INTUITING THE TRUTH OF WHAT'S HAPPENING: ON BION'S "NOTES ON MEMORY AND DESIRE"

BY THOMAS H. OGDEN

Bion's "Notes on Memory and Desire" (1967a) is an impossible paper that this article's author has struggled with for decades. He views the paper, only two and a half pages in length, as a landmark contribution. Despite its title—and its infamous dictates to resist the impulse to remember past sessions and desire for "results"—the paper is not, most importantly, about memory and desire. It proposes a new analytic methodology that supplants awareness from its central role in the analytic process and, in its place, instates the analyst's (largely unconscious) work of intuiting the (unconscious) psychic reality of the present moment by becoming at one with it. This article's clinical examples, provided from the author's own work, illustrate something of his ways of talking with his patients.

Keywords: Memory, desire, intuition, awareness, truth, psychic reality.

An individual's ideas are only as valuable as the use to which they are put by others. It has taken me thirty years of studying Bion's "Notes on Memory and Desire" (1967a) to be able to put into words something of what I have made with this paper.[1] It is an impossibly difficult paper, and

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[1] This discussion of "Notes on Memory and Desire" is the tenth in a series of articles in which I offer studies of seminal analytic contributions. I have previously discussed works by Freud, Winnicott, Isaacs, Fairbairn, Bion, Loewald, and Searles (Ogden 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2011, 2014).

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I have long ago accepted the fact that I will never understand it. It is only recently that I have recognized that my effort to understand the paper is misplaced. It is a paper that asks not to be understood. It asks of the reader something more difficult than understanding, and promises the reader something more valuable than understanding.

The paper, I now realize, is not about memory and desire; it is about intuitive thinking, and the ways in which intuitive thinking works in the analytic situation; it is about the fact that we cannot be taught how to interpret what we sense concerning the patient's unconscious psychic truths. Nor can we be taught how to convey to the patient that we have intuited those truths, much less what it is that we have intuited; nor can we be taught whether it is wise to convey now, or perhaps tomorrow, something of what we sense about the patient's unconscious psychic reality, or whether it might be best never to convey what we sense concerning those truths that the patient holds most sacred.

So, when I ask myself what the paper I am writing is about, I have to say that I am trying to write "Memory and Desire" as my own paper, not in the sense of passing off as mine what is Bion's, but in the sense of writing the paper as a paper that reflects the ways I have been changed by Bion's paper, as opposed to what I have learned from it.[2]

"Notes on Memory and Desire" is an odd paper, only two and a half pages in length, initially published in 1967 in the first volume of a little-known journal, *The Psychoanalytic Forum*, which folded five years later. The paper entered the mainstream of psychoanalytic discourse only when it was reprinted fourteen years later in *Classics in Psychoanalytic Technique* (Langs 1981) and twenty-one years later in *Melanie Klein Today, Volume 2: Mainly Practice* (Spillius 1988).

"Memory and Desire" was one of Bion's late papers, written at a time when he had begun to suffer small strokes. After publishing this paper, Bion published only one major analytic work, *Attention and Interpretation* (1970), and six very brief, relatively minor papers in the decade before his death in 1979.

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[2] This is a personal paper, not a review of what others have done with Bion's paper. I find even the most original and perceptive rewritings of this paper by others (see Grotstein 2009; Meltzer 1978; Symington and Symington 1996) to be distractions from my efforts to say what it is that *I make with Bion's paper* (as opposed to what I make *of* it).

I view "Memory and Desire" as an unfinished paper, not because illness or death prevented Bion from completing it, but because it is a sketch, the beginnings of lines of thought of a sort that do not lend themselves to being completed, but that invite both elaboration and response.

This odd little paper is a landmark contribution. The significance of this paper lies not in its dictate to "cultivate a watchful avoidance of memory" (Bion 1967a, p. 137) and to desist from "desires for results, 'cure,' or even understanding" (p. 137). To my mind, it proposes a revised analytic methodology. Bion supplants "awareness" from its central role in the analytic process and, in its place, instates the analyst's (largely unconscious) work of intuiting the psychic reality (the truth) of the session by becoming at one with it.

In the course of reading/rewriting "Memory and Desire," I present a conception of temporality that I believe is more in keeping with Bion's revised methodology than the conception of that relationship that he offers in his paper. I offer two clinical examples that illustrate something of how I practice psychoanalysis, which is influenced by Bion's "Memory and Desire," but is not the way Bion practiced psychoanalysis, as reflected in the clinical and supervisory work he published (for example, Bion 1959, 1987).

SENSE IMPRESSIONS AND UNCONSCIOUS THINKING

Bion begins the paper with a series of direct statements that point out the unreliability of memory and desire as mental functions suitable for the analyst's use in his critical thinking and scientific judgment.

> Memory is always misleading as a record of fact since it is distorted by the influence of unconscious forces. [1967a, p. 136]

And, the two sentences that follow:

> Desires interfere, by absence of mind when observation is essential, with the operation of judgment. Desires distort judgment by selection and suppression of material to be judged. [p. 136]

In the space of three concise sentences, Bion dismisses two large catego-
ries of mental functioning as unreliable for use by the psychoanalyst.
Desires do not simply "interfere" with observation, they involve "absence
of mind," a shutdown of genuine thinking. This is not a paper in which
Bion rounds the edges. He immediately throws down the gauntlet.

In the second paragraph of the paper, Bion shifts to dense, enig-
matic language:

> Memory and desire exercise and intensify those aspects of the
> mind that derive from sensuous experience. They thus promote
> capacity derived from sense impressions and designed to serve
> impressions of sense. They deal respectively with sense impres-
> sions of what is supposed to have happened and sense impres-
> sions of what has not yet happened. [p. 136]

Repeated readings of this paragraph fail to clarify meaning. I ask which
"aspects of the mind" are "exercised and intensified" (such strange lan-
guage) by memory and desire; what does it mean to "derive from sen-
suous experience" and "to serve impressions of sense"? I receive no reply
to my questions from the text.

Finding that my usual methods of close reading are of no help here,
I shift to a method of reading in which I allow unanswered questions
to accrue until I begin to form impressions (as opposed to understand-
ings)—impressions that suggest, but only suggest, meaning. It comes to
mind, as I grapple with these sentences, that Bion is borrowing from
Freud's (1911) "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Func-
tioning" the term *sense impressions* (p. 220). "Two Principles," which I
consider to be the foundation of Freud's theory of thinking, is, I believe,
the Freud paper to which Bion most often refers. This is not surprising,
given that Bion's project, as I understand it, is the development of a
psychoanalytic theory of thinking, which begins with "Experiences in
Groups" (Bion 1947–1951) and runs through the entirety of the rest of
his written and spoken work.

It would be a distraction to attempt to trace all the ways in which
Bion adopts, rejects, and revises the ideas in Freud's paper, but there are
two aspects of "Two Principles" that I believe provide a necessary context
for reading Bion's "Memory and Desire." First, Freud views as "momen-

tous" (p. 219) the advance in early development when a new principle of mental functioning, the reality principle, begins to direct

> . . . the psychical apparatus . . . to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them. [1911, p. 219]

The second aspect of Freud's paper that forms an essential background for "Memory and Desire" is the idea that the mind, under the dominance of the reality principle, employs a new form of action, the mental action of "*thinking*, which was developed from the presentation of ideas" (Freud 1911, p. 221; italics in original).

Thus, Freud places reality at the center of his theory of thinking, as does Bion. To my mind, Freud's concepts of the pleasure principle and the reality principle are the precursors of, and are still alive in, Bion's conception of mental operations that undermine, and mental operations that promote, an individual's ability to achieve and maintain footing in reality (truth). (In the spirit of Bion's paper, I would rename the reality principle and the pleasure principle *the truth-seeking principle* and *the truth-fearing principle,* respectively.)

If we look again at the dense second paragraph of "Memory and Desire," with Freud's "Two Principles" in mind, possible meanings present themselves. Once again, the paragraph begins:

> Memory and desire exercise and intensify those aspects of the mind that derive from sensuous experience. They thus promote capacity derived from sense impressions and designed to serve impressions of sense. [p. 136]

I would paraphrase this in the following way: memory and desire "exercise and intensify" those mental operations that have their origins in the response of the organism to sensory stimuli. Memory and desire enhance the power of the sense organs, which are "designed to serve [conscious] impressions of sense" and the power of the pleasure (truth-fearing) principle. In so doing, memory and desire undermine genuine unconscious thinking (and thereby contribute to "absence of mind").

The paragraph ends with the conclusion that memory and desire

. . . deal respectively with sense impressions of what is supposed
to have happened and sense impressions of what has not yet
happened. [p. 136]

In other words, memory and desire are mental operations that "deal
with" (are irrevocably tied to) sense impressions and the pleasure (truth-
fearing) principle, which cause memory to fashion the past as we wish it
had been, and lead desire to treat the future as if we were able to foresee
it and control it. For these reasons, memory and desire are antithetical
to the goals of the psychoanalytic enterprise.

In my rewriting of "Memory and Desire," I would like to make ex-
plicit what I believe to be implicit in the paragraph under discussion:
*genuine thinking, which is predominantly unconscious, seeks out the truth (re-
ality).* This, I believe, is the core of Bion's theory of thinking. Moreover,
sensory experience distracts from and undermines genuine thinking.
Without the truth (O[3]), or at least openness to it, thinking is not only
impossible; the very idea of thinking becomes meaningless, just as the
readings of a compass are rendered meaningless in the absence of a
North Pole.

It is important to note that Bion is unequivocal about the necessity
to abstain from memory and desire. He intends to be shocking (in an
effort, I believe, to shake up the solidly ensconced status quo of the then-
current analytic methodologies). Nowhere else in his entire opus does
Bion use language as strong as he does in "Memory and Desire." Take,
for instance, these dictates:

Obey the following rules:
    1. *Memory*: Do not remember past meetings . . . .
    2. *Desires*: Desires for results, "cures," or even understandings
must not be allowed to proliferate. [p. 137]

And, later in the paper:

The psychoanalyst should aim at achieving a state of mind so
that at every session he feels he has not seen the patient before.
If he feels he has, he is treating the wrong patient. [p. 138]

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[3] "Since I don't know what that reality is [the truth of what is occurring in an analytic
session], and since I want to talk about it, I have tried to deal with this position by simply
giving it a symbol 'O' and just calling it 'O,' ultimate reality, the absolute truth" (Bion
1967b, p. 3).

The reader should be stunned by these words. If he isn't stunned, he is reading the wrong paper. "How is it possible not to remember, and not to strive to understand?" the reader should emphatically respond. "And even if eschewing memory and desire were possible, which is doubtful, doesn't that detract greatly from analytic work? Isn't it true that the analyst's act of holding in mind—remembering what the patient has said, sometimes for long periods of time, an important way in which the analyst holds together all the parts of the patient in a way that the patient may never before have been held together and recognized?"

Bion does not answer these questions directly. But I think that (it is always "I think," never "I know"), in the third paragraph of the paper, he begins to address the question of how analytic thinking may operate in the absence of the analyst's memory and desire.

> Psychoanalytic "observation" is concerned neither with what has happened nor with what is going to happen but with what *is* happening. [1967a, p. 136, italics in original]

This is the first of what I believe to be the two most important statements that Bion makes in "Memory and Desire." Analytic thinking is concerned *only* with the present, with "what *is* happening," not with what *has* happened, or what *will* happen, thereby freeing the analyst of his dependence on memory and desire. Psychoanalysis is conducted solely in the present.

Bion adds:

> Furthermore, it [analytic "observation"] is not concerned with sense impressions or objects of sense. Any psychoanalyst knows depression, anxiety, fear and other aspects of psychic reality whether those aspects have been or can be successfully named or not. Of its reality he has no doubt. Yet anxiety, to take one example, has no shape, no smell, no taste. [p. 136]

This passage makes matters even more complex. Bion is now moving beyond the "rules" (p. 137) of eschewing memory and desire; he is saying that the analyst must refrain not only from memory and desire, but also from "sense impressions and objects of sense." He is separating emotions such as depression, anxiety, and fear from the sense impressions (the physical "accompaniments" [p. 136]) of emotions.

What seems crucial to me in this passage is the fact that Bion has returned to the question of reality. He says, "Any psychoanalyst knows depression, anxiety, fear and other aspects of psychic reality . . . . These are the psychoanalyst's real world" (p. 136). Here, Bion is making a plea for a distinctively psychoanalytic understanding of human experience in which there is a difference in the qualities of conscious and unconscious experience: "Any psychoanalyst knows . . . these are the psychoanalyst's real world."

The realm of the unconscious, Bion vehemently insists, is the realm of the psychoanalyst—no one knows the unconscious in the way that the psychoanalyst does, and he must protect it from being "confounded" (p. 137) with the conscious realm of experience. The unconscious is the realm of thinking and feeling that together form the psychic reality (psychoanalytic truth) of an individual at any given moment. The unconscious is not a realm of physical sensation. Physical sensation resides in the domain of conscious experience.

INTUITING PSYCHIC REALITY

All of what I have discussed so far sets the stage for the second of what I believe to be the two most crucial ideas that Bion presents in this landmark paper:

> Awareness of the sensuous accompaniments of emotional experience are [*sic*] a hindrance to the psychoanalyst's intuition of the reality with which he must be at one. [1967a, p. 136]

The idea Bion is presenting here runs counter to the notion that the analyst, while maintaining evenly floating attention, attempts to enhance as much as possible his "awareness" of all that is happening in both sensory and nonsensory dimensions of the session. For example, it is widely accepted that the analyst is interested in the "sensuous accompaniments" of his visual awareness of such events as the patient's gait as she walks to the couch, olfactory awareness of the scent of perfume or perspiration in the consulting room, the auditory awareness of music or cacophony or drone of the patient's voice, and so on.

Why, the reader might ask, would the analyst want to resist experiencing the sensuous accompaniments of emotions, the physicality of life in the consulting room? And how can any form of awareness of what is happening in the analytic setting be a "hindrance" to, and not an enhancement of, the analyst's receptivity to the patient's conscious and unconscious communications? I believe that a response, if not an answer, to these questions can be found in the final clause of the paragraph, where Bion states that the sensuous accompaniments of emotional experience are a hindrance to "*the psychoanalyst's intuition of the reality with which he must be at one*" (Bion 1967a, p. 136, emphasis added).

In other words, if the psychoanalyst is to be genuinely analytic in the way he observes, he must be able to abjure conscious, sensory-based modes of perceiving, which draw the analyst's mind to conscious experience and to modes of thinking (for example, memory and desire) that are fearful/evasive of the perception of the unconscious psychic reality (the truth) of what is occurring in the session. Instead, the analyst must rely on a wholly different form of perceiving and thinking. That form of thinking, which Bion calls *intuition*, has its roots in the unconscious mind. Receptivity to sense impressions, "awareness," and "understanding" are the domain of conscious thought processes. For Bion (1962a), unconscious thinking is far richer than conscious (predominantly secondary process) thinking, which is required to conduct the business of waking life. The unconscious is free to view experience simultaneously from multiple vertices,[4] which would create havoc if one were to use such thinking while trying to carry out the tasks and conduct the interpersonal relationships of waking life.

This passage is something of an announcement that the task of the analyst is not that of understanding or figuring out the nature of the psychic reality of the moment in the analytic session; rather, the analyst's

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[4] For Bion (1962a), unconscious thinking involves the viewing of experience from multiple perspectives simultaneously, thus generating a rich internal dialogue not possible in waking, conscious thinking. Modes of thinking that coexist in dialectical tension with one another include primary process and secondary process thinking; the *container* and the *contained* (Bion 1962a); synchronic and diachronic sense of time; linear cause-and-effect thinking and pattern-based (field theory) thinking; paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of generating experience; presymbolic and verbally symbolic forms of representing experience; and so on.

work is to intuit that unconscious psychic reality by becoming at one with it. Bion does not define the concept of intuition, nor does he offer a clinical illustration of it, but the term itself strongly suggests the predominance of unconscious mental processes in analytic thinking.

While the idea of intuiting the psychic reality of an experience by being at one with it may sound a bit mystical, I believe that we are all engaged in this sort of experience many times, each day, in our dream life. When we dream—both when we are asleep and when we are awake (Bion 1962a)—we have the experience of sensing (intuiting) the reality of an aspect of our unconscious life, and are at one with it. *Dreaming*, in the way I am using the term, is a transitive verb. In dreaming, we are not dreaming *about* something, we are *dreaming something*, "dreaming up" an aspect of ourselves. In dreaming, we are *at one* with the *reality* of the dream; we are the dream. While dreaming, we are intuiting (dreaming up) an element of our unconscious emotional lives, and are at one with it in a way that differs from any other experience. In dreaming, we are most real to ourselves; we are most ourselves.

For me, reverie (Bion 1962a,1962b; Ogden 1997), waking dreaming, is paradigmatic of the clinical experience of intuiting the psychic reality of a moment of an analysis. In order to enter a state of reverie, which in the analytic setting is always in part an intersubjective phenomenon (Ogden 1994a), the analyst must engage in an act of self-renunciation. By self-renunciation, I mean the act of allowing oneself to become less definitively oneself in order to create a psychological space in which analyst and patient may enter into a shared state of intuiting and being-at-one-with a disturbing psychic reality that the patient, on his own, is unable to bear. The analyst does not seek reverie, any more than he seeks intuition. Reverie and intuition come, if they come at all, without effort, "unbidden" (Bion 1967b, p. 147).

It is important to keep in mind that Bion is focusing in "Memory and Desire" on one aspect of analytic methodology: the analyst's work of becoming intuitively at one with the patient's psychic reality. I would add—and I believe that Bion would agree (for instance, as reflected in the title of his book *Learning from Experience* [1962a])—that psychoanalytic methodology is simultaneously involved in intuiting disturbing, unconscious psychic reality *and* in addressing the patient's fears of the

truths of external reality. Among the frightening (and potentially enlivening) truths of external reality are the separateness of the lives of patient and analyst, and the absolute alterity of the world that lies beyond one's control.

INTUITION, THE KNOWN, AND THE UNKNOWN

Bion, in "Memory and Desire," turns next to the relationship between intuition and the unknown:

> What is "known" about the patient is of no further consequence: it is either false or irrelevant. If it is "known" by patient and analyst, it is obsolete . . . . The only point of importance in any session is the unknown. Nothing must be allowed to distract from intuiting that. [p. 136]

To paraphrase, what is known has nothing further to offer and requires no further psychological work. It has yielded what it has to yield, and if patient or analyst continues to dwell on it, it fills psychological space in a "clogging" (p. 137), deadening way. What is known is "either false or irrelevant." It is irrelevant in that it no longer applies to what is happening now, even though it may have been relevant to what happened in yesterday's session or earlier in today's session. Analysis is concerned only with the present. It is false in that we use what we believe we "know" to create the illusion that the unknown is already known, thereby eliminating the need to deal with as-yet-unknown (troubling) psychic truths.

I would expand Bion's thinking about intuition in "Memory and Desire" to include the idea that the work of intuition is manifested not simply in a deepened sense of the psychic reality of a given moment of an analysis, but, perhaps more importantly, is manifested in the ways patient and analyst have been changed by the experience of jointly becoming at one with the formerly unknown (and deeply troubling) psychic reality. I take something Bion (1967c) said in his Los Angeles seminars—which he conducted either shortly before or directly after he wrote "Memory and Desire"—as a reflection of a similar idea. In the first of those seminars, he said:

> I think that what the patient is saying and what the interpre-
> tation is (which you give), is in a sense relatively unimportant.
> Because by the time you are able to give a patient an interpreta-
> tion which the patient understands, all the work has been done.
> [p. 11]

I understand Bion to be saying that by that time the analyst is ready to
make an interpretation, all the work has been done, in the sense that *the
analyst and the patient have already been changed by the experience of jointly
intuiting the unsettling psychic reality with which they have been at one.* The
experience of coming to terms with, being at one with, a formerly un-
thinkable psychic reality changes both patient and analyst. The interpre-
tation is superfluous. What is of importance, when the analyst is ready
to make an interpretation, is the unknown, which is alive even as the
analyst is making the interpretation of what is already known. That un-
known "will not be interpreted probably for a long time . . . possibly even
years" (Bion 1967c, p. 11).

THE PRESENT MOMENT OF THE PAST

Before presenting a clinical illustration of some of the concepts and
phenomena I have been discussing, I will return, for a moment, to the
starting point of my paper: the analyst's use of the mental operations of
memory and desire.

I believe that Bion in "Memory and Desire" makes too sharp a dis-
tinction between past and present, between remembering and living,
when he makes categorical injunctions against remembering. It seems
to me that Bion's conception of memory misconstrues the relationship
of past and present, and the relationship between memory and current
lived experience.

T. S. Eliot (1919) enriches our conception of the relationship of
past to present when he writes that the past is always part of the present,
a "present" that he calls "the present moment of the past" (p. 11). The
present moment of the past, for a writer, is a present-time experience
that contains the entire history of literature—a history "not of what is
dead, but of what is already living" (p. 11). Similarly, in the analytic situ-
ation, the present in which patient and analyst live is a present that does

not stand in contradistinction to a past that no longer exists; rather, the entirety of the past is alive in the present moment of the analytic experience. From this perspective, the analyst sacrifices nothing in eschewing memory. "The past is never dead. It's not even past" (Faulkner 1950, act 1, scene 3).

CLINICAL ILLUSTRATION:
A PLACE FOR THE BABY

What I will offer here is a clinical example in which the patient and I were presented with an emotional problem that asked a good deal of us if we were to genuinely face and respond to what was happening at that moment in the analysis.

I had been working with Ms. C for several years in a five-sessions-per-week analysis when I began to feel, on meeting her in the waiting room, that she was in the wrong place, and that I should tell her politely that the person she came to see was located in another building on the same block as mine. This feeling was particularly puzzling because I was fond of Ms. C and almost always looked forward to seeing her for her sessions. When the patient lay down on the couch that same day, I had the impulse to say, "I love you."

After Ms. C told me a dream in which she had lost something but didn't know what she had lost, I said, "Is loving me such a terrible thing that you have to leave it somewhere else when you come to see me?" I had not planned to say this to the patient, but it felt true as I said it.

Without pause, Ms. C responded, "You've never told me that you love me before."

I said, "Would my love be in the wrong place if I were to love you?"

The patient said, "Yes, I think it would, but I would feel empty if I were to give it back."

I replied, again without pause, "As you were speaking, I couldn't tell whether you meant that you'd feel empty if you simply returned my love as something unwanted, something you had no use for, or whether you meant that feeling love for me would make you feel empty."

"I mean both. You shouldn't love me. I'm a patient. And I also feel that I love you, but I feel that it's being directed at no one, because

you're here in form only, not as a real man I could go out with and possibly marry. That's not just a feeling, it's a fact that can't be undone."

I said, "When you tell me about 'facts that can't be undone,' I feel as if you're killing something or someone. You kill the person you love by saying I don't exist, and by saying I'm no one, so it's a waste of life to give me the love that you feel." I paused, and then said, "I think that in one way you'd like to hear me say, 'You and your love are in the right place. This is exactly the place for them.' But in another way, it would be terribly frightening if I were to say that."

Ms. C said, "I had a very disturbing dream last night in which I was holding my baby boy and saying, 'I love you,' but then I asked myself, 'Is that really true?' I felt that the truth was: no, I don't love him, and because of that he is going to die."

I said, "It's a savage thing that you do to yourself when you say to yourself and to me that you've killed your own child, and so your love for me can't be real. You're saying that a woman who killed her own baby is incapable of love, so the only thing to do with that love is to get rid of it, send it down the block to an imaginary person."

Ms. C said, "You're talking to me today in a way that makes me feel that I'm not an imaginary person, I'm a real person with . . ."

After a short while, I completed the sentence that I thought the patient had begun but could not complete: " . . . a real person with real love for another real person." I felt that Ms. C and I were engaged in a very intimate experience, the nature of which I could not name, but I felt deeply moved by it.

I am reluctant to dissect this moment in the analysis for fear of killing it with theory, but nonetheless I will try. The music of this session, as I listen to it now, is that of a love song intertwined with an elegy.

I sensed, when I met Ms. C in the waiting room, that she wanted to tell me that she genuinely loved her child who, in reality, had died in utero a year earlier, and that I, *as her child*, wanted to say the same ("I love you") to her. But I was not able to live with the anxiety stirred by this kind of thinking and feeling, so in my reverie experience, I sent those feelings down the block to an imaginary person. In retrospect, I think that I was frightened both by the intensity of the analytic love relationship in which Ms. C and I were engaged and by the intensity of the pain she would feel by my speaking to her *as her dead baby*.

The patient was married, but had no living children. She had had a miscarriage (four and a half months into the pregnancy) and began analysis in the midst of a severe depression. She had ceased trying to have a baby after the miscarriage. Ms. C was convinced that her body was telling her that she was unfit to be a mother. She had no children, *and* she had one child who died when he was four and a half months old.

I felt deeply saddened by the patient's feelings of profound loss and guilt. When I spoke to Ms. C in the spontaneous way I have described, I was speaking of my love for her *as her dead baby*, without consciously thinking, "I'm speaking for the dead baby, *and* for the dead baby in the patient *and* for the dead baby in me." I simply spoke as myself, who at that moment was all three of the people I just mentioned. In doing so, I was at one with the psychic reality of the dead baby, which helped the patient to be at one with the reality of *her* dead baby, who was inseparable from me and from her deadened self.

The analytic experience that I have just described occurred, I believe, in the absence of memory. The reader will quite reasonably say, "Both you and Ms. C were remembering the patient's response to an actual miscarriage. You mentioned that fact only after you presented the clinical material, but I think that that fact belonged at the beginning of your presentation so that, as a reader, I could have had available to me the real historical context of the session as you presented your experience with this patient."

But I would say in response, "Neither the patient nor I was engaged in 'remembering the past,' but the past, the death of the baby, was nonetheless very much alive in the present moment of the analysis. You, the reader, may have felt confused about what was real and what was imaginary when I was telling you what happened in the session, but that confusion conveyed more of the truth of that moment of the analysis than would have been conveyed if I had provided the 'historical context' for what was happening. I think that if I had provided the 'real' historical context, I would have stripped the life from what was occurring in that moment of the analysis. Now that I think of it, I did give you a sense of the 'historical context' in the name I gave the clinical illustration: 'A Place for the Baby.' Perhaps, in giving that name to the clinical illustration, I was telling you, but not telling you, part of the emotional

background of what was to follow, just as Ms. C and I both knew and did not know that what was happening between us was a way of feeling and talking about her experience of the death of her baby."

The analytic experience with Ms. C that I have described was built upon multiple coexisting, discordant realities, all of which were true: the baby was dead, *and* the baby was alive; the patient loved me, *and* the patient loved me as her baby; the patient loved her baby, *and* she felt incapable of loving him and unworthy of his love. The truth of each component of this emotional situation was real only when in dialectical tension with its counterpart. If I were to have sided with one component or the other (for instance, by saying, "You really did love your baby in the dream and the real baby who died"), I believe the patient would have felt that I was afraid to know who she really was at that moment—a mother who loved her baby, and a mother who was unable to love her baby.

Before ending this clinical discussion, I will comment briefly on the intertwined music of the elegy and the love song that, to my ear, runs through this segment of the analysis. The elegiac aspect involves primitive, undifferentiated forms of relatedness between the patient and me, between the patient and her dead baby, and between the baby and me. Ms. C and I were experiencing a wide range of deeply felt emotions concerning the dead baby, the origins of which were unclear: were they my feelings, or were they the patient's feelings, or were they those of a third subject that was an unconscious creation of the two of us (which I have elsewhere called the *analytic third* [Ogden 1994b])? Probably all three, in ever-shifting proportions.

At the same time—and in dialectical tension with the elegy—the music of the love song involves more mature forms of relatedness in which Ms. C's and my own sense of alterity to each other is integral to the intense feelings of intimacy, mutual understanding, and even a sense of danger in what was happening in "the analytic love relationship." I use the term *analytic love relationship* not to suggest that the love is less real than in other love relationships, but to specify that this form of love relationship is conceived, and develops within, the very real constraints of the doctor–patient relationship (the analytic frame).

EVOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION

Following his comments on intuitive thinking and being at one with the psychic reality of the present moment, Bion, in "Memory and Desire," introduces the concept of *evolution,* the meanings of which remain obscure in the paper, I think intentionally so:

> In any session, evolution takes place. Out of the darkness and formlessness something evolves. This evolution can bear a superficial resemblance to memory, but once it has been experienced it can never be confounded with memory. It shares with dreams the quality of being wholly present or unaccountably and suddenly absent. This evolution is what the psychoanalyst must be ready to interpret. [1967a, pp. 136-137]

Bion seems to be using the term *evolves* to refer to what is happening in the analytic experience: the emotional experience that is occurring. The term *evolution* here is more verb than noun. It is a state of continuous change, and that process of change is the subject of psychoanalysis.

As I mentioned earlier, the analytic inquiry in "Memory and Desire" is focused exclusively on the present moment of the past. Bion's methodology transforms the most fundamental clinical question from "What does that mean?" to "What's happening now?" The question "What does that mean?" lies at the core of Freud's (1900) work with dreams and Klein's (1975) search for symbolic meaning in children's play. Winnicott (1971), who shifted the focus of child and adult analysis from the symbolic content of play to the capacity for playing, is, I believe, as important a contributor as Bion to the alteration of the fundamental clinical question to "What's happening now?"

The passage introducing the concept of evolution, quoted above, brings to mind an experience I have had innumerable times while being told a dream by a patient. As the analysand is telling me the dream, I usually have no trouble imagining the scene or scenes being described. But I find that as soon as the patient has finished telling me the dream (and sometimes even while the patient is telling me a dream), I have no recollection at all of what the patient has told me. This experience underscores the fact that dreams that patients tell us are not memories;

they are experiences evolving in the present moment of the analysis and have many of the qualities of dreaming, including that oft-experienced surprise and disappointment of finding that the dream, which a moment ago was so present and alive, is "unaccountably and suddenly absent" (Bion 1967a, p. 137). No amount of conscious concentration will bring it back. Often, I find that later in the session, the patient's dream will come to me "unbidden."

For me, one of the most important words in this paragraph on evolution is the final word of the closing sentence: *interpret.* "This evolution is what the psychoanalyst must be ready to interpret" (p. 137). Bion suggests that he is using the term *interpret* to refer to the analyst's talking to the patient about the psychic reality that is occurring (now) in the present moment of the analysis. He gives no clue as to what that might sound like. I can only say what the term *interpret* means to me. But instead of trying to define, or even describe its meaning, I will let the following clinical account speak for itself, before I try to attach words to it.

CLINICAL ILLUSTRATION: AN INVITATION TO STAY

When I opened the door to the waiting room, it seemed more starkly furnished than I'd remembered. There were four magazines, all of them many months out of date, lying on the table that had sat there for more than twenty years.

Ms. J didn't make eye contact with me as she rose from her chair, as if lifting a tremendous weight. She slowly led the way into my consulting room.

After lying down on the couch, she said in a flat voice, "I got up and made sandwiches for the kids. I put the milk and cereal on the breakfast table and somehow got them to school. I can do that."

I felt that Ms. J was very close to losing her mind as well as her ability to function, which frightened me. But I was frightened more for Ms. J's children than I was for her. I pictured them staring at her at the breakfast table, pretending not to notice the lifeless expression on her face.

I said, "As you talk, I'm reminded of the instructions they give on airplanes to put on your own oxygen mask before helping your child to put theirs on."

Ms. J said, "I was looking at a photo that I have framed on my dresser. It's a photo of Jane, when she was about six, holding Lisa, who was only a few months old. The expression on Jane's face is the thing that grabs my attention every time I look at it. She has a pleading look in her eyes that says, 'I don't want to drop her. Please take her from me. I'm too young to be holding a baby.' When I look at that picture, it makes me want to cry. I saw, when I looked at it this morning, that Jane wasn't looking at me or pleading with me, she was looking somewhere else."

I said, "That's the weight you have to carry that's too heavy for you, and would be too heavy for anyone—the weight of the secret that you're not there in the photograph, you're not there in the waiting room when I meet you, you're not here when you're lying on the couch, you're not anywhere."

Ms. J said, "I went to the Diebenkorn exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art. I went to kill time."

I said, "You didn't have to go to the exhibit to kill time. I think that you're already dead, so you don't have time to kill; that's the thing dead people don't have—time. When you're in the waiting room, I don't think you're waiting; you know nothing is going to happen."

Ms. J said, "I stopped wearing a watch months ago, maybe a year. I didn't decide not to wear one, I just found that I didn't have one on, and I haven't put one on since then. I have one on my dresser, and I could put it on in the morning, but I don't, and I've never missed it." As Ms. J was telling me this, it seemed to me that she was mildly interested in what she was saying, which was a rare thing.

"Is it time for me to go?" she asked, her voice now flat again.

Without knowing what I was going to say, I said, "No, it's time for you to stay." Ms. J smiled, faintly.

On hearing what I had just said to Ms. J, it felt true, not simply in a concrete sense—it was not yet the time designated for the end of the session—it was true in an emotional sense. I felt I was inviting her—not just anybody, but her in particular—to stay and spend time with me, "living time," as opposed to clock time, or photograph time, or obligatory time, or dead time, or killing time. I genuinely wanted to spend time with her. I liked her, even enjoyed her, and was inviting her to stay.

For me, the "invitation" was the most important "interpretation" that I made in that session. What I said to Ms. J was my way of conveying

my sense of the psychic reality that was most alive at that moment. The "invitation" I gave her to spend "living time" with me was not a request to have her do something with me in the future; it was my way of saying to Ms. J that we were already, in that moment, spending living time with each other. Her smile was not her acceptance of my invitation so much as it was her acknowledgment that something was already happening in which she was present.

I believe that there are important similarities between what I have just said about what occurred in the session with Ms. J and what Bion is referring to when he says, "This evolution is what the psychoanalyst must be ready to interpret." But the word *interpret*, for me, holds the connotation of the analyst telling the patient what he understands to be the unconscious meaning of what the patient is saying or doing. I would prefer a different term—a term that does not carry that connotation—to describe what I was doing when I spontaneously said, "No, it's time for you to stay." A "term" that would feel more apt, although wordy, would be: *talking with the patient, directly or indirectly, about what is most real and most alive at an unconscious level at that moment.* Most often, this type of "talking with a patient" does not sound like a psychoanalyst making "an interpretation." To me, it sounds and feels like two people talking to each other, two people conversing. I take it as high praise when a patient says to me, "You never make interpretations, you just talk to me."

The purpose of talking with patients is multifold, but, for me, it always includes the effort to help the patient become more fully alive to his or her experience in the present moment. As Bion puts it toward the end of "Memory and Desire":

> "Progress" will be measured by the increased number and variety of moods, ideas and attitudes seen in any given session.
> [1967a, p. 137]

The analytic conversation that evolves with each patient is unique to that patient, and could not occur between any other two people in the world. These are some of the qualities of my way of talking with patients (what Bion calls *interpreting*). The way I talk with patients is not the way any other analyst talks with patients; if it were, the patient would be talking with the wrong analyst.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Bion's "Notes on Memory and Desire" (1967a) is an impossible paper that I have struggled with for decades. Despite its title, it is not, most importantly, a paper about memory and desire. The significance of this paper lies in the way it supplants awareness from its central role in the analytic process and, in its place, instates the analyst's (largely unconscious) work of intuiting the (unconscious) psychic reality of the present moment by becoming at one with it.

The clinical examples from my own work illustrate something of my own manner of being at one with the psychic reality (the truth) of a given moment of a session, and my ways of talking with the patient about that reality.

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BEFORE BABEL: REFLECTIONS ON READING AND TRANSLATING FREUD

BY ERAN J. ROLNIK

The author offers some thoughts on reading and teaching Freud, on translating Freud, on translation in general, and on a possible kinship between translation and the psychoanalytic process. His reading of Freud's works, and the years he spent translating them into Hebrew and editing Hebrew editions of his writings, have made a deep and salient impression on his personal psychoanalytic palimpsest. The author began this labor prior to his psychoanalytic training and has no doubt that, to this day, the experience greatly shapes not only his attitude toward Freud himself, but also the nature of how he listens to patients and the way he thinks and writes about psychoanalysis.

Keywords: Freud, language, translation, writing, internal analytic object, German, *Standard Edition,* Hebrew, culture, James and Alix Strachey, transference.

Psychoanalysts are sometimes asked to single out specific instances or experiences from their lives that have played a seminal role in the formation of their analytic identity. Some see a clear connection between their psychoanalytic work and their life histories. Few analysts would leave out their own personal or training analysis when reflecting on the development of their professional identities. Others would point to their acquaintance with an influential teacher or supervisor as the watershed in

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the evolution of their professional outlook. For yet other analysts, there is a mythological patient, a treatment that remains etched in memory as a turning point in the analyst's self-perception as an analyst. There are also those for whom a particular text continues to resonate in their psychoanalytic language, still shaping how they think and work.

Of course, the identity of every psychoanalyst is a product of cross-fertilization and grafting. It cannot be epitomized only by the analyst's conscious appreciation of a particular theoretical paradigm. My reading of Freud's works, and the years I spent translating them into Hebrew and editing Hebrew editions of his writings, made a deep and salient impression on my personal psychoanalytic palimpsest. I began this labor prior to my psychoanalytic training, and I have no doubt that, to this day, the experience greatly shapes not only my attitude toward Freud himself, but also the nature of how I listen to my patients and the way I think and write about psychoanalysis.

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As psychoanalysis evolved, the reading of the Freudian text acquired significance beyond the ordinary transmission of scientific knowledge. Reading Freud became a social activity that psychoanalysts engaged in long before they began to analyze patients or to perceive themselves as expert listeners. Although reminiscent of the traditional Judaic method of the examination and exegesis of sacred texts with a study partner, reading and interpreting Freud has had far-reaching consequences for the evolution of the discipline and cannot be dismissed as purely scholastic. The tension between orthodoxy and heresy, between partisans and dissidents, informed both the writing of some of Freud's essays and the way in which his acolytes received them.

Moreover, soon enough it became evident that those who wished to consider themselves "Freudians" must accede to a never-ending process of identity formation. In a way quite unprecedented in the history of science and ideas, the institutionalization and professionalization of the new discipline were followed immediately by its popularization and stigmatization. People who had never read a line written by the Viennese physician felt either terribly repelled by him or madly attracted to him. It was as if Western civilization had much more than a need for a new

theory of man; it had a place marked out for a Freud-like individual, a preconception that awaited its fulfillment. Once a person who insisted on playing this historical role begun to publish his ideas, an overdetermined drama of unique proportions began to unfold.

For those who counted themselves among his followers, the situation was even more complex than for those whose relationship to his teaching was entirely projective, structural, or instrumental. Almost each and every piece of new theory that Freud introduced into his system could potentially break out of the frame of his previous work. Being a Freudian thus meant much more than following a young man's journey from dissecting the gonads of eels to dissecting his own dreams, from the first topography to the second topography. It was not enough to understand his preference for the couch and technique of free association, or to accept the centrality of the psychosexual unconscious, the oedipal configuration, or even the dual theory of drives. Being a Freudian meant immersing oneself in the life journey and body of writing of a single person and giving oneself over to its idiosyncrasies, its twists and turns. By following the workings of the mind of a single person struggling to give meaning to phenomena at once both familiar and unaccounted for, private and public, the analyst-to-be prepared herself for the task of following her own mind and the mind of her patients.

In what, then, are psychoanalysts in our time indulging themselves and subjecting their students to during the many hours spent reading Freud over the course of their professional lives? Is it a rite of passage? An act of veneration? A prolonged psychoanalytic bar mitzvah inflicted by the tribe's elders upon members of the younger generation to ensure obedience? Can the value of Freud be reduced, as modern science would have us believe, to the question of the "validity" of his assumptions, or even to the so called "relevance" of his theories to contemporary psychoanalytic discourse? Quite the opposite, I maintain.

As a science, psychoanalysis is unusual in that it cannot afford to adopt a crude teleological notion of progress in which it "forget[s] its founders" (Whitehead 1929, p. 108). In this sense, it resembles humanistic disciplines, such as philosophy or history, which grow through a constant study and reevaluation of their own canonical texts. In the same way that one cannot philosophize without knowing the history of phi-

losophy, it is impossible to understand one's patients analytically without having a good knowledge of Freud.

Psychoanalysts read Freud for as many reasons as there are to undergo analysis and recommend it to one's patients. I assume we read Freud first and foremost because it keeps us attuned to the unconscious; it provides us a hands-on experience with both the discovery of the unconscious and the resistances that this discovery evokes. It further links this historical discovery, and the discoveries that followed it, to our daily business of listening analytically to patients and to ourselves.

Reading Freud, I would argue, like reading no other text in the psychoanalytic body of writing, keeps us in touch with our *internal analytic object*, the essence of which has been defined by Wille (2008) as an inquiring, questioning attitude directed toward introspective and interactional knowledge as a source of inner change; as trust in an unstructured, unconscious communicative process; and as trust in the analytic setting. Freud's writing is intimately linked to the art and practice of analytic listening. Furthermore, Freud—the *Freud imago*—occupies a unique place in each analyst's internal object world.

For the founder of the talking cure, thinking—indeed, surviving mentally—meant first and foremost writing. Freud did not "write up" his ideas; he wrote in order to know what he was thinking about. As he worked in parallel on several essays at a time, Freud's atelier resembled that of an artist, with several unfinished canvases stretched out next to each other, waiting for the muses and whims of the master to allow their completion. Ideas and dilemmas confronted while working on one essay were often caught in midair before reaching the (exceptionally large) sheet of paper, and their flow redirected into another unfinished text, where they settled into the company of other ideas. Some ideas were thus cut short and contained as miniatures within a relatively limited discursive frame, while others awaited their expression within an entirely new context. One occasionally has the feeling that a given text was suddenly hijacked by a train of thoughts that seemingly sprang out of an entirely different creative or theoretical impetus.

"I was depressed the whole time," Freud wrote to Ferenczi on January 2, 1912, as he worked on one of his technical papers, "and anesthetized myself with writing—writing—writing" (Freud and Ferenczi

1993, p. xxvi). On July 3, 1929, while vacationing in Berchtesgaden, he wrote to Eitingon that sheer boredom had made him start writing a piece about culture (*Civilization and Its Discontents,* 1930) (Freud and Eitingon 2004). His most complex metapsychological works were completed within a few weeks, while clinical papers sometimes took years. And then there was, of course, his magnum opus, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), which was never really completed; Freud constantly revisited and reworked it, each new edition fatter and more heavily annotated than its predecessor.

The thought of what Freud (who had a keen eye for technology) might have done with a blog or website should send shivers down the spines of all those who complain about the volume of his writing. In most cases, the final versions of his papers still exhibit the characteristics of a draft or outline, crafted into a "final" version with theoretical content and mental process bound tightly together by the power of his prose (Mahony 1987a). Fortunately, Freud seldom had to put up with any editorial constraints—as he had his own psychoanalytic publishing house from early on—so we can rest assured that the final appearance of the printed text reflected the writer's own decisions. Some of these decisions, from the point of view of today's editorial standards, seem quite outrageous.

Consider, for instance, the frequent movement from the main text to the footer that some of his papers require the eye to follow. Some footnotes, as in the description of the Wolf-Man's case (Freud 1918), are a full two pages long, straining the endurance of even the most patient reader in a way that only years of listening to free associations could prepare him for. Or perhaps the other way around? By that I mean that reading Freud prepares the clinician to *follow the drift*—the kind of loose listening that Freud advised the analyst to adopt. These detours and creeks in the Freudian text may even negate it or put forth an idea that the main text seems almost reluctant to take up.

How characteristic a pattern of movement this is for psychoanalysis, in which a *basso ostinato*, an unusual choice of a word, or perhaps even a sudden bodily sound can disclose the true pulse beneath the flow of associations (Ogden 1999). This is also the reason why the reading of Freud can train the ears even of those who recoil from his theories of the

mind. One need not like or fully understand a Freudian text in order to benefit from it. Reading Freud is as useful in our trade as the practicing of scales is for a pianist. I would like to elaborate a little on the idea of Freud's writing being part of each analyst's identity, or—as I prefer to call it—part of each analyst's *internal analytic object* (Rolnik 2010; Wille 2008).

The evolution of a creative psychoanalytic mind is never a dispassionate intellectual enterprise. It is a laborious, emotional process in which one must work through a thicket of transference attachments to former analysts, supervisors, and idealized theoretical propositions (Rolnik 2008). One may love, hate, admire, or fear psychoanalysis. One may idealize it, project various archaic fantasies into it, or have difficulties with the necessity of mourning some aspects of our selves that have been invested in it. The analyst's faith in psychoanalysis, his tolerance for the uncertainties and ambiguities that are part and parcel of the analytic perspective on life, is only partially contained by the particular analytic school or theory with which the analyst tends to identify.

Freud transferences, either positive or negative, make up a substantial portion of our internal analytic object. These transferences are best worked through within the context of reading Freud. I want to address a specific form of reading to which Freud himself was very much attuned—the reading of a text performed by a translator who labors to transfer it to another language.

It was common in the past to liken the work of psychoanalysis to a translation of the psyche's text (Amati-Mehler, Argentieri, and Canestri 1993). Freud frequently employed the verb *translate* to indicate the process of objective interpretation of unconscious material. The metaphor may not speak to some, who perhaps see little resemblance between the interactions of two persons as it occurs in the analytic setting and the work of a person transferring a written text from one language to another. Yet all of us function as translators, at least for ourselves, when we read texts of the type that Freud left us. When texts of his of a certain kind are read, the reader inevitably tries, consciously or not, to get to the root of what the author intended, to uncover the way he understood the terms he chose. The reader seeks to track Freud's process of choosing the best word to designate what he wanted to say.

The act of reading and the act of translating complement one another, and Freud, who felt more at ease sharing his writing process with his readers than sharing the therapeutic process, invited this type of microscopic translational reading even from readers who were not engaged in translation in the classic sense of the word, and even from those who read him in German.

Reading Freud is not like meeting up with an old acquaintance. Even years of exposure to the psychoanalytic climate will not dull that strange but refreshing sense of the singular that accompanies the encounter with Freud. His "idiotic" writing (as one of his high school teachers termed it) can surprise even his veteran readers. Yet it is not the substance of the texts that protects them from obsolescence. The only way to explain this sense of otherness is to consider Freud's use of words.

The process of reading and translating Freud is psychoanalytic in the sense that it re-creates the analysand's struggle to verbalize and communicate a lexicon of meanings that is by nature private, nonverbal, and idiosyncratic. This is the tension between the unconscious and conscious, between the world of object-representations and that of word-representations, where we are all suspended. In one, there are objects and affects with no names, and in the other, there are words that grope for the object-representations they were once connected to. It is the tension between primary and secondary process thinking, a tension that Freud's extraordinary writing preserves, illustrates, and neutralizes, all at the same time.

Sometimes reading Freud is like being reminded of a dream. One moment it is sharp and vivid, and the next baffling and hazy. Just as there is no one way to interpret a dream, so is there not just one way to translate Freud. In fact, one characteristic of a meaningful text is that it may be reconstrued again and again and a new translated work built on its ruins. A good text is worthy of more than one translation, and a person who values a text has no better way of showing it respect than to retranslate it (Borges 1934).

Translations are by nature less durable than the source texts they attempt to capture, one reason being that processes of linguistic change often precede other changes that occur in our lives. Sometimes translators have difficulty accepting the fact that they are producing a snapshot

of a particular moment in *language*—the target language—and that they are recording a specific instant in the text as it encounters and is transmitted into a different language.

Gadamer (1960) spoke of a "fusion of horizons" (p. 305) between the reader and the text. He argued that people have a "historically effected consciousness" (p. 301) and that they are embedded in the particular history and culture that shaped them. Thus, interpreting a text involves a fusion of horizons in which the translator finds the way to articulate the text's history with his own background. It is the invisible hand of the translator that facilitates this fusion and the experience of understanding that it brings. Translators may achieve this either elegantly or heavy-handedly—for instance, by tempering the text, or by burdening it with their own apologetic or peevish footnotes.

Reading Freud in translation requires the reader to place no small measure of fundamental faith in the translator's ability and intentions. Readers of translations are well acquainted with the experience of shifting uncomfortably in their chairs, knowing that they would not have chosen to use this particular word in this particular place. It could not possibly be, they think, that the author whom they have become acquainted with in the previous pages would write such a sentence. Readers cannot provide any proof for such an assertion, since the original of the text is not available or accessible to them. But the minute they become aware of the translator's presence in the text, they cannot avoid muttering from time to time that the translator seems to have missed something.

Some texts have the power to resist even the worst translators, while others will constantly proclaim her presence—or, worse still, her betrayal. With still other texts, all is lost in translation. In other words, a translation cannot be judged only on its aesthetics or on its faithfulness. There are many other criteria, which are often inherent in the translated text and the type of dialogue that we have with it. Psychologically, these moments of discomfort, experienced by the reader as the translator's failure or betrayal, reflect the yawning abyss between our transference to the translated text and the translator's transference to the source. The German word for *to transfer—übertragen—*also means *to translate,* meaning that even the word Freud chose to designate this psychological

phenomenon bears a connotation of translation as a transfer of meaning in space and time.

Some linguists argue that our perceptions of the world are determined largely, if not entirely, by the structure of our mother tongue. This sort of linguistic determinism is advocated by Edward Sapir (Mandelbaum 1949) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956), and has had an impact on structuralist psychoanalysis. It posits a linguistic relativity in which the structure of language influences the manner in which a person understands reality and behaves with respect to it. But it is no small matter to accept the essentially pessimistic and alienating nature of the sweeping claim that we are the prisoners of a single language. To accept this view is to privilege the formal component of language over its content. More significantly, it implies that there can be no real dialogue between speakers of different languages. If Whorf was right, the readers of a translated text labor under an illusion. They need not a better translation but an entirely different consciousness if they are to be able to comprehend the text.

Of course, this relativist school has many opponents. They point out that relativism is not consistent with the considerable evidence for deep preverbal and prelinguistic strata shared by the speakers of all languages. But as dismal and controversial as this school of linguistics might seem to psychotherapists, I maintain that, as translators and readers, we should not be too quick to join the opposition, which sees language as tantamount to an empty vessel that can be filled with any idea. In this latter view, the differences between languages are insignificant compared to the metalinguistic functions common to every language. Therefore, they maintain, every language can say everything, if its speakers know how to use it properly, and every human experience can be expressed in every language.

But Freud has an original answer of his own to the relations between language and consciousness—one that he illustrates in his own writing. He does not allow his translators to get caught up in metaphysical speculations on the possible meanings of translation and interpretation. He presents them with challenges that require responses.

Many writers have remarked on the unique hermeneutic challenge that Freud's writing presents even to those who read him in the original

German (Habermas 1971). Notably, Freud is not the only German writer whom German speakers sometimes prefer to read in English translation. Freud in translation gets under the reader's skin a little less than he does in German. He is a bit more transparent. Something of the inscrutability of his writing is neutralized, and this can make it easier to read. It is still Freud, but not as intense.

Freud in German is a less convenient target for criticism than the Freud familiar to readers of the English *Standard Edition* of his works. He is elusive and tentative no less than he is categorical and authoritative. Phallic, feminine, and downright polymorphous in his manner of discourse, he baffles no less than he enlightens. No sooner has he formulated a theoretical conclusion than he may launch a counterattack against his ostensibly incontrovertible inference, undermining its validity. By the time the reader has finished reading one of these lengthy sentences, he can no longer be certain which of the evidently contradictory meanings is actually being endorsed by Freud—the thesis or the antithesis.

While I do not subscribe to the position that Freud's major achievement was a linguistic or literary one, the connection between, on the one hand, the structure and some of the unique characteristics of the German language, and, on the other, psychoanalytic theory and even technique, are worth exploring. The German language—and by this, I mean not only its formal shape, but also the metaphorical world intertwined with that structure—made it easier for Freud to formulate and conceptualize his ideas, even if we acknowledge that he used the language as if it were his personal preserve.

Every person who speaks more than one language has had the experience in which one language, not necessarily his mother tongue, lends itself more readily than the other language to expressing a certain mood or idea. These moments, when our thinking transgresses the boundaries set by one language by invading the territory of another language, are always interesting. In general, we seek psychological explanations for the phenomenon, which are always abundant (dissociation, identification, displacement), but sometimes the language has its own will and uses us for its own purposes. We are prisoners of its vocabulary and syntax.

While I have no doubt that psychoanalysis can be understood and communicated in many languages, it seems to be particularly at home in German. Perhaps I should qualify this statement by limiting it to Freudian psychoanalysis, and argue as well that not only the translations of Freud but also the foundational texts of other therapeutic schools have been shaped by their cultural-linguistic contexts. It might be better to rephrase this admittedly rather unsettling thought, which subverts Freud's claim to the universality of his system, as a question: can Freud's theory be sustained by a language other than German? Can the canonical texts of the founder of psychoanalysis be translated without reinventing psychoanalysis (Bettelheim 1983; Mahony 1987b, 2001; Ornston 1992)?

I think that most of Freud's readers have already been convinced that one can think in a Freudian way in all kinds of languages, and that every language contains a Freudian kernel that can be cultivated in a manner appropriate to the special linguistic and historical conditions of the time and place in which the founder of psychoanalysis is called upon to convey his message.

