his direct, muscular fashion: "The way psychoanalytic treatment is generally conducted, it is extremely *impractical*: it doesn't serve the needs of the vast majority of potential patients" (p. 1).

As a result of this directness, the reader quickly becomes aware of having entered into the thinking of an analyst who is a severe if not harsh critic of traditional psychoanalysis. Further reading reveals Renik as devoted to saving analysis from traditions that he considers antiquated and crippling to its effective (read

*practical*) practice. A still closer reading reveals how this revisionist critic, capable of completely shattering previous images of how an analyst should conduct an analysis, manages to remain dedicated to a psychology that is deeply and truly psychoanalytic in nature.

In a series of groundbreaking papers in the 1990s, Renik challenged traditional ideas about the psychoanalyst's mode of participation in the treatment process.<sup>1</sup> He questioned the role of neutrality, indicating that it could be both perilous and detrimental to a successful analysis. He attempted to eliminate the analyst's use of his or her authority in making insistent interpretations, substituting instead the leveling idea of the analyst's "irreducible subjectivity." And, going beyond this, he introduced the idea that the analyst must "play his cards up"—becoming in the process the major advocate for self-disclosure regarding the analyst's actual experience of the patient in the analytic situation. His contributions included a strong defense of the inevitability of enactments, which he felt were not the result of technical lapses, because he believed that both patient and analyst were always enacting unconscious elements in any and all interactions.

In the aggregate, these papers constituted a call not only for a new approach to psychoanalytic technique, but also for a whole new definition of what constituted a psychoanalytic stance. Renik was in the process of demystifying the persona of the analyst with the emergence of a responsive, relatively transparent, reactive, and interactive analyst replacing the often silent, neutral one who depended upon turning questions back to the patient in order to explore the inner fantasies behind any and all direct questions.

While the contents of his formal papers were not universally applauded, they were often the basis for discussion between those traditional analysts who felt that the techniques associated with classical analysis were an immutable part of any treatment that could be called analysis, and those with a more relational bent who

<sup>1</sup> See the following: (1) Renik, O. (1993). Analytic interaction: conceptualizing technique in light of the analyst's irreducible subjectivity. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 62: 553-571; (2) Renik, O. (1996). The perils of neutrality. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 65:495-517; and (3) Renik, O. (1999). Playing one's cards face up in analysis: an approach to the problem of self-disclosure. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 68:521-540.

felt constrained and inauthentic when they attempted to comply with technical demands. By stepping out of a more formal, academic stance and adopting a direct, telling-it-like-it-is approach to how he sees what is wrong with traditional analysis, Renik is able to write about it in a fashion that is accessible to both analysts/therapists and patients.

While some of the content of certain of his previously published papers is contained in this book, this content appears here in a form that is distinctly different and new. The past questioning and challenging of technical shibboleths has been extended to a very penetrating examination of the whole psychoanalytic endeavor from the perspective of its helpfulness to patients. Here Renik is able to write about analysis in a fashion that is accessible to both therapists and patients. What he writes and how he writes it will undoubtedly offend some more classical analysts, while delighting those who favor an interactive analytic persona as the basis for functioning in an analytic relationship.

His are fighting words and challenging concepts. Furthermore, Renik backs his assertions with moving, honest accounts of analytic treatments that illustrate his major assertions. While these case studies are sometimes drawn from analyses conducted on the couch at a four-times-per-week frequency, they also include patients seen in twice-weekly, *vis-à-vis* therapy, as well as one case consisting of a single session. Renik asserts, quite convincingly, that all these cases depend upon psychoanalytic concepts, even when psychoanalytic technique has been placed on the back burner. He manages in his case examples to remain always practical in the very sense in which he defines what is practical psychoanalysis.

The crux of Renik's argument with traditional analysis is his belief that, by insisting on the primary importance of the patient's inner fantasy life and privileging it over the patient's need to be in touch with reality, traditional analysts have led patients into lengthy treatments that are less than helpful in all instances—and even harmful for some patients in regard to their ability to reduce symptoms and live a better, more productive life. In what amounts to a tour de force, he turns traditional analysis on its head, insisting that most if not all of what has been viewed as basic if not sacred

assumptions about the bedrock of analysis is wrongheaded and incapable of forming the basis of a scientifically based system of treatment. In his view, analysis lost its way when it shifted its emphasis away from symptom relief “and became increasingly preoccupied with a special, specifically psychoanalytic goal: the achievement of ‘insight’ for its own sake” (p. 2).

Renik believes that in order to be effective, an analyst needs to continually monitor the degree of symptom reduction and increased productivity and pleasure in the patient’s life. In two sentences, he challenges what has become received knowledge for the traditional analyst when he states:

Therefore, unless insights are validated by correlation with symptom relief (an outcome criterion that is not theory-driven), a closed system is set up in which successful clinical analysis consists of analyst and patient discovering what the analyst assumed a priori to exist. Impractical psychoanalysis is also unscientific psychoanalysis. [p. 2]

Renik’s version of analysis, his “practical psychoanalysis,” is defined in the course of twenty relatively brief chapters. Each chapter includes a clinical narrative demonstrating a particular aspect of his revisionist image of analysis. These stories of treatments that he has conducted are unusually real and moving. They move the reader along with hardly any use of jargon. In themselves, they are worth the price of admission; they should be valuable in helping patients who read the book understand why they should seek out an analyst who works much as Renik does. The patient is definitely empowered in analysis conducted with his approach. He encourages all patients to identify both the nature of their symptoms and the help they are seeking. He believes that the analyst’s activity, manifest in asking questions and in taking an active role in shaping an understanding of “Which of the patient’s assumptions, conclusions, and expectations need to be reviewed and revised so as to relieve the patient’s distress?” (p. 15), is crucial. The analyst is not only allowed to use his or her full range of experi-

ence in communicating with the patient regarding his or her perspective on the patient's reality; the analyst is also encouraged to contrast his or her reality testing with that of the patient. Taking such a position allows the analyst to limit any claim of expertise to his or her own experience in life, as well as his or her experience of the patient during the time of the treatment relationship.