One of the best-known and best-loved statements about translation is attributed to Cervantes. In *Don Quixote* (1605), he likened translating from one language to another to gazing at a tapestry from the reverse side, where all the loose threads and knots are visible. Who can argue with the great Spaniard that life might be nicer if we could always read books in their original languages?

But reading a text in translation is not only a drawback. It offers readers a number of advantages. A translation not only distances us from the original, being as it is a blurred reflection of it, but also permits us an intimate acquaintance with the raw materials from which the text is composed. A translation lays bare a text's hidden structures, the stitches that the author uses to hold together his arguments, the tricks she employs, and the snares she sets for her readers. Freud is well known for laying traps all around the reader, ready to catch him at every step.

The translator himself has mixed feelings about the way he scrounges through the source text. On the one hand, it provides him with a sense of being profoundly close to the writer, but there is also something voyeuristic and intrusive about it. Often, translators find it difficult to look

directly at a source text for a long time after they have completed their work on it.

Freud tried out many metaphors to clarify for himself and his readers the role of the psychoanalyst. He termed the analyst a *surgeon,* a *tour guide,* a *secular priest.* His array of metaphors also included the therapist as *translator.* Yet this metaphor is an exceptional one in Freud's hands because it is of dual significance: it serves both when he speaks about the psychic apparatus, and when he speaks of the mechanism of healing. In other words, the translating psyche is the object of the work of translation assigned to therapist and patient. And good translation has a healing effect (Loewald 1960).

This makes it possible to consider the subversive effect that psychoanalytic theory can have on a concept such as *the original text.* The translation process includes transformation—first and foremost, the translator's translation of the linguistic and psychic space in which the original text was written. In translating Freud, one must cast off the dichotomous view that identifies the language in which the text was written with the "source." The reason is that the text in its original language is itself no more than an attempt to translate something—a thought, a feeling, an experience (Laplanche 1991, 1997).

Because of the view that the original text, in encountering another language, ceases to be a source and itself becomes a new translation of some sort of hidden enigmatic language, we commonly speak of this process in historical terms. We say that a translator needs an acquaintance with the cultural world in which the text was created, and so on. But it seems to me that the attempt to break down the space in which texts are composed into the historical and linguistic factors in operation there is an oversimplification of the creative process.

For this reason, I do not accept the distinction between *translatable* works and *untranslatable* ones. In every translation—not just of poetry, but also of, say, a pun or a metaphor—something gets lost, and something else is created in its place. In fact, attempts to bring the target language in line with the original are not only frustrating; they lead to the creation of something entirely new. Sooner or later, the contours of the unbridgeable gap between the two languages come into view, forming a

kind of mental-linguistic no man's land. If the existence of this gap or space is acknowledged and not smudged, it can become a presence in the new text in surprising and unexpected ways.

In December 1896, Freud wrote to his friend Wilhelm Fliess that "the failure of translation" was what was known in clinical terminology as "repression" (Freud 1896, p. 235). Freud meant that the act of translation is what enables impressions and experiences originating at different stages of life to undergo a transformation that enables them to make the passage between the three mental systems that predate consciousness: the nervous system, which receives the original stimulus; the unconscious; and the preconscious.

The concept of translation also serves Freud in later writings, in which he defines the role of the analyst as a translator of unconscious material into materials that can find a place in consciousness. In one of his final works, he wrote:

> Every science is based upon observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our mental apparatus. But since our science has as its object that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here. We make our observations through the medium of the same perceptual apparatus, precisely by the help of the breaks in the series of mental events, since we fill in the omissions by plausible inferences and translate them into conscious material. In this way we build, as it were, a conscious complement for the unconscious mental processes. The relative certainty of our mental science rests upon the binding force of these inferences. [1940, p. 39]

In the first two sentences of this passage, Freud reminds his readers of the unique difficulty of the psychoanalytic process, in which the object of inquiry, the psyche, is also the means with which it is studied. Note his choice of the metaphor of translation to describe the therapeutic act. Translation is described here as an action in which unconscious material undergoes a transformation in which it *approximately* fits in with conscious material. In other words, the unconscious source and the material that makes its way into the conscious mind do not perfectly match. It is the psychoanalytic version of the question of the relation between source and translation.

This question not only touches on the limitations of translation; it also requires a reexamination of the source-translation dichotomy. In the therapeutic context, it is possible to see how the act of translation, while transferring a meaning from one mental sphere to another, above and beyond its impact on consciousness, changes the source. That is, it changes the object of translation even before it reaches consciousness and takes on its new translated form. An analytic interpretation does not have to be comprehensible to the analysand, or to arouse his resistance, in order to produce a change in unconscious material, in the atmosphere in the room, or in the transference.

Heidigger once attributed all the ills of Western thought to the way in which Roman Latin gulped down Greek philosophy, taking over Greek words without fully appreciating their original meanings. There are translators who seek to give their readers the illusion that the text was written originally in the target language. My view, however, is that a language is not a neutral vessel that can take in and equally sustain every idea. I therefore do not believe that my role as a translator is to paper over the identity of the original text. On the contrary, it sometimes seems to me that I need not protect the reader from the background noise produced by the encounter between language and content. Freud's own writing is full of such noise, and as an exegetist of unparalleled skill, he is not deterred by it and in general makes no effort to camouflage it.

The English *Standard Edition* translation of Freud's works by James and Alix Strachey is notable for the translators' effort to dampen this noise, to explain Freud and protect him when he is unclear or simply confused. Freud had no compunctions about asserting a thing and its opposite; the Stracheys went out of their way to hide that.

Once more: it is doubtful whether everything can be mimicked convincingly in every language. But the translator's task, as I understand it, is to save swaths of meaning from the original text, to preserve all of the original that can be preserved, without "taming" or "converting" it at any price. As a result, readers of my translations of Freud into Hebrew can expect uncomfortable moments when they discover that some of Freud's ideas, and his presentation of them, cause the Hebrew language severe digestive problems. On the other hand, there are places in which Hebrew, with its strata of meaning and association, gives itself over to

Freud's writing, in both form and content. At these moments, it feels as if Hebrew waited long for Freud to come along and pour his ideas into it.

Presumably, future translators of Freud into Hebrew will arrive at entirely different conclusions. Indeed, it is difficult to predict which of the directions in which the Hebrew language might develop in the future would be most amenable to Freud's German. In any case, it is certainly true that what one translator experiences as opaque and untranslatable may show itself, in the work of another translator at a different time, as a challenge that the Hebrew language can meet.

One of the plethora of unique linguistic characteristics of Freud's writing, well integrated into his ideas, is the smooth conversion that German allows between verb, noun, and adjective—conversions that enable Freud to incorporate primary process thinking in a discussion conducted according to the rules of secondary process thinking. In his case studies of Dora (1905) and the Wolf-Man (1918), it is easy to confuse Freud's secondary narrative with the primary narrative, in which he allows his patients to tell their own stories. Freud, it should be noted, seldom used quotation marks in presenting material spoken by his patients or other interlocutors.

As Mahony (1987a) noted in his painstaking study of Freud's writing, German is a very dynamic language that contains many terms for movement and passage, allowing Freud to almost spontaneously coin terms such as *transference*. It appears as a simple verb, morphs into a noun, and then is inserted into the narrative as a modifier. He makes rapid and sudden transitions between tenses (especially past and present) of a kind that English seldom allows. But they are very characteristic of Freud's writing and of the psychoanalytic process itself—and Hebrew welcomes them.

Freud's writing is often choppy. Here, too, Hebrew does a good job of conveying Freud's German. In Hebrew, it is much more acceptable to write incomplete sentences, while standard English style views them as improper in expository prose. Hebrew can contain tension between the descriptive scientific language and the dense figurative and metaphorical language used by Freud—a man whose single award in his lifetime was the Goethe Literary Prize. His almost frantic changes of metaphor

give Freud's writing a poetic cast, and also allow him, with surprising ease, to construct sentences saturated with heavy theoretical weight that common sense and other unconscious resistances would make it difficult for the reader to grasp.

Two characteristics of the work of translating Freud that show themselves to be especially useful are the ability to "submit" to the text and a readiness to "compensate" it for the unavoidable insult that the translation commits. When the act of translation becomes an act of decipherment, when the translator's field of vision becomes filled with a single sentence for too long, the time has come to let go, to permit the sentence to elude our understanding, and to share this experience of misunderstanding with the reader through our translation. This, however, entails a certain paradox, as we have to reenact and capture in words that which eluded the source text.

As I observed earlier, it is not unusual for Freud to resort to hyperbole or to make an assertion and then contradict it in the same breath, aided by the fact that German displays an exceptional ability to allow a single word to bear two almost entirely contradictory meanings. Taking the original title of Walter Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator" (1923)—*Die Aufgabe des Uebersetzers*—as an example, one could argue that part of the *aufgabe*, the task, is the ability to *aufgeben*, to allow the text to remain in places in which it repels attempts to translate it.

I would add to this ability to let go a willingness to compensate the translated text for the damage it suffers through translation. I do not mean only compensation for the meanings that get lost because of the paucity of appropriate vocabulary or a lack of syntactic structures that can do justice to the original (I do not believe that it is the psychoanalytic vocabulary that presents the greatest difficulty to Freud's translators—the unique syntactic structures that appear in his writings are much greater challenges). My intended subject is rather the phonetic and musical injuries that the translation inflicts on the text. Freud's writing is poetic, and as such it swings the translator back and forth between phonetic and semantic translation. In other words, it forces him to score the text as if it were a musical piece and to hover between a translation that privileges the sound of the word and one that prefers its precise meaning.

In certain instances, it is hard to know which is more important to Freud: the way the sound of one word evokes another word, or the word's literal meaning. I am referring not only to word games and the sounds characteristic of the descriptions of dreams and parapraxes, but also to the structure of sentences. Freud is said to have been intolerant of music, but there can be no doubt that, as a writer, he constantly listened to his words and attributed the greatest importance to their music. That is why comparing translations of Freud is much like comparing translations of poetry: more than bringing us closer to the truth hidden in the original text, it rescues the text from the disambiguation that a single translation imposes on it. A comparison of different translations restores the work's dialogic qualities and opens up new possibilities of meaning.

It is not easy for a translator to find the right path between floridity—the traditional refuge of translators from time immemorial, but also a trademark of Freudian rhetoric—and the colloquialism of personal and relaxed speech that Freud often puts to surprising use. Freud's constant search for the proper distance or force of voice to support the internal dialogue that he seeks to elicit in his readers makes its presence felt in abrupt shifts between styles of writing and the use of different linguistic registers. Freud's texts are always aimed at more than one imaginary reader. Sometimes he speaks only to the reader, while at other times he lets the reader listen to his, the writer's, internal monologue. In still others, the reader witnesses an exchange between Freud and one of his students or adversaries. A single register, suitable for all, cannot serve such varied interlocutors.

Jorge Luis Borges (1934), the Argentine writer, essayist, and poet, once said that he had no way of explaining his great popularity in North America except for the possibility that English translation had considerably improved his style. This can hardly be said of the *Standard Edition,* which has been criticized right and left—for example, for its choice of terms such as *instinct, ego, id, superego, catharsis,* and *empathy,* all of them fundamental psychoanalytic concepts. All these English word choices are quite alien to the German originals.

Another example: Alix Strachey, who collaborated with her husband James on rendering Freud into English, hated the choice of *empathy* to translate Freud's *Einfülung,* literally *in-feeling* or *feeling-into.* It is, she said,

"a vile word, elephantine, for a subtle process" (A. Strachey quoted in Meisel and Kendrick 1986, p. 171).

Eventually, however, she surrendered to the dictates of Ernest Jones and accepted the word. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the Stracheys, along with Jones—who was the final arbiter of translation questions—were very attentive to the way that Freud had to be translated to render his ideas more palatable to the groups that would determine the fate of psychoanalysis in the Anglo-Saxon world.

There is certainly cause to differ on the word choices made in the *Standard Edition*, choices that lead many readers to search out psychoanalysis in lexicographic fields rather than in the area of therapy. Another problem is English sentences that, on the one hand, flatten Freud's rich language, and on the other distance it from common usage. It would have been better not to omit obscure or annoying sentences as the Stracheys did. Furthermore, translators should preserve the original's paragraph divisions, so singular in Freud's work, almost no trace of which remain in the *Standard Edition*.

But all this is inevitable. Better than criticizing the editors of the standard English edition for their desire to enrich psychoanalytic language with pseudoscientific terms is to decry the unfortunate term *standard* that expedited the canonization of Freud's works and did the disservice of stamping them with an almost alchemical imprimatur.

The Stracheys and Jones seemed to have been seeking to raise the level of codification in Freud's language. That is, they sought to create a situation in which the communicative value of the word increases because it is assigned to an agreed-upon concept. Like an Eskimo, whose language offers a range of terms signifying different kinds of snow, and like a musician, who has a technical vocabulary enabling him to name and discuss harmonies and tone relations that are not distinguished by laymen, the psychological therapist would be happy to have a vocabulary that could pinpoint shades of affective meaning and complex psychic processes and phenomena.

Yet in his writing, Freud tried to prevent that. He mocked psychiatrists who coined large numbers of names for mental phenomena, preferring the poetic method of combining familiar words so as to awaken

in his readers as many associations and contexts as he could. He was not eager to exchange these for neologisms.

The considerations that guided the editors of the *Standard Edition* were generally ideological rather than aesthetic, but I believe that it would be exaggerating to claim, as some have, that psychoanalysis is everything that got lost in the English translation. There is considerable hyperbole in the claim that Jones's desire to give Freud's work a scientific cast distanced psychoanalysis from the humanist tradition in which Freud was educated. Not only is the distinction between science (*wissenschaft*) and humanism much less sharp in German than in the English tradition, but Freud's writing always walks the line between the positivist-scientific and humanist-hermeneutic-literary genres. This kind of scholarly prose characterized the writing of many Central European intellectuals of Freud's time, serving their wish to integrate their classical humanist educations with their commitment to the positivist paradigm that shaped the scientific discourse of the late nineteenth century.

English is, by nature, less tolerant of the ambiguity and tentativeness characteristic of Freud's German. To the Stracheys' credit, they were aware of the limitations imposed by casting Freud's German into Bloomsbury English. This is testified to by the epitaph affixed to the first volume of the monumental translation project:

> To the thoughts and words of
> SIGMUND FREUD
> this their Blurred Reflection
> Is dedicated by its contriver,
> James Strachey

Every translation involves a paradox of sorts. On the one hand it creates a new wedge between the writer and his ideas, but on the other hand it enriches the target language, tests its boundaries, its flexibility, confronts it with its weaknesses and blind spots. The translation also puts to the test the way in which the language describes and fashions the world of its readers. As a translator, I generally preferred not to weigh down the work with a trail of footnotes chronicling the tribulations of my translation process. The lives of Freud's readers are difficult enough without that. Freud pitches them back and forth between the body of the

text and its margins, blurring the imaginary boundary between essential and rudimental.

I believe it best to confine footnotes to issues that can help readers place the author's statements in their theoretical, historical, or literary context. Furthermore, lexicographical footnotes impede the absorption of a text in its new linguistic environment. They serve the translator more than they respond to any real need of the reader. I thus advocate compensation. What I mean by that is that I sometimes prefer to translate a given word that has no precise Hebrew equivalent in one way in one place and in another way elsewhere. In this way, I am better able to mark out the range of meaning that the word covers in Freud's German.

It goes without saying, however, that such an attempt to capture the entire range of a German word used in a specific context by rendering it in several different Hebrew words has a serious drawback. The practice is inconsistent with the necessity of providing Hebrew readers with a standard psychoanalytic lexicon, so foreign to Freud's free choice of words. His words, especially those he takes from spoken German, are not code words with meanings about which there is a consensus. These words derive their meaning from their context, from the words around them. With Freud, words are much like people. They not only speak with each other, but also sometimes require other words near them in order to know who they are.

Words also have meanings that derive from their pasts, which are not necessarily identical to the meanings that parallel words in other language have gathered up over the course of their histories. In Freud's case, words he used continued to collect meanings during his half-century of writing, and the only way to grasp the full sense of a word is to gain an acquaintance with Freud's full *oeuvre*.

But there is another, opposite danger as well. Like famished hunters of meaning, we are liable to load down Freud's words not only with meanings gained at later stages of his own writing, but also meanings added during the development of the psychoanalytic discourse after Freud. A question today is whether a translator can facilitate the reading of this 19th-century neurologist. Can one use the terms that later emerged to supplement the mechanistic language of drives with which Freud substantiated most of his technical recommendations? What about the lan-

guage of object relations, self psychology, or the interpersonal and relational schools, which entered the psychoanalytic discourse at subsequent stages of its development and enriched psychoanalytic language in a way that makes it possible to translate Freud outside his historical context and render the text more contemporary?

The translation of Freud's writings into other languages played an important role in the acceptance of psychoanalysis outside the German cultural sphere. Some of Freud's translators have adopted Hegel's wish "to teach philosophy to speak German" (Sallis 2002, p. 16). Rather than translate Freud, they seek to "teach" him to write in a specific language or echo a particular psychoanalytic school of thought. The enterprise of translating Freud into Hebrew has seen several attempts at such *translation nationalism* (Venuti 2013) and has mobilized contextualization.

Similarly, translations of Freud into Hebrew done in the 1930s and '40s used biblical and Talmudic language. More than being prompted by constraints of the language at the time, this was meant to make Freud's writing part of the canon of Jewish intellectual works then being put into place by the Jewish national movement. Evidence of this can be seen in a letter sent to Freud by Yehuda Dvosis-Dvir, his first Hebrew translator. Dvosis-Dvir supplemented his rendering of *Totem and Taboo* (Freud 1912–1913) with footnotes adducing biblical passages. The purpose, the translator told Freud, was "to strengthen and corroborate your claims, and occasionally cast them in a new light" (see Rolnik 2012, p. 170).

In the introduction he wrote to the first Hebrew edition—published in 1935—of his 1916–1917 work *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud was bold enough to cast doubt on whether Moses and the prophets would have understood the Hebrew version of his works. This did not, however, prevent the judges of the Tchernichovsky Prize from awarding this honor to Zvi Wislavsky for his translation of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (Freud 1901). Praising Wislavsky for his use of Mishnaic and Midrashic language, the judges declared that, had they not known the work was a translation, they would have thought it written in Hebrew by an ancient (Rolnik 2012).

The dilemmas that arose in the work of translating technical writings into Hebrew were heterogeneous, relating to clinical and technical vocabulary, linguistic structures, terms, and idioms, all of which have

advanced considerably over eighty years of psychoanalytic discourse in Hebrew. But during the process of doing my own translations, I realized that these impasses seemed to want to prove to me that my translation would always be affected by the linguistic climate of the clinical practice of the day.

Freud (1923) published his structural model in the same year that Walter Benjamin published his essay "The Task of the Translator" (1923). Benjamin argued that a bad translation is one that tries to carry out the technical function of conveying information by means of bogus precision. Such a translation leaves in only those parts of the original text that are not vital. Good translations, on the other hand, give the original an afterlife (*Fortleben*), thanks to the fleeting way in which meaning adheres to them.

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The years I spent translating Freud into Hebrew taught me that, paradoxically, just as psychoanalysis should sometimes rest content by conveying to the patient the limitations of the analyst's understanding (A. Freud 1969), so the good enough translation is not always the most precise or "terminable" one. In fact, a psychoanalytically informed Freud translation is usually an interminable one that, while diligently conveying the original language of psychoanalysis—the language psychoanalysts spoke "before Babel"—also tacitly encourages the reader to search further for his own private language of psychoanalysis.

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THE PATERNAL PRINCIPLE: EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

BY JAY GREENBERG

In two fascinating papers, Cláudio Eizirik and Marilia Aisenstein explore the role of the father in both development and clinical practice. The conceptual frame of both papers is anchored in structural thinking, which is more familiar to Latin American and European analysts than it is to most Anglophone readers; because of this, it is important to highlight their central arguments and to spell out what I see as their challenge to North American theorizing.

The concept of *paternal principle*—distinct from any actual relationship between a particular father and a particular son—is implicit but central to Freud's understanding of the social structure into which we are born. Historicized—as Eizirik notes—in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–1913), and developed—as Aisenstein emphasizes in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), the structural view posits a paternal function that precedes and even overshadows lived experience. This contrasts dramatically with North American thinking that was influenced first by ego psychology and later by interpersonal thinking, self psychology, and eventually the relational turn. Each of these traditions privileges what is specific, unique, and observable in the unfolding of individual relationships.

Totem and Taboo and *Moses and Monotheism* focused on the phylogenetic roots of the paternal principle. Freud was less interested in its ontogeny, but two enigmatic passages do address the issue. First, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), Freud writes that "Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (p. 105).

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And, developing the idea two years later, he writes in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) that:

> An individual's first and most important identification [is] his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory. This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate iden- tification and takes place earlier than any object-cathexis. [p. 31]

In putting things this way, Freud makes it clear that the father—as a *principle* or *function*—is an unconscious presence prior to object related- ness. The father with whom we originally identify is not, therefore, the historical father; this is what Freud means when he says that the identifi- cation is part of our "personal prehistory."

This structural approach shapes the sensibility of many continental analysts; for instance, Green (1986) says of the primal scene that it is part of the structure of being human, even if it is never personally wit- nessed. Similarly to Green, Eizirik sees the father not as "the historical oedipal father, the object of desire, or a figure arousing destructive ri- valry, but rather a psychic formation characterized by his third-party role as a separator of mother and child, *and should be understood as a father principle*" (2015, p. 343, italics added).

Aisenstein, noting the connection between the father principle and primal identification, energetically agrees with this; she writes that "the father as *function* or *principle* can be separated from the person of the biological father in flesh and blood" (2015, p. 354).

This point of view has implications both for our developmental theory and for our understanding of the psychoanalytic situation. Per- haps most challenging to North American thinking, it calls into ques- tion, *in principle*, the concept of the dyad. If the presence of the father is established prior to the cathexis of the mother, the structure of related- ness is triangular at its core.

Eizirik is explicit about this, noting that the role of the father has been "neglected by psychoanalysis in the emphasis on the relationship between mother and baby" (p. 345). Consider attachment theory, with its implication that what matters most is what can be inferred from ob- servations of dyadic interactions.

In contrast, both Eizirik and Aisenstein believe that the father profoundly affects all human experience, even if he is absent and even if he has never been met. Aisenstein is especially emphatic about the centrality of the father principle, approvingly citing Stoloff's (2007) idea that emphasis on "the historical weight of real fathers . . . prevents us from focusing on the importance of the symbolic father function" (p. 352). On this view, it is not only the dyad but lived experience itself that can cloud our appreciation of the deepest levels of the father's unconscious presence and influence.

And for both Eizirik and Aisenstein, an appreciation of the paternal principle is in many cases essential to our understanding of therapeutic action, because it accounts for how a benign and sustaining relationship to a father can emerge in the course of treatment, despite the failings of the actual father, and even when the analyst is a woman. Eizirik strongly agrees with Delourmel's (2012) idea that:

> We as analysts must maintain the hope for change and transmit this hope, even in cases of multiple trauma where the real father has failed, while continuing to believe in the patient's primary psychic potential (the father principle) beyond ontogeny, *whose role of induction can be activated/reactivated through the analytic relationship.* [Eizirik 2015, p. 344, italics added]

Eizirik himself puts this poignantly, writing that the paternal principle is "the birthright . . . of what in each new generation needs only to be awakened rather than learned" (p. 342). Aisenstein illustrates this in the discussion of her work with her patient Adrian; she also addressed the theme in her recent paper "A Particular Form of Paternal Identification in Women" (2012). In another recent paper, Faimberg (2013) located a similar sensibility in Winnicott's work; she introduced her original concept of the *as-yet situation* to account for what Eizirik characterizes as an awakening.

The structuralist framework that informs both Eizirik's and Aisenstein's contributions has important implications not only for our understanding of psychoanalytic process, but also for the way we conceptualize the nature of the unconscious itself. In their dialogue, these two authors contribute significantly to the development of their own points of view,

and at the same time interrogate the assumptions of those who work with dramatically different conceptual premises.

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THE FATHER, THE FATHER FUNCTION, THE FATHER PRINCIPLE: SOME CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYTIC DEVELOPMENTS

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The author discusses Freud's thinking on the role of the father, as well as that of later French theoreticians. To illustrate his remarks, he draws on the poetry of Carlos Drummond de Andrade (1912–1987), a Brazilian poet whose work often dealt with themes of the father, the family, and his own paternal relationship. The author also discusses the psychic formation of the father principle and how this may be evident in the clinical analytic setting, even when the analyst's approach privileges field theory, intersubjectivity, or other concepts emphasizing the relationship between analyst and patient.

INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalysis, since its beginning, has dealt with different ways of approaching and attempting to describe or search for meaning in the manifold aspects of human existence. Among many challenges, it tackles the complex, somehow mysterious or enigmatic figure of the father, and his lifelong influence on the life of his children and even on subsequent generations.

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In this paper, I will elaborate on some of Freud's seminal contributions about the role of the father and his conflicted relationships with his children. I will also describe some more recent contributions by French authors. To introduce and illustrate these psychoanalytic views of the role of the father, I will present some aspects of the life and poetry of Carlos Drummond de Andrade (1956, 1963, 1984, 1996, 2000), considered the most important Brazilian poet of the twentieth century.

A POET EXPRESSES HIS PATERNAL RELATIONSHIP

Carlos Drummond de Andrade was born in 1912 in Itabira (located in a mountainous mining region in Minas Gerais, Brazil) and died in Rio de Janeiro in 1987. According to biographical accounts, as well as interviews with the poet himself, his relationship with his father, Carlos de Paula Andrade, was extremely ambivalent. His father was a powerful figure, very strict and authoritarian, and throughout his life Drummond de Andrade felt he had betrayed his father's values and wishes; however, at the same time, he spoke of his love and respect for his father, whose photograph occupied a prominent place in his office.

In one of his last interviews, Drummond de Andrade referred to his father as a sort of judge or avenger, while his mother was described as sweet. Once he had raised his hand toward his father in self-defense, fearing he would hit him, and his father, in turn, stared at him in astonishment, as he had feared that his son would strike *him*. One of his brothers then shouted, half jokingly, "This is parricide!"

One of Drummond de Andrade's most dramatic poems, "Travel in the Family," deals mainly with his relationship with his father:

> In the desert of Itabira
> The shadow of my father
> Took me by the hand.
> So much time lost
> But he didn't say anything
> It was neither day nor night
> But he didn't say anything
> . . . Stepping on books and letters
> We travel in the family . . . .

What a cruel, obscure instinct
Moved its pallid hand
Subtly pushing us
Into the forbidden time forbidden places?
I looked in his white eyes
I cried to him: Speak! My voice
Shook in the air a moment
Beat on the stones. The shadow
Proceeded slowly on
With that pathetic traveling
Across the lost kingdom
But he didn't say anything
I saw grief, misunderstanding
And more than an old revolt
Dividing us in the dark . . .
Refusal to ask pardon
Pride. Terror at night
Speak speak speak speak
I pulled him by his coat
That was turning into clay
By the hands, by the boots
I caught at his strict shadow
And the shadow released itself
With neither haste nor anger
But he remained silent . . . .
There were our difficult lives
And a great separation
In the little space of the room.
The narrow space of life
Holds me close to its shadow,
And on this diaphanous embrace
It is as if I burned myself
All, of poignant love.
Only today do we know each other!
Eyeglasses, memories, photographs
Flow in the river of blood . . . .
Waters no longer allow
To distinguish his distant face,
Distant by seventy years
I felt that he pardoned me

But he didn't say anything
The waters cover his mustache, the family, Itabira, all.[1]
[1963, pp. 66-68]

While reading this poem several times, as though I were listening to a patient's dream, I was struck by its rhythm, by the repetition of the son's request for a word from his father, receiving as an answer only silence, but at the same time feeling the father's hand pushing him through the desert (a strong metaphor for their relationship) and remaining at his side throughout this sad family journey to forbidden places of the past.

As we read the poem, it is as if we are witnessing a voyage to the inner world of the poet—"the little space of the room"—and following his different mental states, reliving past revolts, his deceptions of his father, their difficult shared lives, and eventually his getting closer to his father, feeling "burned . . . all, of poignant love," and finally his feeling pardoned.

But pardoned for what? For his attacks? For frustrating his father's plans for him? For his oedipal wishes, seen in frequent references to naked women? For eventually defeating his father through his success as a well-known poet? Or is this an expression of the unavoidable guilt across the generations for the collective murder of the primeval father? In many of Drummond de Andrade's poems, we perceive his somehow ironic view of himself and his relationship with the powerful and wealthy family of the past.

In another poem, Drummond de Andrade, who jokingly referred to himself as a *farmer of the air*—in contrast to his landowner father—imagines a family dinner in which his father would look at him

. . . with a weary expression, accustomed to perusing the fields
Immense distances, and in the vast expanse a cow
Lost within the bluest blue . . . .
A look that delved into our souls
Acknowledging their putrid depths
With sorrow in his gaze
Cursing in his rage
And gently forgiving.
[1963, p. 74]

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[1] All translations from Drummond de Andrade are by Elizabeth Bishop.

And the poet describes himself as follows:

> I possess all the flaws
> I never glimpsed in you
> And none of your own
> Much less the qualities . . . .
> Nevertheless: I am your son
> Albeit a negative
> Means of confirmation
> . . . So little pleasure I gave you
> Perhaps, none . . . except
> The hope of pleasure
> Perhaps I imparted
> The neutral satisfaction
> Of one who feels their son
> Is so utterly worthless, that he may not
> Be perverse.
> And I am not.
>
> [1963, p. 79]

One can easily trace his self-doubt and constant anxiety in the face of such a powerful father figure.

FATHERS AND SONS IN GREEK MYTHOLOGY AND IN THE BIBLE

Another extremely rich source of insight into the father can be found in the mythologies of many different cultures and eras. In the Ancient Greek story of Daedalus and Icarus, for instance, the father designs wings of feathers and wax that enable the pair to escape from an island prison. Daedalus warns his son not to fly too high or too low, but Icarus, full of the joy of flight, soars too close to the sun. The heat melts the wax that holds his wings together and he plummets into the sea, where he drowns.

This story is thematically similar to that of Phaethon, son of the sun god and a mortal woman. Phaethon seeks out his father, and in his pleasure, Apollo grants him anything he wishes, not realizing that his son's greatest wish is to take his place for a day. When Phaethon announces his desire, Apollo cannot help but acquiesce since he has sworn an oath.

He tries to dissuade the boy with dire warnings, but Phaethon insists on driving the chariot of the sun. The results are disastrous. He loses control of the horses and flies everywhere, scorching heaven and earth, until Zeus himself intervenes and strikes the boy dead with a thunderbolt.

Almost all father–son tales are about the consequences of trespass or, put another way, the cost of disobeying the law of the father. They can be seen as cautionary tales that serve the best interest of the patriarchy by helping to maintain the father's authority, both within the family and in the culture.

The significance of stories about fathers willing to sacrifice or murder their sons is often less apparent, and perhaps because of this, more disturbing. One of the most famous of these is the biblical tale of Abraham and Isaac, in which God tests Abraham by commanding that he sacrifice his son. After much anguish, Abraham takes Isaac up to an altar on a mountain, but just as he is about to slit his son's throat, God, now convinced of Abraham's loyalty, intervenes, and a ram magically appears, tangled in a bush. Abraham is permitted to offer it in Isaac's place. From a father's point of view, this is a gut-wrenching story of divided loyalties—that of culture versus family. In this case, Abraham's loyalty to God (culture) is rewarded, and the substitute sacrifice offers him the best of both worlds, with both culture and family intact.

From the son's point of view, however, this may appear to be a story about a father who cares more for his God than his own flesh and blood. The happy outcome is not as convincing, and the son is left with the traumatic image of a God who demanded his death and a father who was willing to kill him.

The New Testament introduces a different sort of father figure to remedy the harsh and demanding God of Abraham. The Gospel of John puts it quite explicitly: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life" (King James version). The change is quite radical: instead of demanding that fathers sacrifice sons to prove their loyalty to him, God the father, the God of the New Testament, actually sacrifices his own son for the sake of humankind. And whereas the Old Testament God relented at the last moment by offering Abraham a substitute sacrifice, this God allows his son to die on the cross. No substitutes—his devotion to humankind is that profound.

If we examine the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the logic goes even further: God and Christ are one and the same, and so God has actually allowed *himself* to be killed by humans in order to show his devotion to them. To illustrate his promise of everlasting life, he even rises from the grave. And yet even this story cannot avoid an ironic plea from a son's point of view: in his last moments on the cross, Christ laments to his father, "*Eli, Eli, lama sabachtani?*" ("My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?").

Despite their differing origins, locations, and characters, mythological and biblical narratives recurrently depict an ambivalent relationship between fathers and their children: murder, revenge, castration, and envy are on one side, while love, admiration, and the wish to be like the father coexist on the other. In short, these myths and stories form the foundations that allowed Freud and later analysts to put forward a new and coherent view of the unconscious dimension that traverses the ages, phylogeny, and ontogeny.

FREUD'S VIEWS ON THE FATHER

Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (1912–1913) is key to understanding the role of the father in both the individual and collective mind. One can consider that Freud establishes his phylogenetic model of the father figure in this work, beginning with the hypothesis of the father's murder and subsequent devouring by the primal horde—henceforth transmitted in hereditary form—which he characterizes as the original and greatest crime of humanity and the individual. The identification process is based on the murder and devouring of the father by the group of expelled brothers. The slaying of their envied and feared father, object of the conflicting feelings that form the ambivalent content of the paternal complex, gives rise to feelings of guilt and is the basis for the original prohibition against incest.

In other words, the primal father becomes more powerful in death than in life, since what he once prohibited through his mere existence is now something of which his sons deprive themselves in his stead. They renounce crime, prohibit the murder of the substitute father—the totem—and relinquish their right to be his offspring, depriving them-

selves of consequently liberated women as well. And so, driven by a son's feelings of guilt, the two fundamental taboos of totemism were established, in line with the two repressed desires of the Oedipus complex. Those who flouted these taboos were deemed guilty of the only two crimes that concerned primal society.

Thus, the dead father and his retrospective idealization through the aggrandizement of his image also form the basis for civilization and religion. These two founding events—the murder of the father and the act of devouring him—are symbolically updated in the periodic ritual of the totemic meal, perhaps the first human ceremony to repeat and celebrate this criminal gesture from which so many developments emerged, such as social hierarchies, moral restrictions, and organized religions (Freud 1939). The feast is a means of reliving these psychic residues of primitive times, becoming the birthright of what in each new generation needs only to be awakened rather than learned.

An additional aspect is that limiting the tendency to violent rivalry among the brothers ensured their equality, through a drive reduction that is justified by the need to maintain the new order that emerged following elimination of the father. This demonstrates the relevance of a process whose essential element, repeated in the evolution of each individual, is that of renouncing the drives.

These elements of Freud's ideas are based on Darwin's notion of the primal horde and the Robertson Smith hypothesis on the totemic meal, as well as the extensive ethnological documentation available in Freud's time, particularly that of Frazer. It is well known that there has since been widespread opposition to this model, both by anthropologists and by many psychoanalysts.

DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR THINKING ABOUT THE FATHER

In a recent in-depth study of the paternal function and the father principle, Delourmel (2012) points out that the historical truth to which Freud refers was not that of historians, but rather concerned ontogenic development—what was held to be true by the child, with the potential for belief and/or conviction that characterizes the childlike. Freud's per-

sistent hold on this re-creation of what occurred in ancient times demonstrates his interest in the psychoanalytic truth; in this regard, I believe there is powerful corroborative evidence in clinical work with dreams and transference that repeatedly shows us—as much as mythology does—that fantasies of parricide, totemic meals, and resulting prohibitions influence all of us. Thus, one can conclude that, faced with the unknown regarding nature and the origins of the father in the psyche, Freud extracted from ethnological literature what he deemed useful for analytic work.

Among the many authors dedicated to discussing and expanding on Freud's ideas, Green (1995) is particularly noteworthy in suggesting the notion of identification with the primordial father. According to Green, inhibition is at the heart of primary identification with the father. On a primal level, the father is not the historical oedipal father, the object of desire, or a figure arousing destructive rivalry, but rather a psychic formation characterized by his third-party role as a separator of mother and child, and should be understood as a *father principle*.

Concomitant with the establishment of the framing structure of the mother (meaning that there is a psychic structure of the mother function, regardless of whether or not she is concretely present), the father principle as a psychic formation develops through exchanges with the primary object. One of its characteristics is the inhibition of the goal, which can be better understood in the words of Green (1995):

> The father principle, that is, this primordial identification with the father, holds an equivalent position to feelings that preserve the fate of investments toward the object, renouncing complete achievement of the goal. In short, this primal identification, prior to any conflict, acts toward the father in a manner comparable to the behavior of inhibition toward the goal in relation to the mother.[2] [p. 87]

The father principle is transformed during the oedipal stage, into a secondary identification with the castrating father, and is transferred to the ego ideal when the Oedipus complex declines.

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[2] This is my translation from the original French.

It is important to highlight at this point that Green stresses the articulation of the father principle with the framing structure of the mother. Building on what Freud (1912–1913) described about the nature of the sexual drive, which does not favor the attainment of full satisfaction, Green suggested that this limitation (not obtaining full satisfaction) results from an internal operation—something going on at the level of the drives, not resulting from any external influence—that leads to a repression. This would mean a change in the nature of the sexual drive.

This renouncement of the drive's total satisfaction is what makes it possible to maintain an essential component: the link with the parents, the relationship of tenderness. And this is also what allows for the link with the object, the maintenance of some investments in a lasting and unchangeable way, in a solid connection with inhibition concerning the aim of the drive (Green 1986). This may be considered a foundational moment in which there is an internalization not of the object, but of a state of absence of the object, resulting in a framing structure of the mind. If we take into account the action of the work of the negative (Green 1999) in its structuring aspect, the framing structure of the mother can be conceived as a functional capacity resulting from the work of mourning for the primal object.

In his research on paternal function and the father principle, Delourmel (2012) examines Freud's phylogenetic model and other father models developed by contemporary authors, identifying the constant presence of a basic pair of ideas—inhibition/externalization, which characterize the paternal function. Delourmel also proposes a hypothesis about the father principle, in line with Green, and its relationship with the paternal function, viewing these as an opposition/intricacy between phylogeny and ontogeny.

Delourmel is a fierce advocate of the need to defend the phylogenetic hypothesis, since we as analysts must maintain the hope for change and transmit this hope, even in cases of multiple trauma where the real father has failed, while continuing to believe in the patient's primary psychic potential (the father principle) beyond ontogeny, whose role of induction can be activated/reactivated through the analytic relationship. This is a central point in the current discussion, since it allows us to believe—or at least to keep alive the hope—that something primary has

been established, despite all sorts of negative life experiences, and that this more positive element will someday appear in the transference and in the patient's life.

If we consider the phylogenetic hypothesis relevant, and if we accept the basic assumptions established by Freud beginning with *Totem and Taboo* (1912–1913), we will agree that there will always be a psychic presence of the father. We see this over and over again—not only in the transference with patients who did not have the concrete presence of a father, but also in our observations of daily life and of literature. We need only remember Jean Valjean in *Les Misérables* (Hugo 1862).

A central element of Delourmel's (2012) proposal is the relevance of inhibition as a key aspect of the father principle. For this author, there is an important link between the father principle and the process of thinking. The father principle is something whose action is manifested by the advent of an inhibitory function that occurs in the process of theoretical thinking. More primary than the dead father, beyond parricide, the father principle would not need to kill (as suggested by Freud [1912–1913]) in order to impose itself, being content either in prevailing or not.

From this selective, far from extensive sample of contributions to the study of the origin and function of the paternal function in the individual and collective psyche, it is apparent that an extensive debate is under way regarding a central figure in the shaping of the psyche. This was initially much focused on by Freud, but was later neglected by psychoanalysis in the emphasis on the relationship between mother and baby, and has only recently recaptured our interest as psychoanalysts.

It is possible that, among other reasons for this renewed interest, there is a certain decadence in relation to the father, his function, and the father principle in the Western world, with its fragmented scenario, replete with uncertainties, complexities, and ambiguities. Stoloff (2007) considered the current scenario and strongly stressed the need of a father function.

Perhaps there is confusion between the rejection of the patriarchal figure, authoritarian and dominant, and the need for, at the very least, a father principle. Today we are witnessing the violent and irrational operations of several fundamentalist versions of different religions, in which

the presence of an authoritarian and inflexible version of the father who kills opponents and enemies and keeps women in a humiliating role threatens all expressions of independent thinking.

THE FATHER PRINCIPLE
IN THE CLINICAL SETTING

If we consider the changes that have occurred in the manner of reflecting on and practicing psychoanalysis, with its new vision of the analytic field, intersubjectivity, and the cooperative relationship between analyst and patient, as well as the increasing value placed on the analyst's mind, we realize the need to formulate a theory that encompasses this new reality.

For instance, when we read contributions by Ferro and Ogden, strongly influenced by Bion, we can see that there is a shift from reconstruction of the patient's history to the work done jointly by patient and analyst, in the session, which is often described as the dream jointly dreamed by both of them. In this novel and stimulating version of psychoanalysis, we do not search for historical meaning or connections or for causality as a central principle, but rather we seek to understand and describe what is happening at each moment in the here and now. Ogden's (1994) extremely original formulation of the *analytic third* is possibly one of the most innovative descriptions of the way that many analysts currently theorize their clinical practice.

This goes hand in hand with the notion put forward by Baranger and Baranger (1961–1962, 2008) about the analytic field, jointly built by patient and analyst. The Barangers suggested that there is a shared fantasy of the field, as well as *bastions* or bulwarks—a jointly built resistance to analyze and modify character traits of the patient, which reflects the analyst's blind spots as well. However, the Barangers also cautioned us about the fact that the existence of a certain asymmetry in the analytic relationship cannot be denied, and the notion of a father principle continues to be relevant and indispensable.

In my view, we have a controversial issue here. If we see the analytic relationship as a situation in which a patient seeks an analyst for help with his emotional suffering, and the analyst establishes a frame according to usual procedures, it goes without saying that the notion of

a father function or principle will always play a central part in this anal-ysis, just as the disposition to maternity suggested by Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984) will also have a role.

But what about the formulation according to which the analytic dyad builds a new history with their joint work, as Ferro, Ogden, and others propose—would that formulation prevent us from the need of such a notion? Despite our growing awareness of the nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis—in which the relationship between patient and analyst plays a central role, as well as the analyst's mind—many of us still consider neutrality essential to our method (Eizirik 2007).

In my view, regardless of the approach we adopt and regardless of the way we deal with the analytic relationship, the existence of a certain asymmetry is germane to the analytic method, and as a consequence, even when not explicitly mentioned or directly addressed, the notion of the father principle is always present. After all, the analyst remains the guardian of the setting, and he is the one who offers interpretations—whatever notion of the unconscious we adopt and whatever our version of the analytic method.

THE POET AND THE FATHER PRINCIPLE

Throughout his long and productive work as a writer, Carlos Drummond de Andrade not only came into close contact with the significant social conflicts of his time and therefore discovered the other, but also and primarily connected more and more with his own inner struggles. One notices that his poetry conducts a long, careful, and detailed exploration of the topics of childhood, his relationship with his father, family life, ex-periences with friends, moving from town to town, social consciousness, and the *feeling of the world*, which is the title of one of his poems.

The poet, who addresses passion and eroticism in his final years—in-deed, in a vigorous expression of Eros against the unavoidable reunion with Thanatos—concludes his work with the impressive *Farewell* (1996), a requiem for himself and his poetry. The book explores and works through the loss of the most precious gift, life itself, and was left edited and ready for publishing just before his death. It is his poetic will.

Santiago (1996) points out that, in this book, passionate love reappears in the form of a beautiful sonnet that begins with the first line of one of Camões's poems[3]:

> The great pain of past things
> Has converted into delicate pleasure
> When, among a thousand faded photographs
> I had the fortune and grace of seeing you.
> [Drummond de Andrade 1996, p. 18]

This was the poet's final battle, one in which—released from the stylistic and possibly inner constraints that forced his poetry into a more rigid and sometimes distant shape—he leans closer toward the love encounter, exploring its almost endless possibilities, saying his *Farewell* at the same time that he celebrates *natural love* (Drummond de Andrade 2000).

Taking into account what I have described in this paper and the long poetic journey of Carlos Drummond de Andrade, I believe that the poet worked through his ambivalent relationship with the previous Carlos, his father. He attacked him, castrated him, mocked him, killed him as a giant, feared him as a god, despised him, envied him, loved him, occupied his place in the mother's bed, accepted the father function and the father principle—and became himself a loving father to his daughter, and possibly also to thousands of readers who took him as a model and an inspirational figure.

Eventually, the poet found the unexpected happiness of living with others and with himself, thus freeing himself to live the encounter with the other and to find natural love. It seems to me, that ultimately, he succeeded in the extremely difficult task of identifying with his father, as though he had "burned" himself with "poignant love" (Drummond de Andrade 1963, p. 68).

CONCLUSION

Drawn from the poet's vast body of work, my comments are merely examples of how an analyst may read and try to transform poetry in

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[3] Luís de Camões (1524–1580) is often considered the greatest poet of Portugal and of the Portuguese language.

an attempt—perhaps an idiosyncratic one—to find some unconscious meaning or association with his own work. Once in a while, I find—right in the middle of an analytic session, as I listen to a patient—that the best idea or association that occurs to me is a line of Drummond de Andrade's, which I translate into the language of that particular analytic dialogue.

In a similar way, our inner dialogue with our parents, analysts, supervisors, with Freud, and with the analytic authors with whom we feel most at home is a way for us to take advantage of the notion of the ever-present and always-inspiring father function and father principle.

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THE QUESTION OF THE FATHER IN 2015

BY MARILIA AISENSTEIN

> **Keywords:** Freud, paternal issues, fathers, Cláudio Eizirik, Moses, triangulation, Oedipus, Lacan, Ancient Greece, identification, parricide.

It is a pleasure and an honor to have been asked to discuss Cláudio Eizirik's very deep and comprehensive paper on the question of the father. It is rather difficult to discuss a work when one is mostly in agreement with it, so I will simply make a few comments and raise some questions.

I was charmed by Eizirik's quotations from the work of the poet Carlos Drummond de Andrade. Eizirik's culture and love for literature touch me a lot and remind me, obviously, of Freud, a prodigious reader himself, for whom the poets knew how to speak about the psyche better than we technicians of analysis do. I recall that the novel Freud preferred to all others was *The Brothers Karamazov* (Dostoyevsky 1880), whose theme is three parricides in thought and one parricide in action.

I will add only one detail to the author's detour through mythology and tales. I have a question: Eizirik refers to the Old and the New Testaments, and says that the New Testament

> . . . introduces a different form of father figure to remedy the harsh and demanding God of Abraham . . . . The change is quite radical: instead of demanding that fathers sacrifice sons to prove their loyalty to him, God the father, the God of the New Testament, actually sacrifices his own son for the sake of humankind. [2015, p. 340]

For me, this is a very profound and crucial statement. My question is this: could we go as far as to say, as Freud does in *Moses and Monotheism*

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(1939), that the fate of Judaism is to remain the religion of the father, whereas, by deifying the son, Christianity has become a religion of the son? I dare to say that this is my opinion.

I would also like to mention here another sacrificed son, at the origin of Islam, the third monotheist religion: after the miraculous birth of Isaac, Ishmael, the first son of Abraham and his servant Hagar, was banished with his mother. Exiled and rejected, he became the founder of Mecca. The building of Mecca may thus be seen as a response to the broken relationship between father and son in the Bible.

I entirely agree with Eizirik's analysis of *Totem and Taboo* (Freud 1912–1913) but would like to add a few words from *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), where Freud states:

> This turning from the mother to the father points in addition to a victory of intellectuality over sensuality—that is, an advance in civilization, since maternity is proved by the evidence of the senses while paternity is a hypothesis, based on an inference and a premise. [p. 114]

Stoloff (2007) condemns with great precision what he defines as an amalgam of a theory of cultural and symbolic parenthood and the primacy accorded to patriarchy throughout history. I tend to agree with Stoloff. For him, the primacy accorded to the powerful paterfamilias over many centuries has influenced our thought and leads us to blend the theory of symbolic fatherhood with the historical weight of real fathers. Moreover, this prevents us from focusing on the importance of the symbolic father function.

This is why I have no difficulty in agreeing with Eizirik's remarks on Freud's thinking as expressed in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–1913), as well as on the contributions of Green (1995), and finally on those of Delourmel (2012), who, for his part, moves from the function to the *principle*.

For me, a book that gives a perfect illustration of the difference between the symbolic father, the function, the principle, and the real presence of the father is Barack Obama's *Dreams from My Father* (1995), written when the author was a law professor at Harvard. This fascinating memoir—what might be called an autobiographical novel—is an account of Obama's childhood mixed with adult reflections. After his father had

returned to Africa, he was brought up by his mother alone, who had to get up at 4:00 in the morning to make him do his homework before she went to work. She asked him whether he thought she enjoyed getting up so early to wake him, but then pointed out that she had no choice.

I think we see here how a single mother can introduce the law as a third element to which we are all subjected—that is to say, to represent the *paternal function,* as it is described in French psychoanalytic literature. So we can see that the young Barack was taught to carry within him the paternal function or principle.[1]

As I said earlier, I want to come back to *Moses and Monotheism* (Freud 1939), a text that fascinates me. It has been sharply contested for its reconstruction of origins, and Freud himself vacillated between describing it as a *historical novel* or as *analysis applied to history*. Personally, I would call it *theoretical fiction.* He was passionately interested in writing this essay but was hesitant about publishing it.

There are grounds for thinking that *Moses* concerns Freud's ambivalence toward his father and his Judaism, but for me it is important to resituate it within the context of its time—that is to say, within the events of the rise of Nazism and the triumph of barbarism. We may suppose that Freud's sense of urgency arose from what he was witnessing in what could be called the Old Europe, which was thought of as being so "civilized." At the same time, he had to abandon his illusions concerning the work of civilization (*Kulturarbeit*), as well as some of his psychoanalytic illusions: he was faced with analyses that were interminable—with difficult patients, with splitting, negative therapeutic reactions, clinical masochism, and so on.

The thesis that Moses was an Egyptian seems to me crucial. Although this thesis was not totally new (some historians had already proposed it), when formulated by Freud, it became revolutionary. By publishing *Moses,* Freud was taking a risk not only with regard to the Nazis, but also with regard to the Jewish community. I think that the psychoanalytic background of his ideas as expressed in this paper could be that the father can also be an outsider who takes on the paternal role, and consequently

[1] I use *paternal function* and *paternal principle* equally. Stoloff prefers *function,* while Delourmel uses *principle,* arguing that this word has a more transgenerational connotation, but I cannot discern a real difference.

that the father as *function* or *principle* can be separated from the person of the biological father in flesh and blood.

That is why I think I can see in *Moses* the beginnings of the paternal principle, defended today by Delourmel (2012). The principle's basic hypothesis is the hereditary transmission not of traces of a foundational murder, but of a primal or originary potential. This potential may be said to represent within the psyche the conflict between limitless will and a natural limit, from which a triad can emerge.

The paternal principle can be conceived of as a modality of this potential. Its hereditary transmission may be said to result from a selective process of evolution over the course of time—selection, that is, of a human mind capable of giving meaning to triangulation and symbolization.

The paternal quality of this function can be understood first as an aftereffect of the encounter with parental objects, and then, in analysis, through the encounter with the analyst and the analytic setting. The fantasy of parricide would thus be organized only retroactively in relation to these encounters. From there, the originary or primal potential would acquire its quality of the paternal principle opening out onto triangulation. Freud proposes a phylogenetic vision, whereas Delourmel tries to reconsider phylogenesis in terms of modern theories of evolution; I think we agree, however, on thinking of the father as the founding principle of the psyche.

Here I would like to add a mention of Winnicott's work. In a recent and fascinating paper, Faimberg (2013) shows that as early as 1955, Winnicott introduced the father's function into his patient's psyche by linking his interpretations to time and temporality, and especially to the Freudian concept of *Nachträglichkeit.* This allows Faimberg to introduce her original conception of an *as-yet situation,* which she infers from a detailed exploration of and commentary on the analysis of Winnicott's patient described in his "Fragment of an Analysis" (1955). My own approach is very close to this one, for I also defend the idea that time, like the law, is paternal in essence.

In *Moses*, Freud's conclusion is that a *certain characteristic* can be transmitted independently of a direct communication or influence. This raises once again the whole question of the primordial identification

with the father of prehistory, an identification that precedes alterity and object choice and concerns both boys and girls.

Before returning to the question of the primal or originary father (*Urvater*) in Freud, I would like to tell you about another enigma, one concerning the sphinx. When Freud discusses the enigma of the sphinx, I should point out that he is essentially referring to the Ancient Greek tragedy *Oedipus Rex*. Freud's genius is to have considered the audacious unfolding of events in the play as a universal unconscious wish.

To review and highlight certain aspects of the tale, Oedipus is the son (abandoned) of Laius, himself the son of king Labdacus of Thebes. Labdacus dies young, leaving Laius an orphan. Pelops, the king of Peloponnese, raises him as a son and looks after him. But Laius betrays the confidence of his adoptive father by seducing Chrissipus, Pelops's young son. Chrissipus commits suicide. Mad with pain and anger, Pelops then curses Laius and the Labdacides. Sensitive to Pelops's pain, the goddess Hera sends the sphinx to Thebes to punish the city for Laius's crime. This is what is called in Greek mythology *the curse of the Labdacides*.[2]

Sophocles's tragedy deals with the great complexity of the parricide of Oedipus, who bears the weight of his father's transgression and kills him without knowing that he was his father. Roussillon (1991) devotes a superb chapter to the guilt of the hero who has committed parricide without knowing it and who is the bearer of a transgenerational curse.

The sphinx devastated the country, posed enigmatic questions, and then devoured passersby. Oedipus was the first and only person to give the correct answer to the sphinx's riddle, "What is the animal that walks on all fours, then two, and then three?"—it is man, obviously. Defeated, the monster then fled.

But there was another riddle to which no one could find the answer: "Two fathers and two sons are walking together. How many men are there?" According to the legend, the right answer would have been:

[2] In these comments, I am drawing on different sources and different versions of the myth, not only Sophocles's version. For Sophocles, the Oedipus myth is ahistorical, which means that there is no reason why Oedipus was cursed other than that it was the whim of the gods, always incomprehensible to men. This is not true for Aeschylus. These differing versions open questions of how destiny, liberty, and free will were viewed in Ancient Greece. For many historians of antiquity, the notion of free will could not have existed during antiquity.

"There are three—the father, the son, and the grandson. Two are fathers and two are sons."

In Ancient Greece, enigmas always contained a fragment of philosophical wisdom, and this particular enigma is no exception. It refers to the succession of the generations and to the number three: a child always has two parents, forming a threesome; and in this riddle, a man has a father and a son.

We can imagine that Oedipus, the parricidal son of Laius, himself a fatherless father and a pedophilic seducer, might have succeeded in escaping the trap of this riddle as well.

THE FATHER IN FREUD'S WORK

As Eizirik has shown, the question of the father permeates Freud's entire work. I will summarize this by beginning with the *primary identification with the father of personal prehistory*. This is a direct and immediate identification that precedes object choice. Freud calls it "the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person" (1921, p. 105).

He elaborates:

Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex. A little boy will have a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere . . . . This behaviour has nothing to do with a passive attitude towards his father; it is on the contrary typically masculine. It fits in very well with the Oedipus complex, for which it helps to prepare the way. [p. 105]

Freud makes it clear that the father of this primary identification is not the oedipal father. He writes:

It is easy to state in a formula the distinction between a primal identification to the father and the choice of the father as an object. In the first case the father is what one would like to be, and in the second what one would like to have. [p. 106]

Later, Freud (1923) linked the emotional tie of this primordial identification with the father with the ego ideal and the superego, itself essentially constituted by identifications with early parental objects.

I would like to point out here that the ego ideal, introduced by Freud much earlier (1914), is the "social" part of the superego, consisting of collective ideals. He took up this idea again later on (Freud 1933). Owing to this connection between primordial identification and collective ideals, I think that this first identification can be seen as the basis of what Delourmel (2012) describes as the paternal principle.

Some authors, such as Green (1995), Donnet (1995), and Laplanche (1999), have considered that the primordial identification is the transhistorical foundation at the basis of the subject's history. Donnet sees it as an inhibiting function of the drive and thus, if I have understood him correctly, as a pre-form of the superego that is paternal in essence.

According to Freud (1924), the oedipal father is the historical father around whom the Oedipus complex is organized—that is, the one whom the son will first have to renounce before taking over his role through secondary identifications. The *Urvater*, the murder of the father, has a prominent place throughout Freud's work. In a letter to Fliess dated December 6, 1896, Freud writes: "It seems to me . . . *more and more* that heredity is seduction by the father" (Masson 1985, p. 212, italics in original). In 1908, in the second preface to *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1900), we read that the death of one's father is "the most important event, the most poignant loss, of a man's life" (p. xxvi). In his letter of May 1912 to Karl Abraham, Freud writes, "It is correct to identify the father with death, for the father is a dead man, and death himself . . . is only a dead man" (Falzeder 2002, p. 151).

As Eizirik notes, it was above all in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–1913) that Freud works out the concept of the primal father tied to that of parricide. But the latter concept takes on particular amplitude in *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). In the paradigm of Abraham, what is handed down is life, but also phallic power, passed down from God to Abraham and to his son. This transmission is made by surmounting differences between the sexes and the generations. The three terms are important, as the riddle attributed to the sphinx indicates.

I also want to stress here the conjunction between the Freudian notion of the murder of the father and that of the idealized father, developed by Lacan (1955–1956). Lacan wrote:

> The necessity of his [Freud's] reflection led him to tie the appearance of signifier of the Father, as author of the Law, to death—indeed to the killing of the Father—thus showing that, if this murder is the fertile moment of the debt by which the subject binds himself for life to the Law, the symbolic Father, insofar as he signifies this Law, is truly the dead Father. [p. 556]

I must remind readers that Lacan was the first theoretician in France to strongly underline the link between the father and the law in Freud's *oeuvre*.[3] In other words, according to the law, after Oedipus and the castration complex, the dead father succeeds the idealized father of primary identification, a sort of universal Ananke.[4] If this does not occur, the lack may give rise to certain classical configurations, such as paranoia, as in the Schreber case (Freud 1911), or to certain sexual perversions of which the aim is the disavowal of sexual difference and castration.

I will not dwell any further on Freud here but will turn to a very short clinical story.

ADRIAN

Adrian is a patient whom I treated for five years at the Paris Psychosomatic Institute (IPSO) day hospital. He was about thirty when I first met him. A tanned, handsome young man of Italian origin, he was dressed as an executive and always carried an attaché case in which he packed what he needed for the night, but his sneakers and anorak added a rather unusual aspect to his appearance.

Adrian had worked in various jobs, but "I wasn't kept on anywhere." When he came to see me, he was on his way to becoming homeless because he could no longer earn a living.

Adrian had severe idiopathic high blood pressure, which was not controlled, as well as diffuse anxiety described as a permanent state of

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[3] The concept of the *dead father,* meaning the symbolic father of the law, is crucial in Lacanian literature. See Kalinich (2008).

[4] In Greek mythology, Ananke was considered the personification of destiny, necessity, and fate.

alert. His cardiologist had referred him to the IPSO and made it clear that he did not know whether this young man actually took his medication, as he had a hard time imagining what kind of life he led. (The doctor thought he was "crazy," in fact.)

Adrian appeared to fit into a descriptive category of the Paris Psychosomatic School: he demonstrated a crushing of the preconscious and an invasion by external reality—that is, by what could be perceived. There was no psychic working through. Thus, there was no identifiable trace of an expected topography; what we call the superego did not seem to exist. In classical psychiatric nosography, he would in all probability be described as a psychopathic personality.

He did not have a criminal record, but he told me that he had committed certain criminal acts: one night he set fire to the warehouse of a garage from which he had been fired. He had violently beaten a prostitute; he became deeply afraid when she lost consciousness because he thought she was dead, something that "could have caused me some trouble."

Notwithstanding the high blood pressure and the diffuse anxiety, Adrian was obviously the kind of patient whom a psychoanalyst has little opportunity of meeting. The work I did with him consisted in listening to the flood of information he poured forth, and in trying to at least put some spatial-temporal order to it, to give it some meaning, to make connections. The quasi-permanent state of alert that he lived in yielded, we could see together, when he felt himself to be in a "benevolent" setting.

As he was incapable of wondering what was happening in another person's head, Adrian made people uncomfortable. He vaguely perceived this. So he had the feeling that the outside world was often hostile, and that made him violent.

One morning, he saw a beautiful pair of leather gloves in a car, and he broke the window in order to take them. A plainclothes policeman apprehended him and took him to a police station, where he was held for twelve hours. The policeman asked him, "Why did you do that, my boy?" He slapped Adrian, pushed him around a bit, gave him a lecture, and then put his arm around his shoulder and let him leave.

During the next session, Adrian smiled; he seemed ecstatic. "A good man," he said in reference to the policeman, to which I replied, "Perhaps he was the father whom you hadn't even imagined having?"

Adrian was surprised at this: "My mother never spoke to me about him; I don't think she even knew him . . . . Yes, I have never imagined that I had a father."

This session was a turning point in the treatment. For months, Adrian spent many sessions trying to imagine his father. Had his father known of his existence? Had he refused to recognize him? Did this man have a family, other children? Was he a real father, a good father? What did "a good father" mean?

Adrian began constructing the equivalent of a family romance. His mother had probably not informed his father of his birth, he postulated. He imagined situations in which father and son would meet and recognize each other. He started to have dreams and sometimes nightmares in which an unknown man appeared. At the same time, our sessions were less invaded by factual reality, as if the appearance of an image, a fantasy of the father to whom he was trying to give a face and a form, allowed Adrian to have a psychic life.

Likewise, the transference, which up until then had seemed to me to be massively cathected but poorly defined, also began to take shape. Following an account of a dream in which he recognized his car in a parking spot and was afraid that someone might steal it, he made associations to having recently followed me to my car. He told me with some shame that he had become very curious about me and eager to gain information about my life. I interpreted that he was looking for a father and was trying to find out if I had a man in my life and in my head; in other words, he was constructing an oedipal history through the analytic work.

The work with this patient brought to mind a very fine expression used by Herzog (2013): *father hunger*. In fact, having been unaware that he had a father, Adrian discovered a father hunger that gradually gave shape to the clinical material. This material finally became organized around an oedipal experience and structured in a more neurotic way, while at the same time a superego function was established.

It seems to me that this clinical vignette illustrates what Eizirik describes concerning "the central figure [of the father] in the shaping of the psyche" (2015, p. 345). This also coincides with the theses of Stoloff (2007) and Delourmel (2012), cited earlier, who defend the notion of

a paternal function or principle transcending the generations, and the individual history as well as the material person of the biological father and the family father.

CONCLUSION

To Drummond de Andrade's last magnificent poem quoted by Eizirik, I can add only something that philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1985) wrote about fatherhood: "Paternity is a relationship with a stranger who, while being entirely other, is me" (p. 71). This is a definition that I often quote and that reminds me of Freud's poignant paper *Moses and Monotheism* (1939).

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THE ANALYST'S WAY OF BEING: RECOGNIZING SEPARABLE SUBJECTIVITIES AND THE PENDULUM'S SWING

BY RICHARD TUCH

Whether the analyst finds the patient's emerging transference affectively tolerable or intolerable plays an important role in the analytic couple's negotiation of the configuration that the transference-countertransference relationship ultimately assumes. If the analyst is deeply repelled by transference-related roles to which he is assigned, patient-ascribed attributions, or projection-drenched interactions, he may react in violent protest, engaging in enactments that say more about his separable subjectivity than about the intersubjective situation. While there has been a recent trend to view enactments as a crucial aspect of psychoanalytic technique, this trend risks overlooking the way in which the analyst's way of being comes into play in the treatment.

INTRODUCTION

The psychoanalyst's way of being—his personality, temperament, characteristic style of relating to others, unresolved transferences, etc.—helps

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determine his response to, and his clinical interventions with, a given patient. In turn, how he intervenes in treatment can significantly contribute to the way in which the patient's transference manifests. This paper aims to explore these two subjects—the theoretical range of possible ways in which different analysts might respond to a given patient as a function of their ways of being, and how these varied responses help determine the way in which the transference is ultimately expressed.

This paper also questions current trends in certain quarters to overvalue countertransference enactments per se—arguably distinguishable from more contained and considered transference reactions—as the preeminent clinical tool, without which psychoanalytically facilitated psychic change is less likely to occur.

THE ANALYST'S WAY OF BEING

It is helpful to have terms that single out a phenomenon by which the analyst's way of being contributes to the creation of the patient's *manifest transference*, which is distinct from what the patient brings to the treatment—his *core transference*. The core transference refers to a range of ways in which a given patient's transference *could* manifest, while the manifest transference refers to the particular way—one among many—that transference ultimately ends up manifesting.

Unlike the manifest transference, which is more or less co-constructed in the process of analysis, the patient's core transference issues are neither of the analyst's making nor a product of the intersubjective field. Accordingly, transference is both *essential and invariant at its core,* while at the same time, *context-specific and variable* in its surface presentation. The terms *core transference* and *manifest transference* are introduced here to drive home the point that a given patient's manifest transference may differ as a consequence of how the analyst relates to the patient.

The analyst's way of being helps determine his countertransference reactions in general (e.g., it is the metaphorical hook upon which a projection may be hung). It furthermore inclines or disinclines the analyst to engage either in chronic or acute countertransference enactments. The degree to which a given enactment is, on the one hand, more or less equally co-constructed, with each party contributing substantially to its makeup—or, alternatively (though never exclusively), determined more

heavily either by the analyst's or the analysand's *separable subjectivity*—varies considerably. As one slides along a continuum from equal contribution on each party's part to a heavier emphasis on either the analyst's or the analysand's contribution, there is a shift in emphasis from a two-person psychology to a one-person psychology.

Though some countertransference enactments appear to develop as a result of the patient's conscious or unconscious efforts to engage with and impact the analyst—for example, attempts to draw the analyst into acting out an assigned role—believing this invariably to be the case, as some seem to do, disallows for each party's *separable subjectivities* in accordance with the one-person psychological perspective that is reflected in Benjamin's (1995) brand of intersubjectivity, which leaves room for "the other who is truly perceived as outside, distinct from our own mental field of operation" (p. 29). Countertransference reactions that lead to such enactments are not always the result of the patient's efforts to provoke the analyst into assuming a role coincident with the patient's expectations or needs, and may be primarily the manifestation of the analyst's unresolved issues that have been evoked in him by the patient's transference behavior.

THE EVOLVING VIEW OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

Aside from the analyst's way of being, another topic this paper addresses are the trends in our thinking about countertransference enactments. In particular, I will explore current trends that appear to overemphasize the clinical value of countertransference enactments, seeing them as clinically indispensable to the extent that a successful analysis invariably hinges on their development and clinical resolution (Boesky 1990; Chessick 1999; Renik 1993). Some analysts seem to celebrate countertransference enactments as *the* quintessential psychoanalytic intervention—reflected in the way in which some have interpreted Boesky's (1990) often-quoted declaration[1]—which has gone on to become a sort of ral-

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[1] This remark has been quoted in print at least twenty-nine times, judging from the Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing database, and is frequently heard during oral presentations.

lying cry for those who insist on the desirability or even the necessity of enactments[2]: "If the analyst does not get emotionally involved sooner or later in a manner that he had not intended, the analysis *will not proceed* to a successful conclusion" (p. 573, italics added).

Hirsch (1998) comments on how most read Boesky's proclamation:

> He [Boesky] is not simply speaking of emotional involvement with the patient in the form of caring about the patient or becoming aware of countertransference feelings . . . . He is saying that the analyst's countertransference, in the form of enactment, *must* become an actualization of the transference resistance in order for the analysis to be truly and profoundly effective. [p. 87]

I believe the current trend that overemphasizes the centrality and indispensability of countertransference enactments has carried us too far afield, into territory that strikes some as absurd—for example, by declaring countertransference enactments to be not only extraordinarily helpful, but also the very essence of the entire psychoanalytic enterprise (Renik 1996).

A VIGNETTE PUBLISHED BY THEODORE JACOBS

The first clinical material to be considered is a published vignette (Jacobs 1993), one of the many Jacobs presents to illustrate his thesis: how his own personal dynamics sensitize him to react in a particular fashion to the way that patients go about relating to him.

> It is 7:55 a.m. on a Monday. I am in the new office to which I have moved over the weekend, waiting for Mr. V to arrive. He is thirty-eight, single, an attorney, slim, handsome, and polished . . . . He often speaks of himself as a kind of impostor, someone who gives the impression of being far more knowledgeable in his field than he actually is. He is terrified of being ex-

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[2] A careful reading of Boesky's paper indicates this quotation is often taken out of context, given that Boesky does not mean to imply that an enactment, in and of itself, could be considered mutative. Rather, it is essential to recognize the analyst's inevitable, inadvertent contribution to the patient's resistance, which sooner or later must be faced if treatment is to progress toward a successful conclusion.

posed for his inadequacies. There is, however, something men-
acing about Mr. V . . . . Today as I wait for Mr. V, I am more tense
than usual. I anticipate his criticism of my new office and I am
apprehensive about this. Mr. V attaches a great deal of impor-
tance to appearances, and when displeased by surroundings that
he regards as unattractive, he can be caustic. I realize, in fact,
that I am rather self-conscious about the appearance of my new
place, and I am angry with myself for not having anticipated the
problem and invested in some new furnishings . . . . Mr. V rings
the bell. [I open the door.] He goes to the couch, unbuttons his
jacket, and stretches out on it . . . . [After] Mr. V has completed
his silent survey of my office, [he comments]: "You are nothing
if not consistent . . . . It's amazing. Your Sears decorator has
done it again. She has duplicated the old place right down to
the last shabby detail." He pauses and then goes on. "Wasn't it
some philosopher who said that consistency is the hobgoblin of
little minds?" A flash thought occurs to me, accompanied by a
momentary feeling of triumph. Mr. V has it wrong. The actual
quote—I think it was from Emerson—is "a foolish consistency
is the hobgoblin of little minds." It is on the tip of my tongue
to say this, but I know that in correcting my analysand, I would
merely be showing off and acting defensively. I refrain. [1993,
pp. 7-9]

One might consider Jacobs's restraint in this instance to be the ap-
propriate response to what could be considered Mr. V's baiting behavior.
Rather than acting out his countertransference irritation by retaliating,
Jacobs chooses self-restraint, which could be explained both as an act
of discretion—his wish to avoid embarrassing the analysand by calling
attention to his error—and as the maintenance of the proper analytic
stance, which enjoins the analyst to: "Contain your countertransference
reaction, reflect on its meaning, and use the resulting insight to fur-
ther the treatment by fashioning an intervention based on this newly
acquired insight."

So far so good, until one considers what Jacobs discloses about
what he believes had likely driven his "choice," making it seem a lot less
"chosen" than it first appeared:

My transference to Mr. V has drawn much from my relation-
ship to my father and other male authorities. Made anxious by

the prospect of a clash with them, I avoided conflict. To ensure peace I let them be the winners . . . and sought to conceal my feelings of rivalry and competition. This, I think, is what has been happening with Mr. V . . . . I realize, however, that my aggressive feelings have begun to slip out around the edges in the form of the kind of thoughts I have just had. [1993, pp. 8-9]

Suddenly, what at first appeared to be a well-thought-out instance of self-restraint for the good of the treatment and the protection of the analysand's narcissism begins to look more like action motivated chiefly by Jacobs's struggle with his own competitiveness, leading us to wonder whether a less conflicted analyst might be relatively more inclined to enact his retaliatory impulses.[3]

It seems likely that Mr. V sensed—consciously or unconsciously—Jacobs's disinclination to strike back, which could well have given him license to speak up just as he had—no holds barred! Alternatively, had Mr. V been in treatment with an analyst who was apt to push back when taken to task, the development of the manifest transference might have looked somewhat different. In that scenario, Mr. V's core aggression might have been expressed in a less direct fashion—for example, through passive-aggressive channels—just so long as, *and this is essential,* Mr. V was reasonably comfortable with, and could abide by, such alternative expressions of his aggression without feeling that he had been strong-armed into that position by the analyst. Such situations are unconsciously negotiated in the process of analysis on a regular basis.

Alternatively, if Mr. V felt he was being forced to back down by the analyst's overly aggressive response, he might also have felt that he was being relegated to the position of the one *done to* (Benjamin 2004), which could have led him to resist the role assignment. Another possibility has the analytic couple locking horns and neither party backing down, resulting either in the rupture of the therapeutic alliance or in a highly charged thrust in the therapeutic process that might prove productive, to the extent that the analytic couple struggled to work their way past the emerging power struggle. Thus, there are a number of different

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[3] I am not implying that all who are comfortable with their aggression will necessarily act on those impulses, only that being more comfortable with one's aggression moves one *in that direction,* if not over the line.

ways in which the situation could have played out as a function of the analyst's way of being.

Important Implications of Jacobs's Vignette

There are certain things worth noting about Jacobs's analysis of this clinical moment. To begin with, Jacobs had more than one countertransference reaction. His most immediate (core) reaction was an impulse to retaliate, to strike back by shaming the patient for having misquoted Emerson. This we might consider *countertransference proper*. In response to this initial reaction, Jacobs had a *metareaction*—a reaction secondary to his first reaction. Jacobs was not one to experience retaliatory aggression without becoming deeply unsettled by such impulses, and it was this second countertransference reaction—his metareaction—that was instrumental in determining whether his initial impulse to retaliate had a chance of being openly expressed.

Just as patients have a core and a manifest transference, analysts can be said to have corresponding core and manifest countertransference reactions. In this particular case, Jacobs's core countertransference reaction, which most likely served as commentary about what was going on in his patient's mind, was eclipsed by his metacountertransference, which played a determining role in what became manifest.[4]

Jacobs does not consider the content of his metareaction to have been determined by the patient's behavior. He does not see it as having resulted from the patient's assignment of a role for him to play (Sandler 1976a), nor does he believe it to be a response to the patient's transference expectations. He also fails to see his reaction as a manifestation of projective identification.

While Jacobs admits he was triggered by the patient's provocative critique, how he ends up responding, to Jacobs's way of thinking, was of *his own making*—a function of his one-person psychology. Jacobs takes responsibility for *what it is in him that is his*, rather than imagining he was "made" by the patient to react in this particular fashion. Accordingly, he does not believe his metareaction serves as commentary about what was going on in his patient's mind.

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[4] This is not to imply Mr. V would not have been able to sense a stifled impulse to retaliate—only to note that a directly expressed and a stifled reaction will contribute differently to helping mold the patient's manifest transference.

Furthermore, while Jacobs's behavior undoubtedly contributed to the intersubjective field—the two-person psychology—it did not directly originate from that field, given that Jacobs considered his reaction to be a manifestation of his *separable subjectivity.* Current trends that over-emphasize the two-person psychological perspective contribute to our forgetting that we all bring our own psychologies—our *separable subjec-tivities*—to the consulting room, independent of the analytic third that is constituted once the process gets underway. Diamond (2014) refers to these trends as a *rational turn,* which some see as tantamount to a radical paradigmatic shift (Fabozzi 2012; Pine 2011).

THE ANALYST'S SEPARABLE SUBJECTIVITY

What I am proposing by emphasizing the analyst's separable subjectivity is a focus on how the analyst feels about what is being stirred up in him (a *metafeeling*): whether he finds it—along an affective continuum—ir-resistible, highly pleasurable, a bit taxing though reasonably tolerable, emotionally inconsequential, disquieting, hard to live with, or com-pletely unbearable. Trouble is likely to result when the psychic state is located at either end of this spectrum—when countertransference reac-tions are intensely positive or intensely negative. How the analyst ends up interacting with an analysand is partly determined by where the ana-lyst's metareactions lie on this continuum—how personally desirable, tol-erable/manageable, or intolerable his stirred-up internal state is tending toward.

In turn, the shape assumed by the analysand's transference (how it manifests) is partly a function of whether the analyst's internal responses to the patient's emerging transference are *in concert with* or *in opposition to—conjunctive* or *disjunctive,*[5] relative to the patient's way of being—what the patient's behavior seems to require of the analyst in terms of a par-ticular kind of involvement and/or response.

It is important to note that chronic countertransference enactments (Cassorla 2012) may result when the analyst experiences intensely posi-tive countertransference reactions in response to, for example, a partic-ular role or attribution to which he is being assigned by the analysand—

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[5] This follows a distinction drawn by Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood (1987).

one that is welcomed by the analyst to the extent it is consistent with how he likes to, or is inclined to, think of himself. Acute enactments, on the other hand, are more likely to develop when the analyst experiences countertransference reactions that are so deeply disturbing as to result in a sudden and dramatic attempt to protest and/or break free of the assignment, attribution, or projection.

Chronic enactments tend in general to be less dramatic and often, though not invariably, stem from positive countertransference reactions that, for whatever reason, are allowed to go unexamined. Sandler's (1976a) handing his patient tissues each time she cried comes to mind in this regard. It was not until Sandler stopped enacting such behavior that he and the analysand were able to make sense of what the two had together been enacting.

An example of a chronic enactment stemming from intensely negative countertransference reactions is provided by Vida (2001), who describes how an analysand's tyrannical scorn, experienced by the analyst as "disruptions of terrifying magnitude" (p. 29), proved so intimidating that the analyst ultimately "said less and less and eventually became unable to free associate or even to think during her session" (p. 30).

To reiterate two essential points made thus far: the range of ways in which various analysts differentially respond to a given patient's way of being is *a function of the analyst's particular way of being,* and how a given analyst responds to a particular patient contributes to how the patient's transference takes shape. Analysts vary in their personal proclivity to "get into it" with the patient by taking the bait—subtly slipping into a chronic enactment, or more dramatically launching into a more active type of embroilment. Depending on the analyst's way of being, he may feel—along a continuum—resistant to, comfortable with, or desirous of opportunities to act on the impulse to explicitly vent his countertransference reactions. Analysts who are characterologically disinclined to engage in acute enactments may feel aghast at the prospect and may accordingly dedicate themselves to doing whatever they can to stave off certain calamity. Whether such anxiety prohibits such a reluctant analyst from becoming sufficiently engaged with a patient is a question to be taken up at the end of this paper.

Analysts also vary with regard to how prone they are to feeling as if they are being forced by the patient to react in a given way. Some analysts feel that the patient is pushing a personal button—drawing them in, stimulating their emotions, limiting their range of options, etc. Some feel they are being assigned a role that is personally repugnant—enough to set them packing, metaphorically if not literally—a disjunctive experience that puts the patient's needs and those of the analyst at cross purposes.

The analyst's way of being can also play a determining role in the sorts of clinical interventions he makes. Along these lines, Freud's own way of being figured heavily in his thoughts about how one goes about conducting an analysis, admitting his recommendations were "the only one[s] suited to my individuality," and adding "a physician quite differently constituted might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to his patients and to the task before him" (Freud 1912, p. 111).

What the analyst sees as salient in the clinical material—be it a subtle shift in the analysand's associations, a slip of the tongue, the symbolic aspects of a dream, where his own reverie leads him, his countertransference reactions, the nature of the intersubjective field, etc.—might seem to be a function of that analyst's theoretical bent, until one considers the possibility that analysts gravitate to one theory over another not strictly, or even chiefly, because of the strength of the convincing arguments set forth in support of that theory. Rather, the analyst is more likely attracted to a particular theory for reasons having to do with his personal psychology (Faimberg 1992; Jacobs 1986). Some find this position unnerving to the extent that they feel it undermines the scientific basis of psychoanalysis.

THE VARYING DIMENSIONS OF TRANSFERENCE

The essence of transference was historically considered to be *perceptual* in nature: past experiences help determine how one presently sees, interprets, and/or experiences the actions and attitudes of others. The analysand scans the data emanating from the analyst, highlighting and overemphasizing the salient behaviors most consistent with what he an-

ticipates finding. Psychoanalysts long ago came to the realization that transference extends beyond a *readiness to perceive,* and often manifests in the analysand's turning to the analyst to satisfy or to contain certain of the analysand's wishes, needs, desires, or affect states. Accordingly, transference is not limited to perceiving the analyst as being like someone from one's past (the "old object"); it can also involve looking to the analyst to fill the shoes of a once-wished-for parent (the "new object").

A two-person psychological perspective broadens our understanding of transference beyond the confines of the analysand's perception of the analyst or his efforts to seek gratification from the analyst. Here I am thinking in terms of roles assigned by the patient to the analyst and the complementary roles assumed, in turn, by the patient.[6] For example, the analysand may assume the role originally played by the transference figure, resulting in his treating the analyst much as he had been treated by the original object as a child (*identification with the aggressor*); this is but one of the varied ways in which roles are assigned and assumed. This two-person perspective draws our attention to how the analysand unconsciously works to induce the analyst to adopt a particular role, combined with how the analyst behaves in response as the two co-construct the resulting transference-countertransference configuration.

The one-person psychological perspective, by contrast, focuses on each party's *separable subjectivity*—what they bring to the table in the way of personal, context-independent proclivities and resistances to react or resist in a particular fashion. Recognizing that neither the one- nor the two-person perspective can claim exclusivity, notes Benjamin (1995), requires us to struggle with the tensions produced in having to keep both perspectives in mind, even though at times this can be achieved only sequentially, not simultaneously.

What has been laid out thus far is not new; it is generally understood and accepted, though some disagree with the extent to which the person of the analyst can affect the expression of the transference (Etchegoyen 1991; Kernberg 1993). What I wish to add to the equation is the analyst's *unique affective response* to the experience of being stirred up in re-

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[6] As others have noted (Ellman 2010; McLaughlin 1991), role assignment does not issue strictly from the side of the patient.

sponse to what is taking place in the consulting room—ranging from the sense that what he is feeling is desirable, on one end of the spectrum, to his finding it utterly intolerable, on the other. Problems can develop on either end of the spectrum. How the analyst feels about what he is being "required" to experience by virtue of his involvement in the treatment—if not specifically required by the patient—has much to do with his own way of being.

Following this reasoning, the analyst may end up realizing (or frustrating) the analysand's transference expectations by virtue of his willingness (or resistance) to behave in ways that roughly replicate those of an actual or wished-for figure from the analysand's past. In this way, the analyst's behavior helps validate (or negate) the analysand's construction of the analyst as the process moves from perception into *actualization* (Chused 1991; McLaughlin 1991; Poland 1992; Sandler 1976b). In comparable fashion, the analyst may also gratify or frustrate the patient's efforts to draw him into an enactment, get him to accept a role assignment, or induce him to receive and contain his projections.

PROGRESSION IN OUR UNDERSTANDING OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

The evolution in our thinking about countertransference can be thought to have taken place in three successive stages. The first stage occurred halfway through the last century with the publication of papers by Heimann (1950) and Racker (1957) that together helped redefine countertransference as an essential clinical tool, rather than as a bothersome impediment to the work. Heimann argued that:

> The emotions roused in [the analyst] are much nearer to the heart of the matter than his reasoning, or, to put it in other words, his unconscious perception of the analysand's unconscious is more acute and *in advance* of his conscious conception of the situation. [1950, p. 82, italics added]

Heimann then went a step further by declaring the analyst's countertransference to be "*the patient's creation, it is a part of the patient's personality*" (p. 83, italics added). Here she moved into theoretical ter-

ritory that many consider problematic to the extent such thinking fails to consider the analyst's separable subjectivity—the *hook* inside the analyst (Gabbard 1995; Stanicke and Killingmo 2013; Westen and Gabbard 2002) upon which the analysand's projection can be hung.

Racker's (1957) contribution to our understanding of countertransference chiefly involves his introduction of two contrasting terms—*complementary* and *concordant*—to differentiate two types of countertransference reactions.[7] Complementary reactions are defined as those involving the analyst's being seen by the analysand as being like the original object, leading to the analyst's feeling and/or reacting in kind, in accordance with this perception-interpretation, potentially stimulating him to adopt the corresponding counter role that plays against the role assumed by the patient. By contrast, concordant reactions are characterized by the analyst's identification with the analysand's situation, resulting in an empathic response to the analysand's experience.

We have now arrived at one of the chief goals of this paper: a proposed refinement in Racker's definition of complementarity based on the analyst's level of comfort or discomfort with what has become stirred up in him as he goes about treating the patient. Using role responsiveness (Sandler 1976a) as the model: to the extent the analyst's and the analysand's assigned and assumed roles more or less comfortably complement one another (are affectively acceptable to both parties), the complementary relationship can be considered *conjunctive.*

By contrast, *disjunctive* relationships are those in which the roles assigned prove personally repugnant to one or both parties (Faimberg 1992), unacceptable in that they feel alien to one's general way of being (Benjamin 2004). Under such conditions, the situation may feel non-negotiable, thus jeopardizing the ongoing viability of the analysis. Mermelstein (2000) notes that "complementarity becomes problematic when the perceptions and organizing schema of both participants are diametrically opposed, reciprocally threatening the other's functioning, and cannot be easily reconciled" (p. 726).

[7] It is worth noting that sharp distinctions necessitated by the need for illustration leave one with the impression such thinking reflects reality. In fact, however, such clear dichotomies are drawn only for the sake of discussion, and may be misrepresentations of a reality that does not actually permit this simplification. This issue arises time and again in our literature. It deserves notice, though it is inevitably insurmountable.

If the analyst does not welcome what has been stirred up in him as he interacts with the patient, he may work to counter its effect. For example, if the analyst detests the role into which he feels he is being implicitly drawn, he may bristle and resist the role assignment, not realizing he is doing so until after the fact. To the extent that the analyst begins to experience, while interacting with the analysand, highly unpleasurable internal stirrings (affects, memories, thoughts), the resulting countertransference reaction is disjunctive and may result in the analyst's strongly rejecting (1) the role to which he feels he is being assigned, (2) traits or characteristics the patient attributes to him that he finds repugnant, and/or (3) the projections he feels he is being asked to receive and contain.

For example, feeling controlled by the pressures brought to bear for the analyst to adopt a personally repugnant role assignment could result in his conscious—or, more likely, unconscious—efforts to turn the tables to "show the analysand who is boss"—taking charge of the interaction and imposing an agenda of his own that dictates how he and the analysand are to relate to one another, preempting the analysand who, the analyst feels, was trying to do likewise—a battle over who is to be the *doer* and who is to end up the *one done to* (Benjamin 2004).

The second stage in the evolution of our thinking about countertransference, which furthered our thinking about the analysand's impact on the analyst, occurred in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Sandler (1976a) noted that, with certain analysands, he would sometimes *find himself* (that is the operative phrase) unwittingly acting in ways that were uncharacteristic of him, for reasons that escaped him. Jacobs (1986) went a step further by exploring how particular factors in his own background led him to engage with the analysand in an enactment.

Of import is the fact that Jacobs did not believe his analysands were motivated by a wish to cause him to think or feel what it was he ended up thinking or feeling, placing him on the same page with Sandler (1976a), who did not see role responsiveness as a function of the analysand's efforts to foist a role upon the analyst. Rather, Sandler described it as "a function of the analyst's receptivity, not of the analysand's unconscious intention, and [it] should not be regarded as projective identification,

as something that the analysand wants to 'put into' the analyst" (Sandler 1993 p. 1105). Again, we see both these authors insisting on their separable subjectivities, rather than conceptualizing themselves as psychologically yoked to the patient's efforts to entice them to feel certain things, do certain things, have certain memories, etc.

Since Jacobs introduced the term in the mid-1980s, the concept of *enactment* has increasingly been referenced and utilized to understand clinical material. As noted by Bohleber et al. (2013) in their sweeping overview of the subject, "the term 'enactment' is here to stay" (p. 509). This does not mean, however, that all agree about what the term means or what light it might shed on the patient's psyche. Bohleber et al. (2013) offer a serviceable definition of the phenomenon:

> Enactment involves a collapse in the analytic dialogue in which the analyst is drawn into an interaction where he unwittingly acts, thereby actualizing unconscious wishes of both himself and the patient. This collapse implies disturbance of the symbolic function; something emerges that at the moment of enactment is not accessible by language. What follows this moment will determine whether the enactment will have therapeutic value, that is, whether the symbolic function will be restored and integrative work can or cannot happen. [p. 517]

Enactment is thought to involve a loss of analytic capacity on the analyst's part—in reaction to instances when the patient's verbalizations are "meant to *do something or bring about something,* rather than communicate something" (Busch 2009, p. 55, italics in original).

A more recent stage in the evolution of our thinking about countertransference, evidenced in Aron's (1996) concept of *mutuality,* pictures analyst and analysand reciprocally influencing one another in a circular, back-and-forth, chicken-or-the-egg fashion, making it nearly impossible to make out whose behavior set the wheels in motion in the first place. Many favor this model not only because it emphasizes mutual influence, but also because it makes room for the possibility that roles might be assigned by the analyst to the analysand, just as they are assigned by the analysand to the analyst (Ellman 2010; McLaughlin 1991).

ADDITIONAL CLINICAL ILLUSTRATIONS

I will begin this section by considering two clinical examples in which the transference needs of the patient proved deeply unsettling for the analyst and, accordingly, were disjunctive relative to the patient's needs. In the first abstracted example, the patient's transference involves seeing the analyst as someone incapable of understanding what the analysand is going through (Joseph 1985). In this particular case, what the patient expected and/or needed from the analyst was that he play the part, or *wear the attribution* (Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage 1992, 1996), of *the one who would never understand,* against the patient's role of *the one who would never be understood.*

Feeling trapped within the assigned role of the one who could not understand—at a loss as to how to extricate himself from having to live out that role—would likely prove unsettling for any analyst, though more so for analysts who pride themselves on their ability to help their analysands feel understood—underscoring the role that the analyst's separable subjectivity plays in leading him to react to the patient in ways that may influence how the transference unfolds.

Interpreting to the patient his expectation/need to have an analyst who does not and cannot understand is a kind of understanding in and of itself, and consequently may be likewise disallowed by the analysand, who wants nothing to do with the analyst's efforts to prove that he does, in fact, understand—motivated, in part, by his need to feel it is so. Under such conditions, it might be in the best interest of the treatment to accept, at least for the time being, the role of the one who cannot understand, which the analyst will be able to do only to the extent this role is for him on the *conjunctive* end of the conjunctive–disjunctive spectrum. Doing so, paradoxically, might be the sole way in which the analyst might actually demonstrate understanding.

Other analysts have provided examples of how they came to experience aversive states in the process of treating particular kinds of patients. Steiner (2000) presents two cases in which the patients themselves "created states of discord [disjunctions] that left me confused and uncertain and sometimes led me to try to provide meaning that would make sense

of the confusion and *reduce my anxiety*" (p. 246, italics added). Note the use of language: it was the *patients* who created Steiner's internal state, by which the author places responsibility for what got stirred up in him squarely on the patients' shoulders. Also note Steiner's admission that his enactment was in the service of making himself more comfortable—moving him closer to the conjunctive end of the conjunctive–disjunctive scale.

McLaughlin (1991) describes a similar countertransference reaction in which his patient's behaviors

> . . . left me repeatedly in states of futility and bewilderment, doubting my capacities to see anything clearly about her or to articulate effectively. I took myself to task for my ineptitude and felt helpless and angry . . . . Her behaviors effectively pressured me to experience these affects *as my own* with an intensity I found unusually painful. [p. 604, italics added]

In both these clinical instances, the ways in which the patient related to the analyst is conceptualized by the author in terms of projective identification, where something is done to one by another and where pressure from the patient creates in the analyst a narcissistic imbalance (Ellman 2010). This imbalance is seen as sufficient to cause the analyst to act in accordance with the pressure the patient brings to bear to promote action, rather than establishing containment by adopting a particular role, or actualizing a particular transference expectation (Sandler 1976b), or engaging in a particular type of enactment.

The second example of disjunctive intersubjectivity I will give comes from my work with Mr. R, a retired, married man about twenty years my senior, who was referred to me after a lengthy treatment with another clinician had "petered out." He presented with depression and intermittent suicidal impulses, complaining that "no one gives a shit about me, including myself." Though he had received considerable professional recognition in his field, this did little to bolster his self-esteem. While he felt quite needy of praise from others, his neediness typically met with impatience from those around him, who felt imposed upon by the patient's incessant demands that they become an audience for him to impress with his most recent praiseworthy project.

During Mr. R's childhood, his father had sent mixed messages: he cherished his son, yet denigrated him as incapable of achieving much in life, leaving the patient to feel he could not rely on himself and accordingly needed others "over" him to tell him what to do. By contrast, Mr. R's mother was presented as a ghostly figure—and relatively inconsequential in his early development.

For several months, the patient's behavior stimulated something in me that led me to play the role of the mirroring parent who had "ooh-ed and ah-ed" over his display of a recent invention or his considerable knowledge about a wide variety of topics. Then, several months into the treatment, Mr. R began a session by noting that the fichus tree in my office was shedding leaves, using this observation as an opportunity to instruct me about how best to care for the plant. He told me that I should turn it so that the unexposed side could get more light, and he recommended a particular watering schedule best suited for the plant. I understood these to be metaphorical references to his feeling I had been inattentive to him, but before that could be addressed, something intervened that got us onto an entirely different track.

As Mr. R went on instructing me about indoor gardening, I found myself growing irritated. I was not aware of the fact at first, until—after the patient completed his lecture—I suddenly quipped: "You know, I've had that plant for over twenty years!"

The moment those words left my mouth, I had a sinking feeling, aghast at what I had just said. It was a simple statement, but its meaning was not lost on Mr. R. The following session, we had a chance to return to the event when the patient noted upon entering the room that I had tended to the tree (which I had in fact been neglecting). My admission to having heeded his advice was driven by my guilt and my wish to somehow make up for having responding to him in the fashion I had— another enactment.

I came to realize that my feelings about having Mr. R educate me about plants could be expressed in this fashion: "Who do you think you are, coming in here and treating me as if I am some sort of naive imbecile who doesn't know the first thing about plants? Let me tell you something, buddy—I've had this plant for twenty years. Did you hear that? *Twenty years!* Doesn't that say *something* about my abilities as a gar-

dener? Do you think you could keep a plant alive for twenty years? *Huh, Pops?"* Naturally, this was never said to the patient, though my irritation provided us an opportunity to analyze what had been going on in the room, unbeknownst to either of us.

Mr. R's father—not unlike my own—could be discounting of his son's abilities. This led to an interesting situation, for neither the patient nor I was anxious to play the part of the imbecilic child. At the point that he chose to educate me—or, alternatively, to show off how much he knew about yet another in a string of topics—I experienced Mr. R as treating me as his father had treated him and as my father had treated me. I was determined to have no part of this and spoke up to set the record straight. If I were being assigned the role of the ignorant child against the patient's role of the all-knowing father, I was not buying it. Something had to give!

But was this, in fact, what Mr. R intended me to feel? All I knew at this juncture was that I had ceased to play the role of father who marveled at his achievements and wealth of knowledge (a conjunctive role for me). The idea that the patient had unconsciously intended to treat me as his father had treated him was a distinct possibility. But it seemed just as possible that, unconsciously, he wished for me to continue to play the role of admiring father, rather than experiencing his lesson as I actually had: as an effort to make me feel like an idiot, just as his father had made him feel.

Whichever the case, my own separable subjectivity had something to say about the matter, intruding in the way it had for reasons that were, at that moment, more driven by my own personal issues than by my continued availability to respond in kind to what the patient was trying to say or to accomplish with me at that point. While on one level, Mr. R's intention may well have been aimed chiefly at my continuing to admire him for being knowledgeable, he ended up getting more than he had bargained for. Had I not had the type of father I had, I might have been better positioned to continue to play the role of the admirer who could mirror back to the patient a view of himself as wonderfully capable and extraordinarily knowledgeable. But another aspect of my subjectivity emerged. As a result, I ceased to be in conjunctive harmony with the patient. What I wanted was, simply, "off this train!!!"

In contrast with the situation of Jacobs (1993) and Mr. V, discussed earlier, in which the core countertransference impulse to retaliate seemed to serve as a commentary about what was going on in the patient's psyche, in this instance the analyst's (my) core countertransference reaction seemed to be more of his (my) own making.

Let us consider another of Jacobs's (1986) clinical vignettes—this time one that illustrates conjunctive rather than disjunctive complementarity, which resulted in a more insidious, chronic enactment. Jacobs found his patient, Mr. K, so captivating that his mind never wandered once, as it typically would from time to time with other analysands. Jacobs thought this curious, which ultimately led him to realize the autobiographical basis of this enactment. As it turned out, Mr. K's propensity to be a captivating orator ostensibly "transported" (p. 295) Jacobs back to a time in childhood when he had been sitting at the dinner table listening in awe as his father held forth on any number of topics, transfixing his young son. "It was his show," writes Jacobs, "and if I spoke at all it was simply to ask for more details—the equivalent of my interventions years later with my analysand . . . [whose] transference wish [was] for me to play the role of appreciative audience" (p. 295).

Jacobs's revelation raises an interesting question that highlights the paper's central thesis. While certain aspects of his experience with Mr. K may have felt disjunctive to Jacobs, on balance, the prevailing sense of his experience was conjunctive. We might wonder how Mr. K's co-constructed transference may have manifested had he been in treatment with a different sort of analyst—one, for example, who felt he was being asked to play a role he found personally offensive (an example of disjunctive complementarity). It seems easy to imagine such an analyst perhaps experiencing competitive strivings to prove that he, too, had much that was worth hearing, interrupting the patient's tendencies to "hold forth" in order to get a word in edgewise.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

What has been proposed in this paper is a further subdivision of the complementary type of countertransference reaction into *conjunctive* and *disjunctive* subtypes, based on the degree to which the analyst's in-

ternal states, in response to how the patient is behaving, can be placed along a continuum from highly pleasurable, to tolerable/manageable, to utterly intolerable. Conjunctive reactions are those that the analyst can more or less bear and may even take pleasure in experiencing. Conjunctive reactions that are highly pleasurable may give rise to subtle, chronic enactments.

Disjunctive reactions, on the other hand, can prove quite aversive and may trigger active efforts on the analyst's part to fight off such feelings. Whether the analyst's countertransference reaction, on balance, leans more heavily in one direction or the other plays a determining role in his:

(1) openness to accept the analysand's role assignment;

(2) comfort level in living with, rather than immediately challenging, the analysand's transference-based beliefs about who the analyst is ("*wearing the attribution*");

(3) personal predisposition and availability to engage with the patient in an enactment; and

(4) willingness and ability to receive and contain the patient's projections.

Whether the analyst is comfortable, open, and available to participate with the analysand in these varied ways—or, in my proposed terminology, whether his countertransference reactions are more conjunctive than disjunctive—can have tremendous clinical consequences.

A final point I wish to make has to do with the question of whether the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of overprivileging countertransference enactments as the quintessential mutative therapeutic maneuver. This brings us full circle, to the vignette presented at the beginning of this paper: Jacobs's (1993) treatment of Mr. V, the patient who was acerbically critical of Jacobs's new office. In a paper I submitted for publication to a leading psychoanalytic journal, I cited Jacobs's case and wrote that I regarded his reticence to react when provoked as a sign of good psychoanalytic technique.[8] To my surprise, two of the three edi-

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[8] Granted, I had at that moment overlooked his personal reasons for having acted as he had.

torial reviewers of this paper begged to differ—expressing the opinion that Jacobs had, in fact, robbed the analysand of a potentially mutative experience by failing to allow himself to become more reactively engaged with the analysand.

This struck me as odd and led me to consider how far the pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other—from the condemnation of countertransference as a serious impediment to the treatment, to a celebration of countertransference enactment as *the* preeminent mutative event.

The opinions of these reviewers, in conjunction with those expressed by various authors (Boesky 1990; Heimann 1950; Renik 1993, 1996; Whitaker and Malone 1953), illustrate how the overvaluing of enactments has gone so far as to lead some to fault analysts who are characterologically disinclined to succumb to the urge to act, as was the case with Jacobs in his treatment of Mr. V,[9] seeing such a "resistance" to enact as tantamount to a refusal to engage the patient. I consider this an unfortunate development.

The editorial reviewers who insisted it would have been better for Mr. V's treatment had Jacobs "hauled off" and "let the analysand have it" in the name of enactment for the sake of the treatment were ignoring the simple fact that this is not who Jacobs is—an aspect of his way of being, his separable subjectivity, as seen from a one-person psychological perspective, which fails to take into consideration the analyst's irreducible subjectivity, which can neither be eliminated nor denied (Renik 1993). Such matters are the sort that cause Diamond (2014) to counsel "caution in today's more exaggerated weighting of here-and-now transference interpretations, with its focus on *process* often replacing rather than supplementing the significance of unconscious *content*" (p. 544, italics in original).

One's attitude about a given analyst's inclination or disinclination to become embroiled in an acute enactment varies depending on one's stance about such matters. Analysts vary to the extent they are susceptible to "regressions to less evolved perceptiveness in consequence of the

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[9] In fact, Jacobs's inactivity, under the circumstances, could equally be considered an enactment of another sort.

stirring . . . of old and only partially mastered conflicts" (McLaughlin 1991, p. 600). Some seem more inclined to slip into acute enactments, and others less so—though all are susceptible to lapsing unwittingly into chronic enactments. Whether one judges analysts who are more inclined to jump into the fray and actively enact as reckless—as insufficiently cautious—or, alternatively, as having sufficient faith in their ability to regain their analytic footing whenever they momentarily lose the capacity to contain and reflect, makes a great deal of difference in one's view of such practices. The same can be said when looking from the opposite direction—faulting analysts who are less inclined to engage in acute enactments as being overly intellectualizing and hence emotionally unavailable to their patients.

"The question of how to understand and use the meaning of the analyst's inner experience remains controversial," notes Diamond (2014, p. 541). One consideration is the fact that there is something romantic in the notion of intersubjectivity as it seems to be seen by some—which is very much at odds with Benjamin's (1995) perspective on the matter, which underscores the analyst's separable subjectivity. It may be an overstatement to say that we are connected to one another to such a remarkable degree that whatever happens in one person makes direct reference to (is commentary on) what is going on in the other's mind.

For example, Ogden (1997) writes:

> As personal and private as our reveries feel to us, it is misleading to view them as "our" personal creations, since reverie is at the same time an aspect of a jointly (but asymmetrically) created unconscious intersubjective construction that I have termed the intersubjective analytic third. [p. 569]

Seeing one's psychic wanderings as inevitably tied to what is going on in the patient denies the analyst's separable subjectivity. Such a view may be adopted by the analyst to relieve his guilt about having been "asleep at the wheel" when he ought to have been carefully attending to material relevant to the patient, not tending to his separable subjectivity.

It is both appealing and reassuring to think that whatever is stirred up in the analyst's psyche must serve as commentary about the patient's state of mind, since such thinking helps lessen the sense of isolation

and aloneness that is part and parcel of the human condition. But envisioning the analyst's reveries,[10] affect states, evoked memories, and countertransference reactions as invariably synching with what is emanating from the patient—and providing commentary about it—seems to me akin to an ideal, highly attuned mother–infant state of symbiotic union (Tower 1956).

Some of the analyst's countertransference reactions are undeniably about the patient's current psychic condition; some are not. Leaving room for both possibilities is essential to the success of the psychoanalytic process.

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[10] While I have no doubt that Ogden is capable of using reverie in the most productive fashion, I for one have not been able to use my own reverie in this way, and in my discussions with others, I have found that most have a comparable difficulty employing reverie in the way Ogden does.

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REPRESSED GHOSTS AND DISSOCIATED VAMPIRES IN THE ENACTED DIMENSION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT

BY GIL KATZ

One of the most evocative uses of the metaphor of a ghost in psychoanalytic writing was crafted by Hans Loewald in "On the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis" (1960). In this seminal work, Loewald likened the process of psychoanalytic change to that of transforming psychic ghosts into ancestors. In the present paper, the author supplements the metaphor of ghosts that haunt *with the metaphor of* vampires that menace, *and links these two alien experiences to two psychological processes: repression and dissociation. Descriptions of ghosts and vampires in folklore, and the ways they are experienced in analytic treatment, are followed by an explication of the enacted dimension of analytic process—the arena of treatment in which all demons are inevitably revivified, "recognized," and ultimately laid to rest. The paper includes a clinical illustration of a dissociated vampire: a Holocaust trauma transmitted across three generations of survivors.*

Keywords: Enactment, enacted dimension, Hans Loewald, ghosts, vampires, object loss, trauma, Holocaust, intergenerational transmission, sexual abuse, interpsychic, repression, dissociation.

INTRODUCTION

The universality of ghost stories and the enduring popularity of vampire movies and novels in contemporary culture is of course understandable

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psychoanalytically: ghosts and vampires (as well as the many other un-dead figures of myth and lore, such as zombies, shamblers, ghouls, rev-enants, dybbuks, and so on) are representations—projections and exter-nalizations—of internally unacceptable impulses, early unresolved and conflictual object ties, and frightening psychic traumas.

The undead have also populated our psychoanalytic literature. Psy-choanalytic Electronic Publishing's database currently lists 3,348 articles that contain references to ghosts and 471 that contain references to vampires. One of the most evocative uses of the metaphor of a ghost in psychoanalytic theory was crafted by Hans Loewald in his 1960 paper, "On the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis." In this seminal work, Loewald likened the process of psychoanalytic change to that of trans-forming psychic ghosts into ancestors.

In this paper, I would like to supplement the metaphor of *ghosts that haunt* with the metaphor of *vampires that menace.* I will link these alien experiences to different psychological processes—repression and dissoci-ation—and elaborate how both the ghosts and the vampires of a patient return to life within the *enacted dimension* of the treatment (Katz 1998, 2002, 2011, 2014). I will next discuss the process by which these unin-tegrated experiences may be assimilated into one's personality—trans-formed into ancestors—which I will illustrate with an extended clinical vignette in which the metaphor of a vampire figured prominently.

TWO SPECTRAL METAPHORS

In psychoanalytic treatment, Loewald suggested, we engage the uninte-grated internal objects who dwell in the unconscious and haunt present-day life—the ghosts of the past—in order to finally lay them to rest as an-cestors. Once integrated into the fabric of the patient's psychic structure, these ancestors no longer haunt and distort contemporary relationships, but instead provide energy for present-day living.