By writing this book without any attempt to be academic (there are no references to anyone else's work, no connections or comparisons made with others who have made contributions in the same or other directions), Renik has achieved a freedom of expression that has carried his revisionist image of how an analyst should interact with a patient far beyond his earlier forays into questioning one or another aspect of classical analytic technique. His new definition of an analyst is indeed antithetical to the one that would characterize a classical profile of an analyst. For Renik, the analyst who strives to remain anonymous, avoids reality issues in favor of eliciting and analyzing fantasies, and, most of all, who seeks to guard against unwanted feelings about the patient, is embarking upon a fruitless mission.

His explication of what is wrong with analysis will undoubtedly annoy if not infuriate many analysts who find the technique and theory of contemporary conflict theory entirely satisfactory. His recommendations for a participatory analyst who "plays with his cards up," shares his or her reality testing with the patient, and has no problem with enactments or self-disclosure will undoubtedly be seen as heretical by those who define analysis according to a definitive set of techniques. Ironically, they may overlook how thoroughly grounded in analytic theory Renik's suggestions for a "new" psychoanalytic persona actually are; he has deep respect for the role of the unconscious in the patient's life and in the transference-countertransference responses of both patient and analyst. It is this very strong attachment to basic analytic theoretical principles that separates him from those analysts who feel that more change, beyond simply a flexible approach to technique, is required if analysis is to be effective with patients who seek therapeutic help.

In attempting to achieve a new approach to analytic technique without advocating any fundamental alteration in theory, Renik may have left out a consideration of several important shifts in analytic theory that have informed the work of analysts with patients encompassed by the widening scope of clinical analysis. The attention that has increasingly been paid to narcissistically vulnerable patients in the wake of Kohut's work and self psychology is not addressed in this book, despite its obvious relevance to many of Renik's ideas. This may result from his decision not to compare his thinking with that of other contributors to the analytic literature.

At times, he appears to possibly be too dedicated to therapeutic effectiveness to allow for the effective treatment of those patients who require very long periods of analysis without much evidence of therapeutic gain. While he is sensitive to the therapeutic relationship, he nevertheless appears to see its therapeutic action as residing in a series of emotionally corrective experiences, rather than in the new relationship itself. This may appear to be a small and insignificant difference, but it may loom large in the treatment of narcissistically damaged individuals, who represent an increasing proportion of patients who enter analysis solely for the motivation of getting treatment rather than as an aspect of their professional training. Renik's desire for an efficient, practical analysis may serve as a corrective for overly lengthy analyses for some patients, but it would be unfortunate if potential and actual patients who read this book—or their therapists—became convinced that there was something wrong with an analysis simply because it took too long. And it would also be unfortunate if Renik's disapproval of long analyses when the error is on the side of the analyst's being too patient in the absence of results were to be taken as a criticism of *all* long analytic treatments.

He does acknowledge that many patients may require analyses that take many years, including prolonged periods in which change and progress are difficult or impossible to assess. Furthermore, part of what any patient may gain from an analysis is intellectual insight into his or her analyst's theoretical perspective as the basis for constructing an effective worldview. It would be unfair to say



that Renik ignores the very needs and effects in the analysis that he is prescribing for the profession, but these are not specifically addressed, despite their importance for many post-Kohutian analysts.

The innovative aspects of Renik's vision, with the newfound freedom that it bestows upon the analyst in the realm of his or her emotional participation in the treatment, may well have begun to penetrate the historical psychoanalytic dedication to so-called technical excellence. It will take time to determine whether Renik's sweeping vision of analysis will move the field beyond the confines of a technically defined treatment that may well be destined for extinction, or at least relegated to a very minor place in the psychotherapy marketplace. For those who strive to save psychoanalysis from such a fate, *Practical Psychoanalysis for Therapists and Patients* is just what the doctor ordered. Hopefully, this book will attract a wide readership. Renik's arguments for a new approach to psychoanalysis are so clear and forceful that they will, at the very least, contribute to meaningful thought and debate about how to guarantee that analysis adapts to the evolving needs of patients, and, in so doing, can continue to contribute to the understanding of emotional suffering and its effective treatment.

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CRAFT AND SPIRIT: A GUIDE TO THE EXPLORATORY PSYCHOTHERAPIES. By Joseph D. Lichtenberg. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 2005. 195 pp.

Twenty-five years ago, Joseph Lichtenberg published *The Talking Cure: A Descriptive Guide to Psychoanalysis* as an introduction to the field for both potential patients and clinicians. He now offers a new book, updated to reflect his view of crucial changes in the population of patients presenting for psychotherapy and consequent changes in therapy itself.