In Loewald's (1960) words:

The transference neurosis, in the technical sense of the estab-lishment and resolution of it in the analytic process, is due to the blood of recognition which the patient's unconscious is given

to taste—so that the old ghosts may reawaken to life.[1] Those who know ghosts tell us that they long to be released from their ghostlife and led to rest as ancestors. As ancestors they live forth in the present generation, while as ghosts they are compelled to haunt the present generation with their shadowlife. Transference is pathological in so far as the unconscious is a crowd of ghosts, and this is the beginning of the transference neurosis in analysis: ghosts of the unconscious, imprisoned by defences but haunting the patient in the dark of his defences and symptoms, are allowed to taste blood, are let loose. In the daylight of analysis the ghosts of the unconscious are laid and led to rest as ancestors whose power is taken over and transformed into the newer intensity of present life, of the secondary process and contemporary objects. [p. 29]

Loewald's ghost metaphor arises out of the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the dynamic, or motivated, unconscious (as distinguished from what can be called the descriptive unconscious, which would include everything not in awareness at a particular moment). Loewald's ghosts are thus the products of *repression,* along with various other ego defenses that have been employed to protect against early psychic conflict. In this model of mind, an individual's unconscious ghosts—the conflictual internalized object relationships of childhood—are understood to be the primary fashioners of personality structure and the organizers of psychic life.

For many analysts today, psychic life is conceived as being primarily organized as multiple self states arising from the *dissociation* of experience that cannot be metabolized (e.g., Benjamin 2010; Bromberg 2003, 2006, 2011; Davies 1998; Davies and Frawley 1994; Stern 2009). Dissociation is understood as an automatic, biologically based self-protective mechanism rather than as a motivated defense. In this conception, it is in a separate self state or states that aspects of unmetabolizable experience and unintegratable objects reside. In the most extreme situation—

[1] Loewald borrowed this metaphor from Freud (1900), who used it to describe the indestructible nature of the Unconscious. Freud was referencing the "ghosts in the underworld of the Odyssey—ghosts which awoke to new life as soon as they tasted blood" (p. 553n).

dissociative identity disorder—the sequelae of traumatic experience are split off into entirely separate, multiple personalities.

In my opinion, the different defensive/protective mechanisms emphasized in these two conceptions of mind need not be considered opposed to each other. Dissociation—which may be a motivated defense as well as an automatic protective mechanism—and repression interact in complex ways. The psychological issues we work with are multiply determined, layered mixtures of both (see also Smith 2000) even when it comes to trauma. Trauma is best understood not simply as an environmental event, but as a particular interaction between a complex psyche and the environment. Psychic trauma exists on a continuum from "small-t" trauma to the more extreme kinds of "capital-T" Trauma. The dissociative mechanisms employed to cope with such experience also range in their severity and in their impact on personality and functioning (Laub and Auerhahn 1993), and not all necessarily lead to "multiple" self states.

Further, all of the developmental challenges and psychic conflicts of childhood will be experienced as more or less traumatic depending on the environmental context. And every trauma, whether in early childhood or contemporary, capital-T or small-t, will be personally elaborated and colored, organized and reorganized, by ongoing unconscious fantasies, meanings, and conflicting affects. There is always an admixture of repressive and dissociative processes, with the balance perhaps determined by the degree to which the ego or coherence of the self feels overwhelmed and threatened with psychic annihilation.

The above notwithstanding, the differences between these two defensive/protective mechanisms, repression and dissociation, lend themselves to different metaphors for capturing the patient's experience. While Loewald's (1960) metaphor of a ghost aptly captures the recurrent haunting that one experiences from a repressed, conflictual early object relationship, I suggest that the metaphor of a vampire best captures the overwhelming kind of terror and menace that one may experience from a dissociated trauma. In this paper, I will draw the categories of repressed ghosts and dissociated vampires as if they were pure forms because these metaphors provide, for both the patient and the treating clinician, vivid, experience-near imagery for each of these psychic experiences.

I will begin with descriptions of how ghosts and vampires are depicted in folklore and the ways they are experienced in analytic treatment. I will give greater focus to the vampire metaphor as it has been less extensively explored. I will then describe the enacted dimension of analytic process, the arena of treatment in which all demons are inevitably revivified, "recognized," and ultimately laid to rest as ancestors. I will then present an extensive clinical illustration of a dissociated vampire.

GHOSTS AND VAMPIRES IN FOLKLORE AND ANALYTIC TREATMENT

In literature and film, ghosts and vampires are depicted differently. Ghosts haunt; vampires assault. Vampires wreak anguished bodily harm and even death. In everyday life, we have all experienced the hauntings of repressed ghosts—conflictual issues from childhood, now repressed, can generate contemporary feelings of diffuse anxiety, nagging guilt, and unaccounted-for dysphoria. An overwhelming trauma that had to be dissociated, however, generally feels more like some external, *not-me* entity or force—more like an alien, menacing vampire that must be kept, at all cost, at great psychic distance. To be in any kind of contact with a dissociated trauma is to consort with something believed to be lethal. It is to experience more than the disquieting affects of one's repressed ghosts; it is to feel the threat of extreme psychic pain, even psychic annihilation.

In psychoanalytic treatment, traces of an individual's ghosts—the now-repressed conflictual object relationships of childhood populating the dynamic unconscious—may regularly be detected in day-to-day work. They are in disguise as symptoms and other compromise formations, woven into and hidden in ego-syntonic character traits. Patients generally try to describe, to put into words, the emotional haunting they feel, and the analyst's clarifications and interpretive comments about the ghost at hand will make increasing sense to the patient and gradually begin to have an ameliorative effect.

In contrast, as clinical experience shows, a traumatic experience that has never been formulated is often inaccessible and unsymbolizable in treatment for many years. The patient has neither the capacity to tolerate

it nor the words to talk about it. Even if the analyst has some knowledge or sense that there is trauma in the patient's history, his or her words, particularly in the early phase of treatment, either will be rebuffed or will (re)traumatize the patient. Like the vampire that cannot survive in the sun, a dissociated trauma cannot exist initially in the "daylight of analysis." Enshrouded in the darkness of its own separate, alien self state, it lurks at the edges of the patient's consciousness and on the fringes of the treatment, nameless yet deeply terrifying, for a long time.

In Loewald's (1960) metaphor, ghosts do not wish to continue to live in the shadows as defensively unintegrated parts of one's personality who can only distort and warp present-day life. They long to be freed and to take their rightful place as integrated ancestral components of one's personality, to become useful influences in contemporary life. Proust (1913–1927) described this process as follows:

> When we have passed a certain age, the soul of the child that we were and the souls of the dead from whom we sprang come and shower upon us their riches and their spells, asking to be allowed to contribute to the new emotions which we feel and in which, erasing their former image, we recast them in an original creation. [p. 73]

Thus, when a repressed ghost enters the treatment process, it bears a gift for the patient, a gift the analyst helps liberate. In contrast, aspects of a traumatic experience or a traumatic relationship that remain unformulated—dissociated rather than repressed—are generally experienced as *not-me,* as terrifying entities to be avoided at all costs, rather than as something that may potentially bear a gift. Like the vampire in its crypt that is neither living nor dead, a dissociated trauma tends to remain in its own "undead" sector of the self—unformulated, unprocessed. It does not seek the blood of emotional recognition; it seeks the emotional life-blood of its victim, steadily depleting his or her sense of self in order to sustain its own dissociated, malevolent existence.

SPECIFIC TRAUMAS AND THE VAMPIRE METAPHOR

While every trauma is unique to the particular patient's history and psyche, there are some specific categories of trauma that have attracted

the attention of psychoanalytic clinicians, researchers, and writers. I will here focus on three particular traumas—unmourned object loss, sexual abuse, and trauma that has been intergenerationally transmitted—to illustrate how the vampire metaphor captures the well-known self- and object experience of these patients.

Unmourned Object Loss

The process of mourning is a most difficult one, a process that even under the most favorable conditions is perhaps never fully completed. In the best circumstances, the lost object is eventually laid to rest as an ancestral part of one's personality. If the loss has been traumatic, however, the individual may deny and dissociate the trauma, even while accepting the reality of the death in a more rational sector of the self. For such an individual, the lost object has not truly died.[2]

The vampire metaphor captures several aspects of this experience. In legend and myth, a vampire was considered to be a person who had died, suddenly and unexpectedly, "before his or her time," but who nevertheless retains its original corporeal existence in the real world for generations. Similarly, an unmourned love object retains its pre-death psychic existence in the dissociated sector of the personality—never aging, frozen in time. Gottlieb (1994) and Yassa and Smith (2000) have shown that the relationship with the unmourned object may actually come to be represented in analytic treatment through vampire dreams, images, and fantasies. Not only does the shadow of the object fall upon the ego (Freud 1917), but the actual lost, unmourned loved one—now unlost and undead—returns at night, in dreams and nightmares, appearing just the same as he or she did before death, no matter how many years have passed.

But although the person and lost love object are reunited in this way, the reunion is a parasitic one, devoid of true object relatedness. The vampire—the dissociated embodiment of unmourned loss, imbued with the darkness of unresolved pain and anger—drains the individual of vitality, ultimately turning the victim into a kind of undead creature as well, one who is unable to be fully involved in contemporary relationships.

[2] See Frankiel (1994) for clinical examples.

The Sexual Abuser

As portrayed in literature and film, vampires are potent sexual figures, dripping with insatiable need and hunger, full of sexual and aggressive power. A vampire seduces, mesmerizes, excites, and penetrates. It ravishes and violates. Unable to offer resistance, its victim becomes steadily weakened and ill. In this respect, the vampire metaphor personifies the sexual predator and abuser who is dependent on the passive cooperation of its victim in order to survive, and to whom the victim, helpless in the face of its power, continues to be in thrall.

When the victim is a child and the abuser is a parent or caregiver on whom the child is totally dependent, the child's maturational needs for attachment and for the development of a coherent sense of self, unrecognized and unmet by the abuser, come to be experienced as unacceptable. As these unmet needs become ever more infected with continuing abuse and entwined with the wishes and fantasies of the child's evolving sexuality and aggression, the child's experience of him-/herself inevitably becomes infused with abusing and sadomasochistic characteristics.

Experienced as dangerous, even life-threatening, these aggressive aspects of the child's identity need to be disavowed and relocated in a split-off self state (what Faimberg [2005] and Fonagy [2008] call an *alien self*) and/or externalized and projected onto others. The dissociated "vampire self" (or alter, should the traumatic abuse result in a dissociative identity disorder), and those in the external world who are targets of the projections, become repositories of the insatiable aggressive/sexual hunger, leaving the individual depleted and drained of healthy object relational capacity.

Intergenerational Transmission

The effects of any kind of massive trauma do not merely remain dissociated in the victim. In psychoanalytic treatment, we are witness to patients for whom the dissociated trauma of an earlier generation has been transmitted to them. The subject of intergenerational transmission of trauma has generated a considerable amount of psychoanalytic literature. The vampire metaphor captures this kind of transmission vividly; in most renditions of the legend, the vampire's bite does not kill but rather

serves to transmit its "illness"—to create a new vampire that lives on to prey on the next generation.

From various perspectives, such writers as Laub and Auerhahn (1993), Grand (2000), Faimberg (2005), and Fromm (2012) describe an array of identificatory, defensive, and object relational mechanisms involved in this transmission process. The unformulated and dissociated affects and images of the original victim's traumatic experience may be unconsciously identified with by his or her child, and/or intruded into the child by the parent.[3] The child may also identify with the parent's traumatizing modes of relating that are a product of the parent's own unconscious identification with his or her aggressor. All these processes will then eventuate in the original survivor's trauma becoming an alive but unformulated part of the child's psyche, and then, in similar fashion, being transmitted to the third-generation survivor.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

Thus far, I have made sharp distinctions between repression and dissociation through the metaphors of ghosts and vampires. As noted earlier, there is more overlap and complexity than these discrete categories convey. Not every unrepresented or dissociated state will be experienced as a menacing vampire, just as there is a sense in which all repressed wishes and conflicts are experienced as alien. Nevertheless, the addition of the dissociated vampire metaphor to Loewald's repressed ghost metaphor usefully captures aspects of the experience of patients who suffer from the effects of various kinds of overwhelming, capital-T Trauma—in particular, survivors and the offspring of survivors of childhood sexual abuse, unmournable early object loss, and genocide.

Regardless of whether the patient's demon is repressed, dissociated, or some mixture of the two, it will inevitably return to life in the treatment's enacted realm. The further toward the "repressed ghosts" end of the continuum one's demon is, the more work can be done in the verbal dimension of the treatment, although its revivification will inevitably be taking place, simultaneously and without awareness, in the enacted dimension as well, which will become a crucial part of the effectiveness of the working through process. The further a trauma is toward the "disso-

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[3] See Faimberg's (2005) ideas about intrusion and appropriation.

ciated vampire" end of the continuum, the more it can only be accessed as it becomes revivified in the enacted dimension. It is to this dimension of the treatment process that I will now turn.

THE ENACTED DIMENSION: THE SCENE OF THE ACTION

In a successful analytic treatment, a patient's ghosts and vampires—experiences that have been relegated to the repressed unconscious or expelled into the netherworld of the dissociated undead—will be laid to rest as ancestors. To achieve this outcome, the undead must first return to life in the here and now of the analytic dyad—in a form that is less traumatic and more benign, in a form that makes them accessible to analytic treatment. In this section, I will define what I call the *enacted dimension of analytic process* in order to explore how both ghosts and vampires—while experienced differently—ultimately make their appearance enactively in the transference-countertransference matrix.

As I will describe presently, the enacted dimension is a naturally occurring, descriptive part of analytic *process,* not a prescriptive part of analytic technique. Thus I will not be addressing particular strategies or different approaches to treating "ghosts" or "vampires." Rather, I will focus on an *ongoing unconscious arena* of analytic process—present regardless of the analyst's technical approach—in which both the repressed and the dissociated make their appearance.

I will begin by reviewing and expanding on the process inherent in Loewald's (1960) original metaphor of transforming ghosts into ancestors, a forerunner of the enacted dimension. Loewald considered the transference neurosis the arena in which repressed ghosts taste the blood of recognition and come to life. He understood the transference neurosis as evolving within an interactive, transference-countertransference field—in the interaction between the analyst's and patient's different roles and ways of psychic functioning in the analytic undertaking:

> In the development of the psychic apparatus the secondary process, preconscious organization, is the manifestation and result of interaction between a more primitively organized psychic apparatus and the secondary process activity of the environment;

through such interaction the unconscious gains higher organization. Such ego-development, arrested or distorted in neurosis, is resumed in analysis. The analyst helps to revive the repressed unconscious of the patient by his recognition of it; through interpretation of transference and resistance, through the recovery of memories and through reconstruction, the patient's unconscious activity is led into preconscious organization. The analyst, in the analytic situation, offers himself to the patient as a contemporary object. As such he revives the ghosts of the unconscious for the patient by fostering the transference neurosis, which comes about in the same way in which the dream comes about: through the mutual attraction of unconscious and "recent," "day residue" elements. Dream interpretation and interpretation of transference have this function in common: they both attempt to re-establish the lost connexions, the buried interplay, between the unconscious and the preconscious. [1960, pp. 29-30]

Loewald is here primarily describing the *verbally* symbolic aspects of what transpires in day-to-day work within the interactive transference-countertransference field. In Loewald's metaphor, the repressed ghosts of the patient's past are genuinely welcomed into the treatment as transference, and the patient comes to gradually recognize them through the juxtaposed experience of the analyst as both an old (ghost) object and a contemporary object. The ongoing processes of interpretation, recovery of memories, reconstruction, and working through enable repressed ghosts to then finally be internalized as psychic structure, as integrated aspects of one's personality.

In later papers, as I shall describe in what follows, Loewald foreshadowed contemporary interest in enacted processes—early *nonverbal* forms of symbolization and communication—in such concepts as *language action* and *enactive memory,* reflecting a prescient understanding that the transference neurosis and the transference-countertransference field consist of more than what is communicated in representational language.

This additional facet of the transference-countertransference field is its *enacted dimension.* It is in this unconsciously evolving realm of analytic process that patients have the vivid experience that their demons—both ghosts and vampires—have returned to life in the here-and-now reality

of the treatment relationship. The enacted dimension is the continuous, *interpsychic*[4] dimension of all treatment relationships that evolves, without the awareness or intent of either party, side by side and interwoven with the day-to-day content of clinical work—the more familiar, verbally symbolized dimension of the treatment. In the enacted dimension, the patient inevitably induces the analyst to play a part in, and thereby to *actualize*, an unconscious object relationship or traumatic experience.[5] The patient's ghost or the patient's vampire tastes the blood of recognition in the *analyst's* unconscious. (I will illustrate this idea in the case presentation that follows.)

As this dimension of the transference-countertransference matrix evolves, a new edition—a new treatment version—of the early relationship or trauma is created (what Poland [1992], citing the passage from Proust that I quoted earlier, calls an *original creation*) that feels immediate, real, and affectively alive. In this new edition, the past is not just remembered, it is *re-lived*—but in an attenuated, less traumatic form, making possible the ultimate transformation from ghosts into ancestors.

Loewald alludes to this heightened sense of reality, a central feature of the enacted dimension, in the quotation cited earlier, when he likens the transference neurosis to a dream. Dreams feel real. In a dream, repressed ghosts and dissociated vampires use visual and auditory images to provide them with vivid, experientially real expression. In the enacted dimension, they use action (both motor action and verbal action) to provide them with the same kind of vivid, experientially real expression. When this "two-party," waking dream[6] becomes conscious, it forms the

[4] I use the term *interpsychic interaction* (Bolognini 2011; Loewald 1970) to refer to the preconscious/unconscious communication that evolves between the two psyches in the analytic situation. It is thus not strictly inter-*personal* (the more *conscious* interactions between two *people*, as opposed to two *psyches*), and it is not strictly intra-psychic, as two intrapsychic psyches are involved. *Interpsychic communication* creates the realm in which unconscious dynamics, situated independently in patient and analyst, are communicated, take shape, and find expression in overt action or through the ordinary verbal interaction of the analytic encounter.

[5] See also Sandler's (1976) concept of *role responsiveness,* Boesky's (1990) ideas about *unconsciously negotiated resistance,* and Levenson's (1972) description of *transformation and resisting transformation.*

[6] See also Loewald's (1975) ideas, discussed later in this paper, about psychoanalysis as a *dramatic play,* Kern's (1987) formulation of the transference neurosis as a *waking*

basis for experientially based interpretive work in the verbally symbolic dimension of the treatment, creating a unique kind of *experiential insight*—insight about a past that is palpably alive in the present, the kind of insight that produces meaningful psychoanalytic change. The patient's ongoing experience of the oscillation between both dimensions of the treatment—between the realm of reawakened ghosts and vampires and the realm of the analyst as a contemporary object—provides him or her with the opportunity to reopen early paths of development, within which new ways of relating to one's objects and to oneself can be discovered.

The enactive, performative, living quality of what is experienced in the enacted dimension of analytic process is also highlighted by Loewald in later papers (1971, 1975, 1976), in which he discusses the difference between *representational memory* and *enactive memory* (*repetition by action*), and likens the transference neurosis to a dramatic play that takes place in the process between patient and analyst: "Viewed as a dramatic play, the transference neurosis is a fantasy creation woven from memories and imaginative elaborations of present actuality, the present actuality being the psychoanalytic situation, the relationship of patient and analyst" (1975, p. 279).

In this dramatic play—what I have called the play within the play (Katz 2014)—communicative language is increasingly transformed into action forms of language, what Loewald (1975) calls *language action,*[7] which is the major vehicle for the actualization processes that take place in the enacted dimension of the treatment:

> In the course of the psychoanalytic process, narrative is drawn into the context of transference dramatization, into the force-field of re-enactment. Whether in the form of free association or of more consciously, logically controlled trains of thought, narrative in psychoanalysis is increasingly being revealed in its

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dream or a *psychodrama for two,* and Cassorla's (2005, 2013) concepts, from a Bionian perspective, of the *consulting room theatre* and the *dream for two.*

[7] See also Busch's (1989) concept of *action thoughts* and Levenson's (1983) use of the term *language act.* For contemporary appreciations of Loewald's theories of the interplay between enactive and representational forms of language, experience, and memory, in both human development and therapeutic process, see Singer and Conway (2011) and Vivona (2003, 2006, 2009).

character as language action, as symbolic action, and in par-
ticular as language action within the transference force-field.
The emphasis, in regard to content and emotional tone of the
communications through narrative, shifts more and more to
their relevance as transference repetitions and transference ac-
tions in the psychoanalytic situation. One might express this by
saying that we take the patient less and less as speaking merely
about himself, about his experiences and memories, and more
and more as symbolizing action in speech, as speaking from the
depth of his memories, which regain life and poignancy by the
impetus and urgency of re-experience in the present of the ana-
lytic situation. [1975, pp. 293-294]

Thus, despite the talking cure's historical emphasis on verbal sym-
bolization, we now appreciate the extent to which the core experiences
of one's life are remembered and represented in treatment not only in
the verbal sphere, but also—inescapably, and sometimes exclusively—in
the enactive sphere. Repressed ghosts and dissociated vampires return
to life in analytic treatment on the sensorimotor, affect/somatic level,
and also through various *action* forms of *language*.[8] All experiences and
relationships that could not be symbolized verbally at the time of their
occurrence—either because they were preverbal and had no words, or
because they were too traumatic and conflicted—return to life in the
treatment's enacted dimension.

To further "enliven" these ideas, I will turn next to the case of Ann.
This treatment, which I supervised, illustrates the following:

(a) how the traumatic experience of the Holocaust, which could
    not be processed by the original victims, the patient's grand-
    parents, had been transmitted across three generations of
    survivors to the patient;

(b) the relevance of the vampire metaphor—which the patient
    introduced herself—to her experience of the dissociated
    traumatic affects and images that exerted enormous power
    and control over her life; and

(c) the particular defensive arrangement that the patient and
    her mother had created and perpetuated in their rela-

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[8] Here we might think of what Dowling (1982) calls *motor recognitions,* of Bromberg's
(2003) *affective memories*, and of Busch's (1989) *memories in action.*

tionship to protect both of them from knowledge of the trauma—which, from the beginning of the treatment and for an extended period, was re-created, without awareness, in the enacted dimension of the analytic dyad. As their reenactment gradually became recognized and available for verbal symbolization, the patient's menacing, vampiric trauma could finally be consciously known.

INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF A HOLOCAUST VAMPIRE: THE CASE OF ANN

Ann was a talented, 32-year-old artist.[9] She came to treatment saying she experienced "complicated emotional processes" that she wanted to understand: "My experience is sometimes like I have many parts to myself that I need to put together . . . . I want to reach a better integration."

Ann also suffered from somatic symptoms, particularly stomach problems, and was tormented by eating rituals. She described difficulties forming close relationships, especially romantic relationships with men. She managed to avoid serious relationships by moving every two to three years to a different city or even a different country, unable to put down roots anywhere and create her own home. She said: "I am like a street cat that has no home and gets along everywhere . . . or maybe I am more like a turtle whose home is always with him . . . . I need only a small suitcase in which I can easily pack myself—several clothes, some books, my art creations—and here I am, on my way again."

From the beginning of the analysis, Ann exhibited frequent states of traumatic affect—severe anxiety, panic states, acute mortification—that she could not name or process. On her way to one of her first analytic sessions, she had an intense anxiety attack when her subway train became stuck in a tunnel. In the closed and crowded train car, she felt a claustrophobic panic as she breathed in the sour air surrounding her. In any given session, she might be flooded by diffuse and contentless anxiety, and then in the very next session be emotionally numb and talk about an interaction or event that appeared related to, but which she

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[9] I thank Dr. Michal Talby-Abarbanel and her patient "Ann" for their permission to publish this treatment material.

did not and could not connect to, the anxiety of the previous session. For Ann, there were affect states without content, images without feelings, horror without a story.

The nature of these dissociated states and these traumatic affects and images became understandable only after Ann learned—for the first time almost a year into the treatment—of her family's Holocaust experience. Ann was a third-generation Holocaust survivor. Much of her mother's extended family were annihilated; in particular, both of Ann's maternal grandparents lost both their parents. Much of her father's extended family were expelled from their homes and communities, forced to wander from country to country.

The emotional experiences and images of these devastating traumas were transmitted from generation to generation—from her grandparents, to her parents, to Ann—without ever being put into words. There was an unspoken prohibition against verbalizing anything about the Holocaust. She and her mother never talked about their family's history—nor, for that matter, about any emotionally charged aspect of their relationship. These were communicated either nonverbally or through a secret language that they had always had with each other, what Ann called their "code." For example, comments about the weather were understood by both mother and daughter as comments about the atmosphere between them; comments about physical ailments were a communication about the emotional pain that one was causing the other.

Ann's idiosyncratic relationship with her mother was captured in a dream she had during the first year of analysis about a chocolate bar, still in its wrapper, but which was separated into two halves within it. Ann and her mother were separate and attached at the same time. They were physically and geographically separate, and in many ways psychologically differentiated, yet they were emotionally bound together in a symbiotic wrapper within which they remained safe from the unspeakable horrors of the Holocaust—which were, simultaneously, wordlessly transmitted. The two pieces of the chocolate bar also captured the way that the Holocaust trauma was sequestered in an entirely separate sector of Ann's personality, dissociated from her otherwise intact symbolizing capacities.

It was the extended work on this and related dreams, images, and artistic creations that finally led Ann, late in the first of analysis, to

talk to her mother about what it was that they were always not talking about, always avoiding, always terrified about. This eventuated in her finally learning of her grandparents' Holocaust trauma—the dissociated vampire that had menaced three generations of her family.

Despite the fact that Ann had no conscious knowledge of her family history while growing up, that history had nevertheless registered in her body and in her psyche, and came to affect virtually every aspect of her functioning and daily life. Encoded on the sensorimotor level, the trauma found expression in Ann's unmetabolized affect states, somatic symptoms, and eating rituals. Relationally, it found expression in her propensity to live her life as a "wandering Jew": her near-compulsive need to move to a different country every couple of years (as her paternal grandfather was forced to do). In fact, Ann avoided meaningful relationships by moving from place to place, in effect trying to stay one step ahead of her depressed, dissociated vampire who was always threatening to find her.

The split-off experience of her family's Holocaust trauma was also represented and expressed—and without any conscious awareness—in her paintings and other artistic creations. Many of the paintings depicted leaving, moving, and searching for a home that could never be reached. Moreover, tidal waves and destruction were frequent dream images.

The most important way that dissociated aspects of the trauma found expression and representation in Ann's treatment was in its enacted dimension. As I will illustrate, what found symbolic actualization in the transference-countertransference matrix was not only the dissociated affects and existential anxieties of the Holocaust, but also the nonverbal and unacknowledged arrangement with her mother—the chocolate bar relationship—that maintained the dissociation.

Ann's Vampire Story

Before turning to the treatment's enacted dimension in detail, I will describe the 19th-century vampire story that Ann related in the second year of treatment, which occupied the analytic work for several weeks.[10]

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[10] Though it was never cited by Ann, the story was likely *Carmilla* (Le Fanu 1871), a Gothic novella about a female vampire. *Carmilla* predates *Dracula* (Stoker 1897), which it greatly influenced, by some years, and has been adapted in several film versions.

As noted, through the work on the chocolate bar metaphor, Ann was becoming more open to exploring what the idiosyncratic ways of relating that she and her mother had developed were protecting them from— what she called their "dangerously emotional relationship."

The vampire story that she related to her analyst—without fully knowing what she was trying to communicate—was about women vampires who formed intimate, erotic bonds with their female victims.[11] The narrator was a young girl who had become a victim of a beautiful and seductive woman vampire. Gradually and patiently, the vampire tempted her into a love relationship and would secretly bite her on her breast while she was asleep. Every bite made the girl more ill, as through this process the illness of the vampire was transmitted to her. The illness was a kind of depression, Ann stated, as the girl became drained of all her vitality. The girl was about to die and turn into a vampire herself, extending the line of vampires into a new generation, but she was saved at the last moment by her father.

Ann's vampire story captures her experience of the "dangerously emotional relationship" with her mother and the way the Holocaust trauma was transmitted to her. For Ann, the vampire's "illness," the unspeakable traumatic affects and images of the Holocaust, was passed on through nonverbal forms of oral transmission—through what she incorporated along with mother's milk (symbolically, in reversed form, the vampire bite was on the breast) and through the intimacy of more adult forms of love and attachment. For Ann, it became dangerous to love. Love was poisonous and deadly.

Ann commented while talking about the vampire story: "When I get close to another person, I feel as if an open channel is formed between us and things are transmitted between us without my being able to choose what to take in and what to leave out." She became afraid, she said, that she would absorb bad things that belonged to the other person, and that good things would be drained out of her. That was how it was with her mother, who transmitted to Ann her own depression, inner deadness, and unmourned trauma, all of which were still sapping

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[11] While vampires in popular American culture, which are based on Western European vampire myths, are generally male, in earlier, Eastern vampire myths the vampire was almost always female (Wilson 2000).

Ann of her vitality. Indeed, in the treatment's early months, following difficult emotional interactions with her mother, she had sometimes talked about not feeling well physically, feeling that perhaps some "weird virus" had intruded into her. She would then go on a severe fasting diet to purge and cleanse herself.

Ann's vampire story not only illustrates how massive, dissociated trauma is passed on nonverbally from one generation to the next; it also suggests how the dissociative pattern in the recipient may be elaborated and reworked across different levels of development. In Ann's story, the trauma is transmitted not only on the oral incorporative level, through maternal merger, but also through erotic/sexual interaction with the female vampire. In addition, the story has a triadic cast with the introduction of the father as a third who saves the daughter not only from preoedipal attachment to the mother, but also from later erotic enmeshment with her.

One can also see in this story Ann's defensive identification with her dissociated vampire. In the way she lived her life, Ann *became* the vampire. She roamed restlessly from country to country, contaminating relationship after relationship, unable to find peace and rest. In the treatment, experiencing herself as an already contaminated incipient vampire, she feared that any closeness with her (female) analyst would transfer her illness/virus to the analyst and destroy the treatment.

As I will now elaborate, before Ann could consciously know of and integrate the dissociated emotional experience of her grandparents' Holocaust trauma into her personality structure, a new version of defensive arrangement by which she and her mother maintained the trauma in a dissociated state had to become a living part of the transference-countertransference matrix.

The Enacted Dimension of Ann's Analysis

From the treatment's inception, Ann and her analyst had been, without awareness, re-creating the highly idiosyncratic ways of relating developed by mother and daughter—the chocolate bar relationship. This enacted aspect of the analytic relationship formed its continuous backdrop, but it only became conscious and understandable in retrospect. For long and intense periods, patient and analyst literally felt en-

veloped in that chocolate bar wrapper—secretly attached and secretly separate—neither able to talk about substantial areas of their experience together. As Ann and her mother had long done, her analyst found herself speaking with Ann in code—not talking about the real thing or talking in displaced arenas, both of them fully knowing, but never acknowledging, what they were really talking about. They walked on eggshells with each other—Ann fearful that any expression of her more differentiated self would destroy her analyst, and her analyst fearful that any intervention, or any nonintervention, would destroy the treatment.

So sealed in their wrapper were they that, at moments, the analyst actually felt what she presumed was *Ann's* unformulated, inchoate terror, yet could not be sure from whom or from where this experience originated; there was "no membrane," to use Ann's expression. They were reliving the original "emotionally dangerous" relationship that neither wanted to be in, but from which neither could leave.

The analyst reported later that, during this period, she often felt a strong resistance to sharing the clinical process in supervision with me. In addition to being the father/third who could save them, I as the supervisor had become the lurking, dangerous vampire that she and Ann, wrapped together in their wrapper, had to avoid. And even as the material about the Holocaust finally began to emerge, Ann's analyst found herself feeling that discussion with Ann of any experience of attachment and loss—particularly as manifested in the analytic relationship around weekends and other analytic breaks—was inadmissible, a dangerous and forbidden subject in the analysis, the same taboo under which three generations of Holocaust survivors had suffered. In other words, without being fully conscious of it, both feared that any breach in the mutual dissociation inherent in their arrangement would allow the traumatic, vampiric experiences into the room before they were ready to deal with them.

This re-creation in the transference-countertransference was abruptly shattered one day when the analyst, without conscious planning, suddenly found herself putting into words for Ann—in one lengthy, powerful intervention, and with what was for her an atypical degree of intensity and comprehensiveness—everything she had actually come to understand about her patient over a period of time, but what from her

position within the transference-countertransference wrapper she had not previously been able to utter. With more emotion and less of her usual caution, she spoke to Ann about Ann's Holocaust history, about the trauma her grandparents and mother had suffered. She spoke to her about the resulting chocolate bar relationship with her mother that protected them from the trauma, but that also made Ann terrified to take the risk of feeling attached to anyone. And the analyst described in detail how all this had been re-created between them in the treatment.

The analyst worried about the possible effects of her unusual intervention, but she also felt freed, and the treatment suddenly felt more alive. It was as if the allied forces had liberated the camps—or, to return to this paper's theme, it was as if a wooden stake had been suddenly driven into the heart of the vampire—and a new world became visible and possible. Ann, too, seemed relieved. As the session ended and she rose from the couch, she looked her analyst in the eye more directly than was typical, smiled, and said thank you.

I would like to point out that the analyst's unplanned intervention was *part and parcel* of the enacted process: a response to what was likely Ann's unconscious communications that, in the context of the greater safety of treatment, she was ready—and the analyst was ready (discussed in the next section)—to emerge from the maternal transference-countertransference wrapper that they had been bound together in for nearly a year and a half. This allowed Ann to begin the process of bearing witness to and *integrating*—rather than dissociating—this aspect of her psychic heritage and of coming to terms with it as best she might. Through this lengthy enacted process, Ann had the opportunity to convert what had been passively endured in childhood into something that she actively (even if unconsciously) intended, and that she could now begin to actively master.

Once the dissociated Holocaust vampire could find conscious verbal representation in the treatment, Ann began to examine the many ways it had impacted her personality, her artistic productions, and her relationship choices. As the analysis progressed, the many layers of psychic meaning and defense that subsequently became attached to the Holocaust trauma could be gradually worked through. This process also enabled issues that had been obscured by the trauma—other aspects of her

relationship with her mother, and her many-faceted relationship with her father—to take their place in the analytic work.

The Analyst's Ghosts and Vampires

As I have described, the enacted dimension evolves through the in-terpsychic interpenetration that transpires within the transference-countertransference matrix. An enacted process is as unique as each patient–analyst dyad; it is a unique product of both psyches. Thus, in the enacted dimension, the patient's repressed ghosts and dissociated vampires taste the blood of recognition in the unconscious and unformulated areas of the *analyst's* personality that have been activated by those of the patient.

During the same period that Ann was learning of her Holocaust history, Ann's analyst discovered that, unbeknownst to her, she herself had a Holocaust history that her family had never discussed. While aware of some general similarities between her patient's object relationship patterns and anxiety states and her own, after learning of Ann's Holocaust history, the analyst began to realize that there were similarities in their family dynamics—in particular, an aversion to discussing emotional matters, frequent charged silences, and separation and separateness issues. She began to wonder about her own familial history. She knew that her parents had emigrated from Europe shortly before the Second World War, but realized that she had no idea whether there had been members of her extended family who might have stayed behind and what might have happened to them. She discovered that several relatives, on both sides of her family, had indeed remained and were lost in the Holocaust. Unbeknownst to her, and without conscious intent on their part, her parents had bequeathed to her their own dissociated Holocaust vampire.

While it had remained internally unformulated during the early portion of her treatment of Ann, the analyst's dissociated vampire had perhaps been "recognized" by Ann's, enabling Ann to induce her analyst to join her in the chocolate bar wrapper. Both patient and analyst had an initial investment in keeping their vampires in the dark, as neither was ready to have them emerge into the sunlight. As their secret separateness within their protective wrapper gradually strengthened, and as each began to learn of her Holocaust vampire, the analyst suddenly found herself making the long, unplanned interpretation described earlier.

The analyst's ability to face her own dissociated traumatic affects, in conjunction with the beginning readiness in Ann to face hers, allowed the analyst to make interpretive connections for her patient that were now based on and firmly rooted in the live, experiential immediacy of their analytic relationship. Patient and analyst could begin to emerge from the protection of their wrapper, and Ann could now begin—in the "daylight of analysis" (Loewald 1960, p. 29)—to lead and lay her dissociated vampire to rest.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Starting with Loewald's (1960) metaphor of transforming the ghosts of the past into ancestors, which usefully captures the recurrent haunting that one experiences from repressed, conflictual early object relationships, I have offered the metaphor of the *dissociated vampire* to portray the particular kind of danger and terror one experiences from an overwhelming trauma that could not be formulated or processed. I then described how ghosts and vampires are depicted in legend, literature, and film, and how they are experienced in the treatment process. While the sharp distinction made between repression and dissociation is admittedly an oversimplification, the vampire metaphor illuminates and captures, with experience-near imagery, the experience of many patients who suffer from the effects of various kinds of overwhelming trauma—in particular, survivors and the offspring of survivors of childhood sexual abuse, unmournable early object loss, and genocide.

I have then gone on to describe the enacted dimension of psychoanalytic process and its origins in Loewald's seminal writings. The enacted dimension is the continuous, interpsychic dimension of all treatment relationships that evolves, without the awareness or intent of either analyst or patient, side by side and interwoven with the day-to-day content of clinical work. In this enacted dimension—the play within the play (Katz 2014)—the patient inevitably induces the analyst into playing a part in, and thereby actualizing, an unconscious object relationship or traumatic experience. It is in this continuously evolving dimension of the treatment process that the patient's ghosts or vampires come to life in the treatment relationship, providing the opportunity for their being verbally symbolized and laid to rest.

Lastly, I have included an extensive clinical illustration of the major themes of the paper: (a) the relevance of the vampire metaphor to the patient's experience of a dissociated trauma that had been transmitted to her across three generations of Holocaust survivors; (b) the nature of the very particular defensive arrangement that had been created between herself and her mother to protect both of them from knowledge and experience of the trauma; and (c) the way in which this relationship was re-created in the enacted dimension of the analytic dyad, enabling this menacing "vampire" to fully enter the treatment and finally be lain to rest.

CODA

Analysts usefully employ many different metaphors—ghosts, vampires, and various species of the undead—to depict what plagues and possesses our patients and to conceptualize the dynamics of each patient's experience. Ultimately, analytic work involves the process of allowing the undead to return to life in the treatment's enacted dimension, and transforming psychic demons into ancestors and traumatic experiences into memories.

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BION'S THINKING ABOUT GROUPS: A STUDY OF INFLUENCE AND ORIGINALITY

BY JOHN A. SCHNEIDER

One of Bion's least-acknowledged contributions to psychoanalytic theory is his study of the relationship between the mind of the individual (the ability to think), the mentalities of groups of which the individual is a member, and the individual's bodily states. Bion's early work on group therapy evolved into a study of the interplay between mind and bodily instincts associated with being a member of a group, and became the impetus for his theory of thinking. On the foundation of Bion's ideas concerning this interaction among the thinking of the individual, group mentality, and the psyche-soma, the author presents his thoughts on the ways in which group mentality is recognizable in the analysis of individuals.

Keywords: W. R. Bion, group psychology, thinking, psyche-soma, groupishness, Melanie Klein, alpha and beta elements, Freud, herd instinct, Wilfred Trotter, projective identification, protomental states, basic assumption mentality.

INTRODUCTION

How to describe the interplay between mind and body has long been a challenge for psychoanalytic theorists. In this paper, I will discuss what I believe to be one of Bion's least-acknowledged contributions to psychoanalytic theory: his study of the relationship between the mind of the individual (the ability to think), the mentalities of groups of which the

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individual is a member, and the individual's bodily states. In his work on these three aspects of human experience, he demonstrates the way in which the interaction among them has a powerful influence on the health (or illness) of the individual and the maturation of the *psyche-soma* (Bion 1978, 1991).

I will go on to extend Bion's ideas on this interaction among the thinking of the individual, group mentality, and the psyche-soma to include my own conception of the way in which group mentality is surprisingly recognizable in the analysis of individuals and serves as a constant backdrop to personal experience, integral to the very foundation of a sense of self. In the tradition of Bion, I believe that we are always under the influence of the group—that the phantasies of the groups in which we are members are ever present, whether we are with a group, with another person, or by ourselves.

More than sixty years ago, Bion published his earliest essays, written between 1943 and 1951, in a book titled *Experiences in Groups* (1961). In this early work, Bion used groups as laboratories in which to explore his understanding of the mind–body connection. The first paper in this series of essays, "Pre-View: Intra-Group Tensions in Therapy" (Bion 1961), written in collaboration with John Rickman, discusses a novel form of "leaderless" group therapy that Bion and Rickman developed at the military facility where Bion was director of a rehabilitation center during World War II. The paper's subtitle, "Their Study as the Task of the Group," suggests to me that Bion was "not concerned to give individual treatment in public" (Bion 1961, p. 80)—that is, he was exploring a therapeutic approach but was primarily interested in investigating the group as an entity. "The group was essential to myself because I wished to have a group to study" (p. 54). Based on insights early in his career about how individuals think within groups, Bion posited a social instinct—*groupishness* (Bion 1961)[1]—and began developing his theory of thinking.

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[1] No one has pointed out the inseparability of the life of the individual and the life of the group more forcefully or more beautifully than Joseph Conrad (1897): "Few men realize that their life, the very essence of their character, their capabilities and their audacities . . . the courage, the composure, the confidence; the emotions and principles; every great and every significant thought belongs not to the individual but to the crowd: to the crowd that believes blindly in the irresistible force of its institutions and of its morals, in the power of its police and of its opinion" (p. 5).

The difficulty posed by Bion's concept of groupishness—as with Freud's concept of the sexual instinct and Klein's notion of the death instinct—is the question of how the mind goes about solving problems presented by instinctual (bodily) pressure. With groupishness, the mind must wrestle with the combination of its inborn need to be a member of groups and its need to know the truth of its experience. Human beings are conflicted between the pull of their individual thoughts and the pull of their instinctual groupishness (i.e., their collective identity and their need to be of one mind with the group).

With the exception of his concept of groupishness, which I will discuss later in this paper, Bion does not depart much from Freud's structural model or the inherent tensions of id, ego, and superego (Freud 1930; see also Lacan 1966). Bion proposed that the mind develops in response to the conflict inherent in being both a group member and a person with thoughts of his own.

When Bion speaks of the mind, he is referring to the interrelated workings of the mind and body and its inherent psychic conflict; and when he speaks of thoughts, he is referring to thoughts and feelings (including emotions—the bodily components of feelings). "The individual has to live in his own body, and his body has to put up with a mind living in it" (Bion 2005, p. 10).

Here Bion addresses the age-old problem of how an individual's mind and body respond and contribute to group pressures that conflict with the individual's thinking—anxieties that press to co-mingle the boundaries minding the body and bodying the mind—and how this conflict is given meaning. Based on his understanding of this tension, Bion developed a comprehensive theory of thinking that relates bodily sensations to thought. He proposed that the development of thinking results from using our minds to solve emotional problems and to deal with thoughts (alpha elements) that are generated in response to intimate emotional experience:

> The development of thoughts . . . require[s] an apparatus to cope with them . . . [an] apparatus that I shall provisionally call thinking . . . . This differs from any theory of thought as a product of thinking, in that thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the pressure of thoughts and not the other way around. [Bion 1965, pp. 110-111]

Bion writes that "sense impressions [beta elements] related to emotional experience" (1962, p. 17) are converted to alpha elements (which can be linked in the process of thinking). He goes on to say, "Beta elements [are] a way of talking about matters which are not thought at all; alpha-elements are a way of talking about elements which, hypothetically, are supposed to be part of thought" (1990, p. 41). Bion distinguishes between "primitive thinking" as a precursor for the development of thought, and "thinking required for the use of thoughts" (1963, p. 35) once thoughts are formed. This presupposes that thinking is a multistep process that begins before awareness or perception, at a *protomental* (bodily, sensory) level.

To expand upon what I said earlier, I will discuss in this paper how Bion, in his work on groups, takes on a problem that he addresses nowhere else in his vast body of work: the interplay of group mentality, individuality of thought, and the pressures of bodily instinct (in this case, the social instinct of groupishness). I will describe how Bion used the contributions of Freud, Trotter, and Klein to formulate his ideas about how humans think, feel, and behave in groups, as well as his original contributions to the study of groups. Bion does not refute those whom he followed; instead, he shows how each of them presents a valid perspective and then discusses how their theories are consistent with and contribute to his encompassing theory of thinking.[2]

For clarity of exposition, I have divided the body of this paper into three main parts: "Influence," "Originality," and "Experiencing in Groups."

INFLUENCE

Freud's Influence on Bion's Thinking About Groups

In his early papers, Bion generously refers to his theory of groups as an extension of Freud's theory: "I am impressed, as a practicing psycho-

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[2] My discussion of influence and originality in Bion's work has been informed by Ogden's (2006) discussion of Loewald (1979), wherein he elaborates the concept of the "tension between influence and originality," and concludes that "no generation has the right to claim absolute originality for its creations," and yet "each new generation does contribute something uniquely of its own" (Ogden 2006, p. 117). My intention is to extend the implications of Bion's work with groups to aspects of analytic thinking that lie beyond its relevance to group analysis.

analyst, by the fact that the psychoanalytic approach through the individual, and the approach these papers describe through the group, are dealing with different facets of the same phenomena" (1961, p. 8).

Bion notes that after Freud's initial observations on the individual yielded little insight, he began analyzing the transference in the analytic dyad to gain access to the patient's unconscious thoughts, feelings, fantasies, and so on:

> Before Freud . . . the individual was considered to be an intelligible field of study, but it was when Freud began to seek a solution in the relationship between two people, in study of the transference, that he found what was the intelligible field of study for at least some of the problems that the neurotic patient poses. [Bion 1961, p. 104]

Bion (1961) expanded this "intelligible field of study" to include groups, pointing out that the individual has characteristics whose significance cannot be understood unless it is acknowledged that the individual is a herd animal interacting with other humans. The study of groups was important to Bion because it allowed access to observations of an individual psyche otherwise unavailable (1961). He proposed that studying groupishness does not require that "number[s] of people are collected together in one place at one time" (p. 168). In fact, a group has "no significance for the production of group phenomena" (p. 168). In this proposition, Bion was making a major paradigm shift: he emphasized that group dynamics are inherent in individuals, and that they continue to develop in individuals even though they are most evident when individuals are together in groups. Bion believed, contrary to Freud (1920), that the herd instinct is not a phenomenon overlaying mental life: "In my view, no new instinct is brought into play—it is always in play" (Bion 1961, p. 131). "The individual is, and always has been, a member of a group" (p. 168).

This differed dramatically from Freud's (1921) thinking. Freud imported his theory of individual analysis into his thinking about groups based on his *structural model* (1923), while Bion imported ideas derived from groups and the herd mentality into his understanding of the individual mind. Bion expanded Freud's and Trotter's ideas about groups to

develop his own integrated theory of how we think as individuals who are never outside the influence of the mentalities of the groups to which we belong. Freud explicitly rejected the idea of a herd instinct, using the workings of suggestion and libido to explain group phenomena.

To understand how the mind works, Bion introduced a novel method of observation that goes beyond Freud's "explanatory" model of psychoanalysis. Basically, Bion (1961) proposed that psychoanalysts use their "mental microscope" (p. 49) to hold multiple points of view at the same time—each providing information from its own vantage point while influencing the others. The instrument of observation (thinking) that adjusts in order to "illume" one's observations with a "rudimentary binocular vision" (1961, p. 8) offers points of view that are continuously changing while overlapping, thus informing and transforming each other from multiple vantage points simultaneously. This is evidenced in Bion's models of the dialectical interplay between the conscious and unconscious mind, the psychotic and nonpsychotic parts of the personality, and primary and secondary process thinking.

Bion reconceived many of Freud's mental constructs (for example, the relationship between the conscious and unconscious mind), proposing instead that we are aware of and have access to both poles of these dichotomies simultaneously. Bion focused on multiple realities as part of the reality principle—relying on observation of facts from multiple vertices to get to the *selected fact* by using a scientific approach of investigation, as well as personal creativity and intuition. When we extend Bion's conception of the simultaneity of multiple vertices to the analytic relationship, both the patient's and analyst's state of mind are seen as contributing to the creation of a mind capable of thinking and generating meaning.

Freud's paternalistic view that observations are filtered through the lens of the analyst as "chief" evidences his belief in the centrality of the analyst's position in the therapeutic relationship—whereas Bion develops the view that, in analysis, "it takes two people to think" (Ogden and Ogden 2013, p. 25), with each member of the dyad thinking with the other and having a significant effect on the other's defenses and emotions.

Trotter's Influence on Bion's Thinking about Groups

Perhaps the person who most influenced Bion's thinking about groups was Wilfred Trotter. In her introduction to Bion's autobiographical essay, Francesca Bion (1985) states that there were two outstanding men who "played a very great part in his [Bion's] intellectual development" (p. 7). One was H. J. Patton, an authority on Kant's philosophy with whom Bion studied when he was an undergraduate at Oxford; and the other was Wilfred Trotter, his surgical chief when Bion was a medical student at University College Hospital in London. It can be said that Bion owed much of his theoretical thinking to Trotter, whom he looked to as a mentor and father figure.

Trotter is best known in medical circles as an outstanding surgeon, and in sociopsychoanalytic circles for having conceived of the *herd instinct* (Trotter 1916). Although not well acknowledged for his contributions to psychoanalysis, Trotter influenced psychoanalytic thought through his friend Ernest Jones. It was Trotter who developed the concept of *rationalization,* which, at Trotter's instigation, Jones presented at the First International Congress at Salzburg in 1908. Trotter introduced Jones to Freud, and it was Trotter who attended to Freud when Freud was near death (Jones 1940; Maddox 2006).

Trotter's (1916) work on groups preceded Freud's 1921 paper on group psychology. Trotter, however, did not provide a theoretical framework or observational data with which to address the problem of how, in human beings, the herd instinct becomes a mental phenomenon as a result of the reflective *I* or *self* that herd animals are not capable of generating (Schneider 2009).

Trotter's ideas about the herd instinct were seminal to Bion's (1961) thinking about groups, and by extension to all of Bion's theoretical contributions about how the mind works.[3] Bion was in agreement with Trotter's contention that gregariousness is the strongest urge in human beings, as evidenced in the quotation that follows.

[3] As Ogden (2009) observed, "In that collection of papers [*Experiences in Groups,* 1961], Bion introduces a radical reformulation of the psychoanalytic conception of thinking and its psychopathology" (p. 92), which adumbrates almost all the major themes Bion developed in his subsequent writing.

> The individual has an even more dangerous problem to solve [than sexuality] in the operation of his aggressive impulses, which . . . may impose on him the need to fight for his group with the essential possibility of death, while it also imposes on him the need for action in the interests of his survival. [Bion 1992, pp. 105-106]

Trotter (1916) distinguished between "three primitive instincts" (p. 47)—survival, sexual pairing, and feeding—that are activated by the individual and obey the pleasure principle, and what he called the "fourth instinct of gregariousness" (p. 47), which is activated by the group and controlled by a power outside the body.

> The fourth instinct . . . *exercises a controlling power on the individual from without* . . . [and] may actually be unpleasant, and so be resisted from the individual side and yet be forced instinctively into execution. The instinctive act seems to have been too much associated in current thought [i.e., in Freud's pleasure principle] with the idea of yielding to an impulse irresistibly pleasant to the body. [p. 48; italics added] . . . . The others automatically fall into the background. [Trotter 1916, p. 47]

Extending Trotter's ideas, it seems that the *instinctual social force* is an internal state at birth activated from outside the body, which eventually encompasses the entirety of our past and present group experiences.

Bion (1992) concurred with Trotter regarding the primacy of gregariousness over sexual and aggressive instincts: "The patient's socialism menaces his primacy as an individual, and the group demands of him subordination to aims lying outside his personality" (p. 105)—but the group is nonetheless necessary for his sanity and psychological growth.

In proposing the herd instinct, Trotter gives gregariousness biological significance as a bodily instinct, which in Bion's theory is transformed into a psychological trait (*groupishness*). Bion agreed with Trotter's (1916) assessment that

> . . . ordinary psychology is dealing with the two fields—the social and the individual—which are . . . absolutely continuous . . . . All human psychology . . . must be the psychology of associated man, since man as a solitary animal is unknown to us, and every

individual must present the characteristic reactions of the social animal. [p. 12]

That man is also necessarily a sociopolitical animal is a human condition recognized as early in human civilization as Aristotle's time: "Aristotle said man is a political animal; for a man to lead a full life the group is essential . . . to the fulfillment of a man's life . . . as essential . . . as . . . activities of economics and war" (Bion 1961, pp. 53-54). Furthermore:

The inescapable bestiality of the human animal is the quality from which our cherished and admired characteristics spring. "Man is a political animal" means that he has the mental counterpart of the physical characteristics of a herd animal. As psychoanalysts, we are concerned with the mental counterpart of such physical characteristics as can be discerned in the individual when in semi-isolation from his group, but closely involved in a situation likely to stimulate his "pair" characteristics. [Bion 1970, pp. 65-66]

Here, it seems to me, the important idea is that the influence of the group continues regardless of our awareness or intent—whether we are surrounded by others, by ourselves, or in an analytic dyad. Trotter believed humans are so dominated by the herd instinct that they develop an internal representation of the herd so that they can travel and live alone when necessary. Echoing Trotter, Bion (1961) asks, "How do we know when the group begins, or for that matter when it ends?" (p. 88). He responds by saying that we humans are *never* "not in the group," even when we are alone. "No individual, however isolated in time and space, can be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology" (1961, p. 132). "The group, in the sense of a collection of people in a room, adds nothing to the individual or the aggregate of individuals—it merely reveals something that is not otherwise visible" (p. 340).

Like Trotter, Bion believed humans always carry the herd's internal representation, and are therefore suggestible. Trotter (1916) wrote: "Man is not . . . suggestible in fits and starts, not merely in panics and in mobs, under hypnosis, and so forth, but [is] *always*, *everywhere*, and

under any circumstances . . . identified with the voice of the herd" (p. 33, italics added).

In this regard, Bion differed from Freud (1921), who felt that group members align with the leader in a trance-like way due to their heightened suggestibility in the presence of the leader, replacing their own superego with that of the leader as a result of their identification with him. Suggestibility for Bion, by contrast, is an inherent state that is automatic.

Bion proposed that human beings share a belief system that takes on evolutionary importance. They find it almost impossible to hold ideas that conflict with the group mentality, subordinating their individual beliefs and taking as fact what are really shared belief systems that resist and repel contradictory knowledge. He wrote, "The natural psychological habitat is a group animal at war not simply with the group, but with himself for being a group animal" (1961, p. 131)—and we have the choice of either accepting the thinking of the group or adding our own ideas.

Trotter contends that gregariousness enhances our chances for survival and evolution, favoring the survival of the herd over the individual. Bion (1992) echoes Trotter's belief:

> In his relationship with the group, the individual's welfare is secondary to the survival of the group. Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest needs to be replaced by a theory of the survival of the fittest to survive in a group [as an individual]. [pp. 29-30]

Klein's Influence on Bion's Thinking about Groups

At one point, Bion linked his theory of groups to Melanie Klein's (1946) psychoanalytic concepts. The final chapter of *Experiences in Groups* (Bion 1961) is dedicated to her. In the introduction to that chapter, Bion stated:

> My present work . . . convinces me of the central importance of the Kleinian theories of projective identification and the interplay between the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions . . . . Without the aid of these two sets of theories, I doubt the possibility of any advance in the study of group phenomena. [p. 8]

He included in his thinking Klein's "theories of internal objects, projective identification, and failure of symbol formation" (Bion 1952, p. 247). Bion's theory of groups builds on her idea that an individual's psychotic anxieties, generated in the context of first encounters with the object (mother/breast), are reactivated when the individual attempts to make contact with members of a group.

As well as deepening our understanding of many of the concepts introduced by Klein, Bion greatly extended her theory. For instance, he transformed the concept of projective identification (which he thought "played an important role in groups" (1961, p. 149) from an intrapsychic mechanism of defense to a psychological/interpersonal process by which two individuals think together. In Bion's conception of projective identification, the analyst experiences himself in accord with the feelings projected into him by the patient, and in response to interpersonal pressure, finds himself "playing a part . . . in somebody else's phantasy" (p. 149). The patient influences the analyst in such a way that he suffers "a temporary loss of insight" (p. 149).

Bion (1962, 1963) expanded projective identification into a concept of communicativeness, extending it to include a very primitive form of thinking, allowing the patient "to investigate his own feelings in a personality powerful enough to contain them" (Bion 1959, p. 314). He elaborates this when he states, "In its origin, communication is effected by realistic projective identification" (1967, p. 118).

Bion continued to develop his own thinking, even when his ideas seemed to alter Klein's. He did not let the influence of others dictate his process of creating meaning. At every point in his career, Bion refused to align himself with a particular psychoanalytic school of thought. "More than one patient has said my technique is not Kleinian. I think there is substance in this" (Bion 1992, p. 166).

ORIGINALITY

Having discussed the influences of Freud, Klein, and Trotter on Bion's thinking about groups, I will now turn to what I see as original to Bion's contribution to a psychoanalytic theory of thinking that encompasses both individual and group life. I will divide this discussion of Bion's con-

tribution into four subsections, each of which deals with different aspects of his thinking—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that these are different vertices from which to view his thinking: Bion's conception of basic assumption groups, of work groups, of the protomental matrix, and of the analytic dyad.

Bion's Basic Assumption Groups

Bion (1961) transformed Trotter's biological herd instinct into elements of "group mentality" (p. 60) that he called "basic assumption groups" (p. 153). These shared unconscious beliefs are *nonthinking responses* with the strength of instincts, which exist as primitive *protomental states* and can preempt thinking and override observations. The basic assumptions stem from the gregarious instinct, which aligns group members to share their beliefs, emotions, and phantasies, demonstrating a "readiness to combine . . . that is more analogous to tropism in plants than to purposive behavior" (Bion 1961, pp. 116-117).

Bion (1961) referred to the tendency for humans to group together as a "valency"—that is, "a spontaneous unconscious formation of the gregariousness quality in the personality of man" (p. 170). "[There is] *no* valency only by ceasing to be . . . human" (p. 116, italics in original). Thus, to be human is to be under the ever-present influence of the gregarious quality of the personality, and to have the capacity for "instantaneous combinations with other humans in an established pattern of behavior—the basic assumption" (Bion 1961, p. 175).[4]

The three basic assumption elements are basic assumption *dependency,* basic assumption *pairing,* and basic assumption *fight-flight.* Bion explains how these "basic assumption mentalities" manifest in groups. In a basic assumption dependency group, the group members "think they need only wait for a single sustaining leader who will solve all their problems" (p. 82). In a basic assumption pairing group, the group members participate in the creativity of a pair of individuals to produce a savior or saving idea, providing "a Messiah, be it a person, idea, or Utopia" (p. 152). In a basic assumption fight-flight group, the group attacks or flees

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[4] "Man is altruistic because he must be, not because reason recommends it, for herd suggestion opposes any advance in altruism" (Trotter 1916, p. 46).

from any dangerous object or idea; that is, all group problems can be solved by fighting or taking flight from an enemy.

Closely related to the idea that humans operate on basic assumptions is Bion's belief that "there is a hatred of having to learn by experience" (Bion 1961, p. 89), which is very close, if not identical, to Trotter's (1916) notion that people resist changing what is familiar and known to them. "Experience, as is shown by the whole history of man, is met by resistance, because it invariably encounters decisions based upon instinctive belief" (Trotter 1916, p. 35). Trotter and Bion concur that unless a new idea fits already understandable ideas, it disappears. "The mind likes a strange idea as little as the body likes a strange protein, and resists it with similar energy . . . . A new idea is the most quickly acting antigen known to science" (Trotter 1941, p. 189).

Bion (1961) seems to suggest that to learn from experience, one must develop the capacity to think in the face of the immediacy of instinctual feelings. "What we've learned from history is that we do not learn from history," and humans have a "hatred of a process of development" (p. 89). In using such emphatic language, Bion seems to be concurring with Trotter's ideas about thinking and anti-thinking. This also echoes Freud's (1930) idea that we rid the body of pressure by "killing off the instincts" (p. 79), so as not to be left with frustrating feelings.

Acting on the basic assumptions allows access to the affiliated work group mentality, which initially presents as beta elements (the raw sensory data), to be transformed into units of meaningful experience (alpha elements), which can then be linked in the process of thinking and symbolization in the work group. But given the near rapidity of the valence with which basic assumptions are combined, the emotional potential of the protomental gets evacuated as beta elements. In other words, beta elements maintain some of the valence of protomental elements and are expelled by the mind; "the mind is felt to operate as if it were a muscle" (Bion 1965, p. 130).

> [Beta elements are] expelled as air in the lungs is expelled . . . . The patient seems to feel that his mind is an expelling organ like a lung in act of expiration . . . . The patient is using his eyes, and the mental counterpart for vision, as evacuatory musculature. [Bion 1965, p. 131]

As an example of Bion's thinking from multiple vertices, I will conclude this subsection by presenting his discussion of *co-operation:*

> In the group the patient feels he must try to co-operate. He discovers that his capacity for co-operation is emotionally most vital in the basic group, and that, in the pursuit of objectives that do not easily lend themselves to the techniques of the basic group, his ability to co-operate is dependent on a kind of give-and-take that is achieved with great difficulty compared with the swift emotional response that comes of acquiescence in the emotions of the basic group. [1961, p. 90]

The rapidity of the "physical" response of co-operation both limits and is necessary for the ability to move to a form of co-operation involving the pursuit of truth and development. The work group comes together to act on the basic assumption, with the potential to transform itself into the affiliated work group.

Later on in his discussion, Bion presents an example in his own thinking of shifting from a basic assumption mentality to the work group mentality when he reconsiders his earlier thinking about co-operation:

> In trying to achieve precision of aim, I was really suffering . . . through dislike of the emotional quality in myself and in the group that is inherent in membership of the human group . . . . This quality is a [certain] *kind of capacity* for co-operation with the group, but I propose from now on to reserve the word co-operation for conscious or unconscious working with the rest of the group in work; whereas for the capacity for spontaneous instinctive co-operation in the basic assumptions . . . I shall use the word "valency." [1961, p. 116, italics added]

As can be seen, Bion considers the word *co-operation* from multiple vertices, including his internal emotional response to his experience in a group. Consequently, he revises his thinking to use the word *co-operation* only as evidenced in the work group where group members are engaged in *co-operations* (i.e., simultaneous operations). The co-operation resulting from our capacity for instantaneous combination with others is an automatic basic assumption he calls *valency*. Only when cooperative action becomes part of the work group mentality can thinking occur.

The reader can hear in Bion's comments how his thinking process allowed him to shift from the basic assumption mentality to the work group mentality.

Bion's Work Groups

As Bion (1961) conceives of it, the *work group* is a group mentality that exists in tension with the basic assumption groups because, unlike the primitive automaticity of basic assumptions, the work group mentality involves a cooperative endeavor to pursue a common purpose in accord with the reality principle. Basic assumption groups *appear* to be thinking by using previously validated thoughts that avoid thinking. The work group exists because of "the need to develop [thinking] rather than to rely on the efficacy of magic" (Bion 1961), which can only occur by "the painful bringing together" (p. 128) of the primitive basic assumption mentality and the "sophisticated" (p. 96) work group mentality. This is a process that necessitates facing our most primitive fears—our unconscious psychotic states that hate development and rely on magical thinking to avoid the truth (Schneider 2005a, 2005b, 2005c).

In his 1950 paper on groups, Bion introduces his critical idea of the central importance of knowing the truth, an idea that he fully develops twenty years later in *Attention and Interpretation* (1970), which was originally titled *Attention and Interpretation: A Scientific Approach to Insight in Psychoanalysis and Groups.*

> A group acting on basic assumptions would need neither organization nor a capacity for co-operation. It is only when a group begins to act on a basic assumption that difficulties arise. Action inevitably means contact with reality, and contact with reality compels regard for truth; scientific method is imposed, and the evocation of the work group follows. [Bion 1961, pp. 170-171]

While the instinctual tendency in humans is to form groups, basic assumption groups stand in opposition to thinking and, at the same time, are essential to thinking. The work group can get to the truth only by questioning assumed truths and examining facts, leading to the development of ideas challenging to the self.

> It is almost as if human beings were aware of the painful and often fatal consequences of having to act without an adequate grasp of reality, and therefore were aware of the need for truth as a criterion in the evaluation of their findings. [Bion 1961, p. 100]

We are equipped with an unrealized drive to pursue the truth, and in spite of our group mentality, our thinking ultimately confronts reality, so that our work group mentality wins out. "The group and the individuals in it are hopelessly committed to a developmental procedure, no matter what might have been the case with our remote ancestors [Trotter's 'herd']" (Bion 1961, pp. 89-90). "I think one of the striking things about a group is that, despite the influence of the basic assumptions, it is the work group that triumphs in the long run" (1961, p. 135). To guard against basic assumption mentalities taking over the work group mentality, in large groups at the Tavistock Clinic, Bion was known to ask, "Would anyone give a home to a wild idea?" (Britton 2010) as an invitation to consider individual thoughts felt to be out of step with those of the group.

The task of the work group is to learn from the process of facing magical wishes inherent in the group's basic assumption mentalities. While we need external work groups to develop our thinking, one could just as easily say we are cursed with the limitations on thinking inherent in being members of groups operating at the level of basic assumptions. Both are true. "Without basic assumption groups, there would be nothing for the work group to work on" (Ogden 2011).

Bion believes that a work group mentality is always at risk of deteriorating into a basic assumption group mentality, or *anti-thinking*. Learning and innovation can take place only if the work group mentality is allowed to interact with and destabilize basic assumption mentalities, similar to the way that paranoid-schizoid splitting productively destabilizes depressive position certainty and closure.

Bion's Undeveloped Postulate of the Protomental Matrix

A third conception of groups that reflects Bion's originality of thinking is his conception of a protomental matrix that is the origin

of the individual's emotional states. In this matrix, which underlies all human experience, "physical and psychological or mental are undifferentiated . . . . It is from this matrix that emotions proper to the basic assumptions flow" (Bion 1961, p. 102). In this way, Bion extends his model of the self, linking the physical body and the psyche. The protomental matrix is not experienced consciously or unconsciously; rather, it is a constant state—the psychophysical basis of all emotion and thought.

As Bion (1961) states, the protomental "transcends experience" (p. 101). "The emotional state precedes the basic assumption and follows certain proto-mental phenomena of which it is an expression" (p. 101).

When Bion refers to *transcending experience,* we might ask ourselves what else *is* there—how can we know something beyond our own experience? Perhaps something else arises from the herd mentality and forms a background state that is activated when individuals are in groups.

Bion's theory of the protomental matrix extends far beyond Freud's conception of how the mind interacts with the body to transform instincts into events that develop into psychic illness. For Freud, hysteria results from an unconscious psychological conflict in which the body is used for symbolic expression of experiences that are so psychically disturbing that they are relegated to the unconscious through repression. But Bion sees all illness as evolving from the protomental matrix. Protomental phenomena may become either physical states (e.g., blushing) or illnesses (e.g., tuberculosis [Bion 1961]) without psychological registration, or they may become thoughts and emotional states (and good physical health).

The ascension of one of the basic assumptions means that the force and influence of the other two basic assumptions are psychically suspended, but these can powerfully affect bodily states. Bion's protomental matrix anticipates the work of Marty, de M'Uzan, and David (1963) and other writers of the French psychosomatic school, who have proposed that psychosomatic illness is a result of "foreclosed" emotional experience (McDougall 1984; Schneider 1995, 2003a, 2003b, 2007), which has been discharged into the body because it is too disturbing to elaborate psychically.

After publishing *Experiences in Groups* (1961), Bion rarely mentions the protomental matrix; however, it seems to be folded into his later

ideas of alpha and beta elements in his theory of thinking, and eventually into his conceptualization of the self. In his last published paper (Bion 1979), he discusses "the problem of communication within the self" (p. 324). In that paper, he alters the terms of the discussion: "I dislike terms that imply 'the body' and 'the mind,' therefore, I use 'self' to include what I call body and mind; and 'a mental space' for further ideas which may be developed" (pp. 324-325). Our primitive past, our present, and our future are interwoven in the self, which is made up of the entirety of our experiences.

Bion did not clearly distinguish protomental phenomena from beta elements when he moved from his theory of the protomental to his theory of alpha function (Bion 1962). I expand on Bion's ideas here by suggesting that protomental phenomena are the unrepresentable but ever-present state of potentiality that exists as the origin of what may become thoughts. They are neither assimilated (alpha elements) nor unassimilated (beta elements) (Bion 1992), but are the lowest level of sensory data registration and are automatic and reflexive. The underlying protomental state is latent until activated by contact with the outside world, which allows beta elements to form as the first primitive organization with the potential to be transformed into thoughts.

In a group, the basic assumptions are activated automatically from the protomental, with the potential either to be encoded as beta elements for evacuation or transformed into alpha elements available for symbolic thinking in the work group. When protomental elements do not undergo sufficient psychic realization to generate either of these processes, they continue as pre-beta phenomena in the form of a basic assumption. Therefore, they are not contained and cannot be used for dreaming or thinking (Ferro 2002; Grotstein 2000; Schneider 2005c, 2010).

Bion was careful to keep the concept of *protomental* at the postulate level, and cautions the reader not to "establish a more rigid order of cause and effect than I wish to subscribe to, for clinically it is useful to consider these events as links in a circular series [of thoughts]" (1961, p. 101).

In his discussion of the protomental, Bion demonstrates how the mind works, and shows that we must be willing to be puzzled to allow

the mind to think. He conveys the process through his tentative use of language that contains the seeds of his thinking. "I propose to postulate the existence of 'proto-mental' phenomena" (1961, p. 101). He continues, "It might prove useful . . . . I cannot represent my view adequately without proposing a concept that transcends experience . . . if it throws light on what takes place." He emphasizes that "much can be lost by the exclusion of tentative theories that show how different ideas were developed" (1961, p. 7).

Bion's willingness to share unformed ideas demonstrates how he uses wild thoughts, and his meandering fragments convey something to the reader beyond the words that "might throw light on" developing his theory of the mind (1961, p. 101). "The meaning is revealed by the pattern formed and the light thus trapped—not by the structure, the carved work itself" (Bion 1991, p. 190).

EXPERIENCING IN GROUPS

Fragments of Bion's Personal Experience with Groups

As analysts, we struggle with how to take in ideas from "the group" as we attempt to define ourselves to ourselves, and locate ourselves in relation to the analytic community without sacrificing our individuality. Early in his career, Bion moved among and beyond the influences of others to make something of his own; and he also encouraged his peers to take what was original to him and make with it something of their own.

Bion served as president of the British Psychoanalytical Association, chair of the Melanie Klein Trust, and was a highly honored and frequently quoted psychoanalyst. Nevertheless, it seems that he did not feel "heard" in England, and he appeared to believe that his being revered was the problem: when people revere an individual, they do not listen to him. According to his wife, Francesca, Bion's refrain during his last years in London was: "[I'm] akin to being loaded with honors and sunk without a trace" (F. Bion 1995, p. 15). His move to Los Angeles failed to solve the problem of not being heard:

The relationship between myself and my colleagues here in Los Angeles could be accurately described as almost entirely unsuccessful. They are puzzled by and cannot understand me—but

have some respect for what they cannot understand. There is, if
I am not mistaken, more fear than understanding or sympathy
for my thoughts, personality, or ideas. There is no question of
the situation—the emotional situation—being any better any-
where else. I could say much the same for England. [Bion 1992,
p. 334]

Bion was acutely aware of the ubiquity of the dependency basic as-
sumption mentality, which he found in all groups wherever he went. He
seemed to feel tension not only between his original ideas and the ideas
of the theorists who had influenced his thinking about groups—Trotter,
Freud, and Klein—but also between himself and his peers in London
and Los Angeles, who expected him to lead their groups. He seemed to
resist becoming their thought leader, and strived—apparently without
much success—to get them to think on their own, beyond his contribu-
tions, and may have been disappointed by those who made him into a
sort of mystic.

Although his *Experiences in Groups* (1961) had become popular, to
his surprise (Bion 1961, p. 7), Bion felt his thinking about groups and
his theory of thinking in general had not greatly impacted psychoana-
lytic thought. In a letter to one of his children, Bion wrote: "The one
book that I couldn't be bothered with, even when pressure was put on
me ten years later [*Experiences in Groups*], has been a continuous suc-
cess" (F. Bion 1985, p. 213). And earlier, in the introduction to *Expe-
riences in Groups* (Bion 1961), he admitted: "The articles printed here
aroused more interest than I expected" (p. 7). It seems that Bion felt his
original thinking about groups had been misunderstood by his profes-
sional colleagues, who appeared more interested in using his work as a
therapeutic approach than elaborating a theory of thinking.

Basic Assumptions in the Analytic Dyad

Anyone who has employed a technique of investigation that de-
pends on the presence of two people, and psychoanalysis is such
a technique, can be regarded not only as taking part in the in-
vestigation of one mind by another, but also as investigating the
mentality not of a group but of a pair. [Bion 1961, p. 62]

Bion refers to the dyad in analysis as a *pair*. For Bion, "the psycho-analytical situation is not 'individual psychology' but 'pair' [psychology]" (1961, p. 62). "Psychoanalysis, in the light of my experience of groups, can be regarded as a work group likely to stimulate the basic assumption of pairing" (p. 176).

Although Bion never specifically mentioned it, nor did he in any way develop the idea, it seems to me that in the course of individual analysis, breakdowns in the work group mentality stimulate the basic assumption pairing, with alpha function deteriorating into what may turn "the analysis itself into a piece of acting out" (1967, p. 87; see also Britton 2013).

When the individual is in psychoanalysis or in group analysis, thinking eventually triumphs over basic assumptions, *dis*-illusion over illusion, and reality over magical thinking. Bion writes, "The psychoanalytic problem is the problem of growth and its harmonious resolution in the relationships between the container and the contained, repeated in individual, pair, and finally, group (intra- and extra-psychically)" (1970, pp. 65-66). For the patient in a group, the group makes psychological what the individual is not yet able to give psychological form to by turning the protomental into mental.

Bion leaves no doubt about the importance of the herd mentality in individual work. As individuals, we are always in semi-isolation, and coming into contact with the group or an individual analyst stimulates the *basic situation* and *basic emotional drives,* offering us the opportunity to transform the physical into the mental.

Group pressure is derived from a basic assumption group, fight-flight mentality in a patient's (or an analyst's) life—for instance, when an analysand feels persecuted or self-righteous toward the analyst as a consequence of what is occurring in the patient's group life at work. Group thinking affects psychoanalysis in another way as well. The pair is not a group, but the two are always part of larger groups within which they work. For example, when an analyst who is identified with a particular school of psychoanalysis works with a patient who is also an analyst and is identified with the same school, they share implicit viewpoints about the analysis, believing that their analytic approach is the best. They may share the basic assumptions of dependency upon a leader (whether it be Bion, Jung, Klein, Kohut, or anyone else), and the need to pair to

create an analysis—a truth, "a Messiah" (1961, p. 152). They may experience the basic assumption of fight-flight relative to analysts identified with other analytic schools and their leaders.

As analysts and analysands, we bring these three conceptual categories—individual, pair, and group—to our thinking in the analytic situation. Our various group memberships have important consequences for our analytic work, as illustrated by Wallace (2007) in her communication of the personal and professional difficulties posed when her analysis was terminated after her training analyst was expelled from the institute as a consequence of ethical violations. Her communication can be seen as an example of her individual psychology and the relationship to past and present, her unconscious and conscious mind, and her struggle with the repressed unconscious.

As evidenced in Wallace's communication, the pair, individual transference, projective identification, the analytic third, analytic fields, and the mentality of the groups of which she and her analyst were members are all inextricably entwined. They constitute the field in which psychoanalysis is conducted, and demonstrate what can develop between the analyst and the patient—particularly when the analysis is part of training required by an institute, and the analyst has broken the laws of the pair and the group by acting out.

Part of what makes it exceptionally difficult to analyze a candidate within the structure of an institute training model is the pressure from the institute group. The analysis takes place and fulfills the requirement of the group, so both analyst and patient/candidate are agents of the institute; but the analyst is also the agent of the institute who must, at the very least, inform the institute whether or not the candidate has fulfilled the requirements of the institute. In this way, this analysis becomes a special category, because it is not being conducted exclusively for the psychological growth of the patient/candidate; it also serves the needs of the institute group.

Bion (1961) observed that:

The apparent difference between group psychology and individual psychology is an illusion produced by the fact that the group provides an intelligible field of study for certain aspects of individual psychology, and in so doing brings into prominence

phenomena that appear alien to an observer unaccustomed to using the group. [p. 134]

In other words, recognition of our "experiences in groups" is essential for the practice of psychoanalysis, whether that practice be with individuals or with groups. Group therapy training is not only therapeutic, but also benefits the analyst's thinking. Bion says it gives analysts the experience of more easily recognizing and familiarizing themselves with the basic assumptions, which will then be more easily recognized when working in an analytic dyad.

To sum up, there are characteristics in the individual whose real significance cannot be understood unless it is recognized that they are part of his equipment as a herd animal. One cannot understand a recluse living in isolation unless one is informed about the group of which he is a member (Bion 1961).

From this point of view, individual relationships originate from groups. Psychoanalysis requires that the analyst use binocular vision to be aware of when he and the patient are operating in basic assumption mentality or in work group mentality.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Bion's contributions to a psychoanalytic theory of groups foreshadow almost the entirety of his theoretical opus. I have discussed the influence of the work of Freud, Trotter, and Klein on Bion's thinking about groups, and the ways in which Bion radically and originally reshaped psychoanalytic thinking by using his experience with groups. He leaves us with a far-reaching but incomplete theory of a group instinct that is present in the individual in latent form at all times, and is therefore active in every analysis.

We usually do not think much about groups when we are with individual analysands. I suggest that to make only individual interpretations is to miss the tension between the patient and the analyst as members of the analytic dyad and of groups. By attending to the basic assumptions, we may become aware of the underlying latent—but ever-present—fight-flight, pairing, and dependency basic assumption mentalities. In each case, we see the interplay of the three basic assumptions—one prominent and the other two waiting in the wings.

A group mentality is of significance not in some of our analysands, but in all of them. Since it is innate and not related to past experience, it is a common denominator throughout our development during the course of a lifetime, and results in a constant struggle between what we might call our higher reasoning and our lower nature. What is revealed in an analysis that is otherwise hidden is the tension between the analysand's thinking and his innate, instinctual desire to be a member of a group.

Bion challenges us as readers to *re*-view what we believe we know and how we come to know it. He raises uncomfortable questions that destabilize our beliefs, leaving us with self-doubts that spur us to *re*-consider our understandings, and in so doing, he inspires us to think beyond Freud's, Trotter's, and Klein's ideas about groups—and even beyond his own.

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MEDEA BY EURIPIDES: PSYCHIC CONSTRUCTIONS FOR PREVERBAL EXPERIENCES AND TRAUMAS

BY SOTIRIS MANOLOPOULOS

The author introduces Euripides's Medea *as a metaphor of the psyche's attempt to express and symbolize preverbal, unrepresented experiences and wounds visited upon it before there was any word for trauma. He suggests that Medea, the wild foreigner whose murderous magic is unleashed when the facilitating environment betrays her, could be thought of psychoanalytically as the deepest uncharted realms of primitive, traumatized existence yearning to find a way to represent itself on the stage of language and reality. Euripides can help us understand this deep realm of the psyche, with which psychoanalysis also grapples; he presents the realization of an object that traumatically fails to contain preverbal elements and transform them.*

Keywords: Preverbal trauma, Euripides, infanticide, Greek tragedy, hallucinatory realizations, primitive elements, psychic constructions, language, *deus ex machina*.

INTRODUCTION

Euripides, the "rag stitcher," collected whatever scraps of experience he found and wove them into tragic plots. He gave his mythical heroes and gods the appearance of ordinary people. Thus, his Medea takes leave of her myth and becomes disturbingly accessible.

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Medea is tragic because it presents on stage the elements of trauma that lie beyond language and meaning, and that resist embarking on the painful processes required for transformation (mourning, internalization). The psychoanalytic study of Medea's tragedy enriches our understanding of how we gain access to primitive, "untamable" traces of unrepresented experiences. A constant process of psychic construction is realized and resisted in oscillating movements between repetition and fantasy, regression and integration. Through the function of repetition, preverbal memory traces are transferred into the present as images on the stage of consciousness and in the presence of others, to complete their transformation. These regressive movements reach hallucinatory realizations of perceptions from which we construct fantasies to interpret the experiences we repeat (Bion 1962, 1965; Freud 1919, 1920, 1937; Green 2012; Ogden 2004).

Delcourt (2004) gives us the following description of the tragedy. Euripides presented *Medea* in 431 BC in the sacred theater of Dionysus in Athens. The granddaughter of the Sun, overcome by erotic passion for Jason, helps him steal the Golden Fleece. For his sake, she betrays her father and her homeland and murders her brother. She later brings about the death of the aged Pelias by tricking his daughters into cutting him into pieces and boiling them in water in order to rejuvenate him.

Euripides had narrated this story twenty years earlier. What is new this time is the danger of consorting with a sorceress, a murderess, because of whom there is no home to return to. In Corinth, to which Medea and Jason—now a married couple with two children—have fled, the daughter of King Creon is captivated by the handsome Jason, who abandons Medea. Determined to remarry this woman, he waits for his wife to leave the city. Now the foreign barbarian woman Medea finds her place in the Greek world threatened. She convinces the king to allow her one last day in the city before she departs.

Suddenly, out of nowhere, she is visited by Aegeus, King of Athens, who returns to Athens puzzled because he does not understand the oracular prophesy about his childlessness. Medea promises to help him have children, and in return he promises to give her refuge if she can escape Corinth and go to Athens.

Now Medea's plan for revenge against Jason for his betrayal takes final shape. She decides to leave Jason childless. She sends his young bride a dress soaked in a poison that burns the young woman alive, along with the king of Corinth, who runs to save his daughter. As soon as Medea is certain that Jason has lost everything, she kills their two children—her own and Jason's—with her own hands and flees to Athens.

The myth of Medea had been in existence since the eighth century BC. In the fifth century BC, it appeared in the poetry of both Pindar and Euripides. Medea's name is linked etymologically to *thinking, providing,* and *ruling,* but it also shares a common root with *Medusa.* As her myth evolved, the maiden-helper who can contrive, invent, and provide became the dangerous woman who can destroy and take revenge. Medea was presented as provoking terror and envy because she was barbarian and wise; she was different, and she had knowledge; she was a woman— a woman to be feared like an evil spell. Medea came from a barbaric country (Colchis) to a Greek polis, the civilization of which can be taken as a metaphor for the organization of the ego-superego-id structure, founded on the oedipal plot, through the painful processes of loss, mourning, and internalization.

On the other hand, the sudden appearance of Aegeus connects the savagery of this barbarian woman with the birth of Theseus, founder of the *polis* of Athens and its "first father," source of the superego, which of course has its roots in the id and its primitive traces.

Medea's tragedy takes us back to what is foreign within each of us. She calls upon us to confront the unspeakable. The drama *Medea* can be used as a metaphor that carries us back to the wild, primal depths of a country full of riches. A sorceress who can conquer the forces of nature, Medea brings us unrepresented elements from the wells of memory. What is beyond language? How do we deal with unthinkable elements that invade the space of meanings?

THE TRAGIC PLOT

The play begins with the nurse's image from the past, that of the black rocks: "I wish that the Argo had never winged its way through those

black, clashing rocks" (1), she says.[1] Now everything is hostile and those most loved will suffer. "Jason has betrayed his children" (15). Medea struggles with pain, "dissolving all her time away in tears" (25). Time itself becomes petrified: "She hears her friends' advice like a rock or a crashing sea" (28), but she refuses to listen. Medea's heart has become black and stony: "Poor thing! She has learnt through misfortune what it is to be left with no fatherland" (34).

The torment has no end. The day won't go by. A sense of threat hangs over it, real yet not credible. "The clouds of her grief are gathering all around" (107). The women of the chorus ask Medea to come out; grief is a public affair. The play begins with the recognition of her traumatic losses. She must communicate these losses to herself and others, clearly, as they *actually are.*

In response to the chorus's request, Medea emerges on stage, stunned by her pain: "Oh wretched misery how it hurts me! oh I wish I were dead" (96); "cursed children, with a hideous mother, may you perish, and your father with you" (112). "Let me find rest in death" (148). She wants to vanish from the face of the earth; she wants to eliminate the world from her eyes. The chorus replies: "Do you hear the bitter lament sung by this woman of sorrow? But what is all this hurry, this love of the tomb? Senseless child, don't wish for such things" (149).

The chorus observes how sweet the tears that accompany the sweet music of a lament are. It speaks with the deep rhythm of the body, the melody of the speaking voice, the sound sources of representations now in danger of being swept up in wild emotion. In the rustlings of nature, the chorus listens for the memories that come back and give us the courage to go on. Death is easy. Life must be endured. Human beings are but fleeting shadows. The rustlings of nature, like the sorceress's gathering of herbs, roots, leaves, and flowers, remind us of the fleeting shadows, the impressions that a child heard or saw before acquiring speech.

Euripides's chorus does not participate in the plot; rather, it sings a commentary that uses words to mitigate the savagery of passion. For

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[1] Parenthetical numerals following quotations from *Medea* refer to line numbers; see Kovacs (1994). Translations from the Ancient Greek were revised and supplemented by Irene Noel Baker.

example, the chorus sings about Aphrodite drinking from the sweet river Kifissos and filling it with a temperate breeze, her breath as fragrant as the roses that bind her hair (822-828). The songs transform into images the emotions aroused when our bodies vibrate, touched by the object's poetic speech (Danon-Boileau 2007).

We can think of the chorus in *Medea* as narrating the movements of repetition, fantasy, and subjective appropriation of preverbal elements ingrained in myth. These are the fragments of historical truth that we collect and (re)construct through words in everyday life (Freud 1937). We construct a fantasy with which we "interpret" the repetitions of pre-verbal experiences; we situate them on the stage of language and re-ality (linked to sexual differences). We construct a subject to experience them and a place—a meaning for them in personal history.

Euripides describes with traumatically perceptive clarity the nature of Medea, who, like language, has her roots in the body. Thus she is able to work magic and to show by way of the tragedy's *deus ex machina* that we must believe her. Language works magic, and Medea can work her own magic in the pronunciation of words that cast a spell on someone: that is, their sensory, kinetic, and perceptual roots are linked to mean-ings and objects. By virtue of this double origin of words, we can re-gress into a dream until we arrive at a sensory vividness of hallucinatory embodiment that persuades us of its reality. For Euripides, the *deus ex machina* performed this regressive hallucinatory function.

Thus the poet regresses, leading us back to preverbal levels, where everything is ambiguous, prophetic, ecstatic, and terrifying, where an infant feels the anxiety of annihilation. Medea returns to her origins, to her bodily roots, to the original and authentic terror of existence. Through primitive sensory, kinetic, emotional, and perceptual images, she abolishes the logic of secondary processes, daring to confront the depths, where words "sense" unconscious things and represent them (Rolland 2007). Medea's words perceive, touch, wound; they "speak" by linking meanings to primitive images and objects. Since the links have been traumatically lost, her words desperately attempt to make them present again.

Medea speaks with a deep preverbal honesty, fury, and violence about vows that have not been kept: "Dishonored . . . she howls out

the vows her husband made, calling on the ultimate pledge of his right hand." She "cries out" and "calls on the gods to bear witness that Jason has betrayed her" (20), invoking Themis, the goddess of prayer, and Zeus, the treasurer of vows (169).

Medea bellows like the sea. She opposes, she laments, she attacks, she explains in passionate words. But words are untrustworthy: they can betray, be substituted, lie. The narrative of experience belittles the majesty of passion (Ogden 2004). Thus Medea gives voice to Euripides's mistrust of words:

> In many ways I am different from other people . . . . In my view an unjust man who speaks wisely is liable to do the greatest harm . . . like you . . . . Don't pretend to act honorably with your fine words. One word of mine will lay you flat . . . . [579] [But] that's enough of words. I howl at the deed that's to be done. [790]

However, she herself uses forceful rhetoric to persuade Creon not to exile her at once; she gains a day, a day without end. She lies (through her use of rhetoric) in order to make reality bearable. As a human being, she does not resist falseness. She fears the moment that the reality of the object is imminent (Bion 1965).

Medea feels the pain of reality when the stopped clock of melancholy turns to action in the real time of the tragedy. It is now that she risks her actual involvement, the experiencing of her true self in action. Medea does not leaven her hatred with "frothy charm": "Everything has gone wrong." But "he has granted me this one day to stay here"; this will be the last day.

> Of the many ways I have to kill them [Jason and his lover], I don't know which to choose . . . . Shall I light a fire in their bridal bed—or plunge a sharpened sword into their liver . . . . The best is the most direct way, using my innate skill, to kill them with poison. [364-385]

The chorus sings: "Holy rivers flow up to their springs, and justice and everything turns backward" (411). The rivers flowing up present a rupture of the flow, like a void separating the waters of river and sea. Euripides uses his poetry to create a rupture in the natural flow, forming a void.

Then, all of a sudden, Aegeus appears just in time, out of nowhere, "like a harbor for my plans" (768). In the safe harbor of Athens, Medea can tie an oedipal knot. Her invitation to Athens signifies the might of the city that welcomes her without fear. It signifies, moreover, the might that the city will acquire through internalization of the primitive powers of the archaic mother.

Medea promises Aegeus to help him father children, and at once the solution becomes clear to her: she decides to leave Jason childless. Aegeus, an oedipal father, appears suddenly and divides Medea's tragedy in two. He introduces a *not understanding,* a capacity not to know, an opening, an affirming-negating invitation for Medea to flee toward life. The encounter of Aegeus and Medea results in a moment of recognition. Suddenly, Medea feels convinced, as if she has realized what she has always known but never thought.

Euripides was a master of staging and of creating impasses in which reality is imminent, repetitions endless, and the outcome to be feared. At the conclusion of his tragedy, he achieves a resolution to the impasse through the device of a *deus ex machina:* a dragon-drawn chariot, sent by her grandfather the sun god, lifts Medea aloft and takes her far away to Athens, which is open to receiving foreigners.

In Greek tragedies, and above all in those of Euripides, the *deus ex machina*—a fantastic resolution of a complicated situation—is an unexpected plot device that keeps the story moving. It involves the sudden intervention of a new event: normally, the appearance of a god who descends onto the stage or is lifted on high by a crane, surprising the audience. In *Medea,* it is the heroine herself who is lifted to a faraway place. We can also think of the unexpected appearance of Aegeus in the middle of the play as a divine intervention that alters the course of the plot, much as does the *deus ex machina.*

Gods bring about the unexpected. Kovacs (1994) sees the unexpected appearance of Aegeus in connection with a divine intervention (764, 802, 1231, 1260). The commonest form of punishment for not keeping one's oath is the "root-and-branch destruction with loss of all progeny" (1994, p. 280). The discovery of reality, of the difference of the object realized inside the fantasy of a primal scene, is unexpected.

Medea must set the stage to confront her own terrifying primal scene, pursuing it to its ghastly conclusion.

Medea's murdering her own children is an attack against the proof of the reality of her sexual link with Jason. By her act of revenge, she symmetrically gets even and restores balance. "No one will dare to say that I am cowardly and weak, or insignificant" (805). The chorus comments: "There is a muse that brings wisdom to women, but most women, almost all, are strangers to it. And I say that people who have no experience of having children are far happier" (1085).

Medea sends the poisoned garments to burn Jason's bride and her father, Creon, who will be united with his daughter in death. Medea faces the psychotic terror of melancholy: the murder of the object, discovered in its hateful otherness.

While she emerges as independent, Medea must preserve contact with primitive parts as the last bodily links with her lost object. As she prepares her children for their death, it is of their wedding she speaks—identifying in bodily images their part in a lineage that continues. She links the children's bodies with the sounds of words. At the same time, she asks herself to forget that she loves them, to forget that she gave life to them: "Today, remember nothing" (1226).

The children are on stage before Medea appears. They are in danger, and so the nurse "covers," "hides" them: "Go quickly inside to your room" (100). They reappear when Medea sends them to deliver her poisoned gifts.

Twenty-five lines later, the children return from their murderous errand, and Medea bids them farewell in a harrowing monologue (1020), speaking of their sweet smiles, their round laughing eyes, hands, lips, sweet embrace, soft milk-white skin, fragrant breath . . . as if she were lulling them to sleep. These children will die soon and only then do we hear their voices, a scream . . . a few lines of weak, protesting cries (De Romilly 1986).

In the end, Medea becomes something analogous to a force of nature. This can be thought of as a transformation from *knowing* to *becoming*. She will become the "thing" she is to know—the "thing" from which words and meanings originate (Bion 1965). We can also think of

language as a force of nature: it separates us from illusion, overthrowing myths but also uniting us with bodily sources of words and the object.

When the *deus ex machina* carries Medea away, Jason tries with words to reach her, with all the hatred and desperate violence he now feels. But in the fiery chariot of the sun, no one can touch Medea. The orbit of the sun turns to day. The dawn now celebrates the passing of time. For a moment Medea passes through the hallucinatory enactment (the *deus ex machina*); then a new day begins, and an inexplicable redemption is accomplished.

Medea ends with the chorus, exhausted by the frightful drama, saying: "The gods accomplish many unhoped-for things: things did not turn out the way we thought, but the gods found a way to make the unimaginable happen. And this is how it turned out here" (1415). There has been an outcome. The "poetic" work of the psyche can make links: it works! It confirms that the elements of past experience have left traces; they do have a place in one's functions. The traces of the past have not been destroyed. The psyche functions, trying to situate in meanings the lost (but not erased) fragments (Loraux 2006).

Tragedy opens an uncanny void, here bridged by a "construction": an invitation to Athens, a place for Medea to nurse her desire to live. A fixed sequence of repetition has been abstracted, and in its place Euripides offers a new chain of meanings, restoring Medea's "genetic" code of identity. Her magic will be placed in the service of life, of being conceived and born.

Euripides narrates the achievement of internalization of new possibilities, i.e.: (1) reversal of the natural flow and a return to the original sources of meaning, to the roots of words in the body, (2) the recovery of the primary ambiguity of words, (3) the psychic constructions that create links of meanings, and (4) the parental couple's union, giving birth to a flesh-and-blood child.

As a poet, Euripides is himself a prophet—since he creates symbols that open a path to the future—and the enchantress Medea, as priestess of Hecate, is able to read prophetic oracles. The words of a poet and an oracle may be vague, yet they speak to deep areas of the psyche. They come from the area of preverbal ambiguity in which the paradoxical coexistence of internal and external, sensations and meanings, is accepted.

Euripides offers poetics as redemption. We are given a new chance: the unrepresented elements can be put into words linked to an object and relegated to the past, to serve as a background to psychic life.

A slave opens the play with an image of the journey, the adventure of life that begins with the traumatic caesura of birth, by the passage through dangerous black rocks, a loss of mythical union, an act of origin that one may wish never to have occurred. The slave talks about freedom in thinking and autonomy in deciding to internalize or to kill, (to reject) the birth and life of children representing elements of psychic growth.

DISCUSSION

Medea betrayed her fatherland and killed her brother, her father's heir. Since then she has been exiled; she seeks a home to which to return. She came from the world's eastern edge, the dangerous land where the sun rises from the underworld. She has betrayed Colchis for the love of a man because she believed his words; for his part, he has betrayed her by breaking his oath.

She came from a land where every stranger was killed, and she came as a stranger into a new story (an oedipal plot) that is not yet hers. The illusion of being in love is ruptured by reality, that is, the traumatic discovery of the difference of the object, introduced via the awareness of the sexual parental couple. Medea was forced to internalize this oedipal story and to become a link in the chain of its telling. The discovery that the object of desire is a whole object, different, and always escaping the subject's illusions is by itself felt as a deception. For the primitive psyche, it lies beyond meaning.

De Romilly (1986) observed that Euripides is narrating a living story, one beginning with impossible contradictions. This innovator of myths goes on to shock the Athenians—dispelling prevailing notions, the panoply of false pretexts. In myth he seeks only exceptional moments, when the casing of the psyche is forcibly ripped open to reveal its insides. Euripides tears apart the myths surrounding words woven into webs of meaning. For him, language is fictitious; it betrays the authenticity of experience. But he understands its frightening power to inflame, to wound, to destroy.

Euripides's poetic treatment of myths, from which he extracts a profoundly tragic plot, recalls how in psychoanalysis, interpretations and constructions loosen the knots of meanings surrounding the historical truth of the original psychic inscriptions. Analytic work, too, extracts at unexpected, uncanny moments (often in the form of hallucinatory productions of sensory images) the events in which the infant–parent drive and affect exchanges, object relationships, object representations, and words begin to be conceived and internalized (Freud 1919).

Euripides's commentators note that he (the "stage philosopher") was influenced by Anaxagoras and Socrates, but also by the Sophists, teachers of rhetoric who used language in a clever way to win arguments. He utilized his plays to talk about what he had learned about science, perception, language, knowledge, thought, and truth. And he was fascinated by the use of sophisticated rhetorical speeches.

For Euripides, words either say things as they are, or, through an intense dialectic, they utter "lies" that make the truth felt, or they may signify nothing. Words differentiate us from our primary object. In *Orestes,* Electra reminds us of her ancestor Tantalus's original sin: he was able to speak and thus offended the gods. Words maintain their roots in the passions of the soul—desire and sadness at the loss of the primary object with every step toward representation.

Loraux (2006) pointed out that, in tragedy, the sounds of words express the primitive elements of psychic life. Medea is ruled by her passions: her desire, her rage, and her endless grief. The theater of Dionysus was located beside the agora, where Athenian political life was conducted. In the theater, elements of passionate grief (banned from public life) could be openly expressed. Loraux linked the words *aei* (without interruption) and *aiai* (inarticulate cries of mourning).

The Melancholic Murder

We find many versions of the ending to the myth of Medea. In one, her children are dedicated to the temple of Hera; in another, the angry Corinthians violate the asylum of the temple and kill the children to take revenge for Medea's having killed their king and his daughter. In yet another, Medea kills her children by accident.

Euripides's originality lies in the portrayal of Medea herself as killing the children intentionally and assuming personal responsibility for her act. We can think that, in killing her children, Medea kills a part of herself, believing that this is how it must be. Is this her only means of revenge—identifying her children with her helpless child self (revived by Jason's betrayal) and assuming the role of murderess? Is this how she "saves" the children (narcissistic extensions of herself) from a threatening world in which she cannot imagine them existing without her? Does she kill the children's bodies as projections onto their father? Is it for Jason, and for all men, that she takes up the role of primordial sorceress, to absolve them of their own guilty wish to kill their siblings in the primal scene? Or is she assuming everyone's guilt for their attack on the containing mother?

We are asked to accept what we cannot understand, what is beyond meaning. Can Medea's melancholic murder be thought of as a way of returning the children to her womb? Possible interpretations of a repetition that makes such a preverbal terror psychically present are endless.

However, we can say that, with the murder, Medea reverses the natural flow of the river of time. With the fantasy of merger, conflict and traumas cease and she is ready to start again from the beginning. The *deus ex machina* brings an outcome; then the primitive experiences can be performed anew. Poetry promises to restore the wounded integrity of the self. Thus Euripides is expressing the poetic reversal of the flow of time and the longing to return to a fusion with the primary mother.

Through words, Euripides takes us to the children's murder. In Medea's monologue, we hear on the one hand unbearable pain, which may be thought of as a metaphor for the pain caused by the poet's descent into the Hades of the unconscious, activating primitive elements and emotions that have not yet become affects. We are faced with the danger of a rejection of the links, but we also listen to a mother's transformative speech. Medea's words retain the links with the body.

However, Medea's "psychotic" functioning also uses words that have lost contact with their bodily roots and with the object (Freud 1915). We hear Medea "killing" the children, not metaphorically in order to let them sleep, but literally, putting them back to sleep inside her womb. At the same time, we hear her singing to them—invoking their smiles, their

laughing eyes, their hands, lips, soft milk-white skin, fragrant breath. Her threat alternates with her profound concern for their psychic growth.

The poet, regressing to the depths of magical, prophetic ambiguity, where things are also their opposites, touches upon the terror where existence itself is at risk. Every step in psychic growth signals the death of union with the primary mother, but it is also accompanied by the opposite movement: the sacrifice of the children's lives so that they can be offered as energy to the sun god in order to rise again, so that human and divine worlds may become one.

Like the poet, Medea defies public discourse, the language of the establishment. Poetry, like Medea, speaks a foreign language, the language of a foreign land, the unconscious. We learn a foreign language when we acquire our mother tongue. We learn language through our contacts with the sensations of our invested body through the intervention of the object. We learn words when we make the transition from primary identification to secondary identification as the result of cathecting the (otherness of the) object.

The Theater of Threat

Delcourt (2004) remarks on the many layers of irony that Medea's barbaric ancestry reveals. In *Medea*, the poet fashions a woman indomitable—wild, unbridled, and passionate, fiercely in love—who loses her reason when she is betrayed. What makes her terrifying is that she is in command of the secrets of nature and is determined to use them.

Euripides sees Eros as passion, as an all-powerful force of nature that threatens to destroy, but also as a secret source of creativity that humanizes our bodies. The princess of the sun is tormented because she feels mortal. She feels herself to be part of an oedipal situation, that is, a scene in which differences between sexes and between generations force humans to live a terrestrial life inside time, language, reality, and object relationships, as subjects of their destructive and erotic fantasies. For the sake of Eros, Medea became human. But Eros launched her on a torment-filled journey toward mourning the loss of omnipotence, the internalization of drives, and the need to assume responsibility for them.

The origins of Eros are barbaric. André (2011) explains that the anxiety concerning our female nature demonstrates the primacy of the

other. Mother's position is asymmetrical, and her passions violently intrude in the infant's world. She installs herself as something "foreign" within us.

Medea can be thought of as a metaphor for the activation of a threat when unrepresented elements are introduced into an oedipal plot. The loss of omnipotence is felt as life-threatening. Destructive attacks are unleashed. There must be no process, no links that make meaning, which is the evidence that the life of couples goes on. She wants not to feel, not to live, not to exist in history; she wants Jason's marriage with the king's daughter not to take place; she wants there to be no succession to the throne, no birth of children—the primal scene—or, even more terrifying, for its traces to be entirely erased.

Mastronarde (2002) writes that a passionate woman, miraculously insane, represents a threat to overwhelm our capacity to contain a wild nature through words. The sorcery of Medea—who is a relative of the witches Circe and Pasifae—is bound to the earth, to the body of the mother and its senses.

In Euripides's tragedies, the realism of the amphitheater arises on stage. It is as if documentary details try to convince us of the truth of traumatic reality, since metaphorical links (the result of mourning work) are not yet adequate to make meaning from it. In familiar situations, everyday people at times try to avoid something to gain time; they fear reliving the pain of loss, becoming entrapped in impossible stalemates. We hear explanations and responses, in fact, and we hear unbearable pain split off. Jason and Creon offer Medea solutions so that she need not experience inexorable grief and infernal hatred. However, an everyday dialogue reveals in the end that Zeus has been on stage all along.

Excessive reality is barbarous when an experience does not allow a construction of meaning to be completed and an outcome to be realized. The poet combats the gravest threat of all: the paralysis of action, the impasse of the plot, the death of the process. The lack of outcome is an experience on the order of the psychotic, in which the links between words, objects, and their bodily roots have been attacked. The ultimate danger is a repetition with no past, an ever-present fear of breakdown (Winnicott 1974). The play's plot reminds us of those forced to comply with peremptory demands that they were unable to question in thought

or speech. They have endured heavy burdens that they were unable to represent. The key with which to gain entry to their preverbal experiences lies at one pole of their emotional life (McDougall 1989). We can say that, in such cases, the drives are felt as threats because they give meanings to the object. The withdrawal of investments, the death of love for life, is an extreme defense.

Primitive Elements on Stage

Ultimately, we might arrive at the belief that, for the sake of Eros Divine, Medea became human as a metaphor for the hallucinatory embodiment of primitive elements of preverbal experiences that are revived in a new context of psychic construction. Her actions stand for the primitive elements that are left over (split off) as the actual residue of the unrepresented. No form of processing can exhaust them. They constitute the contents of primary repression, or of primitive, unelaborated, split-off material (Levine, Reed, and Scarfone 2013).

In *Medea,* the unprocessed, primitive elements of memory (poisons cooked up in the cauldrons of witchcraft, unworn clothes soaked in poison, jewels dipped in the stuff of pregenital oral and anal remnants) maintain a continuity of self despite the threat. These leftover elements are repeated in action; they also contribute to fantasy formation through their integration and interpretation in subjective history.

Medea's monologue (1020-1080) is astonishing for its extreme oscillation between the tenderness she feels toward her children and her cruel use of them for purposes of revenge and protection of her self-esteem (Simon 1988). Her monologue is an agon played out not between two protagonists, but between two parts of herself (Freud 1940). The repetition of the pain of her trauma is depicted in various scenes. For example, as she prepares to murder her children, they smile at her and she cries: "Why do you smile at me your last smile?" (1040).

Medea would gladly have taken a stand in battle three times rather than give birth even once; her pain is insufferable. She emerges from her myth: she is born into her tragedy, creating her history as a clearly defined person, a compelling figure to both herself and others. She cannot do otherwise: here she is, here she stands, insistent, taking up space and asking for time. Her birth as an individual, her arrival in the

world, and her very freedom are gained through a loss of mythical om-
nipotence each time a new meaning is formed.

Euripides's plots pose a question: how does one proceed to the next
stage, to changing and yet remaining the same, while maintaining one's
core identity intact? What happens to the remains of what existed before?
Fenichel (1934) examined the fate of pregenital elements, for the oral,
anal, and phallic elements—poisons, feces, dragon's teeth, (Golden)
Fleece—all need a space to be remembered (linking and holding), in
contrast to threats of dismemberment (scattering, evacuation).