In *Craft and Spirit*, Lichtenberg explains that, in contrast to the past, when most patients were struggling with neurotic, unconscious conflicts that led to symptoms and character problems, he

sees today's patients as increasingly likely to be people with histories of insecure attachment who have serious concerns about safety and the risk of being retraumatized. The goal of treatment, therefore, is no longer the achievement of insight into warded-off conflicts between childhood wishes and fears, aimed at helping the patient recognize current conflicts, tolerate anxiety, and develop more realistic and satisfying compromise formations; instead, the new goal is to foster the patient's ability to develop secure attachments, with insight occupying a less important role. Analysis and therapy involve a joint examination by patient and therapist of how each responds to the other's attempts to forge, avoid, or sabotage a safe relationship. Given that the therapeutic relationship parallels the earliest, preverbal stages of parent–infant connection, the treatment becomes the careful study of affect states, altered cognition, and enactments.

Lichtenberg feels that there is no longer a clear distinction between psychoanalysis and exploratory psychotherapy. And today, he writes, both therapists and patients expect to be fully and emotionally involved in the treatment, in contrast to what was typical in the past. The relationship between therapist and patient resembles and repeats the relationship between parent and infant or young child, and therefore research studies that address unspoken and spoken communication on both sides contribute to our understanding of the therapeutic process.

As an introductory textbook, *Craft and Spirit* proceeds with basic advice on the structuring of the treatment setting, reworking familiar psychoanalytic concepts into a relational point of view. Lichtenberg is both a lively teacher and a sensitive therapist. His examples simply and elegantly illustrate his points; his work with patients shows great warmth, openness to examine himself, and curiosity. At times, this book is also a polemic for his point of view, as there are innumerable contrasting examples to the classical analyst of folklore—that is, to the cold, detached, pseudoscientific observer who feels nothing and offers the needy and suffering patient intellectual formulations with indifference or contempt. This

caricature may surprise the reader who is a proponent of today's ego psychology, for he or she is familiar with how much attention is given to the analyst's inner state, the patient's nonverbal communications, and the inevitability of enactments in the current clinical teaching and published literature that follow the tenets of ego psychology and conflict-model psychoanalysis. The sectarian tone of the book may enhance the clarity of the message, however; indeed, Lichtenberg has offered a coherent presentation of a relationist perspective of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy.

The chapter of *Craft and Spirit* entitled "A Facilitating Environment" gives the basic prescription for treatment: time, money, and rapport. Lichtenberg emphasizes that the therapist must communicate a sense of safety to the patient. In contrast to earlier practices, he favors frequent sessions for sicker patients, who need the safety of a secure relationship. He welcomes any adjunctive treatments—medication, yoga, meditation, support groups—that will help the patient explore frightening experiences.

He writes elegantly about empathy and playfulness:

Play's most salient feature is the affect of playfulness. Playfulness offers a sense of safety to toy with ideas, to puzzle over ambiguities and paradoxes. Playfulness, humor, irony, and satire create a spirit that both breaks down barriers people put up about their mind-states and allows for a nonthreatening entry into that state. Not surprisingly, dream interpretation, spontaneity of association, and many moments of successful empathic perception flourish when a spirit of play is present. [pp. 23-24]

It is this spirit of playfulness that informs Lichtenberg's function as guide to the psychoanalytic student in becoming increasingly sensitive to the fragility of the patient's attempts to feel connected.

Lichtenberg then recasts familiar psychoanalytic concepts in relational, here-and-now terms. Interpretation becomes *the message containing the message* and *filling the narrative envelope*. He elaborates as follows.

Shifting from a skeptical stance of a detective listening for what is hidden, therapists attending to what is in or is close to awareness affirm for patients the value of their spontaneous associations, of their version of their story of their life. [p. 51]

The author illustrates how a patient's posture, facial expression, and dress may convey his or her true feelings. Similarly, the patient's mode of telling his or her story reflects the earliest history of attachment to caregivers. Transference, repetition compulsion, screen memory, and unconscious fantasy become *the wearing of attributions* in Lichtenberg's parlance. The discovery of *model scenes*—memories, dreams, and enactments—is important because they reveal hidden feelings. Unknowing participation of the therapist in enactment becomes a valuable source of information about both the patient and the treatment itself.

Patient and therapist should jointly explore the patient's view of the therapist. The patient must risk rejection or humiliation in revealing his or her ideas about the therapist; similarly, the therapist must be willing to try on for size the patient's view, rather than explaining it away.

To this reader, much of this seems a little like old wine in new bottles—a retelling in different language of familiar concepts of unconscious fantasy, empathy, and the importance of self-awareness in the analyst. Once again, Lichtenberg criticizes the classical view that defenses need to be interpreted to uncover troubling memories, thoughts, and motives, offering instead what he presents as the new idea that “the aversive motives (resistance, reluctance, and defensiveness) are a communicative expression to be explored like any other message” (p. 115).

Throughout the book, the author refers to observations and extrapolations from infant research and theories of motivation about attachment. His emphasis is on creating a safe environment for traumatized and more disturbed patients, and he therefore counsels the therapist to be active, self-revealing, and protective of the frightened patient. These patients have often experienced early

failures in attachment, and their memories of being attached tend to be preverbal—that is, procedural. Their communications are similarly preverbal, comprising posture, affect states, and behavior. Lichtenberg strives to teach his patients to recognize and ultimately to find words for their experiences.