We need to place primitive preverbal elements in a context (Medea
in Athens). Tragedy is a method of ordering mythical material for pre-
sentation, just as transference is the psychic method that grants us access
to primitive elements. A tragic plot brings the mythical material up to
date. The tragic poet inserts actuality (in contrast to potentiality) into
the mythical material in order to transform it into tragedy. He inserts
action having an end embodied in it (Ramfos 1992–1993). Similarly,
transference inserts the plot missing from primitive material; it inserts
repetition and its interpretation (fantasy), which is a function of the ego
processing material from the id.

Green (2012) refers to the primitive traces that Freud (1900) called
untamable. We should not confine remembering to the function of un-
conscious representations. A significant portion of the psyche operates
with "unrepresented forms of remembering . . . similar to hallucinatory
structures of psychosis" that are primitive traces of the id (Green, p.
1246). How do we acquire access to these prerepresentational layers of
memory? Dream study shows that the regression we undergo in sleep
allows us to "go back as far as possible towards the hallucinatory percep-
tual pole, thereby attaining a surprising degree of sensory vividness" (p.
1246). Euripides achieves such sensory vividness with the hallucinatory
appearance of the *deus ex machina*—which, like constructions and delu-
sion, reconnects sensations both with words and with the object.

The Poet's Thematic Expressions

Euripides's plots are notable for their uncertain outcomes. He re-
turns us to the ambiguity of the embodied roots of words. He asks us

to tolerate uncertainty about our own identity. What is at stake is the construction of new meaning. A moment of hallucinatory realization, the *deus ex machina*, appears suddenly, makes a pronouncement, "picks up the pieces," and announces a plan for the future. It breaks out as a magical and credible phenomenon. It appears in unexpected moments of surprise in which dim experiences are revived in a process whereby the sense of self is revealed.

During his journey back to the psyche's embodied roots, Euripides faces the revival of trauma that has erased the link to a return "home" (mnemonic traces). He provokes a torrent of terror in order to retain the situation of despair in sharp focus—the impossible situation without an outcome. Finally, he creates the *deus ex machina*, a hallucinatory realization that constructs links and offers solutions to the plot's impasses.

The issue is not whether Medea herself killed her children. The matter of the tragedy is one that every Athenian will "decide" deep within his own psyche. It is the Athenians who will interpret, who will decide if all this makes sense, and it is they who will become the subjects of all this. They will take responsibility. They will decide whether children will be born, whether they will live out their time, whether they will discover the history of their birth. They will decide about change, and about the new and strange things that children signify.

It is possible that Euripides was mindful of the war traumas that Athenians had to work through between 479 and 404 BC. Tragic poetry, like psychoanalysis, attempts to prevent catastrophe from gaining the upper hand. Tragedy equates the work of the poet with both paternal and maternal functions; tragedy is the creative work of linking that brings "children" into the world—new assertions that astonish.

The Function of Tragedy

Tragic poetry was born when myths encountered words. We can also say that affects are born when emotions meet the words through an object. From lamentation, we pass into the poetry of lament, beneficent and functioning representations, and beauty in a world full of terror and fear (De Romilly 1986). In poetry, the sound images of words convey meaning. Incoherent cries, tears, laughter make up the dark ru-

diments—it is these that are expressed in poetry, said Loewald (1978), following Valéry.

In our psychic constructions, we find at the heart of meaning the historical truth of these primitive truths, truths a child heard or saw before acquiring speech (Freud 1937). Psychic constructions use poetic links in a way similar to that in which prophetic and magical language uses early, foreign, and incomprehensible words. Medea is the priestess of Hecate, who grants her magical powers and eloquence. In the end, the magical notion that the word and the thing form a unity renders words capable of practicing magic, of opening doors into the unknown, of changing the meaning, the place, the time, the shape of things.

The *re-presenting* of a word recurs with its regression back to where it came from originally: the sensory image and the iconic presentation of the thing (Freud 1900, 1919; Rolland 2007). The gift, the spells, the poisons show how the development of sexuality (fantasy) interprets and transforms the reality that repetition presents. They also indicate the threat against the container (the Golden Fleece; skin covered in ointment, invulnerable to dragon fire; the burning bridal dress) and against words, which risk losing their capacity for containment.

Spectators in the tragedy track down the bodily components, the emotions, from which they construct tragic affects as they listen, for example, to Medea's monologue, and they follow the pathway of the hands, the skin, the eyes, the nose, which link to the sound components of words. It is a miracle of restitution, the restoration of the capacity to make links forming a representational network. Art is sought out for its power to heal narcissistic injury through the work of mourning.

CONCLUSION

Euripides was fascinated by extreme experiences. However, he allows us to make our own contribution, as an audience, to the intrigue played out on stage. Even in the most extreme moments of regression to hatred and despair, and in the radical withdrawal of the drives from objects and the collapse of meaning, in the confusion and mist of undifferentiated shapelessness, discrete tragic affects will emerge out of primitive images

and emotions through words. This is indeed a miracle of restoration. What is being restored is not an actual original event, but the capacity to make links with one's origins—to have a true sense of self, to feel alive, to function and live experiences, to desire and feel related to others. To paraphrase the way in which Aristotle (4th century BC) gives meaning to Homer's verse (8th century BC-a, book 23, line 108; 8th century BC-b, book 4, line 183): thus he spoke, and stirred in them all a desire to mourn. Homer spoke of the importance of creating affects and being able to feel them.

Commentators on the poetics of tragedy give significance to the emergence in the audience of the capability of differentiating tragic affects from the mixture of transitional forms of primitive images and emotions (Benjamin 1925; Sikoutris 1936; Steiner 1963). From the murky waters where the transitional forms of psychic elements coexist, the discerning compassion of the spectator's soul emerges.

Euripides's *Medea* tells us how precarious the work of psychic constructions is. Medea's tragedy can be thought of as a metaphor for preverbal traumatic elements that can neither come to an end nor be repressed. Rather, they need to be given a new life, a new chance for recognition in a transference situation within an oedipal context; they need to be placed in the vast realm of unrepresented states where they can be accessed through psychic constructions, gradually forming the potential past of the subject.

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AN ANNIVERSARY REACTION
IN A FOUR-YEAR-OLD CHILD

BY THEODORE J. JACOBS

The anniversary reaction is a well-known phenomenon. Although in recent years few contributions dealing with this aspect of unconscious mental functioning have appeared in our journals, the older literature contains a sizable number of articles dealing with various aspects of this intriguing topic (Haesler 1986; Hull, Lane, and Gibbons 1993; Mintz 1971; Pollock 1971; Seitz 1975; Wallerstein 1967).

In searching the literature, I have not come across mention of an anniversary reaction in a young child. Some of the above-noted authors, as well as others, have observed that emotional trauma in childhood can give rise later in life to anniversary reactions related to those childhood experiences (Hull, Lane, and Gibbons 1993; Pollock 1971; Seitz 1975). The occurrence of an anniversary reaction in early childhood, however, has not to my knowledge been described.

In this brief communication, I will offer an example of what I believe is an example of just such a reaction. Some colleagues may question whether a child of four, with her comparatively immature brain, is capable of processing the passage of time in such a way as to give rise to a true anniversary reaction. I myself have had questions about that very issue. Since neither I nor the several experienced child analysts with whom I have discussed this question have been able to arrive at a satisfactory alternative explanation of the phenomenon that I will describe,

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I have come to believe that, in fact, it qualifies as an anniversary reaction as that term is commonly understood. Whether the four-year-old child I will discuss was precocious in this respect, or whether, generally speaking, children of that age do have the capacity to develop this type of reaction, remains to be determined.

Timmy was four years, three months of age, when his parents consulted me. They were alarmed by the sudden onset of a troubling symptom. Tim had become afraid to urinate and, as a result, he was holding back his urine despite the considerable pain involved. Until then, Tim had had no medical problems or significant fears. He was toilet trained for both bowel and bladder by age three and had had no accidents or difficulty of any kind since that time. His developmental landmarks were well within normal range; he was not a particularly anxious child; and, except for rather intense sibling rivalry with his two-year-old sister, he had shown no evidence of problematic behavior.

Quite suddenly, however, Tim developed a urination phobia. Instead of urinating freely as he had done until then, Tim held back his urine, clutched his groin area, and bent so low at the waist that he appeared to be doubled over. This maneuver he called the "Big Bee" because, in performing it, he was imitating a bee.

The parents were totally mystified by the sudden onset of this symptom. It seemed to come out of nowhere and to develop overnight. One day, Timmy was perfectly fine; the next, he was a fear-ridden child, terrified of performing a natural function.

The parents were concerned that Tim might have developed an acute urinary tract infection or some other medical problem that made urination painful. Given the fact that his symptoms involved imitating a bumble bee, they speculated that Tim might have been stung by a bee, and this had caused an infection or some kind of allergic reaction that affected the boy's urinary tract. Accordingly, they arranged for an immediate appointment with Tim's pediatrician. The latter examined the boy carefully and performed a urinanalysis. He could find no medical reason for Tim's symptom, told the parents that the problem appeared to be psychological rather than physical, and recommended that they consult a psychiatrist. Although quite skeptical concerning the doctor's

conclusion and fearful that he had missed a serious medical condition, they followed his advice and called me for an appointment.

In our initial consultation, the parents were anxious and bewildered. They related the story of Tim's symptom as a frightening mystery that had no explanation, a situation that magnified their anxiety. It soon became apparent, however, that this was one of those rare situations in which the psychological cause of a mysterious physical symptom was readily apparent.

When asked to describe the events of the days just prior to the onset of Tim's symptom, the parents mentioned something that they had not thought significant, but that in fact provided the key to the mystery. The day before Tim developed his phobic reaction, the parents attended the *bris* of the father's newborn nephew. They took Tim along but made sure that he remained at the very rear of the crowded room in which the ceremony was held. There he played with a young male cousin of his. Both boys were at a considerable distance from the spot at the front of the living room where the actual circumcision took place. The parents were quite sure that Tim was oblivious to what was going on.

In this assumption, however, they were wrong. From what he picked up from the conversation around him—or possibly from his three-year-older cousin's explanation—Tim formed a not entirely erroneous idea of what was happening. He had no understanding of the religious ceremony or what ritual circumcision was all about, but he grasped the central—and for him, terrifying—idea that the baby's penis was being cut. He also understood, however, that he and his cousin were not supposed to know anything about what was taking place. He therefore said nothing to his parents. The next day, Tim refused to urinate.

I told the parents that I suspected Tim had taken in more about what the *bris* was about than was apparent, and it was likely that his imagination concerning what was happening was behind the symptom. I said that a period of analysis could be helpful in such a case and recommended that treatment begin as soon as possible. I made this recommendation because I had evidence that Tim's symptom was a manifestation of an underlying fear of bodily injury that was increasing in severity. The parents agreed, and the next day Tim began an analysis that lasted just short of two years.

Not that it took that long for Tim's symptom to be resolved—on the contrary. In a matter of several months, as we discussed and worked through Tim's fantasy of what had happened to the baby and could very well happen to him, his anxiety diminished and he was able to urinate without fear. We continued the analysis, however, because the underlying fears were still evident.

In addition, Tim's behavior toward his younger sister turned out to be more problematic than his parents had described. Tim had become increasingly aggressive with her, repeatedly punching her on the arm and body when his parents were not looking, and on one occasion very nearly jabbed her in the eye with a pencil.

The issues that lay behind Tim's troubling behavior toward his sister were complex, involving not only his insecure feelings about his place with his mother, but her ambivalence toward him as a boy. This problem took some time and considerable work with the parents to better resolve. In the meantime, Tim's presenting problems appeared to be a thing of the past, as he had been symptom-free for some time.

It came as a total surprise to me, then, and as a shock to Tim's parents, when quite abruptly Tim's symptoms returned. Again, the onset was abrupt, seemingly overnight: Tim again refused to urinate, clutched his groin area, and twisted himself into a knot, as he had done before.

It was early in the morning when Tim's mother called me in a state of high anxiety and asked if I could see Tim that same day. I was able to do so, and in our session, Tim and I strolled together to a nearby park, as we had often done in the past.[1] In the park, we would sit and talk, sometimes throw a ball around, or take a short walk together. On this day Tim wanted to play catch. As we tossed the ball to one another—Tim was remarkably well coordinated for his age—I asked him about his not wanting to urinate again and whether he had any thoughts about why this was happening now.

"It's the Big Bee season, dummy," he said. And he went into his—by now infamous—maneuver of doubling over in imitation of a bee.

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[1] I chose this way of working with him because I found that he was much more communicative when we did this, as opposed to our remaining in the office—where, engaged in silent play, he would become detached and unresponsive.

"I see," I said. "But did anything happen that might have made it the Big Bee season right now? Something scary, perhaps?"

Tim shook his head. "I just told you, it's time for the Big Bee," he said. "It's that time again. Do you get it?"

I did not, but I also did not want to appear to be a "super dummy," as Tim sometimes called me. "I am thinking about this," I said. "I'm trying to figure it out."

"My parents don't get it either," Tim said. "It's just the time for it. That's all."

I finally got it—or thought I did. Tim and I went to sit on a park bench and I took out a pocket calendar that I had tucked in my wallet. I looked up the previous day's date, the day that Tim's symptoms returned. And I looked up the date of the *bris* the preceding year. Tim was right: it *was* the Big Bee season. His symptom had returned exactly one year to the day after it had begun. Tim was having an anniversary reaction.

"You know, Tim, you're right," I said. "It *is* the Big Bee season because you went to that scary party just a year ago. You didn't remember that, but your body did. Isn't that something?"

Tim nodded. "But are there going to be any more of those parties?" he asked.

"No more," I answered. "You won't be going to any more parties like that."

"Then will my body forget about that scary one?"

"It will, Tim," I said. "Your body remembered it because it happened just this time last year. But that was a long time ago."

In saying this, I was clearly going out on a limb and was employing more suggestion than I was aware of at the time. But I also felt that Tim had done the work that needed to be done. His bodily fears had been much reduced, and this reactivation through memory of the previous year's symptom struck me as a unique event, most likely not to be repeated.

"Good," Tim said. "I don't want my body to remember it any more."

And it did not. Tim's analysis had terminated by the time the next anniversary came around, but I checked in with his parents.

"There was no Big Bee season this year," Tim's father confirmed. "Maybe he's finally forgotten about the whole thing."

"I expect he has," I said, "but please let me know if the Big Bee season ever comes around again."

It has been six years and counting. All is quiet on the Big Bee front.

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THE SYNTAX OF OEDIPAL THOUGHT IN THE CASE OF LITTLE HANS

BY LEE GROSSMAN

> **Keywords:** Little Hans, Freud, child analysis, oedipal-phase mentation, infantile sexuality, language, Oedipus complex, repression, infantile amnesia, fantasy, egocentricity, defense.

The case of Little Hans (Freud 1909[1]) is now in its second century of study. It has rightly been called a "founding text" (Young-Bruehl 2007, p. 29), the "prototype of child analysis" (Blum 2007, p. 59), and the first record of child analytic supervision (Bierman 2007, p. 92), since the treatment was conducted by Hans's father in consultation with Freud.

Freud's main goal in reporting the case was to test his ideas on infantile sexuality. Although he listed as a secondary goal to "consider whether [the case] can be made to shed any light upon the mental life of children" (p. 101), he did not seem to note the role of Hans's phase-specific mentation in shaping his phobia. In this brief communication, I will try to show how careful attention to Hans's language and syntax illustrates the nature of oedipal-phase thought and its contribution to pathogenesis.

Freud's report is unique for its time in many ways, even beyond the age of the patient and the fact that the father is the treating analyst. The abundance of verbatim vignettes in particular provides opportunities to draw inferences beyond those of the analyst or consultant. Finally, the report follows the "development and resolution of a phobia in a boy *under* five years of age"[2] (p. 101, italics added), *progressively*, beginning

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[1] Except where otherwise specified, all citations are to this work.
[2] It is curious that the full title of the report is "The Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy," despite the fact that the report begins with the patient at age three and ends with the resolution of the phobia just as Hans turns five.

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with premorbid observations, and continuing as a real-time record of the onset of the phobic symptom and the treatment. It is not a reconstruction. The state of Freud's theory circa 1909 emphasized the epigenetic sequencing of psychosexual stages organized around erotogenic zones. In this historical context, Freud was satisfied that he had succeeded in demonstrating the libidinal and aggressive elements that defined the Oedipus complex. He saw Hans's complex as the model of the source from which adult neuroses were derived.

Although Freud noted aspects of how Hans's mind worked, his interest at the time was with Hans's conclusions, that is, the content of his fantasies, as a contribution to libido theory. Beyond the role of the age-appropriate psychosexual stage and (to some degree) the interaction of his libidinal urges with the environment, he did not take up the question of Hans's developmentally appropriate capacities and vulnerabilities and how they shaped the world as he experienced it. I think most analysts have filled in the blanks since then, but I would like to pursue the information that is available in Freud's own report in order to show how oedipal-phase *mentation* contributed to Hans's difficulties at least as much as his oedipal *conflicts*.

The characteristics of oedipal-age thought on which I would like to focus are as follows:

1. In the course of normal development, the child of Hans's age will have developed a reasoning ability that allows him or her to envision future scenarios based on his or her age-specific theory of cause and effect.

2. The theory in question will be "egocentric," in Piaget's use of the term (see Sandler 1975, p. 369): that is, important events will be construed by the child as having been caused by his or her activities.

3. The child at this stage will have considerable conscious access to sexual and aggressive urges; or, to put it differently, he or she will not yet have successfully repressed these urges.

4. The child at this stage will not have firmly consolidated the ability to differentiate between thought and action (that is, between "psychic" and "external" reality).

5. The child at this stage will assume that the motives of others are identical to his or her own.

My undertaking this task does not seem to me to be a novel contribution. It is consistent, for example, with Sandler's (1975) position, and I think the findings are familiar to contemporary child analysts and observers. I am merely suggesting that these factors can be found even in this very early work, even when its author was not looking for them.

One may ask why these questions have not already been taken up in discussions of Little Hans. I believe three factors may have contributed to the difficulty. First, as noted, in 1909 Freud's interest was in the state of infantile sexuality manifested in the Oedipus complex, not in the ego's capacities and limitations therein. Second, Freud's theory at the time was still the notion that anxiety was the effect of, rather than the motive for, "repression." Because of that theory, when he noted anxiety, he presumed repression.[3] Third, at that time Freud used the word *repression* in the generic sense that we now use the word *defense;* he would not give it a more specific meaning until 1926, when he would also officially revise his anxiety theory. This leads to a good deal of confusion for readers, as it seems that much of what Freud calls *repression* in the case of Hans has to do with the conscious deployment of attention for defensive purposes, rather than the motivated forgetting that is exemplified so dramatically by the infantile amnesia that Freud had noted as early as 1901.

In addition to these three factors, there is some ambiguity in how Freud uses the term *unconscious* in his report. At times he seems to be using Hans's lack of attention to an idea as evidence that it is unconscious—i.e., he conflates the descriptive unconscious with the dynamic unconscious (Freud 1923).

With these complexities in mind, I will now turn to a few selections from Freud's report in an effort to demonstrate some of the points about oedipal-phase thinking that I listed above. Among the tools we have at our disposal, I would like to draw special attention to clues offered by the syntax of Hans's own statements.

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[3] By way of illustration, note Freud's reasoning in the case history: "It was . . . increased affection for his mother which turned suddenly into anxiety—which, as we should say, succumbed to repression. We do not yet know from what quarter the impetus towards repression may have come . . . . Hans's anxiety . . . thus corresponded to a repressed erotic longing" (1909, p. 25).

THE SYNTAX OF DREAM, FANTASY, AND FABLE

Consider Hans's language when he describes a dream: "Last night I thought . . ." (p. 19). "When I was asleep, I thought . . ." (p. 23). It is not clear what "thought" is to him, or what truth value he assigns to it. At the very least, we may infer that the distinction between dreaming and lived experience is not yet firmly consolidated.

Hans does have some distinction in mind between dreaming and thinking. On one occasion he entered his parents' bedroom. The next morning, when his father asks why, Hans tells an elaborate story that begins, "In the night there was a big giraffe in the room." When his father asks if he dreamed it, Hans says, "No, I didn't dream it. I thought it. I thought it all. I'd woken up earlier" (p. 37).

It is in fact unclear whether this was a dream or a waking fantasy, and from Freud's perspective at the time, the distinction was not very important. But we may surmise that the distinction had a different meaning to Hans than the adult version, and/or that its meaning may have been very fluid. At any rate, we should note that Hans's syntax suggests that he experienced the thoughts as an event rather than as an imaginary creation.

Perhaps more revealing is the syntax of Hans's waking thoughts and daydreams. For example, when he describes his fear that a horse will bite him, Hans adds, "The horse'll come into the room" (p. 24)—as if he considered it a real possibility. Hans describes what Freud identified as a masturbation fantasy "equivalent to a dream" (p. 32) as follows: "I *saw* Mummy . . . . I *showed* Grete . . . . I *saw* [Mummy's] widdler" (p. 32, italics added). Note the action verbs; Hans is treating the "fantasy" as actual events.

At several points, Hans tells fantastic stories, often long and involved ones, in which he rapidly switches his ground about what he claims to be true. In one such fable, he adds, "Really and truly I can remember quite well . . . . My word of honour! . . . I'm not joking" (pp. 69, 70). Freud attributes the lying to Hans avenging himself for the father's fabrications about the stork bringing babies. But with respect to other confabula-

tions, Hans interposes, "I say, what I'm telling you isn't a bit true" (p. 77; see also pp. 80, 85).

On one occasion, Hans's father reports the following exchange:

I[4]: Have you ever teased horses?

HANS: Yes, quite often. I'm afraid I shall do it, but I don't really . . . . Once I really did it. Once I had the whip and whipped the horse . . . . What I've told you isn't the least true . . . . I've thought it to myself. [pp. 79-80]

It seems here that Hans is grappling with the distinction between wishing and acting (and relatedly, between truth and falsehood), with limited success. He "knows" the difference; e.g., after his father observes (accuses him?) that Hans still wants to touch his widdler, Hans replies, "But wanting's not doing and doing's not wanting" (p. 31).

But his faith in this distinction seems to come up only in a defensive way and tends to evaporate. In this instance, it seems likely that he has in fact continued to masturbate, but he is trying to tell himself he wasn't "doing" anything by (correctly) parsing the distinction.

In an even more lawyerlike example, after Hans freely acknowledges his preference that his sister not be alive, his father tells Hans that "a good boy doesn't wish that sort of thing." Hans answers, "But he may THINK it" (p. 72, emphasis in the original). Here Hans seems to be distinguishing intention (wishing for) from "neutral" hypothesizing. He makes an even more challenging distinction later on, when considering the wish that his mother should have a baby:

HANS: But I don't want it to happen.

I: But you wish for it?

HANS: Oh yes, *wish*. [p. 92, italics in original]

It may be that Hans is distinguishing wishing from wanting on the basis of intensity; or it may be that he is expressing conflicting wishes. I will not pursue the first possibility, but I will return to the second idea later.

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[4] "I" refers, of course, to the narrator of the account, Hans's father.

CAUSATION AND EGOCENTRICITY

Children of Hans's age normally realize that actions have consequences, but (as we see in Hans) the definition of *action* is expandable to include thoughts and wishes, and the consequences do not always make adult sense. Oedipal children do not believe in accidents and seem unable to accept that they themselves could be innocent bystanders. In Hans's case, we learn that his phobia worsened following his tonsillectomy. When his father tells him that he is worse because his illness prevented him from going for walks, Hans corrects him: "Oh no. It's so bad because I still put my hand to my widdler every night" (p. 30). It seems plausible that Hans construed his "having his tonsils cut" (p. 29) as a consequence of his sexual urges as well.[5]

Central to the theory of cause and effect typical of Hans's age is the kind of self-centeredness that Piaget called *egocentrism* (Sandler 1975). The capacity to appreciate motives of others that differ from our own is a relatively late developmental accomplishment. A *developmental line* (A. Freud 1963) for object relations would begin in some undifferentiated or narcissistic state and pass through a sadomasochistic phase on the way to full appreciation for the independent other. Hans recognizes and appreciates objects, but infers their motives by assuming them to be identical with his own.

Hans displays his age-appropriate egocentrism after admitting that he wished his father would fall down and be hurt. When his father asks why, Hans replies, "Because you're cross" (p. 82). When his father says it is not true, Hans responds, "Yes, it *is* true. You're cross. I know you are. It must be true" (p. 83, italics in original). Any adult might make the same misattribution (or projection), but the certainty about it, appropriate to a four-year-old, might be considered paranoid in the adult.

REPRESSION AND DEFENSE

As noted above, the word *repression* appears throughout Freud's report, but he uses it in the generic sense for which he would later substitute the word *defense*. In fact, it appears that repression proper is conspicuous by

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[5] Slap (1961) comes to a similar conclusion.

its absence in the discussion of Hans. Consider, for example, his usual response to his father's deep interpretive confrontations and questions: "Yes, that's right" (p. 40), or simply "Yes" (pp. 67, 90). In answer to a direct question about his sister, Hans says, "I'd rather she weren't alive" (p. 71).

These statements are made so matter-of-factly that one can almost imagine Hans adding, "So what's your point?" He is very frank and open about both his intention to marry his mother and his thought that "if only Daddy were to die [Hans would] be Daddy"—one of his father's interpretations, to which he responds simply "Yes" (p. 90). In fact, the clearest example of repression in the contemporary sense comes in the postscript, in which Freud notes that the *adolescent* Hans had no recollection of his phobia or of the treatment—it had all been overtaken by the infantile amnesia.

Neubauer (2007) implies that Freud was aware of the conscious availability of Hans's conflicts, as illustrated by Freud's first suggested interpretation of the phobia:

> The truth was, his father was to say, that . . . [Hans] was very fond of his mother and wanted to be taken into her bed. The reason he was afraid of horses now was that he had taken so much interest in their widdlers. [p. 28]

Neubauer comments:

> Freud's recommended interpretation is startlingly direct; apparently, he felt he had no need to address the role of resistances or to elicit free associations. And indeed, Hans was so open at this point to face his conflict, *so conscious of it*, that the interpretation offered was not only accepted without signs of resistance but was rewarded by Hans offering additional memories. [2007, p. 148, italics added]

Hans does demonstrate a repertory of defensive maneuvers, but for the most part they are directed against what is preconsciously available—in other words, they involve alterations in attention (negation, disavowal, displacement, turning away, not noticing) or alterations in perception (condensation, confusion of dream and waking states, confusion of fact and fiction). We have seen some examples of the perceptual alterations already.

As for the deployment of attention, the first obvious example is the phobia itself, in which feelings toward the father are displaced onto horses (I do not think the repression that would be expected to accompany adult phobias has been demonstrated in Hans). The simplest instance was of looking away from the phobic object (p. 33). Among the other perceptual alterations, the plainest was Hans "seeing" his sister's widdler. We hear the negation in Hans's statement to himself that "Everyone has a widdler . . . . It's fixed in, of course" (p. 34).

CONSCIOUS CONTRADICTORY IDEAS

Earlier, I cited a moment in which Hans said he did not want something but wished for it. Hans exhibits a remarkable tolerance for contradiction. Discussing Hans's ambivalence toward his father, Freud notes, "In the adult these pairs of contrary emotions do not as a rule become simultaneously conscious . . . . But in children they can exist peaceably side by side for quite a considerable time" (p. 113). At another point in the case report, Hans says to his father, "I should so like to have children; but I don't ever want it; I shouldn't like to have them" (p. 93). Freud footnotes:

> This startling contradiction was one between phantasy and reality, between wishing and having. Hans knew that in reality he was a child and that the other children would only be in his way; but in phantasy he was a mother and wanted children with whom he could repeat the endearments that he had himself experienced. [p. 93, fn. 2]

This explanation would certainly fit the earlier wishing/wanting conflict as well, although the phrase *in reality* is not unambiguous in the world of the four-year-old; the progressive differentiation of fantasy and reality (Abrams 1984) is one of the tasks of the oedipal phase. But for our purposes, the important feature of the contradictory ideas is that, as Freud noted about the ambivalence, they are *entirely conscious.*

In a neurotic adult, an internally prohibited wish might be repressed while its repudiation remains conscious. In a prelatency child, absent effective repression, the two sides of the conflict often coexist by virtue of

the child's refraining from pursuing the significance of the wishes. I believe this to be the proper meaning of the term *disavowal* (*verleugnung).*

Hans thinks one thought, then the other; he does not trouble himself with reconciling the two. We would expect that, as development proceeds, the imperative to settle the issue would grow as the child's capacity to imagine a causal chain with dire consequences grows. This may coincide with Piaget's concrete operational stage. In any case, we do not get to follow Hans that far.

THE SYNTAX OF THE COMPROMISE

We are told by Freud that Hans found a successful solution to his Oedipus complex with the plumber fantasy: he gets a bigger widdler and a bigger behind, and his father gets to marry his own mother (Hans's grandmother). In discussing this with his father, Hans adds, "I'd like to have a mustache like yours and hairs like yours" (p. 98).

Let us underscore two features about the syntax of Hans's statement. First, his wish is directed more toward the future. I think this is a developmental step, facilitated by the analysis removing an obstacle to it.[6] Second, we may be hearing the beginnings of an identification with the father—"I want to be *like* you"—as a softening of the wish to replace him. The fantasy may be a solution to negative oedipal conflicts as well; the bigger behind may be an effort to identify with his mother.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

I have tried to show how Little Hans's mode of thinking, appropriate for the oedipal phase, contributed to the formation of his phobia. Freud's fidelity in reporting verbatim vignettes allows us to see in Hans's syntax how his capacity to anticipate the future—coupled with his egocentric theory of cause and effect, his largely unrepressed access to his sexual and aggressive urges, his egocentric misattribution of motives to others, and his confusion of thought and action—creates his vulnerability, and to a large extent dictates his symptomatic solution.

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[6] I will not attempt to tackle the very important and complex question of how the analysis accomplished that. For one such effort, see Bierman (2007).

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THE THIRD REICH IN THE THIRD PERSON: EXHUMING THE HORRORS OF THE HOLOCAUST

BY MARTIN A. SILVERMAN

> *An Uncommon Friendship: From Opposite Sides of the Holocaust.*
> By Bernat Rosner and Frederic C. Tubach, with Sally Patterson Tubach.
> Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010. 309 pp.

> The wolf shall also dwell with the lamb, and the leopard
> shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young
> lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead
> them.
> —Isaiah 11:6 (King James version of the *Holy Bible*)

This is a remarkable book about a remarkable friendship between two remarkable men. As boys, on opposite sides of an invisible fence that inexorably separated them from one another, they lived through a horrendous social conflagration that raced through Europe, destroying millions of lives and threatening to hurtle the world back into the abyss of total darkness out of which civilization had emerged. They did not meet until many years later, but their coming together changed their lives and intertwined them in a way that offered them the opportunity to change the lives of others as well.

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Bernat (or Bernie, as he preferred to be known later on) and Frederic (or Fritz, as he referred to himself when I met him by chance in Copenhagen on June 21, 2014) were twelve and almost fourteen years old, respectively, in 1944. Bernat and his Orthodox Jewish family were living in Tab, a small town in southwest Hungary, when Nazi killers rounded them up and shipped them off, in a crowded cattle car, to the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp where all the other members of his family were brutalized and murdered.

Bernie, years later, told Fritz about the arrival in his little village of an assembly of high-ranking SS officers who were resplendent in

> . . . their elegantly tailored uniforms and neatly polished high jack boots . . . [with] the *Totenkopf* skull emblem of the SS on their hats. One displayed the four-starred insignia of an SS *Obersturmbahnführer* (lieutenant colonel) on his lapel . . . . This commanding SS officer turned toward the young ghetto messenger [who was Bernat], patted him on the head, and said, "Kleiner Bube (little boy)." [p. 69]

From a picture that Bernie saw years later, he realized it was Adolf Eichmann who had patted him on the head.

Fritz lived in the German village of Kleinheubach, southeast of Frankfurt am Main (where I served as a US Army psychiatrist from 1963 to 1965, incidentally). His father was a member of the Nazi party, of which he had been a full-time employee, and in 1944 he was a lieutenant in the German army, in which he served as "a Nazi counterintelligence officer in the German general staff" (p. 287). Fritz was in the *Jungvolk*, scheduled to graduate from there into the "Hitler Youth" (Hitler *Schule*).

There had been a small Jewish population in Kleinheubach, but Fritz had not known any of them personally. When he was in second grade, his father "arranged for [his] . . . teacher, a friend of his, to give [Fritz] a primer full of anti-Semitic stories" (p. 52).

Fritz did not like his father, who, among other things, taught him to read by beating him, and he did not see him very much while growing up, as his father was out most of the time, either working or spending time with his Nazi friends. His stepmother, Maria Zink, harbored anti-Nazi sentiments—which she did not hesitate to express—and had a greater influence on Fritz. His own nature was to avoid entrapment

in any organization or ideology while he thought for himself, and he tended to shrink away from authoritarian instruction and indoctrination into his own private world.

Bernie and Fritz did not meet until the summer of 1983. Fritz's wife, Sally, was in line at a pharmacy in San Francisco, where they lived, when she recognized Susan, a former high school friend whom she had not seen for twenty years. After a moment's hesitation, Sally identified herself and they quickly renewed their acquaintance. It turned out that the two had been living just four blocks apart for a number of years.

Susan then invited Sally and her husband, Fritz, to dinner with her and her husband, Bernie. Fritz and Bernie learned that they had a number of things in common. Both had lost their first wives—women only in their forties—to cancer, after which they had had to raise their children by themselves. They were just over a year apart in age and had grown up in Europe, not far from one another, before immigrating to the United States and eventually settling in California. *And they had both gone through the Holocaust, although at opposite poles from one another!*

At first, Fritz was uncomfortable talking with Bernie about their respective backgrounds, and Bernie was reluctant to look back to his past, but as time went on, they got to know one another and they became friends. It became progressively easier for them to think back together to their early experiences in Europe. In 1990, the two couples took a trip together to visit Bernie's childhood village of Tab, Hungary. But it was not until 1993, after Bernie visited the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, that he was ready to tell his story, and two years later, he asked Fritz to write it down for him.

The process took a good number of years. Bernie did not feel able to directly write about what he had gone through, but he told Fritz about it and agreed that Fritz would write it up. (Fritz's wife, Sally, a professional writer, assisted them with the exposition and organization.) For a long time, Fritz found himself needing to be very patient while he waited for Bernie to grow more and more able to let his painful memories emerge—a process with which psychoanalysts are very familiar. What surfaced was an almost unimaginable tale of man's inhumanity to man— as well as of the way in which, via courage, determination, the ability to

obtain desperately needed assistance, and, at times, a stroke of extraor-
dinary good luck, it might be survived.

Fritz took extensive notes and wrote up Bernie's account for him, in
the third person, which Bernie needed him to do so that he could have
enough distance from it to allow his recollections to become bearable.
In writing the book, Fritz moved back and forth between Bernie's and
his own account of what they had gone through during and beyond their
Nazi-era experiences. This kind of back-and-forth alternation not only
provides historical point-counterpoint that brings the two men's child-
hood experiences vividly to life, but it also renders the contents of the
book more bearable to read than it might have been had he reported
Bernie's recollections in a linear, continuous fashion.

What is it that Bernie and Fritz have to tell us? Let me use Fritz's
own words:

> The story emerged in twists and turns. At first it seemed enough
> to listen to Bernie tell me about his concentration camp experi-
> ences in a deliberately detached and factual manner. His initial
> recollections emerged well thought out and usually presented
> without hesitation . . . . It helped that we had a silent agreement
> about the limits regarding what needed to be or should be artic-
> ulated. But then, sometimes a year or more later, heartrending
> facts would surface when he made new "stabs into his memory
> bank," as he called them. I slowly learned that "sticking to facts"
> and recounting them as rationally as possible was also Bernie's
> way of not seeing that these facts had inflicted wounds. It took
> him time to admit this. [p. 21]

They could not write it straight through and, I have to admit, I could
not read the book straight through either. I found that I repeatedly had
to put the book aside because I simply could not go any farther. My
chest would begin to feel that it was swelling and threatening to burst,
and tears were blurring my vision. It was only after a lapse of time that I
could pick up the book and resume reading. Furthermore, I was able to
write this review only in installments separated by periods of decompres-
sion.

The authors provide some background information to set the stage
for relating what occurred in Tab, Hungary, in the spring of 1944. Bernie

grew up in an Orthodox Jewish family that had lived in Tab for generations. The time-consuming demands of the secular and religious training that were so important to Bernie's family and the extreme anti-Semitism that prevailed in Tab combined to prevent him from forming friendships with non-Jewish children in his village. Although largely restricted to living within the Jewish community, Bernie enjoyed a relatively peaceful and pleasant life until the Nazis put a violent end to it.

Fritz was born in Northern California, where his father had played the violin for years, mainly in theaters that showed silent films. The Depression and the advent of the talkies made it hard for him to find work, and in 1933, when Fritz was three years of age—a year after Hitler became chancellor—Fritz's father returned to Germany, taking Fritz and his mother with him. Fritz's mother died soon thereafter, on October 5, 1934, after which Fritz was raised by his paternal grandmother until his father remarried five or six years later.

Family life was not convivial to Fritz's father, however. Fritz and his stepmother counted the evenings they had all spent together as a family and found that for each of them, there were ten in which his father was out with his Nazi friends. Then, in 1940, Fritz's father volunteered for service in the army; they rarely saw him from that time on. Fritz was largely under the influence, in other words, of his much more liberal-minded stepmother and her family than of his father. There were forty-six Jews in Kleinheubach in 1934, but by 1942 the last of them were gone, the majority to concentration camps (twelve of them managed to immigrate to the US).

A few days after the arrival in Tab of Eichmann and his contingent of Nazi officers, all the Jews of the town were rounded up and ordered to march to a Catholic parochial school, where they were forced to strip and be searched. Fritz reports that:

> Right in front of him, Bernie's mother was forced to take off her clothes. He had to watch while, naked and helpless, she was searched by the hands of a hostile Nazi thug. One might argue that Bernie had to endure worse atrocities later at Auschwitz and beyond, but he was only twelve, and he had never seen an adult, much less his own mother, naked. The evil mix of the forced nudity, the public humiliation, and the physical molesta-

tion converged to form an enormous emotional shock for him that symbolized a loss of innocence as well as the beginning of unimaginable horrors to come. [p. 72]

After a few days, the Jews were herded to a brickyard near the train station, from which they were transported to a ghetto way station and then to Auschwitz. As Bernie and Fritz indicate:

These events marked the end of Jewish life in Tab. If the remaining villagers of Tab looted the abandoned homes that were, of course, still filled with possessions—furniture, dishes, carpets, drapes, clothes, memorabilia—their actions did not make it into the history books. On postwar visits to Tab, Bernie found no plaques or monuments remembering the former Jewish community. He discovered the Jewish houses, including his own, still standing and occupied by strangers. How they came into possession of the Rosners' home, he does not know. [p. 73]

Fritz recalls that "the Holocaust had begun earlier in Germany than in Hungary" (p. 73). He vividly remembers his father, on the evening of November 9, 1938—Fritz's eighth birthday—coming in to his grandparents' house and agitatedly reporting that "average German citizens, not the police or the military, were breaking into homes owned by Jews and destroying their property—under police protection" (p. 74). Even Fritz's father, a full-time employee of the Nazi party (who, however had known and befriended Jewish people during his years in San Francisco) declared that this was "stupid." This event marked the end of life as it had once been for the people of Germany.

Fritz eerily describes his further, personal experience of the incident of the "night of breaking glass":

On my way home from school a few days after the Kristallnacht, I saw an empty house in the Baugasse that belonged to Jews, who now were gone. Halfway torn from its frame, the front door hung open. Most of the windows in the two-story house were smashed. Glass, papers, and books were strewn about outside. Feather beds had been slit open and thrown around so that goose down had floated out of the second-story windows to blanket the street . . . . I couldn't overcome my curiosity to enter

the empty house. I walked up a flight of stairs and came upon a scene of chaos in what had been the living room. I was alone, and suddenly my curiosity turned to fear. I ran back down the stairs to the street, then stopped and stared at the house. Something on the cobblestones in the gutter caught my eye—a long white, unused candle. I picked it up, brushed off the dirt, and took it home with me . . . . It was years before I understood that I had committed a theft against the owners of that house in the Baugasse. [pp. 77-78]

On July 3, 1944, Bernie and his family were shipped, in a tightly packed freight car, to Auschwitz, Poland, after having spent a week in an open field in Kaposvar, Hungary. They were four of the 475,000 Jews who were sent there from Hungary to be exterminated. Bernie, his parents, and his younger brother were separated from one another. Unlike 12½-year-old Bernie, who was sent to the slave labor camp in Birkenau, the other members of his family were consigned to the gas chambers and then to the ovens.

In addition to being assigned back-breaking manual labor, Bernie and the others were subjected to starvation, disease, and random beatings. "One particularly cruel Kapo," Fritz tells us, "beat two boys to death. He had been a pediatrician" (p. 89).

One day, a group of boys, including Bernie, were randomly selected for extermination. Bernie recounted this event to Fritz:

About one hundred fifty youngsters assembled on the field. Under the watchful eye of the guards, the children milled around for about half an hour. Then, just as suddenly as they had been ordered to gather, they were told to return to their barracks. Bernie has no explanation for the sudden change of orders. Had there not been enough guards to supervise the killings? Had they run out of poison gas? Had the group of youngsters become too upset and disorderly to dispatch them efficiently to the gas chambers? [p. 93]

At almost the same time that Bernie was shipped to Auschwitz, Fritz was selected, despite his stepmother's protestation, to be one of a half dozen boys who were sent from their *Gymnasium* to attend a *Bannausleselager,* a Nazi training camp from which he would be sent on to the Hitler

Schule, where he would be trained to become one of the future leaders of the Third Reich. There he saw the way in which the Nazi regime sought to indoctrinate and train youngsters so as to shape them into "a controlled horde, a gang, really, legitimized and led by the greatest tribal chief of all time, who sat in Berlin" (p. 103).

Fritz considers himself very lucky that, after he returned from the *Bannausleselager,* his stepmother succeeded in stopping him from being promoted from the *Jungvolk* into the Hitler *Schule*—and he expresses worry about what might have become of him had he fallen under his father's influence rather than under his stepmother's.

Bernie had his own share of good luck, without which he never would have survived at Auschwitz and then at Mauthausen, to which he was reassigned on September 17, 1944. During the selection for that reassignment, for example, he was not initially chosen to leave Auschwitz-Birkenau. Taking his chances, he jumped over the wall to join those who were leaving. A guard pinned his arm to the wall with his boot—but then he shrugged his shoulders and let him go with the group that was leaving.

While the train to Mauthausen was stopped temporarily in Czechoslovakia, Allied planes tried to destroy it with bombs, but they failed to hit their target. Once there, Bernie and the other inmates lived in unheated and often ice-cold, extremely overcrowded barracks. Bernie fought off starvation by smuggling an occasional potato or onion out of the kitchen, where he worked for some time along with other teenagers at the camp. (It was only by lying about his age that he avoided being considered too young to work and consequently executed.)

The sadism of the guards and of some of the Kapos is epitomized in the following passage:

> During the daytime, inmates were herded outside, where they usually spent their time standing about idly in the increasingly cold and wet weather of late September and October. They huddled together for warmth, and one of the amusements of the SS guards and the Kapos was to club those standing on the outside perimeter of the group so that the whole group of prisoners would break into a panicked stampede and trample each other. In one of these melees Bernie sustained a slight leg wound that

developed into a sore that wouldn't heal. He did not seek med-
ical help, however, for fear his injury would mark him "unfit for
work," a death sentence in the concentration camp. [p. 109]

Bernie also described the quarry, in which selected inmates were
forced to carry "back-breakingly heavy stones" (p. 112) up steep, un-
evenly constructed steps, while goaded by guards to go faster—until they
either died of exhaustion or were shoved off the edge by the guards
so that they would fall to their deaths. "Half-dead inmates removed the
emaciated bodies of the dead like garbage, so that still others, who were
already nearly starved to death before they ever reached the quarry,
could take their places" (p. 113).

Bernie was fortunate in being required to spend only one day
working in the quarry, because the *Blockältester* who made the assign-
ments—an Austrian former criminal—saw how terrible Bernie and the
other boys looked after that day (they were the very first group of youths
sent to Mauthausen). Demonstrating a streak of decency, the *Blockältester*
then decided not to send any youngsters to the quarry ever again. That
one day "was more than a nightmare. For Bernie, it was a day in hell"
(p. 113).

Fritz attended school in Miltenberg, 500 kilometers northwest of
Mauthausen. He and the Germans around him experienced hunger and
cold during the war, though nothing like what Bernie went through. In
1943, Fritz came down with tuberculosis. He was sent to a sanitarium at
Friedensweiler, in the Black Forest, for three months. One day, he was
called in to the resident doctor's office, where the doctor and *three men
in uniform* examined him and spent even more time studying his chart. It
was only years later that Fritz read "for the first time that plans had been
made to eliminate 'unfit' tubercular Germans" (p. 121).

This was not the only time that Fritz's life was endangered by Nazi
sadism. With youthful exuberance and adolescent defiance and opposi-
tion, he mimicked Hitler or expressed views in school that were politi-
cally incorrect, on several occasions—unaware of how extreme was the
risk to which he was subjecting himself. In the latter pages of the book,
he tells us about a woman who was executed, after several unsuccessful
appeals of her sentence, merely for stating that she did not like Mr.

Hitler. During the last months of the war in Europe, Fritz and his friend, as they were riding their bicycles along a road, were strafed by an Allied fighter plane, and a hail of bullets barely missed them.

Bernie continued to survive, albeit barely, with the aid of one person or another who provided him with a bit of extra food, a useful item, or a falsified document that saved his life. He benefitted from one stroke of good luck after another. For example, from Mauthausen, he was moved to *Lager 1* in a satellite camp at Gusen, where he made rivets and cut out small parts that were used in the construction of German warplanes. Conditions there were absolutely terrible, and he nearly starved to death, but he later learned that the conditions were even worse in *Lager 2*, out of which almost no one emerged alive.

As the Allied armies approached in April 1945, conditions became even worse. There was almost nothing to eat, the execution rate accelerated, and the sadism and brutality intensified. The Jews at Gusen were marched back to Mauthausen, where

> . . . brutality now became more direct. The bare hands, arms, and legs of the victimizers took over. One particularly vicious guard by the name of Kaduk delighted in placing his victims across a wooden contraption, something like a pair of low sawhorses, and then jumping on their backs, breaking them. [p. 132]

As the sound of Allied guns was heard, several thousand Jewish inmates, including Bernie, were forced into a four-day, forty-kilometer death march to the village of Gunskirchen. More than half of them died on the way, and of those who reached Gunskirchen, half or more "died of murder, starvation, or exhaustion" (p. 135). The makeshift camp was also rife with typhus and dysentery, and it was later learned that the SS guards fed arsenic to the inmates to hasten their demise. Fortunately, they had time to administer only three of the five doses they had planned to give before Allied forces arrived and they had to flee. Bernie was intermittently delirious. He clung to life out of sheer determination.

Then, one day in May, the guards disappeared. Bernie and others raided the stores of the camp for the meager remnants of food the guards had left behind, but it was too late for many of the inmates, who died anyway. A few days later, a Red Cross truck arrived—dispensing

cookies, of all things. At the age of thirteen years and three months, Bernie was liberated.

At the same time, during the month of May 1945, SS officers tried to convince youngsters at Fritz's school, including 14-year-old Fritz himself, to become "officer cadets" (actually, foot soldiers) in the German army. A little later, other SS officers attempted to round up men who might be even minimally capable of taking up arms against the rapidly advancing Allied armies. Each time, they left empty-handed. The war was now over—not only for Bernie, but for Fritz as well.

One might expect that the tale would end at this point, but it continues. Bernie's health rapidly deteriorated over the days following his liberation, as he scrounged for food and warm clothes, fought the lice with which he had become infested, and battled against the residual effects of starvation, illness, and the arsenic he had been dosed with in Gunskirchen. Ultimately, he lost consciousness and woke up in a US Army field hospital. His weight at that time was 58 pounds. With the help of American doctors, he gradually regained his health.

After he had tried unsuccessfully to sneak into an airplane onto which he saw better-fed and -clothed children boarding, another piece of good fortune befell Bernie. Members of the Palestine Jewish Brigade arrived to assist concentration camp survivors and to try to convince them to accompany them to Palestine. They brought Bernie to a series of refugee camps in Italy. The first one was wonderful, but the next two were dreadful; he slept on the ground and received very little food. He scrambled to obtain additional food for himself by offering to do what little jobs he could think of, first for Italian families and then for American GIs.

One day, in Modena, he spotted a jeep carrying four American soldiers bound for the Palazzo Ducale, where they were to be billeted. He approached one of them—who turned out to be 24-year-old Charles Merrill Jr., son of the founder of the Merrill Lynch brokerage firm—and offered to carry his duffel bag into the Palazzo. Merrill later recalled that all he could see moving ahead of him was his duffel bag and little Bernie's bare feet beneath it.

Merrill spoke with Bernie after they got inside and became quite taken with him. To make a long story short, "Charley" not only befriended the orphaned survivor of Nazi concentration camps, but also

spoke with him often and at length. He kept in touch with Bernie after rotating back to the US, and eventually, in November 1945—to Bernie's immense surprise—Charley wrote to Bernie offering to pull strings in order to obtain a visa for him so that he could come to the States.

And this was not all he offered. Charley, now married, invited Bernie to live with him and his wife, Mary; they would become his guardians. It took two years for Charley to obtain the necessary papers, but in November 1947, Bernie left Europe and came to live with Mr. and Mrs. Charles Merrill Jr. in the USA—literally a rags-to-riches transformation.

After the war ended in Europe, the Allied forces made an attempt to de-Nazify Germany. In Kleinheubach, Fritz typed up the lengthy declarations that the German people were required to make to the occupation forces. When the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis were publicized, most people reacted by denying that they had had any awareness of what was taking place, but others—young Fritz included—went through a great deal of soul searching and thinking about what had happened in their country.

In the spring of 1948, when Fritz was seventeen, his father returned from a British POW camp (where he had fared quite well by organizing a POW orchestra that played concerts all over England) in which he had been interned since the end of the war. His father minimized the awareness he had had of what had taken place during the Nazi period, and he took no responsibility whatsoever for the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis. Fritz's father was hardly an object of admiration or respect, and like a good number of his peers, Fritz regarded him as no more than a "defeated loser" (p. 183).

Fritz bridled when his father attempted to reassert authority and control over him, and he looked for new vistas as he contemplated his future. He had long taken pride and pleasure in having been born in San Francisco, and he still had a great-uncle there. Fritz wrote to him, requesting that he sponsor his return to the city where his life had begun. When his great-uncle, who had never liked his father, agreed to sponsor him, Fritz realized that he just had to go, even though he had no idea what he would do when he got there. At the American consulate in Frankfurt, Fritz reaffirmed his American citizenship and renounced his German citizenship.

A lengthy journey brought him back, in 1949, to San Francisco. He was penniless and possessed no more than a smattering of English, but he was determined to create a new life for himself. His father, over Fritz's objections, followed him there a few years later, but they never established a positive relationship with one another. His father remarried and had three more children. He returned to Germany after a while, to teach German to American soldiers stationed in Nuremberg, and then came back to the US to live in Texas. As Fritz told me when he and I met in Copenhagen, he rarely spoke with his father during the years before he died in 1992 at the age of ninety-one.

Fritz learned English and worked at a series of menial jobs before his great-uncle, who appreciated his drive and intelligence, decided that he needed more schooling. The great-uncle paid for Fritz to attend City College of San Francisco, where he excelled. Inspired by his tough but engaging (and appreciative) English teacher, Ruth Somers, Fritz—now armed with an Associate's degree—moved on to the University of California, Berkeley, her alma mater. He then attended graduate school, after which he embarked on a long and distinguished career as a professor of German at UC Berkeley, as well as authoring and co-authoring several books. Indeed, he had found his niche.

Bernie, who had arrived in the US a year and a half before Fritz, was sent to a boarding school (rather than living with his new guardians) before going on to attend Cornell University and then Harvard Law School. He eventually worked his way up to the post of general counsel of the Safeway Stores chain, for which he fought several successful battles to prevent their becoming the victim of hostile takeover attempts intent upon swallowing them up.

In parallel fashion with Fritz's almost total alienation from his father, Bernie drifted apart from his parent guardians, although he did so for very different reasons. It must be meaningful that the rift began after Mary Merrill chided him for hiding his Jewish background from his Episcopalian fiancée. But recovering from experiences as horrendously traumatizing as those Bernie had gone through is no simple matter. One might speculate that his failure to be completely open with his fiancée grew out of a fear of emotionally relying on and/or getting close to a person or persons whom he might lose, and needing to go it more or less alone—the way he had had to do to such an enormous extent in

order to survive while in the Nazi camps. This might also be seen as an identification with the aggressor—but that is another story. Bernie and his guardians did eventually reconcile, though it took a long time for that to happen.

Officially, the word *reparation* means "restoration to good condition" or "a making of amends; making up for a wrong or injury" (*Webster's New College Dictionary* 2007, p. 1214). In German, the word is *Wiedergutmachung*, which literally means "making good again." But would it have been possible to restore Bernie's emotional health to "good condition," or to truly "make amends," or to "make up" to him for what was done to him and his family?

Fritz did not suffer nearly as horrendously as Bernie did, but what he went through was traumatizing nevertheless. What Fritz and Bernie *were* able to do was to leave Europe, go far away to a new place, and start their lives over again. But they carried Europe and their memories inside themselves. When, later on, they decided to dig into what was buried deep inside each of them, they assisted each other in coming to terms with the impact of the Holocaust upon them, insofar as that might be possible—and as they worked on that, over quite a number of years, their friendship only grew stronger.

Bernie and Fritz have remained close friends to this day. After the first edition of their book was published, they gave over a hundred interviews and presentations to audiences in the US and seventeen to European audiences, mainly in Germany. The response was almost universally one of appreciation and gratitude. Young attendees at times asked their opinions as to how the reservoirs of hatred that exist between adversaries around the world today might possibly be resolved.

I hope that Bernie and Fritz will consider giving more talks and presentations. Sometimes it takes *two* children to lead the way.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE POSSIBLE PROFESSION: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS OF CHANGE.
   By Theodore J. Jacobs. New York/Hove, UK: Routledge, 2013. 336 pp.

This book is like an invitation to a wedding of the intrapsychic and inter-subjective dimensions of psychoanalysis. But while the bride and groom show no signs of running, the rabbi does, leaving the knot untied and the guests not quite sure what to think.

For years, Jacobs has been constructing a bridge between classical and contemporary theory, a bridge that permits him to visit both sides of the psychoanalytic river: a bridge over troubled waters. His view from the bridge brings to mind the Arthur Miller play of the same name about a conflict of loyalties. Jacobs seems torn between his loyalty to his teachers and supervisors, who have represented and passed on tradition, and his interest in and use of contemporary theory.

This book is a treatise on the unconscious interactions between patient and analyst, as well as on the place of intersubjective theory in classical psychoanalysis—a theory that some of his colleagues see as contaminating. While the bridge provides connection, it also places in bold relief the differences that continue to divide this profession, alerting the reader that on one bank, theory is valued more highly than the patient, while on the other bank, the uniqueness of the dyad prevails. I think all analysts will resonate with Jacobs's struggle to make peace by finding a point of view that will remain open to modification in the service of growth and development—a view that could save this profession.

Jacobs reviews his experience with his first analyst, whom he notes was "trained in a small, prestigeless institute . . . . [He] would evoke looks of unmitigated contempt" (p. 5) by traditional analysts. Nonetheless, Jacobs was impressed (as was I) with this analyst, Dr. E, who

> . . . for the most part . . . embraced our traditional techniques,
> [yet] . . . did not believe them to be sacrosanct. Rather, he at-

tempted to adapt them to the particular requirement of indi-
vidual cases . . . . When standard technique fails to be effective,
it behooves the analyst to find a way of working that reaches the
patient and proves helpful to him. [p. 6]

For me, this is the important lesson of this book: how to work *for the
patient* and not *for the theory*.

Jacobs's subsequent training analyst, rooted in early Freud and the
topographic theory, unearthed unconscious oedipal fantasies, but failed
to address either the preoedipal relationship with his analysand's mother
or certain characterological issues that his analysand continues to feel
influence his work. Due to that technique, Jacobs says, "I experienced a
certain lack of affective contact with my analyst" (p. 8). So, although he
found this subsequent analysis helpful in certain respects, he also notes
that "I found myself having some questions—and nagging doubts—
about the therapeutic efficacy of traditional analysis" (p. 5). The crux of
the dilemma the author addresses is: will Freudian psychoanalysis survive
by opting for preservation of the status quo or by progressing on from
there?

Chapter 14, "In Search of the Mind of the Analyst: A Progress Re-
port," is about the analyst's creative use of the self. Calling on Casey
Stengel, Jacobs acknowledges the déjà vu of his book's focus, but wants a
second time at bat. His turn at bat this time is exciting in many ways, but
leaves him and us at three balls and two strikes.

Jacobs revisits the familiar analytic debate between classical versus
progressive thinking via his dramatic review of Owen Renik's call for rev-
olution against the intergenerational passing of foundational technique,
on the one hand, and Manuel Furer's dismissal of such a view at the New
York Psychoanalytic Society, on the other. I think this history is important
to our more recently trained analysts in helping them understand the
tensions in the profession that are still active today.

I see Jacobs as somewhere between these two poles, recognizing the
ideas of Thomas Ogden, Daniel Stern, Judith Mitrani, Irwin Hoffman,
and others who show that most of our communication with others is
unconscious. Abundant case material demonstrates how Jacobs uses his
reveries (he calls them countertransference) to understand the patient,

but he falls just short of buying the idea of co-construction and its effects on each party in the dyad. Nevertheless, he does not seem ready to join those colleagues who vehemently criticize concepts of the analytic third or field theory.

Echoes of the Freud–Ferenczi debate reverberate in the book, as they should in today's world when so many of our patients present with childhoods marked by the strain of trauma, and when many do not respond to the classical model. The author's main question, as I see it, is whether we expand theory to respond to widening-scope patients, or whether we persist in labeling them unanalyzable. Do we make bigger, more flexible shoes, or must one size fit all? Can traditional analysts open their minds enough to incorporate the interpersonal aspects of technique? We are reminded throughout that the patient, not our cherished theory, should come first.

The mystery of the runaway rabbi comes closest to being solved in chapter 17, "Travels with Charlie: On My Longstanding Affair with Theory." Actually, there are two Charlies: the author's Uncle Charlie, whose 50-year affair with a mistress showed the young Jacobs that fidelity and fierce disagreement are not mutually exclusive, and in fact can be quite tolerable, even desirable. Interestingly, Uncle Charlie's affair gave Jacobs permission to have his own affair—with "Miss O'Theory," that is: a figure "whom I fight with, distance myself from, try to shed—and dearly need" (p. 255), just as Uncle Charlie related to his mistress. In fact, Jacobs goes on to admit that "we are stuck together as lifetime companions" (p. 255). He feels that Miss O'Theory has become part of him.

I think every classically trained psychoanalyst struggles with this mistress to one degree or another, because her welcoming arms ensure safety, though frequently at the expense of finding one's own voice, the true hallmark of maturity. Could this alert us to separation-individuation difficulties not usually addressed by traditionalists?

So, while Jacobs's mistress shackles him to tradition, we become immersed in his struggle to free himself. Enter Charlie #2, the late Charles Brenner—master theoretician, first a teacher, then a mentor and beloved friend—who is revered by Jacobs as a giant. There are giants in every profession, of course, but their unquestioned idealization can pose serious, even crippling problems.

Charlie Brenner and Jacobs argue about the place of countertransference in treatment, the former giving it a negligible role. For Jacobs, however, it is the most important pathway toward understanding the patient. There is ample case material to show precisely how, by paying attention to the thoughts, images, and memories that pop into his mind as he gives himself over to the patient's material—along with his keen observation of every movement and visible gesture the patient makes—Jacobs finds clues that help him identify the patient's emerging, often-feared unconscious material.

The author makes an excellent case for moving forward, even mourning some of his lost orthodox roots, but his wish to please those on both sides of the river leaves him marooned on the bridge. Distinguishing himself from "certain classical analysts, who perhaps because of their training tend to interpret conflict, especially that between drive derivatives and the mind's protective defenses, without particular consideration given to the state of the patient's self-regard" (p. 258), Jacobs warns us that we should assess the patient's narcissism. And this is where the rubber hits the road: Does a powerful attachment to theory deafen or blind the analyst to the fact that each patient–analyst dyad is unique? Does Miss O'Theory insist that her lover listen to patients in the service of deeply ingrained theory, or can she be persuaded to move beyond it? Is the arguing too exciting to give up? At this point, I think Jacobs and Miss O'Theory may be ready to transition from perversity to the freedom of finding their own unique voices.

We must thank one of Jacobs's supervisors, who taught him to bear the chaos rather than resort to what Jacobs refers to as the Band-Aid of theory. Jacobs allows himself to mention that attachment to theory has infantile roots, but rather than cite possible early developmental issues, he refers to the internalization of parental values. I wanted more. Is the Band-Aid a fetish, a transitional object, a crutch that constitutes a major deterrent to progress in psychoanalysis because it shields the wound from fresh air?

Jacobs comments:

This influence [an overreliance on theory], which is an inherent, if regrettable, part of analytic training in institutes every-

where, often leads to a narrowness of vision and a limited way of working that can pose formidable problems when an analyst is confronted with a patient whose psychology does not fit into our theoretical stance . . . or does not respond to an approach that we favor. [p. 259]

Indeed, how many patients have suffered from not fitting into a specific category, and is it any wonder that this profession is in trouble?

The "stifling isolation that, for so long, characterized the defensive and restrictive position of classical analysis" (p. 297) is on the verge of changing. This book exposes the religious zealotry—a zealotry that must be fought against, in my opinion. This reader is left wondering, based on Jacobs's intriguing, elusive, and seductive book, whether in his eightieth year he will hit a home run, and whether the bride and groom will be married at last, so that we can all dance at the wedding. I would bet on it.

The Possible Profession is a mind-stretching book. Most important, it stands for the uniqueness of each analytic dyad and what its two members can create together: something new.

JANE S. HALL (NEW YORK)

DONALD W. WINNICOTT: A NEW APPROACH. By Laura Dethiville; translated by Susan Ganley Lévy. London: Karnac, 2014. 158 pp.

As the English translation of a French study of the work of a British psychoanalyst given to a sometimes idiosyncratic use of his own native language, *Donald Winnicott: A New Approach* presents an unusual challenge to both reader and reviewer. The author, Laura Dethiville, has been teaching Winnicott's work in a seminar at the Société Freudienne for many years, gaining in the process both a substantial grasp of his thinking and a respectful critique of the problems it sometimes poses (as, she acknowledges, do those of Lacan as well). In essence, her book, aimed primarily toward a French readership, documents the growing psychoanalytic transition from the traditional "Anglo-Saxon" conflict

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theory toward one geared to the impact of early developmental, even prenatal experience.

In an early chapter, Dethiville details Winnicott's biography, emphasizing his childhood experience of being reared by "multiple mothers" (his expression) with a frequently absent father, and being charged in his adolescence with major responsibility for caring for his mother as she lapsed into depression. "Winnicott," she says, "had undeniably a strong female identification, and there is no doubt that this almost exclusive feminine configuration of his family was the origin" (p. 15). It is also rather clear that it strongly shaped his developmental theories, which essentially excluded any reference to paternal influence in the early years. In addition, it seems likely to have contributed to his choice of pediatrics as his initial medical specialty, and to the lifelong concern about infantile dependence and its evolution that shaped his ultimate psychoanalytic interests.

Along the way, we learn about the disastrous rebuff Winnicott suffered around the 1968 presentation of an important though very complex and difficult paper of his.[1] Dethiville recounts how the hostile and dismissive discussion by three major psychoanalytic figures precipitated Winnicott's coronary attack that led to a three-week hospitalization. She omits, however, to locate this unfortunate incident at the New York Psychoanalytic Society, then the defending mainstay of classical Freudian theory and of ego psychology. (I enjoyed the privilege of visiting Winnicott in the hospital during his recovery.)

Dethiville provides lucid accounts of the principal elements in Winnicott's psychoanalytic life and his voluminous writings. In particular, she details the vagaries of his relationship with Melanie Klein, which began well but soon deteriorated on both personal and theoretical grounds (he was one of her "controls," the term Dethiville adheres to in preference to "supervisees"). Much of their difficulty derived from their conflicting positions about the role of the environment in the child's emotional development—an issue that also colored Winnicott's relationship with his second analyst, Joan Rivière, herself a devoted Kleinian.

[1] Winnicott, D. W. (1969). The use of an object. *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 50:711-716.

It was this critical concern that dominated and distinguished Winnicott's work, best reflected in his oft-quoted saying that there is no such thing as a baby.[2] From his brilliant observations about *transitional phenomena* and *transitional objects*[3] to his rather less clarified but provocative reflections on the *true self* and *false self*,[4] all his thinking revolved around the formative power of the early (even intrauterine) relationship between infant and mother. Normal development was defined as dependent on the *primary maternal preoccupation* of the *good enough mother*,[5] and it was from the nexus of maternal failure that all psychopathology, up to and including psychosis, was shaped. It was the analyst's role to permit its resolution—less by means of interpretation than through the ability to accept noncommunication and to survive, literally as well as figuratively, the rigors of the transference and countertransference.

Dethiville does a commendable job of communicating and clarifying the bulk of Winnicott's sometimes paradoxical formulations, respecting his effort to avoid technical jargon and acknowledging obscurities where they exist. She joins in the widespread challenge to Strachey's scientistic translations of Freud's terms for the mental structures, preferring the French *moi, soi,* and *surmoi,* only occasionally confusing the *moi* with consciousness and acknowledging that "sometimes the understanding of his [Winnicott's] texts is a real puzzle" (p. 73).

By and large, the translation by Susan Ganley Lévy appears to be accurate and reasonably idiomatic. Altogether, the book and its comprehensive bibliography will serve students and practitioners alike as a guide to the study of Winnicott's original and influential—if at times controversial—contributions to our understanding of emotional development, human relations, and their vicissitudes.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

[2] Winnicott, D. W. (1960). The theory of the parent–infant relationship. *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 41:585-595.

[3] Winnicott, D. W. (1953). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: a study of the first not-me possession. *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 34:89-97.

[4] Winnicott, D. W. (1956). On transference. *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 37:386-388.

[5] See footnote 3.

BEYOND INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE TRAUMA: INTERGEN-
    ERATIONAL TRANSMISSION, PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT,
    AND THE DYNAMICS OF FORGIVENESS. By Clara Mucci. London:
    Karnac, 2013. 312 pp.

This book is an ambitious attempt to discuss an important topic that is
particularly meaningful for this reviewer. As a Holocaust survivor and
child of survivors, and as a clinical practitioner specializing in trauma, I
was especially interested in Clara Mucci's account of individual and col-
lective trauma, and I looked forward to a new perspective on this widely
researched topic.

Mucci comes from an academic background, having been an Eng-
lish literature professor for many years. She recently trained in psycho-
analysis in the United States and currently practices psychoanalytically
oriented psychotherapy in Italy. Unfortunately, my hope for a new per-
spective was not realized, however; Mucci's theoretical stance on cata-
strophic collective trauma, as presented here, is based on the stale, one-
dimensional, and stereotypical view of survivors perpetuated in much of
the contemporary trauma literature.

Mucci focuses on human-caused trauma—specifically, early rela-
tional trauma, including child abuse, and massive social trauma as en-
countered in genocide. In both these areas, Mucci's interest is in re-
viewing the trauma literature and formulating a theory of the effects of
trauma, its intergenerational transmission, and identifying the psychoan-
alytic interventions that are most effective for the treatment of survivors.
Her ambitious goal is to present an interdisciplinary approach to the
subject, and to integrate neurobiology and attachment theory in a way
that broadens our understanding of trauma and helps us comprehend
its complicated long-term effects.

The book consists of four lengthy chapters, each addressing an as-
pect of individual and collective trauma. These four chapters include:
an exploration of the aftereffects of man-made trauma, a review of psy-
choanalytic approaches to these types of traumas, an analysis of trauma
transmission to the second and third generations, and a final section
that focuses on the possibility for going beyond trauma. The first three

chapters are heavily influenced by the work of other theorists, while in the fourth one, Mucci presents her own theory about the crucial role that forgiveness plays in healing.

Within each chapter, there are numerous short sections with separate headings that guide the reader toward what, more specifically, will be addressed. There is, however, a great deal of overlap among the chapters as Mucci weaves and reweaves various theoretical ideas, research data, some clinical material, and many quotations from the work of psychoanalysts past and present.

For instance, references to intergenerational transmission appear throughout the book, not just in the chapter supposedly devoted to these ideas. There is considerable repetition, and I occasionally found myself wondering whether some of these repeats were errors that had not been picked up in the editing process. For example, three identical quotations from Ferenczi's *Diary* appear in three separate sections and in different chapters, and all make the same point. Additionally, there are missing references and incorrect citations.

The first part of the book, in which Mucci focuses on early relational trauma, is well researched and innovative to the extent that the author integrates ideas from different disciplines, such as psychoanalysis, attachment theory, genetics, and neurobiology. She views attachment theory as essential to the understanding of early relational trauma, which she conceptualizes as resulting from a severe lack of attunement on the part of a caregiver who herself is likely to be suffering from unresolved trauma. The author examines how such a disturbance in the attachment relationship of the child and caregiver leads to insecure and disorganized attachment. Mucci also searches for the neurobiological manifestations of infantile trauma, drawing on the work of Allan Schore, whose neurobiological and psychoanalytic model in the context of attachment regulation figures prominently in her thinking and theorizing.

With regard to child abuse, Mucci discusses changes in psychoanalytic theory and highlights the contrast between Freud and Ferenczi on the issue of the reconstruction of reality and truth. She aligns herself with Ferenczi's emphasis on the reality-based nature of early trauma. She is critical of hermeneutics and the idea of a narrative truth when

it comes to trauma work, which she believes requires the recuperation of historical facts and a definite truth. In my view, however, Mucci minimizes the difficulty of establishing "the truth" about what actually took place in early childhood. Also, she does not address the fact that narrative formulation in psychotherapy is a co-constructed process in which the created story makes sense to both participants in the dyad, and at best approximates reality. I suppose that Mucci's need to get to the truth is reflected in the enthusiasm with which she embraces neuroscience, which presumably provides incontrovertible scientific evidence.

The author's use of the term *relational* and her references to contemporary relational psychoanalysis are somewhat misleading, since her theoretical position is based on a one-person psychology: the analyst, who is the expert on trauma, is guided by theory and proceeds accordingly in order to "cure" the patient. This attitude of the analyst as expert is most evident when Mucci discusses Holocaust trauma, the central focus of much of her book. The tone of her writing suggests that the analyst knows what it is like for the patient to have experienced massive psychic trauma and just how the treatment should proceed, even before the patient has entered her office.

Mucci looks to a previous generation of psychoanalysts for understanding Holocaust trauma, and acknowledges that her thinking has been most influenced by Dori Laub, a child survivor psychoanalyst who has written about this subject extensively. Like Laub, Mucci subscribes to the theory that massive psychic trauma is essentially a break in the connection between self and other, with the result that an empathic dyad no longer exists in the representation of one's internal world. She writes, "This broken connection and the death-instinct that is liberated from the rupture of the cathexis is the main feature of trauma" (p. 72).

From another perspective, I have indicated elsewhere:

To say categorically that the primary empathic bond is erased and the internal representation of the relationship between self and other is destroyed is a sweeping generalization which contradicts the many reports of survivors, that it was their relationships with significant others—whether in real life or as internalized objects—which kept them alive through their ordeal. Knowing

that there was a loved one waiting for them somewhere, and a commitment to tell society what happened in the camps kept many survivors going, despite their wish to end their suffering.[1]

According to Mucci's theoretical position, the concept of the death instinct is indispensable to the understanding and treatment of trauma.[2] Mucci grapples with this concept; in an effort to reconcile how an intrapsychic phenomenon like the death drive can be framed in interpersonal terms, she reasons as follows:

> In acknowledging Ferenczi as the father . . . of contemporary relational and intersubjective psychoanalytic theories, we want also to underline the final result of the intrapsychic nature of what goes under the name of drives, whose intergenerational and transmitted nature is clear, especially as pertains to the death drive, or the negative feeling passed from one generation to the next, imbuing the youngest with death derivative of the death drive. [p. 55]

Another basic assumption of this trauma theory is that, as a result of the loss of the good object and the unleashing of the death instinct, there is a subsequent hole in mental activity, which is characterized by the following: an inability to remember or to concentrate; a cessation of inner dialogue; a suspension of reflection and self-reflection; a shutdown of processes of association, integration, and narrative formation; and a destruction of symbolization and meaning making.[3] While this may be true for some survivors, it is patently not the case for others. In fact, if one examines the creative outpouring of survivor art in poetry, memoirs, and other art forms, it is evident that, on the contrary, there is a heightened need and capacity for self-expression, reflection, cog-

[1] Richman, S. (2014). Art born of genocide. In *Mended by the Muse: Creative Transformations of Trauma.* New York: Routledge, p. 104.

[2] See the following: (1) Laub, D. (2005). Traumatic shutdown of narrative and symbolization: a death instinct derivative? *Contemp. Psychoanal.,* 41:307-326; and (2) Laub, D. & Lee, S. (2003). Thanatos and massive psychic trauma: the impact of the death instinct on knowing, remembering, and forgetting. *J. Amer. Psychoanal. Assn.,* 51:433-464.

[3] Laub, D. & Auerhahn, N. (1989). Failed empathy—a central theme in the survivor's Holocaust experience. *Psychoanal. Psychol.,* 6:377-400.

nitive and emotional integration, narrative formation, inner dialogue, and meaning making. (See the reference provided in footnote 1 on the previous page.)

Primo Levi's words, which are liberally quoted in Mucci's book, suggest very different conclusions than those arrived at in the book. For example, in Levi's memoirs, there are many references to the significant relationships that he maintained in Auschwitz, and how these helped defy attempts to dehumanize him. He also refers to this period of his life as one of "exalted receptivity" and "exceptional spiritedness."[4] In the camp, he was acutely aware of his environment and determined to record the world and people around him; he had an intense drive to understand and a powerful curiosity. Thus, he wrote: "It might be surprising that in the Camps one of the most frequent states of mind was curiosity. And yet, besides being frightened, humiliated, and desperate, we were curious: hungry for bread and also to understand" (see footnote 4: Levi, p. 99). When interviewed years later, he reported that he considered his capacity for reflection, thinking, and observation to have been survival factors.

One has the sense that Mucci sometimes struggles to adapt the theories of her mentors and yet remain true to what she knows from within or from other sources. For example, Laub and Auerhahn postulate that there is a "generic" survivor experience common to all individuals who were directly affected by Nazi persecution, regardless of whether they were in a ghetto, or in hiding, or in an extermination camp (see footnote 3, p. 505). Indeed, their trauma theory makes no room for individual differences; it is implied that all survivors experience the same phenomenon—a loss of the internal other, with the same consequences and psychodynamics.

When Mucci applies this theory, she, too, behaves as though all survivors were identical, but at the same time she is able to recognize that:

> Naturally the extent of trauma suffered depends not only on the survivor's psychic structure and pre-traumatic personality, but also on the length of the imprisonment, the loss of loved ones,

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[4] Levi, P. (1987). *Moments of Reprieve.* New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 11.

whether or not there was sexual abuse, and the frequency and intensity of death threats. [p. 157]

I would add that not only does the extent of trauma suffered differ; but it is also true that human complexity cannot be reduced to sweeping generalizations. The theory as conceptualized by Laub and his associates, and elaborated on in this book, does not do justice to the diversity and complexity of individual responses to traumatic events. It is the unquestioned use of this theory that is the main weakness of *Beyond Individual and Collective Trauma,* in my opinion.

When it comes to intergenerational transmission of trauma, we note a similar tendency to stereotype all survivors, their children, and their grandchildren. Thus, Mucci writes:

> Since symbolization was impossible in the first generation, this burdensome task must be acted out by the second generation in other forms of illness. While the first generation, as we have seen, mostly suffered from anxiety, depression, anhedonia, an inability to describe their own conditions, psychosomatic illnesses (incapacity to symbolize and to mourn, incapacity to express their sufferings in words) with a predominant incapacity to "recount the trauma," it is this task that is left to the second generation. [p. 178]

With regard to the third generation, Mucci writes: "The third may actually develop more severe symptoms because the working-through of the resolution of the trauma inherited is somehow 'foreclosed' to the third generation" (p. 189).

At the same time that Mucci makes these pronouncements about generations of survivors, she acknowledges that research studies find no evidence of psychopathology in the children of survivors. But then, remarkably, she proceeds to contradict this finding; she goes on to say:

> I do think that the desire to stress the resilience and the strength of traumatized people is sometimes a sign, even in the presence of those real features, of the desire to cancel the stigma of death and victimization . . . and thus are signs that past traumas have not been totally digested. [pp. 187-188]

Despite acknowledging evidence to the contrary, Mucci is deter-
mined to view survivors through a pathological lens. This insistence on
unsubstantiated claims regarding the passing down of symptomatology
from one generation to the next has a long history in Holocaust lit-
erature. Mucci has been influenced by the work of individuals such as
Judith and Milton Kestenberg and Martin Bergmann, whom she incor-
rectly identifies as psychoanalyst survivors. Most of the individuals listed
in the book as survivor analysts are in fact not.

Furthermore, it is troubling that, in a book with forty-four pages of
references, there is no mention of the work of a number of psychoana-
lysts—such as myself—who did experience persecution directly and have
been writing about it for years. To give other examples, there is no single
reference to Viktor Frankl, Anna and Paul Ornstein, Henri Parens, Louis
Micheels, or Clemens Loew, all of whom are both psychoanalysts and
survivors.

I wonder if those of us who were left out were omitted because we
do not share Mucci's narrow vision of survivors as irreparably damaged.
In my view, Mucci, who represents a new generation of psychoanalysts
writing about massive psychic trauma, has fallen victim to the *intergen-
erational transmission of trauma stereotypes*, a prominent condition to be
found in the literature (for more about this, see the source in footnote
1, p. 505 of this review).

In the words of Anna Ornstein:

> The frequent references we find regarding the transmission of
> the trauma of the Holocaust from one generation to the other
> may well be related to a phenomenon not infrequent in the psy-
> choanalytic literature, namely, someone with authority makes a
> statement that is then referred to as if it were a proven fact.[5]

Mucci's approach is a highly theoretical one that privileges abstract
theory over lived experience. There is little clinical material to be found
here, and most of the case illustrations come from work reported by

[5] Marcus, P. & Rosenberg, A., eds. (1989). Interview with Anna Ornstein. In *Healing
Their Wounds: Psychotherapy with Holocaust Survivors and Their Families.* New York: Praeger,
p. 113.

others. It is sometimes easy to forget that theoretical constructions are actually hypotheses derived from the personal subjective world of the theorist. These hypothetical constructions do not fit my experience as a survivor, as a child of survivors, as a member of a community of survivors, and as a professional working in the mental health field for fifty years.

In my experience, each individual brings a unique history and set of experiences to life or therapy; when preconceptions bias the therapist's vision, she is unable to be a true witness. The *survivor syndrome*[6] and its counterpart, *the generic survivor* (see footnote 3 on p. 505), are ways of reducing the survivor experience to a labeled category, and miss the essence of the individual who has come for help. I believe that approaching patients with such preconceptions in mind often interferes with true witnessing.

Theoretical formulations that oversimplify the complexity of human reactions to tragedy are problematic. That is not to say that survivors have not been scarred by their trauma, but reactions to traumatic events are diverse, fluid, and highly variable on various levels; there are individual differences among survivors, as well as differences within the same individual depending on states of mind. In my experience, survivors of tragedy, like human beings in general, are complicated and multifaceted; they exist in many different self-states.

In the last chapter of the book, Mucci addresses the possibility of going beyond trauma and offers her theory of forgiveness as a prerequisite to healing. Although she repeatedly reminds the reader that her concept of forgiveness is not meant to have religious connotations, given our common associations to this word, the idea may prove unnecessarily problematic—particularly when accompanied by other quasi-religious terms such as *faith, redemption,* and *grace,* which Mucci also uses occasionally. While I appreciate her idea that letting go of rage and revenge fantasies is a worthy goal, I would prefer a focus on other concepts, such as *coming to terms with* and *acceptance of* what has happened, and the idea that an individual must find her own way beyond trauma.

This idea, too—that only if an individual forgives her perpetrators can she find salvation—is another instance of "one size fits all." I can

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[6] Niederland, W. (1968). Clinical observations on the "Survivor Syndrome." *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 49:313-315.

imagine someone accepting or coming to terms with what has transpired, but without necessarily forgiving. As Wiesel, quoted by Mucci, wrote: "I am asking God not to forgive the murderers. I pray God not to forgive them. And I hope he hasn't done so" (p. 231 of the subject book).

One of this book's ideas that I most appreciate, discussed in the last chapter, is Mucci's recognition that the creative process can be immensely reparative. For instance, she quotes the work of LaCapra,[7] stating that the transitional space of narrative, as found in memoir and literature, can facilitate the working through of traumatic loss and death. In my view, Mucci is at her best when she listens to those who have survived and quotes their testimony.

At the end of the book, the author reports segments of testimony from the Fortunoff Video Archives for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University to illustrate some of her ideas about forgiveness. It is in excerpts from these transcriptions, in the actual words of survivors, that Mucci best captures the subjective experience of those who have struggled with individual and collective trauma. I would have preferred Mucci to have begun the book's thesis from here, rather than from a misguided theory that attempts to fit all survivors into a procrustean bed and ends up perpetuating unfortunate stereotypes.

SOPHIA RICHMAN (NEW YORK)

ANIMAL KILLER: TRANSMISSION OF WAR TRAUMA FROM ONE GENERATION TO THE NEXT. By Vamik D. Volkan. London: Karnac, 2014. 91 pp.

In a recent bestselling novel, *The Absent One* (2012), Danish author Jussi Adler-Olsen creates a group of four apparently psychopathic characters who, with excitement that approaches orgiastic dimensions, take great pleasure in hunting and killing large numbers of animals, especially ones that are members of an endangered species. But this is not always

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[7] LaCapra, D. (2001). *Writing History, Writing Trauma*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

imagine someone accepting or coming to terms with what has transpired, but without necessarily forgiving. As Wiesel, quoted by Mucci, wrote: "I am asking God not to forgive the murderers. I pray God not to forgive them. And I hope he hasn't done so" (p. 231 of the subject book).

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[7] LaCapra, D. (2001). *Writing History, Writing Trauma.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

sufficient to satisfy their lust for hurting and killing. Periodically and compulsively, they don masks and gloves, search out random *human* victims, and mercilessly beat them until they are so bloodied and broken that they have to spend months in hospital to recover from their injuries. Now and then, they shoot and kill their *human* prey. Other than this gruesome hobby (with one important exception), they are well-known, highly successful, rich, and powerful pillars of their society. Their pleasure in brutally beating and killing both animals and people began when they were highly privileged youngsters whose parents—all of whom lavishly provided material possessions, but offered virtually no love or affection—had sent them away to an elite, exclusive boarding school, at which they inevitably gravitated toward one another. It is a marvelous book, and I highly recommend it.

"What?" you say. "Why do you begin a book review that will appear in a serious, stodgy psychoanalytic journal by talking about a crime novel? After all, that's only fiction—it could never happen in real life."

Well, it has. There is wisdom in Oscar Wilde's well-known quip that "life imitates art."[1] Vamik Volkan has spent a lifetime studying and writing about the human propensity for the destruction, carnage, and bloodshed, the delight in raping and pillaging, that characterize war and international conflict. In *Animal Killer,* he has written a book about a single analysis, which he supervised, of just such an individual.

Peter, who began analysis when his wife threatened to leave him if he did not do so, was an extremely avid hunter and taxidermist when not working in a very high-level position for a highly successful military industrial corporation that produced missiles for the armed forces. Each of these missiles was capable of killing tens of thousands of people. His particular pleasure was flying in helicopters in Alaska and machine-gunning whole herds of animals, as well as hunting down and killing wolves and other carnivorous hunters who themselves were killers of those hapless victims. Peter revealed that he had been a helicopter pilot during the Vietnam War, during which, he proudly announced, he had

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[1] Wilde, O. (1889). The decay of lying: an observation. In *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde: Stories, Plays, Poems, and Essays.* New York: Harper & Row, 1989, p. 985.

machine-gunned *human* prey, including women and children, among whom enemy fighters were purportedly hiding.

As the analysis unfolded, it became increasingly clear how Peter had become the man he was. His stepfather, Gregory, entered his life when he was a very young boy, three years after his biological father abandoned six-week-old Peter and his mother. Gregory had survived the Bataan death march, only to spend years in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp in which he was tortured, starved to the point of losing sixty-five pounds, and surrounded by fellow soldiers whom he repeatedly buried and reburied as they succumbed to brutality, starvation, and disease. (Peter's mother had been engaged to Gregory prior to her relationship with Peter's father, but had not been able to hold out and wait for him while she hoped against hope that he might live through the war.)

Peter worshipped his stepfather, who rescued him from the clutches of his weak mother and his both terrifying and insufferable grandmother. Gregory never talked about his war experiences, but he taught Peter to hunt, hunted with him, and eventually sent him to military school. As the analysis unfolded, it gradually became apparent that Peter identified with his stepfather, and that he had unconsciously accepted the tacit assignment to facilitate Gregory's (seeming) recovery from the effects of what his Japanese captors had done to him. Thus, he had joined Gregory in being strong and powerful rather than helpless and emasculated, a victimizer rather than a victim, a hunter rather than hunted prey, and a killer rather than a victim of killers.

While hunting with his stepfather on one occasion, Peter drank from a stream from which he had just seen a raccoon drinking. (During the analysis, he realized that the raccoon's eyes reminded him of pictures he had seen of the sunken eyes of American soldiers who, during the Bataan death march, had drunk filthy water—whenever they could find any water to drink—and had become seriously ill.) Peter was extremely sick for a long period of time, during which he lost fifty-five pounds, just ten pounds less than Gregory had lost while he was in the POW camp. It was shortly after Peter recovered from his lengthy illness that Gregory enrolled him in a military academy.

Peter made the analytic consulting room into a haven of safety, which he called his "island empire." He felt that he escaped from the world into that haven—just as he withdrew frequently into the private sanctuary he had constructed in his home, which he filled with animals that he had shot and then had stuffed by a very skilled taxidermist. The room, it became apparent, unconsciously represented to him both the Japanese island empire and the POW camp in which his stepfather had been interned, away from the world, for three horribly phantasmagoric years. Peter and his analyst, Dr. Pine (supervised by the book's author), discovered that the stuffed animals unconsciously represented a host of things to Peter.

A year or so into the analysis, observing a flock of birds stirred Peter to recall Gregory's construction of a huge, elaborate, multistoried birdhouse for purple martens. All through Peter's childhood, Gregory had tagged, kept track of, guarded, and protected one generation after another of the birds who nested in the birdhouse. He took special care to rescue the fledglings that fell out of the birdhouse and gently returned them to the unit from which they had fallen, so that they might live until they were ready to fly away.

Together, Peter and Dr. Pine came to understand that his stepfather had been doing for the little birds what he had not been able to do for himself or for his comrades in the POW camp. They also came to understand a good deal more about why Gregory had rescued Peter and his mother. *They* had been abandoned when Peter was just six weeks old, just as the army and the American government had abandoned Gregory and his fellow soldiers in the Philippines early in the war. Peter's passion for taxidermy, and especially for finding ways to make the stuffed animals look strikingly *alive,* also became much more intelligible.

This important illustration of the transmission of neurotic conflicts from one generation to another, however, is not the only feature of Volkan's book. It also contains a marvelous account of the skillful analysis of a man with a serious narcissistic disorder. Peter was a self-centered, distant, emotionally isolated human being before the analysis. He suffered from alcoholism and bulimia. It was when Peter had drunkenly

gorged himself at a dinner for some very important men whom his company was wooing for arms contracts, and then vomited into the lap of a former governor, that his wife insisted that he undergo psychoanalytic treatment.

As the analysis began and for some time thereafter, Peter repeatedly flaunted his importance and his financial success while belittling and demeaning his analyst for being his social and intellectual inferior. His tales of having committed murder and mayhem frightened Dr. Pine, who worried that his own life might be in danger. With assistance from the supervisor (Volkan), however, the analyst was able to deftly handle the initial flight into health into which Peter threw himself in order to avoid looking into what was inside him. Dr. Pine passed a number of tests unconsciously designed to determine whether he not only recognized and empathized with the weak, helpless, frightened little boy who lurked beneath Peter's bellicose, terrifying, and arrogant public self, but also that he understood that Peter *was required* to present that persona to the world.

The analysis, not surprisingly, was extremely challenging—to analysand, analyst, and supervisor alike. In resonance with what Peter brought to the analysis, his analyst came to it with some meaningful baggage of his own. He, too, had been abandoned early in life, and he, too, had experienced multiple traumatic experiences, the most recent of which had prompted him to give up practicing for several years, after which he relocated to the vicinity in which Volkan worked and resumed seeing patients. He had gone back into personal analysis, and it was his new analyst who referred him to Volkan for supervision of the case.

Volkan, as supervisor, had to navigate back and forth from one stance, that of a disinterested instructor, to another stance, of an empathic fellow human being, as Dr. Pine brought in and suffered through an account of one countertransference or counteridentification reaction after another, some of which had initiated significant enactments that threatened Peter's analysis.

Volkan stresses the necessity, if one is to be able to analyze a patient with such a "malignant personality organisation" (p. xvii), to allow the patient to impose a "narcissistic transference" (p. 27) into the analytic

relationship. Such a patient *has to* use the analyst in such a way as to pro-
tect and maintain the integrity of his grandiose self, for a considerable
length of time—by at times idealizing, at other times disparaging, and
at still others by casting the analyst into the role of a self-aggrandizing,
ideal, reflective mirror. Alternation between countertransferential ela-
tion, on the one hand, and boredom or anger, on the other, is inevitable
for the analyst of such a patient.

After Peter recalled and then—together with his analyst—explored
the implications of the birdhouse and the sunken-eyed raccoon memo-
ries, a major shift occurred in the analysis: "Now, during his sessions,
and without escaping to grandiose expectations, he and Dr. Pine began
to observe that his 'fat boy,' hungry self-representation was still with him,
split off from his grandiose self" (p. 31).

Shortly thereafter, a dramatic event occurred that pushed the anal-
ysis even further. Peter learned that his mother, whom he had not seen
for years, had become gravely ill. He fainted when he entered the hos-
pital to visit her. She recovered from her illness, but Peter realized that
he had expected her to die. He explored the meaning of this with Dr.
Pine—who, with Volkan's assistance, helped Peter by articulating his in-
terventions in terms of Peter's repressed, ambivalent feelings toward her.
Again, with his supervisor's help, the analyst was able to communicate
this without assaulting the analysand's narcissistic defenses.

This led to Peter sobbingly expressing deep remorse for having
killed innocent women and children during the war in Vietnam. In turn,
this enabled him to encounter the vulnerable, guilt-ridden, anxious
little-boy self-representation that cowered beneath his tough, sadistic,
soldier-murderer, *externally facing* self-representation. And he began, for
the first time, to remember his dreams!

Peter also reached out to his now-aging stepfather, to return to him
as the strong, macho, masculine leader whom he once had been—only
to find that Gregory could no longer fulfill that role. Because of federal
defense cuts and their effects on his employment, Peter found himself
feeling abandoned by the US government as well. He responded to these
twin disappointments by lapsing into "empty sleep" during his analytic
sessions. At first, Dr. Pine did not intrude into this response to feeling

abandoned and rendered empty, but gradually he became able to ex-plore it with Peter.

The Iraqi Gulf War propelled Peter into a temporary reversion to his old warlike, destructive, weapons-producer persona. Afterward, he returned to analytic self-exploration, with the aid of dream recollections and a series of meaningful enactments that he and his analyst staged together. He stopped sleeping during sessions and worked with Dr. Pine at knitting together both his grandiose and hungry selves and the dis-connected love and hate that he harbored toward his primary and con-temporary objects. He gave up big game hunting, disposed of his stuffed animal trophies, and converted his trophy room into a conservatory in which his wife could raise plants and flowers (although of course he had to do this in a grandiose, showy way). His excessive drinking and bulimia had by this time faded away.

Dr. Pine, with Volkan's assistance, helped Peter explore his com-plex relationship with his stepfather and better understand how he had been recruited into cooperating with Gregory, as the latter relived and struggled to overcome his extremely traumatic war experiences. Peter and Gregory had become dramatically intertwined with one another. In resonance with this, Peter and Dr. Pine wrestled, individually and jointly, with the residues of the early losses that *both of them* had experienced.

The fiftieth anniversary of the Bataan death march approached. Peter actively joined in the efforts being made to convince the Amer-ican government to award medals to the march's living survivors. He succeeded in his campaign to see Gregory receive a silver star, a higher award than the three bronze stars he himself had been given for ser-vice in Vietnam. In doing so, he not only honored the stepfather who had rescued him from his traumatic childhood situation, but also helped Gregory re-own the traumatized self-image from which he had fled. Peter no longer needed to "be a 'reservoir' for this image" (p. 66). Ac-cordingly, he became able to revisit his own traumatic past, including its preoedipal and oedipal components.

The book ends with a moving account of two extremely surprising, very dramatic occurrences that punctuated the termination phase of the analysis. But wait!—Just as the reviewer of a suspense novel would do a terrible thing if he revealed its surprise ending, I would be doing a repre-

hensible deed if I described the end of this book. I heartily recommend that the readers of this review obtain a copy of *Animal Killer* so that they can find out what happened—although not only for that reason.

MARTIN A. SILVERMAN (MAPLEWOOD, NJ)

THE PARTS LEFT OUT. By Thomas H. Ogden. London: Karnac, 2014. 199 pp.

In his first novel, *The Parts Left Out,* Thomas H. Ogden uses third-person "omniscient" narration to draw out the personalities of the characters in the story and the decisive questions and motives informing their lives. He does this not only by highlighting their various activities, thoughts, and feelings, but also by instilling in the reader an inquiry into what is not there, to what is left out, missed or missing in how each character lives with him-/herself and with others. Existential realities not easily subject to volition and those painful historical predicaments not subject to satisfactory transformation form the backdrop of the narrative and create moments alive with the possibility of meaningful decision, if the characters choose to make a move.

This overview of *The Parts Left Out* can be seen simply as my interpretation, of course, but the novel's title would seem to serve as the author's opening sign or invocation, indicating one place psychoanalytically informed readers might begin their conversation with the fate of the text and its place in the body of Ogden's work. Before I say more about the novel itself, I would like to offer some psychoanalytic background and context for my reading of Ogden and his expansion of analytic awareness.

Recent work in object relations, Bionian thought, field theory, and intersubjectivity, along with more specific expositions of reverie, awareness without memory or desire, nonverbal communication, and related experiences of relatively unencumbered, "unsaturated," "creative" moments of "disclosure" and "emergence" suggest an openness in our literature to explore what might be meant by *analytic awareness*—beyond what is conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. Theoretically, when we acknowledge and carefully consider how and what it is we do *not*

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know as elements of awareness, and when we inquire into how and of what we (and our patients) may be aware of without knowing, we open the domain of the "analytic unconscious" beyond what Freud and many other analysts have explicated in the past.

In a 2014 paper clarifying Winnicott's expanded conception of the unconscious in connection with primitive agonies—as well as Ogden's own concepts of *undreamt dreams* and the *unlived life*—Ogden describes the unconscious as an area for "experiencing the repressed aspects of life that have occurred and *have been experienced,* but are so disturbing as to be banned from conscious awareness," but also as an area that "involves an aspect of the individual . . . where there exist registrations of events that have occurred, but *have not been experienced.*"[1] These latter elements play a fundamental role in (some) human motivation, Ogden continues. Those "aspects of the individual" that are registered involve the expanding awareness of which I am speaking.

With this sense of awareness in mind, Ogden presents examples in this 2014 paper of how a sense of urgency (conscious and unconscious) can arise out of fear, frustration, disappointment, loss, disturbance, or pain. In its most original form, that felt urgency is not contingent on knowing exactly what the motive, object, cause, or reason for the urgency might be. As thinking develops further, a person might know more exactly (at least in some registers) the "reasons" for a sense of urgency.

Extending this context further, I would like to suggest that a sense of primitive urgency may arise not only out of inner obstacles to living in the form of fears, wishes, intentions, needs, or unbearable states, but also out of (an immersion in) awareness of that creative, expansive, and inclusive energy and urgency in which we find ourselves, of which we are part, and that is synonymous with living and life itself.

This is a formative element in our analytic predicament, as I see it. We find life within ourselves that deeply longs for and reaches for more life. A sense of what is missing can move us, and a sense of *being* can as well. In both dimensions, the formative urgency is felt before self and object are clearly differentiated in awareness. That is, a sense of aware-

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[1] Ogden, T. H. (2014). Fear of breakdown and the unlived life. *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 95:205-223. Quotations are from p. 213; italics are in original.

ness is present before *I* or *we* make any intelligent, self-reflective sense at all. A sense of awareness is a form of undifferentiated knowing and not knowing. We are immersed in this awareness before there is what we might call a mystery of awareness to be aware of.

This is certainly an aspect of experience and a concept of analytic awareness that is much broader than that contained within the traditional analytic distinctions between conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. In this vein, the concept of expanding analytic awareness and the sense of urgency seem intimately related to how we make rational sense analytically, and may serve as a fertile context for appreciating recent developments in psychoanalytic theory, including Lear's illuminating explication of psychoanalysis as the activity of thoughtful self-consciousness informing human life.[2]

In *The Parts Left Out,* Ogden brings many aspects of unknowing and the unknown to awareness through his narrative of the life of an American farm family. Throughout the book, he leaves open a horizon of thought-provoking omissions, up to and including the last sentence: "He wanted to say something, but he didn't know what" (p. 197).

Echoing the mind of an unseen but observant and richly knowing participant in a consciousness presumably accessible to all readers, Ogden describes his characters' subjective circumstances, activities, thoughts, and feelings. Implicitly, Ogden enjoins the reader to become part of the dialogue with the author and the characters and to incorporate this personal experience into ongoing elements in the reader's inner world. In other words, the reader's "self-conscious" awareness expands so that a sense of urgency, knowing, and not knowing are felt, thought about, and lived firsthand. This can be fascinating and disturbing.

Ogden's story opens with the killing of the mother on a family farm in the American Midwest. The story evolves to include the lives of the extended family, along with generations of people who are actually or virtually participants in the killing. Each of the living characters is seen to experience the tragic event in a uniquely personal way. Ogden effectively leaves out many "essential" parts of each character's story, the

[2] Lear, J. (2014). Wisdom won from illness: the psychoanalytic grasp of human being, *Int. J. Psychoanal.,* 95:677-693.

family's story, the community's story, and the human story. The main characters each feel some responsibility in the killing, but did anyone actually intend it to happen? No one seems sure. Who knows who is "really" responsible? If protecting one person from another is an acceptable reason for violence, who is to determine which actions have legitimate motivations and make "acceptable" sense, and which do not?

This determination may have profound consequences in different registers of life—public and private—for everyone involved. Although the book's characters are all part of a "close" family, does anyone know any of the others intimately, or know why a person who is "known well" decides to do what he or she does? Looking back, if a person failed to act in a crisis that affects others, in what way did the person fail? To whom is an individual responsible, after all?

In the end, perhaps implicit in the novel is the suggestion that no one individual is solely to blame for the killing. Even so, something bad has happened that affects the characters and their lives; how are they to go on with themselves from here? On what basis will they or should they decide which decisions are right or wrong, and how should they choose to live their lives?

Given these and many other questions and parts left out, Ogden opens a space for readers to explore their own thoughts. Perhaps as we read, we might find ourselves pulled by the momentum of our own fantasies to consider our own lives in conjunction with the attempt to make sense of how the characters try to understand themselves and what is happening to them. Affect can facilitate this process. Along with violence in many forms and its effects on the characters, the novel brings out feelings of hatred, guilt, anguish, disappointment, bitterness, compromise, abuse, conflict, and major trauma, all of which are attendant on other moments of respect, romance, love, tenderness, kindness, courage, and hope. Misplaced loyalties, cowardice, bewilderment, false promises, secrets, and insanity all have voices in the narrative as the story unfolds.

Overall, I found most of the novel engaging and at times gripping. At moments, however, I did feel distracted or numbed by the broad horizon of thought that Ogden attributes to his characters. Almost all of them seem to be remarkable, independent thinkers in their own right.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, the way in which Ogden skillfully helps us appreciate the characters' inner worlds by means of his own extensive "reading," or through his narrative of their minds, at times reaches far beyond what we might credibly imagine the characters' thinking to be. Who is at work here? What is the story? Are the characters living their own lives in their own rural town on their own terms, or are we hearing an unidentified Oz who is passing through town and offering oracular comments about the town's inhabitants?

These distractions did not derail me for long. In most passages, Ogden presents dialogue that is wonderfully revealing of personalities and relationships. These exchanges sound alive and believable and are thus less liable to be viewed as exquisite intellectual exposition. In dialogue, Ogden includes more by leaving more parts out.

At this point I would like to touch on the educational usefulness of novels written by analysts. Interestingly, in a cursory and informal poll of analysts whom I know, I found that these serious readers and educators could not easily recall even ten novels written by trained analysts that had appeared in English in the last few decades. This small number is unfortunate, since analysts clearly have much to say that could demonstrate through fiction what and how analysts learn and think.

I am familiar with at least two other novels by an analyst, however, that evoke registers of analytic experience and thought that are analytically comparable to those brought to life by Ogden in *The Parts Left Out*. These were both authored by Paul Williams.[3] In addition, the late Allen Wheelis wrote several novels and memoirs that are quite compelling in a different way.[4] Finally (though this list is not meant to be exhaustive), I would like to mention an outstanding recent novel by Theodore Jacobs,[5] favorably reviewed in the most recent issue of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*.[6]

[3] See (1) Williams, P. (2010). *The Fifth Principle*. London: Karnac; and (2) Williams, P. (2012). *Scum*. London: Karnac.

[4] See, for example: Wheelis, A. (1987). *The Doctor of Desire*. New York: W. W. Norton.

[5] Jacobs, T. (2013). *The Year of Durocher*. New York: International Psychoanalytic Books.

[6] Robbins, T. S. (2015). [Review of] *The Year of Durocher*. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 84:261-263.

Thinking about the role that such novels could play in psychoanalytic education, and taking Ogden's novel as a starting point, a seminar might focus on traditional analytic topics, such as unconscious guilt, moral masochism, trauma, the autistic-contiguous-paranoid-schizoid-depressive position, soul murder, intrapsychic and interpersonal conflict, therapeutic interventions from different psychodynamic perspectives, and so on. A less traditional seminar might focus on topics such as: Is there a relationship between personal integrity and madness? How might filial loyalty either interfere with or promote creativity and freedom of expression on the horizon of awareness? Might an analytically informed concept of *virtue* play a constructive role in understanding psychoanalytic pluralism and the optimal therapeutic approach for a given individual?

Here are some additional questions inspired by the novel that could generate productive and educational discussions: If we consciously and deliberately divert, ignore, refuse, or deny attention to an "uncomfortable" experience in awareness, does the experience "disappear"—and if it does not vanish entirely, where does it go? What does an "unforgettable experience" refer to when examined clinically? How might one conceive a meaningful analytic approach to a patient who doesn't care about him-/herself and feels his very being is bad, without inducing a deadly "negative therapeutic reaction"? If the inevitability of fate or multiple determinism is in force, to what extent can a person change—with or without analysis?

In my remarks on *The Parts Left Out,* I have intentionally eschewed explicating more of the novel's story line in the hope that readers will pick it up and read it for themselves. In my reading, Ogden's novel is not just an interesting story. It represents a meditation on human awareness, knowing and not-knowing, the desire to live or not, and a demonstration of the effects of conflict, compromise, and trauma on personal integrity, perception, responsibility, and sanity. I hope my comments will encourage the *Quarterly's* constituents to read Ogden's fine novel both as literature and as a piece of the psychoanalytic project in progress. In my view, Ogden is expanding the horizon of psychoanalytic thought, inquiry, and experience in a way that few others have shown the ability to do.

In conclusion, *The Parts Left Out* is a richly engaging and evocative narrative. Ogden's style of storytelling introduces, expands, and interprets psychoanalytic awareness in a new way. The novel represents a contribution to our literature that may engage us in analytic reverie, broaden our understanding of the scope and meaning of the unconscious, deepen a discussion of what and how we know and do not know, and serve as a springboard for discussion in educational settings.

GREGORY D. GRAHAM (HOUSTON, TX)

DEPRESSION AS A PSYCHOANALYTIC PROBLEM. By Paolo Azzone. Lanham, MD/Plymouth, UK: University Press of America, 2013. 134 pp.

In his comprehensive and well-researched book, Paolo Azzone takes a historical look at depression. He starts by reviewing the Ancient Greeks and the philosophy of the Hellenistic and Roman imperial periods. Of interest to academics and historians will be the relevant historical documents that Azzone selects to build his book's premises. His quotations from these documents often appear in the document's language of origin, including German, Greek, and Latin, as well as in English. By examining the philosophy, literature, and medical history of earlier times, Azzone seeks to secure a comprehensive understanding of depression.

Azzone sees depression as one expression of what he calls "socially shared representations of pain" (p. 49). He also includes the human experiences of sadness, sin, and error, as well as ancient concepts such as *black bile,* in considering depression. He draws on many cultural, historical, and religious influences that he posits have contributed to our contemporary overall understanding of depression. I can well imagine that most clinicians will find themselves agreeing with Azzone's conclusions. Historians, philosophers, and other scholars will also likely appreciate the author's interdisciplinary approach.

Early on, Azzone makes what many will consider an astonishing claim, as follows.