I have found that many beginning analysts struggle with imaginary prohibitions and restrictions in their clinical work. They fear treading on the patient's transference or interfering with associations, and consequently risk becoming frozen in intellectualized formulations. Lichtenberg illustrates how an experienced analyst works—how the analyst uses his or her own observations, fantasies, feelings, and associations to understand and build a bridge with the patient. The spirit of playfulness and curiosity are vital to maintaining empathy, creativity, and attunement with the mind of another person, and particularly with the mind of a regressed, frightened, and angry patient.

This aspect of *Craft and Spirit* is enough to recommend it to any beginning analyst or curious person who is contemplating treatment. I endorse it along with introductory classics by Greenson<sup>1</sup> and Brenner.<sup>2</sup> If the timid and overly cautious analyst is helped by this book to learn to take risks, to become involved and alive, and to accept mistakes, then it has done a great service. The best teaching is experiential, and this book demonstrates both what it is like to be a patient and what it is like to be an analyst. If *Craft and Spirit* is also intended to persuade the traditionally trained analyst of the advantages of a newer school of thought, this reviewer applauds Lichtenberg's skill and liveliness in describing it (although I am not convinced that this approach opens a whole new world of psychoanalytic thinking).

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<sup>1</sup> Greenson, R. R. (1967). *The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 1*. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

<sup>2</sup> Brenner, C. (1973). *An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis (Second Edition)*. New York: Int. Univ. Press.

HOW ANALYSTS THINK AND WHY THEY THINK THE WAY THEY DO: REFLECTIONS ON THREE PSYCHOANALYTIC HOURS. Edited by Arden Aibel Rothstein and Samuel Abrams. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, 2005. 155 pp.

This slim volume is the transcript of a panel commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the New York University Psychoanalytic Institute. Its stated theme was the way in which theoretical perspectives inform clinical work. The editors "reconvened" the panel in written form to allow for additional cycles of dialogue, thereby hoping to provide "the panel one always wishes to attend: one where there is plenty of time for discussion and panelists thoughtfully address each others' ideas and queries" (p. 139).

Is this book the satisfying panel we have always wanted? By my reading, the editors gave us both more and less than they intended. The title they chose portends the discussion: it is overly wordy and promises more than it delivers. A subtitle might have been "The good and the bad about how analysts (and editors who are analysts) think."

The editors wanted to avoid a typical frustration in panel discussions, where panelists talk past one another while the audience senses a potentially enlightening debate that never comes to pass. Here panelists engage each other at length through commentary and direct questioning. The questions and answers are less than fully satisfying, however, because the answers, provided in the middle section of the book in narrative form, are separated from the questions, which are reproduced in an appendix. The interested reader has to work to piece together the two sections. In this and other important ways, the editors did not provide a format to allow for a systematic comparison of views. The panelists try to pin each other down in their questions, but these efforts yield haphazard results. In the end, I had the usual panel experience: all the delights, seductions, and frustrations of one protracted schmooze.

I found this book worth studying in spite of the rambling format. Three hours are presented from a negative transference phase

of the analysis of a seriously impaired young man, Mr. A—hours that the presenter considers a turning point. There is much to be learned from the complex discussion that ensues. To my mind, it distills down to a debate between a discussant who describes himself as a British object relations theorist, M. Nasir Ilahi, and the other four participants, who do not specify their theoretical stances. For want of a better understanding, I will call them *eclectic*, since they make reference to an amalgam of concepts during the course of the discussion. Claudia Lament, Kathleen Lyon, Shelley Orgel, and Peter Neubauer are described by the editors as “trained in a so-called traditional psychoanalytic model” (p. xv).

Over the course of three rounds of this discussion, Ilahi contends that “the other panelists see Mr. A as essentially a psychologically whole person, whereas I see him mostly as deeply split” (p. 116). He asks if they are American ego psychologists. In his view, their description of the patient’s separation-individuation issues (in the Mahlerian sense) fails to pick up on the primitive fantasies of annihilation, splitting, and evacuation that characterize disturbance at the earliest developmental levels. The approach of the presenting analyst, Lament, did not allow her to fully understand or contain the patient’s pathology, according to Ilahi.

In Ilahi’s view, analytic interventions fall short of a therapeutic effect when they assume an alliance with an ego organization in the patient that is not present. The patient’s heavy reliance on splitting makes him largely unavailable as a conscious collaborator in the analysis. Interventions should aim to address emotions being unconsciously lived out in the transference via projection and splitting. Ilahi cites some of the presenting analyst’s interventions as “not achieving anything” (p. 51) because of these problems. For example, one intervention was “Do you think your silence (for the entire hour yesterday and most of the day before) has to do with something you are uncomfortable in experiencing with me?” (p. 13). Nothing is achieved by a direct question such as this, according to Ilahi, because the unconscious living out is

. . . beyond words and beyond the patient’s individual associations . . . . This is a type of transference communication



that an analyst can only decipher through the careful monitoring . . . of the affects being aroused in him or her by the patient, evaluating these in the context of the rest of the patient's material. [p. 47]

The other four participants on this panel were in agreement with Ilahi that Mr. A had very serious problems, but most had a more sanguine view of the helpfulness of the presenting analyst's interventions and of this patient's progress in treatment. Several agreed with Lament that the three hours, occurring after an uncomfortable period of silence, had represented a turning point in the analysis. Some thought that Lament's willingness to tolerate and bear witness to the patient's silent struggles had a therapeutic effect. Emerging from silence, the patient expressed a feeling that "You can't help me . . . . No one can help me" (p. 20). Those who saw evidence for a turning point may have been reacting to the patient's increased awareness of the analyst's separate existence. Mr. A also showed more signs of an observing ego: "I spewed out all this randomness . . . this noise, so that you could put some of this together for me . . . . I see myself more clearly . . . . It's upsetting to see yourself, you can't hide" (p. 21).

Ilahi did not agree that this was a turning point. During this same hour, the patient had reported a succession of "terrible dreams . . . . I was being hunted by Nazis" (p. 19). This was continued evidence, in Ilahi's view, of how the patient split off and projected negative emotions, resulting in feelings of persecution. Mr. A said his girlfriend had attacked him in her sleep "with words of cruelty . . . going for the jugular" (p. 13). Ilahi used this and other material to illustrate that Mr. A felt attacked by the analyst's silence ("sleep").

In spite of the analyst's good intentions and her kindness, her silence was not experienced by [the patient] . . . as something benign, like Poland's concept of "engaged non-intrusiveness," but as a dreadful attack . . . . The patient's internal situation is far more complicated and persecutory [than the other discussants describe it to be] . . . .

While it is true that unconsciously there is fusion between self and object, this is not a benign state and it is constantly under threat . . . . Neither imprecise interpretations nor remaining silent over protracted periods will help, since, much to our dismay, these are not experienced as benign. [pp. 90-91]

This interesting disagreement about a possible turning point is frustrating for the reader to follow because the two sides do not fully respond to each others' arguments. Those who describe Mr. A's greater self- and object awareness do not elicit a response from Ilahi (I wish the editors had pressed him on this), while Ilahi's objections to the benign view of silence are only partially addressed. Orgel contends that the patient's increased awareness in the final hour meant that he "interprets the analyst's silence here as much more than 'going for the jugular'" (p. 114).

This book's prolonged discussion contains valid contributions from both sides. Ilahi articulates limitations in the eclectic approach. He characterizes the others as kind and elegant clinicians, yet criticizes them for being superficial in their understanding of primitive mental states and for being inconsistent. In his view, they are inconsistent in their tracking of the unconscious and of the transference, and they lose sight of the predominant developmental level on which the patient operates. I, too, find that they use concepts too loosely, leaving them guilty of the inconsistencies Ilahi points out.

For example, they agree with Ilahi that Mr. A suffers at the level of annihilation anxiety, yet they go on to speak of oedipal conflicts. They also agree that the patient does not experience separate objects, yet one discussant describes the patient as using the analyst as a selfobject, while another says the analyst serves as a transitional object, praising her ability to "act as witness" to the patient in his process of self-exploration (p. 38). Ilahi points out that to be able to use the analyst in these ways would presuppose a developmentally more integrated psychic state, inconsistent with desperate reliance on splitting to manage unbearable affect (pp. 89-91).

The others respond to Ilahi with criticisms of their own. Orgel sees him as theory-bound:

Dr. Lament, Dr. Lyon, and I think our theories are rather less visible . . . . But I must wonder about the frequent phenomenon that those . . . from other schools seem so bound to their theories, while we believe we are so much more open to the clinical facts. [p. 79]

The eclectic analysts criticize Ilahi's approach for insufficient appreciation of layering in clinical material. Lyon defends her position, saying that "my contributions are influenced by attention to preoedipal as well as oedipal constellations" (p. 106). When she advocates talking to the patient through his adolescent experience, this should not be interpreted as bypassing the anxieties of early development—she is simply approaching it through his "sexualization of earlier sadomasochistic and exhibitionistic conflicts" (p. 106).

In a similar vein, Orgel objects when Ilahi faults him for addressing the patient

. . . in relation to the older, verbal child and not the specific sense of annihilation anxiety associated with earliest development . . . . He writes that I fail to make clear differentiations about the level at which . . . [Mr. A] functions . . . . I believe . . . that Mr. A is an adult, an adolescent, and a child, including a preverbal child, in varying degrees and at different times. [p. 112]

Picking up on Ilahi's comment that it is the healthy part of Mr. A that brings him to analysis, Orgel wonders "where Mr. Ilahi would locate this 'healthy part' developmentally" (p. 112). The implication of Orgel's comeback here is that Ilahi also operates as though he assumes a mixture of developmental levels in the personality of this patient.

Orgel describes classic precepts by which he works: "Interpreting from the surface, addressing affective intensity and defenses against it . . . before content, and maintaining an equidistant stance" (p. 112). He wonders how Ilahi would think about these precepts.

He and others object to Ilahi's approach in that it does not respect the defensive equilibrium and the level of mistrust that Mr. A brings to treatment.

I question how someone like Mr. A—so mistrustful of language and of the other, and so terrified of his separateness . . . could take in and make use of the interpretations Mr. Ilahi suggests, without the work on tolerating “being together” that Dr. Lament has so movingly detailed. [p. 112]

The book's editors, Arden Rothstein and Samuel Abrams, do their work of organization with a very light touch, and in fact this is my main criticism of the book. I am suggesting that the editors delivered more than intended because this discussion and the very way the book was edited give us a sample of the mode of dialogue currently occurring between psychoanalysts, showing its limitations as a way to facilitate progress in our field.