In conclusion, *The Parts Left Out* is a richly engaging and evocative narrative. Ogden's style of storytelling introduces, expands, and interprets psychoanalytic awareness in a new way. The novel represents a contribution to our literature that may engage us in analytic reverie, broaden our understanding of the scope and meaning of the unconscious, deepen a discussion of what and how we know and do not know, and serve as a springboard for discussion in educational settings.

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Early on, Azzone makes what many will consider an astonishing claim, as follows.

> Most symptoms included in the DSM-IV list of diagnostic criteria
> for a Major Depressive Disorder had already been mentioned
> in the *Aphorisms* of the Corpus Hippocratium . . . . The pos-
> sible inclusion of delusional phenomena had been extensively
> stressed since the period of Hellenistic-Roman medicine, as had
> the serious risk of suicide. Little, very little has changed over
> 2400 years in the area of the nosography of depression. [p. 7]

Early in the book, then, the reader will begin to appreciate Azzone's
historical compilation of humanity's attempts to understand, diagnose,
and treat depression—even if some readers disagree with Azzone's con-
clusions. In this context, Azzone discusses what he calls "moral versus
humoral" causes of depression, making what is sure to be a controversial
assertion: "Moral and subsequently psychological causes of depression
have always played a secondary or marginal role in the history of psy-
chiatry" (p. 9). With careful reading, we can see how Azzone intends to
use historical documents speaking to the pathogenesis and treatment of
depression to argue the premise of his book's title: *Depression as a Psycho-
analytic Problem.*

In the context of discussing the role of the analyst's empathy and
the transference and countertransference involved in psychoanalytic
work, Azzone states: "The medical profession always implies some de-
gree of emotional detachment from the sick . . . . The practice of psy-
chotherapy—particularly dynamic psychotherapy—also has some unique
requirements which sharply differentiate it from somatic medicine, in-
cluding biologically based psychiatry" (p. 61).

Quoting Winnicott (1947) and Heimann (1950), Azzone goes on:

> The role of empathy is acknowledged in all therapeutic ap-
> proaches. However, in psychoanalytically oriented treatments,
> the therapist's emotional processes and reactions to the patient's
> statements play a role in both the establishment of therapeutic
> alliance and in the processing of the countertransference. They
> are the engine that fuels the treatment. [p. 61]

Further on in the book, the author's multidisciplinary research
bears fruit in his careful conclusions. He is even-handed in discussing
several studies evaluating the efficacy of many types of psychotherapy

with depressed patients. After presenting efficacy research from several groups—short-term dynamic, psychoanalytic, behavioral, cognitive behavioral, and psychotherapy with medication—Azzone concludes that there is currently no empirical evidence for the supremacy of any one approach.[1] He states: "For the time being, to my knowledge, the empirical evidence for the superior efficacy of a single therapeutic approach as applied to selected depressed patient subgroups over others is still limited" (p. 55).

As a practicing psychoanalyst, I found the second half of Azzone's book particularly relevant for psychoanalysts and psychodynamic clinicians. It is to his credit that parts II and III of his book will likely be useful to many practitioners. In creating his theory and clinical treatment for depression, Azzone begins by going back to the work of Immanuel Kant: Azzone states that psychoanalysts and all clinicians can benefit from considering Kant's "exhaustive discussion of the philosophical problems implicit in human observational knowledge of the external world" (p. 55). While the reading is somewhat dense, it is worthwhile to follow his construction of a theory for the psychoanalytic treatment of depression based on social and cultural factors, works of philosophy, and religious texts.

By this point in the book, it will be clear that the author is championing a psychoanalytic conceptualization of humanity, suffering, and depression that is not at all confined to the measurable, rational, pre-

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[1] In this regard, Azzone cites the following references: (1) Azzone, P. (2001). Incontrare la depressione nei servizi di salute mentale: il contributo della letteratura psicoanalitica [Encounterting depression in mental health services: the contribution of psychoanalytic literature]. *Rivista di Psichiatria,* 36:313-322; (2) Cujpers, P., van Straten, A. & Warmerdam, L. (2007). Behavioral activation treatments of depression: a meta-analysis. *Clin. Psychol. Rev.,* 27:318-326; (3) Fisher, S. & Greenberg, R., eds. (1997). *From Placebo to Panacea: Putting Psychiatric Drugs to Test.* New York: John Wiley & Sons; (4) Jindal, R. D. & Thase, M. E. (2003). Integrating psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy to improve outcomes amid patients with mood disorders. *Psychiatric Svcs.,* 54:1484-1490; (5) Karasu, T. B. (1990a). Toward a clinical model for psychotherapy of depression, I: systematic comparison of three psychotherapies. *Amer. J. Psychiatry,* 147:133-147; (6) Karasu, T. B. (1990b). Toward a clinical model for psychotherapy of depression, II: an integrative and selective treatment approach. *Amer. J. Psychiatry,* 147:269-278; and (7) Roth, A. & Fonagy, P. (1996). *What Works for Whom? A Critical Review of Psychotherapy Research.* New York: Guilford.

dictable, or concrete. In constructing his "Psychoanalytically Oriented Understanding of a Descriptive Psychopathology of Depression" (p. 62), Azzone clearly states: "Let us try to formulate each of the above-mentioned symptoms (listed in the DSM IV-TR) in a language independent of the framework of psychopharmacological or behaviorally oriented psychiatry, one accessible and useful to dynamic psychotherapists as well" (p. 63).

From here Azzone precedes to develop his theory and treatment of depression, starting with an emphasis on the affect most associated with depression: sadness. His conclusion that there must be a theory-driven, relevant description of depressive disorders has been carefully argued to this point in his book. He refers to the work of early analysts—Freud, Klein, Bion, Winnicott, Fenichel, and Bibring—as well as that of many contemporary analysts. The clinical vignettes are quite illustrative of the psychoanalytic treatment of depression, as is the author's application of his descriptive theory of depression to the clinical vignettes. It is here that the reader's patience with earlier dense and excessively erudite passages will pay off. Azzone's clinical illustrations are organized around his now well-defined theoretical concepts and psychoanalytic methods.

It is interesting that Azzone chose to emphasize in the book's title that "depression is a psychoanalytic problem." In reading this book, we see him documenting depression's existence as a *human problem* from antiquity. His work is not just another treatise on the psychoanalytic nosology, theory, and treatment of depression; his work is unique because he frames his understanding of depression within a larger philosophical, historical, and cultural human history. Azzone's conclusion that depression is best understood as a psychoanalytic problem is thus far from a baseless, parochial claim.

I highly recommend Azzone's book to all clinicians. Perhaps more important, I recommend this book to scholars, journalists, and historians. All will be impressed to see the application of some of our greatest works so skillfully applied to the contemporary psychoanalytic practice of treating depression.

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PSYCHOANALYTIC REFLECTIONS ON POLITICS: FATHERLANDS
IN MOTHERS' HANDS. By Eszter Salgó. New York: Routledge, 2014.
190 pp.

Eszter Salgó is an important voice in the field of psychoanalysis and
politics. A faculty member in international relations at the American
University of Rome, yet conversant with a wide range of psychoanalytic
thinking, she has written a compelling, thoughtful, surprising book—er-
udite, yet accessible and engaging—that brings a psychoanalytic critique
to utopian political pathologies of both right and left.

Drawing on a wealth of psychoanalytic and political thinkers and
anthropologists, the author's psychoanalytic starting point is that we per-
ceive reality through a lens of fantasy, and that political communities
are based on shared conscious and unconscious fantasies. Each political
community coalesces around a particular symbolic drama in which these
fantasies are played out on a public stage. The role of unconscious fan-
tasy, especially, is overlooked in much of political analysis.

Explicating her thesis, Salgó observes that transitional periods
marked by chaos and crisis, such as we are in today, stir up feelings of
loss, disorientation, and fear. They create a lack of trust in political lead-
ership and in people's sense of their own power as political and social
agents. Many individuals retreat from this frightening present into their
society's particular shared fantasy of its mythical past—a paradise myth
involving an idyllic Golden Age—or a vision of an idealized future that
promises a return to it, in a new version. In a time of anxiety, leaders may
mold these mythical fantasies into a political vision they can exploit—
a vision that galvanizes people's emotions and stifles their thinking, in
which the leaders portray themselves as new founding fathers.

In democracies, in contrast, Salgó points to the centrality of the ca-
pacity to bring a personal, playful perspective, broadly speaking, to one's
political existence—to feel like an active and influential participant in
the drama unfolding on the public stage. What is necessary, if this is
to become possible in what she calls the *fantastic family*—her term for
political community, which emphasizes its unconscious group-psycholog-
ical dimensions—is a *mother function* and a *father function,* understood in

terms of the complementary developmental perspectives of Winnicott and his surprisingly compatible bedfellow, Lacan.

From Winnicott, Salgó gets the concept of a transitional space where, through the good enough mother's nurturance, protection of the child from impingements, and tolerance of illusion, a sense of subjectivity, authenticity, and agency can grow in the child. From Lacan, we have the idea of the father who interferes with the child's wished-for merger with mother, blocking the child from living in a world of omnipotent fantasy (the Imaginary) by imposing a Symbolic order (The Name or Law of the Father) that requires confronting and being able to think about and mourn the traumas of limits, loss, and lack (the Real). In so doing, the Symbolic Father makes true desire possible—desire as longing persisting, even though what is wished for is accepted as inherently, ultimately, not fully attainable.

In the Imaginary order, in contrast, we chase after the *petit objet a*, the concrete, possibly attainable false substitute masquerading as some imaginary Garden of Eden, promising *jouissance*—the fulfillment of all wishes, a return to merger with mother that in reality can never be. In Symbolic functioning, the child's identification with father supplants the wish for merger with mother and makes possible the child's sacrifice of omnipotence; the paternal function thus unites desire and the social order.

Salgó sums this up as follows:

In order to enter the social world in which we can constitute ourselves as desiring subjects at the level of language, in order to gain the ability to symbolize and to live a normal, neurotic life, it is necessary to sacrifice something, to accept that symbolization can never be total, that something will be forever excluded. It is the prohibition of jouissance that allows for the emergence of desire . . . . None of the objects of our desire will be able to guarantee the perfect enjoyment we are yearning for . . . . The Other is never perfect, it is always lacking . . . . It is lack that allows for creation, . . . and it is creativity that allows for the subject to endure the lack. [p. 43]

A society marked by fear, and lacking maternal and paternal functions that can adequately contain this fear, is vulnerable to a widespread

inability to accept this inevitable failure, as well as to Imaginary thinking. The transitionality that fosters citizens' active, personal participation and creativity in the public realm is undermined, and people are tempted to identify uncritically with "ideologies, leaders, movements, idols" (p. 43). These utopianisms, in which democratic politics are stifled in favor of a single truth—bolstered with assurances from a leader who offers himself as its vehicle, and in the language of whatever mythical world resonates for a particular society—promise that a return to Eden, via the leader's *cosmogony project,* is within reach.[1]

While in democracies, people's acceptance of the impossibility of a definitive return to paradise fuels creative engagement in the public sphere, undemocratic systems are characterized by the pursuit of the *petit objet a* and endless myth construction. They sidestep present difficulties and passively expect a black-and-white resolution from idealized leaders. We might think of the refusal to compromise in politics in the United States in the American right wing these days as the insistence on a single, idealized vision of America, a refusal of limits, and an insistence on *jouissance*—and the belief that only by refusing to compromise this perfect vision will a Golden Age be restored. (This development demonstrates that the demand for conformity can assert itself even under a banner of individualism and freedom—fetishized values of the American right.)

"What differentiates democracy from other forms of society is the legitimization of conflict, the celebration of different conceptions of the good, and refusal to eliminate diversity through the establishment of an authoritarian harmonious order" (p. 68), writes Salgó. In democracies, there is an acceptance of the conflicts inherent to all societies, and of differentness and separateness from the group.

On the level of the individual's experience, Salgó explores how society's failure in its maternal and paternal functions leads to a widespread social alienation in which narcissistic thinking becomes society's norm.

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[1] At this point, the reader may see why I wish Salgó had used the term *fantasy family* rather than *fantastic family.* In English, the latter suggests that something is wonderful—something insiders may feel, though this is hardly likely for those who look on from outside.

Satisfaction of intimate needs feels like the only touchstone. Modernist and postmodernist, consumerist, narcissistic culture, according to Salgó, undermines a sense of meaning and fosters conformism, passivity, and an "imperative to enjoy" (p. 62)—the belief in being able to have it all and a denial of limits and boundaries (including privacy), rather than real desire and creative playfulness. A scientistic belief that everything can be measured, standardized, and controlled replaces deeper emotional experience and personal, critical judgment.

One result of this driven, empty state is the disengagement of individuals from their sociopolitical realities and the deactivation of their creative capacities as political beings. Mechanization, advertising, and sensation-mongering further this alienation, substitute counterfeit play for the real thing, and foster heteronomous societies and nationalist movements. (It is important to add here that Salgó's sometimes-playful tone does not indicate a lack of serious substance in her ideas.)

Salgó explores, with ample documentation, how all this plays out in three contemporary societies besieged by utopian visions: her native Hungary; Italy, where she lives and works; and a utopian vision of the world community. I read Salgó's first "case example," her native land of Hungary, as her prototype. In order to give a sense of her arguments, I will describe her chapter on Hungary in some detail, though I cannot capture the full richness of her ideas in a limited space.

The author states that, in the past few years, a Hungarian strongman has hijacked a democracy; engineered the adoption of a new constitution designed to give him permanent authoritarian powers; established a cult of personality; restricted freedom, diversity, personal autonomy, and playful, creative participation in political life, as well as free speech; established a culture of fear and intolerance; undermined political discourse; and attempted to dominate and control independent institutions. All this Salgó calls "the advancement of narcissistic politics" with manic and aggressive elements (p. 95).

Salgó brings her Winnicottian-Lacanian model to bear on her analysis of Hungary's rapid political descent. Authoritarian rule has a long history in Hungary, and by 2010, collective trauma had made Hungarians ripe for it once again. Neither their newfound freedom after the fall

of the Communist regime nor subsequent membership in the European community—an event that stirred Hungarians' deepest hopes—created a sense of intimate community or provided a solution to the society's considerable ills.

These disappointments resonated with earlier traumas and humiliations that had become lodged in Hungary's national identity, most notably the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, at the end of the First World War, in which Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory—of its Motherland. (More on this in a moment.) Then as now, Hungary fell victim to a strongman—in the present case, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party.

Orbán seduced the nation into—in Lacan's terms—a regressive, Imaginary solution of denial and omnipotent fantasy, rather than building a future in a well-grounded, thoughtful, "Symbolic" way, one that would have required Hungarians to face painful past and present realities and mourn their losses. His promise of *jouissance*—the complete fulfillment of Hungarians' dreams—drew on appeals to tales of Hungary's mythical golden age.

Orbán modeled himself after St. Stephen, the nation's founder a millennium ago. Orbán was to be the founding father of a *new Hungary* who would quickly return the country to glory. In an Imaginary spirit, he marshaled myths and symbols, invented new rituals, and used heroic, overblown, timeless, simplistic, and ultimately meaningless language to evoke emotions and archetypes with little connection to real life. What was in reality a weak and struggling nation was on the verge of becoming a fixed point in the center of a chaotic world, a model to other nations.

Motherland is a powerful symbol for Hungarians, and one Orbán has exploited. Father Orbán was defender of the Motherland, which is the source of life to all Hungarians—even to the point that foreigners are prevented from buying any parcel of it: one does not sell one's mother. Motherland became an *objet petit a*—the key to *jouissance* in the Imaginary fantasy built up by Orbán.

Salgó develops the idea that a longing for mother is disguised behind attachment to Motherland, and that the illusion of reunifying the nation satisfies a wish for fusion with an omnipotent object—a regressive, passive wish ironically hidden behind a rhetoric of autonomy, independence, self-assertion, and will.

Unsurprisingly, God, too, was appropriated by Orbán, with Orbán himself as God's custodian; the Motherland, violated in 1920, would finally be resacralized. And Orbán's appeal was to the mythical ethnic Hungarian nation-family—an exclusionary group—rather than to the state-family, which includes other ethnicities. In the spirit of splitting, projection, idealization, and denigration, discontent was cast as a foreign illness brought from outside, infecting Hungarians and ruining their enjoyment.

Salgó points out that resorting to Imaginary solutions inevitably "leads to . . . a spiraling escalation of further claims and further violations of the democratic (and the Symbolic) order. The government's illusory construct provides membership and protection in exchange for renouncing the use of critical reason" (p. 94). She cites Isaiah Berlin, who observed that: "Nationalism . . . is frequently the reaction of societies that, in order to compensate for their feelings of inferiority, turn to the real or imaginary triumphs and glories of their past and depict the attributes of their national character as enviable" (p. 90), and Lefort and Bibó, who described populations that identify with a nationalist, "people-as-one" fantasy—and with a strong leader—in response to increasing insecurity; as such, they can tolerate neither diversity nor, in consequence, democracy.

Salgó follows up this diagnosis, closing her chapter on Hungary with the $64,000 question: how can people become secure enough so that they are less vulnerable to Imaginary solutions and their purveyors? She turns to political theorist Hans Morgenthau's perspective about the important role of *social* mobility, but also to Béla Hamvas, whose answer is *individual* rebirth. Psychological maturity is needed to respond to what is truly real and of value, and it cannot be attained through external arrangements. Order in society flows from order within its individual members.

In this regard, Salgó informs us of Winnicott's statement that, in a true democracy, "there is a sufficient maturity in the emotional development of a sufficient proportion of the individuals that comprise it for there to exist an innate tendency towards the creation and recreation and maintenance of the democratic machinery" (p. 75).

In this vein, and in the tradition of psychoanalytic social observers like the Mitscherlichs, Salgó places the capacity to mourn as key not only to individual growth, but also to positive social transformation. I appreciate the author's insistence on the continuing influence of individual psychology on large group processes, even as she elaborates her model of group psychology based on ideas originally developed in observing individuals.

In the next chapter, Salgó describes the narcissistic malaise that Italy has fallen into as its historically cherished values of beauty and creativity have given way to the primacy of the profit motive, and its sense of collective purpose to fragmented self-interest. As in Hungary, another new head of government—this time Mario Monti (following the departure of Silvio Berlusconi, whose "bordello society" [p. 119] seemed modeled on his own character, and who embodied a "politics of *jouissance*" [p. 126] that refused all limits and Law)—stirred widespread hope for rebirth. Unlike Orbán in Hungary, Monti—quickly picking up the nickname *Super Mario*—pursued policies of civic mutual responsibility.

Enter Beppe Grillo, comedian by trade, who reacted to Italy's crisis with a populist, anti-system anti-politics. His carnivalesque parodies, transgressions, and spectacles—swimming the strait from the Italian mainland to Sicily and riding around on a Sicilian cart pulled by a horse, for instance—held the establishment up to ridicule. But despite his platform of direct democracy and his efforts to revive a sleeping polity, missing from Grillo's narcissistic personalization of politics, Salgó notes, is "the very idea of community" (p. 130). He makes himself an idol and his followers an audience, refuses debate, tolerates no dissent. He transforms politics into farce. Salgó sees Grillo's carnivals as designed to be permanent, rather than useful transitions to the restoration of social order, and to express yearning for a limitless existence and a total freedom not to be had in this world.

Monti, on the other hand, while fulfilling the role of the mythical hero—as Salgó traces in fascinating detail—ultimately seeks a return to normality and to

> . . . truly democratic politics by performing as a "good-enough mother" and as the Symbolic Father, and by bringing about a

project of autonomy . . . to reinforce Law by restoring the power
of authoritative figures and institutions and to resuscitate desire,
a civil [sic] virtue, by reactivating the dynamism of a society that
had become too gratified and flattened . . . to create a "facili-
tating environment." [p. 131]

Monti is trying to facilitate active political involvement in citizens,
not turn them into spectators. Truth and ethics—not least, beauty as an
ethical value that helps people become better persons, and that connects
deeply with a return to Italy's core identity—are basic to Monti's politics.

Salgó saves up a surprise for her readers in her final chapter, homing
in on her critique of a utopia—this time, targeting the left and the idea
of a world community. More a set of ideals and principles rather than a
functioning political force, since there is in fact no world government,
this movement pursues the unification of the human family, and seeks a
reversal of the traumatic alienation between Mother Earth and her chil-
dren through restoring the earth's health. Salgó traces the development
of this movement, which challenges the dominance of established forms
and ideologies of Western development and draws from indigenous and
marginalized cultures, largely through initiatives taken by international
and nongovernmental organizations.

The author takes the vision of global unification to task for denying
various historically established realities: human needs for boundaries
and enemies, and the likelihood that passions will overrule self-interest
and that ideals will short-circuit reality testing. But the trouble, for Salgó,
culminates in the new global system aspiring not only to defend people's
rights, but also to provide for the happiness, dignity, personal fulfill-
ment, and aesthetic needs of all Mother Earth's children. Salgó discusses
this not just as a codification of the Winnicottian idea that everyone is
entitled to transitional space that fosters personal growth and the expe-
rience of being active players in the world in which they live—a worthy
star to follow, but how could it ever be reached?

Her concern extends further, and here she marshals support from
both psychoanalysts and social scientists. She sees in world-community
ideas a descent into the Imaginary, pressured by a longing to cover over
loss—a "postmodern political myth of 'eternal return to Paradise,' . . .

a *return* to the 'mythical moment of origin'" . . . to a "primordial ma-
triarchy" . . . a yearning for a "return to the joyful period prior to the
trauma, to the (preoedipal) era of omnipotence" (pp. 155-156, italics in
original). However, I think it important to note here that the environ-
mental crisis is fact, and the imperative to protect the environment is
real—co-opted, perhaps, by an Imaginary ideology, but not its product.

For rulers, being a good enough parent is no longer good enough;
the new parents must be omnipotent, providing happiness and a return
to the Golden Age. This grandiose extension from a liberalism that pro-
tects individual rights, to an omnipotent form of parenting that guaran-
tees individual happiness and success, inherently undermines goals that
are actually attainable. I would simply amend Salgó's words to say that
this utopia, unlike those of the right, is not *anti*-liberal—not hostile, *at
least in theory*, to the development of individual autonomy and critical
thinking.

Salgó makes the additional point, in an early chapter, that the de-
velopment of psychoanalysis within a particular country cannot be un-
derstood outside that country's social, political, economic, and cultural
conditions. She explores the case of Ferenczi, the psychoanalytic pioneer
in her native Hungary. She proposes the fascinating idea that his devel-
opment of a version of psychoanalytic practice that was more democratic
than Freud's not only reflected Budapest's more progressive milieu; she
also believes that his explicitly maternal analytic technique—which, in
the hands of his successors over intervening decades, has become a dom-
inating influence in clinical psychoanalysis far beyond Hungary's bor-
ders—was, to an extent, a reaction against the dictator Horthy, the op-
pressive national "father" who ruled Hungary after a period of political
and social instability following the First World War.

Citing Ferenczi's egalitarian *political* publications, Salgó goes so far
as to suggest that his *clinical* writings in the late 1920s may have been
"a veiled protest, a 'maternal revolt' against the authoritarian regime of
the nation's father" (p. 25)—a statement, in "coded language . . . that
the loss of (and separation from) the nurturing mother(land) could not
be worked through in a country led by a severe father-like figure" (p.
24). She also raises the possibility that, in some sense, Ferenczi turned

to "maternal" ideas in an attempt to mourn the authoritarianism under which he lived, both in Hungary and in psychoanalysis.

In something of a mirror image of her unveiling of Ferenczi's political thinking, Salgó, extending Robert Schuett's historical research, discovers in Hans Morgenthau, the architect of political realism in the mid-twentieth century, a Freudian core. Specifically, Morgenthau proposed that individuals, blocked from expressing their own power drives in their daily lives—a drive upon which Morgenthau placed great emphasis—identify with their country's aggression on the international stage; as such, international aggression serves a stabilizing function in society. For Morgenthau, aggressive nationalism follows from, compensates for, and correlates with the degree of powerlessness and insecurity a populace feels.

Overall, Salgó presents an integration of a wide range of psychoanalytic and political thinking that is at once comprehensive, focused, and persuasive. Her masterful work is an excellent example of the thoughtful application of psychoanalytic ideas that is essential in finding ways to conceptualize the political landscape most adequately, so that we can act most rationally and effectively. Like Freud, she charts the vicissitudes of irrational fantasy—this time on a group level—as a way to break free of its influence. The lack of sufficiently deep or sophisticated conceptualizations about the role of unconscious fantasy in political life, both among well-intentioned leaders and opinion-makers and in the citizenry at large, can doom us to continue to fall victim to its dark temptations. Salgó's book casts a penetrating new light on this seductive landscape.

To a growing body of work applying psychoanalytic thinking to political problems, Salgó importantly adds her own sophisticated—and new—emphasis on the central role of play, in both its genuine, creative form and its perverse counterfeits. To Huizinga's classic view of play as a basic structuring force of society's institutions, she adds her Winnicottian perspective: that genuine play—broadly understood as a source of creative, active engagement with a world in which we feel genuinely at home, and which contains a respect for both our inner life and outer reality—is inextricable from democratic politics, in particular. This kind of playful attitude sustains true democracy and threatens authoritarian forms of government.

The corollary, as Salgó suggests most clearly in her discussion of Hungary, is that a political system that deprives its citizens of active participation creates people who fear their own capacity to be active. Salgó elaborates how the transitional space necessary for play is likely to collapse under the weight of fear and insecurity, giving way to a traumatized denial of both our outer and inner realities, and to a submission in which we become pawns in the games of others.

JAY FRANKEL (NEW YORK)

ABSTRACTS

ANNUEL DE L'ASSOCIATION PSYCHANALYTIQUE DE FRANCE (APF), 2014

"Le langage malgré tout: J.-B. Pontalis, la *NRP* et l'APF"

Translated and Abstracted by
Hélène Tessier

In 2007, the *Association psychanalytique de France* (APF) began the yearly publication of *L'Annuel,* a retrospective volume collecting papers revolving around a theme, some of which have been presented during that year's scientific meetings. The theme of the eighth issue—edited by Laurence Kahn, published in 2014 and entitled *Le langage, malgré tout* ("Language in Spite of Everything")—is language, or, more specifically, the signifier. This theme evokes the history of the APF and especially the role of Lacan in the association's early days.

After World War II, the *Société psychanalytique de Paris* (SPP), which had been founded in 1926[1] and was part of the International Psychoanalytical Association, was reestablished. In 1953, upon the creation of a psychoanalytic institute under the leadership of Sacha Nacht, various differences of opinion, whose manifest content concerned the role of the university in training, led to the creation of the *Société française de*

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[1] Among the founding members were Marie Bonaparte, Eugénie Sokolnicka, Rudolph Löwenstein, Adrien Borel, and Édouard Pichon.

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psychanalyse (SFP), under the leadership of Daniel Lagache and others.[2] The *Société française de psychanalyse* applied to the IPA to be recognized as a component organization with the same status as the *Société psychanalytique de Paris.*

A decade of conflict that emphasized the technical practices of Lacan—especially sessions of variable length (including punctuated or short sessions)—culminated in the dissolution of the *Société française de psychanalyse* and in the creation in 1964 of a new psychoanalytic society, the *Association psychanalytique de France.* The *Association psychanalytique de France* was accepted by the IPA on conditions that included barring Lacan from a role in training candidates. Lacan left the organization and, with a group of students and analysands, formed *l'École freudienne de Paris.*[3]

The *Association psychanalytique de France* explicitly describes itself as an organization marked by its origins. On the one hand, it endorses its connection with the work of Lacan, especially with a "return to Freud" and with the notion of the centrality of language in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it stresses the refusal to submit to a master or to a single theory, and thus the importance of preserving a diversity of perspectives within the APF. These two elements structure the present issue of the *Annuel:* the first, in reference to Lacan, is embodied in the theme and presentation of the book, as well as in the content of some of the papers. As for refusal of a master, this element is more complex; though it appears as a leitmotiv in introductions to the various parts of the book, the volume may not be as tolerant as it sees itself, at least in relation to psychoanalytic thinking that does not live comfortably within postmodern epistemology. This point will serve as a guiding thread for my review.

A central thread is necessary since the book's authors and their papers bear different connections to the organizing themes. An epistemological prism seems especially appropriate as the editors give epistemology a central place in the volume, devoting a significant part to pa-

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[2] In addition to Lagache, among the leaders of *Société française de psychanalyse* were Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Françoise Dolto, Blanche Reverchon-Jouve, and Jacques Lacan.

[3] In 1969, Piera Aulagnier and others resigned from *l'École* and formed *l'Organisation Psychanalytique de Langue Française* (OPLF), generally called the Fourth Group. In 1980, Lacan announced the dissolution of *l'École freudienne de Paris.* The history of Lacanian groups goes far beyond what can be summarized here.

pers dealing with the epistemological orientation of the journal *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse* (*NRP*) and with the philosophical choices made by the *NRP*'s editorial board. The subtitle chosen for the book—*J.-B. Pontalis, la NRP et l'APF*[4]—underlines the importance of this aspect.

This volume is divided into three parts. The first, entitled *Travaux* ("Works"), is composed of four papers given at scientific meetings of the APF by Jean Michel Levy, Dominique Clerc, Janine Altounian, and Jean-Yves Tamet. The second and central part, entitled *Avec J.-B. Pontalis autour de la Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse* ("With J.-B. Pontalis and around the *Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse*"), deals with the impact of that journal on French psychoanalysis.

Grouped under the title "The Signifier," the third part contains papers previously published by prominent APF members: *Comment s'isolent les signifiants de demarcation?* ("How Do Demarcation Signifiers Get Isolated?"), by Guy Rosolato (1924–2012); *Les signifiants formels et le moi-peau* ("The Formal Signifiers and the Skin Ego"), by Didier Anzieu (1923–1999); and *La pulsion et son objet-source: son destin dans le transfert* ("The Drive and Its Source-Object: Its Fate in Transference"), by Jean Laplanche (1924–2012).

The First Part: Travaux

These papers are related to language in different ways and to various degrees: the papers by Levy and Altounian deal with words, those by Altounian and Tamet with writing and its therapeutic role, and Clerc's paper with style and identifications.

The title of Levy's paper, *Un accord dissonant* ("A Dissonant Chord/A Dissonant Accord"), contains a pun: in French, the word *accord* means both *chord* and *accord* in English. This pun summarizes the argument of the paper, which deals with the termination of analysis. It underlines that, however it may appear, analyses do not end by "gentleman's agreement." The fate of hate in the transference must always be taken into consideration. Termination evokes death, and the interpretation of termination, as it necessarily involves meaning, can typically be experienced

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[4] J.-B. Pontalis (1924–2013) was a founding member and an early president of the APF. Pontalis founded *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse* and was its editor throughout the twenty-four years (and fifty issues) of its existence, from 1970 to 1994.

as an attempt to kill or tame the unconscious, since the thing-like way in which the unconscious makes itself known corresponds to its meaning-resistant or even word-resistant nature.[5] Drawing from Ferenczi, Balint, and Winnicott, the paper describes the implication of this position for understanding transference and countertransference.

Clerc's paper, *Narcissse en quête de sujet* ("Narcissus Looking for a Subject"), is based on the idea that the form of the thought precedes and structures its content. Quoting Freud,[6] the author emphasizes the non-intentional dimension of form and its relation to the unconscious. The form of thoughts is revealed through styles of expression, which are themselves linked to identification processes. Drawing on Freud's writing on identification and on Lacan's theory of the *trait unaire* ("unitary operator"),[7] Clerc underlines the importance of repetition as a resistance to the acknowledgment of difference. She emphasizes that repetition is at the origin of style and, relying on Lacan's elaborations on the *trait unaire,* she examines his style of expression. She suggests that the oracle-like style (*style oraculaire*) characteristic of Lacan's teaching and writing tends to embody the creative action of the signifier on the signified, and thus to represent the discourse of the unconscious itself.

Altounian's paper, *Dégagement au cours de la cure et par l'écriture, des pulsions de vie enfouies dans un héritage traumatique* ("During Analytic Treatment, the Release through the Writing of Life Drives Buried in a Traumatic Legacy"), gives an account of the opportunities offered by an analysis to work through intergenerational traumatic experiences. The idea of transformation of death drives into life drives as a result of an analysis is borrowed from Laplanche's understanding of sublimation. The idea of the ego as translator is also close to Laplanche's theory of repression as translation. The notion of translation is further developed in Altounian's paper: on the one hand, in relation to transference, and on the other hand, in relation to personal implications of translation in the author's life.

[5] "La parole interprétative comme meurtre de la chose inconsciente" (p. 13): "the words of interpretation as the murder of the unconscious 'thing.'"

[6] Freud, S. (1901). *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. S. E., 6.*

[7] Lacan's *trait unaire* draws from Freud's *Einziger Zug,* which deals with identification processes but makes a different use of this notion, referring to what works as the medium of difference.

In addition to Laplanche, Altounian's paper refers to other psycho-analytic theorists: to Freud, of whom she has a thorough knowledge, and to Piera Aulagnier, René Kaës, and Nathalie Zaltzman. It is worth noting that Altounian's paper includes reflections on the social and political conditions that made possible new receptions of her memories and the retranslation they entailed. Among other factors, she emphasizes the role of French republican institutions—in particular, the school system—and the beneficial effects of their secular structures.

Tamet's paper, *D'où viennent nos notes de séances?* ("Where Do Our Process Notes Come From?"), deals with the importance of writing for psychoanalysts—be it notes, no matter how fragmentary, written down after sessions, or more elaborate clinical reports to be discussed with colleagues. Examining both Freud's clinical papers and his works on the history of psychoanalysis, the author insists on the key position of writing in the transmission of psychoanalysis. The paper also underlines the role of writing as symptomatic of a defense directed partly at alleviating loss. In its ability to make the internal otherness in the analyst known, writing appears as a major instrument to reveal transference manifestations. Drawing from a clinical example and referring to papers by Rolland, Apfelbaum, Kahn, and Pontalis, among others, the author highlights how writing in preparation for a case discussion modified his way of listening to his patients and provided better conditions for interpretation.

Though it was not the objective of any of these papers to discuss the epistemological grounding of psychoanalysis or of the author's orienta-tion, reading them together raises interesting questions in this respect. All four papers refer to disturbances stirred up by the unconscious. They highlight how the isolated and disconnected fragments of scenes or events that constitute the core of the unconscious reappear in the present in a troubling, forceful, and unpredictable manner. At the same time, the authors seem to agree with the assumption that, since theo-rizing in psychoanalysis is undoubtedly permeated by unconscious phe-nomena, their style of reasoning must in some way reflect the associative mode of the psychoanalytic process. Therefore, one must be wary when considering a systematic view of psychoanalytic theory and technique.

With respect to theory, two tendencies can be seen in these papers: a deferential attitude toward Freud's writings, according to which all quo-

tations from Freud are considered equally enlightening, regardless of context, and, at the same time, some latitude in referring to authors or theories that, on the very same issue, differ substantially from Freud's point of view and/or present significant divergences among themselves. In regard to the unconscious, for example, the papers identify a wide variety of manifestations of unconscious fantasies, such as: death wishes toward the father, hate in the transference, penis envy, oedipal and pre-oedipal wishes, mother–son relationships, maternal care, resistance to the ego's efforts to substitute *having* for *being,* loss, and absence.

In addition, some of these papers hold that the unconscious has to do with preverbal states. In this case, the term *infans,* borrowed from Ferenczi and referred to as well in the editor's presentation of the third part of the volume, is given a special importance. It evokes the etymo-logical source of the term *infant* (*in-fans*)—namely, one who does not speak. The unconscious in this sense would relate to what is not now or what has never been symbolized.

All this leads me to a number of observations. For instance, the rela-tion between the unconscious and sexuality requires further inquiry: are love and hate a priori sexual—sexual in a psychoanalytic sense? What does the psychoanalytic dimension of the sexual unconscious add to the understanding of ambivalence, love, and aggression that has been de-veloped by scientific psychology? Similar questions could be raised with respect to symbolization and speech.

Another group of inquiries deals with how sexuality is referred to in relation to the unconscious: on the basis of these papers, we can see that it is mainly informed by the traditional composition of the family (metaphorically or concretely) and seems inseparable from a sexed, or gendered, parental role, or from gendered reference to biographical elements. Can infantile sexuality, the core discovery of psychoanalysis, be reducible to the child's erotic fantasies that involve only the child's own body, or only those of his parents? Must Oedipus, the primal scene, penis envy, and castration have the last word when it comes to defining sexual fantasies in psychoanalysis?

In asking these questions, I do not mean to imply that all psycho-analytic papers must enter into a discussion of their basic theoretical assumptions. However, these papers provide an opportunity to reflect on

the epistemological position privileged in the current issue of the *Annuel.* To pursue this reflection, I will briefly examine the third part of the book before going back to the second part, where the epistemological issues are addressed directly.

The Third Part: Dossier: le signifiant

The third part of the book includes three previously published essays by Rosolato, Anzieu, and Laplanche, brought together under the title "The Signifier." They are important papers, each dealing with a major concept in the author's theories.[8] I will not describe these papers at length as that would require analysis of the theoretical context in which the concepts described were developed, as well as a more general description of each author's theories; instead, I will limit my comments to the notion of the signifier in the framework of the epistemological discussion that I have already begun.

It is a good idea to bring together key papers by prominent theorists and so present an opportunity for readers unfamiliar with their work to get an overview of some of their basic concepts, and for readers more acquainted with their theories to look at them in a different context. As Laurence Kahn, the overall editor of this volume, points out in her presentation of the *Dossier,* the papers are more remarkable for their divergences than for their similarities. Even so, the deep gap between their epistemological orientations—and, consequently, its impact on the definition of the object of psychoanalysis itself—may easily be overlooked.

One may wonder, of course, whether a leveling of the differences between the theories constitutes a problem in the first place—an important question. For the moment, let us say simply that, even though divergences between Rosolato, Anzieu, and Laplanche regarding the signifier are mentioned in the presentation, the grouping of these three papers with this common heading still raises questions for the reader—at least in regard to Laplanche's paper, if not also to the others. Nor do references to language, to the *infans,* and "to what leaves its mark at the margin of language"[9]—mentioned in Kahn's introduction as the

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[8] Some of the works of these three authors have been translated into English.

[9] "Il s'agit de ce qui s'inscrit en marge du langage" (p. 151).

common ground of the three papers—prove to be an accurate guide to Laplanche's conception of the drives.

Even though Laplanche may be known for his use of the expression *enigmatic signifiers,* he eventually abandoned this in favor of *enigmatic messages*—a formulation more evocative of semiotics or even semiology, the framework within which he conceptualizes the term *signifier.* In Laplanche's metapsychology, signifiers are equivalent to messages or parts of messages: they refer to what makes a sign to the child or, in psychoanalysis, to the analysand.

Language does not have special status in Laplanche's theory of the drives, which has more to do with infantile sexuality right from the start. Transference and the analytic situation, not genetic considerations, constitute the starting point of Laplanche's exploration of seduction and of the formation of the sexual unconscious. The emphasis is not on a child devoid of language, on an *infans,* but on a child without a sexual unconscious, in the presence of an adult or an older child who already has one. This theory moves away from classical theories of representation in psychoanalysis; it focuses on messages, nonverbal as well as verbal, and consequently on meaning—or, more precisely, on how the loss or absence of meaning relate to excitation and to autoerotism.

Laplanche rejects psychoanalytic references to archaic memories that presumably result from raw events or factual situations. In human matters, events are always mediated by messages. The thing-like quality of unconscious derivatives is not linked to a lack of representation—in other words, the lack of a psychic form for a "thing" (the events or the situation, the sensory experiences themselves)—but to the *de-signification* of parts of messages that are already in psychic form. These parts become *de-signified signifiers,* cut off from meaning and communicative intent. A de-signified signifier is something that *interpellates*—that makes a sign, without a meaning being bound to the interpellation.

Despite some points in common with Laplanche's theory, Rosolato's demarcation signifiers operate in a totally different epistemological framework. Demarcation signifiers are specific to Rosolato's theoretical developments. He defines them as "the sensory or motor components of any mental or objective representation—other than a verbal representation: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or resulting from contact

through touch."[10] The demarcation signifiers thus represent the first formal supports of representations; they move closer to Bionian thinking as they aim to describe a process to be located at or near the origin of thought.

Entering into a dialectic with other psychological orientations, Rosolato's paper stresses that no account of the *coding of representation* can do away with pain, desire, and emotional states, on which psychoanalysis has a preferential take. The paper puts an emphasis on perception in the formation of the psyche. Faced with the problem of pairing meaning with sensory experiences, it postulates the existence of primary fantasies—mainly the primal scene and seduction fantasy—as the sources of psychic contents that become associated with perception. It is also important to note that gendered family roles, more specifically maternal care and maternal speech, are central in Rosolato's paper. The sexual dimension of the drive would thus revolve around gendered categories and traditional family structures and organizations.

Anzieu's notion of *formal signifiers* is conceptualized in the framework of his theory of the skin ego. It refers to perceptual, sensory, or kinetic traces related to traumatic failures in maternal care. The formal signifiers are called *formal* in opposition to linguistic signifiers. The word *formal* refers to the concept of form as a *Gestalt*, as the contour of the whole resulting from the organization of its parts. The paper suggests that formal signifiers are formed in archaic stages of the psyche and function as psychic containers of primary importance in the clinical situation.

Anzieu's paper proposes three case examples dealing with different levels of psychopathology—borderline, psychotic, and neurotic—to illustrate how the concept of formal signifiers can fruitfully guide clinical interventions. Anzieu emphasizes his reluctance to use the notion of signifiers outside the sphere of language, but underlines that he became convinced about doing so by Rosolato's use of the term, in continuity with Bion's concept of alpha elements, though with a shift closer to Freud's notion of thing presentations. Formal signifiers deal mainly with

[10] "Les traits qui composent toute représentation mentale ou objective, distincte du langage verbal, qu'elle soit visuelle, ou auditive, olfactive, ou de contact gustatif ou cutané, mais aussi . . . relative à la motricité" (p. 153).

ego formation and, more specifically, with the spatial dimension of psychic representation. From this perspective, the concept can be thought about in relation to Laplanche's idea of the ego as translator. However, the reference to sexuality—with respect to the skin ego's function as a carrier of sexual excitation—is determined by (as is the case in Rosolato's paper) classical thinking in regard to the difference between the sexes, to feminine or masculine anatomy, and to Oedipus.

Rosolato's and Anzieu's papers engage in a discussion with one another as well as with Laplanche's theory. It is worth noting that all three papers collected in the *Dossier* come from authors who have developed their own theories, insofar as each introduced original concepts in a systematized way. An original theory implies systematization. It has to set its own boundaries and determine what it is compatible with and what it is not. It must also question its own internal consistency, its position with respect to the field's existing theoretical corpus, and its relation with its object. To elaborate an original theory also means to critically examine existing theories on the basis of their respective value.

The Second Part of the Book: J.-B. Pontalis, the NRP, and the APF

The second part of the *Annuel* takes a very different stance. It presents the rejection of systematic thinking as the most desirable feature of genuine psychoanalytic thinking. According to this view, such a rejection is the necessary consequence of the nature of the object of psychoanalysis: that is, the unconscious resists systematic inquiry and cannot be enclosed in a theoretical system. Furthermore, the idea of a theoretical system in psychoanalysis potentially implies an adhesion to such a system; therefore, it could lead to submission to a master or to a unitary theory.

These two points raise many questions. Why would the unconscious be more disruptive of thought processes when reflecting on psychoanalysis than when elaborating a theory in political science, law, psychiatry, or any other discipline? Is the psychoanalytic method applicable to the elaboration of psychoanalytic theory? Are metapsychology and the theory of practice in psychoanalysis scientific endeavors? Does a dividing line exist between dogmatism and a genuine search for truth in science?

The second part of this volume contains three papers presented at a scientific meeting of the AFP that addressed the *Nouvelle revue de*

psychanalyse (*NRP*), as well as the discussions of these papers by Pontalis and other participants. The meeting took place in 2012, not long before the death of Pontalis. As described in Mérot's foreword to this part, the speakers were chosen according to the wish of Pontalis that they represent different readerships of the journal: Edmundo Gomez Mango, a close friend of Pontalis and a reader of the journal at its beginning; Corinne Ehrenberg, a reader of the journal during its peak years; and Mathilde Girard, a reader from the new generation of psychoanalysts, who became acquainted with the journal only after its publication had ended.

The introduction to this section sets the tone for the main theme of the first two papers. The title of the second paper, *Ni Dieu ni maître* ("Neither God nor Master"), by Ehrenberg, constitutes a condensed version of that theme. The expression *Ni Dieu ni maître*[11] can refer both to Lacan's history within the APF and to the adoption of a specific version of postmodern epistemology in psychoanalysis. As for the latter, the *NRP* is presented as the crucible in which this epistemological identity assumed its most convincing expression.

Lacan is presented by the editors of the book as a central theoretical source, especially for the papers collected in the *Dossier* on the signifier (the book's third and last part, as discussed earlier). The understanding of the unconscious as nonbiological and as closely linked to language expresses the stamp of Lacan's legacy. However, the reference to Lacan covers a more ambiguous position. The importance of Lacan's teaching is described as fundamental, notwithstanding the theoretical positions demonstrated in those papers in this volume that are not in accord with his orientation. The foreword of the book does not offer many exits from the legacy of Lacan's teaching: it affirms that his influence can be traced in "the movement of breaking up with it [his theory], taking it in again and separating from it,"[12] reflected in the papers.

One might wonder what is at stake in the insistence on such a central place for Lacan in the presentation of the papers' theoretical frame-

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[11] Here I am not referring to the paper but to the linguistic expression, quite common in French.

[12] "On mesurera ici combien l'héritage de l'APF tient aussi dans l'élaboration—rupture, reprise, déprise—de l'enseignement de Lacan" (avant-propos).

work. In addition to being a debatable point, this stance tends to eliminate genuine epistemological differences that exist between the theories presented in the various papers in this volume. It also has a pseudo-equalizing effect among contemporary theorists. Here no one can claim authorship of an original theory; each theorist remains Lacan's more or less dissident pupil, whether he wants to be or not.

Ni Dieu ni maître also alludes to a rejection of the orthodoxy embodied in Lacan's teaching. It should be acknowledged that the APF, especially at its beginning, sought a middle ground in a psychoanalytic culture organized around the pro-Lacan and anti-Lacan dichotomy. For this reason, it prides itself for, among other things, its openness to the British school; for example, Girard writes that "she was fed at Winnicott's breast" (p. 119). Bion is another theoretical stalwart, as seen in the works of Rosolato and Anzieu.

The *NRP* is described as a journal promoting debate and free thinking in psychoanalysis—open to other scientific and artistic disciplines and to knowledge in general. Gomez Mango's paper underlines these traits and describes them as welcome developments in French psychoanalysis. Orthodoxy is indeed hardly compatible with the free development of critical or original thinking. However, the refusal of orthodoxy seems to have become assimilated with adhesion to a romantic, if not a postmodern, creed on the object of psychoanalysis and on the way that theory can be developed in this field. Judging by the firm editorial position taken in its favor, we might conclude that such an ideology seems to have succeeded in imposing its domination.

This ideology's main affirmations revolve around the following positions. The unconscious would by nature resist any attempt to be caught in a unitary theory, being itself a creator of *trouble de pensée* ("thought trouble"), irrevocably escaping rational scrutiny. Such an attempt would be pervaded, from the start, by manifestations of the unconscious, making the endeavor not only useless but also destructively defensive. Gomez Mango celebrates *le désemparement de l'intelligence* ("the disabling of intelligence") produced by the encounter with the unconscious.

Ehrenberg writes that theory in psychoanalysis must avoid being involved in speculative work. She underlines how the *NRP* successfully convinced its readers that, through releasing themselves from the *gangue*

("straitjacket") of a so-called general theory, their creative imagination and their reverie would be most able to respond to the creativity of analysands' symptoms.

These affirmations require further consideration. To state that theory should be kept outside the analytic session is one thing. Theory is at the basis of free association and of its counterpart, the analytic method of unbinding—two pillars of analytic practice. However, to affirm that analysts should be "immunized against the search for a unitary theory"[13]—and that systematic inquiry about the nature of the unconscious and its manifestations (which, by the way, are by no means restricted to analytic sessions) is "as vain as the possibility of a complete analysis"[14]—is quite another. This constitutes a mixing up of two levels of reflection. Furthermore, such a denunciation of theory becomes even more puzzling when coupled with affirmations of an alleged consensus about the nature of unconscious fantasies, a consensus presented as unquestionable.

For example, Ehrenberg refers to the privileged point of view that analytic work provides on the operations through which the psychic apparatus resists the acknowledgment of reality—the reality of difference between the sexes, of seduction, incest, and murder. To say the least, such a statement hardly looks like an application of the principle according to which theory should be kept out of analytic sessions.

The rejection of critical thinking in psychoanalysis then appears under a different light. Rationalism—critical reason—is, among other things, a threat to canonical doctrines in psychoanalysis that are oblivious to their sociohistorical anchor. With what tools other than critical reason can there be a deconstruction of the privileged status of the difference between the sexes, the primal scene, castration, or the murder of the father in unconscious fantasy?

There is a huge gap between the refusal of orthodoxy and the refusal of systematic thought in psychoanalysis. To suggest an equivalence between the two is misleading. To denounce blind adhesion to a doctrine is not the same as acknowledging the necessity of using one's reason when engaging in theoretical work; on the contrary, it is the opposite. To

[13] "La *NRP* nous a immunisés contre la recherche d'une théorie unitaire" (p. 110).
[14] "Recherche vaine comme le serait celle d'une analyse *complète* et accomplie une fois pour toutes" (p. 110).

confuse the two can only serve as a rhetorical device in favor of a purely polemic, and thus unscientific, relation to truth.

In his responses to the papers, Pontalis makes clear that the *NRP* did not intend to convey group thinking. There were and are voices that advocate a different conception of theory in psychoanalysis than the one presented in the second part of the *Annuel*. In the APF, one of the most prominent was certainly that of Laplanche, who, within the framework of a rationalist epistemology, developed the *General Theory of Seduction*.[15] This theory represents an integrated metapsychological approach aimed at accounting for the transformative action of analysis and, at the same time, exploring the source and nature of the sexual unconscious. Laplanche took a clear position against postmodern epistemology in psychoanalysis; the introduction of the paper reproduced in the *Annuel* is a plea both for the importance of theory and for the necessary distance that must exist between theory and the experience of analytic practice. The task of psychoanalytic theories, writes Laplanche, is precisely "to help us find the proper place of theory."[16]

This position appears to have been marginalized. Girard's paper, written from the perspective of the new generation of analysts, seems to indicate a conviction that metapsychology has to be liberated from scientism. However, the author expresses reservations about the epistemological orientations favored by the *NRP* and the effects they have had on analytic training. For example, she notes that, if being lost is good news for someone at a more advanced stage of his psychoanalytic journey, it is nonetheless difficult to accept for someone who is still looking for guidance. She also regrets that the time has ended when analysts did not fear setting themselves up in opposition to each other and were thus identifiable by their differences. She writes: "The *NRP* has something in excess [*de trop*], an excess which is not an excess in knowledge or in authority, but a specific excess that comes out of what it wanted to avoid."[17]

[15] Among other references, see: Laplanche, J. (2012). *Freud and the Sexual: Essays, 2000–2006*, trans. J. House & N. Ray, ed. J. Fletcher. New York: International Psychoanalytic Books.

[16] "La théorie analytique doit nous aider à situer la place de la théorie" (p. 202).

[17] "La *NRP* a quelque chose de trop. Un trop qui n'est pas un excès se savoir, d'autorité, ni même un excès de style, mais un trop particulier qui vient justement de ce que la revue a voulu ne pas être. Du trop qu'elle a refusé—trop de savoir, de territorialité, de transfert, de maîtrise—elle a produit quelque chose de baroque et de démesuré" (p. 122).

Why would analysts fear opposing each other? Opposition implies evaluation. Evaluating a theory means attributing a comparative value to it. Are all orientations in psychoanalysis equally valid? Are all definitions of psychoanalytic concepts equally true? Are some theories better than others in accounting for the unconscious, for understanding its mode of action? Are they all equally reliable in providing the necessary conditions to support the project of emancipation that lies at the base of psychoanalysis? Do they all define the project of psychoanalysis in the same way?

The position privileged in this book may seem to reject the introduction of evaluation into epistemology. In fact, it does not. It takes a firm stance on what is best for psychoanalysis. It presents as nonpsychoanalytic the elaboration of a theoretical system that defines the project of transformation specific to psychoanalysis, and aims at internal cohesion in defining its basic concepts and understanding its mode of action with respect to this project.

This position is debatable. If the core concepts of psychoanalysis consist more in the development of a poetic and associative style of expression than in revealing a common ground and a common understanding of psychoanalytic anthropology that can be discussed with other disciplines, what is the relevance of psychoanalysis?

Systematic doubt about dogma is an activity of reason. However, discrediting the position of reason in scientific theory, and casting doubt on its capacity and duty to search for truth and to understand reality, is something completely different. Such discrediting paves the way for the inappropriate placement of myth and mystique in science and, in more dramatic circumstances, for submission and obscurantism. What, if not power, can replace reason in scientific debate? Victory, as Freud once observed, is as a rule on the side of the strongest battalions.[18]

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[18] Freud, S. (1937). Analysis terminable and interminable. *S. E.*, 23, p. 240.