In the introduction, the editors comment that *zeitgeist* affects training. Early in the history of their institute, the group's cohesion rested on allegiance to a single theoretical vantage point. The present panel “inquires about the dangers of thinking in an excessively assertive and self-satisfied manner” (p. xi), implying that such a manner may have characterized their predecessors' way of working. The editors want to avoid the sins of their analytic forbears, yet they go too far in the other direction. The current *zeitgeist*, respect for diversity and a “greater willingness to accept how much is not known” (p. xi), appears to pull them in the direction of leaving issues unresolved. They forego opportunities to sharpen debate by not asking panelists to define their views or answer the same questions. The editorial presence is too shadowy to do the job of structuring contents so that others can follow the main arguments. Panelists and audience are left to do the work of structuring on their own.

Purportedly, the main theme of the book is the question of how theoretical perspectives inform clinical work, yet this is only tangentially addressed; this seems to me a glaring failing. Five psy-

choanalysts were chosen to represent “a spectrum of theoretical points of view” (p. xv), and a logical place to begin would have been to ask panelists to sketch their theoretical positions, but the editors did not do this. It was left to the reader to infer from the clinical comments what the participating analysts’ perspectives might be (except in the case of Ilahi, who was willing to identify his stance, as noted). The editors’ categorization of the others as trained in the “so-called traditional psychoanalytic model” (p. xv) did little to elucidate their theoretical vantage points.

Thus, the panel is founded on a paradox: if we are left to infer the theoretical perspective of the participants, how can we proceed when the stated theme is the ways in which perspective affects clinical work? It is a circular situation.

I do not know whether the editors or participants would agree with my distillation of the panel’s main arguments, because the editors’ comments stay so close to a paraphrasing style that they do little to clarify the issues being debated. I wish they had been willing to outline points of agreement and disagreement, and to take a position as to whether these appear to emanate from theoretical differences. I wish they had asked the participants to answer a uniform set of questions (e.g., “In these hours, how do you describe the core pathology you are working to alter?” or “What is the therapeutic action you are aiming for?”), in order to help us compare their views. As it was, the participants could not even agree about whether true differences existed among them! Ilahi repeatedly stressed basic divergences, while others minimized this, saying, “Mr. Ilahi may be in greater agreement . . . than he seems to believe” (p. 113).

To me it appeared that the hesitancy to summarize main arguments was linked to the perceived danger of being “too assertive and self-satisfied,” that is, “objective,” the current dirty word standing for psychoanalytic hubris. Reluctance to define a theoretical orientation seems to be common in current times. *Eclectic* is the term I have been using to denote this seemingly undefined position, as noted earlier.

On this panel, the field is left open to Ilahi, who gives the impression of taking on the whole crowd. He is not loath to take a unified, assertive position, the very thing the others seem to avoid; they politely imply that his stance is rigid, tendentious, and simplistic. Throughout the discussion, Ilahi persists in trying to get others to spell out their (formal or informal) theoretical grounding, but to no avail. When he asks Lament if she is theoretically aligned with American ego psychology, she responds that:

Such characterizations . . . have the effect of reducing one's efforts to a stereotype . . . . The listener is keen to find what he thinks he should find . . . . He will surely do so, but at a great cost . . . . Fresh listening and openness . . . will fall by the wayside. [p. 102]

She refers to past times when there were "analytic good guys and bad guys," implying that we might be stuck there again if we define theoretical positions. She quotes Betty Joseph, who once deflected an attempt to categorize her theoretical position by saying, "I am simply a psychoanalyst" (p. 103).

Here Lament expresses a current concern, that articulating a theoretical position can lead to destructive value judgments and a closed-minded, tendentious approach to clinical work. To avoid these dangers, she prefers the eclectic/atheoretical stance, which is summed up in "I am simply a psychoanalyst." Yet she must have some conflict about this, for why else would she put herself at the center of a panel whose purpose is to explore theoretical positions? Does she hope to demonstrate that an atheoretical analyst has the most flexible and beneficial therapeutic effect? This is an empirically testable theory, but without her acknowledgment that she *has* a theory (or editors who are willing to press her on this), we get no closer to resolving the question.

At the end of the book, the editors ask readers to "judge for themselves . . . if there was a consensus, and what precisely was that consensus?" (p. 101). This also seems to be a manifestation of a conflicted attitude toward critical thinking. The editors provide no

method for systematic comparison, and then ask how, “precisely,” do these views compare. They sum up by saying that they have “little doubt that orientation influences the way analysts find their way through the extraordinary wealth of clinical information” (p. 101), a conclusion that does no more than restate the assumption that launched the panel in the first place.

The eclectic position is a natural extension of the current zeitgeist, respect for diversity being the rule of the day. This book is an example of how, influenced by the spirit of the age, psychoanalysts are stimulated by diverse ideas, yet conflicted about the use of a method that could effectively compare them. Given that inconsistency may be inherent in eclecticism, such discussions verge on a digression to hodgepodge unless they are combined with a concerted effort at critical thinking. I wish this panel had incorporated a method for systemically laying out and comparing the ideas and practices of the participants. How about a fifty-fifth anniversary panel at New York University Psychoanalytic Institute that would do just that?

**LESLIE JORDAN (DENVER, CO)**

CONVERSATIONS AT THE FRONTIER OF DREAMING. By Thomas H. Ogden. Northvale, NJ/London: Jason Aronson, 2001. 257 pp.

It is always a great pleasure to read a book that takes you to a place you may have visited before, but brings that place to life in such a way that not only revives your best memories of it, but leaves you understanding it in a way you never have before. *Conversations at the Frontier of Dreaming* is such a book. The “place,” the frontier of dreaming, is the intrapsychic border between the unconscious and the preconscious, where raw experience and feeling seek a means of expression so as to be in communication with the conscious mind of the subject as well as with others. In Ogden’s words, it is “the ‘place’ where dreaming and reverie experience occur; where playing and creativity of every sort are born” (p. 7).



Ogden is a wonderful guide to this territory. He speaks its language eloquently, and he is willing to sing you the local songs, take you to the intimate places where only the natives go, and lead you by the hand through its most slippery and rocky terrain so that you may experience the place firsthand and depart with its spirit coursing through your veins as it does through his own.

Ogden moves back and forth between two vantage points as he seeks to familiarize the reader with the activities that go on at this frontier. One is the psychoanalytic situation; the other is the experience of reading (particularly poetry) and the special relationship that occurs between writer and reader of inspired writing of any sort. A central feature of both these vantage points is the use of language and metaphor as tools of representation of experience and of communication between the individuals involved.

In the analytic situation, Ogden emphasizes the importance of the use of metaphor and the elaboration of shared metaphors between patient and analyst. For Ogden, the focus of analysis is not simply the inner life of the patient, but the experience, shared by patient and analyst (though not experienced identically) of the *analytic third*—the set of unconscious experiences generated when the unconscious of the patient and that of the analyst come into relation with one another. Ogden stresses the technical importance of the analyst's turning his attention toward his own reverie—those seemingly random wanderings of the mind in which the analyst appears to himself to be momentarily withdrawing his active attention from the verbal productions of the patient, or feels distracted by some rumblings from his own inner life.

Reverie, Ogden asserts, is the daytime equivalent of dream life and the analyst's window on his own "frontier of dreaming." It provides clues for the analyst to his own unconscious experience of being with the patient at that moment. It constitutes the preliminary efforts of the unconscious to find representation for the analyst's raw, affective experience. The analyst's further reflections upon his reverie may then bring to his consciousness new understandings of his immediate experience with the patient. Ogden's detailed and evocatively described clinical examples show us the

workings of his mind as he engages in this process; they demonstrate compellingly the emotional immediacy and sense of aliveness that such a way of working can bring to the analytic process.

For Ogden, the analytic process is less an uncovering of hidden contents than it is an ongoing act of creation and transformation. As unconscious affective experiences within patient or analyst become represented by preconscious reverie, and, in turn, by conscious communicable verbalizations, they not only are revealed, but also transformed in the process; something new is created. Similarly, as the unconscious of the analyst comes into communication with that of the patient, the analyst is not simply "reading" the patient from the outside, but rather is actively co-constructing a new experience with the patient. The process of seeking metaphorical expression of experience enriches self-consciousness; at the same time, the analyst's interaction and communication with the patient generate new affective experiences and identity experiences that enhance the patient's sense of potentiality.

Ogden focuses particularly in this book on the centrality of language as the medium of the analytic process, and endeavors to bring to the reader's attention the complexity and power of language. In Ogden's wonderfully enlightening readings of the poems discussed in the book, creative writing and the relation established between writer and reader function as a metaphor for the analytic situation, and it is in the elaboration of this metaphor that Ogden communicates what he has seen and understood about the "frontier of dreaming."

Ogden is quick to point out that all metaphors break down at some point, and never makes the mistake of trying to draw one-to-one parallels between reading poetry and listening to a patient; he explicitly warns against the deadening effect of the analyst's self-consciously seeking to use densely poetic language to communicate with the patient or of experiencing the patient's productions as a text to be read. What he does, instead, is to focus attention on important aspects of the unconscious-to-unconscious relation between analyst and patient and between reader and writer, and the various ways in which language is used to mediate these relation-

ships; he brings these two relationships into close conjunction, and then allows the reader to see whatever the reader will see. This discussion provides fresh insights into both the psychoanalytic process and the power of literature.

Ogden gives close attention to the many different levels at which language operates in order to communicate; in his readings of poetry, he calls attention to cadence and tone, to the sounds of letters and phonemes and their resonances with affective and sensuous experience. This underlines the function of language as a tool of evocation as well as of explication, and calls our attention to the ways in which patients and analysts use language not only as a way of communicating verbal contents, but also of acting on one another to evoke particular affective experiences and to make the feelings that are being communicated spring to life. He focuses particularly on the creation of a *voice* through sound, turns of phrase, and tones (playful, ironic, mournful, contemplative, and so forth). For Ogden, the creation of a voice is the principal way in which the artist or the patient uses language—not so much to express himself, but to actually bring himself into being, finding in himself, and experimenting with, different identities or fragments of identities.

Ogden suggests that voice, either for patient or for artist, is never simply the sole expression of the speaker, but rather a co-construction between patient and analyst, or writer and reader, a new and unique voice that arises from the unconscious conjunction between two individuals. He sensitizes the reader's ear to shifts of voice that occur in the analytic situation as important indicators of aliveness and movement in the analytic process and as significant units of communication between patient and analyst.

While this understanding of the co-constructed nature of voice and of the parallels between co-constructed voices of poet and patient provides an enlightening and evocative focus for his readers, Ogden glosses over the *differences* between the co-construction of the poet's voice and that of the patient's voice. For the most part, the poet creates his voice in isolation from his actual audience; to the degree that that voice is co-constructed, it is within

the mind of the reader as the reader responds to the particular elements of the poet's communications that resonate with the reader's own unconscious. But the patient elaborates his voice in the presence of the analyst, actively shaping that voice to the actual and perceived responses of the analyst, immediate and past, and there is a back-and-forth revision and re-creation of the voices of both participants as the process proceeds. This is a considerably more active and elaborate process of co-construction, and one in which the locus is placed more squarely between the two individuals involved.

That said, while the further elaboration of these differences might have led in interesting directions in terms of clarifying the meaning and theoretical understanding of the co-constructed voice, it could also have detracted from the evocative quality of Ogden's more loosely suggestive metaphorical approach, which is effective in stimulating the reader's own imagination and creativity. It is, in fact, the liveliness and integrity of Ogden's voice, filled with the pleasure of creation, discovery, and love of language, that makes the movement back and forth between poetry and analytic process completely recede as a device, giving the book its quality of seamless exposition and making it a compelling read from beginning to end.

Over the course of the book, Ogden gives a close reading of representative works of four poets (Robert Frost, Wallace Stevens, Jorge Luis Borges, and Seamus Heaney) and provides a similar treatment of a Winnicott paper.<sup>1</sup> In these discussions, Ogden primarily draws our attention to the art of the writer—how he uses tone, sound, cadence, indirection, shifts in voice, and so forth to communicate with, stimulate, and emotionally touch the reader. Ogden's focus on the content of these works seems almost secondary to his focus on style. Yet with this focus, Ogden draws the reader deeper into the poems (as well as into the Winnicott paper) and sharpens the reader's attunement to their content.

<sup>1</sup> Winnicott, D. W. (1945). Primitive emotional development. In *Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis*. New York: Basic Books, 1958, pp. 145-156.

The content of each of these works is, of course, of great relevance, in one way or another, to Ogden's understanding of the psychoanalytic process. Frost's 1942 poem "Never Again Would Birds' Song Be the Same"<sup>2</sup> addresses the nature of preverbal identifications based on tone and cadence, their power to permanently transform their subjects, the inextricably bound sense of loss and growth associated with them, and the simultaneous feelings of yearning for and retention of the lost object in these identifications. Heaney's fifth sonnet from "Clearances,"<sup>3</sup> written in 1987, evokes the moment in which a young boy's chaste and innocent love for his mother becomes erotically tinged for the first time (almost but not quite outside his awareness), as he helps her with the routine task of folding freshly laundered bed linens. Borges's "Borges and I,"<sup>4</sup> composed in 1957, captures the experience of two dissociated voices and identities, one public and one private—how each draws upon the other, and the feelings of confusion, distress, and fresh integration when these two voices are brought together to create a new voice.

At its heart, this is a book about creativity, written by a highly creative psychoanalyst in a style that is more evocative than didactic. As such, it probably privileges the art of psychoanalysis over the science of psychoanalysis, and, though it is filled with fresh ideas and observations that are masterfully communicated, it lacks the sense of a coherently elaborated clinical theory or even a theory of technique. Still, Ogden's understanding of the intersubjective nature of the psychoanalytic process, his vision of the essential creativity of that process, and his exquisite sensitivity to its multiple registers of communication are of considerable value, and are likely to make as much of an impact on the reader's clinical work as a more highly elaborated bit of theory might do.

<sup>2</sup> See Poirier, R. & Richardson, M., eds. (1995). *Robert Frost: Collected Poems, Prose, and Plays*. New York: Library of America, p. 308.

<sup>3</sup> See Heaney, S. (1998). *Opened Ground: Selected Poems, 1966-1996*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, pp. 282-290.

<sup>4</sup> See Yates, D. & Irby, J., eds. (1962). *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings of J. L. Borges*. New York: New Directions, pp. 246-247.

In the first poem discussed by Ogden in this book, Frost's "Never Again Would Birds' Song Be the Same," the speaker describes a theory about the effect of Eve's voice on the song of birds in the Garden of Eden, how its "tone of meaning" created a persistent "oversound" (p. 56) that "upon their voices crossed . . . probably . . . never would be lost" (p. 54). In the poem, the voice of the speaker shifts from one of amused contempt for the author of this theory, to one of a thoughtful consideration of the evidence, and finally to one of convinced belief in the theory. The shift in tone quietly resonates with the transformation of the voice of the birds by Eve. And, in a similar fashion, it is impossible to finish this very enjoyable and satisfying book without feeling touched by it in some lasting way. Although *Conversations at the Frontier of Dreaming* may not cause a major shift in the reader's understanding of psychoanalytic theory, Ogden's clinical voice and vision persist as an "oversound" that transforms and enriches the way his readers think about and listen to patients.

**RICHARD ZIMMER (NEW YORK)**